Relevant bibliographies by topics / Bargaining

Academic literature on the topic 'Bargaining'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 22 June 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "Bargaining"

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Heumann, Milton. "Back to the Future: The Centrality of Plea Bargaining in the Criminal Justice System." Canadian journal of law and society 18, no. 2 (August 2003): 133–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0829320100007754.

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Using Professor George Fisher's wonderful new book, Plea Bargaining's Triumph as a springboard and roadmap for a journey into plea bargaining's past and present status, this brief essay will attempt to build a theory accounting for the centrality of plea bargaining in today's—and tomorrow's—criminal justice system. By looking back, Fisher illuminates the present, and suggests a future for plea bargaining in the disposition of the cases. His analysis ends with “plea bargaining's triumph;” with its emergence as the single most important (and powerful) factor in the disposition of criminal cases. I will applaud, but qualify his arguments and speculate about “plea bargaining's future.” His looking back, led him to conclude that plea bargaining coopted or caused most criminal justice innovations of the past two decades, and that almost anthropomorphically, it emerged victorious. His understanding of the “causes” of plea bargaining's centrality deserves applause along with qualification; his painting of a picture of plea bargaining “victory” is correct, and is fruitfully linked to a future informed by his understanding of a past.First, some general ground rules for what I will and will not do in this essay. I will not systematically or exhaustively summarize Fisher's arguments, nor will I referee the disagreements he surfaced with the respect to the work of many major studies of plea bargaining and its history. Suffice it to say that this is a very careful historical study of the origins of plea bargaining, and that it primarily relies on a very detailed and very, very careful analysis of the court records of Middlesex County, Mass., mostly for cases disposed of in the 19th century. Based on these data, and secondary analyses of data from studies of plea bargaining in other jurisdictions, Fisher builds a theory of the growth of plea bargaining that is sometimes original, always engaging, and inevitably provocative. Though I take issue with some of his arguments, he must be lauded for the care and clarity of his presentation, and for the enormous literature he uses to develop and support his case.
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Toit, Pierre Du. "Bargaining about Bargaining." Journal of Conflict Resolution 33, no. 2 (June 1989): 210–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002789033002002.

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Philips, Paul. "Theoretical Problems of Public Interest Sector Industrial Relations." Relations industrielles 31, no. 4 (April 12, 2005): 566–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/028743ar.

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This paper develops a simple industry bargaing model with explicit consideration of the determinants of the bargaining range and the narrowing of that range over time as a function of perceived bargaining power and costs of settlement. The model is then applied to the public-interest sector under altered assumptions of costs of settlement and the introduction of political influences in the determination of bargaining paths. The impact of third party intervention is considered in both the industry and public-interest sector cases.
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Serrano, Roberto, and Rajiv Vohra. "Bargaining and Bargaining Sets." Games and Economic Behavior 39, no. 2 (May 2002): 292–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0895.

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Forrest, Anne. "Bargaining Units and Bargaining Power." Discussion 41, no. 4 (April 12, 2005): 840–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/050264ar.

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Majumder, Boivob. "Plea Bargaining — A Comparative Study of India with Foreign Countries." Theory and Practice of Forensic Science and Criminalistics 29, no. 4 (April 18, 2023): 47–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.32353/khrife.4.2022.03.

