Relevant bibliographies by topics / Badness of death

Academic literature on the topic 'Badness of death'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 10 December 2022
Last updated: 28 January 2023

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Journal articles on the topic "Badness of death"

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Schramme, Thomas. "Can We Measure the Badness of Death for the Person who Dies?" Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 90 (October 2021): 253–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s135824612100031x.

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AbstractI aim to show that the common idea according to which we can assess how bad death is for the person who dies relies on numerous dubious premises. These premises are intuitive from the point of view of dominant views regarding the badness of death. However, unless these premises have been thoroughly justified, we cannot measure the badness of death for the person who dies. In this paper, I will make explicit assumptions that pertain to the alleged level of badness of death. The most important assumption I will address is the assignment of a quantitative value of zero to death, which leads to the conclusion that there are lives not worth living for the affected person. Such a view interprets the idea of a live worth living in quantitative terms. It is in conflict with actual evaluations of relevant people of their lives.
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Bower, Matt, and Bob Fischer. "Categorical Desires and the Badness of Animal Death." Journal of Value Inquiry 52, no. 1 (November 15, 2017): 97–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-017-9604-y.

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Purves, Duncan. "Desire satisfaction, death, and time." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47, no. 6 (2017): 799–819. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2017.1321910.

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AbstractDesire satisfaction theories of well-being and deprivationism about the badness of death face similar problems: desire satisfaction theories have trouble locating the time when the satisfaction of a future or past-directed desire benefits a person; deprivationism has trouble locating a time when death is bad for a person. I argue that desire satisfaction theorists and deprivation theorists can address their respective timing problems by accepting fusionism, the view that some events benefit or harm individuals only at fusions of moments in time. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the timing problem for deprivationism because it locates death’s badness at the same time as both the victim of death and death itself, and it accounts for all of the ways that death is bad for a person. Fusionism improves on existing solutions to the problem of temporally locating the benefit of future and past-directed desires because it respects several attractive principles, including the view that the intrinsic value of a time for someone is determined solely by states of affairs that obtain at that time and the view that intrinsically beneficial events benefit a person when they occur.
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Collins, John M. "FELDMAN’S ACCOUNT OF DEATH’S BADNESS, AND LIFE-DEATH COMPARATIVES." Southwest Philosophy Review 21, no. 2 (2005): 83–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview20052127.

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Korsgaard, Christine M. "Species-Being and the Badness of Extinction and Death." Zeitschrift für Ethik und Moralphilosophie 1, no. 1 (April 2018): 143–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s42048-018-0002-3.

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Blackshaw, Bruce P., and Daniel Rodger. "Meeting the Epicurean challenge: a reply to Christensen." Journal of Medical Ethics 45, no. 7 (February 16, 2019): 478–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2018-105267.

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In ‘Abortion and deprivation: a reply to Marquis’, Anna Christensen contends that Don Marquis’ influential ‘future like ours’ argument for the immorality of abortion faces a significant challenge from the Epicurean claim that human beings cannot be harmed by their death. If deprivation requires a subject, then abortion cannot deprive a fetus of a future of value, as no individual exists to be deprived once death has occurred. However, the Epicurean account also implies that the wrongness of murder is also not grounded in the badness of death, which is strongly counterintuitive. There is an alternative: we can save our intuitions by adopting a more moderate Epicurean account such as that proposed by David Hershenov, who grounds the wrongness of killing in the prevention of the benefit of further good life rather than in the badness of death. Hershenov’s account, however, is equally applicable to Marquis’ argument: abortion similarly prevents a fetus from enjoying the benefit of a future like ours. Consequently, we conclude that Christensen’s criticism of Marquis’ argument fails to undermine his reasoning.
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Cyr, Taylor W. "A puzzle about death’s badness: Can death be bad for the paradise-bound?" International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 80, no. 2 (June 8, 2016): 145–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11153-016-9574-1.

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Brennan, Samantha. "The Badness of Death, the Wrongness of Killing, and the Moral Importance of Autonomy." Dialogue 40, no. 4 (2001): 723–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217300004959.

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RésuméLa mort d'une personne peut-elle être intrinsèquement mauvaise pour la personne qui meurt? Et pourquoi est-il mal de tuer une autre personne? Je soutiens qu'une réponse adéquate à l'une ou l'autre de ces questions requiert d'apprécier l'importance morale de l'autonomie. J'examine ici la conception dominante de ce qui rend la mort mauvaise — la théorie de la dépossession —, ainsi que deux conceptions rivales de ce qui fait qu'il est mal de tuer — la théorie de la dépossession appliquée à l'acte de tuer, et la thèse des droits liminaux de Judith Thomson. Bien que mon objectif principal dans cet article soit d'établir l'importance de l' autonomie pour expliquer à lafois que la mort est mauvaise et qu'il est mal de tuer, je pense également qu'une réflexion sur ce qui rend la mort mauvaise nous apprend quelque chose au sujet des droits et de leur force, et qu'une réflexion sur les droits nous apprend quelque chose quant à ce qui fait que la mort et l'immortalité sont toutes deux de mauvaises choses.
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Frugé, Christopher. "Epicureanism and Skepticism about Practical Reason." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50, no. 2 (October 25, 2019): 195–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/can.2019.12.

