Journal articles on the topic 'Authoritarian durability'
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1
Lachapelle, Jean, Steven Levitsky, Lucan A. Way, and Adam E. Casey. "Social Revolution and Authoritarian Durability." World Politics 72, no. 4 (September 3, 2020): 557–600. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887120000106.
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ABSTRACTThis article explores the causes of authoritarian durability. Why do some authoritarian regimes survive for decades, often despite severe crises, while others collapse quickly, even absent significant challenges? Based on an analysis of all authoritarian regimes between 1900 and 2015, the authors argue that regimes founded in violent social revolution are especially durable. Revolutionary regimes, such as those in Russia, China, Cuba, and Vietnam, endured for more than half a century in the face of strong external pressure, poor economic performance, and large-scale policy failures. The authors develop and test a theory that accounts for such durability using a novel data set of revolutionary regimes since 1900. The authors contend that autocracies that emerge out of violent social revolution tend to confront extraordinary military threats, which lead to the development of cohesive ruling parties and powerful and loyal security apparatuses, as well as to the destruction of alternative power centers. These characteristics account for revolutionary regimes’ unusual longevity.
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Lachapelle, Jean, Steven Levitsky, Lucan A. Way, and Adam E. Casey. "Social Revolution and Authoritarian Durability—ERRATUM." World Politics 73, no. 3 (July 2021): 592. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887121000071.
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Whiting, Susan H. "Authoritarian “Rule of Law” and Regime Legitimacy." Comparative Political Studies 50, no. 14 (January 23, 2017): 1907–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414016688008.
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A prominent hypothesis to explain the durability of authoritarian regimes focuses on the official adoption of law and legal institutions. The present study offers a novel empirical approach to test the relationship between legal construction and regime legitimation, drawing on a quasi-experiment and original panel survey in rural China. Using difference-in-difference, subgroup, and two-stage least squares analyses, it finds that the Chinese state’s project of legal construction powerfully shapes the legal consciousness of ordinary rural citizens and that state-constructed legal consciousness enhances regime legitimacy. The study also presents qualitative evidence to identify the causal mechanism linking state-constructed legal consciousness and regime legitimacy: the expansion of local institutions like state-run legal-aid centers in rural communities. The study contributes to the institutional focus in debates about authoritarian durability by providing evidence at the intersection of state and society.
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Heurlin, Christopher. "Authoritarian Aid and Regime Durability: Soviet Aid to the Developing World and Donor–Recipient Institutional Complementarity and Capacity." International Studies Quarterly 64, no. 4 (September 1, 2020): 968–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa064.
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Abstract How does authoritarian aid influence the durability of dictatorships? Western aid is thought to facilitate authoritarian durability because it can provide patronage. Authoritarian aid, by contrast, has received far less attention. This article examines both Soviet economic and military assistance, developing a theory of donor–recipient institutional complementarity to explain the impact of Soviet aid during the Cold War. The argument is developed through case studies of Vietnam and Ghana and a cross-national statistical analysis of Soviet economic aid and military assistance to developing countries from 1955 to 1991. Soviet economic aid was tied to the purchase of Soviet industrial equipment. When recipient states shared the Soviet Union's centrally planned economy, economic aid strengthened state infrastructural power by (1) enhancing fiscal capacity and (2) cultivating the dependency of the population on the state. Aid flows helped consolidate and maintain authoritarian institutions, promoting authoritarian durability. By contrast, while Soviet economic aid to noncommunist regimes provided some opportunities for patronage through employment in SOEs, the lack of institutional complementarity in planning institutions and overall lack of capacity of these institutions caused Soviet aid to contribute to inflation and fiscal crises. Economic problems, in turn, increased the vulnerability of noncommunist regimes to military coups, particularly when ideological splits emerged between pro-Soviet rulers and pro-Western militaries that undermined elite cohesion. The institutional subordination of the military to communist parties insulated communist regimes from the risk of coups.
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Pietsch, Juliet. "Authoritarian Durability: Public Opinion towards Democracy in Southeast Asia." Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 25, no. 1 (July 4, 2014): 31–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2014.933836.
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Handlin, Samuel. "Mass Organization and the Durability of Competitive Authoritarian Regimes." Comparative Political Studies 49, no. 9 (March 6, 2016): 1238–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414016628186.
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Levitsky, Steven R., and Lucan A. Way. "Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability." Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 4 (December 2012): 869–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592712002861.
