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Journal articles on the topic 'Autocratie'
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1
Baechler, Jean. "Marché et autocratie." Commentaire Numéro43, no. 3 (1988): 624. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/comm.043.0624.
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Baechler, Jean. "Marché, modernisation et autocratie." Commentaire Numéro 53, no. 1 (1991): 99. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/comm.053.0099.
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Bak, Daehee, and Chungshik Moon. "Autocratic time horizons and the growth effect of foreign direct investment." Japanese Journal of Political Science 20, no. 3 (May 22, 2019): 143–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109919000057.
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AbstractThe positive influence of foreign direct investment (FDI) on host countries' economic growth has been widely debated. Given the mixed empirical evidence, scholars have sought to find the economic preconditions under which FDI spillovers are likely to occur and facilitate economic growth in the host countries. Those preconditions are not exogenously dictated but largely shaped by governments' policy preferences. Particularly in autocracies, an autocrat's policy preferences are the driving force that determines whether a host country is likely to be equipped with growth-friendly institutions and policies. We argue that such economic institutions and policies are dependent on the time horizons of autocrats in power. Our empirical analysis covering 64 autocratic countries from 1970 to 2005 supports our main argument that FDI has a positive effect on growth when autocratic time horizons are sufficiently long, and positive FDI spillovers mainly occur through the protection of property right institutions.
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Bak, Daehee. "Autocratic political cycle and international conflict." Conflict Management and Peace Science 37, no. 3 (November 30, 2017): 259–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0738894217741617.
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This article reveals a temporal pattern of conflict behavior over the course of autocratic leaders’ tenure. By identifying a commonly observed domestic political cycle in autocracies, I discuss how the level of domestic constraints on autocrats’ conflict behavior changes over time in three distinct periods: (1) power struggle in the early period of tenure; (2) power consolidation; and (3) power dissipation in the later period of power transition. The empirical analysis on autocratic conflict cycle reveals that the likelihood of autocratic crisis initiation significantly increases during the early years of autocratic leadership tenure, after which it moderately decreases over time. This finding suggests that autocrats’ tenure is a substantively important predictor of autocratic leaders’ conflict behavior.
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Miller, Michael K., and Margaret E. Peters. "Restraining the Huddled Masses: Migration Policy and Autocratic Survival." British Journal of Political Science 50, no. 2 (March 5, 2018): 403–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123417000680.
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What determines citizens’ freedom to exit autocracies? How does this influence global patterns of migration and democratization? Although control over citizen movement has long been central to autocratic power, modern autocracies vary considerably in how much they restrict emigration. This article shows that autocrats strategically choose emigration policy by balancing several motives. Increasing emigration can stabilize regimes by selecting a more loyal population and attracting greater investment, trade and remittances, but exposing their citizens to democracy abroad is potentially dangerous. Using a half-century of bilateral migration data, the study calculates the level and destinations of expected emigration given exogenous geographic and socioeconomic characteristics. It finds that when citizens disproportionately emigrate to democracies, countries are more likely to democratize – and that autocrats restrict emigration freedom in response. In contrast, a larger expected flow of economic emigration predicts autocratic survival and freer emigration policy. These results have important implications for autocratic politics, democratic diffusion and the political sources of migration.
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DI LONARDO, LIVIO, JESSICA S. SUN, and SCOTT A. TYSON. "Autocratic Stability in the Shadow of Foreign Threats." American Political Science Review 114, no. 4 (July 28, 2020): 1247–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055420000489.
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Autocrats confront a number of threats to their power, some from within the regime and others from foreign actors. To understand how these threats interact and affect autocratic survival, we build a model where an autocratic leader can be ousted by a domestic opposition and a foreign actor. We concentrate on the impact that foreign threats have on the stability of autocratic leadership and show that the presence of foreign threats increases the probability an autocrat retains power. Focusing on two cases, one where a foreign actor and the domestic opposition have aligned interests and one where their interests are misaligned, we elucidate two distinct mechanisms. First, when interests are aligned, autocrats are compelled to increase domestic security to alleviate international pressure. Second, when interests are misaligned, autocrats exploit the downstream threat of foreign intervention to deter domestic threats. We also show that autocrats have incentives to cultivate ideological views hostile to broader interests among politically influential domestic actors.
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Zaloznaya, Marina. "Does Authoritarianism Breed Corruption? Reconsidering the Relationship Between Authoritarian Governance and Corrupt Exchanges in Bureaucracies." Law & Social Inquiry 40, no. 02 (2015): 345–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12076.
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This article advocates for ethnographic and historical study of the political roots of corruption. Focusing on informal economies of Belarusian universities, it reexamines two theoretical propositions about corruption in autocracies. The first proposition is that authoritarianism breeds bureaucratic corruption; the second is that autocrats grant disloyal subjects corruption opportunities in exchange for political compliance. Using qualitative data, the author finds that autocracies can generate favorable as well as unfavorable preconditions for bureaucratic corruption. The author argues that lenient autocratic governance, characterized by organizational decoupling, creates favorable conditions for bureaucratic corruption. In contrast, consolidated autocracy, defined by rigid organizational controls, is unfavorable to such corruption. The author also concludes that in autocracies, disloyal populations may be cut off from rather than granted opportunities for bureaucratic corruption. These findings suggest that the relationship between autocratic governance and corruption is more complex than current studies are able to reveal due to their methodological limitations.
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Benedek, István. "Riders on the storm: the role of populism in the global crisis of democracy and in the functioning of electoral autocracies." Politics in Central Europe 17, no. 2 (July 27, 2021): 197–225. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pce-2021-0009.
