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1
Hafiz, Hiba. "Structural Labor Rights." Michigan Law Review, no. 119.4 (2021): 651. http://dx.doi.org/10.36644/mlr.119.4.structural.
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American labor law was designed to ensure equal bargaining power between workers and employers. But workers’ collective power against increasingly dominant employers has disintegrated. With union density at an abysmal 6.2 percent in the private sector—a level unequaled since the Great Depression— the vast majority of workers depend only on individual negotiations with employers to lift stagnant wages and ensure upward economic mobility. But decentralized, individual bargaining is not enough. Economists and legal scholars increasingly agree that, absent regulation to protect workers’ collective rights, labor markets naturally strengthen employers’ bargaining power over workers. Existing labor and antitrust law have failed to step in, leaving employers free to coordinate and consolidate labor-market power while constraining workers’ ability to do the same. The dissolution of workers’ collective rights has resulted in spiking income inequality: workers have suffered economy-wide wage stagnation and a declining share of the national income for decades. To resolve this crisis, some scholars have advocated for ambitious labor law reforms, like sector-wide bargaining, while others have turned to antitrust law to tackle employer power. While these proposals are vital, they overlook an existing opportunity already contained in the labor law that would avoid the political and doctrinal obstacles to such large-scale reforms. This Article argues for a “structural” approach to the labor law that revives and modernizes its equal bargaining power purpose through deploying innovative social scientific analysis. A “structural” approach is one that takes into account workers’ bargaining power relative to employers in determining the scope of substantive labor rights and in resolving disputes. Because employers’ current buyer power strengthens their ability to indefinitely hold out on worker demands in the employment bargain, the “structural” approach seeks to deploy social scientific tools to tailor the labor law’s provisions so that they resituate workers to a bargaining position from which they could equally hold out. This Article makes three key contributions. First, it documents the dispersion and misalignment of workers’ collective rights under current labor law, detailing the historical narrowing of workers’ collective rights to limited tactics by a small set of workers against highly protected individual enterprises and the concomitant rise of employer power (Part I). Second, it introduces and schematizes the wealth of social scientific literature relevant for evaluating the relative bargaining power of employers and employees (Part II). And finally, it offers concrete proposals for how to apply these social scientific tools and insights to three areas of the National Labor Relation Board’s adjudication and regulatory authority: the determination of “employer”/”employee” status, the determination of employees’ substantive rights under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and the determination of what counts as sanctionable unfair labor practices under section 8 of the NLRA (Part III).
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Butolia, Sangeeta, and Prem Singh. "WOMAN’S EMPLOYMENT AND INTRAHOUSEHOLD BARGAINING POWER." ASIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS 3, no. 2 (2022): 315–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.47509/ajeb.2022.v03i02.09.
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While there are various different optimistic communal implications of working status of women, this study tries to analyse the effect of employment that may change relative decision making power of women within household. Using data set of NFHS-4 (2015-16), this paper documents a positive significant increase in women’s relative power to take decisions alone within household. Similarly, women are more likely to take various individual decisions either alone or jointly with husband when they are engaged in labour market. These results are consistent with a theoretical model of bargaining power in which likelihood of a woman to take part in household decision making increases upon entering the labour force. The likelihood of men to be a sole decision maker in the household falls when women are involved in labor market.
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Forrest, Anne. "Bargaining Units and Bargaining Power." Discussion 41, no. 4 (April 12, 2005): 840–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/050264ar.
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Schwarz-Miller, Ann, and Wayne K. Talley. "The relative bargaining power of public transit labor." Research in Transportation Economics 4 (January 1996): 69–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0739-8859(96)80006-0.
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PONTUSSON, JONAS, and PETER SWENSON. "Labor Markets, Production Strategies, and Wage Bargaining Institutions." Comparative Political Studies 29, no. 2 (April 1996): 223–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414096029002004.
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Transformed patterns of labor market governance occupy a central place in the study of contemporary West European political economies. Here, detailed analysis of the dramatic decentralization of wage bargaining in Sweden identifies organized employers, especially engineering employers, as the decisive agents of institutional change. We argue that the employer offensive should be understood as a response to a shift in power within old wage-bargaining institutions, introducing invasive regulation of firm-level pay practices and, at the same time, as a consequence of new flexibility-centered production strategies, giving rise to demands for more firm-level autonomy in wage bargaining. The exceptional features of the old Swedish bargaining and the particular needs of different sectors come into play as we seek to explain the mixed pattern of wage-bargaining changes across Western Europe.
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Pacitti, Aaron. "Bargaining Power, Labor Market Institutions, and the Great Moderation." Eastern Economic Journal 41, no. 2 (February 24, 2014): 160–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/eej.2014.3.
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Bental, Benjamin, and Dominique Demougin. "Declining labor shares and bargaining power: An institutional explanation." Journal of Macroeconomics 32, no. 1 (March 2010): 443–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2009.09.005.
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Batyra, Anna, Olivier Pierrard, David de la Croix, and Henri R. Sneessens. "Structural Changes in the Labor Market and the Rise of Early Retirement in France and Germany." German Economic Review 20, no. 4 (December 1, 2019): e38-e69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12150.
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Abstract The rise of early retirement in Europe is typically attributed to the European system of taxes and transfers. A model with an imperfectly competitive labor market allows us to consider also the effects of bargaining power and of matching efficiency on pre-retirement. We find that lower bargaining power of workers and declining matching efficiency have been important determinants of early retirement in France and Germany. These structural changes, combined with early retirement transfers and population aging, are also consistent with the employment and unemployment rates, labor share and seniority premia.
