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Academic literature on the topic 'Bargaining power of labor'

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Published: 10 December 2022
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Journal articles on the topic "Bargaining power of labor"

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Hafiz, Hiba. "Structural Labor Rights." Michigan Law Review, no. 119.4 (2021): 651. http://dx.doi.org/10.36644/mlr.119.4.structural.

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American labor law was designed to ensure equal bargaining power between workers and employers. But workers’ collective power against increasingly dominant employers has disintegrated. With union density at an abysmal 6.2 percent in the private sector—a level unequaled since the Great Depression— the vast majority of workers depend only on individual negotiations with employers to lift stagnant wages and ensure upward economic mobility. But decentralized, individual bargaining is not enough. Economists and legal scholars increasingly agree that, absent regulation to protect workers’ collective rights, labor markets naturally strengthen employers’ bargaining power over workers. Existing labor and antitrust law have failed to step in, leaving employers free to coordinate and consolidate labor-market power while constraining workers’ ability to do the same. The dissolution of workers’ collective rights has resulted in spiking income inequality: workers have suffered economy-wide wage stagnation and a declining share of the national income for decades. To resolve this crisis, some scholars have advocated for ambitious labor law reforms, like sector-wide bargaining, while others have turned to antitrust law to tackle employer power. While these proposals are vital, they overlook an existing opportunity already contained in the labor law that would avoid the political and doctrinal obstacles to such large-scale reforms. This Article argues for a “structural” approach to the labor law that revives and modernizes its equal bargaining power purpose through deploying innovative social scientific analysis. A “structural” approach is one that takes into account workers’ bargaining power relative to employers in determining the scope of substantive labor rights and in resolving disputes. Because employers’ current buyer power strengthens their ability to indefinitely hold out on worker demands in the employment bargain, the “structural” approach seeks to deploy social scientific tools to tailor the labor law’s provisions so that they resituate workers to a bargaining position from which they could equally hold out. This Article makes three key contributions. First, it documents the dispersion and misalignment of workers’ collective rights under current labor law, detailing the historical narrowing of workers’ collective rights to limited tactics by a small set of workers against highly protected individual enterprises and the concomitant rise of employer power (Part I). Second, it introduces and schematizes the wealth of social scientific literature relevant for evaluating the relative bargaining power of employers and employees (Part II). And finally, it offers concrete proposals for how to apply these social scientific tools and insights to three areas of the National Labor Relation Board’s adjudication and regulatory authority: the determination of “employer”/”employee” status, the determination of employees’ substantive rights under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and the determination of what counts as sanctionable unfair labor practices under section 8 of the NLRA (Part III).
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Butolia, Sangeeta, and Prem Singh. "WOMAN’S EMPLOYMENT AND INTRAHOUSEHOLD BARGAINING POWER." ASIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS 3, no. 2 (2022): 315–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.47509/ajeb.2022.v03i02.09.

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While there are various different optimistic communal implications of working status of women, this study tries to analyse the effect of employment that may change relative decision making power of women within household. Using data set of NFHS-4 (2015-16), this paper documents a positive significant increase in women’s relative power to take decisions alone within household. Similarly, women are more likely to take various individual decisions either alone or jointly with husband when they are engaged in labour market. These results are consistent with a theoretical model of bargaining power in which likelihood of a woman to take part in household decision making increases upon entering the labour force. The likelihood of men to be a sole decision maker in the household falls when women are involved in labor market.
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Forrest, Anne. "Bargaining Units and Bargaining Power." Discussion 41, no. 4 (April 12, 2005): 840–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/050264ar.

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Schwarz-Miller, Ann, and Wayne K. Talley. "The relative bargaining power of public transit labor." Research in Transportation Economics 4 (January 1996): 69–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0739-8859(96)80006-0.

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PONTUSSON, JONAS, and PETER SWENSON. "Labor Markets, Production Strategies, and Wage Bargaining Institutions." Comparative Political Studies 29, no. 2 (April 1996): 223–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414096029002004.

