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Relevant bibliographies by topics / Autocratie

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Academic literature on the topic 'Autocratie'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "Autocratie"

1

Baechler, Jean. "Marché et autocratie." Commentaire Numéro43, no. 3 (1988): 624. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/comm.043.0624.

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Baechler, Jean. "Marché, modernisation et autocratie." Commentaire Numéro 53, no. 1 (1991): 99. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/comm.053.0099.

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Bak, Daehee, and Chungshik Moon. "Autocratic time horizons and the growth effect of foreign direct investment." Japanese Journal of Political Science 20, no. 3 (May 22, 2019): 143–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109919000057.

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AbstractThe positive influence of foreign direct investment (FDI) on host countries' economic growth has been widely debated. Given the mixed empirical evidence, scholars have sought to find the economic preconditions under which FDI spillovers are likely to occur and facilitate economic growth in the host countries. Those preconditions are not exogenously dictated but largely shaped by governments' policy preferences. Particularly in autocracies, an autocrat's policy preferences are the driving force that determines whether a host country is likely to be equipped with growth-friendly institutions and policies. We argue that such economic institutions and policies are dependent on the time horizons of autocrats in power. Our empirical analysis covering 64 autocratic countries from 1970 to 2005 supports our main argument that FDI has a positive effect on growth when autocratic time horizons are sufficiently long, and positive FDI spillovers mainly occur through the protection of property right institutions.

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Bak, Daehee. "Autocratic political cycle and international conflict." Conflict Management and Peace Science 37, no. 3 (November 30, 2017): 259–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0738894217741617.

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This article reveals a temporal pattern of conflict behavior over the course of autocratic leaders’ tenure. By identifying a commonly observed domestic political cycle in autocracies, I discuss how the level of domestic constraints on autocrats’ conflict behavior changes over time in three distinct periods: (1) power struggle in the early period of tenure; (2) power consolidation; and (3) power dissipation in the later period of power transition. The empirical analysis on autocratic conflict cycle reveals that the likelihood of autocratic crisis initiation significantly increases during the early years of autocratic leadership tenure, after which it moderately decreases over time. This finding suggests that autocrats’ tenure is a substantively important predictor of autocratic leaders’ conflict behavior.

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Miller, Michael K., and Margaret E. Peters. "Restraining the Huddled Masses: Migration Policy and Autocratic Survival." British Journal of Political Science 50, no. 2 (March 5, 2018): 403–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123417000680.

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What determines citizens’ freedom to exit autocracies? How does this influence global patterns of migration and democratization? Although control over citizen movement has long been central to autocratic power, modern autocracies vary considerably in how much they restrict emigration. This article shows that autocrats strategically choose emigration policy by balancing several motives. Increasing emigration can stabilize regimes by selecting a more loyal population and attracting greater investment, trade and remittances, but exposing their citizens to democracy abroad is potentially dangerous. Using a half-century of bilateral migration data, the study calculates the level and destinations of expected emigration given exogenous geographic and socioeconomic characteristics. It finds that when citizens disproportionately emigrate to democracies, countries are more likely to democratize – and that autocrats restrict emigration freedom in response. In contrast, a larger expected flow of economic emigration predicts autocratic survival and freer emigration policy. These results have important implications for autocratic politics, democratic diffusion and the political sources of migration.

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DI LONARDO, LIVIO, JESSICA S. SUN, and SCOTT A. TYSON. "Autocratic Stability in the Shadow of Foreign Threats." American Political Science Review 114, no. 4 (July 28, 2020): 1247–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055420000489.

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Autocrats confront a number of threats to their power, some from within the regime and others from foreign actors. To understand how these threats interact and affect autocratic survival, we build a model where an autocratic leader can be ousted by a domestic opposition and a foreign actor. We concentrate on the impact that foreign threats have on the stability of autocratic leadership and show that the presence of foreign threats increases the probability an autocrat retains power. Focusing on two cases, one where a foreign actor and the domestic opposition have aligned interests and one where their interests are misaligned, we elucidate two distinct mechanisms. First, when interests are aligned, autocrats are compelled to increase domestic security to alleviate international pressure. Second, when interests are misaligned, autocrats exploit the downstream threat of foreign intervention to deter domestic threats. We also show that autocrats have incentives to cultivate ideological views hostile to broader interests among politically influential domestic actors.

