Journal articles on the topic 'Badiouan model'

This article examines the relationship between materialism, dialectics, and theology in Alain Badiou's work. The first three sections of the article focus on Badiou's reading of Hegelian dialectics in his 1982 work, Theory of the Subject. The first section accounts for Badiou's splitting of Hegel into an idealist and materialist dialectic, and presents an exposition of the latter. The second section outlines Badiou's critical analysis of the theological model implicit in Hegel's dialectics. The third section investigates the core of this criticism through a discussion of Badiou's reading of the “negation of the negation.” The remaining four sections examine the anti-dialectical interpretation of the Christ-event that Badiou presents in his book Saint Paul. Here the article illustrates how Badiou's insistence on separating the death of Christ from the resurrection is linked to his rejection of the doctrines of Trinity and Incarnation, and how this drives Badiou towards idealism.

Metadata practices in libraries have been shifting towards a graph-centric data model for a number of years due to the influence of the Semantic Web on metadata standards as well as the ongoing engagement of libraries with linked data. This trend is likely to be sustained by the growth of the knowledge graph domain, which is animated by the interests of large technology companies and which represents a continuation of earlier programmes such as expert systems and the Semantic Web. Given the role of Semantic Web ontologies in knowledge graph development and the relevance of philosophical questions of ontology to cataloguing theory, metadata practitioners require theoretical frameworks suitable for conceptualizing the knowledge graph data model’s mixture of data and ontology. To that end, this paper considers the mathematical ontology of philosopher Alain Badiou, which employs set theory to schematize a theory of the multiple. It outlines how Badiou’s ontology is compatible with the graph data model and what it offers to metadata practitioners seeking to critically engage the knowledge graph paradigm.

El siguiente texto pretende dar a conocer qué puede aportar la obra del filósofo francés Alain Badiou en el debate acerca de la situación actual de la educación. Para ello haremos una lectura de su obra en clave propedéutica. Nuestra tesis de partida es que dicha obra puede leerse como un proyecto de recuperación de la filosofía entendida como una educación a través de verdades. Para ubicar esta tesis en el debate educativo contemporáneo utilizaremos la teoría elaborada por Gert Biesta, quien ha construido en las últimas décadas un sistema de pensamiento que ofrece un marco teórico con el que fundamentar propuestas educativas alternativas a las tendencias individualistas, funcionales, mediadoras y controlables del modelo neoliberal dominante. Para Biesta, la educación ha sufrido un proceso de aprendificación, que prioriza sus funciones socializadora y cualificadora y olvida su función subjetivadora. El texto argumentará en qué medida el modelo de educación propuesto por Badiou contribuye a recuperar la función subjetivadora de la educación. La educación como proceso de subjetivación a través de verdades ofrecería a los docentes la posibilidad de fomentar experiencias educativas que interrumpan el carácter individualista, funcional, mediador y controlado del modelo educativo hegemónico. El texto reivindica mayor influencia del pensamiento de Alain Badiou dentro de la pedagogía crítica a la hora de fundamentar propuestas educativas acordes a modelos docentes más democráticos y cooperativos.

En un seminario titulado Filosofía y literatura, el filósofo francés Alain Badiou teorizó acerca de la función didáctica de la literatura en la educación filosófica desde sus orígenes platónicos. Dicha función encuentra un ejemplo de aplicación práctica en el programa de Filosofía para Niños y Niñas (FpN) desarrollado por Matthew Lipman. Sin embargo, poco se ha dicho acerca de la aplicación de esta función a la educación política. En las últimas décadas la denominada segunda generación de teóricos de FpN ha orientado las premisas sobre las que se sustenta su programa de educación filosófica a cuestiones sociales. En el siguiente texto estudiaremos este programa desde la teoría de Alain Badiou con la intención identificar una serie de características que puedan favorecer la aplicación de la literatura en la educación filosófica a partir de la investigación de ideas políticas.

Abstract In seeking to found a ‘new political logic’, Badiou argues that we can only retrieve the political sense of concrete negation through its subordination to a prior field of affirmation: i.e. the opening of a new possibility inside a given historical situation, or ‘the event’, that may be politically realised through the creation of a ‘new subjective body’ consisting in the social affirmation of those new possibilities. Revolutionary politics is therefore said to rest on a synthesis of, on the one hand, democracy in the sense of spontaneous mass-political irruption, and, on the other, a prescriptive elaboration of the ramifications of the event. The discussion then turns to the question of strategy – outside and against the politically moribund State-form – and his reconfiguration of political universality vis-à-vis the formulations of classical Marxism. Badiou counterposes capitalist ideology’s implicit anthropology of self-interested animals to his own of subjects embodied in a generic truth-procedure and its concomitant model of political rights, where what is ultimately at stake is ‘the complete transformation of the form of . . . difference, of the way the difference exists’ rather than a materialist dialectics of antagonistic contradiction. The interview concludes with Badiou clarifying his relationship to Lacanian psychoanalysis as an essential but by no means exhaustive conceptual armoury for understanding the relation between subject and event.

On occasion of his first lecture tour of India in 2010, Źižek sparked off a debate with Nivedita Menon, a leading postcolonial feminist scholar. The debate revolves around Menon's contention that Źižek's emphasis on European, Christian Universalism as the most proactive model for countering capitalism is ignorant of the heteroglossiac postcolonial histories of South Asia. Menon's response (“The Two Źižeks”) suggests that what Źižek appears to be missing is knowledge of the fallibility of Eurocentric discourses in negotiating the colonial and postcolonial situations particular to the subcontinent. Though Źižek's debates with Badiou and Butler are well known, few outside India are aware of the Menon-Źižek debate. This paper will occasion this little known debate to consider some of the major points raised by Menon against the applicability of Źižek's theoretical arguments toward reading and understanding postcolonial politics and culture.

Berlioz's final opera, Béatrice et Bénédict (1860–62) has generally been considered a light-hearted work, revelling in the simple joys of love. Yet his final development of the theme of love, which had preoccupied him at least since the Symphonie fantastique (1830), makes this opéra comique more serious than it might appear to be. Drawing on theories of the human subject by Badiou, Žižek, and Lacan, as well as on the resources of Schenkerian theory, this article invites a new attention on the ideological violence done both by conventional models of love (in this case, on the main characters in the opera) and by the language of tonality. Evaluation of the musical means by which Berlioz psychoanalyzes the characters of a masochist, Héro, and a hysteric, Béatrice, ultimately reveals a surprisingly provocative work of vivid psychological drama.

AbstractThis article studies the socioeconomics of government public expenditure for the arts and the normative foundations of state intervention in the arts. I pose two interrelated research questions: (a) what is the relationship between the public funding of the arts and their consumption? and (b) what mode of justification and what perception of the place of art in society is reflected in this relationship? Based on the philosophical work of Alan Badiou, I develop a novel conceptual framework to delineate three types of normative justifications for the public funding of arts organizations: romantic, didactic and classical. Using data from the public funding of 92 orchestras, theaters and dance troupes in Israel between 1999 and 2011, I estimate a cross-lagged panel data model to study how arts funding both affects and is affected by the levels of consumption of the organizations’ productions. The results of the study show a complex pattern of different relationships between funding and consumption that accord with the three types of normative justifications for public arts funding.

How should we evaluate the global protests against the financial crisis from 2011 and onwards? Do demonstrations on central squares such as Syntagma, Puerta de Sol and Zucotti Park point towards alternative democratic models beyond representative democracy? This article identifies a schism between the protests as events and the protests as self-organisation. Whereas the protests as events remains the dominant interpretation of the protests – delivered with negative connotations by Ivan Krastev and with positive consequences by Slavoj Žizek and Alain Badiou – this article will investigate the protests as self-organisation by emphasizing some of the many examples of autonomous political institution-building and creation of permanent structures of political participation, which have appeared as natural continuations of the protests. I argue that the protests as self-organisation can be seen as re-actualisations of the practices and ideals of council democracy as interpreted by Hannah Arendt and Cornelius Castoriadis. By interpreting the protests through the prism of council democracy, I argue that the manifold political and societal initiatives that have appeared in the wake of these protests attempt to realise a specific notion of democratic autonomy and political freedom.

Within the twenty-year period that coincides with the first twenty years of the Glej Theatre, the essay concentrates on the formation and transformations of non-hierarchical theatre communities, or, in the words of one of its founders, Dušan Jovanović, theatrical tribes. Using historical and present-day examples, the author will try to map the specific devised theatrical procedures producing what Badiou names “a generic vacillation”: “Theatre turns every representation, every actor’s gesture, into a generic vacillation so as to put differences to the test without any supporting base. The spectator must decide whether to expose himself to this void, whether to share in the infinite procedure. He is summoned, not to experience pleasure (which arrives perhaps ‘on top of everything’, as Aristotle says) but to think” (Rhapsody, 124).The essay strives to answer the following questions: How did the Slovenian experimental and non-institutional performing arts scene (as a reaction to the hierarchical structure of repertory theatres) create different non-hierarchical modes in relation to creating the performances, the theatre’s artistic direction and forming temporary communities with emancipated audiences? To which models did this scene turn – then and today – to develop its own logic of devised and collaborative theatrical tactics? And lately: To what extent have those different artistic collaborative tribes changed the theatrical landscape in Slovenia, Yugoslavia and elsewhere?

