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Morin, Annäïg. "Essays in Labor Economics : wages and Bargaining Power along Business Cycle." Thesis, Lyon 2, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011LYO22024/document.
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Les effets de la sévère crise économique qui a suivi la crise financière en 2007-2008 s’est fait fortement ressentir sur le marché du travail. La croissance du chômage et l’insécurité de l’emploi ont considérablement influencé le processus de négociation salariale entre employeurs, employés et syndicats. Cette évolution a mis en avant la nécessité de comprendre à quel point ce processus ainsi que le rapport de force entre les parties en présence diffèrent en période de croissance et en période de ralentissement économique. A.n de répondre à cette question, la présente thèse étudie le comportement des employeurs, des employés et des syndicats lors du processus de fixation des salaires, en mettant particulièrement l’accent sur l’évolution de l’interaction entre ces trois agents à travers le cycle économique. Les deux premiers chapitres de ma thèse analysent les fluctuations du pouvoir des syndicats à travers le cycle et relient ces fluctuations aux fluctuations des salaires. Le premier chapitre propose un cadre théorique qui associe frictions d’appariement et syndicats et démontre que les rigidités salariales proviennent de façon endogène du comportement des syndicats. Le deuxième chapitre de ma thèse teste ces prédictions empiriquement, en utilisant un panel d’industries sur la période 1987-2000 aux États-Unis. Les résultats confirment l’hypothèse que les salaires sont moins corrélés au niveau de productivité lorsqu’ils sont négociés collectivement. L’intensification des propriétés contracycliques de la part salariale est au coeur du mécanisme. Le troisième chapitre propose un modèle avec affichage des salaires qui examine l’évolution du pouvoir de monopsone des entreprises à travers le cycle économique. Les conséquences en termes de dispersion des salaires sont étudiées. Le premier chapitre de ma thèse propose un modèle dynamique du marché du travail qui associe deux caractéristiques principales : frictions d’appariement et syndicats. A.n d’étudier comment les syndicats influencent la volatilité des salaires à travers le cycle, je dissocie les deux composants de la volatilité des salaires : la volatilité du surplus total et la volatilité du pouvoir de négociation effectif des syndicats. Le pouvoir de négociation effectif des syndicats est dé.ni comme la part du surplus total alloué aux travailleurs. Je prouve que ce pouvoir de négociation effectif est endogène et contracyclique, résultat qui provient directement de la fonction d’utilité des syndicats. L’intuition est la suivante. Du fait que les syndicats internalisent la relation entre le niveau des salaires et la création de postes, ils font face à un arbitrage entre le niveau des salaires et le niveau de l’emploi. Ainsi, les préférences des syndicats (donnant la priorité aux salaires ou à l’emploi) fluctuent à travers le cycle, et il en est de même du pouvoir de négociation effectif des syndicats. Il en résulte que, lorsque l’économie est touchée par un choc de productivité, la dynamique du pouvoir de négociation effectif des syndicats neutralise partiellement la dynamique du surplus total, mécanisme qui crée de la rigidité salariale. Le modèle est caractérisé par la coexistence d’un secteur non syndiqué, dans lequel les salaires sont individuellement négociés à la Nash, avec un secteur syndiqué. En calibrant ce modèle avec des données américaines, j’obtiens qu’un choc positif entraine, au moment du choc, une compression de la prime syndicale, suivi par une augmentation régulière de cette prime à mesure que la proportion de travailleurs employés augmente. En corollaire, l’emploi réagit plus fortement lorsque les salaires sont négociés collectivement, mais l’effet est moins persistentThe consequences of the sudden and severe contraction of industrial output in the aftermath of the .nancial crisis of 2007-2008 are increasingly being felt in the labor market. Rising unemployment and job insecurity has greatly in.uenced wage bargaining interactions between firms, workers and trade unions. It pointed out the necessity to understand how di.erent were the wage-setting process and the balance of power between the main actors in good times and bad. As an answer to this issue, this dissertation investigates the wage-setting behavior of .rms, workers and trade unions, placing particular emphasis on how the interaction between these three economic agents changes over the business cycle. The two first chapters of the thesis analyze the fluctuations of the power of trade unions over the cycle, and relate these .uctuations to the .uctuations of wages. The .rst chapter proposes a theoretical framework with search and matching frictions and trade unions and shows how wage rigidity arises endogenously due to the behavior of unions. The second chapter tests these predictions empirically, using a panel of U.S. industries over the period 1987-2000. The results confirm the predictions that wages are less correlated with productivity when collectively bargained. The intensi.cation of the countercyclicality of the labor share is at the core of the mechanism. The third chapter proposes a model with wage posting and investigates how them onopsonistic power of firmse volves along the cycle. The consequences in terms of wage dispersion are examined. The .rst chapter of the dissertation proposes a dynamic model of the labor marketwhichintegratestwomainfeatures: matchingfrictionsandtradeunions. To examine how trade unions shape the volatility of wages over the business cycle, I decompose the volatility of wages into two components: the volatility of the match surplus and the volatility of the e.ective bargaining power. Formally, I de.ne the e.ective bargaining power of the union as the share of the total surplus allocated to the workers. Starting from the union’s objective function, I prove that its e.ective bargaining power is endogenous and countercyclical. Intuitively, because the union internalizes the relationship between the wage level and the job creation, it faces a trade-o. between the wage rate and the employment rate. Therefore, the union’s preferences (wage-oriented or employment-oriented) fluctuate along the cycle and so does its effective bargaining power. As a result, when the economy is hit by a productivity shock, the dynamics of the union’s effective bargaining power partially counteract the dynamics of the total surplus and this mechanism delivers wage rigidity. I specify a model in which a non unionized sector, where wages are negotiated through a standard individual Nash bargaining, coexists with a unionized sector. In the model calibrated with U.S. data, I .nd that a positive productivity shock leads, on impact, to a compression of the union wage premium, followed by a steady increase of this premium as the proportion of employed workers in the trade unions increases. Relatedly, employment reacts stronger when wages are collectively bargained, but its pattern features less persistence
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Palacios, Indira Huber Evelyne. "Decentralized collective bargaining a study of labor union power in Chile, 1990-2004 /." Chapel Hill, N.C. : University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2006. http://dc.lib.unc.edu/u?/etd,603.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2006.Title from electronic title page (viewed Oct. 10, 2007). "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy in the Department of Political Science." Discipline: Political Science; Department/School: Political Science.
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Dasgupta, Poulomi. "Essays on Intra-Household Bargaining Power of Women in India." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/73304.
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This thesis investigates the factors that affect women's bargaining power within the household, in India. The first chapter introduces the literature on household bargaining mostly by describing how household outcomes like children's health indicators and expenditure pattern change with increase in resources under women's control. The second chapter describes the conceptual framework for intra-household bargaining. It discusses the two broad topics – household bargaining models and gendered institutions, that can be used to identify avenues for increasing women's bargaining power within the household.
In chapters three and four, I analyze the factors that determine women's power position, using data on women's involvement in household decision making from a nationally representative longitudinal household survey (India Human Development Survey). The survey was conducted in over 40,000 Indian households, which covers over 200,000 individuals.
In the third chapter, I investigate the effect of women's labor force participation on her involvement in household decision making. After addressing the issues of endogeneity using a fixed effects model, I find that her labor market participation significantly increases her involvement in decision making process, which can be seen as a direct outcome of her increased bargaining power.
In my fourth chapter I analyze whether the women's bargaining power within the household increases with the presence of female politicians at both state and local level. Studying the causal impact of a variable like female political representation is generally riddled with concerns of endogeneity for existence of voter preference. Using share of seats won by women in man-woman close elections as an instrument for overall female representation in in a fixed effect model, I show that an increase in number of female state legislators can actually lead to an increase in the bargaining power of women. This chapter further shows that increase in women's involvement in decision making process in the household is also associated with the female political representation at local level.
The fifth chapter concludes the dissertation by making policy recommendation for strengthening women's bargaining position within the household.Ph. D.
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Carneiro, Francisco Galrao. "Labour market institutions, insider power and informal employment in Brazilian wage determination : 1980-1993." Thesis, University of Kent, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.308838.
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Jarl, Johan. "Return to loyalty : New patterns of cooperation in the Swedish labour market regime." Thesis, Växjö University, School of Social Sciences, 2009. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:vxu:diva-5806.