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Zaloznaya, Marina. "Does Authoritarianism Breed Corruption? Reconsidering the Relationship Between Authoritarian Governance and Corrupt Exchanges in Bureaucracies." Law & Social Inquiry 40, no. 02 (2015): 345–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lsi.12076.

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This article advocates for ethnographic and historical study of the political roots of corruption. Focusing on informal economies of Belarusian universities, it reexamines two theoretical propositions about corruption in autocracies. The first proposition is that authoritarianism breeds bureaucratic corruption; the second is that autocrats grant disloyal subjects corruption opportunities in exchange for political compliance. Using qualitative data, the author finds that autocracies can generate favorable as well as unfavorable preconditions for bureaucratic corruption. The author argues that lenient autocratic governance, characterized by organizational decoupling, creates favorable conditions for bureaucratic corruption. In contrast, consolidated autocracy, defined by rigid organizational controls, is unfavorable to such corruption. The author also concludes that in autocracies, disloyal populations may be cut off from rather than granted opportunities for bureaucratic corruption. These findings suggest that the relationship between autocratic governance and corruption is more complex than current studies are able to reveal due to their methodological limitations.

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Benedek, István. "Riders on the storm: the role of populism in the global crisis of democracy and in the functioning of electoral autocracies." Politics in Central Europe 17, no. 2 (July 27, 2021): 197–225. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pce-2021-0009.

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Abstract It is my contention that populism could be an appropriate framework to describe, explain and connect the phenomena of global crisis of democracy and functioning of electoral autocracies. In order to substantiate this claim, with the method of literature review, I examine first the characteristics of these phenomena. Then I focus on the nature of the relationship between them, in particular on the complex system of new types of autocracies’ stability, in which populism could play a crucial role. Populism, understood as an autocratic (re-)interpretation of democracy and representation, could be a particularly dangerous Trojan Horse for democracy. First and foremost, because its idea of a single, homogeneous and authentic people that can be legitimately represented only by the populist leader is a moralised form of antipluralism which is contrary to the pluralist approach of democracy (i.e. polyarchy). For precisely this reason, populism could play a key role in autocracies, especial in electoral autocracies which may use its core elements. Namely, the Manichean worldview, the image of a homogeneous people, people-centrism and the autocratic notion of representation are very compatible with electoral autocracies, since these regimes hold general elections and their power is built largely upon the alleged will of the people. By using populism, it is possible for these regimes to camouflage and even legitimise their autocratic trends and exercise of power behind the formally multi-party but not fair elections and democratic façade. As a radical turn towards closed autocracies (without de facto multiparty elections) would be too expensive, electoral autocrats need manipulated multi-party elections and other plebiscite techniques that could serve as quasi-democratic legitimation. Because of this, they tend to use the political logic of populism which could transform political contestation to a life- and- death struggle and provides quasi-democratic legitimation and other important cognitive functions. Therefore, populist electoral autocracies, as a paradigmatic type of electoral autocracies, could remain with us for a long time, giving more and more tasks to researchers, especially in the Central and Eastern European region.

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Knutsen, Carl Henrik, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, and Tore Wig. "Autocratic Elections." World Politics 69, no. 1 (December 8, 2016): 98–143. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887116000149.

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Do elections reduce or increase the risk of autocratic regime breakdown? This article addresses this contested question by distinguishing between election events and the institution of elections. The authors propose that elections stabilize autocracies in the long term but at the price of short-term instability. Elections are conducive to regime survival in the long run because they improve capacities for co-optation and repression but produce short-term instability because they serve as focal points for regime opposition. Drawing on data from 259 autocracies from 1946 to 2008, the authors show that elections increase the short-term probability of regime failure. The estimated effect is retained when accounting for the endogeneity of autocratic elections; this finding is critical, since some autocrats may or may not hold elections because of perceived effects on regime survival. The authors also find that this destabilizing effect does not operate in the long term. They find some, although not as strong, evidence that elections stabilize autocratic regimes in the medium to long term, despite their destabilizing immediate effects. These temporal effect patterns are present for both executive and legislative elections, and they are robust to using different measures, control variable strategies, and estimation techniques. In line with expectations, both effect patterns are much clearer for multiparty autocratic elections than for completely uncontested elections.

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Ballard-Rosa, Cameron. "Hungry for Change: Urban Bias and Autocratic Sovereign Default." International Organization 70, no. 2 (2016): 313–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818315000363.

