Journal articles: 'Bargaining power'

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Forrest, Anne. "Bargaining Units and Bargaining Power." Discussion 41, no. 4 (April 12, 2005): 840–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/050264ar.

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Kultti, Klaus. "About bargaining power." Economics Letters 69, no. 3 (December 2000): 341–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00321-9.

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Zhang, Honglei, Jinhe Zhang, Yang Yang, and Qiang Zhou. "Bargaining Power in Tourist Shopping." Journal of Travel Research 57, no. 7 (August 20, 2017): 947–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0047287517724917.

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Bargaining behavior is popular when tourists shop, with bargaining power representing the surplus sellers or buyers obtain after price negotiations. This article applies a two-tier stochastic frontier analysis to estimate sellers’ and buyers’ (i.e., tourists’) surplus terms as a measure of their respective bargaining power. Using large-scale data on shopping behavior obtained from a domestic tourist survey conducted in Nanjing, China, between 2005 and 2010, our empirical results indicate that in general, tourists exhibit stronger bargaining power than sellers. Additionally, tourists’ net surplus, as a measure of relative bargaining power, is heavily informed by their tripographic and sociodemographic characteristics, with the former being more influential. In particular, tourists traveling with companions and obtaining travel information from friends and mass media tend to have stronger-than-average bargaining power.

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Manimabi, Ruth, Sony Heru Priyanto, and Hendrik Johanes Nadapdap. "DAYA KEKUATAN TAWAR MENAWAR PENGUSAHA SLONDOK DI DESA SUMURARUM KECAMATAN GRABAG KABUPATEN MAGELANG." Agrisocionomics: Jurnal Sosial Ekonomi Pertanian 2, no. 1 (May 27, 2018): 58. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/agrisocionomics.v2i1.2355.

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ABSTRACT- This study aims to examine the external environment of slondok companies related to bargaining power used by slondok entrepreneurs with 2 Porter powers, namely bargaining power of buyers and suppliers as well as alternative strategies used by slondok entrepreneurs in increasing bargaining power of slondok. The type of research used is descriptive qualitative. The research method used is case study. The data used are primary and secondary data. Methods of data collection by interview. Participant selection technique with purposive sampling. Validity test and reliability test using source triangulation. Based on the results of research related to the strength of Porter in slondok company shows that the bargaining power of buyers is high, the bargaining power of the suppliers is as well as the alternative strategy applied is Porter's generic strategy. Kata kunci-agroindustri; industri kecil; kekuatan Porter; strategi generik

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Philips, Paul. "Theoretical Problems of Public Interest Sector Industrial Relations." Relations industrielles 31, no. 4 (April 12, 2005): 566–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/028743ar.

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This paper develops a simple industry bargaing model with explicit consideration of the determinants of the bargaining range and the narrowing of that range over time as a function of perceived bargaining power and costs of settlement. The model is then applied to the public-interest sector under altered assumptions of costs of settlement and the introduction of political influences in the determination of bargaining paths. The impact of third party intervention is considered in both the industry and public-interest sector cases.

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Demougin, Dominique, and Carsten Helm. "Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power." German Economic Review 7, no. 4 (December 1, 2006): 463–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0475.2006.00130.x.

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Abstract We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework where parties are risk-neutral and the agent is financially constrained. We show that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining power is analyzed in either of the following three frameworks: in a standard principal-agent (P-A) framework by varying the agent’s outside opportunity, in an alternating offer game, and in a generalized Nash-bargaining game. However, for sufficiently low levels of the agent’s bargaining power, increasing it marginally does affect the equilibrium in the Nash-bargaining game, but not in the P-A model and in the alternating offer game.