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This study aims at defining the development of the macro/meso level Swedish labourmarket regime during the last decade. This includes the effect of structural changesand what development tendencies exist. For this purpose three questions have beenformulated:1. How can the macro/meso level relations between the labour market organizations of the bargainingrounds since 1997 be described using the concepts exit, voice and loyalty as an interpretation oforganizational choices?2. How can the changing relations between the labour market organizations be explained?3. Based on this, how can the present labour market regime be defined?For this purpose the concept of labour market regimes is used. The interactionbetween actors in this is interpreted through a cooperative game theory coupled withthe concepts exit, voice, loyalty. Exit means the actors leaving the system,corresponding to the negotiation game threats. Voice means negotiation conflictresolution. Loyalty both correspond to coalition patterns and forces keeping theregime in place. Material is informant interviews with key actors and officialdocuments from bargaining and negotiation. The results of the study are that therelations have been stabilized by the IA of 1997, since which the development istowards increased peak-level organizational involvement. Because of labour marketfragmentation this takes the form in confederation coordination between differentparties. To conceptualize this I propose the concept peak-level coordinatedbargaining. In this the coalition development is towards the reemergence of oldloyalty patterns and the inclusion of new actors in this system. To explain this pathdependency due to well established loyalties and actor continuity is suggested.
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Skipton, Susan Margaret. "Collective bargaining and pay equity : a study of pay equity bargaining in two Canadian provinces." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1995. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/4190/.
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The aim of this study was to explore the interrelationship between collective bargaining and pay equity. A qualitative case study methodology was used. Eighty-six interviews were conducted with union and management pay equity negotiators, labour lawyers, Pay Equity Commission Review Officers, and other informants. A collection of documentary evidence supplemented these interviews. The empirical work focused on explaining issues of structure, style and power in pay equity bargaining and the complex intertwinings of the structural properties of gender and class were considered crucial to an explanation of these. The key structural dynamic in the negotiation of pay equity was found to be the degree and effectiveness of a labour-feminist politic combined with employer/state commitment, which are themselves interconnected and represent the transformative face of gender and class power relations. The thesis, in providing a theoretically informed discussion of detailed case study material, contributes towards the debate on the effectiveness of collective bargaining as a vehicle for implementing equal pay policy. It also informs the debate on labour-management cooperation in labour relations, especially in public sector collective bargaining. Because legislated pay equity is bargained within a new set of legal parameters, the study may also aid our understanding of the relationship between collective bargaining and the law. Finally, the thesis attempts to unravel the interwoven complexities of gender and class power relations in the collective bargaining process.
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Yu, Zhixian. "Bargaining and contribution games with deadlines." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2018. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50610/.
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This thesis considers play in bargaining games subject to Endogenous Commitment and in contribution games with a sunk cost. In bargaining games, Endogenous Commitment (EC) describes a common feature in negotiation: once an offer is made, neither would the proposer offer nor would the respondent accept anything worse. Similarly, in contribution games, the notion of sunk cost implies an irrevocability similar to EC: it is impossible for either contributor to reduce his or her contribution, so far as the cost is sunk. Another similarity between the bargaining and contribution games in our thesis is that we assume (most of) them to be finite, meaning that there is a deadline effect: when approaching the deadline, the final negotiator/contributor has a stronger incentive to reach an agreement/complete the project. The deadline effect puts the final negotiator/contributor in a relatively weaker position. With these two similarities, the bargaining and contribution games in our thesis share some similar features. In the first chapter, we conduct a literature review. In the second chapter, we study two player alternating finite/infinite bargaining games with Endogenous Commitment. In both cases, the outcomes are affected by the assumption of EC. In the third chapter, we apply Endogenous Commitment in bargaining games with protocols involving uncertainty. The settlement timings then exhibit a U-shaped pattern: players reach an agreement at the first or the last stage of the game. In the fourth chapter, we turn to contribution games with sunk cost and heterogeneous valuations. We show that a minor difference in valuation could affect the total welfare significantly. In our thesis, we adopt several settings in all chapters. As all models include two players, we refer to player 1 as male and to player 2 as female for convenience. When no specific player is referred to, we use i and j to indicate the two players, assuming i to be male and j to be female. When player 1 makes an offer (in bargaining games) or makes a contribution (in contribution games) in stage t (t\in[1,2,...T], T is the length of the game), we denote it as x_{t}; and when player 2 does so, we denote it as y_{t}. Similarly, we denote player i's and player j's choice as m_{t} and n_{t}.
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Gómez, Natalia González. "Three essays on bargaining : On refutability of the Nash bargaining solution; On inter- and intra-party politics; A bargaining model with strategic generosity." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2012. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/56815/.
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This dissertation is a collection of three essays that share one common feature: all three of them relate to the literature on Bargaining. The first and second essay are joint work with my supervisor, Professor Andrés Carvajal. In our first essay we investigate the testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution. We develop polynomial tests of the NBS under different hypothesis about the default levels. For instance, with, and without observation from the outside econometrician of the levels of utility that the individuals would have obtained outside the negotiation. We use the Tarski-Seindenberg algorithm to characterize rationalizable data as those that satisfy a finite system of polynomial inequalities. In our second essay we introduce a new equilibrium concept for games of political competition. We model electoral competition within each party, assuming inner-party members have somewhat conflicting preferences. By using the bargaining protocol à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989) we explicitly model party members’ strategic interactions, their incentives and their decision of whom to elect. Our equilibrium concept attempts to model each member’s decision as if each player were uncertain about, (i) the faction that will eventually dominate the decision made by the other party and (ii) the faction that will dominate in the party’s nomination. In the last essay I focus on one of the classical problems in bargaining: the divide the dollar problem. In our framework we assume players’ utility functions mirror selfish and Rawlsian preferences. We derive the set of subgame perfect equilibria for different arrangements of player types and study why strategic generosity emerges under the bargaining protocol we assume.
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Scarpa, Carlo. "Industry regulation when firms have bargaining power." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.305013.
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Wells, Dominic. "From Collective Bargaining to Collective Begging: State Expansion and Restriction of Collective Bargaining Rights in the Public Sector." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2018. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1522790947706508.
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Gao, Qianyun. "Parental Bargaining and Gender Gap in Primary Education Expenditure." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2017. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1696.
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This paper examines the gender gap in human capital investment in India from the perspective of intra-household bargaining. I test whether the existing gender disparity in bargaining power, in the form of educational attainment of parents, contributes to the differences in educational expenditure between sons and daughters. As the proxy for bargaining power, fathers’ and mothers’ educational attainments both have a positive impact on the human capital investment for the children, but the gender gap widens with fathers’ education and narrows with mothers’. The results are robust controlling for additional variables such as age, number of siblings, household income, caste and location. These findings suggest that mothers may have a preference for daughters’ education. When their bargaining power rises, families tend to spend more equal amounts on the education of daughters and sons. Policies aiming at improving gender equality in education should take into account the decision-making process.
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Sung, Hankyoung. "Essays on veto bargaining games." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1149696640.
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Aniol, Deborah. "The Inequality of bargaining power in consumer contracts." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/53151.
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Freedom and sanctity of contract are principles well found in our law, however, true freedom of contract has become undermined with the increased use of standard-form contracts and this has an effect on equality. An important feature of the supreme law of the country, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, is the principle of equality, which is provided for in section 9. The application of this principle has a significant effect on contract law. Inequality of bargaining power occurs when the terms and provisions of a contract are unfair, unjust and unreasonable. This is the case when a term is excessively one-sided or provides for a provision that is adverse to the consumer. The case is the same where one party is afforded greater protection while the other is defenseless. There is a possibility that the Consumer Protection Act, 68 of 2008 (the CPA ), in trying to promote equal bargaining power, has caused the opposite to happen. The consumer has now been afforded with greater protection and more rights. It is perhaps possible to conclude that, whether the contract will continue is now more strongly determined by the consumer, even though the supplier has fulfilled his obligations in terms of the CPA. A party to a contract who enjoys a large amount of bargaining power in comparison to the other party to the contract may be able to persuade others to act while they themselves do very little or nothing at all.Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2015.
Private Law
LLM
Unrestricted
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Chan, Bing-tai. "Collective bargaining in the Hong Kong public service : a study of Post Office Staff Unions /." [Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong], 1990. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B12816966.
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Wentz, Aric D. "The potential for successful application of interest based bargaining in public sector labor negotiations." Instructions for remote access. Click here to access this electronic resource. Access available to Kutztown University faculty, staff, and students only, 2004. http://www.kutztown.edu/library/services/remote_access.asp.