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We explore the sources of durability of party-based authoritarian regimes in the face of crisis. Recent scholarship on authoritarianism suggests that ruling parties enhance elite cohesion—and consequently, regime durability—by providing institutionalized access the spoils of power. We argue, by contrast, that while elite access to power and spoils may ensure elite cooperation during normal times, it often fails to do so during crises. Instead, the identities, norms, and organizational structures forged during periods of sustained, violent, and ideologically-driven conflict are a critical source of cohesion—and durability—in party-based authoritarian regimes. Origins in violent conflict raise the cost of defection and provide leaders with additional (non-material) resources that can be critical to maintaining unity and discipline, even when a crisis threatens the party's hold on power. Hence, where ruling parties combine mechanisms of patronage distribution with the strong identities, solidarity ties, and discipline generated by violent origins, regimes should be most durable.We apply this argument to four party-based competitive authoritarian regimes in post-Cold War Africa: Kenya, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In each of these cases, an established single- or dominant-party regime faced heightened international pressure, economic crisis, and a strong opposition challenge after 1990. Yet whereas ruling parties in Kenya and Zambia were organized almost exclusively around patronage, those in Mozambique and Zimbabwe were liberation parties that came to power via violent struggle. This difference is critical to explaining diverging post-Cold War regime outcomes: whereas ruling parties in Zambia and Kenya imploded and eventually lost power in these face of crises, those in Mozambique and Zimbabwe remained intact and regimes survived.
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Golosov, Grigorii V. "Authoritarian Party Systems: Patterns of Emergence, Sustainability and Survival." Comparative Sociology 12, no. 5 (2013): 617–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691330-12341274.
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Abstract This article compares competitive authoritarian, one-party authoritarian, and democratic party systems on three parameters: likelihood to emerge, sustainability and durability. By applying a variety of statistical techniques to a comprehensive dataset on post-World War II elections, this study shows that under competitive authoritarianism, elections are less likely to be party-structured than in democracies, and that competitive authoritarian party systems are markedly less sustainable and durable than systems in the other categories, especially in democracies. These findings are in accordance with the theory according to which competitive authoritarian institutions are epiphenomena, reflecting the distribution of power in the polity but not shaping it. Their emergence and survival are consequences rather than causes of the stability and success of contemporary autocracies.
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Casey, Adam E. "The Durability of Client Regimes." World Politics 72, no. 3 (June 10, 2020): 411–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0043887120000039.
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ABSTRACTConventional wisdom holds that great power patrons prop up client dictatorships. But this is generally assumed rather than systematically analyzed. This article provides the first comprehensive analysis of the relationship between foreign sponsorship and authoritarian regime survival, using an original data set of all autocratic client regimes in the postwar period. The results demonstrate that patronage from Western powers—the United States, France, and the United Kingdom—is not associated with client regime survival. Rather, it’s only Soviet sponsorship that reduced the risk of regime collapse. The author explains this variation by considering the effects of foreign sponsorship on the likelihood of military coups d’état. He argues that the Soviet Union directly aided its clients by imposing a series of highly effective coup prevention strategies. By contrast, the US and its allies didn’t provide such aid, leaving regimes vulnerable to military overthrow.
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Scoggins, Suzanne E. "Rethinking Authoritarian Resilience and the Coercive Apparatus." Comparative Politics 53, no. 2 (January 1, 2021): 309–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5129/001041521x15895755803929.
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A state's coercive apparatus can be strong in some ways and weak in others. Using interview data from security personnel in China, this study expands current conceptualizations of authoritarian durability and coercive capacity to consider a wide range of security activities. While protest response in China is centrally controlled and strong, other types of crime control are decentralized and systematically inadequate in ways that compromise the state's coercive power and may ultimately feed back into protest. Considering security activities beyond protest control exposes cracks in China's authoritarian system of control—an area where it is typically perceived to thrive—and calls into question our understanding of regime resilience as well as our current approach to assessing the role coercive capacity plays in authoritarian resilience elsewhere.
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Christensen, Britt. "Cyber state capacity: A model of authoritarian durability, ICTs, and emerging media." Government Information Quarterly 36, no. 3 (July 2019): 460–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2019.04.004.
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Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. "Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia. By Dan Slater. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 342p. $85.00 cloth, $28.99 paper." Perspectives on Politics 9, no. 2 (June 2011): 383–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592711000417.
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It is not easy to offer a critical review of Dan Slater's book. Ordering Power makes several major contributions to the study of both state building and authoritarian durability. The book's analysis converges with ours in many areas; in some of these areas, it takes important steps beyond it.