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Witt, John Fabian. "Rethinking the Nineteenth-Century Employment Contract, Again." Law and History Review 18, no. 3 (2000): 627–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/744072.
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Legal historians have turned with renewed energy in recent years to the project of fleshing out the myriad rules by which the common law of the free labor employment contract structured social relations in nineteenth-century America. Of course, labor relations have always been prominent in the literature. The German sociological tradition has long taught us to see in the legal protection of property rights a source of coercive power over the working classes. And for decades now, historians have studied the great nineteenth-century labor conspiracy cases, which generated leading cases and opinions by judges such as Shaw and Holmes. But there is a new wrinkle in recent accounts of nineteenth-century labor law. Much of the law of property, contract, and tort bears a relatively self-evident (though still too infrequently remarked on) relation to the relative bargaining power of the parties to an employment contract. Property rules, along with a whole host of attendant tort doctrines such as nuisance and trespass, allocate resources among parties. As Robert Hale observed long ago, property rules set the coercive power of A to exclude B from those resources that belong to A, whether A be a prospective employee excluding an employer from the employee's labor power, or an employer excluding a would-be employee from the means of production. In similar fashion, rules of contract and tort that define the weapons that parties may deploy in competition or bargaining also shape the relative bargaining power of social actors. Thus, doctrines of duress, fraud, unconscionability, and adequacy of consideration, and the law of labor conspiracies and competition all create immutable background rules (or sometimes inalienable entitlements) that have considerable impact on bargaining power. In Halean language, we might say that the law of duress, for example, coercively precludes the strong from forcing the weak to consent to a particular deal, or that the doctrine of fraud coercively precludes the slick from outfoxing the dupes.
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Železník, Martin. "Labor Market Regulation and its Characteristics: Comparison Between Czech Republic and Austria." Review of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 2 (January 1, 2011): 93–120. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/v10135-011-0009-8.
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Labor Market Regulation and its Characteristics: Comparison Between Czech Republic and Austria In this paper, we are trying to compare the labor market regulation in the Czech Republic and Austria and its structural parameters that characterize the given labor markets. In order to do that, we estimate the New-Keynesian model with matching frictions and nominal wage rigidities. Labor market regulation is proxied by worker's bargaining power over the wage. This main parameter is moving inside the interval and express a share of the total surplus that arises from filling the vacancy. In fact it expresses the state of who gains more from the added value that the vacancy is filled (worker or employer). Results indicate that workers in Austria and the Czech Republic have almost the same bargaining power that arises from the labor market settings.
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Jacobs, Ken, Rebecca Smith, and Justin McBride. "State and Local Policies and Sectoral Labor Standards: From Individual Rights to Collective Power." ILR Review 74, no. 5 (June 27, 2021): 1132–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00197939211020706.
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The US enterprise-based collective bargaining regime creates substantial limitations for organizing workers in an economy in which supply chains are increasingly disaggregated in ways that reduce worker power. Federal labor law generally preempts state and local policies that directly address private-sector bargaining. State and local governments, however, are not preempted from setting general labor standards. The authors examine four cases of recent experiments using sectoral standards at the local level. The cases show that sectoral standards have the potential to expand new forms of social bargaining through state and local public policy in areas of the country where worker organizations are already strong. Sectoral standards can do so in ways that promote worker organization and build institutional power, especially when combined with robust worker organizing. In presenting these cases, the authors show both the potential power, and limitations, of federalism in US workplace regulation.
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Cauvel, Michael, and Aaron Pacitti. "Bargaining power, structural change, and the falling U.S. labor share." Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 60 (March 2022): 512–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.strueco.2022.01.007.
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Alesina, Alberto, Andrea Ichino, and Loukas Karabarbounis. "Gender-Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 3, no. 2 (May 1, 2011): 1–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.3.2.1.
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Gender-based taxation (GBT) satisfies Ramsey's rule because it taxes at a lower rate the more elastic labor supply of women. We study GBT in a model in which labor elasticities emerge endogenously from intrahousehold bargaining. We explore the cases of superior bargaining power for men, higher male wages, and higher female home productivity. In all cases, men commit to a career in the market, take less home duties than women, and have lower labor supply elasticity. When society resolves its distributional concerns efficiently with gender-specific lump sum transfers, GBT with higher marginal tax rates on (single and married) men is optimal. (JEL D13, H21, H24, J16, J22)
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Isaac, Joe. "Collective Bargaining under Trade Practices Law." Economic and Labour Relations Review 19, no. 1 (November 2008): 39–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/103530460801900104.
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The Howard Government, supported by the Labor Opposition, legislated in 2007 to enable small businesses to engage in collective bargaining with large businesses under the Trade Practices Act. The object of the legislation is to facilitate greater equality in the bargaining power of the parties. Except where the small business sells goods/commodities rather than a service, a person who is ‘employed’ and the business that provides a ‘service’ are both effectively involved in the sale of labour or in the performance of work in the labour market. However, the legal concepts and procedures relating to collective bargaining in these two types of labour transactions are different. One, the ‘employment’ of persons, is placed in the category of workplace relations operating through labour law; the other, the ‘sale of services', is viewed as a commercial transaction, dealt with through commercial law. This paper considers the question of whether there are sufficiently significant differences between these labour/service transactions as to justify the application of two separate sets of laws to deal with them — one to cover transactions between employers and employees, and the other to cover transactions between small and large businesses. A case study will be used to illustrate the involved and unsatisfactory approach of the commercial law route in determining what is in essence a labour transaction rather than a commodity transaction.