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Thesis (M.P.A. )--Kutztown University of Pennsylvania, 2004.Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-06, page: 2964. Typescript. Abstract precedes thesis as 1 preliminary leaf ( iii ). Includes bibliographical references ( leaves 106-109 ).
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Schwartzrock, Karen D. "The impact of state labor relations policy on teacher collective bargaining /." view abstract or download file of text, 2003.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2003.Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 213-225). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.
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Oodit, Sharlaine. "A review of the collective bargaining system in the public service with specific reference to the general public service sector bargaining council (GPSSBC)." Thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10948/d1021029.
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ollective bargaining continues to play a prominent role in shaping employment relations in South Africa, without which the individual worker is powerless and in a weaker bargaining position against his employer. Collective bargaining can be described as an interactive process that resolves disputes between the employer and employee. In South Africa the advent of democracy was accompanied by numerous interventions to level the historically uneven bargaining field. Therefore in examining the history of collective bargaining in South Africa it is necessary to reflect on the state of labour relations prior and post the 1994 democratic elections. The study provides an overview of the practices and processes of public service collective bargaining in the old and new public service. The public sector accounts for a very significant proportion of employment in all countries around the globe, South Africa is no exception. Although the state as employer is in a stronger position than its private sector counterpart, the public employee is potentially also in a stronger position than its private sector counterpart. A defining characteristic of most government activity and services is that they are the ones available to the public. This means that industrial action which disrupts such services has a very significant impact on the public, serving as a substantial leverage in collective bargaining. The bargaining councils in the public sector which ensure the effectiveness of collective bargaining are maintained, are examined to provide a comprehensive understanding of the workings of these institutions. Some of the gains and challenges are also explored to provide a holistic picture of state of collective bargaining in public service. A comparison of countries seeks to analyse and compare globally the developments of collective bargaining in public administrations. The different political systems around the world have developed various labour relations processes in the public service, an examination of the approaches and mechanisms provides alternative ways of doing things. Recommendations are made regarding the changes that need to be made, as well as matters, which need to be analysed and examined further.
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Johnston, Robert L. "Collective action and changes in wage labor." Diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1985. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/54452.
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This study attempted to address the relative merits of the Weberian and Structural Marxist perspectives for explaining changes in the distribution of wage labor. The findings of the study suggested that many of the common assumptions held by Weberians and Structural Marxists concerning the effects of technological growth, increasing bureaucratization of production, increasing concentration of capital, and growth in the ranks of white-collar workers are not supported with data on manufacturing industries in the post-war era. Moreover, this study introduced collective action as an important determinant for explaining changes in the labor process and in the distribution of wage labor. The findings indicate that workers collective action enhances our understanding of labor process development and changes in wage labor. And, the findings suggest that the struggle between workers and capitalists is vital to understanding the process of capitalist development since World War II, contrary to the popularly held beliefs of many post-industrial theorists.Ph. D.
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Molina, Hugo. "Essays on vertical relationships, bargaining power, and competition policy." Thesis, Université Paris-Saclay (ComUE), 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018SACLX020/document.
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Dans de nombreuses industries, les producteurs doivent passer par des intermédiaires afin de distribuer leurs produits sur les marchés. Par exemple, dans le secteur de la grande distribution alimentaire, les producteurs vendent leurs produits à des distributeurs qui ont un accès direct aux consommateurs finaux; dans les secteurs de la santé, les fournisseurs de soins médicaux (e.g., les hôpitaux) traitent avec les assureurs afin d’avoir accès aux patients. Toutes ces industries sont souvent caractérisées par une structure oligopolistique bilatérale avec un petit nombre d'entreprises opérant sur les deux côtés du marché, impliquant des relations commerciales complexes entre les acteurs. En effet, les externalités contractuelles sont omniprésentes dans ce type d’environnement puisque la valeur générée par une transaction et partagée entre un fabricant et un détaillant dépend généralement des décisions contractuelles des autres entreprises opérant sur le marché. Un certain nombre de pratiques, communément appelées « restrictions verticales », peuvent également survenir, telles que des contrats d'exclusivité, des pratiques de ventes liées, ou bien des fixations de prix de revente. En outre, les conditions tarifaires sont principalement déterminées par un processus de négociation entre les entreprises. L’objet de ma recherche consiste à analyser comment les relations verticales entre entreprises dans un contexte aussi complexe que celui des oligopoles bilatéraux peuvent avoir un impact sur le surplus du consommateur et le bon fonctionnement de l’industrie. Dans le premier chapitre de ma thèse, j’élabore un modèle d’économétrie structurelle afin d’analyser empiriquement les relations producteur- distributeur dans des oligopoles bilatéraux avec produits différenciés. L’approche contraste avec la plupart des méthodes empiriques antérieures et permet d’identifier la division du surplus entre les entreprises sans la nécessité d’avoir des données sur les contrats de gros et les coûts marginaux des firmes. Le deuxième chapitre se concentre sur l’étude des effets générés par la formation d’alliances entre distributeurs pour négocier des tarifs communs et acheter des produits auprès de leurs fournisseurs. En utilisant des données d’achats sur les eaux embouteillées réalisés par un panel de consommateurs représentatif de la population Française, j'estime un modèle structurel de demande et d'offre. Je réalise ensuite des simulations pour étudier les effets de trois alliances formées par des distributeurs dans le secteur de la distribution alimentaire en France. Les résultats montrent que le pouvoir de négociation des distributeurs est affaibli, le profit total de l'industrie diminue, et que les consommateurs finaux font face à des prix plus élevés. Le troisième chapitre de cette thèse analyse la pratique du «full-line forcing» comme mécanisme d’éviction sur les marchés verticalement liées. Je considère un modèle dans lequel un producteur multi-produit offre une marque leader et une marque secondaire sur laquelle il est en concurrence avec une entreprise plus efficace. Le modèle permet de mettre en évidence que le « full-line forcing » est une stratégie de négociation efficace car elle permet au producteur multi-produit d’influer sur les points de menace dans les négociations et d’imposer son portefeuille de marques sur les étagères du distributeur, excluant ainsi le producteur concurrent. Cette stratégie émerge à l’équilibre sous trois conditions : (i) la marque leader de l’entreprise multi-produit est suffisamment forte, (ii) son inefficacité sur la marque secondaire n’est pas trop sévère, et (iii) le fournisseur concurrent est assez puissant dans sa négociation avec le distributeur. Les résultats suggèrent que les consommateurs finaux et le bien-être total peuvent être réduit alors que, dans certains cas, le distributeur bénéficie d’une telle stratégie d’évictionIn many economic environments, producers need to deal with intermediaries to supply their products on markets. Examples include grocery markets in which food manufacturers sell their products to retailers who have direct access to final consumers; pharmaceutical industries where manufacturers distribute their drugs on markets through drugstores; multichannel television industries where cable channels sell their programs to multichannel video program distributors who then charge fees to consumers; private healthcare sectors in which medical providers (e.g., hospitals) deal with insurers to have access to sick patients. One particular feature of such industries is that they are often characterized by a bilateral oligopolistic structure with a small number of firms operating on both sides of the market, resulting in complex vertical relationships. Contracting externalities are indeed intrinsic to such environments because the value generated by a transaction and shared between a manufacturer and a retailer generally depends on the contracting decisions of other firms operating on the market. A number of practices, commonly referred to as vertical restraints, may also arise such as exclusive dealing, bundling and tying, resale price maintenance, or quantity discounts. Furthermore, trading terms are mostly determined through a bargaining process between upstream and downstream firms rather than being fixed by one-side of the market. My research consists in analyzing how vertical relationships between firms in such complex settings impact consumer surplus and total welfare. To this end, I rely on both theoretical models and empirical methods to derive predictions of the effects of contractual arrangements within the supply chain. In the first chapter of this dissertation I design a structural framework to analyze manufacturer-retailer relationships in bilateral oligopolies with differentiated products. Our approach contrasts with most prior empirical models of bargaining and allows to identify the division of surplus between firms without data on wholesale contracts and marginal costs. The second chapter investigates the economic effects of alliances formed by retailers to negotiate common prices and purchase products from manufacturers. I use household- level scanner data on bottled water purchases and estimate a structural model of demand and supply. I perform simulations to study the economic effects of three buyer alliances that have been formed by competing retailers in the French food retail sector. Results show that the bargaining power of retailers is weakened, total industry profit decreases, and final consumers face higher prices. The third chapter examines the case of full-line forcing as a foreclosure device in vertically related markets. We consider a setting in which a multi-product manufacturer offers a leading brand and a secondary brand for which it competes with a more efficient single-product firm. We show that full-line forcing is an efficient bargaining strategy as it allows the multi-product manufacturer to affect threat points and impose its brand portfolio on the retailer’s shelves therefore excluding the rival supplier. This strategy arises in equilibrium under three conditions (i) the leading brand of the multi- product firm is strong enough, (ii) the inefficiency on the secondary brand is not too severe, and (iii) the rival supplier is powerful enough in its bargaining with the retailer. Our results suggest that final consumers and total welfare may be harmed whereas, in some cases, the retailer benefits from such a foreclosure strategy
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Stendal, Grant. "The politics of productivity bargaining : the two-tier wage system case /." Title page, contents and abstract only, 1994. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09PH/09phs825.pdf.
