Relevant bibliographies by topics / Bargaining power

Academic literature on the topic 'Bargaining power'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 25 May 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "Bargaining power"

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Forrest, Anne. "Bargaining Units and Bargaining Power." Discussion 41, no. 4 (April 12, 2005): 840–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/050264ar.

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Kultti, Klaus. "About bargaining power." Economics Letters 69, no. 3 (December 2000): 341–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00321-9.

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Zhang, Honglei, Jinhe Zhang, Yang Yang, and Qiang Zhou. "Bargaining Power in Tourist Shopping." Journal of Travel Research 57, no. 7 (August 20, 2017): 947–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0047287517724917.

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Bargaining behavior is popular when tourists shop, with bargaining power representing the surplus sellers or buyers obtain after price negotiations. This article applies a two-tier stochastic frontier analysis to estimate sellers’ and buyers’ (i.e., tourists’) surplus terms as a measure of their respective bargaining power. Using large-scale data on shopping behavior obtained from a domestic tourist survey conducted in Nanjing, China, between 2005 and 2010, our empirical results indicate that in general, tourists exhibit stronger bargaining power than sellers. Additionally, tourists’ net surplus, as a measure of relative bargaining power, is heavily informed by their tripographic and sociodemographic characteristics, with the former being more influential. In particular, tourists traveling with companions and obtaining travel information from friends and mass media tend to have stronger-than-average bargaining power.
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Manimabi, Ruth, Sony Heru Priyanto, and Hendrik Johanes Nadapdap. "DAYA KEKUATAN TAWAR MENAWAR PENGUSAHA SLONDOK DI DESA SUMURARUM KECAMATAN GRABAG KABUPATEN MAGELANG." Agrisocionomics: Jurnal Sosial Ekonomi Pertanian 2, no. 1 (May 27, 2018): 58. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/agrisocionomics.v2i1.2355.

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ABSTRACT- This study aims to examine the external environment of slondok companies related to bargaining power used by slondok entrepreneurs with 2 Porter powers, namely bargaining power of buyers and suppliers as well as alternative strategies used by slondok entrepreneurs in increasing bargaining power of slondok. The type of research used is descriptive qualitative. The research method used is case study. The data used are primary and secondary data. Methods of data collection by interview. Participant selection technique with purposive sampling. Validity test and reliability test using source triangulation. Based on the results of research related to the strength of Porter in slondok company shows that the bargaining power of buyers is high, the bargaining power of the suppliers is as well as the alternative strategy applied is Porter's generic strategy. Kata kunci-agroindustri; industri kecil; kekuatan Porter; strategi generik
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Philips, Paul. "Theoretical Problems of Public Interest Sector Industrial Relations." Relations industrielles 31, no. 4 (April 12, 2005): 566–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/028743ar.

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This paper develops a simple industry bargaing model with explicit consideration of the determinants of the bargaining range and the narrowing of that range over time as a function of perceived bargaining power and costs of settlement. The model is then applied to the public-interest sector under altered assumptions of costs of settlement and the introduction of political influences in the determination of bargaining paths. The impact of third party intervention is considered in both the industry and public-interest sector cases.
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Demougin, Dominique, and Carsten Helm. "Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power." German Economic Review 7, no. 4 (December 1, 2006): 463–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0475.2006.00130.x.