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Fuller, Clay Robert. "Cooperative Authoritarians and Regime Stability." New Global Studies 11, no. 1 (January 1, 2017): 1–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ngs-2017-0009.
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AbstractThis article assumes that the post-cold war unipolar global power structure marked the beginnings of a two-level game of national survival involving an international process of “othering,” where the winning democracies and their leaders (the “West”) view many non-democracies and their leaders as threats that they must convert, subjugate, or eradicate. Using new data on special economic zones (SEZs), I find that geographically restricting economic liberalization and reducing competition from opposition parties increases authoritarian stability and durability in this new environment.
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Ong, Elvin. "Complementary Institutions in Authoritarian Regimes: The Everyday Politics of Constituency Service in Singapore." Journal of East Asian Studies 15, no. 3 (December 2015): 361–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800009115.
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Recent political science research has suggested that autocrats adopt a variety of institutions such as nominally democratic elections and ruling parties to buttress authoritarian durability. In this article I investigate the role of constituency service in an authoritarian regime. I argue that Singapore's Meet-the-People Sessions (MPS) is a complementary institution that can serve to mitigate the weaknesses of other authoritarian institutions, thereby entrenching authoritarianism, rather than serve as a form of democratic representation. First, it is a mechanism to gain valuable everyday information about grievances within the population, thereby allowing the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) to formulate policies and effectively target its response. Second, it is a convenient venue to recruit and socialize ordinary party members, thus helping the PAP forestall potential party decay. Symbolically, conducting MPS is a material performance of the hegemonic ideology of elitism between PAP politicians and ordinary Singaporeans.
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Zakirov, Bekzod. "Authoritarian Regime Stability in Uzbekistan under Patronal President Islam Karimov." Central Asian Affairs 8, no. 3 (December 22, 2021): 273–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/22142290-12340005.
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Abstract This paper investigates the nature of Uzbekistan’s political system under President Islam Karimov through the lenses of patronal presidentialism to explain the factors conducive to the durability of the current regime. The paper argues that the longevity of the authoritarian regime in Uzbekistan can be best understood by a methodology that reconciles the propositions of institutional analysis of authoritarian rule with conventional methods of maintaining power such as coercion and patronage. Revealing the limitation of mainstream literature that overemphasizes neopatrimonialism and informality to understand domestic politics, the paper asserts that patronal president Islam Karimov assumed multiple instruments of power at the intersection of state and economy, which ensured regime stability in Uzbekistan until his death in 2016.
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Wang, Yuhua. "Coercive capacity and the durability of the Chinese communist state." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 47, no. 1 (February 14, 2014): 13–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.01.009.
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Why has the Chinese communist state remained so durable in an age of democratization? Contrary to existing theories, this article argues that the strong state coercive capacity has survived the authoritarian rule in China. We demonstrate that the Chinese Communist Party has taken deliberate actions to enhance the cohesion of its coercive organizations—the police, in particular—by distributing “spoils of public office” to police chiefs. In addition, the state has extended the scope of its coercion by increasing police funding in localities where the state sector loses control of the population. We use and rely on mixed methods to test this theory.
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Ryan, Matthew DJ. "Interrogating ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’: The problem of periodization." Competition & Change 23, no. 2 (September 7, 2018): 116–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1024529418797867.
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From the legislated ‘embedding’ of neoliberalism as seen with constitutional debt ceilings, through sweeping free trade agreements, to the direct, violent suppression of political freedoms; democracy today seems to be under siege from all sides. In response to these troubling developments, Ian Bruff (2014) recently introduced the concept of ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ to understand increasingly undemocratic forms of state and state action in the current conjuncture. This article argues that although ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ presents a useful development in our understanding of these processes, the concept faces several challenges – in particular, that of obscuring a broader history of authoritarianism and its contradictions, by separating neoliberalism into distinct phases. This article considers two moments of authoritarianism within the history of neoliberalism: the United Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher, and the Greek experience of mandated austerity within the strictures of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Through these examples, the article will engage with claims that the ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’ of the post-2007 context is somehow ‘qualitatively distinct’ from earlier forms. It is argued that an enforced separation between these two cases is unhelpful, and that more fruitful directions for this emerging research agenda lie not in a conceptual separation of the past, but rather a consideration of the durability of authoritarian state forms.
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Sinpeng, Aim. "Digital media, political authoritarianism, and Internet controls in Southeast Asia." Media, Culture & Society 42, no. 1 (November 25, 2019): 25–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0163443719884052.