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Prasad, Sanjay, Ravi Shankar, and Sreejit Roy. "Impact of bargaining power on supply chain profit allocation: a game-theoretic study." Journal of Advances in Management Research 16, no. 3 (July 15, 2019): 398–416. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jamr-10-2018-0096.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of bargaining powers of firms in supply chain coordination. It studies selected aspects of bargaining powers, namely, impatience, breakdown probability and outside options, and uses a bargaining-theoretic approach to analyze surplus allocation in a coordinated supply chain. Design/methodology/approach This paper proposes one-supplier one-buyer infinite horizon supply chain coordination game, where suppliers and buyers negotiate for the allocation of supply chain surplus arising out of supply chain coordination. Various aspects of the bargaining power of the negotiating parties are modeled and the paper studies impact of power levels on the results of the bargaining game. Findings A significance of impatience on the bargaining process and the surplus split has been established. This paper also demonstrates a rather counter-intuitive aspect of bargaining that the impatience (as perceived by the other party) can improve the bargaining position and therefore share of profits. Research limitations/implications This paper has limited its analysis to three key components of bargaining power. Future works can study other aspects of bargaining power, namely information asymmetry, learning curve, inside options, etc. Further, the paper has considered an infinite horizon model – this assumption can be relaxed in future research. Practical implications Equations to derive optimal split of the surplus have been derived and can be leveraged to design an autonomous bargaining agent to discover equilibrium profit splits in a cloud or e-commerce setting. Further, insights from this paper can be leveraged by managers to understand their relative bargaining power and drive to obtain the best profit split. Originality/value This paper establishes that impatience (in terms of counter-offer probability) has a significant impact on the bargaining position and on the split of the surplus that the firm can get for themselves. It establishes the advantage of higher levels of impatience, provided the other party recognizes the impatience and factors it in their decision-making process.

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Kozina, Andrzej. "Evaluation of Bargaining Power." Management and Business Administration. Central Europe 22, no. 3 (September 14, 2014): 72–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.7206/mba.ce.2084-3356.108.

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BEALE, HUGH. "INEQUALITY OF BARGAINING POWER." Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 6, no. 1 (1986): 123–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/6.1.123.

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KU, GILLIAN. "THE POWER OF BARGAINING." London Business School Review 28, no. 3 (October 2017): 14–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/2057-1615.12186.

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Reed, William, David H. Clark, Timothy Nordstrom, and Wonjae Hwang. "War, Power, and Bargaining." Journal of Politics 70, no. 4 (October 2008): 1203–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022381608081152.

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DEMARCO, BILL. "Boost Your Bargaining Power." Family Practice News 39, no. 8 (April 2009): 37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0300-7073(09)70325-1.

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Richards, Timothy J., Celine Bonnet, and Zohra Bouamra-Mechemache. "Complementarity and bargaining power." European Review of Agricultural Economics 45, no. 3 (February 15, 2018): 297–331. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/erae/jbx032.

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Lawler, Edward J. "Power Processes in Bargaining." Sociological Quarterly 33, no. 1 (March 1992): 17–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1533-8525.1992.tb00361.x.

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Sap, Jolande. "Bargaining power and wages." Labour Economics 1, no. 1 (June 1993): 25–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0927-5371(93)90004-2.

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Spielman, Bethany. "Futility and Bargaining Power." Journal of Clinical Ethics 6, no. 1 (March 1, 1995): 44–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/jce199506106.

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17

Wang, Cong Cong. "An Empirical Analysis of International Trade Network of Iron Ore." Applied Mechanics and Materials 40-41 (November 2010): 887–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.40-41.887.

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This paper uses data of international iron ore trade in 2009, which cover 61 countries and 134 trade relationships, to evaluate the bargaining power of both export and import countries from the perspective of social network. The countries’ positions in the iron ore trade network and their bargaining power are examined through analysis of their Freeman degree centralities, Bonacich powers, betweenness centralities, and flow centralities. The results of these analyses identify prominent exporters, importers and brokers with great bargaining power, and countries with potential to improve their bargaining positions. The results also reveal the reason why the international negotiations of iron ore trade were almost always in favor of exporters.

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Nakai, Teruhisa. "Bargaining game with asymmetric information about a bargaining power." Journal of Information and Optimization Sciences 25, no. 2 (May 2004): 255–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02522667.2004.10699606.

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Schmitz, Patrick W. "Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach." Economics Letters 119, no. 1 (April 2013): 28–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.01.011.