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AbstractWhat drives autocrats to default on their sovereign debt? This article develops the first theory of sovereign debt default in autocracies that explicitly investigates survival incentives of political actors in nondemocracies. Self-interested elites, fearful of threats to their tenure because of urban unrest, may be willing to endure the long-term borrowing costs that defaulting creates rather than risk the short-term survival costs of removing cheap food policies for urban consumers. I test my main claims that both urbanization and food imports should be associated with greater likelihood of autocratic default using panel data covering forty-three countries over fifty years, finding that autocracies that are more reliant on imported food and that are more urbanized are significantly more likely to be in default on their external sovereign debt. I emphasize the regime-contingent nature of these effects by demonstrating that they are reversed when considering democratic sovereign default. I also substantiate the mechanisms put forward in my theory through illustrative historical cases of sovereign debt default in Zambia and Peru, in which I demonstrate that fear of urban unrest in the face of rapidly increasing food prices did indeed drive autocratic elites to default on international debt obligations. In addition to providing the first political theory of debt default in autocracies, the article introduces two robust predictors of autocratic default that have been overlooked in previous work, and highlights the importance of urban-rural dynamics in nondemocratic regimes.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Autocratie"

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Fénot, Anne Gintrac Cécile. "Achgabat, une capitale ostentatoire : autocratie et urbanisme au Turkménistan /." Paris ; Budapest ; Kinshasa [etc.] : l'Harmattan, 2005. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb400968767.

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Gondje-Djanayang, Godfroy-Luther. "Les violations de la Constitution Centrafricaine depuis 1958 valent-elles coups d'État ?" Thesis, Toulouse 1, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020TOU10039.

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La République Centrafricaine, ancienne colonie Française, située au centre de l'Afrique se confronte de manière récurrente depuis 1958 aux phénomènes de coups d’État et de regain constitutionnel caractérisant le fonctionnement de ses institutions. Ravagée par des multiples crises militaro-politiques et institutionnelles comme la plupart des États Africains, le mode de dévolution du pouvoir politique dans ce pays s'exerce par la démonstration des armes. En règle générale, les coups d'État semblent triompher sur l'expression de la volonté générale. La démocratie participative qui est un élément permettant au peuple de participer à la prise de décision ne représente qu’une doctrine inopérante. Malgré le vent de la démocratisation qui a soufflé en Afrique dans les années 1990, permettant aux institutions africaines d'accéder aux pluralismes politiques, force est de constater que la République centrafricaine continue de basculer depuis 1958 dans une crise institutionnelle. L'inexpérience démocratique, les coups d'État et la confiscation du pouvoir public, la mauvaise gouvernance, l'absence de l’État de droit, puis l'existence des régimes totalitaires sont les maux désacralisant le système institutionnel de ce pays. Toutefois, le mimétisme constitutionnel et les conséquences de la colonisation ont aussi impacté sur le processus de la démocratie en Afrique. Il serait évident que la crise de l’inexistence de l’État de droit en République centrafricaine symbolisera le noyau dans cet emballage juridique et politique, ce qui laisse entrevoir que l’inapplicabilité des textes constitutionnels marquée par la culture des coups d’État va servir à établir la répercussion de ce galvaudage constitutionnel
A government that violates the Constitution, destroys by this act the sovereign people and as Montesquieu said: "There are bad examples that are worse than crimes: and more states have perished because violation of morality more than the violation of Law”. The respect of constitutional norms presents very considerable stakes within the city. This is why major public debates continue to give an important consideration to this subject. The Central African Republic, formerly a French colony, located in the center of Africa, has consistently reinforced these constitutional values since 1958. Ravaged by military, political and institutional crises along with some African states till that the devolution of political power in this country became exercised by the demonstration of weapons. As a general rule, coups d'etat seem to triumph over the expression of the general will. Participatory democracy is an element that allows the people to participate in decision-making. In fact, this is only a real fiction and one of the reasons why the constitutional trajectory of Central African Republic is constantly moving towards a very delicate dysfunction. Perhaps, the democratization that has blown in Africa in the 1990s allowed African institutions to access political pluralism. It is clear that the Central African Republic has continuously been prolonged since 1958 in violations of constitutional norms. Constitutional inexperience, coups d’etat and seizure of public power, bad governance, the absence of the rule of law tied with the existence of totalitarian regimes, considered as the evils that keep on desacralizing the system of the institutional functioning of this country. Even though democracy seems to be the ideal model of governance all the time, constitutional mimicry and the consequences of colonization have also impacted on the system of African democracy. In order to guarantee stability to republican institutions and to provide it with legal certainty, standards must govern and the weapons must enter the magazines

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3

Essama, Owono Simeon. "Trois "entrepreneures de morale" à Amvoé : une étude de cas de la relation d'autorité dans une école primaire du Cameroun." Thèse, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/23335.

