Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Australian constitutional law'

This thesis aims to assess the role played by disagreement in the High Court???s constitutional law decisions. It does so firstly by considering the theoretical arguments in favour of allowing expression of dissent and those which urge judicial restraint and observance of precedential values. The tensions between change and conformity, and also the individual and institutional aspects of adjudication, intersect when the Court divides. The complex nature of disagreement on a multimember judicial body is further examined in the context of devising an empirical methodology for the quantification of dissent on the High Court. The thesis selects a period of a little over twenty years for detailed examination. Within that timeframe, it measures the prevalence and nature of disagreement amongst the Justices of the Court, with particular emphasis upon constitutional cases. From these results, various streams of opinion are examined for subsequent significance. In particular, the thesis contrasts the practice of persistent dissent from the Court???s approach to an issue, with those occasions when a minority Justice yields to the demands of stare decisis. The impact of dissent upon the development of the Court???s constitutional interpretation is evaluated. Although the study finds that direct reversals in the law in favour of an earlier dissent occur very rarely, it argues that dissents may still exercise a powerful influence on the Court???s pronouncements. The contribution which minority opinions make to judicial deliberation is to inevitably alter the context of the Court???s decision. Consideration of two specific case studies illustrates that this may result in the law taking a more moderate path or may actually lead to greater efforts by a majority to strengthen the cogency of its approach. In either scenario, dissent plays a far more subtle role than suggested by the myth of a ???Great Dissenter??? and the dramatic redemption of his or her lone opinions. To only assess the value of dissenting judgments against that standard is to fail to appreciate the true nature of their influence in many cases and their importance to the work of the High Court.

What are the possible bases for the authority of the Australian Constitution? Why should people and judges ever obey the text of the Constitution? The developing tools of analytical jurisprudence assist in answering these questions. Despite its currency, the concept of "sovereignty" provides little assistance in understanding how law provides reasons for action. The concept of authority is more useful. The text of the Australian Constitution has authority in that it provides presumptive reasons for action, overruled when they appear sufficiently erroneous on a cursory examination. The Constitution is part of the Australian legal system. A legal system is normally identified partly by moral norms. These moral norms themselves require that legal systems also be identified where possible by reference to the directives of a previous de facto authority - even when that previous authority no longer has power to make new legal norms. A legal system will be "legitimate" if any improvement to be achieved by revolution would be outweighed by the uncertainty revolution creates. Against this theoretical background, various theories about the Constitution's authority can be assessed. Although the enactment of the Constitution by the Imperial Parliament provides the Constitution with legal authority, it does not confer moral legitimacy. Contrary to a growing judicial and academic consensus in Australia, the Constitution's legitimate authority is not derived from the "will of the people". Nor is it derived from the Constitution's Founders. The will of the people cannot be identified reliably, and wound not provide sufficient reasons for action. The Constitution does embody a federal compact between the colonies. Because it is worthwhile to keep political promises, the polities of the States should fulfil this compact, even though the compact only imposes weak obligations on the Commonwealth. Other possible bases for the Constitution's authority are also inadequate. These include claims that judges are bound to apply the Constitution because their authority is based upon it; that the Constitution embodies "associate obligations", and that the Constitution isa commitment to protect individual rights and democracy. Instead the Constitution has legitimate authority principally because it coordinates individual action towards desirable goals. The Australian Constitution settles the location of authority by authority.

This thesis has three objectives. Its primary objective is to examine, and critically evaluate, the theoretical accounts offered by Hans Kelsen and Joseph Raz to explain the temporal continuity and discontinuity of legal systems. In particular, it evaluates the explanatory power of those accounts by combining an abstract analysis of the accounts in principle and an evaluation based on systematically applying them to one concrete, historically circumstanced instance: the legal systems of British derivation in Australia between 1788 and 2001. The thesis thus tests each account’s factual fit: how adequately it corresponds to, accords with, and persuasively makes sense of, the facts – including complex social facts, attitudes and normative standards – for which it purports to offer an account. Second, the thesis aims to demonstrate, more generally, the utility of applying theoretical accounts to a particular historical instance to complement abstract analysis. Third, the thesis aims to advance the understanding of the evolution of Australian legal systems between 1788 and 2001. These three objectives are achieved through the critical exposition and reconstruction of the accounts, their development and enrichment where refinement is appropriate, their application to the specific context of Australia and their evaluation, individually and in comparison.