Рассматривается особый способ телесного присутствия зрителя в различных произведениях виртуальной реальности (VR). В некоторых из них зритель присутствует лишь в роли наблюдателя / свидетеля, или «призрака», не способного взаимодействовать с миром виртуальной инсталляции и влиять на происходящие в нем события. В других же элемент интерактивности проявляется ярче, роль зрителя более не сводится исключительно к наблюдению, он становится активным участником инсталляции. Произведения искусства, созданные с применением технологий виртуальной реальности, – это искусственные «миры», предлагающие зрителю новые ощущения, обычно зрительные и слуховые, потому что в большинстве проектов передача тактильных ощущений пока отсутствует. Важным аспектом при разработке VR-инсталляций для художника является определение законов «поведения» виртуальной среды, окружающей зрителя, и здесь возможны эксперименты с законами альтернативной природы – VR. Также важны «правила» присутствия в VR зрителя / пользователя. Важно определить, на каких основаниях, в каком статусе он находится в пространстве инсталляции, обладает ли механизмами реагирования, рычагами воздействия на «мир», и если нет, то чем это обусловлено, почему это может быть ценно и для зрителя, и для художника. Если же элемент интерактивности находится в центре образной структуры проекта, то какие выразительные возможности могут открыть действия пользователя и его интеракция с произведением и другими пользователями через это произведение? Как можно охарактеризовать опыт, который получает зритель, взаимодействуя с VR-работами? На эти вопросы мы и постараемся ответить в данной статье, исследуя различные произведения искусства, созданные с помощью технологии VR. Основной авторский тезис заключается в том, что развитие виртуальной реальности дает возможность выстроить опыт нового чувственного плана: альтернативной субъективности и сверхчеловеческого видения многомерных взаимосвязей между явлениями и событиями в мире, – выводя тем самым наш способ мышления на совершенно другой уровень – внеэгоцентрического состояния, формирующего новую оптику «планетарного видения». This article discusses a special way of the bodily presence of the viewer in various works designed for virtual reality. In some of them, the viewer is not able to interact with the world of a virtual installation and influence the events taking place in it (although they can, for example, move through the digital space); in others, there is a limited quality of presence at the perception (but not action) level leading to a meaningful result: when the viewer is compelled to observe events as the director/artist intended – their gaze is built into the point of view of the director or camera. Finally, there is a third type of VR projects where we find an enhancing user interaction with the digital environment. Viewer’s capacities – including the ability to move in the space of the installation and interact with it – depend on the “genealogy” of a particular VR piece. There are basically two types of VR pieces that have the same image and sound output devices, but differ significantly from each other in the way moving image is produced and in the kind of effect produced on a recipient. The first type involves the creation of real-life decoration with actors in it filmed on a panoramic camera (a device with a 360-degree view). This kind of the piece is similar to panoramic cinema: it is basically a film that provides a high-quality image and a bright immersive effect, but does not provide the viewer (just like classical cinema) with the opportunity to interact with screen reality. In these cases interactivity goes down to choosing the point of observation and following the camera. Examples reviewed in the current article include such pieces as “Caves”, “Container”, “Montegelato” (demonstrated at the Venice VR Expanded, 2021 program), etc. The second type of VR is based on creation of virtual space and 3D models of characters and objects inside it (“Goliath”, “Anandala”, “Last Worker”, “Samsara”, “Lavrinthos”, also viewed in Venice). These pieces are technically part of a game-design framework since they are constructed on game “engines” and imply a high degree of interactivity. Here the emphasis is on the interaction with an artificially created world, even though authors may limit the viewer’s ability to act within the VR space and make only limited number of choices. Observing various strategies of interaction in VR, I outline three kinds of them: (1) lack of interaction; (2) limited interaction (participation at the level of perception, but not action); (3) full-fledged interaction. Artists put the very phenomenon of interactivity into question each time eliminating certain aspects of this experience. For example, a user can be deprived of an ability to move (as in the Tree VR project offering one to “be” a tree that cannot “respond” to the violence committed against it) or, conversely, granting one such “rights” and “powers” in the virtual world that are hardly imaginable in everyday practices (flight, telekinesis, etc.). The element of interactivity may either structure the project or, on the contrary, be “bracketed”, users’ actions (participation or the lack of it) turn into means of artistic expression. What kind of expression? How can we describe the experience that a viewer gets interacting with VR pieces? The current article provides an answer to these questions in a broad sociocultural context, including issues of bio- and digital ethics. I examine the VR pieces of the first and second type (where a viewer is limited in actions and cannot influence the events taking place in the installation) and explore the difference between them, conceptualize the compelled inaction of the viewer. In this regard, based on the concept of event introduced by French philosopher A. Badiou (meaning something that changes the frame of our perception of reality), I agrue that VR technologies can be considered as a machine for producing events – an apparatus for actualizing potentialities that are converted into events for the viewer and in the future may or may not become a reality. It depends on whether the viewer decides to “embed” the opportunity offered by the virtual event into their Weltbild. For example, one could take off VR-glasses and transfer the aesthetic affect into some kind of action in reality beginning to show greater social responsibility, taking part in social assistance programs, becoming more tolerant, etc. The effectiveness of this approach is demonstrated by experiments conducted in the Virtual Human Interaction Lab at Stanford University (USA). Furthermore, I focus on projects that create the possibility of communicating and interacting with nonhuman agents that populate the space of VR installations. And the emphasis is shifted from the “anthrope”, who is used to seeing oneself in the center of the world (a subjective position that has been constructed in Western culture since the Renaissance) to the play of nonhuman entities. This pulls up the paradigm of anthropocentrism, basic to European culture, and provides one with an ability to think and act on a completely different level — on extra-egocentric one. In case when the viewer has freedom of movement and interaction within the VR world, the rules and restrictions that the artist/director imposes on this interaction are important, since the quality of viewer’s experience will be shaped by it. It is the need to perform motoric actions aimed at achieving a specific goal (or the impossibility of doing so, as in case of projects of the first and second types) that shapes viewer’s identity in the field. In a VR installation of the third type (“full-fledged presence”), the viewer can, like an actor in the Stanislavsky Theater, become an actor “in the proposed circumstances”. The elements of such installation and models of user’s interaction scenarios with its interface (including motoric actions) are aimed at helping the viewer get immersed into their “role”. However, if in theatrical plays and films actors were supposed to perform for a spectator to follow the plot and transfer their emotional and cognitive projections onto it, in VR these projections are turned onto the viewer. Thus, in the field of virtual reality, languages of various arts intersect: theater, cinema, game design, etc. are giving rise to multiple hybrid formats of experience. Projects of the third type can also be seen as shattering the viewer’s habitual egocentric position. Such projects, which problematize our experience as a contingent construct, make it possible to design an experience of alternative subjectivity. I argue that the development of virtual reality makes it possible to build the experience of a new sensual plane: a re-subjectivised and superhuman vision of multidimensional relationships between phenomena and events in the world. Thereby our way of thinking is being brought to a completely different level: an extra-egocentric state that forms a new optics of “planetary vision”. ”Planetary optics” does not imply a view from afar. The precise (not abstract) way of thinking is a challenging thing; it is hard to get away from reducing reality to familiar schemes, binary oppositions and common hierarchies. That is why, while analyzing the strategies of artists working with the medium of VR throughout this article, I focus on pieces where these familiar schemes get overturned. A hunter becomes a prey, an actor becomes a non-participant, and so on. The binaries of male and female, Eurocentrism and Orientalism, nature and culture, animal and machine get blurred not to erase the boundaries between them but with the aim of offering the spectator-actor a new perspective or even a set of perspectives, points of view, positions of various stakeholders, polarities and experience of a multipolar world. “Planetary optics” does assume a multipolar world (after all, we cannot block some part of it and separate ourselves from other beings, we are too intertwined with other techno- and biological actors) — and one of the ways to achieve this multipolar way of thinking can be through the experience offered by the VR medium, an artistic image that becomes personal experience. And, in turn, existing experience will allow the viewer to attain a more flexible and tuned perception, correlating it with the Weltbild, perhaps, of social groups far from it with their own interests, which however must be taken into account. Therefore, VR as a medium has not only artistic, but also social meaning, since it may concretize and focus human thinking, prone to abstraction, it may synthesize the sensual and the rational. The further development of virtual reality will perhaps make it possible to build a visual experience of a new kind: one associated with a different scale of view, different assemblage points, the experience of a hybrid space that combines the virtual and the real (what might be called a “meta screen”), so that the user will be able to look at the world with a different vision (for example, to see multidimensional connections and networks of actors in different approximations).

The paper is concerned with the exploration of romantic love in two noticeable cin- ematic works of the recent decade: Amour (Michael Haneke, 2012) and Love (Gaspar Noé, 2015). The suggested analysis employs Alain Badiou’s philosophy of love, which enables to explicate the configuration of concepts structuring romantic love as a field of experience and being thus a priori relevant to its cinematic representations. The methodological presupposition of the article concerning the more-than-illustrative philosophical significance of the reading of films, capable, as it is claimed, to radi- cally transform the conceptual framework applied in their reading, is based on Badi- ou’s understanding of the essential cinematic operation as “the passage of an idea.” Specifically, it is shown that each of the films develops some necessary structural ele- ments of Badiou’s model to the effect of deconstructing its most fundamental onto- logical matrix: the Two-scene. To articulate these cinematic trajectories of love, the article puts Badiou in dialogue with other thinkers. The interpretation of Haneke’s Amour focuses on the ethical dimension of love and its relation to death, while intro- ducing into the discussion the voices of Stanley Cavell and Martin Heidegger. The exploration of the dialectics of love and sex in Noé’s film makes recourse to Roger Scruton and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

Teesid: Artikkel lähtub teesist, et armastus kui tunne on lahutamatu sellest, kuidas seda tunnet sõnastatakse ja mõistetakse, ning analüüsib armastust kui kultuurilist kujutelma, mille äratundmine toimub vastavalt ühiskondlikele tõerežiimidele. Analüüsin armastusekujutust kirjandusteostes Alain Badiou armastusmudelite abil ning lisan juurde „omailma-armastuse mudeli“, mis rõhutab armastatu lahutamatust teda ümbritsevast ruumist: armastus ei hõlma vaid armastatut kui kindlalt piiritletud kehalist üksust, vaid ka seda, kuidas armastatu suhestub teda ümbritseva ruumiga ja inimestega. This article presents and analyses Western cultural models for speaking and thinking about love. According to Michel Foucault, each society establishes its regimes of truth: certain types of discourses are approved as truthful while others are declared unreliable. Each society includes mechanisms of control, which distinguish true statements from false, and assign some people (but not others) the authority to judge the true and the false, the acceptable and the unacceptable. Regimes of truth also establish paradigms for judging the truthfulness of love: according to the romantic regime, for example, love is something ephemeral, ungraspable and immeasurable, it transgresses established boundaries and norms; according to the pragmatic regime, by contrast, love can be expressed in economic terms and thus measured: a precious gift expresses commitment (else it would be a waste of money). There may be no common ground for one regime to concede legitimacy to a value asserted by a competing regime. In the view of the romantic regime, for example, the pragmatic regime might be judged as cynical and failing to grasp the essence of love – such weighing of feelings belongs to modern regimes of truth. Both romantic and pragmatic regimes of truth belong to the larger field of cultural imaginaries. Regimes of truth order and systematize the sphere of cultural imaginaries. I understand cultural imaginaries as the common ground for cultural identifications, a cultural complex that links together cultural memory, the value systems of one’s present era, and commonly shared expectations of the future. Cultural imaginaries are grounded partly in national culture, including the cultural knowledge shared by the national community and communicated in classic texts of that culture. In addition to specifically national cultural knowledge, cultural imaginaries of course include supranational value systems. The sphere of cultural imaginaries includes many inconsistencies and incoherences and it is always in flux. Alain Badiou outlines four philosophical models of love: romantic, practical, sceptical, and existential. I suggest that only two of these, romantic and practical (which I call pragmatic), have attained the status of truth regimes. Badiou foregrounds the existential model: according to this model, love is the refashioning of the world through the two, the replacement of an egocentric perspective with a new perspective based on difference. The greatest enemy of such love is not an intruder from the outside, but the self itself that prefers its own egocentric world to the love-world that is constituted through difference. Following some popular models of romantic relations in novels, I point to frequent tensions between the different models of love in fiction: contract-love versus romantic love, love as desire versus love as a friendly attachment, and I promote a model of love as encompassing not simply the figure of the beloved, but also his or her surrounding world. The conglomerate of relations that surrounds the human body and plays part in its identification could be called, following Jacob von Uexküll, an environing world of love. Thus, in Pride and Prejudice by Jane Austen or in Kasuema by Silvia Rannamaa, the female protagonist loves her male counterpart within the context of his environing world, where the beloved’s situatedness in the world becomes a defining part of the amorous relationship. Novels and films offer also a model of love which runs against Badiou’s ideal model of existential love: in some texts, the reader witnesses the birth of agency through love. In Asta Willmann’s short story “Patu vili”, the main character Berit grows from a passive, suffering, violated woman into an active, powerful figure who has strength enough to make groundbreaking decisions. She does not experience love as an existential relationship that offers her the possibility to relate to the world through the two, but she does grow as a human being and she finds strength and support in her relationship. The article concludes with the analysis of Mäetaguse vanad by Anton Hansen Tammsaare – in face of the death of one of the longterm partners, this short story exemplifies important qualities of shared life.

I propose to depict the relationship between Badiou’s philosophy and mathematics as a three-layered model. Philosophy as metaontology creates a metastructure, mathematics as ontology in the form of a condition of philosophy constitutes its situation, and mathematics as a multiple universe of all given axioms, theorems, techniques, interpretations, and systems (set theory, category theory, etc.) is an inconsistent multiplicity. So, we can interpret the relationship between philosophy and mathematics as the one between a metastructure and a situation. By using Easton’s theorem, we come to realise that philosophical concepts in the metastructure “quantitatively” exceed the elements that belong to mathematics as ontology. Therefore, philosophy as metaontology shows the limits of mathematics as ontology.

The young Marx once remarked that political economy finds itself in an estranged form and is therefore in desperate need of a critical reconstruction of its object [Gegenstand]. He proposed a complete deconstruction of economic objectivity and its categories, hoping to recover the true species-life of man. In the article, we assert that contemporary economic theory remains confined by this estrangement, despite managing to ‘revolutionize’ itself out of the grip of classical political economy. The subjectivist-marginalist reliance on ‘measurable’ consumer preferences not only solidified the discipline’s estrangement, but also wrested away any remaining basic principles of economics through neoclassical reconceptualization. A break with estrangement would require novel critical economic thinking that would do away with the discontinuity between classical and neoclassical (contemporary) economics. It would therefore need a rich enough framework to scrutinize its principal categories. We argue that Alain Badiou’s objective phenomenology possesses a complementary synchronic structure able to conform to basic economic tenets, allowing for a comparative and synthetic approach. This would then be the basis for a new model of economic theorizing. We conclude the article with Marx’s value form, seeing it as a possible central category of a newly proposed economic framework.