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Abstract It is my contention that populism could be an appropriate framework to describe, explain and connect the phenomena of global crisis of democracy and functioning of electoral autocracies. In order to substantiate this claim, with the method of literature review, I examine first the characteristics of these phenomena. Then I focus on the nature of the relationship between them, in particular on the complex system of new types of autocracies’ stability, in which populism could play a crucial role. Populism, understood as an autocratic (re-)interpretation of democracy and representation, could be a particularly dangerous Trojan Horse for democracy. First and foremost, because its idea of a single, homogeneous and authentic people that can be legitimately represented only by the populist leader is a moralised form of antipluralism which is contrary to the pluralist approach of democracy (i.e. polyarchy). For precisely this reason, populism could play a key role in autocracies, especial in electoral autocracies which may use its core elements. Namely, the Manichean worldview, the image of a homogeneous people, people-centrism and the autocratic notion of representation are very compatible with electoral autocracies, since these regimes hold general elections and their power is built largely upon the alleged will of the people. By using populism, it is possible for these regimes to camouflage and even legitimise their autocratic trends and exercise of power behind the formally multi-party but not fair elections and democratic façade. As a radical turn towards closed autocracies (without de facto multiparty elections) would be too expensive, electoral autocrats need manipulated multi-party elections and other plebiscite techniques that could serve as quasi-democratic legitimation. Because of this, they tend to use the political logic of populism which could transform political contestation to a life- and- death struggle and provides quasi-democratic legitimation and other important cognitive functions. Therefore, populist electoral autocracies, as a paradigmatic type of electoral autocracies, could remain with us for a long time, giving more and more tasks to researchers, especially in the Central and Eastern European region.
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Knutsen, Carl Henrik, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, and Tore Wig. "Autocratic Elections." World Politics 69, no. 1 (December 8, 2016): 98–143. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887116000149.
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Do elections reduce or increase the risk of autocratic regime breakdown? This article addresses this contested question by distinguishing between election events and the institution of elections. The authors propose that elections stabilize autocracies in the long term but at the price of short-term instability. Elections are conducive to regime survival in the long run because they improve capacities for co-optation and repression but produce short-term instability because they serve as focal points for regime opposition. Drawing on data from 259 autocracies from 1946 to 2008, the authors show that elections increase the short-term probability of regime failure. The estimated effect is retained when accounting for the endogeneity of autocratic elections; this finding is critical, since some autocrats may or may not hold elections because of perceived effects on regime survival. The authors also find that this destabilizing effect does not operate in the long term. They find some, although not as strong, evidence that elections stabilize autocratic regimes in the medium to long term, despite their destabilizing immediate effects. These temporal effect patterns are present for both executive and legislative elections, and they are robust to using different measures, control variable strategies, and estimation techniques. In line with expectations, both effect patterns are much clearer for multiparty autocratic elections than for completely uncontested elections.
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Ballard-Rosa, Cameron. "Hungry for Change: Urban Bias and Autocratic Sovereign Default." International Organization 70, no. 2 (2016): 313–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818315000363.
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AbstractWhat drives autocrats to default on their sovereign debt? This article develops the first theory of sovereign debt default in autocracies that explicitly investigates survival incentives of political actors in nondemocracies. Self-interested elites, fearful of threats to their tenure because of urban unrest, may be willing to endure the long-term borrowing costs that defaulting creates rather than risk the short-term survival costs of removing cheap food policies for urban consumers. I test my main claims that both urbanization and food imports should be associated with greater likelihood of autocratic default using panel data covering forty-three countries over fifty years, finding that autocracies that are more reliant on imported food and that are more urbanized are significantly more likely to be in default on their external sovereign debt. I emphasize the regime-contingent nature of these effects by demonstrating that they are reversed when considering democratic sovereign default. I also substantiate the mechanisms put forward in my theory through illustrative historical cases of sovereign debt default in Zambia and Peru, in which I demonstrate that fear of urban unrest in the face of rapidly increasing food prices did indeed drive autocratic elites to default on international debt obligations. In addition to providing the first political theory of debt default in autocracies, the article introduces two robust predictors of autocratic default that have been overlooked in previous work, and highlights the importance of urban-rural dynamics in nondemocratic regimes.
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Buehler, Matt, and Mehdi Ayari. "The Autocrat’s Advisors: Opening the Black Box of Ruling Coalitions in Tunisia’s Authoritarian Regime." Political Research Quarterly 71, no. 2 (November 8, 2017): 330–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912917735400.
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Why do autocrats retain some elites as core, long-term members of their ruling coalitions for years, while others are dismissed in months? How and why might the type of elites retained within coalitions vary across time and different autocrats? Although what constitutes an authoritarian regime’s ruling coalition varies across countries, often including the military and dominant parties, this article focuses on one critical subcomponent of it—an autocrat’s cabinet and his elite advisors within it, his ministers. Because coalitions function opaquely to prevent coups, scholars consider their inner-workings a black box. We shed light through an original, exhaustive dataset from the Middle East of all 212 ministers who advised Tunisian autocrats from independence until regime collapse (1956–2011). Extracting data from Arabic sources in Tunisian national archives, we track variation in minister retention to identify which elites autocrats made core, long-term advisors within ruling coalitions. Whereas Tunisia’s first autocrat retained elites as ministers due to biographical similarities, capacity to represent influential social groups, and competence, its second autocrat did not. He became more likely to dismiss types of elites retained under the first autocrat, purging his coalition of ministers perceived to be potential insider-threats due to their favored status under his predecessor.
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Jones, Calvert W. "Seeing Like an Autocrat: Liberal Social Engineering in an Illiberal State." Perspectives on Politics 13, no. 1 (March 2015): 24–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592714003119.
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Recent studies of autocratic liberalization adopt a rationalist approach in which autocrats’ motives and styles of reasoning are imputed or deduced. By contrast, I investigate these empirically. I focus on liberal social engineering in the Persian Gulf, where authoritarian state efforts to shape citizen hearts and minds conform incongruously to liberal ideals of character. To explain this important but under-studied variant on autocratic liberalization, I present evidence from rare palace ethnography in the United Arab Emirates, including analysis of the jokes and stories ruling elites tell behind closed doors and regular interviews with a ruling monarch. I find that autocrats’ deeply personal experiences in the West as young men and women supplied them with stylized ideas about how modern, productive peoples ought to act and how their own cultures underperform. The evidence also reveals that such experiences can influence autocrats, even years later, leading them to trust in Western-style liberal social engineering as the way forward, despite the risks. Ethnographic findings challenge the contemporary scholarly stereotype of the autocrat as a super-rational being narrowly focused on political survival, illustrating how memory and emotion can also serve as important influences over reasoning and can drive liberal change.
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Krishnarajan, Suthan. "Economic Crisis, Natural Resources, and Irregular Leader Removal in Autocracies." International Studies Quarterly 63, no. 3 (May 6, 2019): 726–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz006.
