Journal articles on the topic 'Bank capital – Oman'

In the last decade, international organisations (World Bank, OECD and OEU) and many European countries have been apprised of the urgent need to develop and enhance what is generally termed “intellectual capital” and thus the “knowledge creating organization”. The importance of this is something that is increasingly being realised. The importance of Intellectual Capital and how to analyse its important components such as human capital, structural capital and customer capital are also being recognised. In fact, these components constitute the main factors whereby institutions produce and disseminate knowledge which in turn serve as the means through which the quantity of knowledge produced within a country can be added to the national pool of knowledge. This paper deals with the importance of measuring and analysing Intellectual Capital, and furthermore, performs an extensive review of national and international practices related to IC. The paper then proposes a model for measuring the Intellectual Capital of private HEIs in Oman. Indeed, such a model as of the kind we visualise, will improve the performance of organisations, develop better understanding of the nature of IC and go on to study the construction of IC and IC reporting in developing countries. The research was done in the Sultanate of Oman and the results show that the level of measuring the IC of HEIs is still in its early stages. The technique called “the point estimate of overall performance” and “overall performance index” are proposed and implemented to differentiate between the performance of ICs of different institutions. Finally, the paper discusses the difficulties that hinder the assessment of IC in institutions.

This paper attempts to demonstrate the relationship between macroeconomic factors and each of Private Investment in Energy (PIE) and Private Investment in Telecoms (PIT) from 1990 to 2016 in 21 MENA countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Palestine and Yemen). Results reveal that both PIE and PIT are Granger caused by GDP, Real Interest Rate, Gross fixed capital formation, private sector, stocks traded are Granger causing PIE. Also, Inflation, Exports of goods and services and Commercial bank branches are Granger causing PIT. All of the ten macroeconomic variables taken up in study are cointegrated with Investment in energy and telecoms with private participation in the long run. Besides, shocks to all of GDP, gross fixed capital formation, private sector to GDP, general government final consumption expenditure, stocks traded and commercial bank branches (as a proxy of financial inclusion) have a positive and statistically significant effect on the private investment in energy and telecoms.

The objective of this research is to find impact of foreign direct investment on manufacturing industries in Oman. The study utilized a quantitative research method which applied primary and secondary data obtained from Oman's World Bank database (1984-2018). The primary data were collected from a research questionnaire administered to 410 respondents from nine industrial sectors, namely: Textile, Petroleum goods, Electronics, Automotive, Food & Beverages, Agriculture & Fishery, Publishing, Chemicals and Pharmaceutics. The results of this study also revealed that the spillover impacts on domestic companies, like novel technology, marketing strategies, organizational skills, money, jobs, export growth, diversifying of economy and greater competition, lead to enhanced domestic market efficiency and boosted productivity in skill-spreading host economies with the highest impact accompanied with Capital and Technology spillover.

This study is a commentary on the financialperformance and quality capital of Islamic versus conventional banks currentlyoperating in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region. In addition toassessing the financial performance of the full set of banks across various GCCcountries, the study is the first toconsider the extent to which Islamic vs.conventional GCC banks comply with the new Basel III requirements of raising betterquality capital. The study uses bank-level data for 75 (55 conventionaland 20 Islamic) banks in Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain. Financial ratios are used tomeasure and compare Islamic vs. conventional banks performances, and weemploy a comprehensive and the most recent sample of data available in the region, consisting of cross-sections from 2003 to 2011.The results reveal that Islamic banks are, onaverage, less efficient but more profitable, more liquid, more solvent (lessrisky), and enjoyed higher internal growth rates than conventional banks during2003-2011. The results indicate that there are statistically significant differencesbetween the two types of banks, as far as profitability, solvency, and internalgrowth rate ratios are concerned; however, there are no statisticallysignificant differences in liquidity and efficiency. The results also indicatethat banks, as a whole, appear to be largely sufficiently capitalized for BaselIII. Gulf Cooperation Council banks are well positioned to absorb higherprovisions and impairment charges given the higher capital adequacy ratiosreported by most. The Common Equity Ratio, Tier 1 Capital Ratio, and Capital AdequacyRatios (CARs), for the majority of banks in 2011, comfortably satisfy theenhanced capital requirements of Basel III. The results show that Islamic bankshave, on average, noticeably higher (and significantly different) capitalratios compared to conventional institutions. With regard to theimpact of the global financial crisis on both types of the banks, the resultsindicate that Islamic banks performed better thanconventional banks during the period 2006-2009, as the former enjoys highercapitalization, higher liquidity reserves, and also maintained stronger growthcompared to conventional banks in almost countries.Findings of this study may be useful for capital-market participants, as the full set of banks across various Gulf Cooperation Councilcountries needs to be examined before any substantive conclusions can bereached about the relative performance of Islamic versus conventional banks.Further, as the full implementation of Basel III requirements will not takeplace until 2019, the results of this study will convey information that shouldencourage banks to consider the earlier implementation of Basel III capitalrequirements in order to provide themselves with a reputational boost, as wellas a competitive advantage.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to find out the extent to which governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries play a moderating role in the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth. Design/methodology/approach The study uses a 10-year time series (2006-2015) for six GCC countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Secondary sources of data were collected from The World Bank database, general available statistics on the GCC, the Global Entrepreneurship Index from the Global Entrepreneurship and Development Institute (GEDI) and the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) database. Findings Results indicate that governmental support has a significant moderating effect on the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth in the GCC. Furthermore, the strongest indicators of entrepreneurial investments in the Gulf have been found to be risk capital and high growth, which indicate a rapid growth in entrepreneurial investments. The lowest scoring indicators were found to be technology absorption and innovation process. Research limitations/implications Despite the necessary measures taken to assure standard results such as testing data validity, care should be taken when generalizing the research results mainly because the time series of the study (2006-2015) could have been affected by the International and Financial Crisis, though the study has taken this into consideration. Originality/value This study has clarified the significant role of GCC governments in moderating the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth. Thus, the findings of this study are important because they help the GCC governments recognize their significant role and hence to utilize this role by supporting new and existing entrepreneurs particularly through regulatory quality, risk capital, technology absorption and process innovation. Furthermore, this study proves the extent to which entrepreneurship can help enhance the GCC economic growth, hence elaborating the importance of the sustainable resource, such as the human capital, in achieving diversification of sources to move from an oil-based to a more diversified economy.

