Academic literature on the topic 'Banking law (Islamic law)'

AbstractThe focus of this article is the perspective of Islamic Banking Law in the concept of national law, both from the institutional aspect, the aspect of business activities. As well as aspects of liquidity management and financial instruments used, both at the level of laws and implementing regulations; and influencing socio-political, cultural and economic factors. Islamic banking law is a new entity in which there is interaction and mutual greeting between Islamic law and national law. In other words, Islamic banking law lies in two areas of law: Islamic law and national law. Sharia banking law, as the name implies, is Islamic law because it is formed on the principles of Islamic law. At the same time, Islamic banking law is also part of national law because it is formed by the competent state institution with the infrastructure and mechanisms that are formally justified. The discussion focuses on the dynamics of the encounter between Islamic law and national law as the elements of its formation. Such efforts can not ignore the factors - factors that influence it, whether political, cultural or economic.

AbstractKazakhstan has adopted legislation designed to facilitate Islamic banking, and at least one Islamic bank has started operations in Kazakhstan. Islamic banking is based upon traditional Islamic law, which forbids the taking of interest, the making of profit without risk, and profiting from "sinful" businesses such as pornography. The legislation in Kazakhstan forbids such activities for Islamic banks and also requires each Islamic bank to have an independent "Council on the principles of Islamic finance" to rule on bank policies and specific transactions. Islamic banking practices use complex combinations of transactions, each permitted by Islamic law, to mimic common conventional banking transactions, such as loans bearing fixed interest rates and repayable on a fixed date. Stable income and manageable principal obligations from credit-worthy borrowers can ensure that a bank will receive high ratings from leading international credit rating agencies and, thus, can satisfy the requirements of Kazakhstan's bank regulators. The formal difference between Islamic banking transactions and the conventional transactions that they mimic could lead to differing treatment for taxation. To provide a level playing field, Kazakhstan has amended its Tax Code to provide for equal treatment of economically equivalent Islamic and conventional banking transactions. Adjustments have also been made to bankruptcy legislation, reflecting the unavailability of deposit insurance for Islamic banks and the special nature of investment deposits in Islamic banks. There are controversies among Islamic law scholars as to whether or not various practices used to mimic conventional banking transactions are unlawful because they violate the spirit of Islamic law. This creates what is called "Sharia risk", the risk that a transaction will be found unlawful after it has been concluded, with consequences highly unfavorable for a party.

Almost all countries in the world including Indonesia give serious attention to the existence of Islamic banking that using religion approach in all activities and services. Institutional development it should be followed by the availability of legal basis, which is an established and clear. During the six years of its inception, the Islamic banking law stands with a very limited law basis, although the limitations of regulations have been describing aspects of sharia in Islamic banking for sure. The improvement of law is done by replacing Law No. 7 of 1992 by the Law No. 10 of 1998. This law has explicitly mention sharia aspects of Islamic banking, however Islamic banking regulation still governed together with conventional banking. The birth of Law 21 of 2008 became an important change for the development of Islamic banking. This law has given limits and a clear boundary line between Islamic banking and conventional banking in various aspects. The development of Islamic banking regulation are gaining its momentum with the enactment of Law No. 21 of 2008 concerning Islamic Banking. The strategic value of this law is increasingly opening up opportunities and legal certainty to accelerate the development of Islamic banks in the future

Islamic banks are the fastest growing Islamic financial institutions in Indonesia. In fact, Islamic Banks already have special regulations, namely Law Number 21 of 2008. This article aimed to analyze how important the Sharia Banking Law is in maintaining the plurality and sacredness of Islamic law in every sharia banking operational activity. The method used in this article is qualitative with a normative approach. This article found that Sharia Banking Law supports the sacredness of Islamic law, namely to realize the benefit. The existence of the Sharia Banking Law indirectly shows its capacity as a legal product that provides a plurality space so that the law can be enjoyed by all humans and all religions based on community beliefs. In addition, the existence of the Sharia Banking Law can also be a reference for other Islamic law products to provide a plurality value space behind the sacredness of Islamic law in Indonesia.

Islamic law and Islamic banking law are two different entities, although both are substantially identical. This paper seeks to answer the question related to the transformation of Islamic law in Islamic banking law in the context of positivization of law. The study focused on the dialectic of Islamic law and national law in the formulation of Islamic banking law. With a history of regulatory approach, this study found that transformed the Islamic banking law is aspects of shariah compliance, is not Islamic law referred to in fikih muamalah. Sharia compliance is dynamic both in terms of substance, structure and culture. Hukum Islam dan hukum perbankan syariah merupakan dua entitas yang berbeda, meskipun secara substansial keduanya identik. Makalah ini berupaya menjawab persoalan terkait transformasi hukum Islam dalam hukum perbankan syariah dalam konteks positivisasi hukum. Kajian difokuskan pada dialektika hukum Islam dan hukum nasional dalam formulasi hukum perbankan syariah. Dengan pendekatan sejarah perundang-undangan, kajian ini menemukan bahwa yang ditransformasikan dalam hukum perbankan syariah adalah aspek kepatuhan syariah, bukan hukum Islam sebagaimana dimaksud dalam fikih muamalah. Kepatuhan syariah ini bersifat dinamis baik dari sisi substansi, struktur maupun kultur.