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Abstract We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework where parties are risk-neutral and the agent is financially constrained. We show that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining power is analyzed in either of the following three frameworks: in a standard principal-agent (P-A) framework by varying the agent’s outside opportunity, in an alternating offer game, and in a generalized Nash-bargaining game. However, for sufficiently low levels of the agent’s bargaining power, increasing it marginally does affect the equilibrium in the Nash-bargaining game, but not in the P-A model and in the alternating offer game.
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Prasad, Sanjay, Ravi Shankar, and Sreejit Roy. "Impact of bargaining power on supply chain profit allocation: a game-theoretic study." Journal of Advances in Management Research 16, no. 3 (July 15, 2019): 398–416. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jamr-10-2018-0096.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of bargaining powers of firms in supply chain coordination. It studies selected aspects of bargaining powers, namely, impatience, breakdown probability and outside options, and uses a bargaining-theoretic approach to analyze surplus allocation in a coordinated supply chain. Design/methodology/approach This paper proposes one-supplier one-buyer infinite horizon supply chain coordination game, where suppliers and buyers negotiate for the allocation of supply chain surplus arising out of supply chain coordination. Various aspects of the bargaining power of the negotiating parties are modeled and the paper studies impact of power levels on the results of the bargaining game. Findings A significance of impatience on the bargaining process and the surplus split has been established. This paper also demonstrates a rather counter-intuitive aspect of bargaining that the impatience (as perceived by the other party) can improve the bargaining position and therefore share of profits. Research limitations/implications This paper has limited its analysis to three key components of bargaining power. Future works can study other aspects of bargaining power, namely information asymmetry, learning curve, inside options, etc. Further, the paper has considered an infinite horizon model – this assumption can be relaxed in future research. Practical implications Equations to derive optimal split of the surplus have been derived and can be leveraged to design an autonomous bargaining agent to discover equilibrium profit splits in a cloud or e-commerce setting. Further, insights from this paper can be leveraged by managers to understand their relative bargaining power and drive to obtain the best profit split. Originality/value This paper establishes that impatience (in terms of counter-offer probability) has a significant impact on the bargaining position and on the split of the surplus that the firm can get for themselves. It establishes the advantage of higher levels of impatience, provided the other party recognizes the impatience and factors it in their decision-making process.
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Kozina, Andrzej. "Evaluation of Bargaining Power." Management and Business Administration. Central Europe 22, no. 3 (September 14, 2014): 72–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.7206/mba.ce.2084-3356.108.

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BEALE, HUGH. "INEQUALITY OF BARGAINING POWER." Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 6, no. 1 (1986): 123–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/6.1.123.

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KU, GILLIAN. "THE POWER OF BARGAINING." London Business School Review 28, no. 3 (October 2017): 14–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/2057-1615.12186.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Bargaining power"

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Scarpa, Carlo. "Industry regulation when firms have bargaining power." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.305013.

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Sung, Hankyoung. "Essays on veto bargaining games." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1149696640.

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Aniol, Deborah. "The Inequality of bargaining power in consumer contracts." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/53151.

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Freedom and sanctity of contract are principles well found in our law, however, true freedom of contract has become undermined with the increased use of standard-form contracts and this has an effect on equality. An important feature of the supreme law of the country, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, is the principle of equality, which is provided for in section 9. The application of this principle has a significant effect on contract law. Inequality of bargaining power occurs when the terms and provisions of a contract are unfair, unjust and unreasonable. This is the case when a term is excessively one-sided or provides for a provision that is adverse to the consumer. The case is the same where one party is afforded greater protection while the other is defenseless. There is a possibility that the Consumer Protection Act, 68 of 2008 (the CPA ), in trying to promote equal bargaining power, has caused the opposite to happen. The consumer has now been afforded with greater protection and more rights. It is perhaps possible to conclude that, whether the contract will continue is now more strongly determined by the consumer, even though the supplier has fulfilled his obligations in terms of the CPA. A party to a contract who enjoys a large amount of bargaining power in comparison to the other party to the contract may be able to persuade others to act while they themselves do very little or nothing at all.
Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2015.
Private Law
LLM
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Molina, Hugo. "Essays on vertical relationships, bargaining power, and competition policy." Thesis, Université Paris-Saclay (ComUE), 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018SACLX020/document.