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Plea bargaining has become more popular as a means of settling court issues all around the world. Plea bargaining’s application, scope, and operation change significantly between common law and civil law regimes. To analyze these differences in regard to different jurisdictions, a comparison between India and the USA (their plea bargaining) has been done in this study. The relative benefits and drawbacks of plea bargaining are up for debate. This is because it is argued that plea bargaining calls into question the primary goals of a trial, which are to establish the truth and uphold justice. It is without dispute that India needs a framework for speedy justice administration. Indian courts are being battered by the rise in criminal cases. Prisons are now overflowing with inmates who are being held without a trial due to the ongoing delays in case resolution. India has developed plea bargaining (as a response to this sad status of the judicial system), which was acknowledged as a trustworthy strategy for concluding open cases and accelerating the criminal justice system. According to the then-Chief Justice of India, Y. K. Sabharwal (2005-2007), the introduction of plea bargaining in India would not only expedite the criminal justice system but also serve as a restorative form of justice where victims would be equal stakeholders and receive sufficient compensation. However, despite years of conceptualization, the Indian criminal justice system has yet to adopt plea bargaining. The paper attempts to research whether plea bargaining in India in its present form and structure is adequate to achieve that goal by weighing its advantages and disadvantages in the context of the Indian judicial system. Given the above, it is proposed to introduce changes to this contemporary dispute resolution mechanism.
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Busch, Lutz-Alexander, and Ignatius J. Horstmann. "Bargaining Frictions, Bargaining Procedures and Implied Costs in Multiple-Issue Bargaining." Economica 64, no. 256 (November 1997): 669–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0335.00105.

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Johnson, Danette Ifert. "Bargaining simulation: applying bargaining plans and strategies." Communication Teacher 18, no. 2 (April 2004): 57–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1740462042000191937.

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Eraslan, Hülya, and Kirill S. Evdokimov. "Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining." Annual Review of Economics 11, no. 1 (August 2, 2019): 443–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080218-025633.

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This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the extensions to bargaining among asymmetric players in terms of bargaining power, voting weights, and time and risk preferences; spatial bargaining; bargaining over a stochastic surplus; bargaining over public goods; legislative bargaining with alternative bargaining protocols in which players make demands, compete for recognition, or make counterproposals; and legislative bargaining with cheap talk communication.
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Schwarz, Joshua L., Neil W. Chamberlain, and James W. Kuhn. "Collective Bargaining." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 40, no. 3 (April 1987): 444. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2523501.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Bargaining"

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Kohnz, Simone. "Bargaining Impasse." Diss., lmu, 2006. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-49705.

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Muthoo, Abhinay. "Bargaining theory." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.257214.

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Wu, Hanji. "Finite Bargaining Problems." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2007. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/econ_diss/32.

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Bargaining is a process to decide how to divide shared resources between two or more players. And axiomatic bargaining specifies desirable and simple properties the outcome of the bargaining should satisfy and identifies the solution that produces this outcome. This approach was first developed by John Nash in his seminal work(Nash 1950). Since then, numerous studies have been done on bargaining problems with convex feasible set or with non-convex but comprehensive feasible set. There is, however, little work on finite bargaining problems. In this dissertation, we study finite bargaining problems systematically by extending the standard bargaining model to the one consisting of all finite bargaining problems. For our bargaining problems, we first propose the Nash, Maximin, Leximin, Maxiproportionalmin, Lexiproportianlmin solutions, which are the counterparts of those that have been studied extensively in both convex and non-convex but comprehensive problems. We then axiomatically characterize these solutions in our context. We next introduce two new solutions, the maximin-utilitarian solution and the utilitarian-maximin solution, each of which combines the maximin solution and utilitarian solution in different ways. The maximin-utilitarian solution selects the alternatives from the maximin solution that have the greatest sum of individuals’ utilities, and the utilitarian-maximin solution selects the maximin alternatives from the utilitarian solution. These two solutions attempt to combine two important but very different ethical principles to produce compromised solutions to bargaining problems. Finally, we discuss several variants of the egalitarian solution. The egalitarian solution in finite bargaining problems is more complicated than its counterpart in either convex or non-convex but comprehensive bargaining problems. Given its complexity in our context, we start our inquiry by investigating two-person, finite bargaining problems, and then extend some of the analysis to n-person, finite bargaining problems. Our analysis of finite bargaining problems and axiomatic characterizations of the extensions of various standard solutions of convex/non-convex but comprehensive bargaining problems to finite bargaining problems will shed new light on the behavior of these solutions. Our new solutions will expand our understanding of the bargaining theory and distributive justice from a different perspective.
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Nabarro, Joseph Jonathan Nunes. "Good faith in bargaining." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.304397.

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Christiansen, Nels Peter. "Essays on Legislative Bargaining." The Ohio State University, 2009. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1243969494.

