Academic literature on the topic 'Australian army equipment'

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Journal articles on the topic "Australian army equipment"

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Daly, Liz. "The Effects of Current Cold Chain Management Equipment in Controlling the Temperature of Pharmaceutical Stores in an Australian Defence Force Exercise Environment." Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 34, s1 (May 2019): s124. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049023x1900267x.

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Aim:The purpose of this pilot study was to analyze the current cold chain storage methods of Class 8 stores, specifically thermolabile medications and temperature sensitive diagnostics, dressings, and fluids, for the Australian Army in a training area within Australia. This research was designed to identify deficiencies in current storage methods, including the inability to maintain the recommended storage temperature of pharmaceutical stores in accordance with the Therapeutic Goods Administration, as well as foster communication between key stakeholders, including the Royal Australian Army Medical Corps and the Department of Defence Joint Health Command, and to develop a cold chain protocol specific for the Australian Defence Force.Methods:This pilot study identified the common occurrence of breaches in a specific climate and recommends that current mission essential equipment be replaced. It also discusses the need for clearly defined guidelines with accountability of the stakeholders to ensure that the provision of health support to all Australian Defence Force personnel is in accordance with civilian standards.Results:This pilot study identified that the carried thermolabile medications and temperature sensitive diagnostics, dressings, and fluids were commonly exposed to temperatures outside the range recommended by the manufacturers. These findings related mainly to the storage equipment for Class 8 stores used by the Army. As a result, it is recommended that such equipment is replaced so that the cold chain storage meets the Therapeutic Goods Administration Guidelines to ensure that health support to Australian Defence Force Personnel in the field is in accordance with the standard of care expected at a civilian health facility.Discussion:This pilot study has enabled the Australian Defence Force to qualify and quantify the temperature exposure of the medications and stores and engage with key stakeholders to trial and apply new technologies and processes for the management of the cold chain.
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Astika Pidada, Ida Bagus. "PERALATAN PERANG NICA DALAM MENGHADAPI PEJUANG PADA MASA REVOLUSI FISIK DI BALI TAHUN 1945 - 1950." KULTURISTIK: Jurnal Bahasa dan Budaya 3, no. 1 (January 18, 2019): 42. http://dx.doi.org/10.22225/kulturistik.3.1.939.

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[Title: The Nica War Equipment in Facing Patriots in Physical Revolution in Bali In 1945 – 1950] Giving up without the conditions of Lieutenant General H. Ter Poorten (Commander of the Dutch East Indies) on behalf of the United States Army in Indonesia to Liuetenant General Hiroshi Imamura (Japanese Army Leader). Since the Dutch East Indies government ended in Indonesia. At that time Dutch soldiers who were Japanese prisoners of war because they did not have time to flee to Australia were sent to the interior of Siam and Birma to clear forests and make bridges and railways. On August 15th 1945, Japan finally surrendered to allies. This defeat of Japan caused the captives of the Dutch to quickly hold preparatory exercises back to Indonesia. The arrival of the Dutch in Bali received resistance from the fighters under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel I Gusti Ngurah Rai. Although the weapons possessed by fighters in Bali is limited but the struggle is long enough to survive. NICA in the face of fighters in Bali during the physical revolution has used modern war equipment such as: pipercub airplanes, lucked airplanes, motorbikes, jeeps, telephones, bren, mitraliur, stengun, mortar, lichthalon and others but not easy can beat him. This is because the fighters with the people in Bali are united.
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Baikushikova, G. "GLOBAL ARMS MARKET: KEY PLAYERS, FEATURES, TRENDS." BULLETIN Series of Sociological and Political sciences 74, no. 2 (June 30, 2021): 155–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.51889/2021-2.1728-8940.23.

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This article analyzes the current situation in the global arms market. The authors of the article study the role of the main players in the international arms and military equipment market, determine the main trends in the development of the world arms market, analyze the current statistical data characterizing the state of this market. The analysis allows us to conclude that, despite significant dynamic and structural changes, the demand for weapons in the world is not decreasing, as is the competition between the main suppliers of weapons. The intensification of military-political tensions led to an acceleration in the growth rates of the world arms trade. In addition, the geographic vector of development is changing in the global arms market. If in the second half of the twentieth century the Middle East actively acted as importing countries, then in the twenty-first century the center of world trade in military products shifted to Asia and Oceania, where the main importers of weapons are India, Pakistan, Vietnam, Singapore, South Korea, Indonesia, Japan and Australia. Most recently, there has been a new increase in demand for weapons from the Middle Eastern states, primarily Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and Egypt.
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Ningsih, Tiwi Gustria. "NUCLEAR POWERED WARSHIP, DOES INDONESIA NEED IT?" Jurnal Strategi Pertahanan Laut 8, no. 1 (June 14, 2022): 16. http://dx.doi.org/10.33172/spl.v8i1.1039.