This thesis examines the constitutional position in relation to those geographical areas over which the Commonwealth has sole power. These are the Territories, and Commonwealth places (over which, however, the States may retain some vestigial power). The thesis seeks to give a comprehensive account of the constitutional law concerning these heads of power. The thesis traces the tortuous history of the case law on the Territories, with its many instances of inconsistent decisions and dicta. In the words of a High Court Judge, Sir Douglas Menzies, the cases have "not resulted in a coherent body of doctrine". The problems have been particularly acute in regard to the exercise of judicial power, and they are compounded by the silence of the Constitution on some major issues concerning the Territories, such as the relationship between the 'Territories' power and the Constitution as a whole. The thesis' main contention is that, contrary to predominant doctrine, the constitutional position of the Territories and of Commonwealth places is federal, not 'disparate'. In this connection, several tenets are advanced: first, that the Constitution must be interpreted as a whole�that is, as a single instrument; secondly, that the Territories are an integral part of Australia, and their inhabitants, while not enjoying all the constitutional benefits of State residents, are full members of the Australian community; and thirdly, that there is no constitutional distinction to be drawn between different classes of Territory�thus, despite some contrary suggestions, there is no distinction between 'internal' and 'external' Territories or between Territories acquired from the States and Territories otherwise acquired. The thesis explores the particular difficulties, notably in the judicial sphere, that arise from the relevant case law, and it critically examines the cases against the text of the Constitution, as well as against the yardstick of those tenets. With regard to the Territories, the thesis analyses the constitutional topics of executive power and self-government. It considers particular issues concerning each of the three self-governing Territories, including the special status of the Australian Capital Territory as the federal "seat of government". In addition, the thesis looks at the constitutional position in the United States concerning Territories, federal enclaves and the American seat of government (the District of Columbia). The thesis draws a comparison between the American position and the corresponding position in Australia, and it critically considers the judicial interpretation, in both countries, of the constitutional grant to the federal legislature of exclusive, or sole, power over such geographical areas. This process assists an evaluation of the Australian position. The thesis concludes that, in some respects, the Australian case law has gone seriously astray, especially in treating the 'Territories' power as more or less separate from the rest of the Constitution. This judicial approach has led to a convoluted and confusing situation. Despite a degree of amelioration as a result of some more recent cases, the corrective process is by no means complete. The courts are hampered in their development of a "coherent body of doctrine" by the random way in which cases come before them, and it is unlikely that the position can be fully retrieved solely by judicial decisions. The thesis therefore proposes various reforms, and it sets out, in an appendix, proposed amendments of the Constitution. In addition to expounding and criticising the case law on the constitutional topics under discussion, the thesis reviews and, where appropriate, cites from the relevant legal literature. The thesis considers the Australian case law as decided down to the end of 2004.

The under-representation of women in the senior appellate judiciary in common law jurisdictions remains an enduring problem. Much has been written about the lack of women’s participation in the judiciary and what strategies, if any, should be undertaken in order to resolve this persistent problem. However, this thesis takes a step back to ask a broader question: what impact does gender diversity have upon judicial decision making in appellate courts? It seeks to answer this question by engaging feminist standpoint theory to assess the experiences of men and women judges from three common law jurisdictions: England, South Africa and Australia. Through a series of interviews conducted with members of the senior judiciary in these jurisdictions in 2012 and 2013, this thesis explores the extent that interviewees consider that gendered experiences impact upon their own judging, and judging within the dynamics of collegiate appellate courts. This thesis concludes that while it is not possible to pinpoint one particular ‘contribution’ or ‘impact’ that gendered experiences have upon judging, it is nonetheless generally considered by those interviewed to be an important part of the judicial decision making process in several subtle, yet important, ways. Because of the considerable role that diverse gendered experiences play in judicial decision making, appointments processes should be sensitised to the need for diversity of experience and alive to the danger of ostensibly neutral appointment criteria devaluing diverse experiences, particularly the experiences of women in the law.