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Molinder, Jakob, Tobias Karlsson, and Kerstin Enflo. "More Power to the People: Electricity Adoption, Technological Change, and Labor Conflict." Journal of Economic History 81, no. 2 (April 5, 2021): 481–512. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022050721000127.
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Will technical change spur conflicts in the labor market? In this study, we examine electricity adoption in Sweden during the first decades of the twentieth century. Exploiting that proximity to hydropowered plants shaped the electricity network independently of previous local conditions, we estimate the impact of electricity on labor strikes. Our results indicate that electricity adoption preceded an increase in conflicts, but strikes were of an offensive nature and most common in sectors with increasing labor demand. This suggests that electrification provided workers with a stronger bargaining position from which they could voice their claims.
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HABER, LAWRENCE J. "LABOR NEGOTIATIONS AND GAME THEORY: THE CASE OF ASYMMETRIC BARGAINING POWER." Journal of Collective Negotiations (formerly Journal of Collective Negotiations in the Public Sector) 31, no. 1 (July 1, 2006): 21–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.2190/3451-2njm-vge6-en7c.
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Cronin, James E. "Strikes and Power in Britain, 1870–1920." International Review of Social History 32, no. 2 (August 1987): 144–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020859000008403.
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Not long ago, sociologists and labor economists used to talk confidently about the “natural history of the strike”. By that they meant its rather smooth progress along a line that supposedly rose rapidly in the early stages of industrial growth, gradually flattened out with the establishment of stable collective bargaining, and slowly fell as the strike proceeded to “wither away” in the prosperity of “advanced industrial society”.
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Febrihapsari, Mahardani, Wiwik Prihartanti, and Agus Rahmanto. "DEKONSTRUKSI KEKUASAAN DALAM KELUARGA PEKERJA MIGRAN INDONESIA DALAM PERSPEKTIF PETER M. BLAU." Journal of Urban Sociology 3, no. 1 (January 12, 2021): 35. http://dx.doi.org/10.30742/jus.v3i1.1191.
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Migration is one of population studies which has been widely reviewed, particularly labor migration between countries. A booming labor movement recently, gives no small contribution for the country through remittances. However, labor migration, women migrant workers in particular, has its own consequences in the form of changes that occur not only at community level but also at family level. This study attempts to portray power in the migrant family after the wife migrates. The approach used in this study was qualitative with the perspective of Peter M Blau Social Exchange. The results of the study reveal that migration done by women migrant workers changes the power in the family, that is power destruction in the form of domination on the final decision in the family. An increase in economy in line with an increase or even a strengthening in bargaining position of women to men in the family. In this level, Economy is the major determinant of the change. Whereas, the knowledge obtained by the women while being overseas is the minor determinant in the social exchange to husband.Keywords: Power Deconstruction, Women Migrant Worker, Bargaining Position
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Luo, Siqi, and Tao Yang. "Why worker-supported collective bargaining may still fail." Employee Relations: The International Journal 42, no. 2 (December 2, 2019): 471–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/er-06-2019-0250.
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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to illustrate that some enterprise unions in South China, as strategic labor actors, made local progress in collective bargaining, but further elaborates on why gainful bargaining would require a more systematic understanding of the prevailing industrial structure. Design/methodology/approach This paper is mainly drawn from intensive site visits and 51 in-depth interviews in 2013 and 2014, and several follow-ups up to 2018. Three cases of collective bargaining, featuring different union strategies of assertive negotiation, informal cooperation and direct confrontation, are discussed in detail. Findings The study illustrates that viable collective bargaining with worker-supported unions is possible in China. However, the effectiveness of bargaining does not count on this alone; the supply chain structure also imposes significant constraints, mainly by narrowing the bargaining scope of each supplier and differentiating the structural power of their unions. In these cases, institutionalized union coordination beyond individual suppliers is proposed. Research limitations/implications These cases began as post-strike bargaining in Japanese auto supply chains and became the frontier of industrial relations in China. The impact of the supply chain in different sectors or regions requires further study. Originality/value This paper draws attention to the effect of an “invisible” but increasingly significant factor, industrial structure, on enterprise-level collective bargaining in China, unlike many previous criticisms of unwillingness or incompetence among labor actors.
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Brody, David. "Labor History, Industrial Relations, and the Crisis of American Labor." ILR Review 43, no. 1 (October 1989): 7–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/001979398904300103.
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In this look at the disciplinary history of industrial relations and labor history, the author focuses on the long period of disassociation between the two fields and the growing contact between them in the 1980s. He suggests that industrial relations scholars became more receptive to historical modes of thought when events such as the decline in union membership (starting in the mid-1970s) and the sharp recession of 1981–82 proved that industrial relations could not be treated like a static system, describable by invariant laws of labor economics. Similarly, he argues, labor historians, who were able to concentrate on writing “history from the bottom up” during the era of mature collective bargaining, have recently shown a revived interest in the study of institutions, politics, and power.
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Ratner, David, and Jae Sim. "Who Killed the Phillips Curve? A Murder Mystery." Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2022, no. 028 (May 20, 2022): 1–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/feds.2022.028.
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Is the Phillips curve dead? If so, who killed it? Conventional wisdom has it that the sound monetary policy since the 1980s not only conquered the Great Inflation, but also buried the Phillips curve itself. This paper provides an alternative explanation: labor market policies that have eroded worker bargaining power might have been the source of the demise of the Phillips curve. We develop what we call the "Kaleckian Phillips curve", the slope of which is determined by the bargaining power of trade unions. We show that a nearly 90 percent reduction in inflation volatility is possible even without any changes in monetary policy when the economy transitions from equal shares of power between workers and firms to a new balance in which firms dominate. In addition, we show that the decline of trade union power reduces the share of monopoly rents appropriated by workers, and thus helps explain the secular decline of labor share, and the rise of profit share. We provide time series and cross sectional evidence.
