Academic literature on the topic 'Authoritarianism – Russia (Federation)'

The articledeals withthe efforts of the Russian Federation, which is pushing the concept of “sovereign authoritarianism”,to resist democracy promotion under the conditions of “Ukraine Crisis”. The author emphasizes that the ideological component plays an important role for the global geopolitical fight. In particluar, ideological basis of geopolitical struggle for Ukraine has a significant influence and largely determines the course of confrontation between the main global players, namely: the collective West and Russia. Russian Federation has developed its own concept of the non-liberal regime and the mechanisms of its external projection as a way to counter the democracy promotion. By the end of 2017, Russia`s “sovereign authoritarianism” shows its sufficient effectiveness to contain democracy promotion efforts towards Ukraine under the conditions of the “Ukraine Crisis” and in the wider context of European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine. Keywords: “Ukraine crisis”, democracy promotion, sovereign authoritarianism, Ukraine, Russia

While formally a federation that vests significant powers in the sub-national bodies of government and leaves it for its federal units and municipalities to decide who will govern them by conducting elections, the Russian Federation is effectively a centralized authoritarian state. This paper uses evidence from the September 2017 sub-national elections in Russia to examine the role of formal political institutions in sustaining the country’s political regime. The analysis shows that the political domination of the pro-government party over the regional political assemblies is sustained by a complex combination of party regulations and electoral rules. In particular, gubernatorial elections are organized and conducted in a way that ensures the victories of the incumbent governors who are effectively appointed by the president of Russia.

Negative perceptions of Russia as “the Other” in societies belonging to the Western political tradition have been shaped in a long historical perspective and have their own cultural and geopolitical matrix. These stereotypes mostly perceive Russia and its population through collectivism, authoritarianism and impulsiveness. Media and information policies play an indispensable role in shaping stereotypes in the modern and postmodern era. Therefore, the aim of this research is to point at the role of media discourse in supporting and forming negative stereotypes about contemporary Russia. In the introductory part of the Paper, the problem of stereotyping the notions of Russia and the Russians in the Western political space is contextualized, and then the case study on the empirical basis describes the role of the so-called Western media in supporting the established stereotypes in modern times. The main narratives of the information war between the European Union and the Russian Federation were used for media mediation and interpretation of events on the international scene in which the Russian Federation was the main actor during the year of sanctions (2014) and immediately afterwards (2015). We conclude that in the observed period there was a mutual deterioration of the images among the citizens of the EU and RF, while the leading media sacrificed the principle of impartiality of reporting.

This is a review of recent English-language scholarship on the development of Russian identity since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The first part examines literature on the economic and political changes in the Russian Federation, revealing how scholars became more sceptical about the possibility of Russia building a Western-type liberal democracy. The second part investigates approaches to the study of Russian national identity. The experience of empire, in both the tsarist and Soviet periods, gave Russians a weak sense of nationhood; ethnic Russians identified with the multi-national Soviet Union. Seeking legitimacy for the new state, President El'tsin sought to create a civic identity focused on the multi-national Russian Federation. The Communist and nationalist opposition continued to promote an imperial identity, focused on restoring the USSR or creating some other formation including the Russian-speaking population in the former Soviet republics. The final section discusses accounts of the two Chechen wars, which scholars see as continuing Russia's imperial policy and harming relations with Russia's Muslim population. President Putin's co-operation with the West against ‘terrorism’ has not led the West to accept Russia as one of its own, due to increasing domestic repression and authoritarianism.

This study began as an investigation into the proverbial "dog that didn't bark," that failure of intuition which often opens the most interesting avenues of inquiry. In this case, the silent dog was an authoritarian Russian Federation: from 1991 onward, there was widespread expectation that it would be only a matter of time before Russia fell back into old habits, and that the experiment with democracy would be little more than an odd footnote in an otherwise unbroken record of autocracy. I am forced to admit that I was part of this chorus of pessimism, and in late 1993-despite the fact that I felt Y eltsin was right to crush the attempted coup of Ruslan Khasbulatov and Aleksandr Rutskoi-I expected little more than that Russia would then descend into some kind of muddled and mild authoritarianism.