This thesis is a work of Christian theology. Its purpose is twofold: firstly to develop an adequate understanding of reconciliation at the level of peoples and nations; and secondly to make a practical contribution to resolving the problems in Australia for the welfare of all the peoples, and of the land itself. The history of the relationships between the Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Australia has left many problems, and no matter what the non-Indigenous people try to do, the Indigenous peoples of Australia continue to experience themselves as being in a state of siege. Trying to understand what is happening, and what can be done to resolve the problems for the peoples of Australia and the land, have been the implicit drivers for the theological development in this thesis. This thesis argues that the present generation in any trans-generational dispute is likely to continue to sin in ways that are shaped by the sins of the past, which explains why Indigenous peoples in Australia find themselves in a stage of siege, even when the non-Indigenous peoples are trying to pursue policies which they believe are for the welfare of all. The only way to resolve this is for the peoples of Australia to seek reconciliation. In particular, the non-Indigenous peoples need to repent, both of their own sins, and the sins of their forebears. Reconciliation processes have become part of the international political landscape. However, there are real concerns about the justice of pursuing reconciliation. An important part of the theological development of this thesis is therefore to show that pursuing reconciliation establishes justice. It is shown that the nature of justice, and of repentance, can only be established by pursuing reconciliation. Reconciliation is possible because God has made it possible, and is working in the world to bring reconciliation. Because land is an essential part of Indigenous identity in Australia, the history of land in court cases and legislation in Australia over the past half century forms an important case study in this work. It is shown that, although there was significant repentance within the non-Indigenous legal system in Australia, the degree of repentance available through that legal system is inherently limited, and so a more radical approach is needed in order to seek reconciliation in Australia. A final chapter considers what the non-Indigenous people of Australia need to do in order to repent.