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ETHERIDGE, BRYANT. "Contesting the Great Compression: The National Labor Relations Board and Skilled Workers’ Struggle to Control Wage Differentials, 1935–1955." Journal of Policy History 32, no. 2 (March 5, 2020): 183–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0898030620000032.
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Abstract:This article argues that federal labor policy was a factor in causing the Great Compression, the dramatic compression of skill-based wage differentials that occurred in the 1940s, and in bringing it to an end. By giving the National Labor Relations Board the power to determine the appropriate collective-bargaining unit, New Dealers gave industrial unions the means with which to build a more egalitarian wage structure. Unskilled and semiskilled workers seized the opportunity and voted themselves big pay raises. Skilled craftsmen responded by petitioning the NLRB for permission to form their own craft bargaining units, a process known as “craft severance.” As conservatives gained influence in Washington in the 1940s, the board adopted a bargaining-unit policy more favorable to craft unions. By the early 1950s, skilled craftsmen had regained control of their wage demands and thereby helped bring the Great Compression to a halt.
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Bornstein, Josh. "Employees are losing: Have workplace laws gone too far?" Journal of Industrial Relations 61, no. 3 (March 22, 2019): 438–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022185619834321.
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Concern about the economic, social and political cost of growing income inequality is propelling a debate about the loss of employee bargaining power – both in Australia and other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries. The evidence of a pronounced decline in the bargaining power of employees in the Australian labour market is overwhelming. The decline is consistent with a collapse in workplace bargaining as a result of a bargaining framework that has not kept up with major structural change in the labour market. In the absence of decisive legislative intervention, the decline of employee bargaining power is likely to continue.
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Özdemir, Onur. "Financialization and the Labor Share of Income." Review of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 4 (December 1, 2019): 265–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/revecp-2019-0015.
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Abstract Financialization has been growing importance in macroeconomic perspectives since the finance-dominated capitalist relations have captured many of the specific positions in an aggregate economy. However, the empirical literature has substantially ignored the examination of the link between an increasing scale of financialization and the rising income inequality. In this study, a major hypothesis is based on the fact that the finance-dominated capitalism has a considerable effect on distributional practices through the channels of bargaining power. By applying the Kaleckian approach, the paper investigates the relationship between financialization and the labor share of national income using a panel dataset of 52 countries over the 1992-2012 period. The results suggest that a higher level of stock market development leads to a more unequal distribution of income and, thus, to the decline of wage share in the national income. Other factors such as globalization and technical change can also exacerbate the decline of wages, coupled with a decrease in the bargaining position of labor measured by unemployment rate and labor force participation rate.
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Woods, H. D. "Power and Function in Labour Relations." Relations industrielles 15, no. 4 (February 3, 2014): 441–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1021910ar.
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Summary The Author contends that the legal framework which has developed in Canada to deal with collective bargaining has been less favourable to the emergence of strong unions and effective collective bargaining than in the American case. This is explained better by fortuitous (and notably constitutional) circumstances than by calculated policy decisions. Canadian pragmatism in this field has led to a relatively massive State intervention which has strongly affected the basically unstable power relationship between labour and management. And the trend is increasing.
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Heitlinger, Alena. "The Paradoxical Impact of Health Care Restructuring in Canada on Nursing as a Profession." International Journal of Health Services 33, no. 1 (January 2003): 37–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.2190/rmay-nja9-kfw7-1uew.
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This article draws on the concept of “countervailing powers” to explore some of the contradictory effects of Canadian health care restructuring on nursing. The main focus is on key institutional powers in the nursing field, the major individual and collective strategies nurses have adopted in response to restructuring, and the ways in which the interaction between global and national market forces and the aggregate responses of nurses has created a severe shortage of nurses. The global shortage has led to a global competition for nurses' labor. This, along with government budget surpluses, has increased nurses' bargaining power, forcing governments and hospital managers to reverse nursing spending cuts; to offer more secure professional jobs, as opposed to casual work; to engage in aggressive, bonuses-laden recruitment of nurses, both within Canada and abroad; and, more generally, to rethink some of their restructuring strategies. However, since the bargaining power of nurses is largely market dependent and, as such, highly variable, there does not seem to be much potential for a sustained increase in the institutionalized power of the nursing profession.
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Christopherson, Susan, and Michael Storper. "The Effects of Flexible Specialization on Industrial Politics and the Labor Market: The Motion Picture Industry." ILR Review 42, no. 3 (April 1989): 331–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/001979398904200301.
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The authors, citing historical and statistical evidence spanning three decades, examine how the transition to flexibly specialized production organization in the motion picture industry has changed the distribution of work and wages and the definition of skills. One important result of that process has been the emergence of a new form of intra-occupational labor market segmentation, based much less on differences in hourly wage rates than on differential access to hours of work. Also, the reorganization of the production process has altered the relative bargaining power of employers and workers and of different groups within the industry work force, resulting in increased conflict among segments of the work force and a strengthening of employers' bargaining power vis-à-vis industry unions.
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Hodges, Ann C. "Bargaining for Privacy in the Unionized Workplace." International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 22, Issue 2 (June 1, 2006): 147–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/ijcl2006009.