The growth of Islamic banking and financial services (IBF) industry has generated considerable interest in the financial world in recent decades with no exception in Indonesia. The legal infrastructure for the development of IBF in Indonesia has been strengthened with the enactment of Islamic Banking Law No. 21 of 2008. The law includes two new arrangements that are expected to bring about changes in the IBF industry; namely Articles 55 and 68. In light of those articles, it is also essential to observe the development and practice of this industry in selected countries; namely Malaysia and Pakistan. Despite the difference of their legal systems (the practice of the Common Law Systems there as opposed to the Civil Law System in Indonesia), these two countries have been chosen for the resemblance of their IBF industry with the one developed, practiced and offered in. Indonesia. Particularly in Malaysia, the promulgation of the Central Bank Act 2009 and the Islamic Financial Services Act 2013 were aimed at enhancing its legal infrastructure that will not only protect its IBF industry but will ensure stability, growth and confidence of all players and stakeholders. Substantively, Article 68 deals with the Islamic window/ Islamic unit separation. It is quite natural to conclude that Window Model serves only as a transitory mechanism. Therefore, that model is mandated and/or limited to be a mere spun-off or temporary structure for IBF institutions from their parent banks before subsequently becoming a full-fledged institutions. Since this is mandatory, any Islamic window that violates this provision will be fined, or further, their licence will be revoked. Meanwhile in those particular countries this model is still allowed and can be adopted by conventional banks offering IBF services. However, the conventional banks will only be allowed to, offer IBF services once they have demonstrated their serious commitment to IBF and have a clear roadmap towards full conversion of their operations into a full fledged Islamic bank. Whilst Article 55 (1) affirms that the religious court is the institution authorised to settle dispute on matters concerning Islam and the economy, Article 55 (2), nonetheless, provides that if the litigants are in agreement, they can choose to refuse submission to the jurisdiction of the religious court jurisdiction and alternatively choose another forum such as district court to adjudicate the dispute. The selection and submission to another forum, such as the district court, can potentially bring about a conflict of authority and jurisdictions between the district courts and the religious courts. However, according to the decision of the Constitutional Court No.93PUU-X/2012 the Islamic financial disputes fall under the absolute competence of the religious court. While in those selected countries, the Islamic disputes are tried and heard before the jurisdiction of their civil courts, despite the fact that there is a designated civil court in Malaysia that will handle disputes relating to IBF. That choice of forum to render decision on this dispute raises the problem, since many judges who render decision on this case are in favour of the civil law rather than Shari'a (Islamic law). While the Islamic disputes are not merely commercial disputes but involves the questions of Shari matter(s). In this regards, a closer scrutiny on the Malaysian Central Bank Act 2009 will be useful since it provides for reference to the Shari'ah Advisory Council by the courts or arbitrators adjudicating matters relating to IBF disputes. With the rapid advancement of IBF industry and various products and services it offers, disputes are then inevitable. Premised on this realization, this thesis strongly examines and advocates that a proper and strong legal framework and infrastructure as well as substantial support of the legal fraternity are crucial prerequisites for a healthy advancement and significant growth of IBF industry. Therefore with the inclusion the Art 68 and 55 of the Islamic Banking Law, this industry is seen moved towards this advancement.

Islamic banking is an investment and financing system which expands globally. The Islamic banks have only been established for some 30 years but the banking system is based on long-going traditions within Islamic finance. The system is founded on ethical values and emphasises the well-being of society as a whole.

Islamic banking is different from conventional banking in most aspects, since its close tie to religion is very important. The system is not based on interest, as it is prohibited in Islam. Instead Islamic banks offer various kinds of accounts and a range of financing alternatives all complying with the Islamic Law – Shari’a. To work according to Shari’a is crucial for the banks and their activities are controlled by a special Religious Supervisory Board working within the bank.

The implementation of the Islamic banking system varies to some extent between Islamic countries. It has been influenced by its connections to politics of and the history in the countries where the system operates. As a result to the variations between the states’ implementation, the need for harmonisation increases as the expansion of Islamic banks continues. Several organisations work to achieve international standardisation and harmony to make the banking activities more transparent and attractive. The achievement of harmonisation as well as the performance of the banks is crucial for the future of Islamic banking.

The dissertation is based on extensive literature review and a personal interview with a professional within an Islamic bank in Lebanon.