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AbstractEpicureans believe that death cannot harm the one who dies because they hold the existence condition, which states that a subject is able to be harmed only while they exist. I show that on one reading of this condition death can, in fact, make the deceased worse off because it is satisfied by the deprivation account of death’s badness. I argue that the most plausible Epicurean view holds the anti-modal existence condition, according to which no merely possible state of affairs can be good or bad relative to the subject who dies. I go on to show how this condition, as well as any other condition that denies the deprivation account, results in skepticism about practical reason. Thus, the Epicurean faces a dilemma. Either our practical reasoning is hopelessly mistaken or death can make us worse off. Given that our practical reasoning seems at least mildly reliable, we should conclude that death can make us worse off.
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Liao, S. "Time-Relative Interests and Abortion." Journal of Moral Philosophy 4, no. 2 (2007): 242–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1740468107079268.

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AbstractThe concept of a time-relative interest is introduced by Jeff McMahan to solve certain puzzles about the badness of death. Some people (e.g. McMahan and David DeGrazia) believe that this concept can also be used to show that abortion is permissible. In this paper, I first argue that if the Time-Relative Interest Account permits abortion, then it would also permit infanticide. I next reject the suggestion that the Time-Relative Interest Account can at least explain the permissibility of early abortion, even if it cannot explain the permissibility of late abortion. Given this, early and late abortions have to be justified on other grounds.
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Books on the topic "Badness of death"

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Benatar, David. Death. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190633813.003.0005.

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This chapter argues that the human predicament, at least considered as a whole, cannot be escaped by death. This is because death is bad for the person who dies. The Epicurean arguments against this view are considered and rejected. The most common way of accounting for the badness of death is by means of the deprivation account—death is bad because it deprives the person who dies of the future goods that he or she would otherwise have enjoyed. This chapter argues for an augmented account, according to which death is bad because it deprives and annihilates. The chapter then grapples with difficult questions about the timing of death’s badness and about how bad different deaths are. The chapter concludes by considering what attitude we should have toward our mortality.
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Broome, John. The Badness of Death and the Goodness of Life. Oxford University Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195388923.013.0010.

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Hanser, Matthew. The Wrongness of Killing and the Badness of Death. Oxford University Press, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195388923.013.0018.

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Glasgow, Joshua. The Solace. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190074302.001.0001.

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While navigating his own mother’s cancer diagnosis, the author explores how we might find solace in the fact that we will die. Traditionally, philosophical answers to this question center on two possibilities. First, some argue that death is not bad for the one who dies, because they won’t exist after once they are dead. Second, others argue that because immortality would be bad, death has considerable upside. Finding these two answers less than satisfying, the author explores a third option. This third source of solace starts with the idea that insofar as our lives are worth being grateful for, they must have a value. This book argues that because life is implicated in all of our good projects and relationships, its value radiates out to all of life’s parts, be they good or bad. And because passing away is one of the parts of life, it gets some of this radiant value. Finally, just as we are grateful for the value of our lives, so we can affirm this value in passing away. Gratitude is not the most fitting way of affirming the value in death, since passing away is also bad for those who die by depriving them of life’s good opportunities. A more fitting affirmation of the value that death borrows from life, when passing away also visits so much badness upon us, is to take some solace in the fact that our passing away has a portion of life’s positive value.
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Book chapters on the topic "Badness of death"

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"10. The Badness of Death." In Death, 205–33. Yale University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.12987/9780300183429-011.

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Frithjof Norheim, Ole. "The Badness of Death." In Saving People from the Harm of Death, 33–47. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190921415.003.0003.

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In this chapter, I discuss the Time-Relative Interest Account (TRIA) and the Life Comparative Account (LCA) and their implications for summary measures of population health and fair priority setting in health care. First, I argue that an extreme interpretation of TRIA is incompatible with the standard practice of measuring population health by life expectancy at birth as an indicator. Implementing a policy of always saving adults before children would decrease life expectancy in a population. This implication is untenable. Second, I argue that a moderate interpretation of TRIA is compatible with earlier attempts to measure the burden of disease in populations by using marginal age weights in the valuation of Disability-Adjusted Life Years lost. The authors of the Global Burden of Disease study subsequently abandoned age weights. Third, I argue that marginal age weights used for determining social priority for health improvements may be appropriate.
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Greaves, Hilary. "Against “the Badness of Death”." In Saving People from the Harm of Death, 189–202. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190921415.003.0014.