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to empirically investigate the relationship between intellectual capital and corporate governance of Oman's financial sector companies. Intellectual capital has been found to successfully contribute to the economic wealth creation of firms in germane literature. Unfortunately, financial statements do not necessarily capture and reflect the contributions of intellectual capital, thereby leading to an information asymmetry between companies and users of financial statements. The research also investigates the relationship between corporate governance and intellectual capital efficiency across various financial subsectors.Design/methodology/approachData are collected from annual reports available on Muscat Securities Market for 31 listed financial sector companies for the period 2012 to 2016 and analyzed using a multiple regression model. Intellectual capital is measured using Pulic's efficiency measure of value-added intellectual coefficient (VAIC). Corporate governance individual components such as board characteristics, audit committee characteristics and ownership structure are presented as independent variables.FindingsThe findings suggest that board size and frequency of audit committee meetings have a significant association with the intellectual capital efficiency of Oman's financial sector. VAIC and human capital efficiency of banks are also significantly influenced by most of the corporate governance mechanisms; however, other subsectors do not report such findings. Corporate governance of banks in comparison to other subsectors effectively engages in utilizing the potential of intellectual capital efficiency. Agency theory and resource dependency theory find limited support as a result of this study. The GMM results are not robust to the alternative instruments.Research limitations/implicationsThe sample size is small as the study is limited to the listed financial sector of Oman. Future studies can be extended to include all of Oman's or GCC’s listed companies. Additionally, the intellectual capital is measured using the construct of VAIC which suffers some limitations and can be overcome using other tools such as content analysis.Practical implicationsThe findings of this study suggest that Oman's regulators can create an awareness strategy on highlighting the importance of intellectual capital for companies (board of directors and managers), investors, debtors and creditors. Further, Oman's Capital Market Authority and Muscat Securities Market need to strengthen the regulations related to intellectual capital.Originality/valueThis study extends intellectual capital and corporate governance literature by presenting the research outcome for Oman's financial sector. It is useful for Oman's financial sector companies to direct corporate governance measures for driving value creation of firms through the management of intellectual capital efficiency.

PT. Moradon Berlian Sakti is Die Casting manufacturer of Honda motorcycle spare parts and other types of products, such as chair. Along with the rapid advancement of technology, PT. Moradon Berlian Sakti always strive to maintain and improve its existence. One of important factor that need to be noticed is the productivity issue. Productivity assessment can be conducted based on the comparison of company input and output in terms of materials, capital, labor and energy. After learning the level or productivity index, company leader can identify which condition has productivity shrinkage and make decision to increase productivity company based on those condition. Based on the calculations, the levels of productivity index in 2012, was virtually uniform from January to December. But in October the productivity is high and reach the level 94.33%. That is because that performance indicators are in accordance with expectation of company leader. While in December productivity dramatically decreased to 4.67%, it is because less supervision and control from the company.Key Words: Performance indicators, productivity, system evaluationAbstrakPT. Moradon Berlian Sakti merupakan salah satu industri manufaktur yang bergerak di bidang Die Casting dalam membuat spare part sepeda motor Honda, dan beberapa jenis produk lainnya, seperti kursi. Seiring dengan perkembangan zaman dan majunya teknologi pada saat ini PT. Moradon Berlian Sakti selalu berusaha untuk mempertahankan dan meningkatkan keeksistensiannya dalam dunia industri. Salah satu faktor penting yang perlu diperhatikannya adalah masalah produktifitas. Penilaian produktifitas dapat dilihat dari perbandingan nilai input dan output perusahaan, baik dari segi material, modal, tenaga kerja dan energy yang digunakan. Setelah mengetahui tingkat atau indeks produktifitas dari perusahaan itu sendiri, maka pimpinan perusahaan akan mencoba mengevaluasi kondisi-kondisi yang dimana disana terjadi penyusutan produktifitas, sehingga hal tersebut akan mampu meningkatkan produktifitas perusahaan di masa yang akan datang. Berdasarkan perhitungan yang telah dilakukan, maka didapatkan bahwa tingkat indeks produktifitas pada tahun 2012, hampir bisa dikatakan merata mulai dari bulan Januari sampai Desember. Tetapi pada bulan Oktober produktifitas yang dihasilkan tinggi yaitu 94,33%. Hal tersebut dikarenakan bahwa indikator-indikator performansi yang ada pada bulan tersebut sesuai dengan apa yang diharapkan pimpinan perusahaan. Sedangkan pada bulan Desember mengalami penurunan drastis yaitu menjadi 4,67%, hal tersebut disebabkan karena tingkat pengawasan dan pengontrolan yang kurang dari pihak perusahaan.Kata Kunci: Indikator performansi, produktivitas, evaluasi sistem

Purpose: Promote a country comparative assessment of the Islamic banks economic and financial situation. Methodology: We used a descriptive and documentary analytical approach. We collected data on Islamic bank financial indicators in 21 countries and analyzed it in light of the standards recommended by the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The sample consisted of all countries with available data in the IFSB database (PSIFIs). Data refers to the second quarter of 2018 grouped by countries. We used a simple descriptive statistic, in figures form, to analyze the collected data. Results: This document points out that 90% of Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) in the sample calculate the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) according to BCBS recommendations. In addition, 95% have CARs above 8% (the minimum set by BCBS and IFSB). Therefore, 95% of countries have secure financial systems in terms of bank solvency. In terms of asset quality, the Islamic financial system in Oman showed the best quality in managing its resources. Sudan has shown the highest ratios of profitability in its Islamic banks. In the liquidity analysis, it was not possible to identify precisely which country has the best liquidity ratios in short and long term as more than 60% of the countries did not present sufficient data. In terms of net assets over total assets, and short-term compliance, the Islamic financial systems of Egypt and Afghanistan, respectively, led with better liquidity ratios, showing the ability and security to meet their obligations. Contributions of the Study: Identify countries with the highest / lowest risk considering IFSB and BCBS requirements and recommendations.