In the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. election, researchers, policymakers and the general public are grappling with the notion that the 45th president of the United States may very well owe his electoral victory to a sophisticated propaganda effort masterminded by the Kremlin. This article synthesizes existing research on Russia’s domestic information controls, its internet policy at the global level (notably via internet governance processes), and the country’s resurgence as a major geopolitical player to argue that policymakers as well as the general public should consider these themes holistically, particularly as they formulate responses to what many see as the Russian threat to Western liberal democracy. Russia may have lost the Cold War, but it is now waging information warfare against the liberal democracies of Europe and North America in a sophisticated bid to win the next round. Russia does not view internet governance, cybersecurity, and media policy as separate domains. Rather, all the areas covered by those disciplines fall under “information security” for Russian foreign policy. The paper begins by tracing the history of information controls within what is now the Russian Federation before discussing the role of information and internet policy in Russian foreign policy, drawing connections between the Russian government’s control and manipulation of information—including its internet policy—in the domestic and international arenas. Next, it discusses the spread of networked authoritarianism and suggests that a “geopolitics of information” will become increasingly necessary in the coming years. Just as networked authoritarianism establishes strategic infrastructures to control the message domestically and intervene in global media systems, liberal democracies need to rethink media and communication infrastructures to ensure they foster pluralist, rights-respecting societies that are resilient to authoritarianism and extremism. In doing so, they should resist the temptation to respond to this threat in ways that will erode democracy even further, such as expanded surveillance and limits on free expression.

Abstract In the context of electoral authoritarianism, political mobilization is likely to be a more reasonable explanation of cross-regional variations in voting for the party of power than the diversity of the regions’ policy preferences. In the Russian Federation, the political machines which coordinate various activities aimed at mobilizing people to vote for United Russia demonstrate different degrees of effectiveness. This article examines the structural factors that facilitate machine politics focusing on ethnic networks. Although strong ethnic networks are more likely to arise if the members of an ethnic group live close to each other, and at the same time separately from other ethnic groups, so far researchers have neglected to consider the localization of ethnic groups within the territory of an administrative unit as a factor. In order to fill the gap, we have created an original geo-referenced dataset of the localization of non-Russian ethnic groups within every region of the Russian Federation, and developed special GIS (geographic information systems) techniques and tools to measure them in relation to the Russian population. This has made it possible to include the localization of ethnic groups as a variable in the study of cross-regional differences in voting for United Russia. Our analysis finds that the effect of non-Russians’ share of the population on voting for UR increases significantly if non-Russian groups are at least partially geographically segregated from Russians within a region.

Today, authoritarian tendencies are reaching a global extent. It ispossible to say that these tendencies deserve the characterization of - inHuntington's words- a Reverse Wave in the Third Wave of democratization.This study examines the developments in the Russian Federation, Hungary,and Poland, where authoritarianism and regression from the rule of law areseen. A separation from democratization and the rule of law in all these threecountries is clear. It started in Russia and spread to other countries in theform of an avalanche, especially in the field of judiciary. The regression inthe Third Wave is taking place in the judiciary, relatively the most harmlesspolitical power, through instrumentalization of law. It is observed that thesupranational mechanisms, which protect human rights, are rendereddysfunctional under the pretext of ensuring the supremacy of theconstitution, and the rupture from those mechanisms is veiled by presentingit as a matter of sovereignty. Therefore, it is essential that the judiciary befreed from the interventions of other powers and regains its essential role inprotecting rights. To that end, the necessity of nation-states’ reintegrationwith supranational mechanisms which protect human rights is emphasized.