For once I want to be the car crash, Not always just the traffic jam. Hit me hard enough to wake me, And lead me wild to your dark roads. (Snow Patrol: “Headlights on Dark Roads”, Eyes Open, 2006) I didn’t know about the online dating site rsvp.com.au until a woman who I was dating at the time showed me her online profile. Apparently ‘everyone does rsvp’. Well, ‘everyone’ except me. (Before things ended I never did ask her why she listed herself as ‘single’ on her profile…) Forming relationships in our era of post-institutional modes of sociality is problematic. Some probably find such ‘romantically’ orientated ‘meet up’ sites to be a more efficient option for sampling what is available. Perhaps others want some loving on the side. In some ways these sites transform romance into the online equivalent of the logistics dock at your local shopping centre. ‘Just-in-time’ relationships rely less on social support structures of traditional institutions such as the family, workplace, and so on, including ‘love’ itself, and more on a hit and miss style of dating, organised like a series of car crashes and perhaps even commodified through an eBay-style online catalogue (see Crawford 83-88). Instead of image-commodities there are image-people and the spectacle of post-romance romance as a debauched demolition derby. Is romance still possible if it is no longer the naïve and fatalistic realisation of complementary souls? I watched Paul Thomas Anderson’s third film Punch-Drunk Love with the above rsvp.com.au woman. She interpreted it in a completely different manner to me. I shall argue (as I did with her) that the film captures some sense of romance in a post-romance world. The film was billed as a comedy/romance or comedy/drama, but I did not laugh either with or at the film. The story covers the trials of two people ‘falling in love’. Lena Leonard (Emma Watson) orchestrates an encounter with Barry Egan (Adam Sandler) after seeing a picture of him with his seven sisters. The trajectory of the romance is defined less by the meeting of two people, than the violence of contingency and of the world arrayed by the event of love. Contingency is central to complexity theory. Contingency is not pure chance, rather it exists as part of the processual material time of the event that defines events or a series of events as problematic (Deleuze, The Logic of Sense 52-53). To problematise events and recognise the contingencies they inculcate is to refuse the tendency to colonise the future through actuarial practices, such as ‘risk management’ and insurance or the probabilistic ‘Perfect Match’ success of internet dating sites (mirroring ‘Dexter’ from the 1980s dating television game show). Therefore, through Punch-Drunk Love I shall problematise the event of love so as to resuscitate the contingencies of post-romance romance. It is not surprising Punch-Drunk Love opens with a car crash for the film takes romance on a veritable post-Crash detour. Crash – novel and film – serves as an exploration of surfaces and desire in a world at the intersection of the accident. Jean Baudrillard, in his infamous essay on Crash (novel), dwells on the repositioning of the accident: [It] is no longer at the margin, it is at the heart. It is no longer the exception to a triumphal rationality, it has become the Rule, it has devoured the Rule. … Everything is reversed. It is the Accident that gives form to life, it is the Accident, the insane, that is the sex of life. (113) After the SUV rolls over in Punch-Drunk Love’s opening scene, a taxi van pauses long enough for an occupant to drop off a harmonium. A harmonium is a cross between an organ and a piano, but much smaller than both. It is a harmony machine. It breathes and wheezes to gather potentiality consonant sound waves of heterogeneous frequencies to produce a unique musicality of multiplicative resonance. No reason is given for the harmonium in the workings of the film’s plot. Another accident without any explanation, like the SUV crash, but this time it is an accidental harmony-machine. The SUV accident is a disorganising eruption of excess force, while the accidental harmony-machine is a synthesising organisation of force. One produces abolition, while the other produces a multiplicative affirmation. These are two tendencies that follow two different relations to the heterogeneous materialism of contingency. Punch-Drunk Love captures the contingency at the heart of post-romance romance. Instead of the layers of expectation habituated into institutional engagements of two subjects meeting, there is the accident of the event of love within which various parties are arrayed with various affects and desires. I shall follow Alain Badiou’s definition of the event of love, but only to the point where I shall shift the perspective from love to romance. Badiou defines love by initially offering a series of negative definitions. Firstly, love is not a fusional concept, the ‘two’ that is ‘one’. That is because, as Badiou writes, “an ecstatic One can only be supposed beyond the Two as a suppression of the multiple” (“What Is Love?” 38). Secondly, nor is love the “prostration of the Same on the alter of the Other.” Badiou argues that it is not an experience of the Other, but an “experience of the world [i.e. multiple], or of the situation, under the post-evental condition that there were Two” (“What Is Love?” 39). Lastly, the rejection of the ‘superstructural’ or illusory conception of love, that is, to the base of desire and sexual jealously (Badiou, “What Is Love?” 39). For Badiou love is the production of truth. The truth is that the Two, and not only the One, are at work in the situation. However, from the perspective of romance, there is no post-evental truth procedure for love as such. In Deleuze’s terminology, from the perspective of post-romance the Two serves an important role as the ‘quasi-cause’ of love (The Logic of Sense 33), or for Badiou it is the “noemenal possibility [virtualite]” (“What Is Love?” 51). The event of the Two, and, therefore, of love, is immanent to itself. However, this does not capture the romantic functioning of love swept up in the quasi-cause of the Two. Romance is the differential repetition of the event of love to-come and thus the repetition of the intrinsic irreducible wonder at the heart of the event. The wonder at love’s heart is the excess of potentiality, the excitement, the multiplicity, the stultifying surprise. To resuscitate the functioning of love is to disagree with Badiou’s axiom that there is an absolute disjunction between the (nominalist) Two. The Two do actually share a common dimension and that is the radical contingency at the heart of love. Love is not as a teleological destiny of the eternal quasi-cause, but the fantastic impossibility of its contingent evental site. From Badiou’s line of argument, romance is precisely the passage of this “aleatory enquiry” (“What is Love?” 45), of “the world from the point of view of the Two, and not an enquiry of each term of the Two about the other” (49). Romance is the insinuation of desire into this dynamic of enquiry. Therefore, the functioning of romance is to produce a virtual architecture of wonder hewn from seeming impossibility of contingency. It is not the contingency in itself that is impossible (the ‘chaosmos’ is a manifold of wonderless-contingency), but that contingency might be repeated as part of a material practice that produces love as an effect of differentiating wonder. Or, again, not that the encounter of love has happened, but that precisely it might happen again and again. Romance is the material and embodied practice of producing wonder. The materiality of romance needs to be properly outlined and to do this I turn to another of Badiou’s texts and the film itself. To explicate the materialism of romance is to begin outlining the problematic of romance where the material force of Lena and Barry’s harmony resonates in the virtuosic co-production of new potentialities. The practice of romance is evidenced in the scene where Lena and Barry are in Hawaii and Lena is speaking to Barry’s sister while Barry is watching her. A sense of wonder is produced not in the other person but of the world as multiplicity produced free from the burden of Barry’s sister, hence altering the material conditions of the differential repetition of contingency. The materialism in effect here is, to borrow from Michel Foucault, an ‘incorporeal materialism’ (169), and pertains to the virtual evental dimension of love. In his Handbook of Inaesthetics, Badiou sets up dance and theatre as metaphors for thought. “The essence of dance,” writes Badiou, “is virtual, rather than actual movement” (Handbook of Inaesthetics 61), while theatre is an “assemblage” (72) which in part is “the circulation of desire between the sexes” (71). If romance is the deliberate care for the event of love and its (im)possible contingency, then the dance of love requires the theatre of romance. To include music with dance is to malign Badiou’s conception of dance by polluting it with some elements of what he calls ‘theatre’. To return to the Hawaii scene, Barry is arrayed as an example of what Badiou calls the ‘public’ of theatre because he is watching Lena lie to his sister about his whereabouts, and therefore completes the ‘idea’ of theatre-romance as a constituent element (Badiou, Handbook of Inaesthetics 74). There is an incorporeal (virtual) movement here of pure love in the theatre of romance that repotentialises the conditions of the event of love by producing a repeated and yet different contingency of the world. Wonder triggered by a lie manifest of a truth to-come. According to Badiou, the history of dance is “governed by the perpetual renewal of the relation between vertigo and exactitude. What will remain virtual, what will be actualized, and precisely how is the restraint going to free the infinite?” (Handbook of Inaesthetics 70). Importantly, Badiou suggests that theatrical production “is often the reasoned trial of chances” (Handbook of Inaesthetics 74). Another way to think the materiality of romance is as the event of love, but without Badiou’s necessary declaration of love (“What Is Love?” 45). Even though the ‘truth’ of the Two acts as quasi-cause, love as such remains a pure (‘incorporeal’) Virtuality. As a process, there is no “absolute disappearance or eclipse” that belongs to the love-encounter (“What Is Love?” 45), thus instead producing a rhythmic or, better, melodic heterogeneous tension between the love-dance and romance-theatre. The rhythm-melody of the virtual-actual cascade is distributed around aleatory contingencies as the event of love is differentially repeated and is therefore continually repotentialised and exhausted at the same time. A careful or graceful balance needs to be found between potentiality and exhaustion. The film contains many examples of this (re)potentialising tension, including when Lena achieves the wonder of the ‘encounter’ by orchestrating a meeting. Similarly, Barry feigns a ‘business trip’ to Hawaii to meet up with Lena. This is proceeded by the increased urgency of Barry’s manipulation of the frequent flyer miles reward to meet with up with Lena. The tension is affective – both anxious and exciting – and belongs to the lived duration of contingency. In the same way as an actual material dance floor (or ‘theatre’ here) is repeated across multiple incorporeal dimensions of music’s virtuality through the repotentialisation of the dancer’s body, the multiple dimensions of love are repeated across the virtuality of the lovers’ actions through the repotentialisation of the conditions of the event of love. Punch-Drunk Love frames this problematic of romance by way of a second movement that follows the trajectory of the main character Barry. Barry is a depressive with an affect regulation problem. He flies into a rage whenever a childhood incident is mentioned and becomes anxious or ‘scared’ (as one sister described him) when in proximity to Lena. He tries to escape from the oppressive intimacy of his family. He plays with ‘identity’ in a childlike manner by dressing up as a businessman and wearing the blue suit. His small business is organised around selling plungers used to unblock toilets to produce flow. Indeed, Barry is defined by the blockages and flows of desire. His seven-sister over-Oedipalised familial unit continually operates as an apparatus of capture, a phone-sex pervert scam seeks to overcode desire in libidinal economy that becomes exploited in circuits of axiomatised shame (like an online dating site?), and a consumer rewards program that offers the dream of a frequent-flyer million-miles (line of) flight out of it all. ‘Oedipal’ in the expanded sense Deleuze and Guattari give the term as a “displaced or internalised limit where desire lets itself be caught. The Oedipal triangle is the personal and private territoriality that corresponds to all of capitalism’s efforts at social reterritorialisation” (266). Barry says he wants to ‘diversify’ his business, which is not the same thing as ‘expanding’ or developing an already established commercial interest. He does not have a clear idea of what domain or type of business he wants to enter into when diversifying. When he speaks to business contacts or service personnel on the phone he attempts to connect with them on a level of intimacy that is uncomfortably inappropriate for impersonal phone conversations. The inappropriate intimacy comes back to haunt him, of course, when a low-level crook attempts to extort money from him after Barry calls a phone sex line. The romance between Lena and Barry develops through a series of accident-contingencies that to a certain extent ‘unblocks’ Barry and allows him to connect with Lena (who also changes). Apparent contingencies that are not actually contingencies need to be explained as such (‘dropping car off’, ‘beat up bathrooms’, ‘no actual business in Hawaii’, ‘phone sex line’, etc.). Upon their first proper conversation a forklift in Barry’s business crashes into boxes. Barry calls the phone sex line randomly and this leads to the severe car crash towards the end of the film. The interference of Barry’s sisters occurs in an apparently random unexpected manner – either directly or indirectly through the retelling of the ‘gayboy’ story. Lastly, the climatic meeting in Hawaii where the two soon-to-be-lovers are framed by silhouette, their bodies meet not in an embrace but a collision. They emerge as if emitted from the throngs of the passing crowd. Barry has his hand extended as if they were going to shake and there is an audible grunt when their bodies collide in an embrace. To love is to endure the violence of a creative temporality, such as the production of harmony from heterogeneity. As Badiou argues, love cannot be a fusional relation between the two to make the one, nor can it be the relation of the Same to the Other, this is because the differential repetition of the conditions of love through the material practice of romance already effaces such distinctions. This is the crux of the matter: The maximum violence in the plot of Punch-Drunk Love is not born by Lena, even though she ends up in hospital, but by Barry. (Is this merely a masculinist reading of traditional male on male violence? Maybe, and perhaps why rsvp.com.au woman read it different to me.) What I am trying to get at is the positive or creative violence of the two movements within the plot – of the romance and of Barry’s depressive social incompetence – intersect in such a way to force Barry to renew himself as himself. Barry’s explosive fury belongs to the paradox of trying to ‘mind his own business’ while at the same time ‘diversifying’. The moments of violence directed against the world and the ‘glass enclosures’ of his subjectivity are transversal actualisations of the violence of love (on function of ‘glass’ in the film see King). (This raises the question, perhaps irrelevant, regarding the scale of Badiou’s conception of truth-events. After Foucault and Deleuze, why isn’t ‘life’ itself a ‘truth’ event (for Badiou’s position see Briefings on Existence 66-68)? For example, are not the singularities of Barry’s life also the singularities of the event of love? Is the post-evental ‘decision’ supposed to always axiomatically subtract the singular truth-supplement from the stream of singularities of life? Why…?) The violence of love is given literal expression in the film in the ‘pillow talk’ dialogue between Barry and Lena: Barry: I’m sorry, I forgot to shave. Lena: Your face is so adorable. Your skin and your cheek… I want to bite it. I want to bite on your cheek and chew on it, you’re so fucking cute. Barry: I’m looking at your face and I just wanna smash it. I just wanna fucking smash it with a sledgehammer and squeeze you, you’re so pretty… Lena: I wanna chew your face off and scoop out your eyes. I wanna eat them and chew them and suck on them… Barry: [nodding] Ok…yes, that’s funny… Lena: Yeah… Barry: [still nodding] This’s nice. What dismayed or perhaps intrigued Baudrillard about Crash was its mixing of bodies and technologies in a kind of violent eroticism where “everything becomes a hole to offer itself to the discharge reflex” (112). On the surface this exchange between Barry and Lena is apparently an example of such violent eroticism. For Baudrillard the accident is a product of the violence of technology in the logistics of bodies and signs which intervene in relations in such a way to render perversity impossible (as a threshold structuration of the Symbolic) because ‘everything’ becomes perverse. However, writer and director of Punch-Drunk Love, Paul Anderson, produces a sense of the wondrous (‘Punch-Drunk’) violence that is at the heart of love. This is not because of the actual violence of individual characters; in the film this only serves as a canvas of action to illustrate the intrinsic violence of contingency. Lena and Barry’s ‘pillow talk’ not so much as a dance but a case of the necessary theatre capturing the violence and restraint of love’s virtual dance. ‘Violence’ (in the sense it is used above) also describes the harmonic marshalling of the heterogeneous materiality of sound affected by the harmonium. The ‘violence’ of the harmonium is decisively expressed through the coalescence of the diegetic and nondiegetic soundtracks at the end of the film when Barry plays the harmonium concurrently with Jon Brion’s score for the film. King notes, the “diegetic and nondiegetic music playing together is a moment of cinematic harmony; Barry, Lena, and the harmonium are now in sync” (par. 19). The notes of music connect different diegetic and nondiegetic series which pivot around new possibilities. As Deleuze writes about the notes played at a concert, they are “pure Virtualities that are actualized in the origins [of playing], but also pure Possibilities that are attained in vibrations or flux [of sound]” (The Fold 91). Following Deleuze further (The Fold 146-157), the horizontal melodic movement of romance forms a diagonal or transversal line with the differentially repeated ‘harmonic’ higher unity of love. The unity is literally ‘higher’ to the extent it escapes the diegetic confines of the film itself. For Deleuze “harmonic unity is not that of infinity, but that which allows the existent to be thought of as deriving from infinity” (The Fold 147, ital. added). While Barry is playing the harmonium in this scene Lena announces, “So here we go.” These are the final words of the film. In Badiou’s philosophy this is a declaration of the truth of love. Like the ‘higher’ non/diegetic harmony of the harmonium, the truth of love “composes, compounds itself to infinity. It is thus never presented integrally. All knowledge [of romance] relative to this truth [of the Two, as quasi-cause] thus disposes itself as an anticipation” (“What is Love?” 49). Romance is therefore lived as a vertiginous state of anticipation of love’s harmony. The materiality of romance does not simply consist of two people coming together and falling in love. The ‘fall’ functions as a fatalistic myth used to inscribe bodies within the eschatological libidinal economies of ‘romantic comedies’. To anneal Baudrillard’s lament, perversity obviously still has a positive Symbolic function on the internet, especially online dating sites where anticipation can be modulated through the probabilistic manipulation of signs. In post-romance, the ‘encounter’ of love necessarily remains, but it is the contingency of this encounter that matters. The main characters in Punch-Drunk Love are continually arrayed through the contingencies of love. I have linked this to Badiou’s notion of the event of love, but have focused on what I have called the materiality of romance. The materiality of romance requires more than a ‘fall’ induced by a probabilistic encounter, and yet it is not the declaration of a truth. The post-evental truth procedure of love is impossible in post-romance romance because there is no ‘after’ or ‘supplement’ to an event of love; there is only the continual rhythm of romance and anticipation of the impossible. It is not a coincidence that the Snow Patrol lyrics that serve above as an epigraph resonate with Deleuze’s comment that a change in the situation of Leibnizian monads has occurred “between the former model, the closed chapel with imperceptible openings… [to] the new model invoked by Tony Smith [of] the sealed car speeding down the dark highway” (The Fold 157). Post-Crash post-romance romance unfolds like the driving-monad in an aleatory pursuit of accidents. That is, to care for the event of love is not to announce the truth of the Two, but to pursue the differential repetition of the conditions of love’s (im)possible contingency. This exquisite and beautiful care is required for the contingency of love to be maintained. Hence, the post-romance problematic of romance thus posited as the material practice of repeating the wonder at the heart of love. References Badiou, Alain. Briefings on Existence: A Short Treatise on Transitory Ontology. Trans. Norman Madrasz. Albany, New York: State U of New York P, 2006. ———. Handbook of Inaesthetics. Trans. Alberto Toscano. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford UP, 2005. ———. “What Is Love?” Umbr(a) 1 (1996): 37-53. Baudrillard, Jean. Simulacra and Simulation. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1994. Crawford, Kate. Adult Themes: Rewriting the Rules of Adulthood. Sydney: Macmillan, 2006. Deleuze, Gilles. The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993. ———. The Logic of Sense. Trans. Mark Laster and Charles Stivale. European Perspectives. Ed. Constantin V. Boundas. New York: Columbia UP, 1990. Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1983. Foucault, Michel. “Theatricum Philosophicum.” Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews. Ed. D. F. Bouchard. New York: Cornell UP, 1977. 165-96. King, Cubie. “Punch Drunk Love: The Budding of an Auteur.” Senses of Cinema 35 (2005). Citation reference for this article MLA Style Fuller, Glen. "Punch-Drunk Love: A Post-Romance Romance." M/C Journal 10.3 (2007). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0706/03-fuller.php>. APA Style Fuller, G. (Jun. 2007) "Punch-Drunk Love: A Post-Romance Romance," M/C Journal, 10(3). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0706/03-fuller.php>.