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Dans de nombreuses industries, les producteurs doivent passer par des intermédiaires afin de distribuer leurs produits sur les marchés. Par exemple, dans le secteur de la grande distribution alimentaire, les producteurs vendent leurs produits à des distributeurs qui ont un accès direct aux consommateurs finaux; dans les secteurs de la santé, les fournisseurs de soins médicaux (e.g., les hôpitaux) traitent avec les assureurs afin d’avoir accès aux patients. Toutes ces industries sont souvent caractérisées par une structure oligopolistique bilatérale avec un petit nombre d'entreprises opérant sur les deux côtés du marché, impliquant des relations commerciales complexes entre les acteurs. En effet, les externalités contractuelles sont omniprésentes dans ce type d’environnement puisque la valeur générée par une transaction et partagée entre un fabricant et un détaillant dépend généralement des décisions contractuelles des autres entreprises opérant sur le marché. Un certain nombre de pratiques, communément appelées « restrictions verticales », peuvent également survenir, telles que des contrats d'exclusivité, des pratiques de ventes liées, ou bien des fixations de prix de revente. En outre, les conditions tarifaires sont principalement déterminées par un processus de négociation entre les entreprises. L’objet de ma recherche consiste à analyser comment les relations verticales entre entreprises dans un contexte aussi complexe que celui des oligopoles bilatéraux peuvent avoir un impact sur le surplus du consommateur et le bon fonctionnement de l’industrie. Dans le premier chapitre de ma thèse, j’élabore un modèle d’économétrie structurelle afin d’analyser empiriquement les relations producteur- distributeur dans des oligopoles bilatéraux avec produits différenciés. L’approche contraste avec la plupart des méthodes empiriques antérieures et permet d’identifier la division du surplus entre les entreprises sans la nécessité d’avoir des données sur les contrats de gros et les coûts marginaux des firmes. Le deuxième chapitre se concentre sur l’étude des effets générés par la formation d’alliances entre distributeurs pour négocier des tarifs communs et acheter des produits auprès de leurs fournisseurs. En utilisant des données d’achats sur les eaux embouteillées réalisés par un panel de consommateurs représentatif de la population Française, j'estime un modèle structurel de demande et d'offre. Je réalise ensuite des simulations pour étudier les effets de trois alliances formées par des distributeurs dans le secteur de la distribution alimentaire en France. Les résultats montrent que le pouvoir de négociation des distributeurs est affaibli, le profit total de l'industrie diminue, et que les consommateurs finaux font face à des prix plus élevés. Le troisième chapitre de cette thèse analyse la pratique du «full-line forcing» comme mécanisme d’éviction sur les marchés verticalement liées. Je considère un modèle dans lequel un producteur multi-produit offre une marque leader et une marque secondaire sur laquelle il est en concurrence avec une entreprise plus efficace. Le modèle permet de mettre en évidence que le « full-line forcing » est une stratégie de négociation efficace car elle permet au producteur multi-produit d’influer sur les points de menace dans les négociations et d’imposer son portefeuille de marques sur les étagères du distributeur, excluant ainsi le producteur concurrent. Cette stratégie émerge à l’équilibre sous trois conditions : (i) la marque leader de l’entreprise multi-produit est suffisamment forte, (ii) son inefficacité sur la marque secondaire n’est pas trop sévère, et (iii) le fournisseur concurrent est assez puissant dans sa négociation avec le distributeur. Les résultats suggèrent que les consommateurs finaux et le bien-être total peuvent être réduit alors que, dans certains cas, le distributeur bénéficie d’une telle stratégie d’éviction
In many economic environments, producers need to deal with intermediaries to supply their products on markets. Examples include grocery markets in which food manufacturers sell their products to retailers who have direct access to final consumers; pharmaceutical industries where manufacturers distribute their drugs on markets through drugstores; multichannel television industries where cable channels sell their programs to multichannel video program distributors who then charge fees to consumers; private healthcare sectors in which medical providers (e.g., hospitals) deal with insurers to have access to sick patients. One particular feature of such industries is that they are often characterized by a bilateral oligopolistic structure with a small number of firms operating on both sides of the market, resulting in complex vertical relationships. Contracting externalities are indeed intrinsic to such environments because the value generated by a transaction and shared between a manufacturer and a retailer generally depends on the contracting decisions of other firms operating on the market. A number of practices, commonly referred to as vertical restraints, may also arise such as exclusive dealing, bundling and tying, resale price maintenance, or quantity discounts. Furthermore, trading terms are mostly determined through a bargaining process between upstream and downstream firms rather than being fixed by one-side of the market. My research consists in analyzing how vertical relationships between firms in such complex settings impact consumer surplus and total welfare. To this end, I rely on both theoretical models and empirical methods to derive predictions of the effects of contractual arrangements within the supply chain. In the first chapter of this dissertation I design a structural framework to analyze manufacturer-retailer relationships in bilateral oligopolies with differentiated products. Our approach contrasts with most prior empirical models of bargaining and allows to identify the division of surplus between firms without data on wholesale contracts and marginal costs. The second chapter investigates the economic effects of alliances formed by retailers to negotiate common prices and purchase products from manufacturers. I use household- level scanner data on bottled water purchases and estimate a structural model of demand and supply. I perform simulations to study the economic effects of three buyer alliances that have been formed by competing retailers in the French food retail sector. Results show that the bargaining power of retailers is weakened, total industry profit decreases, and final consumers face higher prices. The third chapter examines the case of full-line forcing as a foreclosure device in vertically related markets. We consider a setting in which a multi-product manufacturer offers a leading brand and a secondary brand for which it competes with a more efficient single-product firm. We show that full-line forcing is an efficient bargaining strategy as it allows the multi-product manufacturer to affect threat points and impose its brand portfolio on the retailer’s shelves therefore excluding the rival supplier. This strategy arises in equilibrium under three conditions (i) the leading brand of the multi- product firm is strong enough, (ii) the inefficiency on the secondary brand is not too severe, and (iii) the rival supplier is powerful enough in its bargaining with the retailer. Our results suggest that final consumers and total welfare may be harmed whereas, in some cases, the retailer benefits from such a foreclosure strategy
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Magar, Eric. "Bully pulpits : posturing, bargaining, and polarization in the legislative process of the Americas /." Diss., Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC IP addresses, 2001. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3026372.