The contrast between the theory and practice of Islamic banking is generally acknowledged by many scholars. After more than three decades in operation, the rapid growth of the Islamic banking industry is, in reality being driven by the application of the debt-like contracts (e.g. murÁbaÎah and ijÁrah) rather than the profit and loss sharing contracts (e.g. muÃÁrabah and mushÁrakah). As the adaptation of the former contracts creates "unauthentic" Islamic financial products, many have questioned their compliance with sharÐÝah principles. The present study analyses this issue by examining the application of muÃÁrabah rules in Malaysian Islamic banking practices. It evaluates the extent to which the current practices fulfil the principles and the ethical framework of the muÃÁrabah contract as propounded by the classical jurists. The study also analyses the justifications of Malaysian sharÐÝah scholars for modification of the doctrine, adapting it to the modern banking business. The study found that the local sharÐÝah scholars have adopted an incoherent legal methodology when making their ijtihÁd. They can be very rigid, concentrating solely on the legal technicality and at the same time be very flexible, adapting an unregulated doctrine of maÒlaÎah. Therefore, some of their resolutions could be seen as contradictory to the rulings found in classical fiqh.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Western Sydney, 2007.
A thesis presented to the University of Western Sydney, College of Business, School of Law, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Includes bibliographies.

This thesis examines various issues of arbitration law and practice in relation to the Islamic Shari’a law and the law of Saudi Arabia in general, and for arbitration in conventional banking disputes in particular. The thesis found that the Shari’a regulates arbitration tightly compared to other contemporary developments as no fundamental differences were found to exist between the classical Shari’a arbitration rules and the Saudi arbitration regulations, which represent the codification of the Hanbali law of arbitration. Unlike other arbitration laws, almost all kinds of disputes can be settled by arbitration in Saudi Arabia, and these include family and some criminal disputes such as murder and personal injuries. Moreover, this thesis demonstrates the difference between Islamic law and Saudi law. The latter is more comprehensive as it includes Islamic law and the borrowed Codes and Acts of the laws of other nations. The legal status of banking interest under the Saudi law is not clearly defined and it is not clear whether riba contradicts with the public policy of Saudi Arabia or not. This uncertainty has an impact on arbitration related to banking disputes and has led me to conclude that arbitration is not the best method for settling disputes involving domestic conventional banking business. Although resorting to the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes of SAMA might provide a better solution, the decisions of the Committee are not “strong” enough to be fully enforced and the payment of interest continues to be an avoidable obligation in Saudi Arabia; therefore, the thesis examined the alternative remedies for both domestic and international banking arbitration. The thesis also found that if the enforcement of an international arbitration award is sought in Saudi Arabia, the award will be subject to the mandatory application of Shari’a law, which in addition to the imposition of interest, prohibits also certain kinds of commercial contracts.

The main objective of this research is to examine whether the current practices of Islamic banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia are compatible with the principles of Shariah. This examination includes the current uses of sukuk (Islamic bonds), the models of takaful (Islamic insurance) and accepted risk transfer mechanisms in Islamic structured finance (Islamic derivatives). The second purpose is to investigate the basic laws of banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia and examine whether they are compatible with Shariah principles. The final aim is to suggest solutions to the absence of regulatory and supervisory systems of Islamic finance in Saudi Arabia by proposing a legislative and regulatory framework for Islamic banking and finance in Saudi Arabia. The research findings show that there are no specific laws and regulations governing Islamic banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia. In addition, there is no independent central Shariah board to regulate and supervise Islamic banking and financial activities in Saudi Arabia, nor are there are any specialised commercial courts to look into banking issues. The research finds that there are some articles in the law of supervision of cooperative insurance companies in Saudi Arabia, and its implementing regulations, which do not comply with Shariah, and in addition, there is some incompatibility between the law and its implementing regulations. The final finding is that the issuance of sukuk and Islamic financial derivatives in Saudi Arabia are not consistent with Shariah requirements, due to the absence of regulatory policies and supervisory harmonisation, while Islamic insurance needs to amend some articles of the law of supervision of cooperative insurance companies in Saudi Arabia, and its implementing regulations, in order to comply with Shariah and also to avoid incompatibility between them.

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2011.
The Islamic Banking industry has been one of the fastest growing industries worldwide with a compound annual growth rate of 28% between 2006 and 2009(Reuters, 2010). These growth rates were experienced amidst the worst economic meltdown the world has seen in decades. This is a clear indication that there is a high level of confidence in the industry. Although the industry has existed for centuries, the past few decades have brought about a revival in Islamic banking. Many Western countries are recognising the industry’s importance and have taken various steps in supporting the establishment of it. South Africa has also taken such steps and has a vision of becoming a hub for Islamic banking on the African continent. This mini thesis examines the differences in nature of the underlying principles of Islamic and conventional banking which then brings to the fore the various challenges that exist in the unhindered functioning of Islamic banks within Western countries. These challenges revolve around institutional and legal frameworks, regulatory and supervisory bodies, South African Reserve Bank requirements, interest, taxation and conceptual understandings. In order to provide recommendations to address these challenges, case studies of Islamic banking in both, Islamic and Western countries were conducted. These case studies provided insight into how countries have addressed similar challenges and to what degree were they successful. This provided the basis from which recommendations were made for Islamic banking to function efficiently and effectively in South Africa and for the country to achieve its goal of becoming a hub of Islamic banking on the African continent.