Abstract This study examines the dynamics of electoral reforms in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and their influence on the disproportionality of parliamentary representation since the electoral system experienced major changes in 2003. We suggest that some characteristics of the electoral system may be highly instrumental in ensuring and maintaining United Russia’s influence in legislative bodies. This makes it possible to classify them as forms of institutional manipulation typical of electoral authoritarianism. Based on the statistical description and regression analysis, the study demonstrates the impact of some elements of electoral reforms on disproportionality during the periods at issue. At the same time, we can identify the methods of cementing the dominant party’s hold on power that the authorities find the most effective. In this regard, we make the conclusion that certain elements of the electoral system function as a balanced mechanism, which is evidenced by how they have been used during the different periods. Additionally, the study analyses the impact of disproportionality on electoral behavior, with the hypothesis about its negative influence on the electoral turnout being supported. Yet we regard the lower turnout as a consequence of the voting behavior of both the opposition’s supporters and loyalists. Finally, the electoral reforms in Russia seem to have put limits on disproportionality of parliamentary representation due to the issue of legitimacy.

The article is devoted to the study of the biggest challenges, threats and dangers for modern Ukrainianness. The issue of challenges, threats and dangers facing Ukraine and Ukrainianness since 1991 is very relevant today. Scientists who work in the field of crisisology distinguish the concepts of «challenges», «threats», «dangers», «crises», «risks», «catastrophes», «collapse», «wreck», etc. The theoretical and methodological basis of our study is a combination of scientific potential of crisisology, conflictology and Ukrainian studies. Crisisology, conflictology and Ukrainian studies face the task of transdisciplinary understanding of the essence and severity of these challenges, threats and dangers, which are relevant in many areas such as military-defense, geopolitical, demographic, state-building, spiritual worldview, ecological, economics, energy, information, cultural and artistic, linguistic, moral and ethical, scientific, nation-building, educational, political and legal, social, territorial, technological, financial, etc. To these are added threats and dangers: 1) large-scale war with Russia; 2) total spread of COVID-19 in Ukraine; 3) the implementation of a new geostrategic course in Russia (called «geopolitical revenge»); 4) spreading the ideology of the «Russian world», intensifying new attempts by the Russian Federation to dismember Ukraine, supporting separatization and federalization of Ukraine; 5) possible escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian and Armenian-Azerbaijani conflicts, which could lead to a new global confrontation and even a world war; 6) ineffective fight against corruption in Ukraine; 7) the lack of a proper response from the authorities to the need to immediately end Russia’s information and psychological war against Ukraine; 8) destruction of small and medium business and further financial and economic stratification of Ukrainian society; 9) procrastination with the solution of the poverty problem (in conditions when about 60% of Ukrainians are below the poverty line); 10) possible man-made disasters in Ukraine; 11) possible transformation of Ukraine from a subject into an object of international relations; 12) possible rejection of European integration; 13) discrediting the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity, in order to spread Russian narratives about the coup in Ukraine; 14) intensification of interfaith conflicts in Ukraine; 15) inadequate decision-making by incompetent authorities (threat of economic decline and large-scale financial crisis in Ukraine, possible change in Ukraine’s vector of development, threat of capitulation, refusal of the authorities to resolve the «Ukrainian crisis» (which began after Russia’s aggression and has become a factor influencing the security of Europe and the world) from the standpoint of Ukraine as a subject, not an object); 16) refusal to solve the problems of internally displaced persons; 17) possible «freezing» of the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict in order to further destabilize Ukraine; 18) strengthening of geopolitical and geoeconomic instability, intensification of intercivilizational and geopolitical confrontation in the world; 19) possible decline of democracy and rise of authoritarianism in Ukraine; 20) expansion of the border with Russia (in case of its absorption of Belarus); 21) possible disintegration of Ukrainian society and world Ukrainiannes; 22) further violation of international law by the Russian Federation; 23) exacerbation of the economic and migration crisis in Europe; 24) radicalization of part of the Islamic world; 25) due to the collapse of the USSR. The challenges, threats and dangers facing Ukrainians can unfold at the global, continental and national levels. Ukrainians must find adequate answers to modern challenges and mechanisms to minimize threats and dangers; ensure stable economic growth; to create a powerful system of national security, army and defense-industrial complex; find ways to ensure national interests in the current crisis; to develop optimal models for resolving the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict, reintegrating the population of the occupied territories and restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Conventional wisdom views authoritarian legislatures as 'rubber stamps'. According to this model, non-democratic parliaments are entirely subservient to dominant executives, having no influence on the development of policy; as a result, all bills introduced into the legislature become laws without amendment. Although these bodies might perform other functions, they serve - according to this account - a purely ceremonial function in the policy-making process. There is evidence, however, inconsistent with this portrayal from a range of non-democracies, including evidence of executive bill failure and bill amendment. Existing attempts to explain these apparently deviant observations refer to some degree of legislative autonomy - bills fail and change as a result of legislator influence. According to these accounts, authoritarian elites use legislatures to co-opt members of the opposition and to gather information about citizen grievances. This dissertation, in contrast, argues that legislative activity in non-democracies can be driven by executive concerns. Whereas the 'rubber stamp' model infers from executive dominance an absence of legislative activity, the approach proposed by this dissertation suggests there are a variety of reasons why executive actors might want to amend or kill off their own bills in the legislature. In particular, these legislative policy developments can result from clashes between executive factions, which use legislative institutions to monitor, challenge, and amend each others' proposals. This dissertation proposes and assesses this new approach using fine-grained data on legislative processes and outputs from the contemporary Russian State Duma. The analysis draws on a variety of data sources, using both qualitative and quantitative methods. The findings suggest that legislative institutions can still 'matter' in non-democracies, even with an entirely subservient body of legislators.