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Louw, Melt. "Unequal bargaining power : time to reconsider the exceptio doli generalis?" Diss., University of Pretoria, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/73457.
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An overview of the concept of unequal bargaining power in the realm of contract law and if, when bargaining power is abused, the exceptio doli generalise offered an acceptable remedy.Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoriua, 2019.
Private Law
LLM
Unrestricted
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Nim, Asger. "The Danish Labor Movement’s Mobilization on Twitter during the Collective Bargaining in 2018." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för informatik och media, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-392288.
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This thesis explores the Danish labor movement’s use of Twitter during the collective bargaining in spring 2018 from a mobilisation perspective. This is done to investigate 1) the form of contentious politics practiced by the Danish labor movement, and 2) the role of trade unions in the Danish labor movement. One specific hashtag, #ok18, is analyzed. This investigation mainly builds on framing theory as developed by Snow & Benford (1986; 2000) and its connection to the logic of collective action, and the logic of connective action developed by Bennet & Segerberg (2013). Three methods were used to analyze the labor movement on Twitter: a social network analysis of @mentions, semantic network analyses of Twitter streams, and a quantitative content analysis. This study finds that the most important and central actors within the labor movement on Twitter are trade unions. Nothing indicates that Danish public employees used Twitter to organize independently of trade unions. Furthermore, the labor movement used Twitter to articulate collective action frames that served as shared “schemata of interpretation” for the collective bargaining. In addition, several framing processes that changed the collective action frames were identified. These results all indicate that the labor movement’s mobilisation on Twitter during the collective bargaining of 2018 is best described by the logic of collective action. There were no indications of personalization of politics or of an increased symbolical inclusiveness. The successful mobilisation in Spring 2018 might therefore be interpreted, with the big proviso that that this study only investigates Twitter, as the first small steps towards a revitalization of conventional trade union politics in Denmark.
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Redae, Mehari. "Privatisation in Ethiopia : the challenge it poses to unionisation and collective bargaining." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2015. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/70936/.
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The thesis explores the challenge Ethiopia as a developing country faces in responding to issues associated with economic liberalisation on the one hand and the protection and promotion of ‘core’ labour rights on the other. In order to closely examine the issue, privatisation and the collective aspects of labour rights have been considered for analysis. More specifically, the status of unionisation and collective bargaining in the privatised enterprises in Ethiopia has been examined through the medium of case studies. The literature on privatisation and labour examined the adverse effect of privatisation from the perspective of the job losses associated with it. The contribution of this thesis is its contention that job loss associated with privatisation, if any, is a short-term and an individualised issue. There are rather other concerns to the labour force associated with privatisation which are long-lasting, issue of collectivity and with broader implications. Privatisation programme has been put into effect since the early 1980s in a more noticeable manner in terms of pace and scope in developing countries owing to, at times, external prescription from multilateral lending and donor institutions to privatise State-owned enterprises as far and as fast as possible. Responding positively to such a donor prescription brings with it a financial and technical assistance from these institutions in addition to the perception that investment would be attracted and retained with liberalised economic policy. Ethiopia has embarked upon the actual implementation of the privatisation programme since 1995. Side by side to this, at the international level, freedom of association and collective bargaining has attained special status in the ILO jurisprudence since the adoption of the 1998 ILO Declaration. In fact, in the Ethiopian context, these labour rights have been incorporated into Ethiopian law by ratifying the relevant ILO conventions by the country in 1963. Moreover, they have been enshrined in the country’s Constitution since 1995 providing them a constitutional law status. These State actions formally impose international and national obligation on Ethiopia to respect, protect and promote the rights. In terms of labour profile, the privatisation programme, as an aspect of economic liberalisation, expects a liberal and flexible labour market. However, such flexibility is criticised of directly or indirectly eroding labour standards including the rights to unionisation and collective bargaining. Thus this state of affairs places Ethiopian policy makers in a dilemma on how to address both sides of the concerns and interests. The dilemma has been reflected in the ambivalent position the country’s law making, implementation and interpretation activities manifested themselves.
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Massey, James. "Essays on the use of commitment and tough negotiation tactics in bargaining." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2014. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/67175/.
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This thesis analyses the role of commitment in bargaining. Chapter 1 looks at how players could use finite length commitment to affect the bargaining model in a multiperiod model. The idea of this is to complement the existing literature on infinite length commitment. In line with the infinite commitment literature, a rational player can mimic a commitment type to gain a considerable advantage, although, as will be seen, there are key differences. Chapter 2 analyses whether one should take the opportunity to commit oneself when the opponent does not perfectly observe the decision taken. Logically, if one’s opponent sees no difference between a bluff and actual commitment then one may as well bluff, since the opponent acts the same and committing is a needless sacrifice of freedom. When the opponent may discover a bluff as such, the situation is far less clear and this Chapter analyses when a commitment outcome is likely to prevail. Chapter 3 takes a rather different approach and analyses how hard one should negotiate when there are other parties who may enter the deal. The general finding is that one should follow the crowd and act the same way as everyone else. All three chapters heavily use the mathematical tool of game theory. However, while Chapter 1 uses non-cooperative game theory, the analysis of Chapters 2 and 3 primarily use evolutionary game theory.
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Cheng, Lin. "Organized Labor and Debt Contracting." The Ohio State University, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1343146465.
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Qotoyi, Thanduxolo. "Dismissals within the context of collective bargaining." Thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10948/1039.
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Competitive forces in the market force employers to change the way they operate their businesses. The changes that employers have to make often demand an alteration of the employees’ terms and conditions of employment. By law employers are not permitted to unilaterally effect changes to the employee’s terms and conditions of employment. They have to obtain the consent of the affected employees. This is where collective bargaining fits in. The employer has to negotiate with the employees. One way in which through the process of collective bargaining an employer can exert pressure on the employees to accept the changes is to effect a lock-out. Under the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 within the context of a lock-out, an employer was permitted to use conditional dismissal as a bargaining weapon. This conditional dismissal had to be coupled with an offer of reemployment should the employees accept an employer’s demand. In essence, the lock-out had a bite in the form of the conditional dismissal. This made the lock-out quite effective. The 1995 Labour Relations Act prohibits in no uncertain terms the use of a dismissal as a means of compelling employees to accept an employer’s demand in any matter of mutual interest. Within the collective bargaining context, dismissal is not a legitimate option. The employer only has the lock-out as a tool of compulsion. The definition of a lock-out in terms of this Act does not accommodate the use of dismissal. This makes the lock-out option to be less potent than it was under the 1956 Labour Relations Act. However, employers are permitted to dismiss on operational grounds, provided that they follow a fair procedure. Terms and conditions of employment greatly feature in the operational requirements of a business. If the employees’ terms and conditions of employment are not responsive to the operational requirements of the business and they are unwilling to accept changes to those terms, the employer has the right to dismiss them. The employer will not be dismissing the employees as a way of inducing them to accept the changes. He will instead be dismissing them on the basis of operational requirements. iv The question that then arises is how should a dismissal that is intended to compel employees to accept an employers demand (falling within section 187(1)(c) of the 1995 Labour Relations Act be distinguished from a dismissal that is genuinely based on operational requirements as contemplated by section 188(1)(a)(ii). Doesn’t the fact that section 187(1)(c) explicitly prohibits the use of dismissal within the context of collective bargaining give rise to some tension with section 188(1)(a)(ii) which categorically gives employers the right to dismiss on operational grounds. The decision of the Labour Appeal Court in Fry’s Metals v NUMSA has stated that there is no tension whatsoever between the two sections. The court has also ruled that the dismissals that are hit by section 187(1)(c) are those dismissals that are accompanied by an offer of reemployment. According to the court, this offer is indicative of the real purpose of the employer, namely to compel employees to accept his demand. Dismissals not accompanied by an offer of re-employment are on the other hand a true reflection of the fact that the employer is indeed dismissing the employees for operational requirements. This literal interpretation of the meaning and scope of section 187(1)(c) has the potential of opening the floodgates. Instead of resorting to the use of the lock-out to secure the agreement of employees in the collective bargaining process, employers now have a potent tool in the form of a dismissal. As long as the employer makes it abundantly clear that the dismissal is final and irrevocable, he is free from the claws of section 187(1)(c). Given the fact that the lock-out option is not always effective, employers may find it hard to resist the temptation to use the threat of permanent dismissal as a bargaining chip. It is an option that is emasculated by the fact that in an employer initiated lock-out the use of replacement labour is prohibited. The threat of not just a conditional dismissal but a permanent one may force employees to capitulate to the employer’s demand during negotiations. This would effectively render negotiations about changes to terms and conditions of employment a farce. The employer would have an upper hand. The implications of this narrow interpretation are quite far-reaching. The long held view that dismissal is not a legitimate weapon of coercion in the collective bargaining process is under serious challenge. Only conditional dismissals are illegitimate in the collective bargaining v arena. Permanent dismissals are permitted. This negates the very purpose of the collective bargaining process. This study seeks to examine the anomalies that flow from this interpretation of the meaning of section 187(1)(c). The study further investigates if this interpretation is not at odds with what the legislation really intended to achieve by enacting this clause. The study also explores ways in which the sanctity of collective bargaining could be restored. Recommendations are made to that effect.