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Ce travail est une étude exploratoire sur la relation d’autorité en salle de classe dans une école primaire publique du Cameroun. Je voulais comprendre comment les enseignants et les élèves d’une école publique en milieu périurbain vivent la relation d’autorité en salle de classe. Pour rendre compte de cette expérience, j’ai choisi l’approche de terrain prônée par l’interactionnisme symbolique. J’ai alors eu recours à l’observation de deux classes (106 h 43 min), à 12 entretiens semi-structurés avec les élèves des deux classes et 3 autres avec la directrice d’école et les deux titulaires des deux classes. Analysée dans un premier temps au moyen de deux catégories : l’épistémique et le déontique, la relation d’autorité apparaît comme une relation verticale basée sur la coercition. Ensuite, pour mieux comprendre la complexité des interactions qui favorisent un tel type de relation, j’ai convoqué la théorie de la structuration sociale de Giddens. Cela m’a permis de placer le vécu de la salle de classe dans le contexte méso-social de la politique éducative, puis dans le contexte macro social des politiques d’ajustement structurel qui régentent le Cameroun et d’autres pays dits en développement pour découvrir que la domination du macro social sur le méso social crée une anomie au niveau des orientations scolaires. Ce qui permet aux enseignantes d’instituer et d’appliquer leurs propres normes à l’école. C’est cet acte d’invention et d’application des normes qui fait d’elles des « entrepreneures de morale ».

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Bader, Julia [Verfasser], and Aurel [Akademischer Betreuer] Croissant. "China, autocratic cooperation and autocratic survival / Julia Bader ; Betreuer: Aurel Croissant." Heidelberg : Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg, 2011. http://d-nb.info/1179784898/34.

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Uzonyi, Gary. "Audience costs, autocratic regimes, and militarized conflict." Tallahassee, Fla. : Florida State University, 2008. http://purl.fcla.edu/fsu/lib/digcoll/undergraduate/honors-theses/341760.

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Paniagua, Corazao Valentín. "Democracia representativa versus autocracia representativa." THĒMIS-Revista de Derecho, 2015. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/109944.

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Andrade, Uchoa Cavalcanti Maria de Betania de. "Urban reconstruction and autocratic regimes : a case study of Bucharest." Thesis, Oxford Brookes University, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.262091.

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Monzón, Pedroso Odar. "La Democracia y la autocracia en Kelsen." Bachelor's thesis, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos. Programa Cybertesis PERÚ, 2013. http://cybertesis.unmsm.edu.pe/handle/cybertesis/3078.

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La presente investigación trata sobre la democracia y la autocracia en Kelsen. El problema central de este trabajo plantea el hecho de que Kelsen propugna el postulado de la neutralidad científica según el cual el científico debe únicamente describir su objeto de conocimiento, es decir, no puede manifestar sus preferencias ideológicas, morales o políticas sobre el objeto de estudio. Sin embargo, nuestro autor también ha manifestado que la democracia es mejor que la autocracia. Por ello, nuestro objetivo es determinar si Kelsen contradice este postulado científico. Nuestra hipótesis es que él sí contradice su postulado de la neutralidad científica cuando muestra su preferencia por la democracia y su rechazo por la autocracia.

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Rivera, Víctor Samuel. "Autocracia republicana clerical: Rorty y García Calderón." Foro Jurídico, 2017. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/119876.

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Monzón, Pedroso Odar Edilberto. "La Democracia y la autocracia en Kelsen." Master's thesis, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 2013. https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12672/3373.