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AbstractWhy do autocratic leaders escape revolution, coups, and assassination during times of economic crisis? I argue that the spike in natural resource revenues since the 1960s has increased autocratic crisis resilience. The availability of this alternative revenue stream provides autocratic leaders with a constant inflow of money, increases their ability to repress dissent, and improves their access to international credit. Extending the analysis back to 1875, I show that the relationship between economic crisis and irregular leader removal in autocracies is strong and robust before the 1960s, but disappears in more recent periods. Interaction analyses confirm that the effects of economic crisis are moderated by natural resource income. These findings are robust to an array of alternative specifications, including analyses that address endogeneity concerns via instrumental variable (IV) estimation. A more particular examination of the theoretical mechanisms also supports the argument. These findings challenge widely held beliefs in the literature of a strong, direct effect of economic crisis on autocratic leader survival; they explain why economic crisis seems to destabilize some autocrats, but not others.
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Miller, Michael K. "The Strategic Origins of Electoral Authoritarianism." British Journal of Political Science 50, no. 1 (September 18, 2017): 17–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123417000394.
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Why do autocrats hold multiparty elections? This article argues that transitions to electoral authoritarianism (EA) follow a strategic calculus in which autocrats balance international incentives to adopt elections against the costs and risks of controlling them. It tests this hypothesis with a multinomial logit model that simultaneously predicts transitions to EA and democracy, using a sample of non-electoral autocracies from 1946–2010. It finds that pro-democratic international leverage – captured by dependence on democracies through trade ties, military alliances, international governmental organizations and aid – predicts EA adoption. Socio-economic factors that make voters easier to control, such as low average income and high inequality, also predict EA transition. In contrast, since democratization entails a loss of power for autocrats, it is mainly predicted by regime weakness rather than international engagement or socio-economic factors. The results demonstrate that different forms of liberalization follow distinct logics, providing insight into autocratic regime dynamics and democracy promotion’s unintended effects.
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Bak, Daehee, Michael R. Kenwick, and Glenn Palmer. "Who’s careful: Regime type and target selection." European Journal of International Relations 22, no. 4 (July 26, 2016): 872–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354066115611479.
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Democratic leaders are commonly thought to be more likely than autocrats to select into conflicts where the ex ante probability of victory is high. We construct a novel empirical test of this notion by comparing democracies to various types of autocracies and determining which states are most likely to initiate disputes against relatively strong or weak opponents. Contrary to common belief, we find that democracies are not more selective than most forms of autocracy. Only military regimes demonstrate unique patterns of target selection, with these states being particularly likely to initiate disputes against relatively strong opponents. Our findings suggest a need to further scrutinize the conventional wisdom on democratic target selection and to disaggregate autocratic regimes into more refined categories when doing so.
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Mazumder, Soumyajit. "Autocracies and the international sources of cooperation." Journal of Peace Research 54, no. 3 (May 2017): 412–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343316687018.
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Under what conditions do autocracies peacefully settle disputes? Existing studies tend to focus on the domestic factors that shape conflict initiation. In this article, I show how domestic institutions interact with international institutions to produce more cooperative outcomes. Particularly, this study argues that as autocracies become more central in the network of liberal institutions such as preferential trade agreements (PTAs), they are less likely to initiate a militarized interstate dispute (MID). As a state becomes more democratic, the effect of centrality within the PTA network on the peaceful dispute settlement dissipates. This is because greater embeddedness in the PTA regime is associated with enhanced transparency for autocracies, which allows autocracies to mitigate ex ante informational problems in dispute resolution. Using a dataset of MID initiation from 1965 to 1999, this study finds robust empirical support for the aforementioned hypothesis. Moreover, the results are substantively significant. Further analysis into the causal mechanisms at work provides evidence in favor of the information mechanism. Autocrats who are more embedded in the PTA network tend to have higher levels of economic transparency and economic transparency itself is associated with lower rates of conflict initiation. The results suggest that an autocrat’s structural position within the international system can help to peacefully settle its disputes.
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Knutsen, Carl Henrik, and Magnus Rasmussen. "The Autocratic Welfare State: Old-Age Pensions, Credible Commitments, and Regime Survival." Comparative Political Studies 51, no. 5 (June 20, 2017): 659–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414017710265.
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In this article, we argue that autocratic regimes are no less likely than democracies to adopt old-age pensions, although autocratic programs are less universal in their coverage. Our theoretical argument focuses on the strong incentives that autocratic regimes have for enacting and maintaining such programs to ensure regime survival. Autocratic pension programs can be considered club goods that (a) are targeted to critical supporting groups and (b) solve credible commitment problems on promises of future distribution, thereby mitigating probability of regime breakdown. We test three implications from the argument, drawing on a novel dataset on welfare state programs and including 140 countries with time series from the 1880s. First, we find that autocracies are no less likely than democracies to have old-age pension programs. But, second, autocracies have less universal pension programs than democracies. Third, pension programs effectively reduce the probability of autocratic breakdown.
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Kailitz, Steffen, and Daniel Stockemer. "Regime legitimation, elite cohesion and the durability of autocratic regime types." International Political Science Review 38, no. 3 (November 26, 2015): 332–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512115616830.
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We present a theory that addresses the question of why autocracies with a regime legitimation which ties the destiny of the members of the ruling elite, namely the nobility or ideocratic elite, to the survival of the autocracy, namely (ruling) monarchies and communist ideocracies, are more durable than other kinds of autocracies. Using logistic regression analysis and event history analysis on a dataset on autocratic regimes in the period 1946 to 2009, we are able to show that ruling monarchies and communist ideocracies are indeed the most durable autocratic regime types.
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Czap, Hans J., and Kanybek D. Nur-tegin. "Government Positions for Sale - A Model of Grand Corruption." Business and Politics 14, no. 2 (August 2012): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/1469-3569.1414.
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This paper develops a model for a particular type of grand corruption often encountered in developing countries, namely, the sale of government positions by autocratic rulers. A two-stage game is considered, where the autocrat moves first to maximize his revenue from the sale of positions in the cabinet by choosing a price that must be paid by interested politicians. The latter become bureaucrats who maximize their utility from bribe revenues for the given price set by the president. Backward induction yields subgame-perfect equilibrium levels of corruption of the president and bureaucrats. A key insight from this analysis is that conventional tools of fighting corruption become ineffective when corruption at the very top is ignored. The model is distinctive in its treatment of individual moral costs of being corrupt and in its consideration of a revolutionary constraint on the autocrat's choices.