Il existe une continuité dans l’« idée » russe de l’Etat qu’une analogie dans la continuité des systèmes ne reflète pas. De la Russie impériale à la Russie soviétique, l’Etat (Gosudarstvo) n’est pas conçu comme une entité abstraite et autonome. A la dimension césariste du pouvoir correspond la non-émergence, et du concept et de la réalité d’un Etat. Jusqu’en 1917, la conception russe du pouvoir est conditionnée par le discours idéologique – religieux. Après 1917, sa principale caractéristique est d’être subordonnée à l’idéologie, en tant qu’expression de la volonté du Parti communiste. L’Etat soviétique s’impose donc comme un Etat « de fait » et non comme un Etat « de droit ». La prédominance du discours idéologique entrave, à la fois, la constitution d’une culture de l’Etat, qui reste une culture du pouvoir, et la formation d’une culture de l’antériorité et de la supériorité du droit sur l’Etat. Après la désintégration de l’Union soviétique, la référence à la démocratie libérale et à l’Etat de droit devient un outil de la création d’une nouvelle légitimité pour l’Etat postcommuniste. L’entrée de la Russie dans la modernité politique nécessite une rupture avec les postulats idéologiques du passé. Or, la déconstruction du socialisme est un processus beaucoup plus complexe que la construction de la démocratie. Bien qu’ayant subi, sur plusieurs siècles, plusieurs types de transitions – de l’absolutisme de droit divin au socialisme, puis au postcommunisme -, l’Etat russe a donc conservé certains caractères constants et typiques qui en font, encore aujourd’hui, un modèle hybride, en tension entre autoritarisme et démocratie
There is a continuity as concerns the « idea » of the state that an analogy with the different systems does not reflect. From imperial to Soviet Russia, the state (Gosudarstvo) is not thought of as an abstract and autonomous entity. Until 1917, the Russian conception of power is conditioned by the religious ideological discourse. After 1917, her main feature is one of submission to ideology, in other words the expression of the will of the Communist Party. The Soviet state stands out by its « de facto » nature, rather than a « de jure » state. The supremacy of the ideological discourse hampers both the constitution of a new state culture, which remains focused on power, and the formation of the precedence and the superiority of law over the state. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, reference to liberal democracy and the rule of law becomes a tool in creating renewed legitimacy for the postcommunist state. Russia’s entry into political modernity demands a rupture with the ideological postulates of the past. The dismantlement of socialism is a much more complex process than the construction of democracy. Despite having been subjected, over centuries, to many types of transition – absolutism founded on divine right to socialism, then postcommunism -, the Russian state has always preserved certain features (be they constant or specific) that make it, and still today, a hybrid model pulling towards both authoritarianism and democracy