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La presente investigación trata sobre la democracia y la autocracia en Kelsen. El problema central de este trabajo plantea el hecho de que Kelsen propugna el postulado de la neutralidad científica según el cual el científico debe únicamente describir su objeto de conocimiento, es decir, no puede manifestar sus preferencias ideológicas, morales o políticas sobre el objeto de estudio. Sin embargo, nuestro autor también ha manifestado que la democracia es mejor que la autocracia. Por ello, nuestro objetivo es determinar si Kelsen contradice este postulado científico. Nuestra hipótesis es que él sí contradice su postulado de la neutralidad científica cuando muestra su preferencia por la democracia y su rechazo por la autocracia. La veracidad de esta hipótesis ha sido demostrada a lo largo de este trabajo, sobre todo en los primeros capítulos.
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Books on the topic "Autocratie"

1

Sawyer, Amos. The emergence of autocracy in Liberia: Tragedy and challenge. San Francisco, Calif: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1992.

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Fénot, Anne. Achgabat, une capitale ostentatoire: Autocratie et urbanisme au Turkménistan. Paris: Harmattan, 2005.

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Fénot, Anne. Achgabat: Une capitale ostentatoire : autocratie et urbanisme au Turkm. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2006.

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Le pouvoir de Wade: Autocratie, impunité et perte de valeurs. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2013.

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Hunt, John. Philharmonic autocrat. London: John Hunt, 2001.

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Aaltola, Mika. Democratic Vulnerability and Autocratic Meddling. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54602-1.

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Autocratic tradition and Chinese politics. Cambridge [England]: Cambridge Universtiy Press, 1993.

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Larres, Klaus. Dictators and Autocrats. London: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003100508.

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Onta, Pratyoush R. (Pratyoush Raj), Parajuli Lokranjan, and Martin Chautari Centre for Social Research and Development (Kathmandu, Nepal), eds. Autocratic monarchy: Politics in panchayat Nepal. Kathmandu: Martin Chautari, 2012.

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Pirenne, Jacques-Henri. Alexandre Ier, autocrate de bonne volonté. Bruxelles: Editeurs d'art associés, 1988.

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Book chapters on the topic "Autocratie"

1

Kort, Michael G. "The Autocratic State." In The Soviet Colossus, 8–18. Eighth edition. | New York, NY : Routledge, [2019]: Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351171885-3.

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Meyer, Max. "Behavior Towards Autocracies." In Liberal Democracy, 41–44. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47408-9_7.

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Weidmann, Nils B., and Espen Geelmuyden Rød. "Reinforcement or Substitution? Internet and Protest across Different Autocracies." In The Internet and Political Protest in Autocracies, 128–42. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190918309.003.0009.

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Autocratic regimes differ in the extent of individual freedoms they grant their citizens. In particular, in some autocracies, citizens are allowed to form organizations, while in others, freedom of association is severely restricted. Does digital communication serve as an alternative means to mobilize, thereby bypassing traditional restrictions in autocracies? The book analyzes the effect of Internet penetration on protest across different national environments, to test if the effect varies across depending on existing strategies of autocratic rule. In particular, it distinguishes between two scenarios: reinforcement of traditional forms of authoritarian control, where the Internet is used to strengthen traditional repression, and substitution, where the Internet helps autocratic governments regain control they have given up by partly liberalizing the political arena. The chapter presents empirical evidence in support of the latter scenario, which suggests that the Internet helps autocrats maintain political control that they no longer have through institutional channels.

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Kroenig, Matthew. "The Autocratic Advantage?" In The Return of Great Power Rivalry, 36–50. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190080242.003.0003.

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This chapter explores the idea of an autocratic advantage in international politics. Throughout the ages, scholars, including Alexis de Tocqueville, have argued that autocracies have an advantage in international politics. These arguments are resurfacing today as Russia and China vie for global leadership. According to the autocratic advantage idea, autocracies can set a long-term plan and stick to it. They can take bold action. They can be ruthless when necessary. And their domestic politics are marked by stability. In contrast, democracies are preoccupied by two-year election cycles, stymied in endless debate, and unduly constrained by morality and law. And their politics are marked by messy political infighting. This chapter weighs these ideas, and concludes that many of these so-called autocratic advantages are not, in fact, unique to autocracies and others should more properly be considered handicaps rather than advantages.

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Mauk, Marlene. "Levels and sources of regime support in democracies and autocracies." In Citizen Support for Democratic and Autocratic Regimes, 93–157. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198854852.003.0005.