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A sharp rise in the use of digital media in Southeast Asia in recent years has raised questions about the impact of these digitally networked technologies on the prospect for democratization in a region known for its authoritarian resilience. In the absence of a regional uprising as witnessed in the Middle East through the Arab Spring, Southeast Asian authoritarian states have maintained their durability despite a massive surge in online political activities and in some cases, digitally mediated large-scale mobilization of opposition groups. What explains authoritarian resilience in Southeast Asia in the face of rising opportunities for online political opposition? This article argues that while digital media has emerged as an important repertoire of activism, particularly for political opposition groups, a deft combination of political authoritarianism and increasing Internet controls have stunted democratic pressure in society and hampered future prospect for democratization. It also offers a comparative analysis of how the Internet more generally and digital media in particular has affected state-society relations in Southeast Asia in recent years. In order for digitally mediated political opposition to meaningfully challenge the existing authoritarian incumbents, sufficient opening in the political system is needed. This means, authoritarian states with competitive, routinized elections which have recently experienced large-scale or sustained mobilization by opposition groups are most likely to be susceptible to breakdown than closed regimes.
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Mahdavi, Paasha, and John Ishiyama. "Dynamics of the Inner Elite in Dictatorships: Evidence from North Korea." Comparative Politics 52, no. 2 (January 1, 2020): 221–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.5129/001041520x15652680065751.
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How does the circle of inner elites evolve over time in dictatorships? We draw on theories of authoritarian power-sharing to shed light on the evolution of politics in North Korea. Given challenges in collecting individual-level data in this context, we employ web-scraping techniques that capture inspection visits by the dictator as reported by state-run media to assemble network data on elite public co-occurrences. We test the durability of this network since Kim Jong-un's rise to power in December 2011 to find suggestive evidence of elite purging. Our findings contribute to the broader literature on authoritarian elite dynamics and to subnational studies on power-sharing in communist states. Importantly, our approach helps bring the study of North Korean politics more firmly in the mainstream of political science inquiry.
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Chen, Ling S. "Getting China’s Political Economy Right: State, Business, and Authoritarian Capitalism." Perspectives on Politics 20, no. 4 (December 2022): 1397–402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s153759272200247x.
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There is no doubt that the political economy of contemporary China has received significant attention, both in academic disciplines and in the real world. The role of the state in the economy and the relations between government and business actors have always been central concerns of classic social science works about China. There are, however, several crucial challenges in studying this topic. The complicated landscape of a multilayered, fragmented Chinese state and numerous state-owned, private, foreign, or mixed-type businesses has made it difficult to tease out their interactions and establish a comprehensive theoretical model. The fast-changing nature of state–market relations and their vast subnational and sectoral variation has often prevented scholars from generalizing those lessons beyond the case or issue area. Yet, among all these, the most daunting challenge is: How can studies of a particularly interesting phenomenon in China’s political economy contribute to broader discussions of state–society relations, regime durability, and state-led development without losing respectable country expertise?
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Leijendekker, Iris, and Bruce Mutsvairo. "On digitally networked technologies, hegemony and regime durability in authoritarian regimes: a Zimbabwean case study." Information, Communication & Society 17, no. 8 (June 20, 2014): 1034–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369118x.2014.920399.
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Nguyen, Hai Hong. "Resilience of the Communist Party of Vietnam's Authoritarian Regime since Đổi Mới." Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35, no. 2 (August 2016): 31–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/186810341603500202.
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Unlike communist parties in the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has overcome crises to remain in power for the last 30 years and will most likely continue ruling in the coming decades. Strategies and tactics undertaken by the CPV are found to be identical to those canvassed in the extant literature on the durability of authoritarian regimes around the world. The present paper argues that the CPV's regime has been resilient thus far because it has successfully restored and maintained public trust, effectively constrained its opposition at home, and cleverly reduced external pressures. To support this argument, the analysis electively focuses on four aspects: (1) economic performance, (2) political flexibility, (3) repression of the opposition, and (4) expansion of international relations.
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Bayulgen, Oksan. "Foreign Investment, Oil Curse, and Democratization: A Comparison of Azerbaijan and Russia." Business and Politics 7, no. 1 (April 2005): 1–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1099.