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The regional security environment is heating up due to the formation of defense cooperation between Australia, America and Britain (AUKUS) with their first agreement, namely the procurement of nuclear-powered attack submarines for Australia from the US. Through the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia expressed that Indonesia is concerned about the decision because it could disrupt regional security stability and also lead to an arms race. However, this nuclear-powered submarine has many advantages that conventional diesel-powered submarines do not have. Actually, what is a nuclear-powered submarine? Which countries have used it? And does Indonesia also need submarines or other nuclear-powered warships? These three questions will be discussed in research using qualitative methods by considering previous research and international law related to maritime affairs and defense. Although Indonesia needs modernization of defense equipment to be able to balance its power with regional countries, there are many considerations if the modernization is carried out by procuring nuclear-powered submarines, ranging from costs, human resources, facilities, Indonesian principles to applicable international law .
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Lam, Ricky, Rhys Hillsley, Jun Steele, and Steve Whitfield. "Developing Cultural Competence In Paramedic Education: An Analysis of Culturally Diverse Training Equipment Amongst Universities In Australia And New Zealand." Australian Journal of Clinical Education, November 3, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.53300/001c.40320.

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Aim: This study aims to identify the availability of culturally diverse training equipment across approved paramedicine undergraduate degrees in Australia and New Zealand and explore its impact on a university’s ability to teach paramedic care that is culturally safe and competent. Methodology: Academic staff from 16 university accredited paramedicine programs across Australia and New Zealand were invited to complete an online survey about their access to culturally diverse training equipment and their ability to teach culturally competent paramedic care. Responses were then summarised in tables. Results: There were a total of 14 responses. The total number of students enrolled in each program ranged from <100 - >500. There are a total of at least 140 ALS manikin, only twelve (n=12) identified as reflecting people of colour. In addition to this, there were 145 cannulation arms, 27 (n=27) were identified as being of colour. Most respondents believed that their university developed emerging skills in culturally competent paramedic care. Conclusion: Access to culturally diverse training equipment across Australian and New Zealand universities is limited. Access to culturally diverse training equipment impacts a university’s ability to teach paramedicine students culturally safe practice through simulation-based learning. Greater access to culturally diverse equipment plays an important role in a university’s ability to make students more culturally aware. It was concluded that acquiring more culturally diverse training equipment will lead to greater levels of cultural competence amongst paramedicine students.
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Keegan, Richard James, Andrew Flood, Theo Niyonsenga, Marijke Welvaert, Ben Rattray, Mustafa Sarkar, Lee Melberzs, and David Crone. "Development and Initial Validation of an Acute Readiness Monitoring Scale in Military Personnel." Frontiers in Psychology 12 (November 18, 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2021.738609.

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Personnel in many professions must remain “ready” to perform diverse activities. Managing individual and collective capability is a common concern for leadership and decision makers. Typical existing approaches for monitoring readiness involve keeping detailed records of training, health and equipment maintenance, or – less commonly – data from wearable devices that can be difficult to interpret as well as raising privacy concerns. A widely applicable, simple psychometric measure of perceived readiness would be invaluable in generating rapid evaluations of current capability directly from personnel. To develop this measure, we conducted exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis with a sample of 770 Australian military personnel. The 32-item Acute Readiness Monitoring Scale (ARMS) demonstrated good model fit, and comprised nine factors: overall readiness; physical readiness; physical fatigue; cognitive readiness; cognitive fatigue; threat-challenge (i.e., emotional/coping) readiness; skills-and-training readiness; group-team readiness, and equipment readiness. Readiness factors were negatively correlated with recent stress, current negative affect and distress, and positively correlated with resilience, wellbeing, current positive affect and a supervisor’s rating of solider readiness. The development of the ARMS facilitates a range of new research opportunities: enabling quick, simple and easily interpreted assessment of individual and group readiness.
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Koorts, Harriet, Anna Timperio, Gavin Abbott, Lauren Arundell, Nicola D. Ridgers, Ester Cerin, Helen Brown, et al. "Is level of implementation linked with intervention outcomes? Process evaluation of the TransformUs intervention to increase children’s physical activity and reduce sedentary behaviour." International Journal of Behavioral Nutrition and Physical Activity 19, no. 1 (September 17, 2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12966-022-01354-5.