The concept "beneficial use" plays a pivotal role in South African water law reform. It forms the foundation of the mechanism to make water use rights available for the reform of the allocation of water use entitlements. The mechanism involves that water use rights that were unexercised in the two years before the promulgation of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 are not defined as existing lawful water uses. Where the concept "beneficial use" is utilised to cancel unexercised water use rights, it can cause potential hardship. Some people whose rights have been cancelled believe that they should be able to rely on the property clause in section 25 of the Constitution of 1996 to either have the legislation declared unconstitutional or to demand compensation. Section 25 of the Constitution of 1996 prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of property and states that property may only be expropriated for a public purpose or in the public interest, subject to compensation. Section 25(4) states, however, that the public interest includes the nation's commitment to land reform and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's natural resources. It is clear from this that reforms to bring about access to water are allowed by the property clause. One of the main questions discussed in this thesis was whether section 32 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 that made more water available for distribution for reform purposes by cancelling unexercised water user rights, leads to an arbitrary deprivation or an expropriation of property. It should be noted that section 32 of the National Water Act did not constitute an arbitrary deprivation of property, as sufficient reason exists for water law reform. A possible constitutional challenge based on the lack of due process of law because of the retrospective operation of the section may possibly be averted because of the existence of section 33 of the National Water Act. Section 33 of the Act mitigates hardship by allowing unexercised water uses to be declared existing lawful water uses in certain circumstances where a good reason for the non–exercise of the water use right existed. Even in cases where section 33 does not prevent section 32 from being regarded as an arbitrary deprivation of property because there still was not a proper procedure, the government will probably be able to show that the limitation in section 32 is, in terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution of 1996, reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society. Despite the fact that section 25(1) prohibits arbitrary deprivations, it does not prohibit the government from regulating competing rights to use water even though some people may be negatively affected by the regulation. Because the Minister merely acts as public trustee of the nation's water resources on behalf of the national government in terms section 3(1) of the National Water Act, it cannot be claimed that the government acquired the cancelled water use rights. A claim that compensation should be paid for an expropriation of property will therefore not succeed. Compensation is only payable in terms of section 22(6) and section 22(7) of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 for a loss of existing water entitlements, such as existing lawful water uses or existing licences. A court should thus consider interpreting section 25 by providing for compensation where an individual was unfairly burdened and was therefore denied the protection of the equality clause in section 9 of the Constitution when his unexercised water use rights were cancelled by section 32. The concept "beneficial use" currently restricts the content of the water use entitlement existing in terms of section 4 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998. The loss of the entitlement when inter alia a licence for an existing lawful water use is refused, is not protected by the payment of compensation when water is used in an unfair or disproportionate manner, because such utilisation would not be regarded to be beneficial use. It became apparent that in terms of the current water law dispensation in South Africa, the possibility of compensation for an amendment of a water use licence and the refusal of a licence for an existing lawful water use implies that a water use entitlement is a right in property. The fact that section 22(7) of the National Water Act states that the amount of the compensation must be determined in accordance with section 25(3) of the Constitution implies that the legislature also recognises that a water use entitlement is constitutional property. Section 22(7) of the National Water Act underlines the basic premises of the National Water Act by subjecting the amount of the compensation that is payable to the same limitations that restrict the entitlement to use the water. The stipulations of section 22(7) draw the attention to the fact that the exercise of both existing lawful water uses and water use licences as rights in property is subject to basic principles of the National Water Act such as the Reserve and the concepts "public trusteeship" and "beneficial use" of the water resources. The fact that compensation is only payable when there has been severe prejudice to the economic viability of an undertaking implies that water use entitlements have to be exercised at the time of the application for the compensation to be payable. The concept "beneficial use" – in the sense that a water use must not be wasteful or polluting and in the sense that only water use entitlements that are being exercised are protected – thus restricts the water use entitlement as a property right. During the research, American and Australian water law reform and their interpretation of their property clauses were compared to water law reform in South Africa and the South African property clause. Furthermore, Australian policy to encourage more beneficial water use by the trade in water entitlements or allocations, was also discussed. South Africans will likely in future be encouraged to trade in water use entitlements or allocations. The objective with allowing the trade in water use entitlements or allocations is to encourage people to rather use water for uses with a high value instead of uses with a lower value. In this way the concept "beneficial use" may be broadened to include water allocation or entitlement trading. However, it was argued that a disproportionate impact on third parties would mean that water allocation or entitlement trading would in some cases not be regarded as beneficial use anymore.
Thesis (LL.D.)--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