This article studies whether firm-level and country-level factors affect to the corporation's debt maturity in case of Vietnam or not. The paper adopts the balance panel data of 267 listed companies on two trading board HOSE and HNX in the period from 2008 to 2015, estimated by FEM, REM, 2SLS and GMM method. To intrinsic factors, research results show that financial leverage and default risk control have high positive statistical significance with the debt maturity, but tangible assets are lower than those factors. In addition, growth opportunities and company quality have negative impacts to the debt maturity. To external factors, the results point out that economic growth, stock market development and governmental regulation's efficiency demonstrate the positive relationship to the debt maturity with fairly low correlation levels. 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Covid-19 pandemic forced Islamic banking in Oman to slow down and to change strategies adapting to the current situation. The Covid-19 outbreak has raised various challenges for Islamic banking. In order to maintain the sustainable growth of the industry, stakeholders of Islamic banking should strive collectively to solve these challenges. Nevertheless, Islamic banking was able to maintain and manage capital and liquidity buffers. The growth for 2021 is expected to remain stable for at least a single-digit growth. However, there would be asset-quality and profitability pressure for Islamic banks within the Sultanate of Oman. This paper highlights the performance of Islamic banking in Oman amid the Covid-19 outbreak. This paper demonstrates that the industry merely recorded a single-digit growth compared to the last seven years at double-digit growth due to the pandemic. The paper further delineates on the prospects and challenges of Islamic Banks Entities (IBEs). It also suggests some practical solutions for survival. This paper contributes to providing an alluded picture of the current conditions and situation of Islamic banks in Oman as well as insights to deal with the challenges to enhancing the banking performances during the Covid-19 outbreak.

Motivated by the large number of banking studies in Indonesia that have not included NOP (Net Open Position) in profitability modeling, our research aims to realize this. As for the reason for the importance of the Net Open Position (NOP) variable, it is almost certain that all banks will use foreign currency items in their asset and liability management activities. All commercial banks in the BUKU level 1, 2, 3 and 4 will definitely be involved in demand deposits as a consequence of continuing financial market activities to safeguard the economic activities of a country. By referring to previous research models from Al-Omar, et.al. (2008), Albulescu (2015), Muhmad & Hashim (2015), Menicucci & Paolucci (2016) and Saputri & Oetomo (2016) then identified four determinants of bank profitability variables, namely CAR, NPL, NOP and LDR. These four variables will then be defined conceptually and formulas referring to banking theory applicable in Indonesia, namely CAMEL (Capital, Management, Asset, Earning and Liquidity). Each variable will function as a bank specific factor that will determine the profitability of the bank both grossly as measured by ROA and net measured by ROE. Results of the test with panel data regression show that the NOP variable is always a determining factor in the ROA and the ROE models. This also provides evidence that NOP is indeed very important in determining ROA and ROE for bankers. With the proven NOP as the main determinant, the argument is supported that commercial banks must pay attention to the foreign exchange items in their asset and liability management. In addition to NOP, NPL is also important for determining ROA and ROE of banks.

PurposeThis study examines the impact of intellectual capital efficiency and corporate governance mechanisms on the annual report readability of Oman's financial sector companies.Design/methodology/approachThe study uses a sample of 150 firm-year observations of listed financial sector companies in the Muscat Securities Market, Oman, from 2014 to 2018. Flesch Reading ease and Flesch Kinkaid Index are used as proxies for annual report readability. As part of sensitivity analysis, the study also uses the natural logarithm of annual report pages as alternative readability measures. The investigation is conducted using random effects regression analysis and supported with system GMM estimation for robustness.FindingsThe findings of this study demonstrate a decrease in intellectual capital efficiency associated with better readability of annual reports for the financial sector firms. Alternatively, banks report a positive association of intellectual capital efficiency with the Flesch Reading ease score of the annual report. The structural capital and capital employed efficiency are also found to be negatively associated with annual report readability. Corporate governance mechanisms such as dispersed ownership and audit committee size also result in easy-to-read annual reports that support agency theory.Research limitations/implicationsThe research was conducted for financial firms of Oman, and thereby the findings can be generalized to the financial sector of countries with similar settings, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region.Practical implicationsThe policy implications arising from this study suggest a strengthening of the intellectual capital efficiency and corporate governance mechanisms to improve the readability of the firms and thereby increase investor confidence.Originality/valueThis paper's uniqueness is in the model used to investigate the impact of intellectual capital efficiency and corporate governance mechanisms on the annual report readability of an emerging market.