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Transformed patterns of labor market governance occupy a central place in the study of contemporary West European political economies. Here, detailed analysis of the dramatic decentralization of wage bargaining in Sweden identifies organized employers, especially engineering employers, as the decisive agents of institutional change. We argue that the employer offensive should be understood as a response to a shift in power within old wage-bargaining institutions, introducing invasive regulation of firm-level pay practices and, at the same time, as a consequence of new flexibility-centered production strategies, giving rise to demands for more firm-level autonomy in wage bargaining. The exceptional features of the old Swedish bargaining and the particular needs of different sectors come into play as we seek to explain the mixed pattern of wage-bargaining changes across Western Europe.
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Pacitti, Aaron. "Bargaining Power, Labor Market Institutions, and the Great Moderation." Eastern Economic Journal 41, no. 2 (February 24, 2014): 160–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/eej.2014.3.

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Bental, Benjamin, and Dominique Demougin. "Declining labor shares and bargaining power: An institutional explanation." Journal of Macroeconomics 32, no. 1 (March 2010): 443–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2009.09.005.

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Batyra, Anna, Olivier Pierrard, David de la Croix, and Henri R. Sneessens. "Structural Changes in the Labor Market and the Rise of Early Retirement in France and Germany." German Economic Review 20, no. 4 (December 1, 2019): e38-e69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12150.

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Abstract The rise of early retirement in Europe is typically attributed to the European system of taxes and transfers. A model with an imperfectly competitive labor market allows us to consider also the effects of bargaining power and of matching efficiency on pre-retirement. We find that lower bargaining power of workers and declining matching efficiency have been important determinants of early retirement in France and Germany. These structural changes, combined with early retirement transfers and population aging, are also consistent with the employment and unemployment rates, labor share and seniority premia.
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Witt, John Fabian. "Rethinking the Nineteenth-Century Employment Contract, Again." Law and History Review 18, no. 3 (2000): 627–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/744072.

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Legal historians have turned with renewed energy in recent years to the project of fleshing out the myriad rules by which the common law of the free labor employment contract structured social relations in nineteenth-century America. Of course, labor relations have always been prominent in the literature. The German sociological tradition has long taught us to see in the legal protection of property rights a source of coercive power over the working classes. And for decades now, historians have studied the great nineteenth-century labor conspiracy cases, which generated leading cases and opinions by judges such as Shaw and Holmes. But there is a new wrinkle in recent accounts of nineteenth-century labor law. Much of the law of property, contract, and tort bears a relatively self-evident (though still too infrequently remarked on) relation to the relative bargaining power of the parties to an employment contract. Property rules, along with a whole host of attendant tort doctrines such as nuisance and trespass, allocate resources among parties. As Robert Hale observed long ago, property rules set the coercive power of A to exclude B from those resources that belong to A, whether A be a prospective employee excluding an employer from the employee's labor power, or an employer excluding a would-be employee from the means of production. In similar fashion, rules of contract and tort that define the weapons that parties may deploy in competition or bargaining also shape the relative bargaining power of social actors. Thus, doctrines of duress, fraud, unconscionability, and adequacy of consideration, and the law of labor conspiracies and competition all create immutable background rules (or sometimes inalienable entitlements) that have considerable impact on bargaining power. In Halean language, we might say that the law of duress, for example, coercively precludes the strong from forcing the weak to consent to a particular deal, or that the doctrine of fraud coercively precludes the slick from outfoxing the dupes.
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Železník, Martin. "Labor Market Regulation and its Characteristics: Comparison Between Czech Republic and Austria." Review of Economic Perspectives 11, no. 2 (January 1, 2011): 93–120. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/v10135-011-0009-8.

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Labor Market Regulation and its Characteristics: Comparison Between Czech Republic and Austria In this paper, we are trying to compare the labor market regulation in the Czech Republic and Austria and its structural parameters that characterize the given labor markets. In order to do that, we estimate the New-Keynesian model with matching frictions and nominal wage rigidities. Labor market regulation is proxied by worker's bargaining power over the wage. This main parameter is moving inside the interval and express a share of the total surplus that arises from filling the vacancy. In fact it expresses the state of who gains more from the added value that the vacancy is filled (worker or employer). Results indicate that workers in Austria and the Czech Republic have almost the same bargaining power that arises from the labor market settings.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Bargaining power of labor"

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Morin, Annäïg. "Essays in Labor Economics : wages and Bargaining Power along Business Cycle." Thesis, Lyon 2, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011LYO22024/document.