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Abstract: This article considers whether collective bargaining can enhance privacy protection for employees in the United States. Employers are increasingly engaging in practices that invade employee privacy with few existing legal protections to limit their actions. While data on the extent of bargaining about privacy is limited, it appears that unions in the U.S. have primarily used the grievance and arbitration procedure to challenge invasions of privacy that lead to discipline of the employee instead of negotiating explicit contractual privacy rights. In contrast to the U.S., labor representatives in many other countries, particularly in the European Union, have greater legal rights of consultation with employers and take a more proactive approach to protection of employee privacy. While this approach offers promise for achieving greater privacy for employees and more flexibility for employers, the article concludes that it is unlikely to be widely adopted in the U.S. because of the limited power of labor unions.
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Himes, Henry. "The United Steelworkers of America's Path to Private Security: The Postwar Retiree Crisis, Politics, and Communism, 1946–1949." Labor 19, no. 2 (May 1, 2022): 42–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/15476715-9576793.
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Abstract In 1949 the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) successfully bargained for a pension and social insurance system, opening the door for social insurance and pension bargaining across organized labor throughout the post–World War II era. Indeed, the explosion of security bargaining after World War II facilitated the growth of America's unique but flawed public-private welfare system. Many historians have viewed labor's postwar turn to collective bargaining in a negative light and have argued that due to the weakening of labor's political power in the immediate postwar era, labor abandoned its progressive postwar vision and instead opted for a more insular, less socially oriented agenda achieved at the bargaining table. This argument still holds true, but a close inspection of the USWA's postwar work highlights a more nuanced picture. The USWA was one of the few labor unions to challenge the constitutionality of the antilabor Taft-Hartley Act (1947). The union's fight against Taft-Hartley came into conflict with the union's dire need to bring long-term security to its members, especially after many steel corporations began arbitrarily terminating steelworkers at age sixty-five in 1946. Ultimately, the issue of delivering long-term security to USWA members overshadowed the union's effort to defeat Taft-Hartley. This article focuses on the USWA's effort to bring long-term security to its members from 1946 to 1949 and looks at the postwar retiree crises in steel, the weakness of the public and private welfare systems in that era, the Inland Steel decision, the USWA's challenge to Taft-Hartley, and 1949 bargaining.
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I. Sachs, Benjamin. "THE UNBUNDLED UNION." Revista Direito das Relações Sociais e Trabalhistas 4, no. 2 (October 9, 2019): 16–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.26843/mestradodireito.v4i2.126.
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Public policy in the United States is disproportionately responsive to the wealthy, and the traditional response to this problem, campaign finance regulation, has failed. As students of politics have long recognized, however, political influence flows not only from wealth but also from organization, a form of political power open to all income groups. Accordingly, as this Essay argues, a promising alternative to campaign finance regulations is legal interventions designed to facilitate political organizing by the poor and middle class. To date, the most important legal intervention of this kind has been labor law, and the labor union has been the central vehicle for this type of organizing. But the labor union as a political-organizational vehicle suffers a fundamental flaw: unions bundle political organization with collective bargaining, a highly contested form of economic organization. As a result, opposition to collective bargaining impedes unions’ ability to serve as a political-organizing vehicle for lowerand middle-income groups. This Essay proposes that labor law unbundle the union, allowing employees to organize politically through the union form without also organizing economically for collective bargaining purposes. Doing so would have the immediate effect of liberating political-organizational efforts from the constraints of collective bargaining, an outcome that could mitigate representational inequality. The Essay identifies the legal reforms that would be necessary to enable such unbundled “political unions” to succeed. It concludes by looking beyond the union context and suggesting a broader regime of reforms aimed at facilitating political organizing by those income groups for whom representational inequality is now a problem.
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Girdėnas, Šarūnas. "A NOTE ON SIMPLE MONETARY POLICY RULES WITH LABOR MARKET AND FINANCIAL FRICTIONS." Macroeconomic Dynamics 22, no. 5 (January 23, 2018): 1321–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1365100516000626.
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We consider a New-Keynesian model with financial and labor market frictions where firms borrowing is limited by the enforcement constraint. The wage is set in a bargaining process where the firm's shareholder and worker share the production surplus. As debt service is considered to be a part of production costs, firms borrow to reduce the surplus which allows to lower the wage. We study the model's response to financial shock under two Taylor-type interest rate rules: first one responds to inflation and borrowing, second one to inflation and unemployment. We have found that the second rule delivers better policy in terms of the welfare measure. Additionally, we show that the feedback on unemployment in this rule depends on the extent of workers' bargaining power.
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Ward, Scott. "“Wishing your Family, Chrysler, and the Government an Abundance of Happiness for Christmas and the New Year”: The Chrysler Bailout and the Strange Persistence of New Deal Liberalism." Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 15, no. 1-2 (January 14, 2016): 92–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691497-12341377.
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In terms of industrial decline, Chrysler was just another death rattle among the blast furnaces sputtering throughout the Midwest, the dimming hum of shuttering textile mills up and down the Piedmont, and Appalachian coal towns drying up into nothing. Yet, it was more than just layoffs and bankruptcies; it appeared to be the end of what the New Deal Order had accomplished in postwar America—stable employment and rising wages coupled with economic growth. Indeed, since World War ii, Chrysler had been near the core of that very New Deal liberalism. Like its counterparts in mass-production industry, Chrysler had made its peace with organized labor and submitted to routinized collective bargaining. The seeds of that bargaining, especially in the auto industry, set the pattern for organized and unorganized workers across the nation. The tacit partnership of the federal government, big business, and organized labor that formed the core of New Deal liberalism established the pattern of collective bargaining, routinized industrial production, Cold War consensus, Democratic Party power, federal intervention into the economy, and affluence that would define postwar American life.