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Abstract Background TransformUs was a four-arm school-based intervention to increase physical activity and reduce sedentary behaviour among primary school children. Pedagogical and environmental strategies targeted the classroom, school grounds and family setting. The aims of this study were to evaluate program fidelity, dose, appropriateness, satisfaction and sustainability, and associations between implementation level and outcomes among the three intervention arms. Methods At baseline, 18-months (mid-intervention) and 30-months (post-intervention), teachers, parents and children completed surveys, and children wore GT3X ActiGraph accelerometers for 8 days at each time point to determine physical activity and sedentary time. Implementation data were pooled across the three intervention groups and teachers were categorised by level of implementation: (i) ‘Low’ (< 33% delivered); (ii) ‘Moderate’ (33–67% delivered); and (iii) ‘High’ (> 67% delivered). Linear and logistic mixed models examined between group differences in implementation, and the association with children’s physical activity and sedentary time outcomes. Qualitative survey data were analysed thematically. Results Among intervention recipients, 52% (n = 85) of teachers, 29% (n = 331) of parents and 92% (n = 407) of children completed baseline evaluation surveys. At 18-months, teachers delivered on average 70% of the key messages, 65% set active/standing homework, 30% reported delivering > 1 standing lesson/day, and 56% delivered active breaks per day. The majority of teachers (96%) made activity/sports equipment available during recess and lunch, and also used this equipment in class (81%). Fidelity and dose of key messages and active homework reduced over time, whilst fidelity of standing lessons, active breaks and equipment use increased. TransformUs was deemed appropriate for the school setting and positively received. Implementation level and child behavioural outcomes were not associated. Integration of TransformUs into existing practices, children’s enjoyment, and teachers’ awareness of program benefits all facilitated delivery and sustainability. Conclusions This study demonstrated that intervention dose and fidelity increased over time, and that children’s enjoyment, senior school leadership and effective integration of interventions into school practices facilitated improved intervention delivery and sustainability. Teacher implementation level and child behavioural outcomes were unrelated, suggesting intervention efficacy was achieved irrespective of implementation variability. The potential translatability of TransformUs into practice contexts may therefore be increased. Findings have informed scale-up of TransformUs across Victoria, Australia. Trial registration International Standard Randomized Controlled Trial Number ISRCTN83725066; Australian New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry Number ACTRN12609000715279. Registered 19 August 2009. Available at: https://www.anzctr.org.au/Trial/Registration/TrialReview.aspx?id=308387&isReview=true
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King, Emerald L., and Denise N. Rall. "Re-imagining the Empire of Japan through Japanese Schoolboy Uniforms." M/C Journal 18, no. 6 (March 7, 2016). http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/mcj.1041.

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Introduction“From every kind of man obedience I expect; I’m the Emperor of Japan.” (“Miyasama,” from Gilbert and Sullivan’s musical The Mikado, 1885)This commentary is facilitated by—surprisingly resilient—oriental stereotypes of an imagined Japan (think of Oscar Wilde’s assertion, in 1889, that Japan was a European invention). During the Victorian era, in Britain, there was a craze for all things oriental, particularly ceramics and “there was a craze for all things Japanese and no middle class drawing room was without its Japanese fan or teapot.“ (V&A Victorian). These pastoral depictions of the ‘oriental life’ included the figures of men and women in oriental garb, with fans, stilt shoes, kimono-like robes, and appropriate headdresses, engaging in garden-based activities, especially tea ceremony variations (Landow). In fact, tea itself, and the idea of a ceremony of serving it, had taken up a central role, even an obsession in middle- and upper-class Victorian life. Similarly, landscapes with wild seas, rugged rocks and stunted pines, wizened monks, pagodas and temples, and particular fauna and flora (cranes and other birds flying through clouds of peonies, cherry blossoms and chrysanthemums) were very popular motifs (see Martin and Koda). Rather than authenticity, these designs heightened the Western-based romantic stereotypes associated with a stylised form of Japanese life, conducted sedately under rule of the Japanese Imperial Court. In reality, prior to the Meiji period (1868–1912), the Emperor was largely removed from everyday concerns, residing as an isolated, holy figure in Kyoto, the traditional capital of Japan. Japan was instead ruled from Edo (modern day Tokyo) led by the Shogun and his generals, according to a strict Confucian influenced code (see Keene). In Japan, as elsewhere, the presence of feudal-style governance includes policies that determine much of everyday life, including restrictions on clothing (Rall 169). The Samurai code was no different, and included a series of protocols that restricted rank, movement, behaviour, and clothing. As Vincent has noted in the case of the ‘lace tax’ in Great Britain, these restrictions were designed to punish those who seek to penetrate the upper classes through their costume (28-30). In Japan, pre-Meiji sumptuary laws, for example, restricted the use of gold, and prohibited the use of a certain shade of red by merchant classes (V&A Kimono).Therefore, in the governance of pre-globalised societies, the importance of clothing and textile is evident; as Jones and Stallybrass comment: We need to understand the antimatedness of clothes, their ability to “pick up” subjects, to mould and shape them both physically and socially—to constitute subjects through their power as material memories […] Clothing is a worn world: a world of social relations put upon the wearer’s body. (2-3, emphasis