Islamic banking is a banking system that is based on the principles of sharia or Islamic law. The principles of Islamic finance forbid interest - this is commonly known as riba - charity (zakat), forbid high risk (gharar), forbid some transactions like gambling, and are based on PLS (Profit-Loss Share). The most important concept is that both charging and receiving interest are strictly forbidden; money may not generate profits. Islamic banks have largely survived the global economic crisis intact and they offer a safer operation than conventional banks. CAMEL analysis is a supervisory rating system to classify a bank's overall condition according to Capital (C), Assets (A), Management (M), Earnings (E) and Liquidity (L). In the analysis a variety of indicators were calculated based on data from the annual reports. The results of the four banks were averaged separately, then classified (1 = good, 2 = adequate, 3 = satisfactory, 4 = acceptable, 5 = unacceptable) according to the desired criteria, the changes over the years and the relative values of the four banks.

Ours is an age of pervasive political turbulence, and the scale of the challenge requires new thinking on politics as well as public ethics for our world. In Western countries, the specter of Islamophobia, alt-right populism, along with racialized violence has shaken public confidence in long-secure assumptions rooted in democracy, diversity, and citizenship. The tragic denouement of so many of the Arab uprisings together with the ascendance of apocalyptic extremists like Daesh and Boko Haram have caused an even greater sense of alarm in large parts of the Muslim-majority world. It is against this backdrop that M.A. Muqtedar Khan has written a book of breathtaking range and ethical beauty. The author explores the history and sociology of the Muslim world, both classic and contemporary. He does so, however, not merely to chronicle the phases of its development, but to explore just why the message of compassion, mercy, and ethical beauty so prominent in the Quran and Sunna of the Prophet came over time to be displaced by a narrow legalism that emphasized jurisprudence, punishment, and social control. In the modern era, Western Orientalists and Islamists alike have pushed the juridification and interpretive reification of Islamic ethical traditions even further. Each group has asserted that the essence of Islam lies in jurisprudence (fiqh), and both have tended to imagine this legal heritage on the model of Western positive law, according to which law is authorized, codified, and enforced by a leviathan state. “Reification of Shariah and equating of Islam and Shariah has a rather emaciating effect on Islam,” Khan rightly argues. It leads its proponents to overlook “the depth and heights of Islamic faith, mysticism, philosophy or even emotions such as divine love (Muhabba)” (13). As the sociologist of Islamic law, Sami Zubaida, has similarly observed, in all these developments one sees evidence, not of a traditionalist reassertion of Muslim values, but a “triumph of Western models” of religion and state (Zubaida 2003:135). To counteract these impoverishing trends, Khan presents a far-reaching analysis that “seeks to move away from the now failed vision of Islamic states without demanding radical secularization” (2). He does so by positioning himself squarely within the ethical and mystical legacy of the Qur’an and traditions of the Prophet. As the book’s title makes clear, the key to this effort of religious recovery is “the cosmology of Ihsan and the worldview of Al-Tasawwuf, the science of Islamic mysticism” (1-2). For Islamist activists whose models of Islam have more to do with contemporary identity politics than a deep reading of Islamic traditions, Khan’s foregrounding of Ihsan may seem unfamiliar or baffling. But one of the many achievements of this book is the skill with which it plumbs the depth of scripture, classical commentaries, and tasawwuf practices to recover and confirm the ethic that lies at their heart. “The Quran promises that God is with those who do beautiful things,” the author reminds us (Khan 2019:1). The concept of Ihsan appears 191 times in 175 verses in the Quran (110). The concept is given its richest elaboration, Khan explains, in the famous hadith of the Angel Gabriel. This tradition recounts that when Gabriel appeared before the Prophet he asked, “What is Ihsan?” Both Gabriel’s question and the Prophet’s response make clear that Ihsan is an ideal at the center of the Qur’an and Sunna of the Prophet, and that it enjoins “perfection, goodness, to better, to do beautiful things and to do righteous deeds” (3). It is this cosmological ethic that Khan argues must be restored and implemented “to develop a political philosophy … that emphasizes love over law” (2). In its expansive exploration of Islamic ethics and civilization, Khan’s Islam and Good Governance will remind some readers of the late Shahab Ahmed’s remarkable book, What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic (Ahmed 2016). Both are works of impressive range and spiritual depth. But whereas Ahmed stood in the humanities wing of Islamic studies, Khan is an intellectual polymath who moves easily across the Islamic sciences, social theory, and comparative politics. He brings the full weight of his effort to conclusion with policy recommendations for how “to combine Sufism with political theory” (6), and to do so in a way that recommends specific “Islamic principles that encourage good governance, and politics in pursuit of goodness” (8).