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Schuler, Paul. "Position Taking or Position Ducking? A Theory of Public Debate in Single-Party Legislatures." Comparative Political Studies 53, no. 9 (March 26, 2018): 1493–524. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414018758765.
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Are representatives in authoritarian legislatures encouraged to take positions on salient issues? More generally, why do some autocracies allow public debate on hot topics at all? Understanding the dynamics of public legislative debate is important for the roles authoritarian legislatures are theorized to play in regime legitimation and information provision. I argue that the decision to allow public debate depends on autocratic incentives to mobilize public sentiment against the bureaucracy. While allowing debate on salient issues risks galvanizing antiregime sentiment, doing so may also mobilize public opinion against wayward government officials to improve performance and deflect blame. Therefore, I predict that autocrats will only allow public debate on issues they have delegated to the government. I test this using an automated content analysis of debate in the Vietnam National Assembly, with results showing evidence of position taking on salient issues, but only on issues the party delegates to the state.
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Kirshner, Alexander S. "Nonideal democratic authority." Politics, Philosophy & Economics 17, no. 3 (October 11, 2017): 257–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1470594x17732068.
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Empirical research has transformed our understanding of autocratic institutions (Gandhi, 2008; Magaloni, 2006; Schedler, 2009). Yet democratic theorists remain laser-focused on ideal democracies, often contending that political equality is necessary to generate democratic authority (Buchanan, 2002; Christiano, 2008; Estlund, 2008; Kolodny, 2014B; Shapiro, 2002; Viehoff, 2014B, Waldron, 1999). Those analyses neglect most nonideal democracies and autocracies – regimes featuring inequality and practices like gerrymandering. This essay fills that fundamental gap, outlining the difficulties of applying theories of democratic authority to nonideal regimes and challenging long-standing views about democratic authority. Focusing on autocrats that lose elections (for example, Sri Lanka, 2015), I outline the democratic authority of nonideal, flawed procedures. Flawed elections are unjustifiably biased toward incumbents. But under certain conditions, ignoring an incumbent’s loss would require not treating one’s fellow citizens as equals. Under those conditions, therefore, citizens are bound to obey those electoral outcomes – that is, flawed procedures can possess democratic authority.
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Wright, Joseph, Erica Frantz, and Barbara Geddes. "Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival." British Journal of Political Science 45, no. 2 (September 26, 2013): 287–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123413000252.
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This article uncovers a new mechanism linking oil wealth to autocratic regime survival: the investigation tests whether increases in oil wealth improve the survival of autocracies by lowering the chances of democratization, reducing the risk of transition to subsequent dictatorship, or both. Using a new measure of autocratic durability shows that, once models allow for unit effects, oil wealth promotes autocratic survival by lowering the risk of ouster by rival autocratic groups. Evidence also indicates that oil income increases military spending in dictatorships, which suggests that increasing oil wealth may deter coups that could have caused a regime collapse.
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Prinz, Aloys L., and Christian J. Sander. "Political leadership and the quality of public goods and services: Does religion matter?" Economics of Governance 21, no. 4 (September 9, 2020): 299–334. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10101-020-00242-7.
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Abstract Despite some indications to the contrary, religion still plays an important role in contemporary society. In this paper, the association between religion and the quality of public goods and services, measured by the so-called “delivery quality” index of the Worldwide Governance Indicators project, is empirically investigated. Besides religion, different political regimes may also have a crucial impact on the quality of public goods and services. In the paper, a distinction is made between theocratic, autocratic and democratic systems. It is hypothesized that the delivery quality is lower in theocratic and autocratic regimes than in democracies. In addition, religious diversity may enhance the quality of public goods and services in otherwise autocratic and democratic regimes. The level of religious goods and services provision should be lower in religiously diverse societies, because the costs of these goods are higher due to a lack of economies of scale. This may leave more potential for the provision of high-quality public goods and services by the state. These hypotheses are tested empirically with data from 190 countries. The empirical estimates confirm that both theocratic and autocratic regimes provide lower average delivery quality than democracies. Furthermore, a positive association of religious leadership with delivery quality is found in strict autocracies. Greater religious diversity is thus linked to a better quality of pubic goods and services in democracies, but not in autocracies.
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Akhremenko, Andrei, and Yulia Shulika. "Political Security in Authoritarian Systems with a Resource Rent Economy: a Result of the „Social Contract” and High Resource Prices?" Przegląd Strategiczny, no. 12 (December 31, 2019): 299–318. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/ps.2019.1.19.
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Most researchers believe that states which are rich in natural resources are more able to maintain political stability in comparison to countries without such an access to exceptional profits. However, some rent resource autocracies are unanimously considered fragile, and their ability to extract maximum rents does not always contribute to political and economic security during price fluctuations. Based on the idea that the state’s ability to extract resources imposes on it certain ob- ligations, the research question touches upon the quality of governance as a supposed core factor, which mediates the resource dependence and political security in terms of stateness and the ability to fulfil the “social contract.” The latter is described as implementation of political decisions, provision of public goods and services. However, the quality of governance is substantially different in various autocratic systems. Using casestudy and descriptive statistics, the authors try to reveal the context and ascertain which factors trigger the horizon length of autocrats` political strategies during rising and falling resource prices. The authors affirm that resource dependence negatively affects political security less due to an absence of economic growth during price breaks, and more due to the struggle of political elites for the redistribution of resources, absence of disciplinary mechanisms, weak representation and accountability systems, and poor enabling environments as a basis for quality of resource management. The authors conclude that political security in autocratic resource economies is achieved through the coexistence of political will and triggers, conducive to specifying the length of the planning horizon.
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Blauth, Angela Cruz. "O fenômeno da autocracia dentro do processo grupal." Barbarói, no. 46 (March 9, 2016): 67. http://dx.doi.org/10.17058/barbaroi.v0i46.5123.
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RESUMO
Buscando levantar uma reflexão acerca da autocracia operando em sistemas grupais, foi realizada uma revisão teórica a fim de esclarecer o tema, integrada juntamente à analise do filme A Onda. A experiência autocrata retratada no filme entre professor e alunos, mostra-se compatível às teorias grupais psicanalíticas, que buscam explicar como certos tipos de grupo se formam, qual a característica de seus líderes, e quais as motivações inconscientes que delineiam o funcionamento deste grupo. O presente trabalho revisitou o governo Hitler, sendo este um dos principais modelos de autocracia totalitária da história, além de ter sido tomado como base para a constituição de grupo no filme. A teoria social-histórica e a psicanálise se integram neste trabalho em uma mesma perspectiva.