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Chen, Tsung-Kang, Yan-Shing Chen, and Hsien-Hsing Liao. "Labor unions, bargaining power and corporate bond yield spreads: Structural credit model perspectives." Journal of Banking & Finance 35, no. 8 (August 2011): 2084–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.01.013.
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Bergholt, Drago, Francesco Furlanetto, and Nicolò Maffei-Faccioli. "The Decline of the Labor Share: New Empirical Evidence." American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 14, no. 3 (July 1, 2022): 163–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mac.20190365.
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We use time series techniques to estimate the importance of four main explanations for the decline of the US labor income share: rising firm markups, falling bargaining power of workers, higher investment-specific technology growth, and more automated production processes. Identification is achieved with restrictions derived from a stylized model of structural change. Our results point to automation as the main driver of the labor share, although rising markups have played an important role in the last 20 years. We also find evidence of capital-labor complementarity, suggesting that capital deepening may have raised the labor share. (JEL D21, D43, E25, J51, L23, O33, O41)
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Keune, Maarten. "Inequality between capital and labour and among wage-earners: the role of collective bargaining and trade unions." Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 27, no. 1 (February 2021): 29–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/10242589211000588.
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In the context of rising inequality between capital and labour and among wage-earners in Europe, this state-of-the-art article reviews the literature concerning the relationship between collective bargaining and inequality. It focuses on two main questions: (i) what is the relationship between collective bargaining, union bargaining power and inequality between capital and labour? and (ii) what is the relationship between collective bargaining, union bargaining power and wage inequality among wage-earners? Both questions are discussed in general terms and for single- and multi-employer bargaining systems. It is argued that collective bargaining coverage and union density are negatively related to both types of inequality. These relationships are however qualified by four additional factors: who unions represent, the weight of union objectives other than wages, the statutory minimum wage, and extensions of collective agreements by governments.
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Huang, Fung-Yea. "Regional Cooperation on Labor Issues." Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 9, no. 2 (June 2000): 199–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/011719680000900203.
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Globalization in the past few decades has facilitated the growth of economies and individuals that possess mobile capital and knowledge. However, the situation of less educated workers did not improve as expected because the possibilities for employers to adopt technology, outsourcing, or moving elsewhere serve to keep their bargaining power low. Gaps are widening between less educated and educated workers and between developing and developed economies. This paper suggests that a closer cooperation among Japan, the newly industrial economies and Southeast Asia in monitoring and facilitating short-term labor migration can be a positive factor in narrowing the gaps. Enhancing the skill formation functions of the migration process and upgrading the skills of workers in labor importing economies are among the critical areas that would benefit from regional cooperation.
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Teng-Calleja, Mendiola, Cristina Jayme Montiel, and Marshaley Jaum Baquiano. "Humour in Power-Differentiated Intergroup Wage Negotiation." Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology 9, no. 1 (April 23, 2015): 15–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/prp.2015.2.
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This research examined the role of humour in power-differentiated wage bargaining conversations. We collected transcripts of wage bargaining between the local labour union and management negotiators of a multinational beverage company operating in the Philippines. Through conversation analysis, we determined how both parties utilised humor to challenge or maintain power relations even as both labour and management worked towards a wage bargaining agreement. Findings show that humour was used to maintain intergroup harmony, subvert authority and control the negotiation. Our findings may be useful for labour organisations and multinational corporations that operate in Southeast Asian countries with historically tumultuous labour relations such as the Philippines. Studies have shown how humour can play a significant role in various social interactions, such as business meetings (Rogerson-Revell, 2007), conversations between friends (Hay, 2000) and co-workers (Holmes, 2000), problem solving (Dunbar, Banas, Rodriguez, Liu, & Abra, 2012), conflict negotiations (Maemura & Horita, 2012) and price haggling (O’Quin & Aronoff, 1981). We note, however, that humour analysis rarely considers asymmetric features of social interactions occurring within the context of negotiation.
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Wad, Peter. "Solidarity Action in Global Labor Networks. Four Cases of Workplace Organizing at Foreign Affiliates in the Global South." Nordic Journal of Working Life Studies 4, no. 1 (March 1, 2014): 11. http://dx.doi.org/10.19154/njwls.v4i1.3548.
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Globalization transforms workforces of transnational corporation from predominantly home countrydominated workforces into foreign-dominated, multinational workforces. Thus, the national grounding of trade unions as the key form of labor organizing is challenged by new multinational compositions and cross-border relocations of corporate employment affecting working conditions of employees and trade unions in local places. We assume that economic globalization is characterized by expanding global corporate network of vertically and horizontally integrated (equity-based) and disintegrated (nonequity-based) value chains. We also assume that globalization can both impede and enable labor empowerment. Based on these premises the key question is, how can labor leverage effective power against management in global corporate networks? This question is split into two subquestions: a) How can labor theoretically reorganize from national unions and industrial relations institutions into global labor networks that allow prolabor improvement in global workplaces? b) How and why has labor in a globalized economy secured the core International Labor Organization (ILO) international labor right to organize companies and conduct collective bargaining? The Global Labor Network perspective is adopted as an analytical framework. Empirically, a comparative case methodology is applied comprising four more or less successful industrial disputes where labor achieved the right to organize and undertake collective bargaining. The disputes took place in affiliated factories of foreign transnational corporations located in Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Turkey. The conclusion is that the combination of global labor capabilities and global labor strategizing must generate strategic labor power that adequately matches the weaknesses of the counterpart’s global corporate network in order to achieve prolabor outcomes. The most efficient solidarity action was leveraged by a cross-border alliance of workplace collectives, national industrial unions, and a global union federation using global framework agreements (GFAs) with key customers of the employer. The least efficient campaign relied primarily on domestic developing country state institutions supported by a foreign labor nongovernmental organization (NGO).