Many see armed conflict in Syria as a flashpoint for international law. The situation raises numerous unsettling questions, not least concerning normative foundations of the contemporary collective-security and human-security systems, including the following: Amid recurring reports of attacks directed against civilian populations and hospitals with seeming impunity, what loss of legitimacy might law suffer? May—and should—states forcibly intervene to prevent (more) chemical-weapons attacks? If the government of Syria is considered unwilling or unable to obviate terrorist threats from spilling over its borders into other countries, may another state forcibly intervene to protect itself (and others), even without Syria’s consent and without an express authorization of the U.N. Security Council? What began in Daraa in 2011 as protests escalated into armed conflict. Today, armed conflict in Syria implicates a multitude of people, organizations, states, and entities. Some are obvious, such as the civilian population, the government, and organized armed groups (including designated terrorist organizations, for example the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS). Other implicated actors might be less obvious. They include dozens of third states that have intervened or otherwise acted in relation to armed conflict in Syria; numerous intergovernmental bodies; diverse domestic, foreign, and international courts; and seemingly innumerable NGOs. Over time, different states have adopted wide-ranging and diverse approaches to undertaking measures (or not) concerning armed conflict in Syria, whether in relation to the government, one or more armed opposition groups, or the civilian population. Especially since mid-2014, a growing number of states have undertaken military operations directed against ISIS in Syria. For at least a year-and-a-half, Russia has bolstered military strategies of the Syrian government. At least one state (the United States) has directed an operation against a Syrian military base. And, more broadly, many states provide (other) forms of support or assistance to the government of Syria, to armed opposition groups, or to the civilian population. Against that backdrop, the Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict (HLS PILAC) set out to collect states’ statements made from August 2011 through November 2016 concerning use of force in relation to Syria. A primary aim of the database is to provide a comparatively broad set of reliable resources regarding states’ perspectives, with a focus on legal parameters. A premise underlying the database is that through careful documentation of diverse approaches, we can better understand those perspectives. The intended audience of the database is legal practitioners. The database is composed of statements made on behalf of states and/or by state officials. For the most part, the database focuses on statements regarding legal parameters concerning use of force in relation to Syria. HLS PILAC does not pass judgment on whether each statement is necessarily legally salient for purposes of international law. Nor does HLS PILAC seek to determine whether a particular statement may be understood as an expression of opinio juris or an act of state practice (though it might be).

Overview: This report looked across Covid Collective outputs and grouped findings into three sections. Section 2) Pandemic response; Section 3) Increased marginalisation; and Section 4) Emergent outcomes. Section 4 describes outcomes, both positive and negative, which evolved and were more unpredictable in nature. Pandemic response: Findings on national response highlight shortfalls in national government actions in Bangladesh, Malawi, the Philippines, Yemen, and Syria. Emergency law responses have, in some cases, led states to exert powers with no legal basis. In transitioning economies, state militarisation is having negative effects on constitutionalism and peacebuilding. Lack of trust in state security institutions is identified as an issue in Yemen. Improved consultation between the community, government and security institutions is needed. From a micro perspective, lockdowns were found to hit households close to subsistence the hardest bringing restrictions in to question with regards to welfare choices. Regional responses had different features (outlined in section 2). It is suggested for future research to look at how regional responses have changed interactions between regional and global organisations. The Islamic Development Bank, for example, helped function as a redistribution pool to improve inequalities between country capacities in the Middle East. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) supported accurate information reporting. International response with regard to vaccination is falling short in terms of equality between developed and developing economies. World Bank response is questioned for being insufficient in quantity and inefficient in delivery.

In this paper, we argue that setting up a new Digital Public Infrastructure - a National Fraud Portal (NFP) - is the only way to address fraud and consumer scams efficiently. NFPs provide a technological solution as a shared facility for banks, law enforcement, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the central bank, the conduct supervisor, and other stakeholders. Further down the line, NFPs can connect to one another as cross-border criminal activity increases (a likely consequence of suppressing fraud domestically). The National Fraud Portal (NFP) enables: The real-time tracing and tracking of fund movements across the banking system that allow banks to recover funds for victims quickly The validation and prioritization of cases across the economy using data-driven models The faster identification of new mule accounts at a reduced cost More accurate methods for fraud detection and risk scoring that employ Graph AI deployed on network data. The real-time provision of risk scores and features to banks via APIs, allowing them to improve their fraud models and make faster, more accurate decisions about preventing fraudulent payments before settlement. In this paper, we detail the technological components of the National Fraud Portal. The paper is a result of FNA’s work building technology for National Fraud Portals in Southeast Asia, as well as conversations with over 100 institutions across 20 countries that are actively working on, or have an interest in tackling the problem of fraud and scams.