Palavras Chave: Grupos, psicanálise, A Onda, Hitler, autocracia, totalitarismo.
ABSTRACT
Seeking to raise a debate about autocracy in group operating systems, a literature review was performed to clarify the issue, along with integrated analysis of the film The Wave. The autocrat experience portrayed in the film between teacher and students seems compatible to psychoanalytic group theories that seek to explain how certain types of groups are formed, leader’s characteristic, and which unconscious motivations operated in this kind of group. This article revisited the Hitler government, for being one of the main models of totalitarian autocracy of history, and has been taken as the basis for the formation of the group in the film. The social-historical theory and psychoanalysis integrate this work in the same perspective.
Keywords: Groups, psychoanalysis, The Wave, Hitler, autocracy, totalitarism.
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AHMED, FAISAL Z. "The Perils of Unearned Foreign Income: Aid, Remittances, and Government Survival." American Political Science Review 106, no. 1 (January 16, 2012): 146–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055411000475.
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Given their political incentives, governments in more autocratic polities can strategically channel unearned government and household income in the form of foreign aid and remittances to finance patronage, which extends their tenure in political office. I substantiate this claim with duration models of government turnover for a sample of 97 countries between 1975 and 2004. Unearned foreign income received in more autocratic countries reduces the likelihood of government turnover, regime collapse, and outbreaks of major political discontent. To allay potential concerns with endogeneity, I harness a natural experiment of oil price–driven aid and remittance flows to poor, non–oil producing Muslim autocracies. The instrumental variables results confirm the baseline finding that authoritarian governments can harness unearned foreign income to prolong their rule. Finally, I provide evidence of the underlying causal mechanisms that governments in autocracies use aid and remittances inflows to reduce their expenditures on welfare goods to fund patronage.
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Gjerløw, Haakon, and Carl Henrik Knutsen. "TRENDS: Leaders, Private Interests, and Socially Wasteful Projects: Skyscrapers in Democracies and Autocracies." Political Research Quarterly 72, no. 2 (April 4, 2019): 504–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912919840710.
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Political leaders often have private incentives to pursue socially wasteful projects, but not all leaders are able to pursue these interests. We argue that weaker accountability mechanisms allow autocratic leaders to more easily realize wasteful projects than democratic leaders. We focus on one particular project, skyscraper construction, where we obtain objective measures comparable across different contexts. We test different implications from our argument by drawing on a new dataset recording all buildings exceeding 150 m, globally. We find that autocracies systematically build more new skyscrapers than democracies. Furthermore, autocratic skyscrapers are more excessive than democratic ones, and—in contrast with democracies—autocracies pursue skyscraper projects to about the same extent in rural/poor and urban/rich societies. When investigating different mechanisms entailed in our argument, the link between regime type and skyscraper construction seems due in large part to stronger vertical accountability mechanisms and more open information environments in democracies.
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Letsa, Natalie Wenzell. "‘The people's choice’: popular (il)legitimacy in autocratic Cameroon." Journal of Modern African Studies 55, no. 4 (November 23, 2017): 647–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x17000428.
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AbstractWhile many analysts assume that the autocratic regime of Paul Biya is deeply unpopular amongst ordinary Cameroonians, there is almost no existing analysis of public opinion in Cameroon. In fact, Cameroonians are deeply divided in their beliefs about politics; while many view the government as democratic and legitimate, others see the regime as entirely autocratic. What explains these fundamental divides in beliefs? While existing theories point to demographic factors as the most important predictors of political opinions, this article argues that in autocratic regimes, political geography is even more important to understanding these divides. Political parties in autocratic regimes develop opposite narratives about the legitimacy of the state, and regardless of education, partisanship, age, or ethnicity, citizens living in party strongholds are far more likely to adopt these narratives than citizens outside of strongholds. Understanding these divides is critical to explaining regime legitimisation in Cameroon, and African autocracies more broadly.
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Miller, Michael K. "The Autocratic Ruling Parties Dataset: Origins, Durability, and Death." Journal of Conflict Resolution 64, no. 4 (September 27, 2019): 756–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002719876000.
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How do autocratic ruling parties gain power? What predicts their durability and how they fall? This article introduces the Autocratic Ruling Parties Dataset, the first comprehensive data set on the founding origins, modes of gaining and losing power, ruling tenures, and other characteristics of autocratic ruling parties. It covers all ruling parties in the world from 1940 to 2015. Contrary to common assumptions, most ruling parties are not created by sitting dictators, but follow a range of paths to power that influence their style and duration of rule. To illustrate the data’s uses, the article confirms that ruling parties stabilize autocracies. Further, parties’ origins and histories matter, with revolutionary and foreign-imposed parties the most durable and parties empowered through elections the least durable. By recognizing ruling parties’ heterogeneity, histories, and potential autonomy from individual dictators, the data can contribute to open questions on autocratic politics, regime stability, and democratization.
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Brooks, Willis. "The Politics of the Conquest of the Caucasus, 1855-1864." Nationalities Papers 24, no. 4 (December 1996): 649–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905999608408475.
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The study of politics is popular in Russian history; the examination of Russian politics in its regions is not, at least, not yet. The spectrum of interpretations about autocratic politics includes the parading of litanies of imperial arbitrariness and/or manipulation of interest groups against each other, incidents of ministerial incapacity to restrain the autocrat, examples of the inordinate power of favorites, the failure to establish regularizing institutions that would restrain autocrats, and a series of interesting categories including such wonderfully suggestive terms as “free floaters” proposed in Alfred Rieber's important article on the subject. Whether one is wedded to the notion that tsars decided all in the nineteenth century, or advocate some scheme that emphasizes the plurality of conflicting interests at play in decisionmaking, however, the pattern of scholarly production suggests that regional politics has been of secondary importance, and that in any event documentation often is lacking; in short, such approaches are not seen as ideal lines of inquiry. This article seeks to make a contribution to the debate about the politics of autocrats by examining a localized question where documentation is rather complete and where ministerial/bureaucratic lines may be traced fairly closely, in an attempt to shed added light on Russia's leadership in a time of great crisis, specifically the aftermath of the humiliating defeat in the Crimean War and the tension surrounding the preparations and implementation of the Emancipation and other reforms. To be specific as well as anticipatory, it is argued that there are regional questions of great national, indeed international, importance to autocrats, that the Caucasus was so recognized in the post-Crimean War period, and that those involved in the region affected policy decisions in ways that rivaled, as well as displaced, senior officials in the capital.