O presente trabalho é um esforço teórico. Esforço, no sentido de que pensar a política na atualidade – crises no modelo democrático e neoliberal – é uma atividade de tal nível de amplitude que jamais será encerrada em si mesma. A ideia do presente trabalho é debater que há uma demanda urgente de encontro da política consigo mesma. Que a política é, na sua essência a realização do impossível, como afirma o filósofo francês Alain Badiou. E que, por ser aquilo que força o impossível a acontecer, a política não está nas instâncias limitantes das possibilidades institucionais oferecidas, atualmente. A conjuntura atual indica a existência de um paradoxo: soluções para as crises oferecidas nos limites dos modelos já existentes e necessidade de ampliação do potencial disruptivo da política. O objetivo deste trabalho é discutir o paradoxo político da atualidade, no sentido de afirmar a necessidade de que a política seja recobrada no seu poder de inconformidade com as formas institucionais presentes. Para além de Alain Badiou, outros pensadores norteiam a discussão proposta, a exemplo de Slajov Zizek, Perry Anderson e Vladimir Safatle. Do ponto de vista metodológico, trata-se de uma revisão de literatura. Concluímos pela necessidade de se afirmar o real disruptivo da política, no contemporâneo.

As part of my practice-based doctoral thesis, I designed an experiment to develop a model of collaborative theatre-making based on collective ownership, in contrast to prevailing hierarchical collaborative practice, where artistic vision lies mainly with the director, and divisions of labour dominate. I conducted the experiment in the real world of rehearsals and performances with a theatre collective I established for this purpose. In this article I discuss my Marxist framework, justifying why I believe capital and cooperation to be the primary dialectic of cultural economy, at the root of the hegemony of hierarchical collaborative theatre. I identify the relationship between Marxist theory and Alain Badiou’s (2005) disruption of the status quo via ‘truth’, as well as and Baz Kershaw’s (2011) essential components for PAR, premised on dialectical paradoxes. I discuss Dialectical Collaborative Theatre (DCT), the original research, rehearsal and performance pedagogy I developed in response to prevailing collaborative practice. While ideology and ethics are integral to DCT, the focus of this article is the pedagogy born out of the dialectical interplay between praxis and truth. I am currently exploring the ideology of DCT in another forthcoming and parallel article, "Dialectical Collaborative Theatre: Ideology, Ethics and the Practice of Equality."

In this paper I employ the notion of the ‘thought of the outside’ as developed by Michel Foucault, in order to defend the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze against the criticisms of ‘elitism,’ ‘aristocratism,’ and ‘political indifference’—famously leveled by Alain Badiou and Peter Hallward. First, I argue that their charges of a theophanic conception of Being, which ground the broader political claims, derive from a misunderstanding of Deleuze’s notion of univocity, as well as a failure to recognize the significance of the concept of multiplicity in Deleuze’s thinking. From here, I go on to discuss Deleuze’s articulation of the ‘dogmatic image of thought,’ which, insofar as it takes ‘recognition’ as its model, can only ever think what is already solidified and sedimented as true, in light of existing structures and institutions of power. Then, I examine Deleuze’s reading of Foucault and the notion of the ‘thought of the outside,’ showing the ‘outside’ as the unthought that lies at the heart of thinking itself, as both its condition and its impossibility. Insofar as it is essential to thinking itself, finally, I argue that the passage of thought to the outside is not an absolute flight out of this world, as Hallward claims, but rather, a return of the different that constitutes the Self for Deleuze. Thinking is an ongoing movement of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, or as Foucault says, death and life. Thinking, as Deleuze understands it, is essentially creative; it reconfigures the virtual, thereby literally changing the world. Thinking is therefore, according to Deleuze, thoroughly political.

Abstract Study question Can Machine Learning predict ploidy status from embryo evolutive morphological parameters in a non intrusive way? Summary answer Reporting cumulative embryo scoring from early development days and feed it to machine learning algorithms can help better predict the ploidy status of embryos What is known already Wiemer and Kelley showed morphological parameters and development rates were important parameters to consider during the embryo transfer process. Minasi et al. showed morphology assessment at blastocyst stage was correlated with ploidy status. Chavez-Badiola et al. showed a deep learning algorithm could predict the embryos ploidy with an accuracy of 70% and with positive predictive value of 0.79 using labeled blastocysts images. Study design, size, duration Study was a retrospective cohort analysis from 2019 to 2020 of 2520 biopsied embryos (669 cycles) cultured at POMA fertility clinic. Observations included all autologous embryos undergoing PGTA on day 5 or 6 with known PGTA status. Embryos from donors and with undefined PGTA results were excluded from the study. The embryos were classified as either euploid (n = 1528) or displaying a chromosomal anomaly (n = 992) Participants/materials, setting, methods Input of the machine learning model included patient age and 19 morphological parameters collected on days 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 (symmetry, number of cells, blastocyst status, fragmentation, ICM and troph grades). An xgboost algorithm was trained on 80% of the data (n = 2016) and tested on 20% of blind data (n = 504). Main results and the role of chance Xgboost machine learning algorithm managed to predict ploidy status on the blind dataset with an accuracy of 79%, significantly higher than random chance (AUC= 0.71) and a positive predictive value of 87%. Blastocyst stage parameters that are usually monitored to assess embryo quality (ICM, troph and blastocyst status on days 5 and 6) ranked high in the predictive power of the machine learning algorithm. It appeared that despite moderate to small individual correlation with the ploidy status, including parameters on day 1 (including number of PNs and number of cells on day1 PM check) to day 3 increased the performance of the classification algorithm from 70% accuracy to 79% accuracy. Machine learning algorithms are able to exploit evolution of morphological parameters during the development to improve the prediction. Limitations, reasons for caution Dataset was derived from one single clinic with manual annotations. Results should be validated on more clinics and inter-operator variation in morphological parameters annotation should be assessed to confirm robustness of the model and increase its predictive power. Wider implications of the findings: Study shows the potential of detecting ploidy status in a non intrusive way and participating to embryo selection. Study confirms the importance of annotating morphological parameters of embryos in the early days of development. Trial registration number Not applicable