Banco de la República is celebrating its 100th anniversary in 2023. This is a very significant anniversary and one that provides an opportunity to highlight the contribution the Bank has made to the country’s development. Its track record as guarantor of monetary stability has established it as the one independent state institution that generates the greatest confidence among Colombians due to its transparency, management capabilities, and effective compliance with the central banking and cultural responsibilities entrusted to it by the Constitution and the Law. On a date as important as this, the Board of Directors of Banco de la República (BDBR) pays tribute to the generations of governors and officers whose commitment and dedication have contributed to the growth of this institution.1 Banco de la República’s mandate was confirmed in the National Constitutional Assembly of 1991 where the citizens had the opportunity to elect the seventy people who would have the task of drafting a new constitution. The leaders of the three political movements with the most votes were elected as chairs to the Assembly, and this tripartite presidency reflected the plurality and the need for consensus among the different political groups to move the reform forward. Among the issues considered, the National Constitutional Assembly gave special importance to monetary stability. That is why they decided to include central banking and to provide Banco de la República with the necessary autonomy to use the instruments for which they are responsible without interference from other authorities. The constituent members understood that ensuring price stability is a state duty and that the entity responsible for this task must be enshrined in the Constitution and have the technical capability and institutional autonomy necessary to adopt the decisions they deem appropriate to achieve this fundamental objective in coordination with the general economic policy. In particular, Article 373 established that “the State, through Banco de la República, shall ensure the maintenance of the purchasing power of the currency,” a provision that coincided with the central banking system adopted by countries that have been successful in controlling inflation. In 1999, in Ruling 481, the Constitutional Court stated that “the duty to maintain the purchasing power of the currency applies to not only the monetary, credit, and exchange authority, i.e., the Board of Banco de la República, but also those who have responsibilities in the formulation and implementation of the general economic policy of the country” and that “the basic constitutional purpose of Banco de la República is the protection of a sound currency. However, this authority must take the other economic objectives of state intervention such as full employment into consideration in their decisions since these functions must be coordinated with the general economic policy.” The reforms to Banco de la República agreed upon in the Constitutional Assembly of 1991 and in Act 31/1992 can be summarized in the following aspects: i) the Bank was assigned a specific mandate: to maintain the purchasing power of the currency in coordination with the general economic policy; ii) the BDBR was designatedas the monetary, foreign exchange, and credit authority; iii) the Bank and its Board of Directors were granted a significant degree of independence from the government; iv) the Bank was prohibited from granting credit to the private sector except in the case of the financial sector; v) established that in order to grant credit to the government, the unanimous vote of its Board of Directors was required except in the case of open market transactions; vi) determined that the legislature may, in no case, order credit quotas in favor of the State or individuals; vii) Congress was appointed, on behalf of society, as the main addressee of the Bank’s reporting exercise; and viii) the responsibility for inspection, surveillance, and control over Banco de la República was delegated to the President of the Republic. The members of the National Constitutional Assembly clearly understood that the benefits of low and stable inflation extend to the whole of society and contribute mto the smooth functioning of the economic system. Among the most important of these is that low inflation promotes the efficient use of productive resources by allowing relative prices to better guide the allocation of resources since this promotes economic growth and increases the welfare of the population. Likewise, low inflation reduces uncertainty about the expected return on investment and future asset prices. This increases the confidence of economic agents, facilitates long-term financing, and stimulates investment. Since the low-income population is unable to protect itself from inflation by diversifying its assets, and a high proportion of its income is concentrated in the purchase of food and other basic goods that are generally the most affected by inflationary shocks, low inflation avoids arbitrary redistribution of income and wealth.2 Moreover, low inflation facilitates wage negotiations, creates a good labor climate, and reduces the volatility of employment levels. Finally, low inflation helps to make the tax system more transparent and equitable by avoiding the distortions that inflation introduces into the value of assets and income that make up the tax base. From the monetary authority’s point of view, one of the most relevant benefits of low inflation is the credibility that economic agents acquire in inflation targeting, which turns it into an effective nominal anchor on price levels. Upon receiving its mandate, and using its autonomy, Banco de la República began to announce specific annual inflation targets as of 1992. Although the proposed inflation targets were not met precisely during this first stage, a downward trend in inflation was achieved that took it from 32.4% in 1990 to 16.7% in 1998. At that time, the exchange rate was kept within a band. This limited the effectiveness of monetary policy, which simultaneously sought to meet an inflation target and an exchange rate target. The Asian crisis spread to emerging economies and significantly