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Sato, Yasuhiro. "Bargaining Power of Landlords and Underdevelopment in a System of Cities." Blackwell, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/2237/7160.
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Ndackson, Danjuma. "Response to foreign investment regulations in Nigeria : the bargaining power model." Thesis, University of Strathclyde, 1987. http://oleg.lib.strath.ac.uk:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=21495.
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The interest for this research developed from the researcher's observation of host countries' policies (particularly developing countries) towards foreign direct investments. Available literature identify five main categories (though not mutually distinguishable) of host country policies: expropriatory, regulatory, receptive, promotional, and open-door policies. In this research, we are concerned with regulatory (control) policies. The response of MNCs to regulatory policies is identified to comprise of two stages: initial behaviour to 'conflict' (the policy), and the exploitation of (ownership) advantages. An MNC's initial behaviour could be competitive, collaborative, accommodative, compromising, or avoidant. Where the MNC adopts a compromising behaviour, bargaining as a means of resolving the 'conflict' is pursued. Whether this takes place or not in resolving the 'conflict', the MNC is likely to look back (assess) on what its ownership advantages are, vis-a-vis the host-country's location advantages, and then act on the basis of this assessment. Nigeria, like any other host country has economic policies, some of which affect MNCs. These include the Business Permit / Immigration Act, 1963; the Companies Decree, 1968; the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees, 1972 and 1977; the Local Sourcing Policy; etc. This research considers the factors influencing the response of MNCs to three of these policies: indigenization of ownership; nigerianization of management; and the local sourcing of raw materials. Four host-country characteristics and five MNC characteristics were hypothetically chosen as influential in the firms' response to each of the policies. The host country characteristics are: Nigeria's market attractiveness, availability of needed raw materials in Nigeria, availability of required human resources in Nigeria, and competition in the firm's industry in Nigeria. The MNC characteristics are: the firm's technological intensity, export intensity, complexity of managerial and operational tasks, size, and age. The major research findings are: (a) Most of the firms in the sample were collaborative in their behaviour in all the policies. (b) The most important (actually, the only) host country characteristic that significantly influenced the response of firms to the policies was Nigeria's market attractiveness. (c) The most important MNC characteristic that influenced the firms' response to the policies was their technology. (d) Contrary to popular opinion, this research found that important MNC characteristics encouraged or made firms to remain in Nigeria as well as comply with government policy, rather than making them arrogant or delay compliance. (e) All the firms in the study indicated that they had complied with the policies. Survey results were complemented with case studies. And the findings from the cases support all the above.
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Yang, Min Li. "Bargaining power, ownership and control of international joint ventures in Taiwan." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2006. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1443/.
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This thesis provides an empirical analysis of international joint venture activities in Taiwan. The primary purpose is to examine control and its antecedents in terms of ownership, bargaining power, resources contribution, and motivation for forming international joint ventures. Primary data collected by a mail questionnaire is analysed along five core dimensions of international joint venture activities. First, the mechanism, focus, and extent of parent control is identified and tested in a number of sample characteristics. These empirical results also reveal that most joint ventures in Taiwan have higher autonomy and have more autonomy on the appointment of key function managers. Parent firms seek to focus their control over specific activities of the joint ventures rather than attempting to control the entire range of joint venture activities. Second, the results of equity shares held by the host country parents and foreign parents show that both parents have minority shareholding in the joint ventures. A higher ownership by the parents in joint ventures indicates that they have a higher percentage of board members. Third, the relative importance of a set of bargaining power is identified with hypothesis testing of the relationship between control and bargaining power. There is little evidence that the relationship between bargaining power and control is not closely associated. Fourth, the relative importance of resource contribution by parents is identified and hypotheses are tested on the relationship between control and resource contribution factors. The results are strongly supported that the relationships between resource contributions in terms of physical, invisible, financial, human, and organizational ability of parents and their control has significant and positive associations. Fifth, the relative importance of a set of motives for international joint venture formation is identified and hypotheses are tested on the relationship between control and motivation factors in terms of technological acquisition, knowledge learning, risk sharing, competitive strategy consideration, resource complementarily, market expansion. The findings reveal a limited number of significant correlations between motivation factors and control.
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Oliphant, Lukhanyo Shane. "The right to engage in collective bargaining." Thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10948/19463.
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The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) was formulated by consensus from Government, Labour and Business. The advent of the new democratic dispensation brought with it the need to bring reforms to the country’s repressive labour laws, which were the hallmarks of the former apartheid regime. The new democratic dispensation’s priority was to ensure that the laws governing the employment relationship were again in line, with the International Labour Organization’s requirements (ILO). The consolidation of the country’s labour laws became critical for the new democratic dispensation because it became imperative that labour laws, once and for all became inclusive of all South Africa’s working force. During this post democratic period South Africa has been able to bring this consolidation to our regulatory framework through democratizing labour relations. This has meant that all organized workers for the first time after 1995, could have access to collective bargaining. South Africa has also enjoyed a period of relative labour stability during this period but only until recently, has the institution of collective bargaining been under the severest attack. This contestation in this labour regime is about the constitutional right to engage in collective bargaining. It has become of paramount importance to understand the meaning of this right to engage in collective bargaining, how far does this right extend to organized employees and most importantly what are now the impediments to the realization of this right? This is a broad and a very important topic in our labour law jurisprudence. The rationale for this treatise is to articulate the right to engage in collective bargaining, amid recent developments. At the same time to probe whether or not a justiciable duty to bargain in good faith (legally enforceable duty), should be reintroduced in our collective bargaining framework. This would be an option in reestablishing this institution in the face of insurmountable challenges, particularly as far as managing the conduct of bargaining parties during the collective bargaining process. The LRA does not envision such a legally enforceable duty to bargain in our labour relations framework, preferring rather apolicy based on voluntarism. The LRA has instead created a legally recognized framework were bargaining parties, determine their own collective process, without undue interference from the state and the courts. This has been the position since the inception of the new democratic order.Times have changed constitutional challenges have been mounting against provisions of the LRA, which have been deemed by some as unconstitutional. This is reference to the inaccessibility of the collective bargaining process; relating directly to the right to engage in collective bargaining.The disjuncture between the Constitution and the enabling legislation the LRA will also be scrutinized, as the result has been confusion regarding the meaning and the application of this constitutional right to engage in collective bargaining.
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Fourcade, Cécile. "L' autonomie collective des partenaires sociaux : essai sur les rapports entre démocratie politique et démocratie sociale /." Paris : LGDJ, 2006. http://www.gbv.de/dms/spk/sbb/recht/toc/523123817.pdf.
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Doiron, Denise J. "Wage and employment contracts as equilibria to a bargaining game : an empirical analysis." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1987. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/27001.