added)The significant re-imagining of Japanese cultural and national identities are explored here through the cataclysmic impact of Western ideologies on Japanese cultural traditions. There are many ways to examine how indigenous cultures respond to European, British, or American (hereafter Western) influences, particularly in times of conflict (Wilk). Western ideology arrived in Japan after a long period of isolation (during which time Japan’s only contact was with Dutch traders) through the threat of military hostility and war. It is after this outside threat was realised that Japan’s adoption of military and industrial practices begins. The re-imagining of their national identity took many forms, and the inclusion of a Western-style military costuming as a schoolboy uniform became a highly visible indicator of Japan’s mission to protect its sovereign integrity. A brief history of Japan’s rise from a collection of isolated feudal states to a unified military power, in not only the Asian Pacific region but globally, demonstrates the speed at which they adopted the Western mode of warfare. Gunboats on Japan’s ShorelinesJapan was forcefully opened to the West in the 1850s by America under threat of First Name Perry’s ‘gunboat diplomacy’ (Hillsborough 7-8). Following this, Japan underwent a rapid period of modernisation, and an upsurge in nationalism and military expansion that was driven by a desire to catch up to the European powers present in the Pacific. Noted by Ian Ferguson in Civilization: The West and the Rest, Unsure, the Japanese decided […] to copy everything […] Japanese institutions were refashioned on Western models. The army drilled like Germans; the navy sailed like Britons. An American-style system of state elementary and middle schools was also introduced. (221, emphasis added)This was nothing short of a wide-scale reorganisation of Japan’s entire social structure and governance. Under the Emperor Meiji, who wrested power from the Shogunate and reclaimed it for the Imperial head, Japan steamed into an industrial revolution, achieving in a matter of years what had taken Europe over a century.Japan quickly became a major player-elect on the world stage. However, as an island nation, Japan lacked the essentials of both coal and iron with which to fashion not only industrial machinery but also military equipment, the machinery of war. In 1875 Japan forced Korea to open itself to foreign (read: Japanese) trade. In the same treaty, Korea was recognised as a sovereign nation, separate from Qing China (Tucker 1461). The necessity for raw materials then led to the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), a conflict between Japan and China that marked the emergence of Japan as a major world power. The Korean Peninsula had long been China’s most important client state, but its strategic location adjacent to the Japanese archipelago, and its natural resources of coal and iron, attracted Japan’s interest. Later, the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05), allowed a victorious Japan to force Russia to abandon its expansionist policy in the Far East, becoming the first Asian power in modern times to defeat a European power. The Russo-Japanese War developed out of the rivalry between Russia and Japan for dominance in Korea and Manchuria, again in the struggle for natural resources (Tucker 1534-46).Japan’s victories, together with the county’s drive for resources, meant that Japan could now determine its role within the Asia-Pacific sphere of influence. As Japan’s military, and their adoption of Westernised combat, proved effective in maintaining national integrity, other social institutions also looked to the West (Ferguson 221). In an ironic twist—while Victorian and Continental fashion was busy adopting the exotic, oriental look (Martin and Koda)—the kimono, along with other essentials of Japanese fashions, were rapidly altered (both literally and figuratively) to suit new, warlike ideology. It should be noted that kimono literally means ‘things that you wear’ and which, prior to exposure to Western fashions, signified all worn clothing (Dalby 65-119). “Wearing Things” in Westernised JapanAs Japan modernised during the late 1800s the kimono was positioned as symbolising barbaric, pre-modern, ‘oriental’ Japan. Indeed, on 17 January 1887 the Meiji Empress issued a memorandum on the subject of women’s clothing in Japan: “She [the Empress] believed that western clothes were in fact closer to the dress of women in ancient Japan than the kimonos currently worn and urged that they be adopted as the standard clothes of the reign” (Keene 404). The resemblance between Western skirts and blouses and the simple skirt and separate top that had been worn in ancient times by a people descended from the sun goddess, Amaterasu wo mikami, was used to give authority and cultural authenticity to Japan’s modernisation projects. The Imperial Court, with its newly ennobled European style aristocrats, exchanged kimono silks for Victorian finery, and samurai armour for military pomp and splendour (Figure 1).Figure 1: The Meiji Emperor, Empress and Crown Prince resplendent in European fashions on an outing to Asukayama Park. Illustration: Toyohara Chikanobu, circa 1890.It is argued here that the function of a uniform is to prepare the body for service. Maids and butlers, nurses and courtesans, doctors, policemen, and soldiers are all distinguished by their garb. Prudence Black states: “as a technology, uniforms shape and code the body so they become a unit that belongs to a collective whole” (93). The requirement to discipline bodies through clothing, particularly through uniforms, is well documented (see Craik, Peoples, and Foucault). The need to distinguish enemies from allies on the battlefield requires adherence to a set of defined protocols, as referenced in military fashion compendiums (see Molloy). While the postcolonial adoption of Western-based clothing reflects a new form of subservience (Rall, Kuechler and Miller), in Japan, the indigenous garments were clearly designed in the interests of ideological allegiance. To understand the Japanese sartorial traditions, the kimono itself must be read as providing a strong disciplinary element. The traditional garment is designed to represent an upright and