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Bartkiw, Timothy J. "Charting a New Course in a Fissured Economy? Employer Concepts and Collective Bargaining in the US and Canada." International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 37, Issue 4 (December 1, 2021): 385–416. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/ijcl2021018.
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The legal concept of the employer plays an increasingly important and contested role in the modern economic context of broad-sweeping organizational fissuring. This article focuses on the role of employer concepts specifically in the collective bargaining domain, where they hold the unique potential to substantially affect access to regulated collective bargaining, its efficacy, and the extent of worker bargaining power. Building on a critical engagement with previous normative literature on fissuring and on the concept of the employer, the paper examines the interaction of fissuring and employer concepts in the context of the US and Canadian ‘Wagnerist’ collective bargaining regimes, and compares the trajectory of employer concept doctrine in each of these two countries in recent decades. The comparative analysis suggests that while employer concept reform within collective bargaining regimes remains constrained in important respects in both the US and Canada, these concepts have also recently diverged in important formal respects shaping their effects in fissured contexts. This divergence is comprised of a formal expansion of their scope in Canada; a narrowing of their scope in the US; and an effective inversion of the US joint employer concept consequentially into less of a remedial, and a more restrictive device. As a heuristic, comparison of US developments with those in its neighbour’s regime that has much else in common, help to highlight the extraordinarily restrictive nature of most recent US doctrine, including the 2020 National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) final rule on joint employer status, its facilitation of fissuring, and the formidable task confronting US labour of somehow bringing lead firms into the regulated collective bargaining process. Employer Concept, Fissuring and Collective Bargaining, Joint Employer, Scope of Collective Bargaining Regime
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Song, Garrison Hongyu. "Capital Mobility vs. Labor Mobility:Theory and Implications." International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues 12, no. 4 (July 19, 2022): 47–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.32479/ijefi.13221.
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A random search-based model is proposed to study the impact of the relative mobility of capital with respect to labor on income inequality and financial globalization for the first time. Our simulation results indicate that capital is less mobile than labor domestically. Our simulation results further suggest the duality of capital mobility in financial globalization, in which more mobile capital may not always promote financial globalization. Lastly, our simulation results show that the share of labor income in the gross proceeds is negatively related to the relative mobility of capital, the separating rate between capital and labor, and the bargaining power of capital, which may shed light on income inequality in the U.S.
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Pringle, Tim, and Quan Meng. "Taming Labor: Workers’ Struggles, Workplace Unionism, and Collective Bargaining on a Chinese Waterfront." ILR Review 71, no. 5 (April 12, 2018): 1053–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0019793918768791.
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This article examines the case of the Yantian International Container Terminal (YICT) to consider under what conditions unions can provide effective workplace representation in China. The authors draw on semi-structured interviews to analyze how and why the union was effective, despite rigid prohibitions against organizing outside of the Party-led All-China Federation of Trade Unions. The authors argue that the YICT union developed a system of annual collective bargaining that tamed the power of militant dockworkers and helped prevent strikes. This outcome required an effective enterprise-level trade union that was nevertheless able to influence and manage members’ somewhat ambiguous acceptance of its role. Ultimately, workers’ interests were partially represented and their acquisition of associational power—in the form of trade unions—increased.
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Huang, Yujuan, Haoying Xu, Hengyu Liu, Wenguang Yu, and Xinliang Yu. "The Impact of Family Care for the Elderly on Women’s Employment from the Perspective of Bargaining Power." International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 18, no. 11 (May 31, 2021): 5905. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18115905.
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Due to the wishes of the elderly and the traditional family culture in China, family care is the main way of providing for the aged, and women’s care is the main way. This is not conducive to the protection of women’s employment rights and the realization of self-worth under the background of increasing women’s autonomy. Based on the latest data of the China Health and Nutrition Survey Database (CHNS), this paper uses ordinary least squares (OLS) and the instrumental variable method of control endogeneity to analyze the influence of family care activities on the labor participation rate of married women. The innovation of this paper is to introduce family bargaining power into this kind of model for the first time, and further analyze the heterogeneity from the perspective of bargaining power differences. The empirical results show that the family elderly care activities have an obstacle effect on married women’s participation in employment, and the family members with strong bargaining power will significantly hinder employment, so this paper puts forward policy recommendations in line with the actual situation, hoping to provide theoretical support for the improvement of the social security system for the elderly.
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Zweig, Derek. "Market Power, NAIRU, and the Phillips Curve." Abstract and Applied Analysis 2020 (December 16, 2020): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/7083981.
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We explore the relationship between unemployment and inflation in the United States (1949-2019) through both Bayesian and spectral lenses. We employ Bayesian vector autoregression (“BVAR”) to expose empirical interrelationships between unemployment, inflation, and interest rates. Generally, we do find short-run behavior consistent with the Phillips curve, though it tends to break down over the longer term. Emphasis is also placed on Phelps’ and Friedman’s NAIRU theory using both a simplistic functional form and BVAR. We find weak evidence supporting the NAIRU theory from the simplistic model, but stronger evidence using BVAR. A wavelet analysis reveals that the short-run NAIRU theory and Phillips curve relationships may be time-dependent, while the long-run relationships are essentially vertical, suggesting instead that each relationship is primarily observed over the medium-term (2-10 years), though the economically significant medium-term region has narrowed in recent decades to roughly 4-7 years. We pay homage to Phillips’ original work, using his functional form to compare potential differences in labor bargaining power attributable to labor scarcity, partitioned by skill level (as defined by educational attainment). We find evidence that the wage Phillips curve is more stable for individuals with higher skill and that higher skilled labor may enjoy a lower natural rate of unemployment.