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The rentier-state literature pays little attention to the initial political conditions that shape the way an oil-rich country develops its resources. One of the key causal mechanisms linking oil wealth and regime type is the relationship between foreign investors and host governments. Especially in the developing countries that depend on international financing and expertise, the role of foreign capital in fashioning the balance of power in the political system and thereby the distribution of oil wealth becomes ever more important. As the experiences of Azerbaijan and Russia in the 1990s demonstrate, among oil-rich states in the developing world, those with authoritarian regimes tend to fare better in terms of attracting FDI in the oil sector than states with democratizing (or hybrid regimes). The durability of some authoritarian regimes in the developing world is partly a function of this external legitimation from foreign investors.
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Lynch, Marc. "After Egypt: The Limits and Promise of Online Challenges to the Authoritarian Arab State." Perspectives on Politics 9, no. 2 (June 2011): 301–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1537592711000910.
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The uprisings which swept across the Arab world beginning in December 2010 pose a serious challenge to many of the core findings of the political science literature focused on the durability of the authoritarian Middle Eastern state. The impact of social media on contentious politics represents one of the many areas which will require significant new thinking. The dramatic change in the information environment over the last decade has changed individual competencies, the ability to organize for collective action, and the transmission of information from the local to the international level. It has also strengthened some of the core competencies of authoritarian states even as it has undermined others. The long term evolution of a new kind of public sphere may matter more than immediate political outcomes, however. Rigorous testing of competing hypotheses about the impact of the new social media will require not only conceptual development but also the use of new kinds of data analysis not traditionally adopted in Middle East area studies.
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PAN, JENNIFER, and KAIPING CHEN. "Concealing Corruption: How Chinese Officials Distort Upward Reporting of Online Grievances." American Political Science Review 112, no. 3 (June 6, 2018): 602–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055418000205.
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A prerequisite for the durability of authoritarian regimes as well as their effective governance is the regime’s ability to gather reliable information about the actions of lower-tier officials. Allowing public participation in the form of online complaints is one approach authoritarian regimes have taken to improve monitoring of lower-tier officials. In this paper, we gain rare access to internal communications between a monitoring agency and upper-level officials in China. We show that citizen grievances posted publicly online that contain complaints of corruption are systematically concealed from upper-level authorities when they implicate lower-tier officials or associates connected to lower-tier officials through patronage ties. Information manipulation occurs primarily through omission of wrongdoing rather than censorship or falsification, suggesting that even in the digital age, in a highly determined and capable regime where reports of corruption are actively and publicly voiced, monitoring the behavior of regime agents remains a challenge.
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Matfess, Hilary. "Rwanda and Ethiopia: Developmental Authoritarianism and the New Politics of African Strong Men." African Studies Review 58, no. 2 (September 2015): 181–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/asr.2015.43.
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Abstract:Current classification systems create typologies of authoritarian regimes that may overlook the importance of national policies. Rwanda and Ethiopia in particular are perplexing case studies of post-1990s governance. Both nations are characterized by high growth economies with significant state involvement and the formal institutions of democracy, but deeply troubling patterns of domestic governance. This article proposes a new category of authoritarianism called “developmental authoritarianism,” which refers to nominally democratic governments that provide significant public works and services while exerting control over nearly every facet of society. The article then reflects upon the durability and implications of this form of governance.
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Thomas-Woolley, Barbara, and Edmond J. Keller. "Majority Rule and Minority Rights: American Federalism and African Experience." Journal of Modern African Studies 32, no. 3 (September 1994): 411–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x00015160.
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Withthe demise of the Soviet Union and the fall of many authoritarian régimes, some observers suggest that we are in the midst of what can be called a worldwide democratic revolution. Although questions remain as to the durability of these changes, particularly in Africa, it is clear that we are at a cross-roads. Nations are considering what kinds of political institutions they want to replace those they are trying to dismantle. What, at this historical moment, is the special appeal of democracy in the non-Western world? Is it the promise of individual freedom? or popular elections designed to give all citizens a say in who governs? or the prospect of guaranteed individual and group rights?
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Curry, Mark Stevenson. "Political Crisis and Institutional Resilience: Conditional Cash Transfers under Scrutiny in Brazil and Philippines." International Studies Review 18, no. 2 (October 19, 2017): 59–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/2667078x-01802004.