A strong capital adequacy ratio is crucial to a financial institution's success and helps it to survive any potential financial crisis. From Q1 2017 to Q4 2019, the influence of the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) on the performance of Commercial Islamic Banks in MENA nations (Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan) is examined. The performance measures utilized in this study are Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). The study's sample frame comprises all Islamic commercial banks in the designated MENA nations, with a sample size of 18 Islamic commercial banks. Panel data, fixed and random models, are applied in this study since there are multiple entities and time series. The findings of the study showed that the selected Islamic banks are committed to Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) which is defined under Basel III. This is considered the largest percentage regulated by the Basel Committee. The study also found that there is a statistically negative significant influence of CAR on both performance indicators ROE and ROA in the commercial Islamic banks in the selected MENA countries. The results of the study can be useful to a policymaker or decision-makers in the Islamic Banks industry. First, the research could be a reference to financial regulators such as central banks which may use the findings to provide regulation on optimal capital levels for local banks in terms of regulations, deregulations, and financial disruption. Next, the practice implications in the Islamic banking sector will provide them with insight as to how a bank’s capital influences its earnings. Hence, management can work towards attaining an optimal structure that maximizes their performance as well as identifying “best” and “worst” practices associated with capitalization levels.

Purpose This paper aims to investigate and provide an objective appraisal of the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on Islamic and conventional financial institutions and Islamic windows in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Design/methodology/approach The panel data techniques are conducted country-wise in each financial institution type: random-effect model, fixed-effect model and Hausman test. Findings The results of the first phase analysis that extends from 1 January 2020 to 30 October 2020 show that Islamic financial institutions are less exposed to the repercussions of the COVID-19 outbreak than the conventional and Islamic window financial institutions in Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE. Moreover, the Islamic financial institutions in Saudi Arabia and Oman have not been affected by the COVID-19 outbreak. The second phase analysis for the COVID-19 outbreak that extends from 1 November 2020 to 17 March 2021 confirms the disappearance of the negative impact of COVID-19 on Islamic financial institutions in Bahrain and Oman. Practical implications The findings present that Islamic banks are not as resilient in the COVID-19 pandemic as in the 2008 financial crisis. It can be suggested that regulatory authorities, financial institutions and other key policymakers in the GCC countries should focus on implementing regulatory reforms related to human capital, innovative products, research and development to further develop individuals, societies and institutions within the framework of Islamic ontology to be more resilient in such crises. Originality/value This paper provides a different perspective from existing literature on the pandemics and financial institutions by comparing the stock prices in Islamic and conventional financial institutions and Islamic windows in GCC countries during the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, this paper should be considered as a contribution to filling a gap in the literature.

ABSTRACT In this article, I propose to take up the concept and physical space of a photographic 'darkroom' located in Stone Town, Zanzibar, to explore a set of images from the Capital Art Studio (1930-present) collection produced by Ranchhod Oza (1907-93), and inherited by his son Rohit Oza (1950-). I employ a concept of darkness to read this visual archive differently and propose multiple 'other lives' for a set of images. First, by bringing this African photography collection to light, I am taking it out of the 'dark rooms' of history in one sense and exposing it for interpretation. Second, I focus my lens on the Oza physical darkroom located in the back of the studio on Kenyatta Road in Stone Town, where photographs of a range of Zanzibari persons were both developed and printed and that open up the darkroom as a place of photographic complexity and sensorium, and not just mechanical reproduction. Third, I develop darkness as a form of beauty in certain images of sky, water and skin from this archive that showcase Zanzibar's position as an Indian Ocean island and port city whilst under rule by the Omani Sultanate (1698-1964) and British Protectorate (1890-1963). Fourth, I conceptualise the Zanzibar Revolution of 1964 as a time of visual darkness, which temporarily restricted photographic practices operating in Stone Town under the new Afro-Shirazi political party. Throughout my analysis, I use a framing of 'darkness' to interrogate photography as an aesthetic practice deeply immersed in materialities and metaphors of dark and light, black and white, and as integral to Zanzibar's oceanic islandness.