We Break Up, I Publish: Theorising and Emotional Processing like Taylor Swift In 2007 after the rather painful end of my first long-term same-sex relationship I asked myself two questions (and like a good graduate student wrote a paper about it that was subsequently published): (1) what is love; (2) and if love exists, are queer and straight love somehow different. I asked myself the second question because, unlike my previous “straight” breakups (back when I honestly thought I was straight), this one was different, was far more messy, and seemed to have a lot to do with the fact that my then fresh ex-boyfriend and I had dramatically different ideas about how the relationship should look, work, be codified, or if it should or could be codified. It was an eye-opening experience since the truth that these different ideas existed—basically his point of view—really only “came out” in my mind through the act and learning involved in that breakup. Until then, from a Queer Theory perspective, you could have described me as a “man who had sex with men,” called himself homosexual, but was so homonormative that if you’d approached me with even a light version of Michel Foucault’s thoughts on “Friendship as a Way of Life” I’d have looked at you as queerly, and cluelessly, as possible. Mainstream Queer Theory would have put the end of the relationship down to the difference and conflict between what is pejoratively called the “marriage-chasing-Gay-normaliser,” represented by me, and the “radical-Queer(ness)-of-difference” represented by my ex-boyfriend, although like a lot of theory, that misses the personal (which I recall being political...), and a whole host of non-theoretical problems that plagued that relationship. Basically I thought Queer/Homosexual/Lesbian/Transgendered and the rest of the alphabet soup was exactly the same as Straight folks both with respect to a subjective understanding of the self, social relations and formations, and how you acted or enacted yourself in public and private except in the bedroom.. I thought, since Canada had legalised same-sex marriage, all was well and equal (other than the occasional hate-crime which would then be justly punished). Of course I understood that at that point Canada was the exception and not the rule with respect to same-sex rights and same-sex marriage, so it followed in my mind that most of our time collectively should be spent supporting those south of the border or overseas who still faced restrictions on these basic rights, or out-and-out violence, persecution and even state-sanctioned death for just being who they are and/or trying to express it. And now, five years on, stating that Canada is the exception as opposed to the rule with respect to the legalisation of same-sex marriage and the codification of same-sex rights in law has the potential to be outdated as the recent successes of social movements, court rulings and the tenor of political debate and voting has shifted internationally with rapid speed. But it was only because of that breakup that these theoretical and practical issues had come out of my queer closet and for the first time I started to question some necessary link between love and codification (marriage), and how the queer in Queer relationships does or potentially can disrupt this link. And not just for Queers, but for Straight folk too, which is the primary point that should be underlined now and is addressed at the end of this paper. Because, embittered as I was at the time, I still basically agree with the theoretical position that I came to in that paper on love—based on a queering of the terms of Alain Badiou—where I affirmed that love resisted codification, especially in its queer form, because it is fidelity to an act and truth between two or more partners which resists the rigid walls of State-based codification (Potts, Love Hurts; Badiou, Ethics and Saint Paul). But as one of the peer reviewers for this paper rightly pointed out, the above distinctions between my ex and myself implicitly rely upon a State-centric model of rights and freedoms, which I attacked in the first paper, but which I freely admit I am guilty of utilising and arguing in favour of here. But that is because I am interested, here, not in talking about love as an abstract concept towards which we should work in our personal relationships, but as the state of things, and specifically the state of same-sex marriage and the discourse and images which surrounds it, which means that the State does matter. This is specifically so given the lack of meaningful challenges to the State System in Canada and the US. I maintain, following Butler, that it is through power, and our response to the representatives of power “hailing us,” that we become bodies that matter and subjects (Bodies That Matter; The Psychic Life of Power; and Giving An Account of Oneself). While her re-reading of Althusser in these texts argues that we should come to a philosophical and political position which challenges this State-based form of subject creation and power, she also notes that politically and philosophically we have yet to articulate such a position clearly, and I’d say that this is especially the case for what is covered and argued in the mainstream (media) debate on same-sex marriage. So apropos what is arguably Foucault’s most mature analysis of “power,” and while agreeing that my State-based argument for inclusion and rights does indeed strengthen the “biopolitical” (The History of Sexuality 140 and 145) control over, in this case, Queer populations, I argue that this is nonetheless the political reality with which we are working in and analyzing, and that is my concern here. Despite a personal desire that this not be the case, the State or state sanctioned institutions do continue to hold a monopoly of power in conferring subjecthood and rights. To take a page from Jeremy Bentham, I would say that arguing from a position which does not start from or seriously consider the State as the current basis for rights and subjecthood, though potentially less ethically problematic and more in line with my personal politics, is tantamount to talking and arguing about “nonsense on stilts.” “Caught in a Bad Romance?” Comparing Homonationalist Trajectories and the Appeal of Militarist Discourse to LGBT Grassroots Organisations In comparing the discourses and enframings of the debate over same-sex marriage between Canada in the mid 1990s and early 2000s and in the US today, one might presume that how it came to say “I do” in Canada and how it might or might not get “left at the altar” in the US, is the result of very different national cultures. But this would just subscribe to one of a number of “cultural explanations” for perceived differences between Canada and the US that are usually built upon straw-man comparisons which then pillorise the US for something or other. And in doing so it would continue an obscuration that Canada, unlike the US, is unproblematically open and accepting when it comes to multicultural, multiracial and multisexual diversity and inclusion. Which Canada isn’t nor has it ever been. When you look at the current discourse in both countries—by their key political representatives on the international stage—you find the opposite. In the US, you have President Barack Obama, the first sitting President to come out in favour of same-sex marriage, and the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, setting same-sex rights at home and abroad as key policy planks (Gay Rights are Human Rights). Meanwhile, in Canada, you have Prime Minister Stephen Harper, in office since 2006, openly support his Conservative Party’s “traditional marriage” policy which is thankfully made difficult to implement because of the courts, and John Baird, the badly closeted Minister of Foreign Affairs, who doesn’t mention same-sex rights at home or with respect to foreign relations—unless it is used as supplementary evidence to further other foreign policy goals (c.f. Seguin)—only showing off his sexuality outside of the press-gallery to drum up gay-conservative votes or gay-conservative fundraising at LGBTQ community events which his government is then apt to pull funding for (c.f. Bradshaw). Of course my point is not to just reverse the stereotypes, painting an idyllic picture of the US and a grim one of Canada. What I want to problematise is the supposed national cultural distinctions which are naturalised when arguments are made through them as to why same-sex marriage was legalised in Canada, while the Defense of Marriage Act still stands in the US. To follow and extend Jasbir Puar’s argument from Terrorist Assemblages, what we see in both same-sex marriage debates and discourses is really the same phenomenon, but, so far, with different outcomes and having different manifestations. Puar contends that same-sex rights, like most equalising rights for minority groups, are only granted when all three of the following conditions prevail: (1) in a state or narrative of exception, where the nation grants a minority group equal rights because “the nation” feels threatened from without; (2) only on the condition that normalisation (or homonormalisation in the case of the Queer community) occurs, with those who don’t conform pushed further from a place in the national-subject; (3) and that the price of admission into being the “allowed Queer” is an ultra-patriotic identification with the Nation. In Canada, the state or narrative of exception was an “attack” from within which resulted in the third criterion being downplayed (although it is still present). Court challenges in a number of provinces led in each case to a successful ruling in favour of legalising same-sex marriage. Appeals to these rulings made their way to the Supreme Court, who likewise ruled in favour of the legalisation of same-sex marriage. This ruling came with an order to the Canadian Parliament that it had to change the existing marriage laws and definition of marriage to make it inclusive of same-sex marriage. This “attack” was performed by the judiciary who have traditionally (c.f. Makin) been much less partisan in appointment or ruling than their counterparts in the US. When new marriage laws were proposed to take account of the direction made by the courts, the governing Liberal Party and then Prime Minister Paul Martin made it a “free vote” so members of his own party could vote against it if they chose. Although granted with only lacklustre support by the governing party, the Canadian LGBTQ community rejoiced and became less politically active, because we’d won, right? International Queers flocked to Canada—one in four same-sex weddings since legalisation in Canada have been to out of country residents (Postmedia News)—as long as they had the proper socioeconomic profile (which is also a racialised profile) to afford the trip and wedding. This caused a budding same-sex marriage tourism and queer love normalisation industry to be built around the Canada Queer experience because especially at the time of legalisation Canada was still one of the few countries to allow for same-sex marriages. What this all means is that homonationalism in Canada is much less charged. It manifests itself as fitting in and not just keeping up with the Joneses when it comes to things like community engagement and Parent Teacher Association (PTA) meetings, but trying to do them one better (although only by a bit so as not to offend). In essence, the comparatively bland process in the 1990s by which Canada slowly underwent a state of exception by a non-politically charged and non-radical professional judiciary simply interpreting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms at the provincial and then the federal level is mirrored in the rather bland and non-radical homonationalism which resulted. So unlike the US, the rhetoric of the LGBT community stays subdued unless there’s a hint that the right to same-sex divorce might get hit by Conservative Party guns, in which case all hell breaks loose (c.f. Ha). While the US is subject to the same set of logics for the currently in-progress enactment of legalising same-sex marriage, the state of exception is dramatically different. Puar argues it is the never-ending War on Terror. This also means that the enframings and debate in the US are exceptionally charged and political, leading to a very different type of homonationalism and homonationalist subject than is found in Canada. American homonationalism has not radically changed from Puar’s description, but due to leadership from the top (Obama, Clinton and Lady Gaga) the intensity and thereby structured confinement of what is an acceptable Queer-American subject has become increasingly rigid. What is included and given rights is the hyper-patriotic queer-soldier, the defender of the nation. And what reinforces the rigidity of what amounts to a new “glass closet” for queers is that grassroots organisations have bought into the same rhetoric, logic, and direction as to how to achieve equality as the Homecoming advertisement from the Equal Love Campaign in Britain shows. For the other long-leading nation engaged in the War on Terror narrative, Homecoming provides the imagery of a gay member of the armed services draped in the flag proposing to his partner at the end of duty overseas that ends with the following text: “All men can be heroes. All men can be husbands. End discrimination.” Can’t get more patriotic—and heteronormative with the use of the term “husbands”—than that. Well, unless you’re Lady Gaga. Now Lady Gaga stands out as a public figure whom has taken an explicitly pro-queer and pro-LGBT stance from the outset of her career. And I do not want to diminish the fact that she has been admirably effective in her campaigning and consistent pro-queer and pro-LGBT stance. While above I characterised her input above as leadership from the top, she also, in effect, by standing outside of State Power unlike Obama and Clinton, and being able to be critical of it, is able to push the State in a more progressive direction. This was most obviously evidenced in her very public criticism of the Democratic Party and President Obama for not moving quickly enough to adopt a more pro-queer and pro-LGBT stance after the 2008 election where such promises were made. So Lady Gaga plays a doubled role whereby she also acts as a spokesperson for the grassroots—some would call this co-opting, but that is not the charge made here as she has more accurately given her pre-existing spotlight and Twitter and Facebook presence over to progressive campaigns—and, given her large mainstream media