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Laroche, Mélanie, Frédéric Lauzon Duguay, and Patrice Jalette. "When Collective Bargaining Leads to Inequality: Determinants of Two-Tier Provisions in Canadian Collective Agreements." ILR Review 72, no. 4 (November 27, 2018): 871–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0019793918813363.
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This study examines two-tier provisions—a form of labor segmentation in firms that is increasingly formalized in collective agreements. Drawing on a large population of Canadian collective agreements from the private sector, the authors show that the adoption of these provisions is related more to industrial relations context than to economic uncertainty. Also, depending on whether the two-tier provisions focus on compensation or on job security, their determinants operate dissimilarly. This study contributes to labor market segmentation theory by showing the circumstances under which collective bargaining can marginalize newly hired workers in the primary labor market, namely, weak union power, pressures from sectoral comparisons, employer use of concessionary tactics and, ironically, collective agreements featuring advantageous working conditions.
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Oreffice, Sonia. "Did the legalization of abortion increase women’s household bargaining power? Evidence from labor supply." Review of Economics of the Household 5, no. 2 (March 20, 2007): 181–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11150-007-9009-y.
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Kemp-Benedict, Eric, and Y. K. Kim. "Household indebtedness, distribution, and bargaining power under distribution-induced technological change: a macroeconomic analysis." Review of Keynesian Economics 9, no. 3 (July 19, 2021): 297–318. http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/roke.2021.03.01.
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We present a stylized model to explore the interaction between household debt, functional income distribution, and technological change. We assume that weak labor bargaining power allows firms to set their mark-ups in order to meet a target profit rate. At a low wage share, workers’ households are assumed to have limited flexibility in meeting financial goals, so household indebtedness tends to rise as the wage share falls. Rising indebtedness further lowers labor's bargaining power, a phenomenon that was observed in the wave of financialization that began in the late twentieth century. Thus, rising debt levels allow firms even greater freedom to raise their target profit rate. We find that the dynamics can be either stable or unstable, with the potential for a self-reinforcing pattern of rising household indebtedness and falling wage share, consistent with trends in the US from the 1980s onward. The unstable cycle can be triggered by increased willingness by workers to incur debt and rising influence of household indebtedness on labor's bargaining strength and income distribution. The model can shed some light on widely observed trends over recent decades regarding household indebtedness, inequality, and technological changes in the US, and potentially in other OECD countries.
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Stanfield, Jared, and Robert Tumarkin. "Does the Political Power of Nonfinancial Stakeholders Affect Firm Values? Evidence from Labor Unions." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 53, no. 3 (April 29, 2018): 1101–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002210901800008x.
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Whereas corporate political connections are known to enhance equity values, we demonstrate that union political activity can have the opposite effect. We examine the consequences of a recent Australian state law that restricts union political activity but does not change collective bargaining rights. In the wake of this law, the equity values of affected unionized firms significantly increase, and consistent with this market reaction, these firms are able to bargain for more favorable labor contracts than their unionized peers in other states. The evidence strongly suggests that unions use political activism to extract rents from shareholders and benefit their members.
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GANS, JOSHUA S., and ANDREW LEIGH. "Bargaining Over Labour: Do Patients Have Any Power?*." Economic Record 88, no. 281 (November 17, 2011): 182–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4932.2011.00776.x.
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Anner, Mark. "Meeting the Challenges of Industrial Restructuring: Labor Reform and Enforcement in Latin America." Latin American Politics and Society 50, no. 02 (2008): 33–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-2456.2008.00012.x.
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Abstract Despite a strengthening of collective labor rights in Latin America over the last 15 years, most labor movements in the region have lost power because neither the content nor the enforcement mechanisms associated with the labor reforms fully took into consideration the challenges presented by economic restructuring. Reforms facilitating union formation did not strengthen unions but instead increased union fragmentation. Collective bargaining structures did not respond to the exigencies of international outsourcing; and the initial round of reforms in the 1990s did not contemplate the need to strengthen labor law enforcement mechanisms at a time when heightened international competition created a need for greater state vigilance of labor standards. Recent reforms or proposed reforms hold more promise for labor, but truly union-friendly labor relations regimes require deeper changes. A review of several Latin American cases is followed by a closer examination of Brazil and El Salvador.
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Choi, I. G., P. Sohn, and J.-Y. Seo. "The relationship between labour unions’ bargaining power and firms’ operating flexibility: New evidence from emerging markets." South African Journal of Business Management 46, no. 4 (December 31, 2015): 65–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/sajbm.v46i4.110.
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This study analyses the relevance between the bargaining power of labour unions and the operating flexibility on firms’ capital costs by using non-financial firms listed on the Korean stock exchange from 1999 to 2013. Under the assumption that constraints in business activities attributed to the collective bargaining power of labour unions lead to reduced operating flexibility and increased capital costs, we test this notion empirically; the main test results are as follows: First, we find from portfolio analysis that the cost of capital is higher for firms in more unionized industries. Second, we find that union coverage positively affects the cost of capital at a significant level. Third, we confirm through robustness tests that the industry adjusted union coverage (IAUC) also has a positive effect on the cost of capital at a significant level. As a result, the effect holds after controlling for a host of industry- and firm-level characteristics, and is stronger when unions have more favourable bargaining power. Thus, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the increase of labour unions’ bargaining power leads to raise firms’ capital costs by decreasing operating flexibility in the Korean firms.