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Dasgupta, Poulomi. "Essays on Intra-Household Bargaining Power of Women in India." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/73304.

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This thesis investigates the factors that affect women's bargaining power within the household, in India. The first chapter introduces the literature on household bargaining mostly by describing how household outcomes like children's health indicators and expenditure pattern change with increase in resources under women's control. The second chapter describes the conceptual framework for intra-household bargaining. It discusses the two broad topics – household bargaining models and gendered institutions, that can be used to identify avenues for increasing women's bargaining power within the household. In chapters three and four, I analyze the factors that determine women's power position, using data on women's involvement in household decision making from a nationally representative longitudinal household survey (India Human Development Survey). The survey was conducted in over 40,000 Indian households, which covers over 200,000 individuals. In the third chapter, I investigate the effect of women's labor force participation on her involvement in household decision making. After addressing the issues of endogeneity using a fixed effects model, I find that her labor market participation significantly increases her involvement in decision making process, which can be seen as a direct outcome of her increased bargaining power. In my fourth chapter I analyze whether the women's bargaining power within the household increases with the presence of female politicians at both state and local level. Studying the causal impact of a variable like female political representation is generally riddled with concerns of endogeneity for existence of voter preference. Using share of seats won by women in man-woman close elections as an instrument for overall female representation in in a fixed effect model, I show that an increase in number of female state legislators can actually lead to an increase in the bargaining power of women. This chapter further shows that increase in women's involvement in decision making process in the household is also associated with the female political representation at local level. The fifth chapter concludes the dissertation by making policy recommendation for strengthening women's bargaining position within the household.
Ph. D.
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Louw, Melt. "Unequal bargaining power : time to reconsider the exceptio doli generalis?" Diss., University of Pretoria, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/73457.

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An overview of the concept of unequal bargaining power in the realm of contract law and if, when bargaining power is abused, the exceptio doli generalise offered an acceptable remedy.
Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoriua, 2019.
Private Law
LLM
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Sato, Yasuhiro. "Bargaining Power of Landlords and Underdevelopment in a System of Cities." Blackwell, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/2237/7160.

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Ndackson, Danjuma. "Response to foreign investment regulations in Nigeria : the bargaining power model." Thesis, University of Strathclyde, 1987. http://oleg.lib.strath.ac.uk:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=21495.