unbending column—where two meters of under bindings are used to discipline the body into shape are then topped with a further four meters of a stiffened silk obi wrapped around the waist and lower chest. To dress formally in such a garment requires helpers (see Dalby). The kimono both constructs and confines the women who wear it, and presses them into their roles as dutiful, upper-class daughters (see Craik). From the 1890s through to the 1930s, when Japan again enters a period of militarism, the myth of the kimono again changes as it is integrated into the build-up towards World War II.Decades later, when Japan re-established itself as a global economic power in the 1970s and 1980s, the kimono was re-authenticated as Japan’s ‘traditional’ garment. This time it was not the myth of a people descended from solar deities that was on display, but that of samurai strength and propriety for men, alongside an exaggerated femininity for women, invoking a powerful vision of Japanese sartorial tradition. This reworking of the kimono was only possible as the garment was already contained within the framework of Confucian family duty. However, in the lead up to World War II, Japanese military advancement demanded of its people soldiers that could win European-style wars. The quickest solution was to copy the military acumen and strategies of global warfare, and the costumes of the soldiery and seamen of Europe, including Great Britain (Ferguson). It was also acknowledged that soldiers were ‘made not born’ so the Japanese educational system was re-vamped to emulate those of its military rivals (McVeigh). It was in the uptake of schoolboy uniforms that this re-imagining of Japanese imperial strength took place.The Japanese Schoolboy UniformCentral to their rapid modernisation, Japan adopted a constitutional system of education that borrowed from American and French models (Tipton 68-69). The government viewed education as a “primary means of developing a sense of nation,” and at its core, was the imperial authorities’ obsession with defining “Japan and Japaneseness” (Tipton 68-69). Numerous reforms eventually saw, after an abolition of fees, nearly 100% attendance by both boys and girls, despite a lingering mind-set that educating women was “a waste of time” (Tipton 68-69). A boys’ uniform based on the French and Prussian military uniforms of the 1860s and 1870s respectively (Kinsella 217), was adopted in 1879 (McVeigh 47). This jacket, initially with Prussian cape and cap, consists of a square body, standing mandarin style collar and a buttoned front. It was through these education reforms, as visually symbolised by the adoption of military style school uniforms, that citizen making, education, and military training became interrelated aspects of Meiji modernisation (Kinsella 217). Known as the gakuran (gaku: to study; ran: meaning both orchid, and a pun on Horanda, meaning Holland, the only Western country with trading relations in pre-Meiji Japan), these jackets were a symbol of education, indicating European knowledge, power and influence and came to reflect all things European in Meiji Japan. By adopting these jackets two objectives were realised:through the magical power of imitation, Japan would, by adopting the clothing of the West, naturally rise in military power; and boys were uniformed to become not only educated as quasi-Europeans, but as fighting soldiers and sons (suns) of the nation.The gakuran jacket was first popularised by state-run schools, however, in the century and a half that the garment has been in use it has come to symbolise young Japanese masculinity as showcased in campus films, anime, manga, computer games, and as fashion is the preeminent garment for boybands and Japanese hipsters.While the gakuran is central to the rise of global militarism in Japan (McVeigh 51-53), the jacket would go on to form the basis of the Sun Yat Sen and Mao Suits as symbols of revolutionary China (see McVeigh). Supposedly, Sun Yat Sen saw the schoolboy jacket in Japan as a utilitarian garment and adopted it with a turn down collar (Cumming et al.). For Sun Yat Sen, the gakuran was the perfect mix of civilian (school boy) and military (the garment’s Prussian heritage) allowing him to walk a middle path between the demands of both. Furthermore, the garment allowed Sun to navigate between Western style suits and old-fashioned Qing dynasty styles (Gerth 116); one was associated with the imperialism of the National Products Movement, while the other represented the corruption of the old dynasty. In this way, the gakuran was further politicised from a national (Japanese) symbol to a global one. While military uniforms have always been political garments, in the late 1800s and early 1900s, as the world was rocked by revolutions and war, civilian clothing also became a means of expressing political ideals (McVeigh 48-49). Note that Mahatma Ghandi’s clothing choices also evolved from wholly Western styles to traditional and emphasised domestic products (Gerth 116).Mao adopted this style circa 1927, further defining the style when he came to power by adding elements from the trousers, tunics, and black cotton shoes worn by peasants. The suit was further codified during the 1960s, reaching its height in the Cultural Revolution. While the gakuran has always been a scholarly black (see Figure 2), subtle differences in the colour palette differentiated the Chinese population—peasants and workers donned indigo blue Mao jackets, while the People’s Liberation Army Soldiers donned khaki green. This limited colour scheme somewhat paradoxically ensured that subtle hierarchical differences were maintained even whilst advocating egalitarian ideals (Davis 522). Both the Sun Yat Sen suit and the Mao jacket represented the rejection of bourgeois (Western) norms that objectified the female form in favour of a uniform society. Neo-Maoism and Mao fever of the early 1990s saw the Mao suit emerge again as a desirable piece of iconic/ironic youth fashion. Figure 2: An example of Gakuran uniform next to the girl’s equivalent on display at Ichikawa Gakuen School (Japan). Photo: Emerald King, 2015.There is a clear and vital link between the influence of the Prussian style Japanese schoolboy uniform on the later creation of the Mao jacket—that of the uniform as an integral