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Ping, Han, Bahaudin G. Mujtaba, and Chen Xue. "Changes In The Bargaining Power Of Chinese Migrant Workers And The Factors Enhancing Laborers Power." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 30, no. 1 (December 30, 2013): 135. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v30i1.8289.

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The shortage of migrant workers phenomenon is not only a reflection of the changing concept of occupation for Chinese migrant workers, but it also increases job opportunities for such workers. Migrant workers fight for higher wages through strikes and collective negotiations. These changes reflect the enhancement of the bargaining power of Chinese migrant workers.This paper explores the factors that enhance Chinese migrant workers bargaining power, uses a fuzzy comprehensive evaluation based on the analytic hierarchy process to assess the effect of various factors, and analyzes the positive and negative effects of enhancing the bargaining power. Finally, this paper predicts changes in the bargaining power of Chinese migrant workers and provides corresponding recommendations to protect their advantages.

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Bacharacb, Samuel B., and Edward J. Lawler. "Power Dependence and Power Paradoxes in Bargaining." Negotiation Journal 2, no. 2 (April 1986): 167–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1571-9979.1986.tb00349.x.

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Wu, Chenkai. "The Leading Role of the Procurator in China's Plea Bargaining Process." Asian Journal of Social Science Studies 7, no. 4 (April 14, 2022): 70. http://dx.doi.org/10.20849/ajsss.v7i4.1093.

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The leniency system for plea bargaining in China is a plea bargaining system similar to plea bargaining in the United States. With the substantial increase in the application rate of the leniency system for plea guilty and accepting punishment, the criminal policy of "fewer arrests, careful prosecution and prudence" has become its due meaning. In China, the functions of censorship, arrest and prosecution are exercised by prosecutors. The burden of powers and responsibilities of prosecutors allows prosecutors to have procedural decision-making power and substantive disposition power in the plea bargaining process, that is, the procuratorial dominance. In the context of fewer arrests, prudent prosecution and prudent detention, prosecutors have greater discretion over arrest and prosecution during the plea negotiation process, coupled with the high adoption rate of sentencing suggestions in practice, the expansion of prosecutors’ substantive disposition powers, and the procuratorial dominance further highlighted. However, we must clarify the relationship between procuratorial power and sentencing power, clarify the status and responsibilities of prosecutors, and further improve the leading role of prosecutors.

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23

Guo, Hongmei, Shuiliang Gu, and Yingsheng Su. "Bargaining Power Choices with Moral Hazard in a Supply Chain." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2018 (2018): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/2068287.

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A supply chain contract is established using a dynamic, Nash bargaining game which determines the optimal bargaining power allocation for the manufacturer, retailer, and society in an environment affected by moral hazard and irreversible investment. The results found that the manufacturer’s choice was to hold all bargaining power; however, due to the remaining information problem, the retailer still had a profit; in contrast, the retailer was only willing to give up bargaining power if the manufacturer’s profit was reserved. The optimal bargaining power allocation was found to be strongly related to the ability to convert and monitor technology, with the bargaining power gradually shifting to the manufacturer as the technology improved. A numerical simulation is given to examine the theoretical results.

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Jung, Sung-Moon, Shie-Gheun Koh, Young-Jin Kim, and Pyung-Hoi Koo. "Coordinated Supply Contracts for a Two-Echelon Supply Chain under Given Bargaining Powers." Sustainability 15, no. 17 (August 29, 2023): 13005. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su151713005.

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This paper addresses the supply contracts within a decentralized supply chain comprising an upstream component supplier and a downstream manufacturer. With the need to invest in production capacity before the sales season, suppliers often make conservative capacity decisions due to uncertain demand, which gives rise to the double marginalization problem. The distribution of supply chain profits is typically determined based on each member’s relative bargaining power, often exogenously provided in the market. While numerous studies have been conducted to design supply contracts for coordination in decentralized supply chains, most of them overlook the supplier’s capacity constraints and the existing bargaining power structure. To bridge this gap, this study proposes a supply contract scheme that achieves coordination under any given bargaining power structure. The key finding of this paper is that two contract types, namely capacity cost-sharing (CCS) and surplus capacity compensation (SCC), can address the entire spectrum of bargaining powers. This study demonstrates how to identify a specific threshold for a given bargaining power structure, from which the appropriate contract type is selected. Through numerical illustrations, we present how to select coordinated contracts for different bargaining power structures and examine the influence of contract parameters on the profit of each supply chain member. The primary contribution is that this study provides actionable insights for practitioners to effectively implement coordinated contracts by presenting a straightforward and practical methodology.