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The interest for this research developed from the researcher's observation of host countries' policies (particularly developing countries) towards foreign direct investments. Available literature identify five main categories (though not mutually distinguishable) of host country policies: expropriatory, regulatory, receptive, promotional, and open-door policies. In this research, we are concerned with regulatory (control) policies. The response of MNCs to regulatory policies is identified to comprise of two stages: initial behaviour to 'conflict' (the policy), and the exploitation of (ownership) advantages. An MNC's initial behaviour could be competitive, collaborative, accommodative, compromising, or avoidant. Where the MNC adopts a compromising behaviour, bargaining as a means of resolving the 'conflict' is pursued. Whether this takes place or not in resolving the 'conflict', the MNC is likely to look back (assess) on what its ownership advantages are, vis-a-vis the host-country's location advantages, and then act on the basis of this assessment. Nigeria, like any other host country has economic policies, some of which affect MNCs. These include the Business Permit / Immigration Act, 1963; the Companies Decree, 1968; the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees, 1972 and 1977; the Local Sourcing Policy; etc. This research considers the factors influencing the response of MNCs to three of these policies: indigenization of ownership; nigerianization of management; and the local sourcing of raw materials. Four host-country characteristics and five MNC characteristics were hypothetically chosen as influential in the firms' response to each of the policies. The host country characteristics are: Nigeria's market attractiveness, availability of needed raw materials in Nigeria, availability of required human resources in Nigeria, and competition in the firm's industry in Nigeria. The MNC characteristics are: the firm's technological intensity, export intensity, complexity of managerial and operational tasks, size, and age. The major research findings are: (a) Most of the firms in the sample were collaborative in their behaviour in all the policies. (b) The most important (actually, the only) host country characteristic that significantly influenced the response of firms to the policies was Nigeria's market attractiveness. (c) The most important MNC characteristic that influenced the firms' response to the policies was their technology. (d) Contrary to popular opinion, this research found that important MNC characteristics encouraged or made firms to remain in Nigeria as well as comply with government policy, rather than making them arrogant or delay compliance. (e) All the firms in the study indicated that they had complied with the policies. Survey results were complemented with case studies. And the findings from the cases support all the above.
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Yang, Min Li. "Bargaining power, ownership and control of international joint ventures in Taiwan." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2006. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1443/.

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This thesis provides an empirical analysis of international joint venture activities in Taiwan. The primary purpose is to examine control and its antecedents in terms of ownership, bargaining power, resources contribution, and motivation for forming international joint ventures. Primary data collected by a mail questionnaire is analysed along five core dimensions of international joint venture activities. First, the mechanism, focus, and extent of parent control is identified and tested in a number of sample characteristics. These empirical results also reveal that most joint ventures in Taiwan have higher autonomy and have more autonomy on the appointment of key function managers. Parent firms seek to focus their control over specific activities of the joint ventures rather than attempting to control the entire range of joint venture activities. Second, the results of equity shares held by the host country parents and foreign parents show that both parents have minority shareholding in the joint ventures. A higher ownership by the parents in joint ventures indicates that they have a higher percentage of board members. Third, the relative importance of a set of bargaining power is identified with hypothesis testing of the relationship between control and bargaining power. There is little evidence that the relationship between bargaining power and control is not closely associated. Fourth, the relative importance of resource contribution by parents is identified and hypotheses are tested on the relationship between control and resource contribution factors. The results are strongly supported that the relationships between resource contributions in terms of physical, invisible, financial, human, and organizational ability of parents and their control has significant and positive associations. Fifth, the relative importance of a set of motives for international joint venture formation is identified and hypotheses are tested on the relationship between control and motivation factors in terms of technological acquisition, knowledge learning, risk sharing, competitive strategy consideration, resource complementarily, market expansion. The findings reveal a limited number of significant correlations between motivation factors and control.
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Books on the topic "Bargaining power"

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Smith, Verna. Bargaining Power. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7602-2.

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Bargaining power. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.

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Epstein, Richard Allen. Bargaining with the state. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1993.

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Blanchflower, David. Insider power in wage determination. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1989.

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Lockwood, Ben. Tax incidence, market power, and bargaining structure. London: Birkbeck College, 1989.