piece of worn propaganda (Atkins).For Japan, the rapid deployment of new military and industrial technologies, as well as a sartorial need to present her leaders as modern (read: Western) demanded the adoption of European-style uniforms. The Imperial family had always been removed from Samurai battlefields, so the adoption of Western military costume allowed Japan’s rulers to present a uniform face to other global powers. When Japan found itself in conflict in the Asia Pacific Region, without an organised military, the first requirement was to completely reorganise their system of warfare from a feudal base and to train up national servicemen. Within an American-style compulsory education system, the European-based curriculum included training in mathematics, engineering and military history, as young Britons had for generations begun their education in Greek and Latin, with the study of Ancient Greek and Roman wars (Bantock). It is only in the classroom that ideological change on a mass scale can take place (Reference Please), a lesson not missed by later leaders such as Mao Zedong.ConclusionIn the 1880s, the Japanese leaders established their position in global politics by adopting clothing and practices from the West (Europeans, Britons, and Americans) in order to quickly re-shape their country’s educational system and military establishment. The prevailing military costume from foreign cultures not only disciplined their adopted European bodies, they enforced a new regime through dress (Rall 157-174). For boys, the gakuran symbolised the unity of education and militarism as central to Japanese masculinity. Wearing a uniform, as many authors suggest, furthers compliance (Craik, Nagasawa Kaiser and Hutton, and McVeigh). As conscription became a part of Japanese reality in World War II, the schoolboys just swapped their military-inspired school uniforms for genuine military garments.Re-imagining a Japanese schoolboy uniform from a European military costume might suit ideological purposes (Atkins), but there is more. The gakuran, as a uniform based on a close, but not fitted jacket, was the product of a process of advanced industrialisation in the garment-making industry also taking place in the 1800s:Between 1810 and 1830, technical calibrations invented by tailors working at the very highest level of the craft [in Britain] eventually made it possible for hundreds of suits to be cut up and made in advance [...] and the ready-to-wear idea was put into practice for men’s clothes […] originally for uniforms for the War of 1812. (Hollander 31) In this way, industrialisation became a means to mass production, which furthered militarisation, “the uniform is thus the clothing of the modern disciplinary society” (Black 102). There is a perfect resonance between Japan’s appetite for a modern military and their rise to an industrialised society, and their conquests in Asia Pacific supplied the necessary material resources that made such a rapid deployment possible. The Japanese schoolboy uniform was an integral part of the process of both industrialisation and militarisation, which instilled in the wearer a social role required by modern Japanese society in its rise for global power. Garments are never just clothing, but offer a “world of social relations put upon the wearer’s body” (Jones and Stallybrass 3-4).Today, both the Japanese kimono and the Japanese schoolboy uniform continue to interact with, and interrogate, global fashions as contemporary designers continue to call on the tropes of ‘military chic’ (Tonchi) and Japanese-inspired clothing (Kawamura). References Atkins, Jaqueline. Wearing Propaganda: Textiles on the Home Front in Japan, Britain, and the United States. Princeton: Yale UP, 2005.Bantock, Geoffrey Herman. Culture, Industrialisation and Education. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1968.Black, Prudence. “The Discipline of Appearance: Military Style and Australian Flight Hostess Uniforms 1930–1964.” Fashion & War in Popular Culture. Ed. Denise N. Rall. Bristol: Intellect/U Chicago P, 2014. 91-106.Craik, Jenifer. Uniforms Exposed: From Conformity to Transgression. Oxford: Berg, 2005.Cumming, Valerie, Cecil Williet Cunnington, and Phillis Emily Cunnington. “Mao Style.” The Dictionary of Fashion History. Eds. Valerie Cumming, Cecil Williet Cunnington, and Phillis Emily Cunnington. Oxford: Berg, 2010.Dalby, Liza, ed. Kimono: Fashioning Culture. London: Vintage, 2001.Davis, Edward L., ed. Encyclopaedia of Contemporary Chinese Culture. London: Routledge, 2005.Dees, Jan. Taisho Kimono: Speaking of Past and Present. Milan: Skira, 2009.Ferguson, N. Civilization: The West and the Rest. London: Penguin, 2011.Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Penguin, 1997. Gerth, Karl. China Made: Consumer Culture and the Creation of the Nation, Cambridge: East Asian Harvard Monograph 224, 2003.Gilbert, W.S., and Arthur Sullivan. The Mikado or, The Town of Titipu. 1885. 16 Nov. 2015 ‹http://math.boisestate.edu/gas/mikado/mk_lib.pdf›. Hillsborough, Romulus. Samurai Revolution: The Dawn of Modern Japan Seen through the Eyes of the Shogun's Last Samurai. Vermont: Tuttle, 2014.Jones, Anne R., and Peter Stallybrass, Renaissance Clothing and the Materials of Memory. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000.Keene, Donald. Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852-1912. New York: Columbia UP, 2002.King, Emerald L. “Schoolboys and Kimono Ladies.” Presentation to the Un-Thinking Asian Migrations Conference, University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, 24-26 Aug. 2014. Kinsella, Sharon. “What’s Behind the Fetishism of Japanese School Uniforms?” Fashion Theory 6.2 (2002): 215-37. Kuechler, Susanne, and Daniel Miller, eds. Clothing as Material Culture. Oxford: Berg, 2005.Landow, George P. “Liberty and the Evolution of the Liberty Style.” 22 Aug. 2010. ‹http://www.victorianweb.org/art/design/liberty/lstyle.html›.Martin, Richard, and Harold Koda. Orientalism: Vision of the East in Western Dress. New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1994.McVeigh, Brian J. 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Gao, Xiang. "‘Staying in the Nationalist Bubble’." M/C Journal 24, no. 1 (March 15, 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.5204/mcj.2745.