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It is tempting for health care analysts to theorize about the value of life-saving in terms of the “badness of death.” This move is innocuous in principle, but in practice it tends to lead theorists seriously astray. The problems arise because the concept of “badness” has several very different natural interpretations, and it proves notoriously difficult to keep the focus on the relevant ones. By way of illustration, this chapter surveys two particular such mistakes that (I will argue) philosophers and health care analysts have made. The first occurs in the context of Jeff McMahan’s Time-Relative Interest Account of the badness of death. The second concerns the value of family planning interventions. The mistakes in question would both be avoided if the debates were reframed in terms of the maximization of an appropriately chosen overall value function, eschewing any explicit reference to badness.
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"The Privative Badness of Death." In Planning for the Future, 9–14. mentis Verlag, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/9783957437365_003.

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Broome, John. "The Badness of Dying Early." In Saving People from the Harm of Death, 105–15. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190921415.003.0008.

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A common intuition suggests that it is less bad for an infant to die than for a young adult to die. This is puzzling because the infant has more life ahead of her than a young adult, so it seems she loses more when she dies. Jeff McMahan supports the common intuition and defends it by means of what he calls the “Time-Relative Interest Account” of the badness of death. I shall describe two possible interpretations of the Time-Relative Interest Account and raise a problem for each. Then I shall offer an alternative defense of the common intuition, which is an extension of the theory in population ethics known as “critical-level utilitarianism.”
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Kamm, F. M. "The Badness of Death and What to Do About It (if Anything)." In Almost Over, 1–30. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190097158.003.0001.

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Chapter 1 discusses the pros and cons of four views about the badness of death on the assumption that it involves one’s ceasing to exist: Deprivationism, Willlhavehadism, Alloverism, and Insultism. It considers how these views bear on such questions as whether death is always bad for the person who dies, whose life to save when not all can be saved, how the distribution of goods and bads in a life matters, and whether it is reasonable to have an asymmetrical attitude toward death and prenatal nonexistence. The chapter also considers what the four views imply about the badness of the extinction of humanity (and all other persons).
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Bradley, Ben. "A Gradualist View about the Badness of Death." In Saving People from the Harm of Death, 134–45. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190921415.003.0010.

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In this chapter I introduce a view that has not been explored in detail and argue that it is a more plausible version of gradualism than extant views. It is based on the following simple thoughts: there is a difference between individuals that are susceptible to harm (by death or anything else) and individuals that are not. This difference is just the difference between individuals that are subjects of well-being and individuals that are not. And there is no sharp boundary between the individuals that are subjects of well-being and those that are not. In many cases it is vague whether an individual is a welfare subject. I attempt to formulate a view about the badness of death that takes account of this vagueness. I argue that this view, the Partial Welfare Subject View, has advantages over other gradualist views about death’s badness such as the Time-Relative Interest Account.
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Campbell, Tim. "Health Care Rationing and the Badness of Death." In Saving People from the Harm of Death, 255–66. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190921415.003.0019.

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According to Jeff McMahan, health care professionals ought to save an individual, A, from dying as a young adult (e.g., at age 30) rather than save some other individual, B, from dying as a newborn, even if the latter intervention would give B twice as many years of full-quality life as the former intervention would give A. Call this claim Young Adults over Newborns. In this chapter, I argue that if we accept Young Adults over Newborns, then we must reject at least one of three other more plausible claims. This constitutes a strong reason to reject Young Adults over Newborns.
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Černý, David. "Autonomous Vehicles, the Badness of Death, and Discrimination." In Autonomous Vehicle Ethics, 20—C2.N24. Oxford University PressNew York, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197639191.003.0002.

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Abstract The aim of this chapter is to address concerns regarding possible discriminatory behavior of autonomous vehicles (AVs) in collision situations. In the first part, the author analyzes paradigmatic cases of direct discrimination and arrives at a semiformal definition of it. The second part is devoted to a thorough investigation into the nature and badness of death and culminates with a defense and characterization of the deprivation account of the badness of death. In the final part, the author sets out to apply the analysis, conclusions, and conceptual distinctions from the previous two parts to the problem of whether distributing harms based on age necessarily involves some form of discrimination. The conclusion is negative: if an AV distinguished between two possible trajectories, each of which would lead to the death of a human person, on the basis of age, its choice and behavior would not be an instance of direct discrimination.
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McMahan, Jeff. "The Comparative Badness for Animals of Suffering and Death." In The Ethics of Killing Animals, 65–85. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199396078.003.0005.

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