For at least the past two decades, international Anglicanism has been gripped by a crisis of identity: what is to be the dynamic between autonomy and interdependence? Where is authority to be located? How might the local relate to the international? How are the variously diverse national churches to be held together 'in communion'? These questions have prompted an explosion of interest in Anglican ecclesiology within both the church and academy, with particular emphasis exploring the nature of episcopacy, synodical government, liturgy and belief, and common principles of canon law. However, one aspect of Anglican ecclesiology which has received little attention is the place of provincial polity and metropolitical authority across the Communion. Yet, this is a critical area of concern for Anglican ecclesiology as it directly addresses questions of authority, interdependence and catholicity. However, since at least the twentieth century, provincial polity has largely been eclipsed by, and confused with, the emergence of a dominant 'national church' polity. This confusion has become so prevalent that the word 'province' itself is used interchangeably and imprecisely to mean both an ecclesial province in its strict sense and one of the 39 'member- churches' which formally constitute the Anglican Communion, with a handful of 'extra-provincial' exceptions. The purpose of this research project is to untangle this confusion and to give a thorough account of the development of provincial polity and metropolitical authority within the Communion, tracing the historical origins of the contemporary status quo. The scope of this task is not in any way intended to be a comprehensive history of the emergence of international Anglicanism, but rather to narrowly chart the development of this particular unit of ecclesial polity, the province, through this broader narrative. The historical work of Part One in itself represents an important new contribution to Anglican Studies; however, the project aims to go further in Parts Two and Three to identify from this context key questions concerning the problems facing contemporary Anglican polity as the basis for further theological and ecclesiological reflection. Part Two examines how provincial polity has given way to an assumption of the 'national church' as the building block of the Communion. To what extent is it consonant with Anglican tradition? How is it problematic? What tensions exist with a more traditional understanding of the province? How might all this relate to wider political understandings and critiques of the 'nation- state' in an increasingly globalised world? Along with the emergence of a 'national church' ecclesiology, so too has the role of the 'Primates' been magnified. Part Three charts this development, culminating in a critique of the recent 2016 Primates' Meeting. What is the nature of primacy within Anglicanism and how does it relate to metropolitical authority? What is the right balance of honour and authority as it relates to primacy? How do Anglican understandings of primacy correspond to those of the Roman and Orthodox Communions? Finally, Part Four attempts to give some concrete focus to the preceding discussion through the illustrative example of the Anglican Church of Australia, which is frequently cited as being analogous to the Communion in having a loose federal system and resolutely autonomous dioceses. The prevalence of this 'diocesanism' has recently been criticised by the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse. However, there has been a recent revival of provincial action within the Province of Victoria in response to these issues which will be evaluated to discern what the Australian example might offer toward a theologically robust and credible ecclesiology for Anglicanism into the twenty-first century.

A ‘democratic deficit’ has been well identified in the operations of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG). This has previously been identified as a primarily political problem. However, perhaps there is more to the story. If COAG is fulfilling a constitutional role as well as a political role, the consequences of its democratic deficit could be far more wide-reaching, threatening the democratic integrity of the constitutional system. In order to determine whether this is the case, this thesis will do two things. First, it will establish whether COAG is a constitutional convention. If this is the case, COAG will be fulfilling a constitutional role and should be considered part of the constitutional framework. Second, this thesis will extrapolate what the consequences of the democratic deficit would be if COAG was a constitutional institution rather than a political one. Answers to these questions will be crucial in developing our system of government to accommodate both democracy and federalism. To do nothing would see democracy further sacrificed in the face of federalism.
Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, Law School, 2016.

This thesis considers various interactions between law, conscience, and religion in three countries: Germany, the United States, and Australia. Looking in detail at recent controversies, including those over headscarves and crucifixes, and sometimes exploring philosophical and theological themes, this thesis makes comparisons across these countries based on case law, existing legislation, and constitutional provisions, as well as proposed legislative reform. The thesis also considers debates that occur inside religious traditions and reflects upon how such discussions impact the well-established sincerity test, which prohibits courts from taking positions on theological questions. Understanding a foreign solution to a familiar problem often leads to a more precise grasp of one’s own law. This thesis applies this axiom to inform debate in the future work of Australian federal and state Parliaments as they attempt to protect freedom of conscience and religion in a complex social milieu.
Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, Law School, 2020

Immigration detention in Australia - consistency with international prohibition on arbitrary detention. Consequences in Australia of international illegality. Scope of Commonwealth legislative power, relevant limitations on legislative power.
Introduction Chapter i: Immigration detention under international law Chapter ii: International human rights law in Australia Chapter iii: Australian constitutional law Conclusion Bibliography