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Ozkardas, Ahmet. "Essays on wage bargaining." Thesis, Paris 1, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA010079.

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Cette dissertation de doctorat développe des contributions importantes à la littérature sur la négociation salariale. Nous introduisons des taux d’actualisation variant dans le temps pour les modèles de négociation salariale afin de modéliser des situations réelles d’une manière plus précise. Dans le Chapitre 1, nous présentons les objectifs principaux de cette dissertation. Dans le Chapitre 2, nous offrons un bref aperçu de la littérature sur les modèles de négociation, plus précisément des modèles de négociation salariale. Nous rappelons les approches axiomatiques et stratégiques des modèles de négociation et étudions en détail l’approche stratégique des modèles de négociation salariale. Dans le Chapitre 3, nous étudions le modèle de négociation salariale avec des préférences qui varient dans le temps. Tout d’abord, nous analysons les équilibres en sous-jeu parfait dans le modèle, d’autre part, nous déterminons les gains d’équilibre en sous-jeux parfaits des parties. Par ailleurs, nous étudions les équilibres inefficaces dans le modèle. Dans le Chapitre 4, nous étudions quelques extensions du modèle de négociation salariale généralisé. Premièrement, nous analysons les négociations salariales avec les actions de “go-slow” et étudions les gains d’équilibre en sous-jeux parfaits. Par ailleurs, nous étudions un modèle de négociation salariale où la firme a l’option de “lockouts”. Dans le Chapitre 5, nous appliquons les modèles de négociation de salaires généralisés aux problèmes de la vie réelle, comme les négociations de prix. Dans le Chapitre 6, nous présentons les conclusions et donnons de nouvelles perspectives à nos recherches futures
This Ph.D. dissertation develops important contributions to the literature on wage bargaining. We introduce discount rates varying in time to the wage bargaining models in order to model real life situations in a more accurate way. In Chapter 1, we state the main objectives of this dissertation. In Chapter 2, we deliver a brief literature overview of bargaining models, more precisely wage bargaining models. We recall axiomatic and strategic approaches to bargaining and then describe in details strategic approach to wage bargaining models. In Chapter 3, we investigate the wage bargaining model with preferences varying in time. First, we analyze subgame perfect equilibria in the model and then determine the subgame perfect equilibria payoffs of the parties. Furthermore, we study the inefficient equilibria in the model. In Chapter 4, we investigate some extensions of the generalized wage bargaining model. First, we analyze wage bargaining with the go-slow actions of the union and study the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. Next, we investigate a wage bargaining model where the firm has the lockout option. In Chapter 5, we apply the generalized wage bargaining models to real life problems, such as price negotiations. In Chapter 6, we present conclusions and give new insights to our future research
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Gómez, Natalia González. "Three essays on bargaining : On refutability of the Nash bargaining solution; On inter- and intra-party politics; A bargaining model with strategic generosity." Thesis, University of Warwick, 2012. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/56815/.

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This dissertation is a collection of three essays that share one common feature: all three of them relate to the literature on Bargaining. The first and second essay are joint work with my supervisor, Professor Andrés Carvajal. In our first essay we investigate the testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution. We develop polynomial tests of the NBS under different hypothesis about the default levels. For instance, with, and without observation from the outside econometrician of the levels of utility that the individuals would have obtained outside the negotiation. We use the Tarski-Seindenberg algorithm to characterize rationalizable data as those that satisfy a finite system of polynomial inequalities. In our second essay we introduce a new equilibrium concept for games of political competition. We model electoral competition within each party, assuming inner-party members have somewhat conflicting preferences. By using the bargaining protocol à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989) we explicitly model party members’ strategic interactions, their incentives and their decision of whom to elect. Our equilibrium concept attempts to model each member’s decision as if each player were uncertain about, (i) the faction that will eventually dominate the decision made by the other party and (ii) the faction that will dominate in the party’s nomination. In the last essay I focus on one of the classical problems in bargaining: the divide the dollar problem. In our framework we assume players’ utility functions mirror selfish and Rawlsian preferences. We derive the set of subgame perfect equilibria for different arrangements of player types and study why strategic generosity emerges under the bargaining protocol we assume.
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Sung, Hankyoung. "Essays on veto bargaining games." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1149696640.