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The object of this research is to study how unions and firms divide the surplus or rents available to them. Many instruments are used in practice to make this division, but standard micro data only includes two: wages and employment. I use a new approach to study wage and employment contracts as I consider them equilibrium points in a noncooperative bargaining game.
This work is an extension of wage-employment determination models, the extension being the incorporation of a bargaining model, specifically, a Rubinstein bargaining game. Given the objective functions of the two players, the wage and employment equations are specified by the equilibrium conditions for the game. Also, additional determinants of the contracts are identified. One of the characteristics of the model is that the wage and employment contracts are affected by the relative strike costs of the two negotiating parties even in the absence of strikes.
The data involve the B.C. wood products industry and the IWA, a powerful union believed to have been successful at capturing rents. The data include input and output quantities and prices and equations representing input demands and output supply are estimated simultaneously with the negotiated wage and employment equations. Four estimation models are derived corresponding to two bargaining frameworks and two sets of assumptions on the firms' technology. The two bargaining frameworks correspond to two polar cases that have been assumed in the wage-employment determination literature: in one case, the wage is set through bargaining while the employment level is chosen by the firm, in the second case, both the wage and employment level are negotiated. In one pair of models, output is treated as exogenous to the bargaining while in the second set of models, output is endogenous and capital is exogenous.
The bargaining game is successfully implemented in the sense that technology and union utility parameters are generally reasonable and comparable to previous estimates. Also, the determinants of relative strike costs enter significantly in the estimation. The union is seen to care about employment as well as the wage with slightly more weight being placed on the employment level. Rent maximization is always rejected. Bargaining powers are calculated at each data point and results indicate that the 1980's recession increased the relative power of the union. The hypotheses of equal bargaining powers and complete union bargaining power are tested and rejected. Also, the proportion of rents captured by the firm is found to be a poor indicator of its bargaining power.
Although the qualitative results mentioned above are robust across the four models, parameter values are generally sensitive to both the technology assumptions and the bargaining framework. Ignoring the simultaneity of wages, employment and other variables chosen by the firm can be very misleading. Finally, the model in which both wages and employment are negotiated consistently performs better than the framework in which employment is unilaterally set by the firm.Arts, Faculty of
Vancouver School of Economics
Graduate
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Zhang, Fan. "Regional disparity in homeownership, investment choice, and intra-household bargaining : evidence from Chinese household surveys." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2018. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/52103/.
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This thesis contains three studies that provide theoretical and empirical evidence on household decisions in housing and investment portfolios in China, using 2010-2014 data from the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS). The first study investigates regional disparities in homeownership and value of owner-occupied housing in Chinese cities by using panel data from 2010-2014 CFPS. The results show that demographic characteristics actively shape the housing outcomes of urban households in different regions. The results also reveal development trajectories of regional economies. The findings indicate that while urban households benefit from an emerging population and an enormous growth in the private sector in the Eastern and Central regions, in the Northeastern region households are hindered in homeownership by an ageing population and an economy dominated by oversized but inefficient state-owned enterprises (SoEs). The second study adopts a nested logit approach, applying three data sets from the 2010-2014 CFPS. This approach explores how household investment choice differs with personal and household characteristics (e.g., such as health, demographic features, and institutional factors) across the broad investment categories of financial assets, private businesses, and real estate. I also employ a sub-sample from the 2012 CFPS that is restricted to parental households to examine how parenthood alters household investment decisions by building a binomial logistic model. The empirical results show that migration and income have a positive effect on investment decisions in the nested logit models. The evidence from the subsample finds that there are significant differences in the impact of demographic composition between investment categories. Using the 2010-2014 CFPS panel data, the third study investigates how household investment holdings vary according to demographic composition and intra-household bargaining strength in urban China. In addition, to explore the allocation of household investment, a further examination is carried out in the fixed-effect model with the specification of the Working-Leser function and in a Tobit model with two limits. Empirical evidence supports the following hypotheses: (a) changes in demographic composition considerably alter household investment holdings; and (b) the existence of a higher proportion of female children is strongly associated with an increase in household investments in financial assets.
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Beck, Steven R. "Computer bargaining in México and Brazil 1970-1990 : dynamic interplay of industry and politics." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2012. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/278/.
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Theories of host country – TNC bargaining seek to explain dependency shifts based on positional assets and relative capabilities. This analysis of the efforts of México and Brazil to promote and direct the development of a national computer industry from 1977 to 1990 reveals a bargaining landscape that is more dynamic than the traditional bargaining model anticipates. This thesis explains the variable nature of bargaining gains and losses by analysing the on-going, complex interplay of political, industry and market forces. Despite industry characteristics that favoured foreign capital, both México and Brazil achieved bargaining gains in the computer industry. Brazilian state actors enticed national finance and industrial groups to invest in the industry, prompted the development of indigenous technological capacity, and limited the market influence of computer transnationals for more than a decade. With more limited policy ambition, support and duration, México had initial success prompting TNC minority joint ventures in microcomputers and extracting concessions from the TNCs for exports. In both cases, however, bargaining gains were not secure; shifts in dependency were not progressive and one-directional. In fact, the study exposes a reverse trend toward greater dependency on foreign capital in both countries. For this reason one may not employ either case to support the obsolescing bargain in high technology industries. This thesis highlights three factors neglected by the traditional bargaining construct: the dynamism of the global computer industry which opened and closed
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O'Brien, Fabius Prince. "Determinants of total bargaining outcomes in the open-shop environment." Diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1986. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/71266.
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Today, labor union membership has dropped to its lowest level in over 40 years. Attempts to boost aggregate union membership through large scale organizing drives have largely failed. This has placed a great deal of pressure on unions to provide services to existing union members. This would seem to be especially true for labor unions operating in right-to-work states where union members can simply quit the union if they are not satisfied with the union's efforts. Accordingly, this project sought to explain the extent to which local unions have been successful in achieving desirable bargaining outcomes for their members through the exercise of bargaining power.
The purpose of this project was to assess the relationship between sources of plant-level bargaining power and changes in collective bargaining outcomes in an open-shop environment. Sources of power were grouped into those over which the union had relatively greater control (strikes, union strength, and decertification attempts) and those over the employer had relatively greater control (bargaining unit employment, plant closure communications, and degree of labor intensity).
A three-page survey questionnaire was employed to collect plant-level data from Virginia and Iowa representing sources of bargaining power relevant to specific time periods to help identify whether sources of bargaining power were more or less effective in securing bargaining outcomes favorable to the local union during episodes of union militancy.
Results demonstrate that strike incidence and union strength, two consistent traditional predictors of various bargaining outcomes were ineffective as sources of union bargaining power at least for these samples. Strike duration did lead to greater bargaining outcomes for union members in Iowa. Decertification activity was so low in these samples that meaningful relationships were not possible. Changes in bargaining unit employment, over which the employer has relatively greater influence were directly related to bargaining outcomes in the Iowa sample of plants which did not experience strikes. In Virginia, the threat of a plant closure by an employer during an impasse lead to lower bargaining outcomes for union members as predicted. The degree of labor intensity was unrelated to changes in bargaining outcomes for either state.
When considering all significant relationships (supportive and nonsupportive), strikes demonstrated a particularly disruptive influence. Research results suggested that future research should consider industrial, union affiliation, and regional differences in plant level studies.Ph. D.
Pages xiv-xix missing.
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Vettori, Stella. "Alternative means to regulate the employment relationship in the changing world of work." [S.l.] : [s.n.], 2005. http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-11082005-142503/.
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Thesis, LLD--University of Pretoria, 2005."Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Laws (LLD) in the Department of Mercantile Law, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria." Includes bibliographical references and index.
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Benjamin, Joy Delorenza. "The 2004 Japanese Professional Baseball Collective Bargaining Negotiations: A Qualitative Case Study." NSUWorks, 2015. http://nsuworks.nova.edu/shss_dcar_etd/13.