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Kidding ourselves: Breadwinning, babies, and bargaining power. New York, NY: BasicBooks, 1995.

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Power plays: Bargaining tactics for transforming South Africa. Halfway House [South Africa]: Southern Book Publishers, 1991.

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Laruelle, Annick. Voting and collective decision-making: Bargaining and power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

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Friedberg, Leora. Determinants and consequences of bargaining power in households. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.

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Sanfey, Peter J. Changes in union bargaining power in Britain, 1971-1989. Canterbury: University of Kent at Canterbury, 1993.

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Book chapters on the topic "Bargaining power"

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Smith, Verna. "A Tale of Two Countries." In Bargaining Power, 1–8. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7602-2_1.

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Smith, Verna. "Analysing Public Policy: Does Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework Help?" In Bargaining Power, 9–20. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7602-2_2.

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Smith, Verna. "A Comparison of the English and New Zealand General Practice Sub-Systems." In Bargaining Power, 21–31. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7602-2_3.

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Smith, Verna. "England: Context and the Quality and Outcomes Framework." In Bargaining Power, 33–57. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7602-2_4.

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Smith, Verna. "Utility of Kingdon’s Framework: Policymaking in England." In Bargaining Power, 59–74. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7602-2_5.

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Smith, Verna. "New Zealand: Context and the Performance Programme." In Bargaining Power, 75–109. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7602-2_6.

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Smith, Verna. "Utility of Kingdon’s Framework: Policymaking in New Zealand." In Bargaining Power, 111–23. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7602-2_7.

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Smith, Verna. "The Two Case Studies Compared." In Bargaining Power, 125–51. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7602-2_8.

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Smith, Verna. "Conclusion." In Bargaining Power, 153–55. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7602-2_9.

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Kenyon, Susan M. "Bargaining with Power." In Spirits and Slaves in Central Sudan, 147–62. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137027504_8.

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Conference papers on the topic "Bargaining power"

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Yuanyuan, Chen, and Heng Cheng Suang. "Contract renegotiation and bargaining power." In the 14th Annual International Conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2346536.2346581.

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Hidajat, Taofik. "Pandemic, Lender Risk and Borrower Bargaining Power." In The 3rd International Conference on Banking, Accounting, Management and Economics (ICOBAME 2020). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.210311.010.

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Cao, Qian, Yindi Jing, and H. Vicky Zhao. "Power bargaining in multi-source relay networks." In ICC 2012 - 2012 IEEE International Conference on Communications. IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icc.2012.6364426.

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Sanguanpuak, Tachporn, and R. M. A. P. Rajatheva. "Power bargaining for amplify and forward relay channel." In 2009 Fourth International Conference on Communications and Networking in China (CHINACOM). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/chinacom.2009.5339958.

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Kim, Jong-Kyu, Kwon-Hee Lee, Abdul Halim Hakim, Pandian Vasant, and Nader Barsoum. "ROBUST DESIGN FOR A COUPLED SYSTEM, USING BARGAINING FUNCTION." In POWER CONTROL AND OPTIMIZATION: Proceedings of the Second Global Conference on Power Control and Optimization. AIP, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.3223924.

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Zehavi, Ephraim, and Amir Leshem. "Bargaining over the interference channel with total power constraints." In 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks (GameNets). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/gamenets.2009.5137431.

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Mhiri, Mariem, Karim Cheikhrouhou, and Abdelaziz Samet. "Power control in a cognitive radio system using bargaining theory." In 2012 International Symposium on Communications and Information Technologies (ISCIT). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iscit.2012.6380927.

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Duan, Bowen, Yueming Cai, Jianchao Zheng, and Wendong Yang. "Cooperative jammer power allocation — A Nash bargaining solution method." In 2015 International Conference on Wireless Communications & Signal Processing (WCSP). IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/wcsp.2015.7341069.

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Ma, Lijun, and Yingxue Zhao. "Channel Bargaining with Fairness-concerned Agents under Power-form Demand." In 2012 Fifth International Conference on Business Intelligence and Financial Engineering (BIFE). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/bife.2012.29.