Defence date: 20 September 2018
Examining Board: Hanspeter Kriesi, European University Institute (Supervisor); Vladimir Gelman, European University at Saint Petersburg; Anton Hemerijck, European University Institute; John Ora Reuter, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
Why do incumbents in electoral authoritarian regimes retain power? This study seeks to answer this fundamental question by linking electoral fraud and sincere voting for the incumbent with incumbent’s distributive politics and, accordingly, by looking at the puzzle of authoritarian survival from two perspectives. An elite-oriented incumbent’s strategy suggests that, unlike democracies, where distributive politics is primarily targeted at voters, authoritarian incumbents inevitably have to deliver benefits to political elites in order to secure their loyalty, which is eventually converted into electoral fraud, repression of the opposition forces, persecution of the media, refraining from challenging the incumbent, and other authoritarian policy outcomes. A mass-oriented incumbent’s strategy implies that, if electoral competition is not meaningless, authoritarian incumbents also have to deliver benefits to the general public in order to secure genuine mass support, which eventually results in sincere voting for the incumbent. This argument is tested on cross-regional data from Russia as a prominent case of persistent electoral authoritarianism. The analysis begins with a poorly studied but an immanent element of any kind of authoritarianism – electoral fraud perpetrated by political elites and their local agents. Having developed a novel measure of electoral fraud forensics based on quintile regression, I demonstrate that electoral fraud in the Russian 2000–2012 presidential elections played a typical role for electoral authoritarianism: it was neither outcome-changing as it occurs in closed authoritarian regimes nor intrinsically sporadic as in electoral democracies, but it was widespread and hardly avoidable by the incumbent. The study then dwells on examination of the federal transfers to regional budgets as a type of public and formally legal yet politically motivated distribution. Not only were the central transfers allocated to the regions according to the principle of electoral allegiance to the federal incumbent presidents, but it also appears that, as authoritarian regime was consolidating over time, the larger amount of transfer funds was allocated to the bureaucracy (as part of the regime’s elite clientele) in order to secure its loyalty. The loyalty of regional elites, in its turn, was eventually converted into distinct authoritarian policy outcomes, including electoral fraud and persecution of the media. This resulted in a general bias of the electoral playing field and, thereby, contributed to sustaining the authoritarian equilibrium. By contrast, the analysis finds no evidence that the politicized transfers influenced sincere voting for the incumbent. These mixed findings indicate that popular support under electoral authoritarianism is still puzzling and calls for further examination, whereas securing loyalty of political elites via delivering them clientelist benefits is crucial for regime survival in personalist electoral dictatorships.

Defence date: 15 September 2017
Examining Board: Prof. Alexander H. Trechsel, University of Lucerne (EUI Supervisor); Prof. Grigorii V. Golosov, European University at Saint Petersburg (External Supervisor); Prof. Jennifer Gandhi, Emory University; Prof. Hanspeter Kriesi, European University Institute
One of the widely shared features of modern autocracies is the presence of democratically-designed institutions. Elections, referendums, legislatures, and parties are the essential institutions 'bydefault'. Political regimes that have introduced nation wide elections have become the predominant type of political regimes in the contemporary world.