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Walton and McKersie (1965) defined relationship patterns as those shared attitudes that are important to negotiators when they are interacting together. In the case of the 2004 Japanese Professional Baseball collective bargaining negotiations, Dabscheck (2006) discussed the major issues and events that led to the two (2) day labor strike. However, his article did not describe how the relationship pattern between the Nippon Professional Baseball (NPB) and the Japanese
Professional Baseball Players Association (JPBPA) changed to facilitate the settlement of the conflict. Along the same vein, researchers (Adair, Brett, & Okumura, 2001; Adair & Brett, 2005; Deck, Farmer, & Zeng, 2009; and Doucet, Jehn, Weldon, & Wang, 2009; Drake, 1995; Neu, 1988; and McDaniel, 2000) attempted to show a link between negotiator behavior from cultural and communication perspectives, however, there was little empirical attention paid to the psychological process, such as thoughts, perceptions, emotions, and attitudes, and its link to negotiator behavior leaving a gap in the existing scholarly literature. To address the gap in Dabscheck's (2006) article and the existing scholarly literature, I utilized Yin's (2009) Case Study Research Approach to qualitative inquiry by analyzing document reviews and engaging collaboratively with research participants through focused interviews to investigate how the relationship pattern in the 2004 Japanese Professional Baseball collective bargaining negotiations changed from the beginning to the end of the conflict if at all.
I found that the NPB and the JPBPA institutional pattern of relationship at the start of the conflict began with a containment-aggression relationship pattern, and over four (4) months, the pattern of relationship did change from containment-aggression to cooperation. Upon further investigation, I found that the NPB and the JPBPA negotiators operated initially in the distributive bargaining sub-process utilizing reinforcement tactics, but over the course of four (4) months, they began to operate in the integrative bargaining sub-process with the utilization of cognitive balance tactics even though the NPB and the JPBPA negotiators never abandoned operating in the distributive bargaining sub-process. In essence, they operated in hybrid distributive and integrative sub-processes at the same time. Moreover, I discovered that the NPB and the JPBPA moved from containment-aggression to cooperation not only because of a change in the NPB's lead negotiator position, but also because of a shared emotional moment between the NPB and the JPBPA negotiators, which initiated a shift away from stalemate. Although environmental factors, such as the media, fans, politicians, and other unions, over the course of four (4) months did not waiver in their support for the resolution of the conflict, the evidence did not directly demonstrate the way that their support and their influence manifested in the collective bargaining negotiations.
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Wilson, Marie Elaine. "Collective bargaining in higher education: A model of statutory constraint." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/185108.
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This dissertation explores the impact of the state public sector legal environment as a determinant of the governance content of faculty collective bargaining agreements. Using content analysis, the legal environment and contractual content are reduced to quantities that may be explored through the lens of population ecology. Legal environment is determined to have a significant impact on the development of contractual content and individual factors of governance and statutory form are identified. Specifically, the statutory scope language and reservation of management rights are seen as the primary environmental forces determining policy and rule issues in contractual content. Further, the relevant temporal element for an ecological model appears to be the tenure of public sector bargaining in each state. National affiliation, institutional type and other temporal variables do not have a significant impact on governance language. Implications and directions for further research are discussed.
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Williams, Sean Phillip. "The Power of Footdragging: Bargaining and Delay in the Federal Confirmations Process." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2008. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1204639921.
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Shin, Seung-hoon. "State and market in Korea : host country bargaining power and FDI policy." Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2007. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/10299/.
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The purpose of this thesis is to detennine what constitutes desirable Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policies for the state in the age of globalisation. The study begins with the realistic assumption that FDI has variable effects on host economies, and that multinational corporations (MNCs) are fundamentally national finns doing business internationally. This assessment of FDI reflects the needs of government efforts to increase their bargaining power vis-a-vis MNCs in order to maximise the positive effects of FDI while minimising its negative effects. Based on this view, I develop a theoretical framework, namely the N eo Bargaining Model (NBM) , and identify the factors that have an impact on government bargaining power. The model is applied to the Korean state and produces the following findings that: (1) the bargaining power of the Korean state has diminished constantly over time; (2) the Korean state's bargaining power has been affected by internal factors (the decline of the developmental state) and external factors (the progress of globalisation); and (3) the bargaining power of the state affects its bargaining outcomes. Finally, these findings enabled me to argue that: (1) the state must have strong bargaining power in order to attain more beneficial effects and less hannful consequences from the MNCs; (2) in order to increase the bargaining power of the state, an active role of the state in the market is required; and (3) lastly, the NBM suggests ways for the state to increase its bargaining power, which are the key for successful FDI policy in the global era.
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Maekawa, Wakako. "Policy bargaining and incompatibilities in civil wars : intervention, power-sharing, and preferences." Thesis, University of Essex, 2018. http://repository.essex.ac.uk/22746/.
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Civil wars in which conflict parties claim a regime lead to crisis at both domestic and international levels. Such claims for new regime have been a part of the democratization process throughout history. Thus, for both domestic and international participants in civil conflicts, bargaining is often a central issue. While conflict parties face pressure to cease civil war, salient issues at stake sometimes make parties less inclined to settle. Even if parties reach an agreement, in many cases, this is only a part of the long process of ending war. The outcome might also create incompatible situations for different parties, in some cases, causing another conflict. In other cases, such an outcome simultaneously solves other parties' incompatible situations. This dissertation investigates how and when politically incompatible situations in civil wars are resolved through the process of war termination. It re-examines the arguments used for international relations and civil conflict terminations with a particular focus on the subject of bargaining over political institutions, and the changing phases of termination process. Those theories are tested by using various potential outcomes as measures of conflict terminations in civil wars over government.
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Mukong, Alfred Kechia. "Social networks, bargaining power within couples, and maternal health care in Tanzania." Doctoral thesis, University of Cape Town, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/16691.
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Includes bibliographical referencesThis thesis focuses on the use of maternal health services and child health in Tanzania. The main focus is on how these issues relate to social networks and bargaining power within couples. These issues are interrelated and are discussed in three essays. The first essay investigates the impact of information externalities in social networks on the use of antenatal services. Particular emphasis is placed on the extent to which the probability of early antenatal check-up and antenatal completion are affected by social networks. Adopting an econometric technique that minimises the problem of omitted variable bias, the analysis suggests that these network effects increase the probability of antenatal care completion by an additional 6 to 35 percent, and may be as high as 59 percent. The study further finds that without adequate control of omitted variables, the network impact would be understated. It is also evident that failure to control for individual and household observable characteristics overstates the impact of networks. Results from the two approaches used in this study confirm that irrespective of the definition of social network, having a high quality contacts increase the probability of utilising maternal health services. The second essay examines the effect of bargaining power within couples on the probability of delivering in a health facility (public and private), as opposed to a home birth. It further investigates the effect of bargaining on the probability of health care provider choice at childbirth using a multinomial nested logit. Evidence suggests that cooperation within couples in decision-making, female discretion over household resources, and freedom from domestic violence increases the probability of childbirth in a facility, as opposed to home. The study finds that a woman's influence on service use varies if she is better educated than her partner. In addition, while cooperation in household decision and the incidence of domestic violence significantly affect private facility use, female discretion over household resources has a strong effect on public facility choice. Finally, antenatal completion, health knowledge, and maternal specific factors increase the probability of delivering in a public and private facility. ii The third essay empirically explores the contribution of intra-household bargaining, to the rural-urban gap in child nutrition. The study analyses the effect of parental bargaining indicators (cooperation in household decisions, the incidence domestic violence and discretion over household resources) on the probability of child stunting in both rural and urban areas. The essay contributes to the literature by demonstrating empirically that differences in intra-household bargaining increase the rural-urban gap in child health. It further contributes to the literature by correcting for possible sample selection bias. The results suggest that the significant effects of household bargaining indicators on child stunting in Tanzania are mainly from the rural and not the urban population. It provides evidence that weak bargaining power within couples in rural areas account for 5 percent of the rural-urban gap in child nutrition. The contribution reduces to 4 percent after correcting for sample selection bias. The results also suggest that failure to adequately correct for selection bias leads to a substantial underestimation of the overall rural-urban gap in child nutrition by 11 percent.
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Han, Eunice Sookyung. "Essays on the Teachers' Labor Market." Thesis, Harvard University, 2013. http://dissertations.umi.com/gsas.harvard:10790.