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Celestino, Mauricio Rivera, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. "Fresh carnations or all thorn, no rose? Nonviolent campaigns and transitions in autocracies." Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 3 (May 2013): 385–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343312469979.
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Whereas optimists see the so-called Arab Spring as similar to the revolutions of 1989, and likely to bring about democratic rule, skeptics fear that protest bringing down dictators may simply give way to new dictatorships, as in the Iranian revolution. Existing research on transitions has largely neglected the role of protest and direct action in destabilizing autocracies and promoting democracy. We argue that protest and direct action can promote transitions in autocracies, and that the mode of direct action, that is, whether violent or nonviolent, has a major impact on the prospects for autocratic survival and democracy. We present empirical results supporting our claim that nonviolent protests substantially increase the likelihood of transitions to democracy, especially under favorable international environments, while violent direct action is less effective in undermining autocracies overall, and makes transitions to new autocracies relatively more likely.
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Qvortrup, Matt, Brendan O’Leary, and Ronald Wintrobe. "Explaining the Paradox of Plebiscites." Government and Opposition 55, no. 2 (August 10, 2018): 202–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2018.16.
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AbstractRecent referendums show that autocratic regimes consult voters even if the outcome is a foregone conclusion. They have been doing so with increasing frequency since Napoleon consulted French citizens in 1800. Why and when do dictatorial regimes hold referendums they are certain they will win? Analysing the 162 referendums held in autocratic and non-free states in the period 1800–2012, the article shows that referendums with a 99% yes-vote tend to occur in autocracies with high ethnic fractionalization and, in part, in sultanistic (tinpot or tyrannical) regimes, but generally not in communist (totalitarian) states. An explanation is proposed for this variation.
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Escribà-Folch, Abel, Tobias Böhmelt, and Ulrich Pilster. "Authoritarian regimes and civil–military relations: Explaining counterbalancing in autocracies." Conflict Management and Peace Science 37, no. 5 (April 9, 2019): 559–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0738894219836285.
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How do autocracies structure their civil–military relations? We contend that personalist dictators are more strongly associated with counterbalancing than other authoritarian regime types. Personalists are characterized by weak institutions and narrow support bases, a lack of unifying ideologies and informal links to the ruler. They thus have strong incentives to coup-proof and, as we contend, counterbalancing seems particularly attractive. Quantitative analyses of autocratic regimes’ counterbalancing efforts since the 1960s provide support for this expectation. By showing that institutional coup-proofing significantly varies across autocratic forms of government, we contribute to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and civil–military relations.
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Pond, Amy. "Financial Liberalization: Stable Autocracies and Constrained Democracies." Comparative Political Studies 51, no. 1 (March 29, 2017): 105–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414017695333.
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Why do autocratic rulers liberalize financial markets? This article shows how autocrats use financial liberalization for two distinct purposes. First, autocrats may use liberalization to bolster the economy, making revolution less attractive to the political opposition and stabilizing the autocracy. Second, when stabilization of the autocracy is too costly, autocrats may use liberalization to make assets more mobile. Mobility provides elite asset owners with external investment options, which limit redistribution. When redistribution is the main fear associated with democratization, the mobility associated with liberalization makes direct control of political institutions through dictatorship unnecessary. Thus, autocrats use liberalization to stimulate the economy and stabilize their rule or to reduce redistribution in anticipation of democratization. Suharto’s policies in Indonesia and Pinochet’s policies in Chile illustrate these two objectives of financial liberalization.
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Dukalskis, Alexander, and Johannes Gerschewski. "What autocracies say (and what citizens hear): proposing four mechanisms of autocratic legitimation." Contemporary Politics 23, no. 3 (March 16, 2017): 251–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2017.1304320.
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Covitz, Howard H. "Living With Shattered Dreams: A Confession and a Hypothesis." Journal of Humanistic Psychology 60, no. 4 (April 4, 2020): 494–502. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022167820912662.
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The author describes how his and his patients’ sense of the ethical has been affronted by candidate and then President Donald Trump. He offers a hypothesis that autocratic leaders—by choosing an outrageous persona—split the nation they wish to dominate into two starkly separated camps that both, in certain ways, mimic the autocrat’s behaviors.
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Beloshitzkaya, Vera. "Democracy and Redistribution: The Role of Regime Revisited." East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures 34, no. 3 (December 26, 2019): 571–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0888325419892063.
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This study challenges a well-supported institutionalist theory in comparative politics that links democracy with higher levels of redistribution as well as studies that link authoritarianism with welfare state liberalization. Using pooled cross-sectional data for ten post-communist countries spanning twenty-five years and a dynamic model specification, the study shows that, contrary to what the institutionalist theory predicts, post-communist democratic governments redistribute about 0.6 percent less of their GDP on social protection in the short term and 1.3 percent less in the long term than post-communist autocrats do. However, consistent with the cultural legacies hypothesis, there are no differences when it comes to redistribution of life chances through health care and education. I attribute the finding that post-communist autocracies redistribute more via social spending and are reluctant to liberalize their welfare states to their need to maintain popular legitimacy in a region where citizens are accustomed to high levels of redistribution and popular protests often lead to regime turnover. I argue that post-communist democracies have other available mechanisms to maintain their legitimacy, namely, free and fair elections, while post-communist autocratic governments have to rely on redistribution to do so. The findings have implications for our understanding of authoritarian resilience in the region.
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Lee, Don S., and Paul Schuler. "Testing the “China Model” of Meritocratic Promotions: Do Democracies Reward Less Competent Ministers Than Autocracies?" Comparative Political Studies 53, no. 3-4 (July 4, 2019): 531–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414019858962.