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Les effets de la sévère crise économique qui a suivi la crise financière en 2007-2008 s’est fait fortement ressentir sur le marché du travail. La croissance du chômage et l’insécurité de l’emploi ont considérablement influencé le pro­cessus de négociation salariale entre employeurs, employés et syndicats. Cette évolution a mis en avant la nécessité de comprendre à quel point ce processus ainsi que le rapport de force entre les parties en présence diffèrent en période de croissance et en période de ralentissement économique. A.n de répondre à cette question, la présente thèse étudie le comportement des employeurs, des employés et des syndicats lors du processus de fixation des salaires, en mettant partic­ulièrement l’accent sur l’évolution de l’interaction entre ces trois agents à travers le cycle économique. Les deux premiers chapitres de ma thèse analysent les fluc­tuations du pouvoir des syndicats à travers le cycle et relient ces fluctuations aux fluctuations des salaires. Le premier chapitre propose un cadre théorique qui associe frictions d’appariement et syndicats et démontre que les rigidités salariales proviennent de façon endogène du comportement des syndicats. Le deuxième chapitre de ma thèse teste ces prédictions empiriquement, en utilisant un panel d’industries sur la période 1987-2000 aux États-Unis. Les résultats confirment l’hypothèse que les salaires sont moins corrélés au niveau de pro­ductivité lorsqu’ils sont négociés collectivement. L’intensification des propriétés contracycliques de la part salariale est au coeur du mécanisme. Le troisième chapitre propose un modèle avec affichage des salaires qui examine l’évolution du pouvoir de monopsone des entreprises à travers le cycle économique. Les conséquences en termes de dispersion des salaires sont étudiées. Le premier chapitre de ma thèse propose un modèle dynamique du marché du travail qui associe deux caractéristiques principales : frictions d’appariement et syndicats. A.n d’étudier comment les syndicats influencent la volatilité des salaires à travers le cycle, je dissocie les deux composants de la volatilité des salaires : la volatilité du surplus total et la volatilité du pouvoir de négocia­tion effectif des syndicats. Le pouvoir de négociation effectif des syndicats est dé.ni comme la part du surplus total alloué aux travailleurs. Je prouve que ce pouvoir de négociation effectif est endogène et contracyclique, résultat qui provient directement de la fonction d’utilité des syndicats. L’intuition est la suivante. Du fait que les syndicats internalisent la relation entre le niveau des salaires et la création de postes, ils font face à un arbitrage entre le niveau des salaires et le niveau de l’emploi. Ainsi, les préférences des syndicats (donnant la priorité aux salaires ou à l’emploi) fluctuent à travers le cycle, et il en est de même du pouvoir de négociation effectif des syndicats. Il en résulte que, lorsque l’économie est touchée par un choc de productivité, la dynamique du pouvoir de négociation effectif des syndicats neutralise partiellement la dynamique du surplus total, mécanisme qui crée de la rigidité salariale. Le modèle est carac­térisé par la coexistence d’un secteur non syndiqué, dans lequel les salaires sont individuellement négociés à la Nash, avec un secteur syndiqué. En calibrant ce modèle avec des données américaines, j’obtiens qu’un choc positif entraine, au moment du choc, une compression de la prime syndicale, suivi par une aug­mentation régulière de cette prime à mesure que la proportion de travailleurs employés augmente. En corollaire, l’emploi réagit plus fortement lorsque les salaires sont négociés collectivement, mais l’effet est moins persistent
The consequences of the sudden and severe contraction of industrial output in the aftermath of the .nancial crisis of 2007-2008 are increasingly being felt in the labor market. Rising unemployment and job insecurity has greatly in­.uenced wage bargaining interactions between firms, workers and trade unions. It pointed out the necessity to understand how di.erent were the wage-setting process and the balance of power between the main actors in good times and bad. As an answer to this issue, this dissertation investigates the wage-setting behavior of .rms, workers and trade unions, placing particular emphasis on how the interaction between these three economic agents changes over the business cycle. The two first chapters of the thesis analyze the fluctuations of the power of trade unions over the cycle, and relate these .uctuations to the .uctuations of wages. The .rst chapter proposes a theoretical framework with search and matching frictions and trade unions and shows how wage rigidity arises endoge­nously due to the behavior of unions. The second chapter tests these predictions empirically, using a panel of U.S. industries over the period 1987-2000. The re­sults confirm the predictions that wages are less correlated with productivity when collectively bargained. The intensi.cation of the countercyclicality of the labor share is at the core of the mechanism. The third chapter proposes a model with wage posting and investigates how them onopsonistic power of firmse volves along the cycle. The consequences in terms of wage dispersion are examined. The .rst chapter of the dissertation proposes a dynamic model of the labor marketwhichintegratestwomainfeatures: matchingfrictionsandtradeunions. To examine how trade unions shape the volatility of wages over the business cycle, I decompose the volatility of wages into two components: the volatil­ity of the match surplus and the volatility of the e.ective bargaining power. Formally, I de.ne the e.ective bargaining power of the union as the share of the total surplus allocated to the workers. Starting from the union’s objective function, I prove that its e.ective bargaining power is endogenous and coun­tercyclical. Intuitively, because the union internalizes the relationship between the wage level and the job creation, it faces a trade-o. between the wage rate and the employment rate. Therefore, the union’s preferences (wage-oriented or employment-oriented) fluctuate along the cycle and so does its effective bargain­ing power. As a result, when the economy is hit by a productivity shock, the dynamics of the union’s effective bargaining power partially counteract the dy­namics of the total surplus and this mechanism delivers wage rigidity. I specify a model in which a non unionized sector, where wages are negotiated through a standard individual Nash bargaining, coexists with a unionized sector. In the model calibrated with U.S. data, I .nd that a positive productivity shock leads, on impact, to a compression of the union wage premium, followed by a steady increase of this premium as the proportion of employed workers in the trade unions increases. Relatedly, employment reacts stronger when wages are collectively bargained, but its pattern features less persistence
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Palacios, Indira Huber Evelyne. "Decentralized collective bargaining a study of labor union power in Chile, 1990-2004 /." Chapel Hill, N.C. : University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2006. http://dc.lib.unc.edu/u?/etd,603.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2006.
Title from electronic title page (viewed Oct. 10, 2007). "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy in the Department of Political Science." Discipline: Political Science; Department/School: Political Science.
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Dasgupta, Poulomi. "Essays on Intra-Household Bargaining Power of Women in India." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/73304.