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Rajkovska, Mihaela, and Mijalche Santa. "Method for More Successful Usage of Airbnb by Hosts and Guests in Developing Countries." In Digital Restructuring and Human (Re)action. University of Maribor Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.18690/um.fov.4.2022.27.

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In this paper we aim to propose a method for more successful usage of Airbnb platform by the hosts and guests in North Macedonia. To achieve this, we have performed qualitative research and interviewed twenty individuals. The collected data was analyzed through grounded theorizing. Based on the analysis we identified that the dimensions under which the hosts have most control and through which can impact the value perception of the guests is the bargaining power they have. To increase the bargaining power, we have identified steps that the hosts should follow. These proposals are empirically based and practically useful.
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Reports on the topic "Bargaining power"

1

Ali, S. Nageeb, B. Douglas Bernheim, and Xiaochen Fan. Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w20011.

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Friedberg, Leora, and Anthony Webb. Determinants and Consequences of Bargaining Power in Households. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12367.

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Alviarez, Vanessa, Michele Fioretti, Ken Kikkawa, and Monica Morlacco. Two-Sided Market Power in Firm-to-Firm Trade. Inter-American Development Bank, April 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0004746.

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We develop a quantitative theory of prices in firm-to-firm trade with bilateral negotiations and two-sided market power. Markups reflect oligopoly and oligopsony forces, with relative bargaining power as weight. Cost pass-through elasticities into import prices can be incomplete or complete, depending on the exporters and importers bargaining power and market shares. In U.S. import data, we find that U.S. importers have substantial market power and disproportionate leverage in price negotiations. The estimated model produces accurate predictions of the impact of Trump tariffs on pair-level prices. At the aggregate level, ignoring two-sided market power could exaggerate tariff pass-through by about 60 percent.
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Bowen, Renee, Ilwoo Hwang, and Stefan Krasa. Agenda-Setter Power Dynamics: Learning in Multi-Issue Bargaining. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w27981.

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Novella, Rafael, Laura Ripani, Guillermo Cruces, and Maria Laura Alzuá. Conditional Cash Transfers, Female Bargaining Power and Parental Labour Supply. Inter-American Development Bank, November 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0011426.

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Recent empirical evidence has indicated that Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) do not have an aggregate effect on adult labour supply, however little attention has been paid to the role of other intrahousehold dynamics. This paper examines how the bargaining power structure of households affects the parental labour supply response to CCT programmes. We analyse randomized experimental designs from rural areas of Honduras (PRAF), Mexico (PROGRESA), and Nicaragua (RPS), and find that CCT programmes slightly change paternal and maternal labour supply and that this effect depends on the distribution of power in the household.
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Pollak, Robert. Bargaining Power in Marriage: Earnings, Wage Rates and Household Production. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w11239.

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Beckert, Walter. Empirical analysis of countervailing power in business-to-business bargaining. Institute for Fiscal Studies, November 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1920/wp.cem.2011.3211.

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Cassidy, Rachel. The power to protect: household bargaining and female condom use. CSAE, July 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1920/wp.ifs.2018.0818.

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Alviarez, Vanessa, Michele Fioretti, Ken Kikkawa, and Monica Morlacco. Two-Sided Market Power in Firm-to-Firm Trade. Inter-American Development Bank, August 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0003493.

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Firms in global value chains (GVCs) are granular and exert bargaining power over the terms of trade. We show that these features are crucial to understanding the well-established variation in prices and pass-through across importers and exporters. We develop a novel theory of prices in GVCs, which tractably nests a wide range of bilateral concentration and bargaining power configurations. We test and evaluate the models predictions using a novel dataset merging transaction-level U.S. import data with balance sheet data for both U.S. importers and foreign exporters. Our pricing framework enhances traditional frameworks in the literature in accurately predicting price changes following a tariff shock. The results shed light on the role of firms in determining the tariff pass-through onto import prices.
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Zhang, Weilong, Cameron Peng, and Ran Gu. The gender gap in household bargaining power: a portfolio-choice approach. The IFS, May 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1920/wp.ifs.2021.1121.

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