This thesis seeks to resolve a particular problem in the Australian human rights regime—the conflict between the legal right to equal treatment and the conscientious claim to a right to refuse equal treatment. A right may be claimed to discriminate in respect of protected attributes in exception to the legal right to equality. The problem arises when vendors of goods or services claim that as a manifestation of their religious liberty, they have the right to refuse to deal with customers who possess a protected attribute because to do so would offend their conscientiously-held objections in relation to that attribute. Whether and how such a right should be granted in diminution of the right to equal treatment thus creates a problem. Despite legislation and litigation seeking some form of balance between liberty and equality, the problem remains unresolved and appears incapable of resolution. The only solution suggested to date has been the creation of further exceptions and ad hoc exemptions to equality laws permitting discrimination in cases where the conscience is impinged. An ideal solution to the problem should be guided by sufficiently clear principles that avoids the need to call upon the legislature for amendments to cater for new categories of conscientious objection or for the courts to resolve ongoing interpretational disputes. Solutions that require either ongoing legislative amendment or judicial intervention are unlikely to provide an efficient, durable, workable solution to the problem. Can religious freedom be protected in Australia without the need for the continual creation of conscientious exceptions to equality laws? And, if so, under what theoretical framework? The answer to the first question is ‘yes’. In answer to the second, a theoretical framework is to be found in ‘constitutional spatial theory’, the elements of which are outlined in the thesis. The principal element, human dignity, is all but completely absent in the Australian regime. This thesis argues that the need to provide for ongoing exceptions and exemptions can be overcome. Introducing a concept of ‘constitutional space’ would provide the missing principled rationale by limitation of rights and freedoms to their allocated spaces, avoiding encroachment upon other rights. It would also break the current mendicant cycle of advocacy, begging for a place for religious freedom in the current paradigm of exemptions. The resolution is presented in four stages to produce a novel system for dealing with human rights in Australia and resolving the conflict identified in respect of religious freedom: 1. The first stage is the formulation of a hypothesis that there can be a theoretical framework, not previously applied to the problem in Australia, involving the constitutional spatial theory and the principle of human dignity, which can be tested in three ways. 2. The second stage is the first test of the hypothesis—namely, whether such a theory can be formulated. 3. The third stage is the second test of the hypothesis—namely, whether the theory can embrace human dignity as a part of its resolution of the problem. 4. The fourth stage is the third test of the hypothesis—namely, whether the theory, embracing human dignity, can provide, first, a constitutional space for religious freedom and, secondly, a durable solution to the problem without creating exceptions and ad hoc exemptions to equality laws for conscience. The thesis presents a novel framework. That framework, first, enshrines human dignity as the dominant and guiding principle; secondly, it guarantees rights by a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights, creating a new constitutional space for religious freedom; and thirdly, it finally resolves the clash of discrimination and equality by the invocation of the Hohfeldian rights theory.
Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Law, 2022

Ideas that are migrating from Canada are already guiding advocates who seek greater judicial and constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. However, there is a need for a conceptual framework through which to approach the lessons that can be learned from Canada in this area. Inspired by The Migration of Constitutional Ideas, an edited work by Sujit Choudhry, in this thesis I argue that by thinking about the migration and transplantation of foundational ideas and by differentiating between four ‘modes’ of migration (arguments of counsel, judicial determinations, academic critique and constitutional reform deliberations), it is possible to better understand some of the processes that are at play. In particular, by adopting the terminology of the ‘migration’ and ‘transplantation’ of ‘foundational’ ideas, I aim to demonstrate that it is dangerous to transplant foundational ideas, whether derived from the common law or constitutional law, without other ideas (particularly in relation to implications) also migrating. This thesis is a response to two distinct but related topics: ‘Topic 1 — The Potential for Judicial Recognition of Indigenous Self-Government Rights: The Migration of Foundational Ideas from Canada to Australia’ and ‘Topic 2 — Constitutional Recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples, the Race Power and an Anti-Discrimination Guarantee: Contemplating Canadian Approaches to Equality’. Through these two topics I examine two of the recognised modes of recognition — judicial and constitutional — and focus on two discrete types of recognition — self-government and non-discrimination — and the lessons that can be learned from Canada. In response to the first topic I consider the extent to which foundational ideas are migrating from Canada to Australia in the field of Indigenous self-government rights and whether these ideas could be used in Australian courts. In response to the second topic I consider the extent to which Canadian experiences may assist when exploring the potential implications of prohibiting discrimination in the Australian Constitution and when examining the various options that are available. As far as the migration of foundational ideas from Canada is concerned, in Topic 1 my starting point is to consider what could be learned from the Canadian jurisprudence in order to understand the ideas that have migrated or could potentially migrate to Australia. In contrast, in Topic 2 I start with an appraisal of the lack of recognition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in the Australian Constitution and the perceived problems with s 51(xxvi) (the ‘race power’), and in so doing I consider what benefits (modified) Canadian transplants may offer, if any.