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This thesis investigates the factors that affect women's bargaining power within the household, in India. The first chapter introduces the literature on household bargaining mostly by describing how household outcomes like children's health indicators and expenditure pattern change with increase in resources under women's control. The second chapter describes the conceptual framework for intra-household bargaining. It discusses the two broad topics – household bargaining models and gendered institutions, that can be used to identify avenues for increasing women's bargaining power within the household. In chapters three and four, I analyze the factors that determine women's power position, using data on women's involvement in household decision making from a nationally representative longitudinal household survey (India Human Development Survey). The survey was conducted in over 40,000 Indian households, which covers over 200,000 individuals. In the third chapter, I investigate the effect of women's labor force participation on her involvement in household decision making. After addressing the issues of endogeneity using a fixed effects model, I find that her labor market participation significantly increases her involvement in decision making process, which can be seen as a direct outcome of her increased bargaining power. In my fourth chapter I analyze whether the women's bargaining power within the household increases with the presence of female politicians at both state and local level. Studying the causal impact of a variable like female political representation is generally riddled with concerns of endogeneity for existence of voter preference. Using share of seats won by women in man-woman close elections as an instrument for overall female representation in in a fixed effect model, I show that an increase in number of female state legislators can actually lead to an increase in the bargaining power of women. This chapter further shows that increase in women's involvement in decision making process in the household is also associated with the female political representation at local level. The fifth chapter concludes the dissertation by making policy recommendation for strengthening women's bargaining position within the household.
Ph. D.
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Carneiro, Francisco Galrao. "Labour market institutions, insider power and informal employment in Brazilian wage determination : 1980-1993." Thesis, University of Kent, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.308838.