affected the Colombian economy. The exchange rate came under strong pressure to depreciate as access to foreign financing was cut off under conditions of a high foreign imbalance. This, together with the lack of exchange rate flexibility, prevented a countercyclical monetary policy and led to a 4.2% contraction in GDP that year. In this context of economic slowdown, annual inflation fell to 9.2% at the end of 1999, thus falling below the 15% target set for that year. This episode fully revealed how costly it could be, in terms of economic activity, to have inflation and exchange rate targets simultaneously. Towards the end of 1999, Banco de la República announced the adoption of a new monetary policy regime called the Inflation Targeting Plan. This regime, known internationally as ‘Inflation Targeting,’ has been gaining increasing acceptance in developed countries, having been adopted in 1991 by New Zealand, Canada, and England, among others, and has achieved significant advances in the management of inflation without incurring costs in terms of economic activity. In Latin America, Brazil and Chile also adopted it in 1999. In the case of Colombia, the last remaining requirement to be fulfilled in order to adopt said policy was exchange rate flexibility. This was realized around September 1999, when the BDBR decided to abandon the exchange-rate bands to allow the exchange rate to be freely determined in the market.Consistent with the constitutional mandate, the fundamental objective of this new policy approach was “the achievement of an inflation target that contributes to maintaining output growth around its potential.”3 This potential capacity was understood as the GDP growth that the economy can obtain if it fully utilizes its productive resources. To meet this objective, monetary policy must of necessity play a countercyclical role in the economy. This is because when economic activity is below its potential and there are idle resources, the monetary authority can reduce the interest rate in the absence of inflationary pressure to stimulate the economy and, when output exceeds its potential capacity, raise it. This policy principle, which is immersed in the models for guiding the monetary policy stance, makes the following two objectives fully compatible in the medium term: meeting the inflation target and achieving a level of economic activity that is consistent with its productive capacity. To achieve this purpose, the inflation targeting system uses the money market interest rate (at which the central bank supplies primary liquidity to commercial banks) as the primary policy instrument. This replaced the quantity of money as an intermediate monetary policy target that Banco de la República, like several other central banks, had used for a long time. In the case of Colombia, the objective of the new monetary policy approach implied, in practical terms, that the recovery of the economy after the 1999 contraction should be achieved while complying with the decreasing inflation targets established by the BDBR. The accomplishment of this purpose was remarkable. In the first half of the first decade of the 2000s, economic activity recovered significantly and reached a growth rate of 6.8% in 2006. Meanwhile, inflation gradually declined in line with inflation targets. That was how the inflation rate went from 9.2% in 1999 to 4.5% in 2006, thus meeting the inflation target established for that year while GDP reached its potential level. After this balance was achieved in 2006, inflation rebounded to 5.7% in 2007, above the 4.0% target for that year due to the fact that the 7.5% GDP growth exceeded the potential capacity of the economy.4 After proving the effectiveness of the inflation targeting system in its first years of operation, this policy regime continued to consolidate as the BDBR and the technical staff gained experience in its management and state-of-the-art economic models were incorporated to diagnose the present and future state of the economy and to assess the persistence of inflation deviations and expectations with respect to the inflation target. Beginning in 2010, the BDBR established the long-term 3.0% annual inflation target, which remains in effect today. Lower inflation has contributed to making the macroeconomic environment more stable, and this has favored sustained economic growth, financial stability, capital market development, and the functioning of payment systems. As a result, reductions in the inflationary risk premia and lower TES and credit interest rates were achieved. At the same time, the duration of public domestic debt increased significantly going from 2.27 years in December 2002 to 5.86 years in December 2022, and financial deepening, measured as the level of the portfolio as a percentage of GDP, went from around 20% in the mid-1990s to values above 45% in recent years in a healthy context for credit institutions.Having been granted autonomy by the Constitution to fulfill the mandate of preserving the purchasing power of the currency, the tangible achievements made by Banco de la República in managing inflation together with the significant benefits derived from the process of bringing inflation to its long-term target, make the BDBR’s current challenge to return inflation to the 3.0% target even more demanding and pressing. As is well known, starting in 2021, and especially in 2022, inflation in Colombia once again became a serious economic problem with high welfare costs. The inflationary phenomenon has not been exclusive to Colombia and many other developed and emerging countries have seen their inflation rates move away from the targets proposed by their central banks.5 The reasons for this phenomenon have been analyzed in recent Reports to Congress, and this new edition delves deeper into the subject with updated information. The solid institutional and technical base that supports the inflation targeting approach under which the monetary policy strategy operates gives the BDBR the necessary elements to face this difficult challenge with confidence. In this regard, the BDBR reiterated its commitment to the 3.0% inflation target in its November 25 communiqué and expects it to be reached by