appeal and willingness to use this space to argue for queer and LGBT rights, performs the function of a grassroots organisation by herself as far as the general public is concerned. And in her recent queer activism we see the same sort of discourse and images utilised as in Homecoming. Her work over the first term of Obama’s Presidency—what I’m going to call “The Lady Gaga Offensive”—is indicative: she literally and metaphorically wrapped herself in the American flag, screaming “Obama, ARE YOU LISTENING!!! Repeal ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ and [have the homophobic soldiers] go home, go home, go home!” (Lady Gaga Rallies for Repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell). And presumably to the same home of otherness that is occupied by the terrorist or anything that falls under the blanket of “anti-American” in Puar’s critique of this approach to political activism. This speech was modelled on her highly successful one at the National Equality March in 2009, which she ended with “Bless God and Bless the Gays.” When the highly watched speeches are taken together you literally can’t top them for Americanness, unless it is by a piece of old-fashioned American apple-pie bought at a National Rifle Association (NRA) bake-sale. And is likely why, after Obama’s same-sex “evolution,” the pre-election ads put out by the Democratic Party this year focused so heavily on the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and the queer patriotic soldier or veteran’s obligation to or previous service in bearing arms for the country. Now if the goal is to get formal and legal equality quickly, then as a political strategy, to get people onside with same-sex marriage, and from that place to same-sex rights and equal social recognition and respect, this might be a good idea. Before, that is, moving on to a strategy that actually gets to the roots of social inequality and doesn’t rely on “hate of ‘the other’” which Puar’s analysis points out is both a byproduct of and rooted in the base of any nationalist based appeal for minoritarian rights. And I want to underline that I am here talking about what strategy seems to be appealing to people, as opposed to arguing an ethically unproblematic and PC position on equality that is completely inclusive of all forms of love. Because Lady Gaga’s flag-covered and pro-military scream was answered by Obama with the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and the extension of some benefits to same-sex couples, and has Obama referring to Gaga as “your leader” in the pre-election ads and elsewhere. So it isn’t really surprising to find mainstream LGBT organisations adopting the same discourse and images to get same-sex rights including marriage. One can also take recent poll numbers from Canada as indicative as well. While only 10 percent of Canadians have trust in political parties, and 17 and 16 percent have trust in Parliament and Prime Minister Harper respectively, a whopping 53 percent have trust in the Canadian Forces (Leblanc). One aspect that undergirds Puar’s argument is that especially at a "time of war," more than average levels of affection or trust is shown for those institutions that defend “us,” so that if the face of that institution is reinscribed to the look of the hyper-patriotic queer-soldier (by advertising of the Homecoming sort which is produced not by the State but by grassroots LGBT organisations), then it looks like these groups seem to be banking that support for Gays and Lesbians in general, and same-sex marriage in specific, will further rise if LGBT and Queer become substantively linked in the imagination of the general public with the armed forces. But as 1980s Rockers Heart Asked: “But There’s Something That You Forgot. What about Love?” What these two homonationalist trajectories and rhetorics on same-sex marriage entirely skip over is how exactly you can codify “love.” Because isn’t that the purpose of marriage? Saying you can codify it is like grasping at a perfectly measured and exact cubic foot of air and telling it to stay put in the middle of a hurricane. So to return to how I ended my earlier exploration of love and if it could or should be codified: it means that as I affirm love, and as I remain in fidelity to it, I subject myself in my fundamental weakness constantly to the "not-known;" to constant heartbreak; to affirmations which I cannot betray as it would be a betrayal of the truth process itself. It's as if at the very moment the Beatles say the words 'All you need is love' they were subjected to wrenching heartbreak and still went on: 'All you need is love...' (Love Hurts) Which is really depressing when I look back at it now. But it was a bad breakup, and I can tend to the morose in word choice and cultural references when depressed. But it also remains essentially my position. If you impose “till death or divorce do us part” on to love you’re really only just participating in the chimera of static love and giving second wind to a patriarchal institution which has had a crappy record when it comes to equality. It also has the potential to preserve asymmetrical roles “traditional marriage” contains from when the institution was only extended to straight couples. And isn’t equality the underlying philosophical principle and political position that we’re supposedly fighting for if we’re arguing for an equal right to get married? Again, it’s important to try and codify the same rights for everyone through the State at the present time because I honestly don’t see major changes confronting the nation state system in Canada or the US in the near future. We remain the play-children of a digitally entrenched form of Foucaultian biopower that is State and Capital directed. Because while the Occupy Wall Street movements got a lot of hay in the press, I’ve yet to see any substantive or mainstreamed political change come out of them—if someone can direct me to their substantive contribution to the recent US election I’d be happy to revise my position—which is likely to our long term detriment. So this is a pragmatic analysis, one of locating one node in the matrices of power relations, of seeing how mainstream LGBT political organisations and Lady Gaga are applying the “theoretical tool kits” given to us by Foucault and Puar, and seeing how these organisations and Gaga are applying them, but in this case in a way that is likely counter to authorial intention(s) and personal politics (Power/Knowledge 145, 193; Terrorist Assemblages). So what this means is that we’re likely to continue to see, in mainstream images of same-sex couples put out by grassroots LGBT organisations, a homonationalism and ideological construction that grows more and more out of touch with Queer realities—the “upper-class house-holding PTA Gay”; although on a positive note I should point out that the Democratic Party in the US seems to be at least including both white and non-white faces in their pre-election same-sex marriage ads—and one that most Queers don’t or can’t fit themselves into especially when it comes down to the economic aspect of that picture, which is contradictory and problematic (c.f. Christopher). It also means that in the US the homonationalism on the horizon looks the same as in Canada except with a healthy dose of paranoia of outsiders and “the other” and a flag draped membership in the NRA, that is, for when the queer super-soldier is not in uniform. It’s a straightjacket for a closet that is becoming smaller because it seeks, through the images projected, inclusion for only a smaller and smaller social sub-set of the Lesbian and Gay community and leaves out more and more of the Queer community than it was five years ago when Puar described it. So instead of trying to dunk the queer into the institution of patriarchy, why not, by showing how so many Queers, their relationships, and their loving styles don’t fit into these archetypes help give everyone, including my “marriage-chasing-Gay-normaliser” former self a little “queer eye, for all eyes.” To look at and see modern straight marriage through the lenses and reasons LGBT and Queer communities (by-and-large) fought for years for access to it: as the codification and breakdown of some rights and responsibilities (i.e. taking care of children); as an act which gives you straightforward access to health benefits and hospital visitation rights; as an easy social signifier for others of a commitment to another person that doesn’t use diluted language like “special friend;” and because when it comes down to it that “in sickness and in health” part of the vow—in the language of a queered Badiou, a vow can be read as the affirmation of a universal and disinterested truth (love) and a moment which can’t be erased retrospectively, say, by divorce—seems like a sincere way to value at least one of those you really care for in the world. And hopefully it, as a side-benefit, it acts as a reminder but is not the actuality of that first fuzzy feeling which (hopefully) doesn’t go away. But I learned my lesson the first time and know that the fuzzy feeling might disappear as it often does. It doesn’t matter how far we try and cram it into any variety of homonationalist closets, since it’ll always find a way to not be there, no matter how tight you thought you’d locked the door to keep it in for good if it wants out. Because you can’t keep emotions by contract: so at the end of the day the logical, ethical and theoretically sound position is to argue for the abolition of marriage as an institution. However, Plato and others have been making that argument for thousands of years, and it still doesn’t seem to have gained popular traction. And we also need to realise, contrary to the opinion of my former self and The Beatles, that you really do need more than love as fidelity to an event of you and your partner’s making when you are being denied your partners health benefits just because you are a same-sex couple, especially when those health benefits could be saving your life. And if same-sex marriage codification is a quick fix for that and similar issues for those who can fit into the State sanctioned same-sex marriage walls, which admittedly leaves some members of the Queer community who don’t overlap out, as part of an overall and more inclusive strategy that does include them then I’m in favour of it. That is, till the time comes that Straight and Queer can, over time and with a lot of mutual social learning, explore how to recognise and give equal rights with or without State based codification to the multiple queer and sometimes polyamorous relationship models that already populate the Gay and Straight worlds right now. So in the meantime continue to count me down as a “marriage-chasing-Gay.” But just pragmatically, not to normalise, as one of a diversity of political strategies for equality and just for now. References Badiou, Alain. Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil. New York: Verso, 2001. ———. Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003. Bradshaw, James. “Pride Toronto Denied Federal Funding.” The Globe and Mail. 7 May. 2012 ‹http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/pride-toronto-denied-federal-funding/article1211065/›. Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York: Routledge,1990. ———. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”. New York: Routledge, 1993. ———. Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York: Routledge, 1997. ———. The Psychic Life of Power: Theories of Subjection. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997. ———. Giving an Account of Oneself. New York: Fordham UP, 2005. Christopher, Nathaniel. “Openly Gay Men Make Less money, Survey Shows.” Xtra! .5 Nov. 2012 ‹http://www.xtra.ca/public/Vancouver/Openly_gay_men_make_less_money_survey_shows-12756.aspx›. Clinton, Hillary. “Gay Rights Are Human Rights, And Human Rights Are Gay Rights.” United Nations General Assembly. 26 Dec. 2011 ‹http://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2011/12/06/383003/sec-clinton-to-un-gay-rights-are-human-rights-and-human-rights-are-gay-rights/?mobile=nc›. Foucault, Michel. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977. Ed. Colin Gordon. Trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, Kate Soper. New York: Random House,1980. —. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. Toronto: Random House, 1977. —. The History of Sexuality Volume One: An Introduction. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Random House, 1978. Heart. “What About Love.” Heart. Capitol Records, 1985. CD. Ha, Tu Thanh. “Dan Savage: ‘I Had Been Divorced Overnight’.” The Globe and Mail. 12 Jan. 2012 ‹http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/dan-savage-i-had-been-divorced-overnight/article1358211/›. “Homecoming.” Equal Love Campaign. ‹http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a54UBWFXsF4›. Leblanc, Daniel. “Harper Among Least Trusted Leaders, Poll Shows.” The Globe and Mail. 12 Nov. 2012 ‹http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/harper-among-least-trusted-leaders-poll-shows/article5187774/#›. Makin, Kirk. “The Coming Conservative Court: Harper to Reshape Judiciary.” The Globe and Mail. 24 Aug. 2012 ‹http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/the-coming-conservative-court-harper-to-reshape-judiciary/article595398/›. “Lady Gaga Rallies for Repeal of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ in Portland, Maine.” 9 Sep. 2010 ‹http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g4rGla6OzGc›. “Lady Gaga Speaks at Gay Rights Rally in Washington DC as Part of the National Equality March.” 11 Oct. 2009 ‹http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7jepWXu-Z38›. “Obama’s Stirring New Gay Rights Ad.” Newzar.com. 24 May. 2012 ‹http://newzar.com/obamas-stirring-new-gay-rights-ad/›. Postmedia News. “Same-sex Marriage in Canada will not be Revisited, Harper Says.” 12 Jan. 2012 ‹http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/01/12/same-sex-marriage-in-canada-will-not-be-revisited-harper-says/›. Potts, Graham. “‘Love Hurts’: Hunter S. Thompson, the Marquis de Sade and St. Paul Queer Alain Badiou’s Truth and Fidelity.” CTheory. rt002: 2009 ‹http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=606›. Puar, Jasbir. Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times. London: Duke UP, 2007. Seguin, Rheal. “Baird Calls Out Iran on Human Rights Violations.” The Globe and Mail. 22 Oct. 2012 ‹http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/baird-calls-out-iran-on-human-rights-violations/article4628968/›.