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Jarl, Johan. "Return to loyalty : New patterns of cooperation in the Swedish labour market regime." Thesis, Växjö University, School of Social Sciences, 2009. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:vxu:diva-5806.

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This study aims at defining the development of the macro/meso level Swedish labourmarket regime during the last decade. This includes the effect of structural changesand what development tendencies exist. For this purpose three questions have beenformulated:1. How can the macro/meso level relations between the labour market organizations of the bargainingrounds since 1997 be described using the concepts exit, voice and loyalty as an interpretation oforganizational choices?2. How can the changing relations between the labour market organizations be explained?3. Based on this, how can the present labour market regime be defined?For this purpose the concept of labour market regimes is used. The interactionbetween actors in this is interpreted through a cooperative game theory coupled withthe concepts exit, voice, loyalty. Exit means the actors leaving the system,corresponding to the negotiation game threats. Voice means negotiation conflictresolution. Loyalty both correspond to coalition patterns and forces keeping theregime in place. Material is informant interviews with key actors and officialdocuments from bargaining and negotiation. The results of the study are that therelations have been stabilized by the IA of 1997, since which the development istowards increased peak-level organizational involvement. Because of labour marketfragmentation this takes the form in confederation coordination between differentparties. To conceptualize this I propose the concept peak-level coordinatedbargaining. In this the coalition development is towards the reemergence of oldloyalty patterns and the inclusion of new actors in this system. To explain this pathdependency due to well established loyalties and actor continuity is suggested.

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Skipton, Susan Margaret. "Collective bargaining and pay equity : a study of pay equity bargaining in two Canadian provinces." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1995. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/4190/.

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The aim of this study was to explore the interrelationship between collective bargaining and pay equity. A qualitative case study methodology was used. Eighty-six interviews were conducted with union and management pay equity negotiators, labour lawyers, Pay Equity Commission Review Officers, and other informants. A collection of documentary evidence supplemented these interviews. The empirical work focused on explaining issues of structure, style and power in pay equity bargaining and the complex intertwinings of the structural properties of gender and class were considered crucial to an explanation of these. The key structural dynamic in the negotiation of pay equity was found to be the degree and effectiveness of a labour-feminist politic combined with employer/state commitment, which are themselves interconnected and represent the transformative face of gender and class power relations. The thesis, in providing a theoretically informed discussion of detailed case study material, contributes towards the debate on the effectiveness of collective bargaining as a vehicle for implementing equal pay policy. It also informs the debate on labour-management cooperation in labour relations, especially in public sector collective bargaining. Because legislated pay equity is bargained within a new set of legal parameters, the study may also aid our understanding of the relationship between collective bargaining and the law. Finally, the thesis attempts to unravel the interwoven complexities of gender and class power relations in the collective bargaining process.
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Yu, Zhixian. "Bargaining and contribution games with deadlines." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2018. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/50610/.

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This thesis considers play in bargaining games subject to Endogenous Commitment and in contribution games with a sunk cost. In bargaining games, Endogenous Commitment (EC) describes a common feature in negotiation: once an offer is made, neither would the proposer offer nor would the respondent accept anything worse. Similarly, in contribution games, the notion of sunk cost implies an irrevocability similar to EC: it is impossible for either contributor to reduce his or her contribution, so far as the cost is sunk. Another similarity between the bargaining and contribution games in our thesis is that we assume (most of) them to be finite, meaning that there is a deadline effect: when approaching the deadline, the final negotiator/contributor has a stronger incentive to reach an agreement/complete the project. The deadline effect puts the final negotiator/contributor in a relatively weaker position. With these two similarities, the bargaining and contribution games in our thesis share some similar features. In the first chapter, we conduct a literature review. In the second chapter, we study two player alternating finite/infinite bargaining games with Endogenous Commitment. In both cases, the outcomes are affected by the assumption of EC. In the third chapter, we apply Endogenous Commitment in bargaining games with protocols involving uncertainty. The settlement timings then exhibit a U-shaped pattern: players reach an agreement at the first or the last stage of the game. In the fourth chapter, we turn to contribution games with sunk cost and heterogeneous valuations. We show that a minor difference in valuation could affect the total welfare significantly. In our thesis, we adopt several settings in all chapters. As all models include two players, we refer to player 1 as male and to player 2 as female for convenience. When no specific player is referred to, we use i and j to indicate the two players, assuming i to be male and j to be female. When player 1 makes an offer (in bargaining games) or makes a contribution (in contribution games) in stage t (t\in[1,2,...T], T is the length of the game), we denote it as x_{t}; and when player 2 does so, we denote it as y_{t}. Similarly, we denote player i's and player j's choice as m_{t} and n_{t}.
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Gómez, Natalia González. "Three essays on bargaining : On refutability of the Nash bargaining solution; On inter- and intra-party politics; A bargaining model with strategic generosity." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2012. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/56815/.