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Segendorff, Björn. "Essays on bargaining and delegation." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Samhällsekonomi (S), 1998. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-666.

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This dissertation consists of three essays. Essay 1: Delegation and Threat in Bargaining.Two principals ("nations") appoint one agent each to bargain over the provision of a public good. Two institutional set-ups are studied, each with a different level of authority given to the agents. Here authority means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals choose agents with preferences differing from their own. The low-authority equilibrium Pareto dominates (with regard to the principals) the case of the principals deciding on the provisions simultaneously (autarchy). The high-authority equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the low-authority equilibrium and it may even be dominated by autarchy. Essay 2: Delegation of Bargaining and Power.Two principals simultaneously appoint one agent each and decide how much power to give to their agents. The agents' task is to bargain over the provision of a public good. Power here means the right to decide the own side's provision if negotiations break down. In equilibrium the principals delegate to agents that are relatively disinterested in the public good and give them all power. The fact that both principals have the possibility to delegate is, in equilibrium, harmful to at least one of them. The equilibrium may even be Pareto dominated by the outcome under autarchy. Essay 3: Labor- and Product-Market Structure and Excess Labour.This study analyzes under what labor- and product-market structures a firm may hire more labor than needed to produce its profit maximizing output. Three labor-market structures are studied: (1) decentralized (firm-specific unions), (2) one-sided centralization (central union and several firms), and (3) centralized (central union and employers' association). Excess labor is explained by the risk-sharing motive that in the model exists between the risk-averse workers and the risk-neutral firm owner. Labor may be excessively hired in any of the labor-market structures and under a wide range of product-market structures; duopoly, oligopoly etc.
Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 1998
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Pichler, Eva. "Union Wage Bargaining and Status." Inst. für Volkswirtschaftstheorie und -politik, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 1991. http://epub.wu.ac.at/6281/1/WP_8.pdf.

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The paper investigates the nexus between the structure of union wage bargaining and workers' preferences for status, which is measured by relative wages. For two types of workers it is shown that due to externalities on the other group's status wages of both types of workers will be lower if an encompassing union negotiates for the whole workforce than if different groups of workers are unionized separately. Moreover, unemployment will be reduced by the central union relative to separate negotiations even if unions are not concerned with employment effects of wage negotiations at all.
Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series
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Books on the topic "Bargaining"

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Pemberton, James. Bargaining structure and bargaining outcomes. Reading: University of Reading. Department of Economics, 1989.

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Karagözoğlu, Emin, and Kyle B. Hyndman, eds. Bargaining. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5.

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The bargaining. New York: Simon Pulse, 2015.

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Smith, Verna. Bargaining Power. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-7602-2.

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Napel, Stefan. Bilateral Bargaining. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56160-3.

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Collective bargaining. Albany, N.Y: New York State School Boards Association, 1999.

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Plea bargaining. 3rd ed. Huntington, N.Y: Juris, 2012.

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Yildiz, Muhamet. Walrasian bargaining. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2001.

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Chamberlain, Neil W. Collective bargaining. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986.

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Chamberlain, NeilW. Collective bargaining. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986.

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Book chapters on the topic "Bargaining"

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Dindaroğlu, Burak, and Seda Ertac. "Field Experiments in Bargaining." In Bargaining, 343–64. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_16.

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Fuchs, William, and Andrzej Skrzypacz. "Dynamic Bargaining with Private Information." In Bargaining, 61–86. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_4.

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Karagözoğlu, Emin, and Kyle B. Hyndman. "Introduction." In Bargaining, 1–7. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_1.

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Backus, Matthew, Thomas Blake, and Steven Tadelis. "Bargaining in Online Markets." In Bargaining, 365–85. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_17.

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Eraslan, Hülya, Kirill S. Evdokimov, and Jan Zápal. "Dynamic Legislative Bargaining." In Bargaining, 151–75. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_8.