“One has to get rid of the bad taste of wanting to be in agreement with many.” (Nietzsche 53)Community is a policing word: the local community, the Christian community, the school community, the international community. The word evokes informal, benign, yet insistent patterns of authority, built around imagined consensuses. It is a judgement word. It includes and excludes, and always on terms that are imagined pre-set, pre-determined by an identity also already determined or incipient, yet always legitimate, receiving the credit, the credibility it deserves. The community is always licensing actions on its own behalf because it is the very authentic logic of legitimation, of folk sovereignty, of a natural peace that should not be disturbed. It is defensive in its very nature, always at risk of being disturbed from its regular state, its constitutive, deserved and deserving calm. It is the community against which you are most likely to offend. It is easily offended.Communities still claim to be natural. They stabilise, definitively, around an identity they assume to have inherited from fact, a locality, a choice, a lifestyle, a sexual preference. This is what allows them to normalise and judge so determinedly. Normalising judgement is the genre of signifying practice which most clearly defines community. Community is not unrelated to family, one of its isotopes. It even evokes family as its formalising logic and rhetorical resource, yet especially now, it cannot, even in its national forms, especially its post-colonial national forms, lay more than a token claim to the consanguinity that still haunts even the most reformed construction of family. The impetus of community therefore is to naturalise. It cites an identity, imagined to be pre-given, and then renders it incontestable by making it the lodestone of a local policy, one that can be used to make you an offender.Coalition is to community what friendship is to family. If family implies a pre-given situation into which one emerges without option, friendship allows for agency, your circulation in the world as a self-fashioning person, an adventurer, a discoverer, a forger of ties. You are a member of a family at home. Family like community even at its most attenuated is where you are at home, even in its most abstract and discontinuous. Yet, you are a friend in the same way you are a citizen, because you are in the world, where you are what you are by the right of election. You choose your friends. You decide who they are to be. Family naturalises even when it forms from those who share no genetic inheritance. Community too naturalises, imagining its chosen identity to be inherited from the established states of the world and therefore enduring, before and beyond us all, and therefore possessed of an authority and legitimacy no-one has chosen and that therefore no-one can question. Friendship, on the other hand, is an artifice. It is taken up and abandoned at will. Coalition too is chosen. Its only past is that of decision, not of inheritance. You enter into friendship with someone because you share no blood or family inheritance with them. The claim of friendship between family members does not convince because it is not necessary, and because it would create a contradictory history: you cannot chose what you have inherited from nature. The past doesn’t need to be that crowded. It can’t be. It is the same with coalition. If you were a member of a community with someone, you wouldn’t need to form a coalition with them. What would be the point? You are together with them, whether you like it or not.Coalition, therefore, requires an irreducible difference. This is both its practical logic, and its governing ethic. It assumes and respects otherness. This is what it has in common with friendship. You are friends with someone because you are different to one another, not because of what you have in common. That is the charm and attraction of friendship, the discovery of connection in difference. Coalition is friendship magnified to a politics. It repeats friendship’s respect for otherness without needing to risk its experiment with intimacy. Unlike community, coalition is a venture. It is proudly extensive, not defensive. It holds out its hand to you even if it doesn’t like you. It is not only the invention of a practice, but of a value, the value of human exteriority. Even when we are at our most solipsistic and closed, our most misanthropic and scornful, it is never impossible for human beings to connect with one another. That possibility can never be reduced to zero. Coalition assumes this irreducible openness to the other, and that is what links it irrevocably to the progressive as an incontestable virtue. What Derrida says of (what Aristotle says of) friendship here is also true of coalition. It is by nature a virtue:Since friendship does not – and above all must not – have the reliability of a natural thing or a machine; since its stability is not given by nature but is won, like constancy . . . through the endurance of a virtue, primary friendship, ‘that which allows all others to be named’ . . . we must say that it is founded on virtue. (Derrida, Politics 23)If we pursue the analogy with friendship, coalition is in itself a value, regardless of the reason that the coalition has formed. Unlike communities which keep obscuring their origins and claiming the authority of the natural or at least the inherited, contrived or naturalised, coalitions never deny they are artifice. They are formed historically for historical purposes. Often they even seem to concede that this makes them second-best. They are the substitute for perhaps the greater legitimacy that a community might purportedly have if we don’t think about it too deeply, or if we rest our politics on sentimentality, the endlessly resurging underside of the politics of the ideological era. Coalitions substitute for the natural bond of community the political purpose of history, even of the moment, as they form and un-form to repeal rogue legislation, combat sectional interests, clarify obscured rights, challenge illegal occupations and so on. Yet, over and above, beyond and before this, they are the institution of a primary, perhaps the primary social value. They are the positive enactment of the idea that relationships form in difference. Coalitions are not inherited or determined, but chosen as the result of a decision, and this decision is the taking on of the responsibility not only towards a specific political issue but to those who might only share with me a momentary commitment. Again unlike community, in which universality, specifically the conformity of all members to a fundamental identity or nature, is not only taken for granted but required, definitive and ineluctable, in coalition, the universality of a shared idea or judgement is merely an agreement destined to be outlived. Coalition is universality without conformity, agreement without oneness.In political terms, it is a double benefit, therefore. It both responds to some kind of political emergency, and models democratic openness to the other as purposeful social action. It is an action and a virtue. The risk, of course, is that these two enter into conflict with one another, especially that the virtue of social relationship trumps the exigencies of the critical political moment. In other words, the logic of relationship becomes the fundamental achievement at the expense of political engagement. It is here that the virtues and dangers of coalition become apparent. What is virtuous about coalition might in fact be the very thing that threatens its political effectiveness. Coalition works by persuasion and enlistment. It is a logic of the endlessly open “plus one.” Because no singular identity restricts membership of the coalition, it is endlessly open to an ever extending inclusivity. If you can be persuaded to agree about perhaps only one thing, then you can become part of a coalition. You can even pronounce on your own membership, given that the formal protocols of coalition membership are loose and the threshold to be crossed for membership is so specific. You can perhaps even be a member of a coalition without anyone else ever knowing. It can rely on the most limited and specific of agreements. The risk is that the logic of persuasion, enlistment and agreement over-shadows the particular politics which is the ostensible pretext for the formation of the coalition in the first place. In short, the logic of persuasion and enlistment takes over from the logic of opposition and resistance, which is what defines the political. Coalition risks becoming a church logic, therefore, and it is arguable that its cultural inheritance is fundamentally consistent with the social mission of Christianity and Islam, which aim to gradually enlist all, despite difference and non-identity. By committing to enlistment, coalition risks substituting an indefinitely extendable agreement for the political efficacy of enmity, the virtues of peace for the achievements of struggle. At its worst, coalition risks substituting the satisfactions of feeling positive about the other for the recognition of enmity as fundamentally definitive of the political and thus of the social. It risks becoming what Nietzsche disliked in democracy, its “talkative good conscience” (cited in Derrida, Politics 38), which is in the end nothing but a repression.The problem lies with coalition’s fundamentally positive construction of the other, and of sociality in general. This emerges through the definitive role of decision in coalition. You don’t decide to join a community. You find yourself in it. You may elect to leave but only in order to become a renegade. Your identity remains haunted by the community you have spurned as a lapsed member. To become a member of a coalition, on the other hand, is the result of some kind of election on your part, and this special event can take on a major significance in the evolution of your self-relation, as an instantiation of your will and thus autonomy. In Derrida, however, the decision is aporetic. Its relationship to the subject is indeterminate. What makes a decision is its openness on an in-determinacy, its possibility of always being radically otherwise, what Derrida calls, citing Nietzsche, its perhaps (Politics 68). The decision is, therefore, an event. It is a pivoting. It turns on what might and might not happen. It always, at some irreducible level, surprises. In any event, what happens might not happen: every event carries within it the traces of what does not happen. Even in its most emphatic confirmation of an option, the event remains haunted by all those things that did not happen, that did not become it, that it did not specify, that still define it as the chosen thing. Something cannot be chosen unless there is that which remains un-chosen.The decision, then, inevitably involves an openness of the subject towards that which it does not and cannot do. It arises in a field unchosen by the subject in which choosing takes place. To this extent, it happens to a subject more than it is a doing by a subject. To Derrida, this makes the decision irreducibly passive, even “unconscious,” (Politics 68), an idea he embraces in its heretical relationship to traditional understandings of agency: “In sum,” he writes, “a decision is unconscious – insane as that may seem, it involves the unconscious and nevertheless remains responsible” (Politics 69). Because it involves the other possibility, it is not certain in the way the automatic enactment of a pre-fixed program you know is right is certain. The latter Derrida calls mere calculation, the implementation of that to which you have or even know no alternative. Calculation does what is known unambiguously to be right, to be without alternative. Decision, requires doubt, uncertainty. It opens the subject to the ineluctable certainty of its own failure, if not now then inevitably. This is what makes it a taking on of the unknown, of the enactment within the subject of that which is unknown to it, its unconscious.Decision then is the overcoming of the subject in its own action. It defies self-identity, exposing the subject to that which is other to it, that otherness which now defines it in its relationship to itself. As the social enactment of decision, then, coalition instantiates the subject’s excess over itself, its constitutional and necessary orientation to that which exceeds it, which it now understands not simply as otherness but as other people. Again, this makes coalition analogous to friendship, the other social relation formed by election. In both cases, the actual decision seems to happen to the subject as much as it seems to be the simple result of will. Why do I find myself a friend with you, but not the person standing next to you? What draws me to this coalition and not that is not simply the patient, systematic, rational evaluation of moral and political alternatives, but my enthusiasm for one thing, my disgust with another. It is through this unstable, semi-obscure and dynamic producing of separating options that my decision suddenly emerges to always in some way surprise me. I don’t know why I like you. I don’t know why I believe this and not that, why I connect in the way I do, even though I know I am answerable, responsible for these choices, at some point, if even just before the casual court of my own curiosity.Friendship then and coalition are made but they are also received. They deconstruct the opposition between these alternatives. This is what distinguishes them from community, which routinely denies that it is made in which the making is denied, even though a rigorous deconstruction would contest the notion that pure inheritance is possible especially as the constitution of a self. Community would then merely be coalition in denial of itself. But the quality of otherness should not be simply taken for granted. Alain Badiou complains about the value given to respect for otherness as the only contemporary ethic. The responsibility of our behaviour is not towards the enactment of priorities and values of our own individual or collective subjectivity, but to a mere logic of do no harm. To engage properly with Badiou’s point would require a whole other argument, but he does alert us to the temptations of sentimentalising respect for otherness as the definition of social relations which thus risk settling into an ethic of a benign and self-justifying harmlessness as the final social good.Is the other always good? Again, I want to approach this question by returning to Derrida’s account of friendship, and its relationship to enmity. Derrida recalls that at least in the hands of Carl Schmitt, decisionism is always a logic of enmity (Politics 67). How does this relate to what we have said about decision, otherness and friendship? As we have seen, coalition like friendship is the enactment of a decision, albeit possibly an unconscious one, in Derrida’s terms. You elect who is to be your friend, and you elect the coalitions you will join. Coalition is artificial, therefore. It does not make the claim implied by the notion of community; that the primary social bonds are natural, and therefore, inherited, unelected, perhaps even instinctive. The institution of the coalition by way of the decision is, therefore, an historical event. Where in community, the natural bond to which I am subject already exists, perhaps even was the very thing that called me into being, the formation of the bond between me and others is something I choose, one way or another in coalition. Where in community, only certain people marked out by some essential attribute over which they have little control (their only choice is to express or repress it) are the ones with whom I can join, in coalition, nothing necessarily or essentially distinguishes the people with whom I enter into alliance, other than the fact that they too have made the decision. The decision, therefore, groups together in coalition those who are in themselves indistinguishable from anyone else. They become my partner in coalition. They become my political friend. Yet, there is nothing about them that has pre-marked them for this friendship. They could just as easily not have entered into relationship with me, or indeed they could have become my enemy. This is the fulfilment of the logic of decision: the option chosen in decision is always in relation to that which has not been chosen. It is marked by the trace of the un-elected. The friend too is marked by the trace of those who are not chosen.In Politics of Friendship, Derrida pursues these issues by way of a reading of Carl Schmitt. Schmitt famously argued that the political grouping is defined by the collective identification of a shared enemy. You become a friend only by agreeing on a specific other who is to be your foe. There is, according to Schmitt’s argument, nothing about the enemy that marks them out to be your enemy: no traditional rivalry, no ethnic contempt, no economic competition or cultural antipathy, nothing about the enemy requires them to be your enemy. If such markers are seen to exist, they are superadded to the antagonism in order to invest it with a motivating intensity. Yet, such emotion is unnecessary. Someone is the constituting enemy of your group because your group could not be a group without an enemy, some enemy or other, someone you need to be prepared to kill, as the enactment of your political being. So, you become a member of a political grouping – you attain political friendship – by your preparedness to kill some other, even though there is nothing about them in themselves that requires you to do this, or even want it. They could just as easily be your friend if circumstances were different. The fact they are your enemy is purely historically contingent.Derrida puts it like this in his reading of Schmitt:There is no friend without this possibility of killing which establishes this non-natural community. Not only could I only enter into friendship only with a mortal, but I could love in friendship only a mortal at least exposed to so-called violent death – that is, exposed to being killed, possibly by myself. (Politics 122)So, in coalition, I decide to enter into relationship with those who could just as well be my enemies. Derrida’s aim in his reading of Schmitt is to show that the fundamental opposition on which the latter’s theory of the political depends – the historically enduring distinction between friend and enemy – is untenable. Since the friend can only be my friend because they are just as equally qualified to be my enemy, the distinction cannot be sustained. The rapid renomination of friends as enemies and enemies as friends in historical experience would seem to bear out the radical fragility of these categories.For our purposes in a discussion of coalition, I want to derive a slightly different point. The formation of political friendship will always bear with it a trace of enmity. You cannot be friends with someone who cannot just as easily be your enemy – in fact perhaps tomorrow, if not in some way always already. The formation of political friendship must also involve the inevitable enactment or at least acknowledgement of enmity. This is clear in the logic of community which imagines essential, natural differences which pre-identify groups implicitly alien and therefore constitutively already on the threshold of enmity. We have seen how these assumptions enact the willing blindness, the determined naivety, of community. Yet, there is blindness in coalition as well, a denial of its constitutive relationship with enmity. Because it forms by way of decision, coalition operates by a practice of persuasion and enlistment, the endlessly open to the other logic of the “plus-one” we have mentioned, the addition of the extra other comrade and so on theoretically forever. In other words, coalition believes in the hypothesis that everyone can enlist, that the addition of yet one more ally, one more member, one more willing other, can go on forever, as long as you use the right language to persuade them, theoretically to the point of absolute universality.The risk here is the repression of the constituting logic of enmity, the forgetting of the role of antagonism in politics. The selection of the political friend involves distinguishing them from those who are your enemies. Your friends are those who are not (now) your enemies. In other words, the selection of your friend involves the ready identification of the non-friend, and this withholding of friendship must stretch, open-endedly, all the way to antagonism and opposition. The formation of coalition should not be seduced by its own image of itself as the incipience of a potential universal agreement. Coalition involves the establishment of political friendship in the context of the separation from political opponents, who will, at some level, never be less than to-be-opposed. Post-1960s politics in the west has been beset by different styles of coalition that have in their own ways striven to deny or frustrate political conflict: on the soft left, an automatic rejection of violence and war, regardless of what might need to be achieved; on the soft right, a complete acceptance of the market as the measure of social progress, a neo-liberal consensus that has tolerated no alternative social logic in planning and policy in government, mainstream media, corporation and institution. Coalition, by valuing agreement as a virtue in and of itself, risks disregarding the historical role and necessity of conflict in politics, a conflict that must potentially run to physical violence.In the historical context of an issue like the politics of climate change, there is the risk of being taken by the idea that what is required is more effective communication, better explanation, more persuasion. Then everyone will understand, agree and join the coalition of the willing to act. What this overlooks is the fact that already, no matter what the stakes, the political context is one in which antagonists have already emerged: whether by way of dogma, self-interest or sub-cultural intolerance. The politics of climate change is a politics nonetheless, built on antagonism as much as consensus, hostility as much as care, enmity as much as friendship. The politics of climate change must be recognised as being, as much about fighting as it is about persuasion.Is otherness always good? The ethic of openness to the other about which Badiou complains is routinely seen as the enactment of the ultimate and endlessly extending commitment to a social generosity. Derrida’s elaborations of a justice in excess of law, of an absolute hospitality in excess over local customs and practices of asylum, of a democracy-to-come in excess of any enacted historical democratic practice, all of which acknowledge the indeterminateness and immeasurability of the other, have all been read as socially optimistic and positive ethical instances of an opening towards a new Enlightenment. But as Derrida never avoided saying, these opennesses on the indeterminate nature of otherness always involves the risk of the worst, perhaps even of “radical evil” (Faith 83). The formation of political friendships, like coalition, also always involves the recognition of enmities. Without enmity, coalitions could not form. The very openness on the other that makes friendship available is the perhaps slightly withheld but always possible identification of the other as enemy, as danger, as something to be fought, as bad. It is this that in the end, every decision decides, in its openness to the other, whether it likes it or not. Without the willingness to accept enmity as necessary, even desirable, politics is not possible.ReferencesBadiou, Alain. Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil. Trans. Peter Hallward. London: Verso, 2001.Derrida, Jacques. “Faith and Knowledge.” Acts of Religion. Ed. Gil Anidjar. Trans. Samuel Weber. London and New York: Routledge, 2002. 40-101. ———. Politics of Friendship. Trans. George Collins. London: Verso, 1997.Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973.