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Chapter 1 begins with the motivation of my study in teachers' labor market. I employ a monopolistic screening model to show that there exist multiple equilibria in the educational system; a pooling equilibrium and a separating equilibrium. The model predicts that the pooling equilibrium is optimal only when the average quality of teacher applicants is high. Using data from the OECD, I examine the relation between teachers' earnings and teacher quality of the U.S. and Korea. Chapter 2 focuses on teachers and their career dynamics, and the data is at teacher level. Using the Current Population Survey for 2001-2010, I show that public school teachers are paid less compared to other comparable college graduates in non-teaching sectors. By studying the change in earnings after career changes, I find the evidence of positive selection when teachers move into the non-teaching sectors and of negative selection when non-teachers move into the teaching sector, which results in the decrease in the average teacher quality. Chapter 3 looks at both teachers and school districts, and I use district-teacher matched dataset, based on the School and Staffing Survey (SASS) for 2007-2008. I employ a multilevel model and a propensity score matching to identify union effects in states with different legal environments for collective bargaining of teachers. I find that collective bargaining is neither necessary nor sufficient for unions to affect teachers' well-being. I show that meet-and-confer is a popular alternative to collective bargaining and that it is an important mechanism for unions to influence teachers' non-wage benefits. Chapter 4 concerns school districts, and I use SASS district level data. I reevaluate the role of teachers unions on pay structure and districts' financial status. In contrasts to previous findings, I find that the variance of teachers' earnings is higher in more unionized settings. Moreover, I show that the financial status of districts with teachers unions is stronger than that of districts without the unions. I confirm that unionism is associated with less usage of performance pay system.Economics
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Hall-Baker, Tre'Shawn. "Conflict, Knowledge, and Collective Bargaining in Public Education." ScholarWorks, 2017. https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations/4631.
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Negative conflict in public school districts during collective bargaining impedes efforts towards creativity and student success. The purpose of this phenomenological study was to explore the experiences of conflict for participants in collective bargaining in California public school districts. Complexity theory and social construction theory were used as the conceptual framework for the research, and ideas related to conflict, social interactions, knowledge management, and collective bargaining were examined to gain an understanding as they related to the central phenomenon. The specific research questions pondered in this study related to how conflict was experienced in California public schools during collective bargaining, what the perception of conflict was when knowledge management tools were used, and what some of the outcomes from conflict were when knowledge management tools were used. Data were collected from 25 participants who met the specified criteria of having experienced collective bargaining in a California public school setting, having experienced conflict during collective bargaining as a part of the negotiating teams, and must have experienced the use of knowledge management tools when in conflict during collective bargaining. Findings showed that knowledge management tools were a benefit to positive perceptions of conflict and positive conflict outcomes during collective bargaining in California public schools. The findings effectuate positive social change because when in conflict, knowledge is an intermediary that fills a void where there is a gap in understanding and a lack of viable solutions between the parties.
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Kandile, Msondezi Gorden. "The effect of recent amendments to the LRA within the context of collective bargaining." Thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10948/17831.
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The Labour Relations Act, 1995 makes no provision of a legally enforceable duty to bargain, but affords certain rights to unions such as organisational rights. Although employers are obliged to grant these rights to representative unions, they are not compelled to engage in bargaining with them as there is no duty to negotiate. However, the refusal to bargain will result in power play in order to convince the other party to negotiate. If an employer refuses to negotiate with a union, the union is able to strike without any fear of dismissal of its members, provided that the strike takes place with requirements of the Act. The questions that need to be answered are amongst others whether the amendments on organisational rights will truly broaden access to section 14 and 16 rights of the Labour Relations Act? Further than that, to investigate whether these amendments will lead a decline in industrial action related to organisational rights. It also becomes imperative to find whether these arrangements will enable commissioners to carry out the mandate of minimizing the proliferation of trade unions. The study aims to provide understanding of the principles of collective bargaining in the workplace. This in turn promotes better understanding of the rights enshrined in section 23(5) of the Constitution which provides that trade unions, employers’ organisation and employers have the right to engage in collective bargaining. This right is given effect to the Labour Relations Act as amended. The law regarding collective bargaining in South Africa has been interpreted in two ways; the Labour Relations Act refers to a duty to bargain collectively, while the Constitution refers to a right to engage in collective bargaining. These two interpretations have been subjected to judicial criticism in three cases in the South African National Defence Force. They are currently the main cases dealing with this issue in South Africa. The implications that a trade union is entitled to embark on strike action in order to obtain organisational rights in circumstances where it is not regarded as sufficiently representative, provides some form of relief for minority unions. Against this background, the critical legal question is the impact of recent amendments to the Labour Relations Act within the context of collective bargaining.
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Gartside, Richard John. "Strength in numbers : the impact of trade union mergers on trade union power." Thesis, Open University, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.287007.
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Swain, Jo Elyn Christiansen. "The influence of relational trust between the superintendent and union president." Diss., Montana State University, 2007. http://etd.lib.montana.edu/etd/2007/swain/SwainJ1207.pdf.
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Foca, Nolusindiso Octavia. "The role of the education labour relations council in collective bargaining." Thesis, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10948/d1021054.
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The 1996 Constitution provides workers with the right to form and join trade unions and to participate in the activities and programmes of those trade unions. The organizational and associated rights contained in sections 23(2)-(4) of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa, form the bedrock of a labour-relations system characterized by voluntarist collective bargaining. The constitutional protection that the above section gives to these organisational rights shields the trade unions and employer organisations from legislative and executive interference in their affairs and in turn, inhibits victimisation of and interference in trade unions by employers. One of the expressly stated purposes of the Labour Relations Act of 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the “LRA”) is to promote collective bargaining and to provide a framework within which employers, employers’ organisations, trade unions and employees can bargain collectively to determine wages, terms and conditions of employment, other matters of mutual interest and to formulate industrial policy. Notwithstanding the above purpose, the Act does not compel collective bargaining, with the result that the courts have no role in determining, for example, whether an employer should bargain collectively with a trade, what they should bargain about, at what level they should bargain or how parties to a negotiation should conduct themselves. Despite this, by extending and bolstering the right to strike, the LRA has effectively empowered trade unions to have recourse to the strike as an integral aspect of the collective bargaining process. The LRA provides a framework that is conducive to collective bargaining and thus providing for the establishment of bargaining councils. The purpose of this treatise is to examine the role played by the Education Labour Relations Council (hereinafter referred to as the “ELRC”) as one of the sectoral bargaining councils in the Public Service, in collective bargaining. In order to place this discussion in context, it is valuable to know the history of industrial relations and collective bargaining in South Africa.
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Sajid, Muhammad, and Imran Siddiqui. "A distributed, load-aware, power and frequency bargaining protocol for LTE-based networks." Thesis, Linköpings universitet, Kommunikations- och transportsystem, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-76893.
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In this thesis a distributed, dynamic, load aware, joint power and frequency allocation protocol for 4G networks along with system-level simulated results are presented. In all cellular networks, a key limiting factor for throughput is inter-cell interference, especially at the cell edges. Several methods have been proposed and adopted in each mobile network generation to cancel or suppress its effects, whereas each method has its drawbacks in terms of receiver complexity or additional control nodes. However, the proposed protocol presented here does not impose any architectural changes. In 4G networks such as LTE, the choice of OFDMA for the air interface has paved the way for selective frequency and power allocation in the available spectrum. Taking advantage of this opportunity, fractional frequency reuse (FFR) has been proposed in OFDMA based mobile networks in order to reduce the throughput loss at the cell edges due to inter-cell interference. In FFR, center users lose part of available spectrum that is dedicated to the edge users. Our protocol aims to minimize this loss of center users incurred by FFR, at the cost of minimal degradation at the edges. An eNodeB, only when overloaded, requests its neighbours’ edge band to be used for its center users at a reduced power level. This is done via small message exchange between the eNodeBs. The neighbors of the overloaded eNodeBs solve a small local knapsack problem to decide whether band lending is feasible or not. A distinguishing feature of this protocol is the power level adjustment for the borrowed band, which is mutually decided by the borrower and lender. The band is released when it is not needed or it is causing unacceptable loss to the lender. The implementation is done in a Matlab based LTE system level simulator. For the implementation of our protocol in the simulator, starting point was implementation of FFR-3 functionality, a prerequisite and a baseline for comparison with our protocol. Results are compared among three different setups of re-use1, FFR-3 and our protocol by varying number of overloaded eNodeBs for various numbers of scenarios and the comparison is made based on the center users’ throughput, edge users’ throughput. An estimation of time and protocol overhead is also presented. We have observed center users’ throughput gain up to 46%, at the cost of 9% edge users’ throughput loss, when compared to the classic FFR-3 scheme. The overall system throughput goes up to 26 % in heavily loaded scenario. The utility of the protocol for an LTE system is evident from the results, which is supported by the dynamic and decentralized nature of the protocol. This ensures better utilization of spectrum, by temporarily allocating more bandwidth where it is needed more.
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Negrusa, Brighita. "Qualitative aspects of mate availability and their effects on intra-household bargaining power." Connect to this title online, 2007. http://etd.lib.clemson.edu/documents/1193079212/.
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