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Peleckis, Kęstutis. "BARGAINING POWER IN THE SYSTEM OF NEGOTIATIONS STRATEGY : ESSENCE, CONCEPTION, ELEMENTS / DERYBINĖS GALIOS DERYBŲ STRATEGIJOS SISTEMOJE: ESMĖ, KONCEPCIJA, ELEMENTAI." Mokslas – Lietuvos ateitis 6, no. 1 (February 20, 2014): 72–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/mla.2014.10.

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In order to manage effectively the process of formulation negotiation strategy and its implementation it is necessary to know, understand and reveal the powers of negotiating parties. Scientific analysis of literature sources enabled to present the concept of bargaining power, to describe the basic elements and principlesof bargaining power. The analysis demonstrated that scientific literature contains a number of researches devoted for investigations of power in negotiations, internal relations of organisations, human social relations. This article presents the definition of negotiation power, analyses the nature of negotiation power, its resources, elements and their relationships. Negotiating power is essential in shaping the negotiating strategy. Analysis of bargaining power definitions in the scientific literature suggests that the content of powers definition varies in dependance on its application context. In order to reach better cognition of the bargaining power, a comprehensive overview of the researches of the bargaining powers in recent decades is necessary. The article also provides recommendations for further research. Siekiant efektyviai valdyti derybų strategijos formavimo ir įgyvendinimo procesą būtina įvertinti, suprasti ir atskleistibesiderančių pusių derybines galias. Remiantis mokslinės literatūros šaltinių analize pateikiama derybinių galių koncepcija,apibūdinami pagrindiniai derybinių galių elementai ir jų taikymo principai. Mokslinėje literatūroje aprašyta nemažaityrimų, skirtų galioms derybose, organizacijų vidaus santykiuose, žmonių socialiniuose santykiuose nagrinėti. Straipsnyje pateikiamasderybų galios apibrėžimas, nagrinėjama derybų galios kilmė, jos šaltiniai, elementai ir jų tarpusavio sąsajos. Derybųgalia esminė formuojant derybų strategiją. Nustatyta, kad derybų strategijos formavimo išeities taškas yra derybinių galių identifikavimasir priemonių, leidžiančių tas galias panaudoti, numatymas. Išanalizavus derybinių galių apibrėžimus mokslinėjeliteratūroje galima teigti, kad galių apibrėžimo turinys priklauso nuo jų taikymo konteksto. Siekiant geriau pažinti derybinesgalias, apžvelgti̇̀ pastarųjų dešimtmečių derybinių galių moksliniai tyrimai. Straipsnyje išsamiau analizuojami šie klausimai:derybinių galių apibrėžimas, jų tipologija, galių esmė ir prigimtis, galių ir derybų rezultatyvumo tarpusavio sąsaja. Pateikiamatolesnių mokslinių tyrimų rekomendacijų.

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Córdoba, Juan C., Anni T. Isojärvi, and Haoran Li. "Endogenous Bargaining Power and Declining Labor Compensation Share." Finance and Economics Discussion Series, no. 2023-030 (May 2023): 1–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/feds.2023.030.

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Workhorse search and matching models assume constant bargaining weights, while recent evidence indicates that weights vary across time and in cross section. We endogenize bargaining weights in a life-cycle search and matching model by replacing a standard Cobb-Douglas (CD) matching function with a general constant elasticity of substitution (CES) matching function and study the implications for the long-term labor share and bargaining power in the U.S. The CES model explains 64 percent of the reported decline in the labor share since 1980, while the CD model explains only 28 percent of the decline. We then use the model to recover changes in bargaining power and find that workers' bargaining power has declined 11 percent between 1980 and 2007 because of a decline in tightness.