Tematem pracy są przemiany prawno-ustrojowe zachodzące we współczesnej Rosji od czasu upadku ZSRR. Praca składa sie z pieciu rozdziałów, przedstawiających w chronologicznym porządku kolejne etapy kształtowania ustroju współczesnego państwa rosyjskiego. W rozdziale pierwszym omówiona została ustrojowa geneza współczesnego państwa rosyjskiego. Przeanalizowano proces emancypacji władz RSFRR i przekształcania sie tej republiki związkowej w samodzielne państwo. Proces ten przedstawiony został w aspekcie istniejącego do chwili rozwiązania ZSRR dualizmu prawno-ustrojowego na terytorium Rosji oraz zagadnień związanych z przejeciem kontroli nad strukturami państwa sowieckiego przez władze suwerennej Rosji. Wiele miejsca poswiecono powstawaniu nowych instytucji, w tym przede wszystkim powołaniu urzedu prezydenta Rosji oraz nowej strukturze terytorialnej kraju. Rozdział drugi jest poswiecony przyjetej w 1993 roku konstytucji Federacji Rosyjskiej. Ze wzgledu na dominującą pozycje prezydenta, skupiono sie przede wszystkim na omówieniu jego pozycji ustrojowej oraz na relacjach pomiedzy głową państwa a innymi osrodkami władzy, zwłaszcza regionalnymi. Rozdział trzeci obejmuje okres prezydentury Borysa Jelcyna od wejscia w zycie konstytucji do momentu ustąpienia prezydenta z urzedu 31 grudnia 1999 roku. W tym czasie podjeto w Rosji nieudaną próbe zbudowania demokracji liberalnej. Konflikt pomiedzy prezydentem a komunistyczną opozycją w Dumie Państwowej oraz niepopularne reformy gospodarcze doprowadziły do powaznego osłabienia władzy prezydenckiej. W rozdziale przedstawiono przebieg konfliktu oraz jego konsekwencje dla państwa. Do najwazniejszych nalezało rozproszenie władzy i utworzenie nieformalnych struktur skupionych wokół byłej nomenklatury, oligarchów oraz przywódców regionalnych. Rozdział czwarty jest poswiecony pierwszym dwóm kadencjom prezydenckim Władimira Putina. Te czesć pracy otwiera prezentacja programu silnej władzy ogłoszonego przez Putina po jego zwyciestwie wyborczym w 2000 roku. Praktyczną realizacją tego programu były reformy ustrojowe w Rosji omówione szczegółowo na podstawie aktów normatywnych z tego okresu. Analiza reform została przeprowadzona przede wszystkim pod kątem procesu wzmacniania władzy oraz ponownej centralizacji państwa. Poszczególne reformy: ustrojowe, administracyjne, gospodarcze oraz struktur siłowych zostały opisane w kolejnych podrozdziałach. Przedstawiono takze proces przejmowania przez obóz prezydencki kontroli nad zasobami i instytucjami państwa mającymi kluczowe znaczenie dla utrzymania władzy. W rozdziale piątym został przedstawiony system władzy zbudowany przez Władimira Putina po jego powrocie na urząd prezydenta w 2012 roku. Omówiono kolejne etapy ewolucji prawno-ustrojowej Rosji, do której doszło w odpowiedzi na pogarszającą sie koniunkture polityczną i gospodarczą. Waznym elementami tej ewolucji były m.in. dalsze zmiany ustawodawstwa wyborczego, w tym przywrócenie bezposrednich wyborów gubernatorów i kolejna modyfikacja relacji pomiedzy władzą centralną i regionami. Dalsza czesć rozdziału poswiecona jest kształtowaniu sie dojrzałego autorytaryzmu w Rosji oraz problemowi przestrzegania praw obywatelskich. Zwrócono tu wiele uwagi na proces postepującej personifikacji władzy oraz wzrost znaczenia struktur siłowych. Przedstawiono takze i przeanalizowano akty normatywne ograniczające wolnosć wypowiedzi, w tym ustawodawstwo wprowadzające nowe zaostrzone zasady korzystania z internetu w Rosji. Rozdział kończy prezentacja źródeł oraz głównych załozeń tzw. konserwatywnego zwrotu – ideologii przyjetej przez obóz władzy po powrocie Putina na urząd prezydenta. Prace kończą konkluzje uzasadniające teze o autorytarnym kierunku ewolucji prawno- ustrojowej w Rosji. Zaprezentowano tu również syntetyczną charakterystykę ustroju Federacji Rosyjskiej posiadającego w obecnej formie wszystkie najważniejsze cechy pozwalające zaliczyć go do współczesnych odmian autorytaryzmu, określanych w literaturze jako „rywalizujący autorytaryzm” (competetive authoritarianism).
The subject of the work is legal and constitutional transformations occurring in modern Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The work consists of five chapters, presenting successive stages of shaping the political system of the modern Russian state in chronological order. The first chapter discusses the constitutional origins of the modern Russian state. The analysis includes the process of emancipation of the RSFSR authorities and the conversion of this federal republic into an independent state. This process is presented in terms of the legal and constitutional dualism on the Russian territory, that existed until the dissolution of the Soviet Union and issues related to the acquisition of control over the structures of the Soviet state by the