the end of 2024.6 Monetary policy will continue to focus on meeting this objective while ensuring the sustainability of economic activity, as mandated by the Constitution. Analyst surveys done in March showed a significant increase (from 32.3% in January to 48.5% in March) in the percentage of responses placing inflation expectations two years or more ahead in a range between 3.0% and 4.0%. This is a clear indication of the recovery of credibility in the medium-term inflation target and is consistent with the BDBR’s announcement made in November 2022. The moderation of the upward trend in inflation seen in January, and especially in February, will help to reinforce this revision of inflation expectations and will help to meet the proposed targets. After reaching 5.6% at the end of 2021, inflation maintained an upward trend throughout 2022 due to inflationary pressures from both external sources, associated with the aftermath of the pandemic and the consequences of the war in Ukraine, and domestic sources, resulting from: strengthening of local demand; price indexation processes stimulated by the increase in inflation expectations; the impact on food production caused by the mid-2021 strike; and the pass-through of depreciation to prices. The 10% increase in the minimum wage in 2021 and the 16% increase in 2022, both of which exceeded the actual inflation and the increase in productivity, accentuated the indexation processes by establishing a high nominal adjustment benchmark. Thus, total inflation went to 13.1% by the end of 2022. The annual change in food prices, which went from 17.2% to 27.8% between those two years, was the most influential factor in the surge in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Another segment that contributed significantly to price increases was regulated products, which saw the annual change go from 7.1% in December 2021 to 11.8% by the end of 2022. The measure of core inflation excluding food and regulated items, in turn, went from 2.5% to 9.5% between the end of 2021 and the end of 2022. The substantial increase in core inflation shows that inflationary pressure has spread to most of the items in the household basket, which is characteristic of inflationary processes with generalized price indexation as is the case in Colombia. Monetary policy began to react early to this inflationary pressure. Thus, starting with its September 2021 session, the BDBR began a progressive change in the monetary policy stance moving away from the historical low of a 1.75% policy rate that had intended to stimulate the recovery of the economy. This adjustment process continued without interruption throughout 2022 and into the beginning of 2023 when the monetary policy rate reached 12.75% last January, thus accumulating an increase of 11 percentage points (pp). The public and the markets have been surprised that inflation continued to rise despite significant interest rate increases. However, as the BDBR has explained in its various communiqués, monetary policy works with a lag. Just as in 2022 economic activity recovered to a level above the pre-pandemic level, driven, along with other factors, by the monetary stimulus granted during the pandemic period and subsequent months, so too the effects of the current restrictive monetary policy will gradually take effect. This will allow us to expect the inflation rate to converge to 3.0% by the end of 2024 as is the BDBR’s purpose.Inflation results for January and February of this year showed declining marginal increases (13 bp and 3 bp respectively) compared to the change seen in December (59 bp). This suggests that a turning point in the inflation trend is approaching. In other Latin American countries such as Chile, Brazil, Perú, and Mexico, inflation has peaked and has begun to decline slowly, albeit with some ups and downs. It is to be expected that a similar process will take place in Colombia in the coming months. The expected decline in inflation in 2023 will be due, along with other factors, to lower cost pressure from abroad as a result of the gradual normalization of supply chains, the overcoming of supply shocks caused by the weather, and road blockades in previous years. This will be reflected in lower adjustments in food prices, as has already been seen in the first two months of the year and, of course, the lagged effect of monetary policy. The process of inflation convergence to the target will be gradual and will extend beyond 2023. This process will be facilitated if devaluation pressure is reversed. To this end, it is essential to continue consolidating fiscal sustainability and avoid messages on different public policy fronts that generate uncertainty and distrust. 1 This Report to Congress includes Box 1, which summarizes the trajectory of Banco de la República over the past 100 years. In addition, under the Bank’s auspices, several books that delve into various aspects of the history of this institution have been published in recent years. See, for example: Historia del Banco de la República 1923-2015; Tres banqueros centrales; Junta Directiva del Banco de la República: grandes episodios en 30 años de historia; Banco de la República: 90 años de la banca central en Colombia. 2 This is why lower inflation has been reflected in a reduction of income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient that went from 58.7 in 1998 to 51.3 in the year prior to the pandemic. 3 See Gómez Javier, Uribe José Darío, Vargas Hernando (2002). “The Implementation of Inflation Targeting in Colombia”. Borradores de Economía, No. 202, March, available at: https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/5220 4 See López-Enciso Enrique A.; Vargas-Herrera Hernando and Rodríguez-Niño Norberto (2016). “The inflation targeting strategy in Colombia. An historical view.” Borradores de Economía, No. 952. https://repositorio.banrep.gov.co/handle/20.500.12134/6263 5 According to the IMF, the percentage change in consumer prices between 2021 and 2022 went from 3.1% to 7.3% for advanced economies, and from 5.9% to 9.9% for emerging market and developing economies. 6 https://www.banrep.gov.co/es/noticias/junta-directiva-banco-republica-reitera-meta-inflacion-3