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Proponents of the “China Model” suggest that autocracies, particularly in East Asia, reward competence more than democracies. However, a competing literature argues that autocracies are less likely to reward competence because autocrats fear that competent officials could challenge for power. We argue that autocracies do not fear technical competence; they fear political competence. As such, autocracies may promote ministers with technical competence but punish the politically competent. Democracies, by contrast, place a premium on political competence when deciding whom to promote. We provide the first test of this theory on how ministerial behavior is rewarded using a unique data set of political performance and promotions in nine East Asian countries. Our findings show that autocracies promote officials with technical competence as long as the ministers limit their political behavior. In democracies, parliamentary and presidential democracies promote those displaying political competence.
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Bélanger, Louis, Érick Duchesne, and Jonathan Paquin. "Foreign Interventions and Secessionist Movements: The Democratic Factor." Canadian Journal of Political Science 38, no. 2 (June 2005): 435–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423905040643.
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Abstract.This article explores the impact of political regime type on the decision of third states to support secessionist movements abroad. It suggests that democracies share political values, which lead them to oppose their mutual secessionist claims, while autocracies are not bound by this normative consideration. The statistical analysis supports the effect of the democratic factor: democracies rarely support secessionist groups emerging from democratic states. Moreover, it shows that there is no autocratic counterpart to this argument. This research also casts some serious doubts on the ability of conventional explanations—namely vulnerability and ethnic affinities—to explain external support to secessionist movements.Résumé.Cet article analyse l'impact du type de régime politique sur la décision des États tiers d'appuyer des mouvements sécessionnistes à l'étranger. L'étude soutient que les démocraties partagent des valeurs politiques communes qui les mènent à s'opposer aux mouvements indépendantistes qui se manifestent parmi elles, alors que les régimes autocratiques ne sont pas liés par cette considération normative. L'analyse statistique valide l'effet du facteur démocratique : les démocraties appuient rarement les groupes sécessionnistes qui émergent au sein d'autres États démocratiques. Les données démontrent également qu'il n'y a pas d'équivalent autocratique faisant écho au facteur démocratique. L'étude indique en outre que les thèses courantes de la vulnérabilité et du lien ethnique expliquent mal l'appui des États tiers aux groupes sécessionnistes.
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Roller, Edeltraud. "Comparing the performance of autocracies: issues in measuring types of autocratic regimes and performance." Contemporary Politics 19, no. 1 (March 2013): 35–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2013.773201.
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Kaufman, Robert R., and Stephan Haggard. "Democratic Decline in the United States: What Can We Learn from Middle-Income Backsliding?" Perspectives on Politics 17, no. 02 (October 29, 2018): 417–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592718003377.
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We explore what can be learned from authoritarian backsliding in middle income countries about the threats to American democracy posed by the election of Donald Trump. We develop some causal hunches and an empirical baseline by considering the rise of elected autocrats in Venezuela, Turkey, and Hungary. Although American political institutions may forestall a reversion to electoral autocracy, we see some striking parallels in terms of democratic dysfunction, polarization, the nature of autocratic appeals, and the processes through which autocratic incumbents sought to exploit elected office. These processes could generate a diminished democratic system in which electoral competition survives, but within a political space that is narrowed by weakened horizontal checks on executive power and rule of law.
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HOLLYER, JAMES R., B. PETER ROSENDORFF, and JAMES RAYMOND VREELAND. "Transparency, Protest, and Autocratic Instability." American Political Science Review 109, no. 4 (November 2015): 764–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055415000428.
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The collapse of autocratic regimes is often brought about through large-scale mobilization and collective action by elements of the populace. The willingness of any given member of the public to participate in actions such as strikes and protests is contingent upon her beliefs about others’ willingness to similarly mobilize. In this article, we examine the effect of a specific form of transparency—the disclosure of economic data by the government—on citizen belief formation, and consequently on collective mobilization. We present a theoretical model in which, under autocratic rule, transparency increases the frequency of protests, and increases the extent to which protest is correlated with incumbent performance. We find empirical support for these claims. Transparency destabilizes autocracies via mass protest.
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WEEKS, JESSICA L. "Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict." American Political Science Review 106, no. 2 (May 2012): 326–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055412000111.
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How do domestic institutions affect autocratic leaders’ decisions to initiate military conflicts? Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I argue that institutions in some kinds of dictatorships allow regime insiders to hold leaders accountable for their foreign policy decisions. However, the preferences and perceptions of these autocratic domestic audiences vary, with domestic audiences in civilian regimes being more skeptical of using military force than the military officers who form the core constituency in military juntas. In personalist regimes in which there is no effective domestic audience, no predictable mechanism exists for restraining or removing overly belligerent leaders, and leaders tend to be selected for personal characteristics that make them more likely to use military force. I combine these arguments to generate a series of hypotheses about the conflict behavior of autocracies and test the hypotheses using new measures of authoritarian regime type. The findings indicate that, despite the conventional focus on differences between democracies and nondemocracies, substantial variation in conflict initiation occurs among authoritarian regimes. Moreover, civilian regimes with powerful elite audiences are no more belligerent overall than democracies. The result is a deeper understanding of the conflict behavior of autocracies, with important implications for scholars as well as policy makers.
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Hyde, Susan D., and Elizabeth N. Saunders. "Recapturing Regime Type in International Relations: Leaders, Institutions, and Agency Space." International Organization 74, no. 2 (2020): 363–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818319000365.
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AbstractA wave of recent research challenges the role of regime type in international relations. One striking takeaway is that democratic and autocratic leaders can often achieve similar levels of domestic constraint, which in many issue areas results in similar international outcomes—leading many to question traditional views of democracies as distinctive in their international relations. In this review essay, we use recent contributions in the field to build what we call a “malleable constraints” framework, in which all governments have an institutionally defined default level of domestic audience constraint that is generally higher in democracies, but leaders maintain some agency within these institutions and can strategically increase their exposure to or insulation from this constraint. Using this framework, we argue that regime type is still a crucial differentiator in international affairs even if, as recent studies suggest, democratic and autocratic leaders can sometimes be similarly constrained by domestic audiences and thus achieve similar international outcomes. This framework helps reconcile many competing claims in recent scholarship, including the puzzle of why autocracies do not strategically increase domestic audience constraint more often. Just because autocracies can engage audience constraints and democracies can escape them does not mean that they can do so with equal ease, frequency, or risk.
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Lake, David A. "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War." American Political Science Review 86, no. 1 (March 1992): 24–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1964013.