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Extraordinary political transitions in 2016 in two middle-income developing countries, Brazil and the Philippines, may adversely affect efforts to reduce poverty and gender/social inequalities through Conditional Cash Transfers (‘CCTs’). This paper investigates institutional conditions governing CCTs in these two countries and reflects on the potential impacts of policy incursions. The proposition here is that sound developmental programmes can produce broad and compelling within-institution influences as well as causal cross-institution linkages in other domains. New and quickly successful programmes can also be targets for policy assaults and subversions. How resilient are social protection institutions like CCTs to political shocks? Applying Levitsky and Way’s (2015) concept of timing and sequencing in authoritarian regime durability to the question of institutional resilience, this comparative-historical case study aims to examine three issues: the processes traced by CCT evolution that in each case relate to institutional resilience, the factors contributing to policy shocks, and the resilience of CCTs in response to seismic macro-political change. The approach takes varieties of knowledge as a valuable alternative to neoliberal structures of domination and contributes to the important and urgent need to understand social protection institutions as human development resources of variable durability.
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Vengroff, Richard. "Governance and the Transition to Democracy: Political Parties and the Party System in Mali." Journal of Modern African Studies 31, no. 4 (December 1993): 541–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x00012234.
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Although many African countries have had to address pressures for democratisation and are undergoing some form of transition, Mali is an especially interesting case which could provide useful insights into the durability of democracy on the continent and elsewhere. Mali has experienced extraordinary changes in the past two years leading to the almost total transformation of the political system from a highly authoritarian régime to one which has all the trappings of a liberal democracy. Unlike most other nations, Mali was fortunate in being able to write a new constitution and hold elections without the burden of continued participation in the process by a ruling party and head of state. Therefore, the more open procedures offer a better indication of the degree to which, given the opportunity, a modern democratic system can take root in the African milieu.
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Weber, Kamil. "Rola tradycji konfucjańskich w umacnianiu współczesnego reżimu politycznego Koreańskiej Republiki Ludowo-Demokratycznej." Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne 26 (August 23, 2019): 36–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/1643-0328.26.3.
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The role of Confucian traditions in strengthening the contemporary political regime of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea In Asian countries authoritarian relationships have been noticeable for centuries not only on political but also on social grounds.The teachings of Confucius were important in this aspect. According to many authors, they still exert a significant influence in North Korea and have an impact on the durability of Kim Jong-un. However, there are also opinions that it is a big mistake to describe this country as Confucian. For this reason the aim of this article is to show the real meaning of this ideology in North Korea. This will be done by demonstrating similarities of the present situation to the principles of Confucianism, as well as denials of the guidelines of this ideology. As a result, this will allow the author to analyze how Confucian traditions can determine the future of the regime in Pyongyang.
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Gel’man, Vladimir. "Constitution, Authoritarianism, and Bad Governance: The Case of Russia." Russian Politics 6, no. 1 (March 30, 2021): 71–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00601005.
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Abstract Among many arguments for constitutional changes presented in the wake of the 2020 campaign for the popular vote in Russia, there was the idea that “cementing” Russia’s political landscape for the sake of the regime’s durability would serve as a tool for improvement of quality of governance. This argument, in a way, followed the essential point of Mancur Olson describing many autocrats across the globe as “roving bandits” with their short-term time horizons and incentives for predatory behavior. To what extent may the constitutional extension of the time horizon of Russia’s authoritarian regime contribute to conversion of Russia’s state officials and top managers from the “roving” to the “stationary” model, in Olson’s terms? On the basis of previous research, I argue that the nature of Russia’s political regime—electoral authoritarianism under personalist rule—prevents such a trajectory of further evolution. Indeed, the set of constitutional changes adopted in Russia in July 2020 is likely to preserve bad governance as a mechanism of maintenance of politico-economic order, as intentionally built and developed during the post-Soviet period. While certain technocratic solutions for Russia’s governance, aimed at “fool-proofing”, may avert the risks of major disasters, under conditions of durable authoritarianism the use of these devices will not result in major advancements in the quality of governance. Rather, they may contribute to further decay and aggravation of the numerous vices of bad governance.
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Wasielewski, Szymon. "Bogurodzico, przegoń Putina. Pussy Riot – feministki kontra autorytaryzm w Rosji." Świat Idei i Polityki 18, no. 1 (December 31, 2019): 316–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/siip201917.