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This chapter presents the results of the empirical analysis of levels and sources of citizen support for democratic and autocratic regimes. The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, it compares the levels of regime support in democracies and autocracies. It shows that levels of citizen support, while varying considerably across individual countries, are roughly equal between democratic and autocratic regimes. Second, the analysis investigates the individual-level sources of regime support. It finds evidence that the same set of individual-level sources affect regime support in democracies and autocracies and that they do so in virtually the same way across regimes. Third, it addresses the system-level sources of regime support in democracies and autocracies. Using multilevel structural equation modeling, it observes effects of three of the four system-level sources in both types of regimes; yet, these system-level sources do not affect regime support in the same way in democracies as in autocracies.

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Mauk, Marlene. "Conceptualizing political support in democracies and autocracies." In Citizen Support for Democratic and Autocratic Regimes, 23–34. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198854852.003.0002.

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This chapter conceptualizes political support in democratic and autocratic contexts. It first sets the basis for a comparison between democratic and autocratic contexts by defining both democracy and autocracy and outlining the fundamental differences between the two types of regimes, both in terms of institutional structures and functional logics. Taking into account how the different institutional structures and functional logics of democracies and autocracies affect the structure of political support, it distinguishes between three levels of political support: political value orientations, regime support, and incumbent support. Discussing their consequences for the stability of democratic and autocratic regimes, the chapter identifies regime support as the most consequential attitude for regime stability.

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Epperly, Brad. "The Expected Utility of Insurance." In The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in Dictatorship and Democracy, 8–47. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198845027.003.0002.

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This chapter offers a new version of popular “insurance” models of judicial independence, in which the competitiveness of the electoral arena induces leaders to prefer more independent courts, as a means of offering policy and personal security if they lose power. That is, paying the “premium” of increased constraints on behavior imposed by independent courts now for the insurance of protection in the future if out of office. The crux of the argument is that the risks associated with losing power in autocratic regimes are greater than in democracies, and therefore competition should be more salient in dictatorships than democracies. The stakes are higher because autocratic power means access to wealth and state resources in a way rarely equaled in democratic regimes, and more importantly the likelihood of being punished after leaving office is greater for former autocrats. Judiciaries exercising greater independence, however, can minimize the risks of being a former leader, and the chapter leverages this finding to develop an expected utility model, the empirical implication of which is higher salience of competition—when present—in autocracies. Unlike previous theories of how competition affects independence, this model integrates both the likelihood of losing office and the risks associated with such an outcome, and thus allows us to examine the phenomena across the democracy/dictatorship divide.

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"Autocratic." In More Than Words, 130. Routledge, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203010747-32.

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Weidmann, Nils B., and Espen Geelmuyden Rød. "Introduction." In The Internet and Political Protest in Autocracies, 1–12. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190918309.003.0001.

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The introduction of the book starts out by distinguishing between two narratives about the effect of the Internet in autocratic systems: According to “liberation technology” proponents, Internet technology is likely to empower activists in autocracies by reducing autocratic governments ability to control the ow of information and communication, while the “repression technology” perspective emphasizes the sinister ways by which autocratic regimes can use the Internet for propaganda and surveillance. The chapter argues that in order to advance the scientific debate, research should move beyond this overly simple distinction, and needs to identify the conditions under which this technology helps protesters vs. when it benefits dictators. This requires a more nuanced conception of protest and its different stages, but also better, more fine-grained data of protest and Internet penetration.

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Kendall-Taylor, Andrea, Natasha Lindstaedt, and Erica Frantz. "7. Authoritarian Instability and Breakdown." In Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes, 122–41. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/hepl/9780198820819.003.0007.

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What factors increase the risk of autocratic breakdown? 124 Elite divisions and defections 124 Youth bulge 129 Electoral fraud 132 Natural disasters 134 External factors 135 Conclusion 140 Key Questions 141 Further Reading 141 Forecasting the failure of authoritarian regimes is difficult. Many long-standing and seemingly stable autocracies have unraveled in a matter of weeks. No one predicted, for example, that the ...

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Conference papers on the topic "Autocratie"

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Clark, Ruaridh, Giuliano Punzo, Kristaps Baumanis, and Malcolm Macdonald. "Consensus speed maximisation in engineered swarms with autocratic leaders." In the International Conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2952744.2952765.

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Chen, Shyi-Ming, and Bing-Han Tsai. "A new method for autocratic decision making using group recommendations." In 2013 International Conference on Machine Learning and Cybernetics (ICMLC). IEEE, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmlc.2013.6890780.