This thesis examines internal union and external factors affecting union relations with Aboriginal workers in the wool and cattle sectors of the South Australian and Northern Territory pastoral industries, from union formation in the nineteenth century to the cold war period in the 1950s.
PhD Doctorate

Justice Deane was a member of the High Court from 1982 until 1995. This thesis examines Deane's constitutional jurisprudence during this period and argues that his decisions were permeated by themes and principles forming a coherent vision of the Constitution and its interpretation. Although voiced most fully in Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times (1994) 182 CLR 104, Deane's constitutional vision was evident from his earliest High Court decisions. Central to Deane's constitutional philosophy was his concept of 'the people'. Deane regarded 'the people' as the source of legal authority of the Constitution, and the Constitution as ultimately concerned with their governance and protection. Although Deane recognised the importance of representative democracy as a fundamental commitment of the Constitution, it was the Court, and judicial process, that for Deane was the most important guarantee of individual liberty. Consistent with this understanding of the role of the Court, Deane's jurisprudence favoured rights-sensitive interpretations of the Constitution's text, including the development of a number of innovative, and controversial, implied constitutional rights. These features of Deane's constitutional jurisprudence, matched with his reliance on broad and flexible interpretive principles in constitutional interpretation, challenged orthodox assumptions of the legitimate limits on judicial review in the Australian constitutional system. In the years since Deane's departure from the Court the concept of 'the people' as the source of the Constitution's authority has gained wide acceptance. Few have also accepted Deane's bold vision of the Court's duty to protect the fundamental rights of 'the people' from legislative interference. Until this aspect of Deane's constitutional vision is adopted, some of his more controversial interpretations of the Constitution are unlikely to gain the acceptance of a majority of the Court. However, much of Deane's jurisprudence displays his reliance on his distinctive concept of 'the people' to support the application of both established principles of constitutional interpretation and a number of innovative interpretive principles to derive moderate conclusions on the meaning and effect of the Constitution. For this reason, Deane's jurisprudence contains many fresh and compelling answers to questions regarding the meaning of the Constitution in contemporary Australia.