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This dissertation is a collection of three essays that share one common feature: all three of them relate to the literature on Bargaining. The first and second essay are joint work with my supervisor, Professor Andrés Carvajal. In our first essay we investigate the testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution. We develop polynomial tests of the NBS under different hypothesis about the default levels. For instance, with, and without observation from the outside econometrician of the levels of utility that the individuals would have obtained outside the negotiation. We use the Tarski-Seindenberg algorithm to characterize rationalizable data as those that satisfy a finite system of polynomial inequalities. In our second essay we introduce a new equilibrium concept for games of political competition. We model electoral competition within each party, assuming inner-party members have somewhat conflicting preferences. By using the bargaining protocol à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989) we explicitly model party members’ strategic interactions, their incentives and their decision of whom to elect. Our equilibrium concept attempts to model each member’s decision as if each player were uncertain about, (i) the faction that will eventually dominate the decision made by the other party and (ii) the faction that will dominate in the party’s nomination. In the last essay I focus on one of the classical problems in bargaining: the divide the dollar problem. In our framework we assume players’ utility functions mirror selfish and Rawlsian preferences. We derive the set of subgame perfect equilibria for different arrangements of player types and study why strategic generosity emerges under the bargaining protocol we assume.
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Scarpa, Carlo. "Industry regulation when firms have bargaining power." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.305013.

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Wells, Dominic. "From Collective Bargaining to Collective Begging: State Expansion and Restriction of Collective Bargaining Rights in the Public Sector." Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2018. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1522790947706508.

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Books on the topic "Bargaining power of labor"

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Bargaining power. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.

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Kidding ourselves: Breadwinning, babies, and bargaining power. New York, NY: BasicBooks, 1995.

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Pollak, Robert A. Bargaining power in marriage: Earnings, wage rates, and household production. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005.

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Datt, Gaurav. Bargaining power, wages and employment: An analysis of agricultural labor markets in India. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1996.

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Dobbelaere, Sabien. Joint estimation of price-cost margins and union bargaining power for Belgian manufacturing. Bonn, Germany: IZA, 2005.

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Smith, Jennifer C. Bargaining power and local labour market influences on wage determination. Coventry: Warwick University, Department of Economics, 1996.

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Card, David E. Bargaining power, strike durations, and wage outcomes: An analysis of strides in the 1880s. Princeton, NJ: Industrial Relations Section, Dept. of Economics, Princeton University, 1995.

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Card, David E. Bargaining power, strike duration, and wage outcomes: An analysis of strikes in the 1880s. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1992.

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Godard, John. Managerial interests and union power: A theory and analysis of structural variation in bargaining outcomes using firm-level survey data. Kingston, Ont: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University, 1990.

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Dartmann, Christoph. Re-distribution of power, joint consultation or productivity coalitions?: Labour and postwar reconstruction in Germany and Britain, 1945-1953. Bochum: Universitatsverlag Dr. N. Brockmeyer, 1996.

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Book chapters on the topic "Bargaining power of labor"

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Vercherand, Jean. "The Asymmetry of Bargaining Power." In Labour, 75–107. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137373618_4.

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Braunstein, Elissa, and Gerald Epstein. "Bargaining Power and Foreign Direct Investment in China: Can 1.3 Billion Consumers Tame the Multinationals?" In Labor and the Globalization of Production, 209–48. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230523968_9.