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Democracies are less likely to fight wars with each other. They are also more likely to prevail in wars with autocratic states. I offer an explanation of this syndrome of powerful pacifism drawn from the microeconomic theory of the state. State rent seeking creates an imperialist bias in a country's foreign policy. This bias is smallest in democracies, where the costs to society of controlling the state are relatively low, and greatest in autocracies, where the costs are higher. As a result of this bias, autocracies will be more expansionist and, in turn, war-prone. In their relations with each other, where the absence of this imperialist bias is manifest, the relative pacifism of democracies appears. In addition, democracies, constrained by their societies from earning rents, will devote greater absolute resources to security, enjoy greater societal support for their policies, and tend to form overwhelming countercoalitions against expansionist autocracies. It follows that democracies will be more likely to win wars.
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Neundorf, Anja, Johannes Gerschewski, and Roman-Gabriel Olar. "How Do Inclusionary and Exclusionary Autocracies Affect Ordinary People?" Comparative Political Studies 53, no. 12 (July 16, 2019): 1890–925. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414019858958.
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We propose a distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary autocratic ruling strategies and develop novel theoretical propositions on the legacy that these strategies leave on citizens’ political attitudes once the autocratic regime broke down. Using data of 1.3 million survey respondents from 71 countries and hierarchical age–period–cohort models, we estimate between and within cohort differences in citizens’ democratic support. We find that inclusionary regimes—with wider redistribution of socioeconomic and political benefits—leave a stronger antidemocratic legacy than exclusionary regimes on the political attitudes of their citizens. Similarly, citizens who were part of the winning group in an autocracy are more critical with democracy compared with citizens who were part of discriminated groups. This article contributes to our understanding about how autocracies affect the hearts and minds of ordinary citizens.
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Guriev, Sergei, and Daniel Treisman. "The Popularity of Authoritarian Leaders." World Politics 72, no. 4 (September 23, 2020): 601–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887120000167.
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ABSTRACTHow do citizens in authoritarian states feel about their leaders? While some dictators rule through terror, others seem genuinely popular. Using the Gallup World Poll’s panel of more than one hundred-forty countries in 2006–2016, the authors show that the drivers of political approval differ across regime types. Although brutal repression in overt dictatorships could cause respondents to falsify their preferences, in milder informational autocracies, greater repression actually predicts lower approval. In autocracies as in democracies, economic performance matters and citizens’ economic perceptions, while not perfectly accurate, track objective indicators. Dictators also benefit from greater perceived public safety, but the authors find no such effect in democracies. Covert censorship of the media and the Internet is associated with higher approval in autocracies—in particular, in informational ones—but ratings fall when citizens recognize censorship. In informational autocracies, executive elections trigger a ratings surge if there is leader turnover, but, unlike in democracies, reelected autocrats enjoy little honeymoon.
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Lord, Justin, Akbar Ghiasi, Ganisher Davlyatov, and Robert Weech-Maldonado. "The Impact of Leadership Styles on Quality and Financial Performance in High Medicaid Nursing Homes." Innovation in Aging 4, Supplement_1 (December 1, 2020): 679. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/geroni/igaa057.2363.
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Abstract This study examined the association between leadership styles (autocrat, consultative autocrat, consensus manager, and shareholder manager) and resident quality and financial performance in under-resourced nursing homes. Survey data from 391 Directors of Nursing were merged with secondary data from LTCFocus, Area Health Resource File, Medicare Cost Reports, and Nursing Home Compare. Two multivariate regressions were used to model the relationship between leadership styles and the dependent variables: nursing home star ratings (1-5) and operating margin. The independent variables were composite scores for leadership styles, while control variables included organizational and county-level factors. Results show that compared to autocratic leadership, the consultative autocrat (solicits feedback but has total authority) was associated with lower quality (p < 0.05), while the consensus manager (delegates authority to the group) was associated with lower profit margin (p < 0.05). Under-resourced facilities need to recognize trade-offs of different decision making styles for performance.
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Shen-Bayh, Fiona. "Strategies of Repression." World Politics 70, no. 3 (June 1, 2018): 321–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887118000047.
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Strategies of repression vary widely between extrajudicial and judicial extremes, from unrestrained acts of violence to highly routinized legal procedures. While the former have received a great deal of scholarly attention, judicial methods remain relatively understudied. When and why do rulers repress their rivals in court? The author argues that autocrats use a judicial strategy of repression when confronting challengers from within the ruling elite. Unlike regime outsiders, who pose a common, external threat to mobilize against, insiders present a more divisive target. When autocrats confront the latter, a judicial strategy legitimizes punishment, deters future rivals, and generates shared beliefs regarding incumbent strength and challenger weakness. Using original data on political prisoners in postcolonial sub-Saharan Africa, the author finds that autocrats were significantly more likely to use a judicial strategy against insiders and an extrajudicial strategy against outsiders. A case study of Kenya traces the logic of the theory, showing how intraregime conflict made courts a valuable instrument of state repression. The findings demonstrate how courts can play a central role in autocratic survival.
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McManus, Roseanne W., and Keren Yarhi-Milo. "The Logic of “Offstage” Signaling: Domestic Politics, Regime Type, and Major Power-Protégé Relations." International Organization 71, no. 4 (2017): 701–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818317000297.
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AbstractThis paper explores the question of how major powers signal support for their protégés. We develop a theory that explains why major powers show support for some protégés using highly visible “frontstage” signals of support, while supporting other protégés through less visible, but nonetheless costly, “offstage” signals. From an international strategic perspective, it is puzzling that major powers do not always send the most visible signal possible. We argue that this can be explained by considering the domestic environments in which the leaders of major powers and protégés operate. Focusing particularly on the United States as we develop our theory, we argue that the US will prefer to send offstage signals of support for more autocratic protégés for several reasons. First, sending frontstage support signals for autocracies would expose US leaders to charges of hypocrisy. Second, frontstage signals of support for autocracies face an impediment to credibility because of the public backlash in the United States that overt support for dictators could generate. Third, many autocratic protégés would be reluctant to accept a frontstage signal of support from the US because it could undermine their regime stability. We test our theory in a data set that records various support signals sent by the United States for other countries between 1950 and 2008, finding strong support for our expectations. We also find evidence of the causal mechanisms posited by our theory in a case study of relations between the US and the Shah's Iran.