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Knyazeva, Irina V., and Nikolay N. Zaikin. "The Phenomenon of Bargaining Power on the Competitive Product Markets." Journal of Modern Competition 16, no. 4 (August 31, 2022): 5–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.37791/2687-0657-2022-16-4-5-18.

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The emergence of network retailers and corporate associative structures in some industries, which became the largest buyers or initiators of market processes, began to form the buyer’s market power or bargaining power of the buyer that became the object of a broader study and confirmed its relevance. The realization of bargaining power on the part of the consumer does not always manifest itself in the system of economic interactions as an action that violates competition, but often is identified as a mechanism of business strategies or a form of implementation of marketing competitive practices. There are types of markets and market situations in which bargaining power is essentially the central link of the transaction, regulating prices, volumes, contract terms and distribution of benefits. The purpose of the study is to consider the phenomenon of bargaining power, since the consequences of its manifestations form long-term losses for both the seller and the market as a whole. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to solve several tasks: to conduct a theoretical analysis of the concept of “bargaining power”, to determine the difference between bargaining power and market power and to identify factors affecting the formation and development of bargaining power. This article focuses on the study of the evolution of theoretical thought in the field of disclosure of the phenomenon of bargaining power. Foreign sources give some understanding of the subject of bargaining power, but the question of factors, research schools and evaluation indicators still remains open. Based on the available bibliographic content, the article presents a comprehensive analysis of the category of “bargaining power” in various conditions of interaction of agents, the established scientific directions of its study. The systematized factors influencing the negotiating power and the vectors of their impact reflect the accumulated author’s opinion of different research views. The article reflects the criteria characteristics of the manifestation of bargaining power in the market. Understanding the essence of the phenomenon under study can be useful for expanding the field of market analysis in cases of antimonopoly proceedings, preventing anticompetitive actions, forming an antimonopoly compliance system and preventing antimonopoly risks.

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Ruppert, Stancanelli, and Wasmer. "Commuting, Wages and Bargaining Power." Annals of Economics and Statistics, no. 95/96 (2009): 201. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/27917410.

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Haller, Hans, and Steinar Holden. "Ratification Requirement and Bargaining Power." International Economic Review 38, no. 4 (November 1997): 825. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2527218.

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Subramanian, Guhan. "Takeover Defenses and Bargaining Power." Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 17, no. 4 (September 2005): 85–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2005.00062.x.

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Kirkbride, Paul S., and Jim Durcan. "Bargaining Power and Industrial Relations." Personnel Review 16, no. 2 (February 1987): 3–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/eb055557.

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Inderst, Roman. "Contract design and bargaining power." Economics Letters 74, no. 2 (January 2002): 171–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(01)00545-6.

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Manzini, Paola. "Strategic bargaining with destructive power." Economics Letters 65, no. 3 (December 1999): 315–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00160-3.

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Calvó-Armengol, Antoni. "Bargaining power in communication networks." Mathematical Social Sciences 41, no. 1 (January 2001): 69–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(00)00049-4.

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Østerdal, Lars Peter. "Bargaining power in repeated games." Mathematical Social Sciences 49, no. 1 (January 2005): 101–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.07.001.

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Gersbach, Hans, and Hans Haller. "Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption." Social Choice and Welfare 33, no. 4 (April 24, 2009): 665–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0385-5.

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Lohrke, Franz T., Gina W. Simpson, and David M. Hunt. "Extending the bargaining power model." Journal of Management History 13, no. 2 (April 17, 2007): 153–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17511340710735564.

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du Toit, Pierre. "Consociational Democracy and Bargaining Power." Comparative Politics 19, no. 4 (July 1987): 419. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/421815.

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Iozzi, Alberto, and Tommaso Valletti. "Vertical Bargaining and Countervailing Power." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6, no. 3 (August 1, 2014): 106–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.3.106.