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Balayan, Alexandr A., and Leonid V. Tomin. "Surveillance City. Digital Transformation of Urban Governance in Autocratic Regimes." In 2021 Communication Strategies in Digital Society Seminar (ComSDS). IEEE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/comsds52473.2021.9422841.

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Schwartz, Donald, Lois Delcambre, and April Gillam. "AutoCRAT templates for design knowledge capture." In The earth and space science information system (ESSIS). AIP, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.44382.

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Hu, Xiaoling. "Discussions on Chinese Autocratic Monarchy System from the Perspective of Confucianism--Obtaining Benefits From One Source." In 4th International Conference on Management Science, Education Technology, Arts, Social Science and Economics 2016. Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/msetasse-16.2016.185.

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Lips, Silvia, Rozha K. Ahmed, Khayyam Zulfigarzada, Robert Krimmer, and Dirk Draheim. "Digital Sovereignty and Participation in an Autocratic State: Designing an e-Petition System for Developing Countries." In DG.O'21: The 22nd Annual International Conference on Digital Government Research. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3463677.3463706.

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Cheng, Shou-Hsiung, Shyi-Ming Chen, and Zhi-Cheng Huang. "A novel autocratic decision making method using group recommendations based on ranking interval type-2 fuzzy sets." In 2016 Eighth International Conference on Advanced Computational Intelligence (ICACI). IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icaci.2016.7449808.

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Hao, Dong, Kai Li, and Tao Zhou. "Payoff Control in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma." In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/41.

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Repeated game has long been the touchstone model for agents’ long-run relationships. Previous results suggest that it is particularly difficult for a repeated game player to exert an autocratic control on the payoffs since they are jointly determined by all participants. This work discovers that the scale of a player’s capability to unilaterally influence the payoffs may have been much underestimated. Under the conventional iterated prisoner’s dilemma, we develop a general framework for controlling the feasible region where the players’ payoff pairs lie. A control strategy player is able to confine the payoff pairs in her objective region, as long as this region has feasible linear boundaries. With this framework, many well-known existing strategies can be categorized and various new strategies with nice properties can be further identified. We show that the control strategies perform well either in a tournament or against a human-like opponent.

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Chen, Shyi-Ming, and Li-Wei Lee. "A note on “linguistic-labels aggregation and consensus measure for autocratic decision-making using group recommendations”." In 2010 International Conference on Machine Learning and Cybernetics (ICMLC). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmlc.2010.5580824.

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Glushkova, Svetlana. "Liberal Ideas of B.N. Chicherin: The Past and The Present." In The Public/Private in Modern Civilization, the 22nd Russian Scientific-Practical Conference (with international participation) (Yekaterinburg, April 16-17, 2020). Liberal Arts University – University for Humanities, Yekaterinburg, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.35853/ufh-public/private-2020-25.

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Russian liberal heritage, first of all, the scientific works of the famous Russian legal expert Boris Chicherin, is the fundamental basis for the developing science of human rights in modern Russia; it is from this position that this article examines Chicherin’s work. The main purpose of the study is to identify Chicherin’s priorities in shaping new progressive ideas for Russia and to examine the transformation of his views. In examining and analysing Chicherin’s liberal ideas, historical, logical and comparative methods were applied. It has been concluded that Chicherin set the foundation of the liberal theory of human rights, elaborated a set of progressive ideas and a blueprint of reforms, which determined the formation of several generations of liberals in autocratic Russia and are still relevant today. Defending the priority of private law over public law, Chicherin argued: a civil order based on private law must always be free from state absorption. He was among the first in Russia to develop the idea of a constitutional state in relation with the creation of free institutions and the formation of a high intellectual and moral level of society. By developing the new policy of ‘liberal measures and strong state authority’ as an optimal model for Russian state and society, Chicherin gave rise to the formation of political science in Russia. The author believes that the analysis and discussion of Chicherin’s academic writings in university classrooms and at academic conferences contribute to the formation of a culture of human rights, a liberal worldview, a new generation of reformers, and the advancement of the emerging science of human rights.

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Reports on the topic "Autocratie"

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Martinez-Bravo, Monica, Gerard Padró Miquel, Nancy Qian, and Yang Yao. The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in China: Theory and Empirical Evidence on the Autocrat's Trade-off. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w24032.

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