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The events that took place in Russia at the end of 2011 – the rigged parliamentary elections and the nomination of Vladimir Putin as presidential candidate, his return to the Kremlin after four years, caused numerous protests on a previously unknown scale. According to various estimates, tens of thousands of dissatisfied citizens took to the streets of Moscow. They were led by Alexei Navalny and Boris Nemtsov, who was later murdered in 2015. The public support of the authorities and the condemnation of the protesters by Patriarch Cyril – the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, was met with a reaction from a now outraged society. On February, 21 2012, the famous feminist group Pussy Riot, staged a performance in the building of the Council of Christ the Saviour in Moscow. The performance was to be a form of protest against the informal alliance of „the throne and the altar”. This informal alliance has been present in Russia for many years, it obliges both sides to mutual support, especially in times of crisis. The trial of the three members of the Pussy Riot group – Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, Ekaterina Samucevich and Maria Alokhina was strictly political, despite strict efforts of judges and prosecutors to change its character. Under the pretence of offending religious feelings, a political lynch was carried out against the three women. The real reason for such harsh actions, was disobedience against the head of the Russian state and standing in opposition to the authoritarian form of government. The phoney trial was treated as a warning to the system’s opponents, for them to think twice before undertaking any actions against the state authorities. Pussy Riot’s performance and its consequences have provoked many questions about the condition of the rule of law in Russia and the durability of Vladimir Putin’s regime. The article describes the earlier activities of Pussy Riot, background of the events preceding performance in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, a trial and the world’s response to the verdict. The research area durability and stability of political system in Russia during the presidency of Vladimir Putin and what it guarantees. The main hypothesis is the assumption that any manifestation or insubordination to the existing order in Russia is treated as an affront, and every person undertaking such action must be severely punished and stigmatized. The research method used in the article is an analysis of written sources.
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Xu, Feng. "Building China’s Eldercare Market: The Imperatives of Capital Accumulation and Social Stability." Social Sciences 11, no. 5 (May 13, 2022): 212. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/socsci11050212.
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The paper investigates China’s effort to create an eldercare market to shed light on how China’s economic reform entailed the creation of new institutions (e.g., eldercare market including eldercare labour market) and the reconfiguration of existing institutions (e.g., governance and regulation, the family, and the community). All this was needed for the market to flourish while maintaining and strengthening the regime. An urban eldercare market, including an eldercare labour market, was created by local governments (i.e., municipalities, districts, counties, and towns) with central government policy directives, in order to address China’s demographic aging and care crisis. However, once enough demand and supply were created, local governments turned to New Public Management (NPM) to operate publicly funded eldercare institutions. The paper argues that NPM has different rationalities in China than in liberal democracies; in China, they strengthen the Party and contribute to the durability of the authoritarian rule, rather than “shrink the state”. However, in China as in the West, bureaucratic logic hampers the implementation of NPM and the governance of the eldercare sector. The implication of bureaucratic logic driving the regulation of the eldercare sector is that care is not at the centre of eldercare. The paper also argues that the commodification and privatization of eldercare, in line with the global trend, was a deliberate government policy aimed at creating a positive condition for the market economy to flourish, but at the expense of social reproduction/care. Unlike many Western transitions to market provision, this one entailed the decline in the extended family as the main eldercare institution of the immediate past. However, the commodification and privatization of social reproduction have been incomplete and met with resistance, prompting the state to invest more in the sector to maintain social stability. Data for this paper derive from personal interviews with key informants and eldercare workers, official document analysis, and secondary literature analysis from Chinese scholars in mainland China.
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Luo, Jing Jing, and Kheang Un. "Organizational Strength and Authoritarian Durability in Cambodia." Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 2022, 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/cpcs.2022.1627857.
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This article draws from multiple sources of data including longitudinal field research such as interviews with diverse stakeholders—party apparatchik, leaders of civil society organizations, and representatives of international institutions operating in Cambodia. Analyzing these data using the literature on the durability of single-party authoritarianism, we argue that authoritarian durability in Cambodia is associated with the ruling party’s strength, which has its roots in the party’s evolution from a liberation movement and counterinsurgency struggle from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. This movement and struggle fostered a shared sense of hardship, and a common identity among the party’s leadership, which in turn generated enduring partisan identities, rigid interparty boundaries, and strong party organizational structure. Additionally, we postulate that distribution of patronage largesse made possible through rents associated with extraction of natural resources, foreign aid, and foreign investment further strengthened the ruling party, allowing it to project infrastructural power in surveilling and mobilizing voters and in exercising coercion against its challengers.
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Nikolaevich Shkel, Stanislav, and Eduard Sagidulovich Gareev. "Durability of the Authoritarian Regimes: The Role of Procedural Factors." Asian Social Science 11, no. 19 (July 30, 2015). http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ass.v11n19p205.