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We study a set of bilateral Nash bargaining problems between an upstream input supplier and several differentiated but competing retailers. If one bilateral bargain fails, the supplier can sell to the other retailers. We show that, in a disagreement, the other retailers' behavior has a dramatic impact on the supplier's outside options and, therefore, on input prices and welfare. We revisit the countervailing buyer power hypothesis and obtain results in stark contrast with previous findings, depending on the type of outside option. Our results apply, more generally, to the literature that incorporates negotiated input prices using bilateral Nash bargaining. (JEL C72, C78, D43, L13, L14, L81)

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Chae, Suchan, and Paul Heidhues. "Buyers' Alliances for Bargaining Power." Journal of Economics Management Strategy 13, no. 4 (December 2004): 731–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2004.00030.x.

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Kitamura, Hiroshi, Noriaki Matsushima, and Misato Sato. "Exclusive contracts and bargaining power." Economics Letters 151 (February 2017): 1–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.021.

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Fabbri, Daniela, and Leora F. Klapper. "Bargaining power and trade credit." Journal of Corporate Finance 41 (December 2016): 66–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.07.001.

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Stephenson, Kevin. "Shareholder bargaining power in bankruptcy." Atlantic Economic Journal 22, no. 1 (March 1994): 102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02301712.

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Omillo, Francis Okumu. "Estimating the effect of buyers’ bargaining power on Kenyan small food manufacturers’ income." Independent Journal of Management & Production 10, no. 2 (April 1, 2019): 548. http://dx.doi.org/10.14807/ijmp.v10i2.846.

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The purpose of this study is to predict the effect of buyers’ bargaining power (customers’ price sensitivity, knowledge level, union, ability to integrate backward, switching costs and resale buying) on incomes of small food manufacturers. A survey of perceptions of 132 sampled small food processors in Nairobi and Busia Counties was done. From the gradation of the perceptions on seven-point likert scale, inferences were made on buyers bargaining power influence on the larger population of small food manufacturers in Kenya. On one hand, the study revealed that every unit of buyer’s sensitivity to prices, not unionized, integrated backwards and bought for goods for resale accounted for a positive change small food processors’ income by 0.011, 0.013, 0.005 and 0.010, respectively. On the other hand, the study showed a negative change of 0.006 and 0.008 in incomes of small agro-food processors with every unit change in the level of buyer’s knowledge and shifted to alternative product, respectively. Using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) linear regression statistical inference, there was no single standalone buyers’-bargaining-power-factor that significant influenced incomes of small food manufacturers in Kenya. However, the amalgam of the buyers bargaining power cues actually did influence the incomes (t=8.294, p= 0.00, sig <0.05, 2 tailed). Given the findings, the study recommends that marketers of food products should treat buyers bargaining powers factors as a whole and not as individual components. Further studies should consider structural equation modeling to determine a model with critical buyers-bargaining-powers factors.

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Nirantechaphat, Wachirarat, and Asawin Nedpogaeo. "Communication for Power Negotiation of the Underground Lotto Gamblers." International Journal of Sociologies and Anthropologies Science Reviews 3, no. 4 (July 17, 2023): 239–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.60027/ijsasr.2023.3116.

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Background and Aim: This paper aim to investigate that communication in negotiating the power dynamics among Underground Lotto Gamblers. This article is part of the research on the Identities and Communication Networks of Middle-Class Underground Lotto Gamblers. Its purpose is to study communication in negotiating the power dynamics among Underground Lotto Gamblers. The study identified the following real-world bargaining strategies: (1) The bargaining power of capital owners is symbolic bargaining. (2) The bargaining power between the dealer and the lottery seller involves negotiating to build confidence. (3) The bargaining power between lottery dealers and lottery gamblers includes cultural bargaining, economic bargaining, social bargaining, negotiating lottery rules, and negotiating the power of sellers. This extends to lotteries in the realm of social media. Materials and Methods: Through the qualitative approach, this paper investigates the phenomenon. Results: The results suggest that the bargaining power is driven by two objectives: preserving honor and dignity, as well as maintaining the business network of Underground Lotto. First and foremost, it is evident that both the dealer and the lottery seller must demonstrate their ability to resolve issues for network members in case the police request tribute or make arrests. Additionally, this is manifested in establishing communication channels and defining rules. These rules encompass setting limits for lottery sales/installments, paying tribute, providing discounts, organizing promotions, employing lottery-winning techniques, determining payment receipt periods, and setting a limit on the number of participants. Conclusion: It is hoped that these elements are essential in any real-world business, including those operating on social media.