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Claessens, Elke, and Dimitri Mortelmans. "Who Cares? An Event History Analysis of Co-parenthood Dynamics in Belgium." In European Studies of Population, 131–52. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68479-2_7.

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AbstractUntil the end of the twentieth century, child custody arrangements after separation typically continued the gendered pre-separation parenting division, with mothers taking up childcare and fathers paying child support. Recently, there has been a significant rise in co-parenting after separation, reflecting the trend towards more socio-economic, work- and childcare-related gender equality during the relationship. However, it remains unclear to what extent the organization of the pre-separation household dominates over important changes in the lives and labor force participation of parents after separation in choosing to co-parent.This study uses longitudinal Belgian register data to consider the effect of post-separation dynamics in parents’ life course and labor force participation in deciding to co-parent. While certain pre-separation characteristics remain predictive of co-parenting, our results suggest a societal trend towards co-parenting as the parenting norm. Increased time in paid work positively affects co-parenting probabilities, but we find no effect of a post-separation income increase, even though this would imply greater bargaining power to obtain sole custody. As such, the investigated post-separation changes seem to be an indication of parents moving towards supporting and attempting to gain gender equal parenting after separation.
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Smith, Verna. "A Tale of Two Countries." In Bargaining Power, 1–8. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7602-2_1.

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Smith, Verna. "Analysing Public Policy: Does Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework Help?" In Bargaining Power, 9–20. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7602-2_2.

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Smith, Verna. "A Comparison of the English and New Zealand General Practice Sub-Systems." In Bargaining Power, 21–31. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7602-2_3.

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Smith, Verna. "England: Context and the Quality and Outcomes Framework." In Bargaining Power, 33–57. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7602-2_4.

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Smith, Verna. "Utility of Kingdon’s Framework: Policymaking in England." In Bargaining Power, 59–74. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7602-2_5.

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Smith, Verna. "New Zealand: Context and the Performance Programme." In Bargaining Power, 75–109. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7602-2_6.

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Smith, Verna. "Utility of Kingdon’s Framework: Policymaking in New Zealand." In Bargaining Power, 111–23. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7602-2_7.

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Conference papers on the topic "Bargaining power of labor"

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Bhandari, Pitambar. "Making the Soft Power Hard: Nepal’s Internal Ability in Safeguarding National Interest." In 8th Peace and Conflict Resolution Conference [PCRC2021]. Tomorrow People Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.52987/pcrc.2021.008.

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Abstract Soft power is an important instrument of foreign policy and a tool in safeguarding national interests. Under various regimes after the advent of democracy in 1950, Nepal has experienced a turbulent effect of international influence on technology, governance capability, policy transfer, labor migration and climatic affairs. In these contexts, traditional diplomatic effort based on persuasive bargaining requires an interest based practice which is complicated for the countries like Nepal where military power and economy are considered to be public goods rather than strategic base for the expansion of domestic policy making the other countries follow. Nepal creates an exemplary image in coping with the internal and external threats even during the major political transitions in 1950, 1990 and 2006. In all these power sharing mechanisms, the immunity that galvanized internal forces with minimum experience of indirect influence from the neighbouring countries shows that soft power values in Nepal became the major component for managing internal tensions and mitigating external interests. At one hand, the sources of soft power rests on ancient value system and on the other, Nepal celebrates new political system confronting the values earlier regime survived on. Political crisis before 2015 and the natural disaster after it plunged Nepal into a serious threat. During the time of crisis it is need and the value that functions compared to the interest. This paper posits a central question that how soft power became a variant during the war to peace transition from 2006 to the period of implementation of constitution stipulated in 2015 with the result of a stable government. The first part of the paper explores the dimensions of soft power in Nepal- both perceived and practiced- after Jana Aandolan II. The effectiveness of soft power in maintaining the geostrategic importance through a constant coupling of soft power diplomacy adopted and endorsed in Nepal by the external powers and Nepal’s own soft power standpoint will be analyzed in the second part of the paper. The last section of the paper analyzes the challenges for effective implementation of soft power diplomacy in meeting the national interest. Key words: Soft power, geo-strategic importance, national interest
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Yuanyuan, Chen, and Heng Cheng Suang. "Contract renegotiation and bargaining power." In the 14th Annual International Conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2346536.2346581.