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Introduction The highly contagious COVID-19 virus has presented particularly difficult public policy challenges. The relatively late emergence of an effective treatments and vaccines, the structural stresses on health care systems, the lockdowns and the economic dislocations, the evident structural inequalities in effected societies, as well as the difficulty of prevention have tested social and political cohesion. Moreover, the intrusive nature of many prophylactic measures have led to individual liberty and human rights concerns. As noted by the Victorian (Australia) Ombudsman Report on the COVID-19 lockdown in Melbourne, we may be tempted, during a crisis, to view human rights as expendable in the pursuit of saving human lives. This thinking can lead to dangerous territory. It is not unlawful to curtail fundamental rights and freedoms when there are compelling reasons for doing so; human rights are inherently and inseparably a consideration of human lives. (5) These difficulties have raised issues about the importance of social or community capital in fighting the pandemic. This article discusses the impacts of social and community capital and other factors on the governmental efforts to combat the spread of infectious disease through the maintenance of social distancing and household ‘bubbles’. It argues that the beneficial effects of social and community capital towards fighting the pandemic, such as mutual respect and empathy, which underpins such public health measures as social distancing, the use of personal protective equipment, and lockdowns in the USA, have been undermined as preventive measures because they have been transmogrified to become a salient aspect of the “culture wars” (Peters). In contrast, states that have relatively lower social capital such a China have been able to more effectively arrest transmission of the disease because the government was been able to generate and personify a nationalist response to the virus and thus generate a more robust social consensus regarding the efforts to combat the disease. Social Capital and Culture Wars The response to COVID-19 required individuals, families, communities, and other types of groups to refrain from extensive interaction – to stay in their bubble. In these situations, especially given the asymptomatic nature of many COVID-19 infections and the serious imposition lockdowns and social distancing and isolation, the temptation for individuals to breach public health rules in high. From the perspective of policymakers, the response to fighting COVID-19 is a collective action problem. In studying collective action problems, scholars have paid much attention on the role of social and community capital (Ostrom and Ahn 17-35). Ostrom and Ahn comment that social capital “provides a synthesizing approach to how cultural, social, and institutional aspects of communities of various sizes jointly affect their capacity of dealing with collective-action problems” (24). Social capital is regarded as an evolving social type of cultural trait (Fukuyama; Guiso et al.). Adger argues that social capital “captures the nature of social relations” and “provides an explanation for how individuals use their relationships to other actors in societies for their own and for the collective good” (387). The most frequently used definition of social capital is the one proffered by Putnam who regards it as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, “Bowling Alone” 65). All these studies suggest that social and community capital has at least two elements: “objective associations” and subjective ties among individuals. Objective associations, or social networks, refer to both formal and informal associations that are formed and engaged in on a voluntary basis by individuals and social groups. Subjective ties or norms, on the other hand, primarily stand for trust and reciprocity (Paxton). High levels of social capital have generally been associated with democratic politics and civil societies whose institutional performance benefits from the coordinated actions and civic culture that has been facilitated by high levels of social capital (Putnam, Democracy 167-9). Alternatively, a “good and fair” state and impartial institutions are important factors in generating and preserving high levels of social capital (Offe 42-87). Yet social capital is not limited to democratic civil societies and research is mixed on whether rising social capital manifests itself in a more vigorous civil society that in turn leads to democratising impulses. Castillo argues that various trust levels for institutions that reinforce submission, hierarchy, and cultural conservatism can be high in authoritarian governments, indicating that high levels of social capital do not necessarily lead to democratic civic societies (Castillo et al.). Roßteutscher concludes after a survey of social capita indicators in authoritarian states that social capital has little effect of democratisation and may in fact reinforce authoritarian rule: in nondemocratic contexts, however, it appears to throw a spanner in the works of democratization. Trust increases the stability of nondemocratic leaderships by generating popular support, by suppressing regime threatening forms of protest activity, and by nourishing undemocratic ideals concerning governance (752). In China, there has been ongoing debate concerning the presence of civil society and the level of social capital found across Chinese society. If one defines civil society as an intermediate associational realm between the state and the family, populated by autonomous organisations which are separate from the state that are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values, it is arguable that the PRC had a significant civil society or social capital in the first few decades after its establishment (White). However, most scholars agree that nascent civil society as well as a more salient social and community capital has emerged in China’s reform era. This was evident after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, where the government welcomed community organising and community-driven donation campaigns for a limited period of time, giving the NGO sector and bottom-up social activism a boost, as evidenced in various policy areas such as disaster relief and rural community development (F. Wu 126; Xu 9). Nevertheless, the CCP and the Chinese state have been effective in maintaining significant control over civil society and autonomous groups without attempting to completely eliminate their autonomy or existence. The dramatic economic and social changes that have occurred since the 1978 Opening have unsurprisingly engendered numerous conflicts across the society. In response, the CCP and State have adjusted political economic policies to meet the changing demands of workers, migrants, the unemployed, minorities, farmers, local artisans, entrepreneurs, and the growing middle class. Often the demands arising from these groups have resulted in policy changes, including compensation. In other circumstances, where these groups remain dissatisfied, the government will tolerate them (ignore them but allow them to continue in