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Fréchette, Guillaume, John H. Kagel, and Massimo Morelli. "Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining." Journal of Public Economics 89, no. 8 (August 2005): 1497–517. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.02.009.

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Lu, Wenxue, Yuxin Wei, and Rui Wang. "Handling inter-organisational conflict based on bargaining power." International Journal of Conflict Management 31, no. 5 (March 27, 2020): 781–800. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijcma-06-2019-0092.

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Purpose This paper aims to reveal the effects of an organisation’s bargaining power on its negotiating behaviours (including integrating, obliging, compromising, dominating and avoiding) in the context of inter-organisational conflict in construction projects and investigate how organisational power distance orientation moderates the relationship between the organisation’s bargaining power and its negotiating behaviours. Design/methodology/approach The authors conducted a questionnaire survey among practitioners in the Chinese construction industry with the final sample consisting of 219 responses. A structural equation model was used to analyse the data and test the hypotheses. Findings The results reveal that an organisation’s bargaining power is positively associated with dominating and integrating behaviours but negatively associated with obliging and avoiding behaviours. Additionally, bargaining power is found to be negatively associated with compromising behaviour when the organisation has a high power distance orientation. Finally, a higher degree of power distance orientation strengthens the positive effect bargaining power has on dominating behaviour. Practical implications The findings can help practitioners to predict the negotiating behaviours of a counterpart according to its bargaining power and the power distance in its organisational culture. This can then enable practitioners to adjust their strategies accordingly and steer the negotiations towards a win–win outcome. Originality/value This study applies the approach-inhibition theory of power to inter-organisational negotiations and empirically tests the relationship between an organisation’s bargaining power and its negotiating behaviours in the context of construction projects. Additionally, this study reveals that organisational power distance orientation moderates this relationship.

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Bornstein, Josh. "Employees are losing: Have workplace laws gone too far?" Journal of Industrial Relations 61, no. 3 (March 22, 2019): 438–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022185619834321.

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Concern about the economic, social and political cost of growing income inequality is propelling a debate about the loss of employee bargaining power – both in Australia and other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries. The evidence of a pronounced decline in the bargaining power of employees in the Australian labour market is overwhelming. The decline is consistent with a collapse in workplace bargaining as a result of a bargaining framework that has not kept up with major structural change in the labour market. In the absence of decisive legislative intervention, the decline of employee bargaining power is likely to continue.

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SHOKOOHI, ZEINAB, AMIR HOSSEIN CHIZARI, and MAHDI ASGARI. "INVESTIGATING BARGAINING POWER OF FARMERS AND PROCESSORS IN IRAN'S DAIRY MARKET." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 51, no. 1 (September 13, 2018): 126–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/aae.2018.26.

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AbstractThe farm-gate price of raw milk in Iran is determined annually in negotiations among representatives of dairy processors, milk producers, and government officials. This study estimates the average bargaining power of dairy farmers and processors, through applying the generalized axiomatic Nash approach in a bilateral bargaining model. We employ annual data from 1990 to 2013 to estimate econometric representation of a bilateral bargaining model using a Monte Carlo expectation maximization algorithm. Results imply a higher bargaining power of 0.69 for processors, compared with 0.31 for farmers. This asymmetry of bargaining power causes unequal allocation of gains in the milk market.

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Moon, Chul W., and Augustine A. Lado. "MNC-Host Government Bargaining Power Relationship: A Critique and Extension Within the Resource-Based View." Journal of Management 26, no. 1 (February 2000): 85–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014920630002600108.

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In this paper, we critique the literature on MNC-Host government bargaining power relationship, and propose an integrative theoretical model within the resource-based view of the firm. Recognizing that a firm’s bargaining power is directly related to rent generation, we analyze how firm-specific resources provide the basis of a sustainable bargaining power for the MNC vis-á-vis the host government. Furthermore, we identify several industry and country characteristics as moderators of the relationship between MNC resources and bargaining power. In the last section of the paper, we offer directions for future research and theory development in this area.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Bargaining power'

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