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Isoni, Andrea, Robert Sugden, and Jiwei Zheng. "Focal Points in Experimental Bargaining Games." In Bargaining, 109–30. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_6.

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Recalde, María P., and Lise Vesterlund. "Gender Differences in Negotiation and Policy for Equalizing Outcomes." In Bargaining, 455–75. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_21.

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Feltovich, Nick, and Nejat Anbarcı. "Market Institutions, Prices and Distribution of Surplus: A Theoretical and Experimental Investigation." In Bargaining, 203–25. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_10.

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Yürükoğlu, Ali. "Empirical Models of Bargaining with Externalities in IO and Trade." In Bargaining, 227–47. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_11.

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Rachmilevitch, Shiran. "Between Utilitarianism and Egalitarianism: Some Ethical Aspects of the Nash Bargaining Solution." In Bargaining, 131–50. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_7.

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Conference papers on the topic "Bargaining"

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Chakraborty, Tanmoy, Michael Kearns, and Sanjeev Khanna. "Network bargaining." In the tenth ACM conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1566374.1566398.

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Dai, Xianhua, Hong Li, and Xing Tong. "Efficient Strategic Bargaining." In 2011 International Conference on Management and Service Science (MASS 2011). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmss.2011.5998130.

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Apolloni, Bruno, Aamna Al Shehhi, and Ernesto Damiani. "Bargaining Compatible Explanations." In 2019 IEEE International Conference on Cognitive Computing (ICCC). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iccc.2019.00028.

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Heddaya, Mourad, Solomon Dworkin, Chenhao Tan, Rob Voigt, and Alexander Zentefis. "Language of Bargaining." In Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers). Stroudsburg, PA, USA: Association for Computational Linguistics, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.735.

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Pengyu, Lu, Li Yijun, and Feng Yuqiang. "A Design of Automated Bargaining System Based On Consumers' Bargaining Pattern." In The Proceedings of the Multiconference on "Computational Engineering in Systems Applications". IEEE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cesa.2006.313602.

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Lu Pengyu, Li Yijun, and Feng Yuqiang. "A Design of Automated Bargaining System Based On Consumers' Bargaining Pattern." In Multiconference on "Computational Engineering in Systems Applications. IEEE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cesa.2006.4281927.

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Lai, H. F., S. G. Chen, and W. H. Jeng. "Deductive E-Bargaining System." In 2008 Eighth International Conference on Intelligent Systems Design and Applications (ISDA). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isda.2008.138.

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Backus, Matthew, Thomas Blake, Jett Pettus, and Steven Tadelis. "Communication and Bargaining Breakdown." In EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467541.

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Winoto, Pinata, Gordon I. McCalla, and Julita Vassileva. "Strategic delay in bargaining." In the 6th international joint conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1329125.1329153.

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Nguyen, Thanh. "Coalitional bargaining in networks." In the 13th ACM Conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2229012.2229071.

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Reports on the topic "Bargaining"

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Pollak, Robert. Bargaining with Altruism. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w30499.

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Bagwell, Kyle, Robert Staiger, and Ali Yurukoglu. Multilateral Trade Bargaining: A First Look at the GATT Bargaining Records. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w21488.

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Helpman, Elhanan, and Torsten Persson. Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w6589.

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Pollak, Robert. Bargaining Around the Hearth. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w13142.

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Deng, Shanglyu, Dun Jia, Mario Leccese, and Andrew Sweeting. Bargaining and Dynamic Competition. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w32360.

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Backus, Matthew, Thomas Blake, Bradley Larsen, and Steven Tadelis. Sequential Bargaining in the Field: Evidence from Millions of Online Bargaining Interactions. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24306.

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Grossman, Sanford, and Motty Perry. Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 1986. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/t0056.

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Karas, T. H. The START III bargaining space. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), August 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/674660.

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Battaglini, Marco. Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w25664.

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Azzimonti, Marina, Gabriel Mihalache, and Laura Karpuska. Bargaining over Taxes and Entitlements. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w27595.

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