Introduction I am a transmigrant who has moved back and forth between the West and the Rest. I was born and raised in a Muslim family in a predominantly Muslim country, Bangladesh, but I spent several years of my childhood in Pakistan. After my marriage, I lived in the United States for a year and a half, the Middle East for 5 years, Australia for three years, back to the Middle East for another 5 years, then, finally, in Australia for the last 12 years. I speak Bengali (my mother tongue), Urdu (which I learnt in Pakistan), a bit of Arabic (learnt in the Middle East); but English has always been my medium of instruction. So where is home? Is it my place of origin, the Muslim umma, or my land of settlement? Or is it my ‘root’ or my ‘route’ (Blunt and Dowling)? Blunt and Dowling (199) observe that the lives of transmigrants are often interpreted in terms of their ‘roots’ and ‘routes’, which are two frameworks for thinking about home, homeland and diaspora. Whereas ‘roots’ might imply an original homeland from which people have scattered, and to which they might seek to return, ‘routes’ focuses on mobile, multiple and transcultural geographies of home. However, both ‘roots’ and ‘routes’ are attached to emotion and identity, and both invoke a sense of place, belonging or alienation that is intrinsically tied to a sense of self (Blunt and Dowling 196-219). In this paper, I equate home with my root (place of birth) and route (transnational homing) within the context of the ‘diaspora and belonging’. First I define the diaspora and possible criteria of belonging. Next I describe my transnational homing within the framework of diaspora and belonging. Finally, I consider how Australia can be a ‘home’ for me and other Muslim Australians. The Diaspora and Belonging Blunt and Dowling (199) define diaspora as “scattering of people over space and transnational connections between people and the places”. Cohen emphasised the ethno-cultural aspects of the diaspora setting; that is, how migrants identify and position themselves in other nations in terms of their (different) ethnic and cultural orientation. Hall argues that the diasporic subjects form a cultural identity through transformation and difference. Speaking of the Hindu diaspora in the UK and Caribbean, Vertovec (21-23) contends that the migrants’ contact with their original ‘home’ or diaspora depends on four factors: migration processes and factors of settlement, cultural composition, structural and political power, and community development. With regard to the first factor, migration processes and factors of settlement, Vertovec explains that if the migrants are political or economic refugees, or on a temporary visa, they are likely to live in a ‘myth of return’. In the cultural composition context, Vertovec argues that religion, language, region of origin, caste, and degree of cultural homogenisation are factors in which migrants are bound to their homeland. Concerning the social structure and political power issue, Vertovec suggests that the extent and nature of racial and ethnic pluralism or social stigma, class composition, degree of institutionalised racism, involvement in party politics (or active citizenship) determine migrants’ connection to their new or old home. Finally, community development, including membership in organisations (political, union, religious, cultural, leisure), leadership qualities, and ethnic convergence or conflict (trends towards intra-communal or inter-ethnic/inter-religious co-operation) would also affect the migrants’ sense of belonging. Using these scholarly ideas as triggers, I will examine my home and belonging over the last few decades. My Home In an initial stage of my transmigrant history, my home was my root (place of birth, Dhaka, Bangladesh). Subsequently, my routes (settlement in different countries) reshaped my homes. In all respects, the ethno-cultural factors have played a big part in my definition of ‘home’. But on some occasions my ethnic identification has been overridden by my religious identification and vice versa. By ethnic identity, I mean my language (mother tongue) and my connection to my people (Bangladeshi). By my religious identity, I mean my Muslim religion, and my spiritual connection to the umma, a Muslim nation transcending all boundaries. Umma refers to the Muslim identity and unity within a larger Muslim group across national boundaries. The only thing the members of the umma have in common is their Islamic belief (Spencer and Wollman 169-170). In my childhood my father, a banker, was relocated to Karachi, Pakistan (then West Pakistan). Although I lived in Pakistan for much of my childhood, I have never considered it to be my home, even though it is predominantly a Muslim country. In this case, my home was my root (Bangladesh) where my grandparents and extended family lived. Every year I used to visit my grandparents who resided in a small town in Bangladesh (then East Pakistan). Thus my connection with my home was sustained through my extended family, ethnic traditions, language (Bengali/Bangla), and the occasional visits to the landscape of Bangladesh. Smith (9-11) notes that people build their connection or identity to their homeland through their historic land, common historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions. Though Pakistan and Bangladesh had common histories, their traditions of language, dress and ethnic culture were very different. For example, the celebration of the Bengali New Year (Pohela Baishakh), folk dance, folk music and folk tales, drama, poetry, lyrics of poets Rabindranath Tagore (Rabindra Sangeet) and Nazrul Islam (Nazrul Geeti) are distinct in the cultural heritage of Bangladesh. Special musical instruments such as the banshi (a bamboo flute), dhol (drums), ektara (a single-stringed instrument) and dotara (a four-stringed instrument) are unique to Bangladeshi culture. The Bangladeshi cuisine (rice and freshwater fish) is also different from Pakistan where people mainly eat flat round bread (roti) and meat (gosh). However, my bonding factor to Bangladesh was my relatives, particularly my grandparents as they made me feel one of ‘us’. Their affection for me was irreplaceable. The train journey from Dhaka (capital city) to their town, Noakhali, was captivating. The hustle and bustle at the train station and the lush green paddy fields along the train journey reminded me that this was my ‘home’. Though I spoke the official language (Urdu) in Pakistan and had a few Pakistani friends in Karachi, they could never replace my feelings for my friends, extended relatives and cousins who lived in Bangladesh. I could not relate to the landscape or dry weather of Pakistan. More importantly, some Pakistani women (our neighbours) were critical of my mother’s traditional dress (saree), and described it as revealing because it showed a bit of