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Khanna, Rahul, Adhar Bhagat, Nitesh Dewani, and Harvinder . "M-Power the Labor." In International Conference on Computer Applications — Management. Singapore: Research Publishing Services, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.3850/978-981-08-7303-5_1442.

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FAGIOLO, G., G. DOSI, and R. GABRIELE. "MATCHING, BARGAINING, AND WAGE SETTING IN AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL OF LABOR MARKET AND OUTPUT DYNAMICS." In Proceedings of the Wild@Ace 2003 Workshop. WORLD SCIENTIFIC, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789812702258_0005.

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Hidajat, Taofik. "Pandemic, Lender Risk and Borrower Bargaining Power." In The 3rd International Conference on Banking, Accounting, Management and Economics (ICOBAME 2020). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.210311.010.

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Cao, Qian, Yindi Jing, and H. Vicky Zhao. "Power bargaining in multi-source relay networks." In ICC 2012 - 2012 IEEE International Conference on Communications. IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icc.2012.6364426.

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Collins, Riley. "Bargaining for the Common Good? A Comparative Analysis of COVID-19 Instructional Policies Across Labor Contexts." In 2021 AERA Annual Meeting. Washington DC: AERA, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.3102/1690179.

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Sanguanpuak, Tachporn, and R. M. A. P. Rajatheva. "Power bargaining for amplify and forward relay channel." In 2009 Fourth International Conference on Communications and Networking in China (CHINACOM). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/chinacom.2009.5339958.

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Kim, Jong-Kyu, Kwon-Hee Lee, Abdul Halim Hakim, Pandian Vasant, and Nader Barsoum. "ROBUST DESIGN FOR A COUPLED SYSTEM, USING BARGAINING FUNCTION." In POWER CONTROL AND OPTIMIZATION: Proceedings of the Second Global Conference on Power Control and Optimization. AIP, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.3223924.

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Zehavi, Ephraim, and Amir Leshem. "Bargaining over the interference channel with total power constraints." In 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GameNets). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/gamenets.2009.5137431.

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Reports on the topic "Bargaining power of labor"

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Nguyen, Thi Dien, Thi Minh Hanh Nguyen, Thi Minh Khue Nguyen, and Ayako Ebata. Policies to Improve Migrant Workers’ Food Security in Vietnam. Institute of Development Studies (IDS), March 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/ids.2022.019.

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Migrant workers in Vietnam make up 7.3 per cent of the population. Despite rapid economic growth, they suffer from precarious working conditions and food insecurity, which Covid-19 control measures have exacerbated. Urgent action is needed to improve migrant workers’ access to nutritious food during crises and increase resilience to future economic shocks through: (1) short-term responses that provide nutritious food; (2) improving living conditions through effective enforcement of existing policies; (3) expanding coverage of the government social safety net; and (4) progressive reform of labour law to reduce their vulnerability to job loss and increase their bargaining power.
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Pecorino, Paul, and Mark VanBoening. Bargaining, Fairness and the Labor Allocation Problem. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, December 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada414359.

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Ali, S. Nageeb, B. Douglas Bernheim, and Xiaochen Fan. Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w20011.

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Sadka, Joyce, Enrique Seira, and Christopher Woodruff. Information and Bargaining through Agents: Experimental Evidence from Mexico’s Labor Courts. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w25137.

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Berger, David, Kyle Herkenhoff, and Simon Mongey. Labor Market Power. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w25719.

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Friedberg, Leora, and Anthony Webb. Determinants and Consequences of Bargaining Power in Households. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12367.

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Azar, José, Steven Berry, and Ioana Marinescu. Estimating Labor Market Power. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w30365.

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Bowen, Renee, Ilwoo Hwang, and Stefan Krasa. Agenda-Setter Power Dynamics: Learning in Multi-Issue Bargaining. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w27981.

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Freeman, Richard, and Robert Valletta. The Effect of Public Sector Labor laws on Collective Bargaining, Wages, and Employment. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w2284.

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Pollak, Robert. Bargaining Power in Marriage: Earnings, Wage Rates and Household Production. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w11239.

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