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Zhang, Changdong. "Capitalists, Taxation, and Authoritarian Durability: Reexamine the Infrastructural State Power Mechanisms in China." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4183510.
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Carothers, Christopher. "The Autocrat's Corruption Dilemma." Government and Opposition, June 23, 2021, 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2021.23.
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Abstract A large body of scholarship shows that autocrats can use corruption strategically to strengthen their political hold, such as by distributing rents to their supporters. However, this scholarship often overlooks how corruption may also politically damage autocrats. I argue that corruption often brings substantial political costs alongside its advantages, resulting in a ‘corruption dilemma’ for autocrats. I show that in recent years, public anger over corruption has led to numerous anti-government protests and has been a major cause of autocrats being ousted from power. How politically costly corruption is depends on factors such as the public's tolerance for corruption, whether the autocrat is accountable to quasi-democratic institutions and whether the autocrat can credibly claim to be fighting corruption. The case of Malaysia illustrates how relying on corrupt practices to stay in power can backfire even in a long-standing authoritarian regime. My analysis advances our understanding of corruption's mixed role in authoritarian durability and authoritarian strategies of rule.
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Rochlitz, Michael, Olga Masyutina, Koen J. L. Schoors, and Yulia Khalikova. "Authoritarian Durability, Prospects of Change and Individual Behavior: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Russia." SSRN Electronic Journal, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4228848.
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Makone, Itai, and Derica Lambrechts. "How Durable are Hybrid Regimes? The Case of Zimbabwe as a Hybrid Regime." Politeia 40, no. 1 (December 15, 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.25159/2663-6689/9716.
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In general, the durability of the hybrid regime is debated due to the coexistence of democratic and authoritarian regime institutions in the system, functioning in disconnect with each other. There is also the inevitable expectation of a hybrid regime to change. This study argues that a hybrid regime can have lasting durability, using the case of Zimbabwe between 1990 and 2018. A hybrid regime conceptual framework is developed by identifying four indicators of hybridity: elections, civil liberties, tutelary interference, and political elite cohesion. The framework is then applied to Zimbabwe. The country shows five diverse variations of hybridity, which are: liberal; competitive illiberal; competitive; illiberal; and military regimes, grouped by the most observable indicators identified in the hybrid regime framework. Thus, hybridity is found to be fluid and varies within the state over a period of 28 years. As is indicated, different timeframes identified in Zimbabwe experienced more, or less, characteristics of democratic rule or authoritarianism, but never a spill-over to new regime representation. Consequently, due to the adjustable and changeable nature of the hybrid regime, transformation into a different system becomes less predictable. The study further identifies five factors that enable the durability of the hybrid regime: lengthy incumbent government; high political elite cohesion; low leadership turnover; a strong statesman; and competitive opposition.
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McLellan, Rachael. "Delivering the Vote: Community Politicians and the Credibility of Punishment Regimes in Electoral Autocracies." Comparative Politics, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.5129/001041523x16601556495592.
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How do authoritarian regimes punish ordinary opposition voters? I argue that elected community politicians help make “punishment regimes,” which discourage opposition support, credible. Strengthened by decentralization reforms, community politicians have information and leverage necessary to identify and punish opposition supporters. When the regime wins community elections, these politicians extend the regime’s reach deep into communities. When opposition parties win, their reach is constrained weakening their electoral control. Using mixed-methods evidence from Tanzania, I show regime-loyal community politicians use their distributive and legal-coercive powers to “deliver the vote” leading voters in these communities to fear individual reprisals for opposition support. In contrast, voters fear individual punishment in opposition-run communities significantly less. This study demonstrates the importance of local institutions and elections when understanding regime durability.
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Woldense, Josef. "What Happens When Coups Fail? The Problem of Identifying and Weakening the Enemy Within." Comparative Political Studies, January 18, 2022, 001041402110474. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00104140211047402.
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The ruler’s ability to cope with crises is critical for authoritarian durability. Yet, the coping mechanism—the actual management strategies by which rulers confront crises—is largely treated as a black box. This study takes a step in addressing this problem by examining how rulers use their appointment powers to manage the crisis that is the aftermath of failed coups. I argue that the principle challenge of this period is that rulers cannot identify the opposition and to cope, they deliberately infuse the center of the regime with officials from the periphery to dilute and ultimately weaken the invisible enemy they confront. Using a novel dataset on the appointments of mid and high level officials over the course of 34 years in Ethiopia, I find that the ruler relied considerably on outside officials following the failed coup in 1960 in ways he never did before or after the event.