her back. They took pride in their traditional dress (shalwar, kameez, dopatta), which they considered to be more covered and ‘Islamic’. So, because of our traditional dress (saree) and perhaps other differences, we were regarded as the ‘Other’. In 1970 my father was relocated back to Dhaka, Bangladesh, and I was glad to go home. It should be noted that both Pakistan and Bangladesh were separated from India in 1947 – first as one nation; then, in 1971, Bangladesh became independent from Pakistan. The conflict between Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) and Pakistan (then West Pakistan) originated for economic and political reasons. At this time I was a high school student and witnessed acts of genocide committed by the Pakistani regime against the Bangladeshis (March-December 1971). My memories of these acts are vivid and still very painful. After my marriage, I moved from Bangladesh to the United States. In this instance, my new route (Austin, Texas, USA), as it happened, did not become my home. Here the ethno-cultural and Islamic cultural factors took precedence. I spoke the English language, made some American friends, and studied history at the University of Texas. I appreciated the warm friendship extended to me in the US, but experienced a degree of culture shock. I did not appreciate the pub life, alcohol consumption, and what I perceived to be the lack of family bonds (children moving out at the age of 18, families only meeting occasionally on birthdays and Christmas). Furthermore, I could not relate to de facto relationships and acceptance of sex before marriage. However, to me ‘home’ meant a family orientation and living in close contact with family. Besides the cultural divide, my husband and I were living in the US on student visas and, as Vertovec (21-23) noted, temporary visa status can deter people from their sense of belonging to the host country. In retrospect I can see that we lived in the ‘myth of return’. However, our next move for a better life was not to our root (Bangladesh), but another route to the Muslim world of Dhahran in Saudi Arabia. My husband moved to Dhahran not because it was a Muslim world but because it gave him better economic opportunities. However, I thought this new destination would become my home – the home that was coined by Anderson as the imagined nation, or my Muslim umma. Anderson argues that the imagined communities are “to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined” (6; Wood 61). Hall (122) asserts: identity is actually formed through unconscious processes over time, rather than being innate in consciousness at birth. There is always something ‘imaginary’ or fantasized about its unity. It always remains incomplete, is always ‘in process’, always ‘being formed’. As discussed above, when I had returned home to Bangladesh from Pakistan – both Muslim countries – my primary connection to my home country was my ethnic identity, language and traditions. My ethnic identity overshadowed the religious identity. But when I moved to Saudi Arabia, where my ethnic identity differed from that of the mainstream Arabs and Bedouin/nomadic Arabs, my connection to this new land was through my Islamic cultural and religious identity. Admittedly, this connection to the umma was more psychological than physical, but I was now in close proximity to Mecca, and to my home of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Mecca is an important city in Saudi Arabia for Muslims because it is the holy city of Islam, the home to the Ka’aba (the religious centre of Islam), and the birthplace of Prophet Muhammad [Peace Be Upon Him]. It is also the destination of the Hajj, one of the five pillars of Islamic faith. Therefore, Mecca is home to significant events in Islamic history, as well as being an important present day centre for the Islamic faith. We lived in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia for 5 years. Though it was a 2.5 hours flight away, I treasured Mecca’s proximity and regarded Dhahran as my second and spiritual home. Saudi Arabia had a restricted lifestyle for women, but I liked it because it was a Muslim country that gave me the opportunity to perform umrah Hajj (pilgrimage). However, Saudi Arabia did not allow citizenship to expatriates. Saudi Arabia’s government was keen to protect the status quo and did not want to compromise its cultural values or standard of living by allowing foreigners to become a permanent part of society. In exceptional circumstances only, the King granted citizenship to a foreigner for outstanding service to the state over a number of years. Children of foreigners born in Saudi Arabia did not have rights of local citizenship; they automatically assumed the nationality of their parents. If it was available, Saudi citizenship would assure expatriates a secure and permanent living in Saudi Arabia; as it was, there was a fear among the non-Saudis that they would have to leave the country once their job contract expired. Under the circumstances, though my spiritual connection to Mecca was strong, my husband was convinced that Saudi Arabia did not provide any job security. So, in 1987 when Australia offered migration to highly skilled people, my husband decided to migrate to Australia for a better and more secure economic life. I agreed to his decision, but quite reluctantly because we were again moving to a non-Muslim part of the world, which would be culturally different and far away from my original homeland (Bangladesh). In Australia, we lived first in Brisbane, then Adelaide, and after three years we took our Australian citizenship. At that stage I loved the Barossa Valley and Victor Harbour in South Australia, and the Gold Coast and Sunshine Coast in Queensland, but did not feel at home in Australia. We bought a house in Adelaide and I was a full time home-maker but was always apprehensive that my children (two boys) would lose their culture in this non-Muslim world. In 1990 we once again moved back to the Muslim world, this time to Muscat, Sultanate of Oman. My connection to this route was again spiritual. I valued the fact that we would live in a Muslim country and our children would be brought up in a Muslim environment. But my husband’s move was purely financial as he got a lucrative job offer in Muscat. We had another son in Oman. We enjoyed the luxurious lifestyle provided by my husband’s workplace and the service provided by the housemaid. I loved the beaches and freedom to drive my car, and I appreciated the friendly Omani people. I also enjoyed our frequent trips (4 hours flight) to my root, Dhaka, Bangladesh. So our children were raised within our ethnic and Islamic culture, remained close to my root (family in Dhaka), though they attended a British school in Muscat. But by the time I started considering Oman to be my second home, we had to leave once again for