This article is about refugees’ and migrants’ dreams of home and family and stems from an Australian Research Council Linkage Grant, “A Hand Up: Disrupting the Communication of Intergenerational Welfare Dependency” (LP140100935), with Partner Organisation St Vincent de Paul Society (WA) Inc. (Vinnies). A Vinnies-supported refugee and migrant support centre was chosen as one of the hubs for interviewee recruitment, given that many refugee families experience persistent and chronic economic disadvantage. The de-identified name for the drop-in language-teaching and learning social facility is the Migrant and Refugee Homebase (MARH). At the time of the research, in 2018, refugee and forced migrant families from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan constituted MARH’s primary membership base. MARH provided English language classes alongside other educational and financial support. It could also organise provision of emergency food and was a conduit for furniture donated by Australian families. Crucially, MARH operated as a space in which members could come together to build shared community.As part of her role, the researcher was introduced to Sara (de-identified), a mother-tongue Arabic speaker and the centre’s coordinator. Sara had personal experience of being a refugee, as well as being MARH’s manager, and she became both a point of contact for the researcher team, an interpreter/translator, and an empathetic listener as refugees shared their stories. Dreams of home and family emerged throughout the interviews as a vital part of participants’ everyday lives. These dreams and hopes were developed in the face of what was, for some, a nightmare of adversity. Underpinning participants’ sense of agency, subjectivity and resilience, Badiou argues (93, as noted in Jackson, 241) that hope can appear as a basic form of patience or perseverance rather than a dream for justice. Instead of imagining an improvement in personal circumstances, the dream is one of simply moving forward rather than backward. While dreams of being reunited with family are rooted in the past and project a vision of a family which no longer exists, these dreams help fashion a future which once again contains a range of possibilities.Although Sara volunteered her time on the research project as part of her commitment to Vinnies, she was well-known to interviewees as a MARH staff member and, in many cases, a friend and confidante. While Sara’s manager role implies an imbalance of power, with Sara powerful and participants comparatively less so, the majority of the information explored in the interviews pertained to refugees’ experiences of life outside the sphere in which MARH is engaged, so there was limited risk of the data being sanitised to reflect positively upon MARH. The specialist information and understandings that the interviewees shared positions them as experts, and as co-creators of knowledge.Recruitment and Methodological ApproachThe project researcher (Jaunzems) met potential contributors at MARH when its members gathered for a coffee morning. With Sara’s assistance, the researcher invited MARH members to take part in the research project, giving those present the opportunity to ask and have answered any questions they deemed important. Coffee morning attendees were under no obligation to take part, and about half chose not to do so, while the remainder volunteered to participate. Sara scheduled the interviews at times to suit the families participating. A parent and child from each volunteer family was interviewed, separately. In all cases it was the mother who volunteered to take part, and all interviewees chose to be interviewed in their homes. Each set of interviews was digitally recorded and lasted no longer than 90 minutes. This article includes extracts from interviews with three mothers from refugee families who escaped war-torn homelands for a new life in Australia, sometimes via interim refugee camps.The project researcher conducted the in-depth interviews with Sara’s crucial interpreting/translating assistance. The interviews followed a traditional approach, except that the researcher deferred to Sara as being more important in the interview exchange than she was. This reflects the premise that meaning is socially constructed, and that what people do and say makes visible the meanings that underpin their actions and statements within a wider social context (Burr). Conceptualising knowledge as socially constructed privileges the role of the decoder in receiving, understanding and communicating such knowledge (Crotty). Respecting the role of the interpreter/translator signified to the participants that their views, opinions and their overall cultural context were valued.Once complete, the interviews were sent for translation and transcription by a trusted bi-lingual transcriber, where both the English and Arabic exchanges were transcribed. This was deemed essential by the researchers, to ensure both the authenticity of the data collected and to demonstrate “trust, understanding, respect, and a caring connection” (Valibhoy, Kaplan, and Szwarc, 23) with the participants. Upon completion of the interviews with volunteer members of the MARH community, and at the beginning of the analysis phase, researchers recognised the need for the adoption of an interpretive framework. The interpretive approach seeks to understand an individual’s view of the world through the contexts of time, place and culture. The knowledge produced is contextualised and differs from one person to another as a result of individual subjectivities such as age, race and ethnicity, even within a shared social context (Guba and Lincoln). Accordingly, a mother-tongue Arabic speaker, who identifies as a refugee (Al-Hameed), was added to the project. All authors were involved in writing up the article while authors two, three and four took responsibility for transcript coding and analysis. In the transcripts that follow, words originally spoken in Arabic are in intalics, with non-italcised words originally spoken in English.Discrimination and BelongingAya initially fled from her home in Syria into neighbouring Jordan. She didn’t feel welcomed or supported there.[00:55:06] Aya: …in Jordan, refugees didn’t have rights, and the Jordanian schools refused to teach them [the children…] We were put aside.[00:55:49] Interpreter, Sara (to Researcher): And then she said they push us aside like you’re a zero on the left, yeah this is unfortunately the reality of our countries, I want to cry now.[00:56:10] Aya: You’re not allowed to cry because we’ll all cry.Some refugees and migrant communities suffer discrimination based on their ethnicity and perceived legitimacy as members of the host society. Although Australian refugees may have had searing experiences prior to their acceptance by Australia, migrant community members in Australia can also feel themselves “constructed in the public and political spheres as less legitimately Australian than others” (Green and Aly). Jackson argues that both refugees and migrants experiencethe impossibility of ever bridging the gap between one’s natal ties to the place one left because life was insupportable there, and the demands of the nation to which one has travelled, legally or illegally, in search of a better life. And this tension between belonging and not belonging, between a place where one has rights and a place where one does not, implies an unresolved relationship between one’s natural identity as a human being and one’s social identity as ‘undocumented migrant,’ a ‘resident alien,’ an ‘ethnic minority,’ or ‘the wretched of the earth,’ whose plight remains a stigma of radical alterity even though it inspires our compassion and moves us to political action. (223)The tension Jackson refers to, where the migrant is haunted by belonging and not belonging, is an area of much research focus. Moreover, the label of “asylum seeker” can contribute to systemic “exclusion of a marginalised and abject group of people, precisely by employing a term that emphasises the suspended recognition of a community” (Nyers). Unsurprisingly, many refugees in Australia long for the connectedness of the lives they left behind relocated in the safe spaces where they live now.Eades focuses on an emic approach to understanding refugee/migrant distress, or trauma, which seeks to incorporate the worldview of the people in distress: essentially replicating the interpretive perspective taken in the research. This emic framing is adopted in place of the etic approach that seeks to understand the distress through a Western biomedical lens that is positioned outside the social/cultural system in which the distress is taking place. Eades argues: “developing an emic approach is to engage in intercultural dialogue, raise dilemmas, test assumptions, document hopes and beliefs and explore their implications”. Furthermore, Eades sees the challenge for service providers working with refugee/migrants in distress as being able to move beyond “harm minimisation” models of care “to recognition of a facilitative, productive community of people who are in a transitional phase between homelands”. This opens the door for studies concerning the notions of attachment to place and its links to resilience and a refugee’s ability to “settle in” (for example, Myers’s ground-breaking place-making work in Plymouth).Resilient PrecariousnessChaima: We feel […] good here, we’re safe, but when we sit together, we remember what we went through how my kids screamed when the bombs came, and we went out in the car. My son was 12 and I was pregnant, every time I remember it, I go back.Alongside the dreams that migrants have possible futures are the nightmares that threaten to destabilise their daily lives. As per the work of Xavier and Rosaldo, post-migration social life is recreated in two ways: the first through participation and presence in localised events; the second by developing relationships with absent others (family and friends) across the globe through media. These relationships, both distanced and at a distance, are dispersed through time and space. In light of this, Campays and Said suggest that places of past experiences and rituals for meaning are commonly recreated or reproduced as new places of attachment abroad; similarly, other recollections and experience can trigger a sense of fragility when “we remember what we went through”. Gupta and Ferguson suggest that resilience is defined by the migrant/refugee capacity to “reimagine and re-materialise” their lost heritage in their new home. This involves a sense of connection to the good things in the past, while leaving the bad things behind.Resilience has also been linked to the migrant’s/refugee’s capacity “to manage their responses to adverse circumstances in an interpersonal community through the networks of relationships” (Eades). Resilience in this case is seen through an intersubjective lens. Joseph reminds us that there is danger in romanticising community. Local communities may not only be hostile toward different national and ethnic groups, they may actively display a level of hostility toward them (Boswell). However, Gill maintains that “the reciprocal relations found in communities are crucially important to their [migrant/refugee] well-being”. This is because inclusion in a given community allows migrants/refugees to shrug off the outsider label, and the feeling of being at risk, and provides the opportunity for them to become known as families and friends. One of MAHR’s central aims was to help bridge the cultural divide between MARH users and the broader Australian community.Hope[01:06: 10] Sara (to interviewee, Aya): What’s the key to your success here in Australia?[01:06:12] Aya: The people, and how they treat us.[01:06:15] Sara (to Researcher): People and how they deal with us.[01:06:21] Aya: It’s the best thing when you look around, and see people who don’t understand your language but they help you.[01:06:28] Sara (to Researcher): She said – this is nice. I want to cry also. She said the best thing when I see people, they don’t understand your language, and I don’t understand theirs but they still smile in your face.[01:06:43] Aya: It’s the best.[01:06:45] Sara (to Aya): yes, yes, people here are angels. This is the best thing about Australia.Here, Sara is possibly shown to be taking liberties with the translation offered to the researcher, talking about how Australians “smile in your face”, when (according to the translator) Aya talked about how Australians “help”. Even so, the capacity for social connection and other aspects of sociality have been linked to a person’s ability to turn a negative experience into a positive cultural resource (Wilson). Resilience is understood in these cases as a strength-based practice where families, communities and individuals are viewed in terms of their capabilities and possibilities, instead of their deficiencies or disorders (Graybeal and Saleeby in Eades). According to Fozdar and Torezani, there is an “apparent paradox between high-levels of discrimination experienced by humanitarian migrants to Australia in the labour market and everyday life” (30) on the one hand, and their reporting of positive well-being on the other. That disparity includes accounts such as the one offered by Aya.As Wilson and Arvanitakis suggest,the interaction between negative experiences of discrimination and reports of wellbeing suggested a counter-intuitive propensity among refugees to adapt to and make sense of their migration experiences in unique, resourceful and life-affirming ways. Such response patterns among refugees and trauma survivors indicate a similar resilience-related capacity to positively interpret and derive meaning from negative migration experiences and associated emotions. … However, resilience is not expressed or employed uniformly among individuals or communities. Some respond in a resilient manner, while others collapse. On this point, an argument could be made that collapse and breakdown is a built-in aspect of resilience, and necessary for renewal and ongoing growth.Using this approach, Wilson and Arvanitakis have linked resilience to hope, as a “present- and future-oriented mode of situated defence against adversity”. They argue that the term “hope” is often utilised in a tokenistic way “as a strategic instrument in increasingly empty domestic and international political vocabularies”. Nonetheless, Wilson and Arvanitakis believe hope to be of vital academic interest due to the prevalence of war and suffering throughout the world. In the research reported here, the authors found that participants’ hopes were interwoven with dreams of being reunited with their families in a place of safety. This is a common longing. As Jackson states,so it is that migrants travel abroad in pursuit of utopia, but having found that place, which is also no-place (ou-topos), they are haunted by the thought that utopia actually lies in the past. It is the family they left behind. That is where they properly belong. Though the family broke up long ago and is now scattered to the four winds, they imagine a reunion in which they are together again. (223)There is a sense here that with their hopes and dreams lying in the past, refugees/migrants are living forward while looking backwards (a Kierkegaardian concept). If hope is thought to be key to resilience (Wilson and Arvanitakis), and key to an individual’s ability to live with a sense of well-being, then perhaps a refugee’s past relations (familial) impact both their present relations (social/community), and their ability to transform negative experiences into positive experiences. And yet, there is no readily accessible way in which migrants and refugees can recreate the connections that sustained them in the past. As Jackson suggests,the irreversibility of time is intimately connected with the irreversibility of one’s place of origin, and this entwined movement through time and across space proves perplexing to many migrants, who, in imagining themselves one day returning to the place from where they started out, forget that there is no transport which will convey them back into the past. … Often it is only by going home that is becomes starkly and disconcertingly clear that one’s natal village is no longer the same and that one has also changed. (221)The dream of home and family, therefore and the hope that this might somehow be recreated in the safety of the here and now, becomes a paradoxical loss and longing even as it is a constant companion for many on their refugee journey.Esma’s DreamAccording to author three, personal dreams are not generally discussed in Arab culture, even though dreams themselves may form part of the rich tradition of Arabic folklore and storytelling. Alongside issues of mental wellbeing, dreams are constructed as something private, and it generally breaks social taboos to describe them publicly. However, in personal discussions with other refugee women and men, and echoing Jackson’s finding, a recurring dream is “to meet my family in a safe place and not be worried about my safety or theirs”. As a refugee, the third author shares this dream. This is also the perspective articulated by Esma, who had recently had a fifth child and was very much missing her extended family who had died, been scattered as refugees, or were still living in a conflict zone. The researcher asked Sara to ask Esma about the best aspect of her current life:[01:17:03] Esma: The thing that comforts me here is nature, it’s beautiful.[01:17:15] Sara (to the Researcher): The nature.[01:17:16] Esma: And feeling safe.[01:17:19] Sara (to the Researcher): The safety. ...[01:17:45] Esma: Life’s beautiful here.[01:17:47] Sara (to the Researcher): Life is beautiful here.[01:17:49] Esma: But I want to know people, speak the language, have friends, life is beautiful here even if I don’t have my family here.[01:17:56] Sara (to the Researcher): Life is so pretty you only need to improve the language and have friends, she said I love my life here even though I don’t have any family or community here. (To Esma:) I am your family.[01:18:12] Esma: Bring me my siblings here.[01:18:14] Sara (to Esma): I just want my brothers here and my sisters.[01:18:17] Esma: It’s a dream.[01:18:18] Sara (to Esma): it’s a dream, one day it will become true.Here Esma uses the term dream metaphorically, to describe an imagined utopia: a dream world. In supporting Esma, who is mourning the absence of her family, Sara finds herself reacting and emoting around their shared experience of leaving siblings behind. In doing so, she affirms the younger woman, but also offers a hope for the future. Esma had previously made a suggestion, absorbed into her larger dream, but more achievable in the short term, “to know people, speak the language, have friends”. The implication here is that Esma is keen to find a way to connect with Australians. She sees this as a means of compensating for the loss of family, a realistic hope rather than an impossible dream.ConclusionInterviews with refugee families in a Perth-based migrant support centre reveals both the nightmare pasts and the dreamed-of futures of people whose lives have experienced a radical disruption due to war, conflict and other life-threatening events. Jackson’s work with migrants provides a context for understanding the power of the dream in helping to resolve issues around the irreversibility of time and circumstance, while Wilson and Arvanitakis point to the importance of hope and resilience in supporting the building of a positive future. Within this mix of the longed for and the impossible, both the refugee informants and the academic literature suggest that participation in local events, and authentic engagement with the broader community, help make a difference in supporting a migrant’s transition from dreaming to reality.AcknowledgmentsThis article arises from an ARC Linkage Project, ‘A Hand Up: Disrupting the Communication of Intergenerational Welfare Dependency’ (LP140100935), supported by the Australian Research Council, Partner Organisation St Vincent de Paul Society (WA) Inc., and Edith Cowan University. The authors are grateful to the anonymous staff and member of Vinnies’ Migrant and Refugee Homebase for their trust in and support of this project, and for their contributions to it.ReferencesBadiou, Alan. Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism. Trans. Ray Brassier. 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