authorities of sovereign Russia. A large part of the chapter was devoted to the establishment of new institutions, especially the appointment of the office of the president of Russia and the new territorial structure of the country. The second chapter is devoted to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted in 1993. Due to the dominant position of the president, the chapter focuses was mainly on discussing his constitutional position and on the relationship between the head of state and other centers of power, especially the regional authorities. Chapter three covers the period of the presidency of Boris Yeltsin from the entry into force of the constitution until the resignation of the president on December 31st, 1999. During that time in Russia, a failed attempt to build a liberal democracy was made. The conflict between the president and the communist opposition in the State Duma as well as unpopular economic reforms led to a serious weakening of the presidential power. The chapter outlines the course of the conflict and its consequences for the state. The most important was disperses of the power and the creation of informal structures centered around the former nomenclature, oligarchs and regional leaders. Chapter four is devoted to the first Vladimir Putin’s two presidential terms. This part of the work starts with a presentation of a strong power program announced by Putin after his election victory in 2000. The practical implementation of this program was the political reforms in Russia, discussed in detail based on the legislative acts from this period. The analysis of the reforms was carried out primarily in terms of the process of strengthening the power and re-centralizing of the state. The particular reforms: political, administrative, economic, military and security force structures were described in the following sections. The chapter covers also the process of taking over the control by the presidential camp over the resources and state institutions, that are essential to maintaining power. Chapter five presents the power system built by Vladimir Putin after his return to the president's office in 2012. It discusses the successive stages of Russia's legal and political evolution, which has occurred in response to the deteriorating policy and economic situation. Important elements of this evolution were m.in. further changes to electoral legislation, including the restoration of direct elections of governors and the subsequent modification of the relationship between the central authority and the regions. The remainder of the chapter is devoted to the development of the mature Russian authoritarianism and the problem of respect for civil rights. Much attention has been paid to the process of progressive personalization of power and the increase in the importance of military and security structures. It also covers and analyses normative acts limiting freedom of expression including legislation introducing new stricter rules for use of the Internet in Russia. The chapter ends with the presentation of the sources and the main assumptions of the so-called conservative return – an ideology adopted by the power camp after Putin's return to the presidential office. The work concludes with conclusions justifying the thesis of the authoritarian direction of legal and systemic evolution in Russia. It also presents the synthetic characteristics of the regime of the Russian Federation, which in its present form has all the most important features allowing it to be counted as contemporary type of authoritarianism, described in the literature as competitive authoritarianism.

This chapter traces the tactics used by the art Slovenian collective, Neue Slowenische Kunst (NSK), specifically the art section, Irwin and the music group, Laibach, to criticise the socialist state of Yugoslavia. The chapter offers a brief overview of the political climate at the time leading up to and during the Yugoslavian wars (1980s and ‘90s). Closely analysed is NSK’s use of ambiguity and parody to hold a mirror up to authoritarianism and Irwin’s appropriation of early Russian avant-garde motifs to criticise socialist-realism and the State’s ‘misuse’ of art. As protection against retaliation by the state, NSK never prescribed their intentions, so audiences and viewers needed to bring their own context and perspective to events. Once Slovenia left the Yugoslavian Federation to enter into free-market capitalism, NSKs tactics seemed far less potent, flowing neatly into a 1980s western art context (a moment in history) that embraced ambivalence and indeterminacy. As an approach that hides a work’s political intent, allowing its viewers to have their own political views affirmed, it is argued that such a tactic fails to shake the political aesthetic. [181]