a place that could provide us with a more secure future. Oman was like Saudi Arabia; it employed expatriates only on a contract basis, and did not give them citizenship (not even fellow Muslims). So after 5 years it was time to move back to Australia. It was with great reluctance that I moved with my husband to Brisbane in 1995 because once again we were to face a different cultural context. As mentioned earlier, we lived in Brisbane in the late 1980s; I liked the weather, the landscape, but did not consider it home for cultural reasons. Our boys started attending expensive private schools and we bought a house in a prestigious Western suburb in Brisbane. Soon after arriving I started my tertiary education at the University of Queensland, and finished an MA in Historical Studies in Indian History in 1998. Still Australia was not my home. I kept thinking that we would return to my previous routes or the ‘imagined’ homeland somewhere in the Middle East, in close proximity to my root (Bangladesh), where we could remain economically secure in a Muslim country. But gradually I began to feel that Australia was becoming my ‘home’. I had gradually become involved in professional and community activities (with university colleagues, the Bangladeshi community and Muslim women’s organisations), and in retrospect I could see that this was an early stage of my ‘self-actualisation’ (Maslow). Through my involvement with diverse people, I felt emotionally connected with the concerns, hopes and dreams of my Muslim-Australian friends. Subsequently, I also felt connected with my mainstream Australian friends whose emotions and fears (9/11 incident, Bali bombing and 7/7 tragedy) were similar to mine. In late 1998 I started my PhD studies on the immigration history of Australia, with a particular focus on the historical settlement of Muslims in Australia. This entailed retrieving archival files and interviewing people, mostly Muslims and some mainstream Australians, and enquiring into relevant migration issues. I also became more active in community issues, and was not constrained by my circumstances. By circumstances, I mean that even though I belonged to a patriarchally structured Muslim family, where my husband was the main breadwinner, main decision-maker, my independence and research activities (entailing frequent interstate trips for data collection, and public speaking) were not frowned upon or forbidden (Khan 14-15); fortunately, my husband appreciated my passion for research and gave me his trust and support. This, along with the Muslim community’s support (interviews), and the wider community’s recognition (for example, the publication of my letters in Australian newspapers, interviews on radio and television) enabled me to develop my self-esteem and built up my bicultural identity as a Muslim in a predominantly Christian country and as a Bangladeshi-Australian. In 2005, for the sake of a better job opportunity, my husband moved to the UK, but this time I asserted that I would not move again. I felt that here in Australia (now in Perth) I had a job, an identity and a home. This time my husband was able to secure a good job back in Australia and was only away for a year. I no longer dream of finding a home in the Middle East. Through my bicultural identity here in Australia I feel connected to the wider community and to the Muslim umma. However, my attachment to the umma has become ambivalent. I feel proud of my Australian-Muslim identity but I am concerned about the jihadi ideology of militant Muslims. By jihadi ideology, I mean the extremist ideology of the al-Qaeda terrorist group (Farrar 2007). The Muslim umma now incorporates both moderate and radical Muslims. The radical Muslims (though only a tiny minority of 1.4 billion Muslims worldwide) pose a threat to their moderate counterparts as well as to non-Muslims. In the UK, some second- and third-generation Muslims identify themselves with the umma rather than their parents’ homelands or their country of birth (Husain). It should not be a matter of concern if these young Muslims adopt a ‘pure’ Muslim identity, providing at the same time they are loyal to their country of residence. But when they resort to terrorism with their ‘pure’ Muslim identity (e.g., the 7/7 London bombers) they defame my religion Islam, and undermine my spiritual connection to the umma. As a 1st generation immigrant, the defining criteria of my ‘homeliness’ in Australia are my ethno-cultural and religious identity (which includes my family), my active citizenship, and my community development/contribution through my research work – all of which allow me a sense of efficacy in my life. My ethnic and religious identities generally co-exist equally, but when I see some Muslims kill my fellow Australians (such as the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005) my Australian identity takes precedence. I feel for the victims and condemn the perpetrators. On the other hand, when I see politics play a role over the human rights issues (e.g., the Tampa incident), my religious identity begs me to comment on it (see Kabir, Muslims in Australia 295-305). Problematising ‘Home’ for Muslim Australians In the European context, Grillo (863) and Werbner (904), and in the Australian context, Kabir (Muslims in Australia) and Poynting and Mason, have identified the diversity within Islam (national, ethnic, religious etc). Werbner (904) notes that in spite of the “wishful talk of the emergence of a ‘British Islam’, even today there are Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Arab mosques, as well as Turkish and Shia’a mosques”; thus British Muslims retain their separate identities. Similarly, in Australia, the existence of separate mosques for the Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Arab and Shia’a peoples indicates that Australian Muslims have also kept their ethnic identities discrete (Saeed 64-77). However, in times of crisis, such as the Salman Rushdie affair in 1989, and the 1990-1991 Gulf crises, both British and Australian Muslims were quick to unite and express their Islamic identity by way of resistance (Kabir, Muslims in Australia 160-162; Poynting and Mason 68-70). In both British and Australian contexts, I argue that a peaceful rally or resistance is indicative of active citizenship of Muslims as it reveals their sense of belonging (also Werbner 905). So when a transmigrant Muslim wants to make a peaceful demonstration, the Western world should be encouraged, not threatened – as long as the transmigrant’s allegiances lie also with the host country. In the European context, Grillo (868) writes: when I asked Mehmet if he was planning to stay in Germany he answered without hesitation: ‘Yes, of course’. And then, after a little break, he added ‘as long as we can live here as Muslims’. In this context, I support Mehmet’s desire to live as