This thesis examines the legal relationship between police and government in Australia to ascertain the extent to which the statutory forms and the understanding of those forms allow Australian police forces to be subject to direct or indirect government direction. The thesis also proposes areas of law reform to establish a constitutionally and legally coherent relationship. The methodology for the thesis is doctrinal and documentary. It involves examination of the statutory, parliamentary, judicial and historical record in Australia and comparable jurisdictions (predominantly United Kingdom and Canada) to ascertain the elements of the different models, the reason for their enactment and how they have been applied and understood. The thesis finds that there are three different statutory approaches used in Australia: the No, Broad and Limited Direction Models. However, the understanding of those models and the development of the Limited Direction Model, has been confused by a supposed doctrine of police independence developed during the 20th century based on flawed legal and historical considerations. Those flawed considerations include: • Selective use of the historical record; • Ignoring expressions of parliamentary intention when interpreting legislation; • Misapplication of judicial authorities; • Inflating the significance of the office of constable; • Misunderstanding and misapplying the doctrine of separation of powers; • Applying a flawed ‘mythology’ regarding Sir Robert Peel and his intentions; and • Minimising the constitutional significance of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. This flawed view, combined with an erroneous understanding constitutional conventions, have led to a widely held but confused understanding of the police government relationship in Australia that police are, or should be independent of government in relation to ‘operational’ matters, but with no settled view as to the meaning of that term. This is further confused by another widely held view that policy decisions are the preserve of government, even though policy and operations are related and not contradictory concepts. The thesis has also identified a further area of confusion in the relationship, being significant legislative reductions to the security of tenure of Police Commissioners. All State police Commissioners are now employed for 5 year terms and most have little or no protection from arbitrary termination of appointment. This provide a means for indirect influence in a non transparent manner over Police Commissioners. Given this confused relationship the thesis proposes elements as a basis for the development of a coherent constitutional relationship. Those elements are: • Basing the relationship on the doctrine of ministerial responsibility with government empowered to direct police on all or the majority of policing matters. The only exclusions would be matters which can be demonstrated as inappropriate for government to direct. This element is consistent with government’s responsibility for policing and recognises that the effectiveness of police, as with other statutory bodies, can require certain well defined areas of independence. • Requiring the government direction power to be exercised transparently; which will ensure that governments are subject to scrutiny for exercises of that power. • Increasing the security of tenure for Police Commissioners, so as to reduce indirect government influence over police.

This thesis argues that the ‘rule of law’ was not followed in colonial and post-federation Australia in relation to a fundamental principle of the common law. According to the rule in Calvin’s Case (1608), no person born as a ‘subject’ in any part of the King’s dominions could be an ‘alien’. This was the legal position in Australia from the reception of English law until well after federation. In colonial and post-federation Australia the racial meaning of ‘alien’ was consistently used in political and legal contexts instead of its proper legal meaning. In legislation and parliamentary debates, cases and prosecutions, inter-colonial conferences and conventions it was employed to refer not merely to those who were ‘aliens’ under the common law but also to people regarded as ‘aliens’ in the broader or racial sense of the word, especially those of non-European background. Chinese and Indian settlers, Pacific islanders and even indigenous Australians were treated as ‘aliens’ in Australia even if under British law they were actually ‘subjects’ of the Crown and not ‘aliens’ at all in the accepted legal sense. In the 1820s and 1830s the New South Wales Supreme Court thought it inconceivable that ‘barbarous’ indigenous inhabitants could ‘owe fealty’ or allegiance to the British Crown, considering their legal position analogous to that of ‘foreigners’ or ‘strangers’. In debates on exclusionary legislation in the 1870s and 1880s, parliamentarians in the Australian colonies portrayed all Chinese settlers as ‘aliens’, despite acknowledging that many came from Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements or other British possessions. Immigrants from British India were generally treated the same way. Delegates to Australia’s constitutional conventions in the 1890s, including prominent legal figures, repeated this mistake. And in the 1900s Pacific islanders born in Australia as British subjects were deported as ‘aliens’ with the approval of the Australian High Court. The misuse of ‘alien’ in this case contributed to a defective judgment still cited today in support of the Commonwealth’s claims to extensive exclusionary power. Between federation and the Second World War, Queensland’s dictation test legislation and industrial awards regulating various occupations provide many examples of the misuse and manipulation of the term ‘alien’ in a legal context. In prosecutions under these laws the word was used as a weapon against non-Europeans whether they were ‘aliens’ under the law or not. Commentators both in the early years of federation and in more recent times have failed to identify the misuse of ‘alien’– and have made the same error themselves. This mistake is critical because of the continued force of the term in Australian law. The Commonwealth’s sweeping power to define who shall be citizens of Australia and to exclude, detain indefinitely without trial and deport ‘aliens’ is still justified by reference to colonial and post-federation cases and constitutional convention debates where ‘alien’ was incorrectly used in its racial sense contrary to the rule of law.