a Muslim in a non-Muslim world as long as this is peaceful. Paradoxically, living a Muslim life through ijtihad can be either socially progressive or destructive. The Canadian Muslim feminist Irshad Manji relies on ijtihad, but so does Osama bin Laden! Manji emphasises that ijtihad can be, on the one hand, the adaptation of Islam using independent reasoning, hybridity and the contesting of ‘traditional’ family values (c.f. Doogue and Kirkwood 275-276, 314); and, on the other, ijtihad can take the form of conservative, patriarchal and militant Islamic values. The al-Qaeda terrorist Osama bin Laden espouses the jihadi ideology of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), an Egyptian who early in his career might have been described as a Muslim modernist who believed that Islam and Western secular ideals could be reconciled. But he discarded that idea after going to the US in 1948-50; there he was treated as ‘different’ and that treatment turned him against the West. He came back to Egypt and embraced a much more rigid and militaristic form of Islam (Esposito 136). Other scholars, such as Cesari, have identified a third orientation – a ‘secularised Islam’, which stresses general beliefs in the values of Islam and an Islamic identity, without too much concern for practices. Grillo (871) observed Islam in the West emphasised diversity. He stressed that, “some [Muslims were] more quietest, some more secular, some more clamorous, some more negotiatory”, while some were exclusively characterised by Islamic identity, such as wearing the burqa (elaborate veils), hijabs (headscarves), beards by men and total abstinence from drinking alcohol. So Mehmet, cited above, could be living a Muslim life within the spectrum of these possibilities, ranging from an integrating mode to a strict, militant Muslim manner. In the UK context, Zubaida (96) contends that marginalised, culturally-impoverished youth are the people for whom radical, militant Islamism may have an appeal, though it must be noted that the 7/7 bombers belonged to affluent families (O’Sullivan 14; Husain). In Australia, Muslim Australians are facing three challenges. First, the Muslim unemployment rate: it was three times higher than the national total in 1996 and 2001 (Kabir, Muslims in Australia 266-278; Kabir, “What Does It Mean” 63). Second, some spiritual leaders have used extreme rhetoric to appeal to marginalised youth; in January 2007, the Australian-born imam of Lebanese background, Sheikh Feiz Mohammad, was alleged to have employed a DVD format to urge children to kill the enemies of Islam and to have praised martyrs with a violent interpretation of jihad (Chulov 2). Third, the proposed citizenship test has the potential to make new migrants’ – particularly Muslims’ – settlement in Australia stressful (Kabir, “What Does It Mean” 62-79); in May 2007, fuelled by perceptions that some migrants – especially Muslims – were not integrating quickly enough, the Howard government introduced a citizenship test bill that proposes to test applicants on their English language skills and knowledge of Australian history and ‘values’. I contend that being able to demonstrate knowledge of history and having English language skills is no guarantee that a migrant will be a good citizen. Through my transmigrant history, I have learnt that developing a bond with a new place takes time, acceptance and a gradual change of identity, which are less likely to happen when facing assimilationist constraints. I spoke English and studied history in the United States, but I did not consider it my home. I did not speak the Arabic language, and did not study Middle Eastern history while I was in the Middle East, but I felt connected to it for cultural and religious reasons. Through my knowledge of history and English language proficiency I did not make Australia my home when I first migrated to Australia. Australia became my home when I started interacting with other Australians, which was made possible by having the time at my disposal and by fortunate circumstances, which included a fairly high level of efficacy and affluence. If I had been rejected because of my lack of knowledge of ‘Australian values’, or had encountered discrimination in the job market, I would have been much less willing to embrace my host country and call it home. I believe a stringent citizenship test is more likely to alienate would-be citizens than to induce their adoption of values and loyalty to their new home. Conclusion Blunt (5) observes that current studies of home often investigate mobile geographies of dwelling and how it shapes one’s identity and belonging. Such geographies of home negotiate from the domestic to the global context, thus mobilising the home beyond a fixed, bounded and confining location. Similarly, in this paper I have discussed how my mobile geography, from the domestic (root) to global (route), has shaped my identity. Though I received a degree of culture shock in the United States, loved the Middle East, and was at first quite resistant to the idea of making Australia my second home, the confidence I acquired in residing in these ‘several homes’ were cumulative and eventually enabled me to regard Australia as my ‘home’. I loved the Middle East, but I did not pursue an active involvement with the Arab community because I was a busy mother. Also I lacked the communication skill (fluency in Arabic) with the local residents who lived outside the expatriates’ campus. I am no longer a cultural freak. I am no longer the same Bangladeshi woman who saw her ethnic and Islamic culture as superior to all other cultures. I have learnt to appreciate Australian values, such as tolerance, ‘a fair go’ and multiculturalism (see Kabir, “What Does It Mean” 62-79). My bicultural identity is my strength. With my ethnic and religious identity, I can relate to the concerns of the Muslim community and other Australian ethnic and religious minorities. And with my Australian identity I have developed ‘a voice’ to pursue active citizenship. Thus my biculturalism has enabled me to retain and merge my former home with my present and permanent home of Australia. References Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London, New York: Verso, 1983. Australian Bureau of Statistics: Census of Housing and Population, 1996 and 2001. Blunt, Alison. Domicile and Diaspora: Anglo-Indian Women and the Spatial Politics of Home. 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Citation reference for this article MLA Style Kabir, Nahid. "Why I Call Australia ‘Home’?: A Transmigrant’s Perspective." M/C Journal 10.4 (2007). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0708/15-kabir.php>. APA Style Kabir, N. (Aug. 2007) "Why I Call Australia ‘Home’?: A Transmigrant’s Perspective," M/C Journal, 10(4). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0708/15-kabir.php>.