the advocacy), or, when the need arises, supress the disaffected groups (F. Wu 2). At the same time, social organisations and other groups in civil society have often “refrained from open and broad contestation against the regime”, thereby gaining the space and autonomy to achieve the objectives (F. Wu 2). Studies of Chinese social or community capital suggest that a form of modern social capital has gradually emerged as Chinese society has become increasingly modernised and liberalised (despite being non-democratic), and that this social capital has begun to play an important role in shaping social and economic lives at the local level. However, this more modern form of social capital, arising from developmental and social changes, competes with traditional social values and social capital, which stresses parochial and particularistic feelings among known individuals while modern social capital emphasises general trust and reciprocal feelings among both known and unknown individuals. The objective element of these traditional values are those government-sanctioned, formal mass organisations such as Communist Youth and the All-China Federation of Women's Associations, where members are obliged to obey the organisation leadership. The predominant subjective values are parochial and particularistic feelings among individuals who know one another, such as guanxi and zongzu (Chen and Lu, 426). The concept of social capital emphasises that the underlying cooperative values found in individuals and groups within a culture are an important factor in solving collective problems. In contrast, the notion of “culture war” focusses on those values and differences that divide social and cultural groups. Barry defines culture wars as increases in volatility, expansion of polarisation, and conflict between those who are passionate about religiously motivated politics, traditional morality, and anti-intellectualism, and…those who embrace progressive politics, cultural openness, and scientific and modernist orientations. (90) The contemporary culture wars across the world manifest opposition by various groups in society who hold divergent worldviews and ideological positions. Proponents of culture war understand various issues as part of a broader set of religious, political, and moral/normative positions invoked in opposition to “elite”, “liberal”, or “left” ideologies. Within this Manichean universe opposition to such issues as climate change, Black Lives Matter, same sex rights, prison reform, gun control, and immigration becomes framed in binary terms, and infused with a moral sensibility (Chapman 8-10). In many disputes, the culture war often devolves into an epistemological dispute about the efficacy of scientific knowledge and authority, or a dispute between “practical” and theoretical knowledge. In this environment, even facts can become partisan narratives. For these “cultural” disputes are often how electoral prospects (generally right-wing) are advanced; “not through policies or promises of a better life, but by fostering a sense of threat, a fantasy that something profoundly pure … is constantly at risk of extinction” (Malik). This “zero-sum” social and policy environment that makes it difficult to compromise and has serious consequences for social stability or government policy, especially in a liberal democratic society. Of course, from the perspective of cultural materialism such a reductionist approach to culture and political and social values is not unexpected. “Culture” is one of the many arenas in which dominant social groups seek to express and reproduce their interests and preferences. “Culture” from this sense is “material” and is ultimately connected to the distribution of power, wealth, and resources in society. As such, the various policy areas that are understood as part of the “culture wars” are another domain where various dominant and subordinate groups and interests engaged in conflict express their values and goals. Yet it is unexpected that despite the pervasiveness of information available to individuals the pool of information consumed by individuals who view the “culture wars” as a touchstone for political behaviour and a narrative to categorise events and facts is relatively closed. This lack of balance has been magnified by social media algorithms, conspiracy-laced talk radio, and a media ecosystem that frames and discusses issues in a manner that elides into an easily understood “culture war” narrative. From this perspective, the groups (generally right-wing or traditionalist) exist within an information bubble that reinforces political, social, and cultural predilections. American and Chinese Reponses to COVID-19 The COVID-19 pandemic first broke out in Wuhan in December 2019. Initially unprepared and unwilling to accept the seriousness of the infection, the Chinese government regrouped from early mistakes and essentially controlled transmission in about three months. This positive outcome has been messaged as an exposition of the superiority of the Chinese governmental system and society both domestically and internationally; a positive, even heroic performance that evidences the populist credentials of the Chinese political leadership and demonstrates national excellence. The recently published White Paper entitled “Fighting COVID-19: China in Action” also summarises China’s “strategic achievement” in the simple language of numbers: in a month, the rising spread was contained; in two months, the daily case increase fell to single digits; and in three months, a “decisive victory” was secured in Wuhan City and Hubei Province (Xinhua). This clear articulation of the positive results has rallied political support. Indeed, a recent survey shows that 89 percent of citizens are satisfied with the government’s information dissemination during the pandemic (C Wu). As part of the effort, the government extensively promoted the provision of “political goods”, such as law and order, national unity and pride, and shared values. For example, severe publishments were introduced for violence against medical professionals and police, producing and selling counterfeit medications, raising commodity prices, spreading ‘rumours’, and being uncooperative with quarantine measures (Xu). Additionally, as an extension the popular anti-corruption campaign, many local political leaders were disciplined or received criminal charges for inappropriate behaviour, abuse of power, and corruption during the pandemic (People.cn, 2 Feb. 2020). Chinese state media also described fighting the virus as a global “competition”. In this competition a nation’s “material power” as well as “mental strength”, that calls for the highest level of nation unity and patriotism, is put to the test. This discourse recalled the global competition in light of the national mythology related to the formation of Chinese nation, the historical “hardship”, and the “heroic Chinese people” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). Moreover, as the threat of infection receded, it was emphasised that China “won this competition” and the Chinese people have demonstrated the “great spirit of China” to the world: a result built upon the “heroism of the whole Party, Army, and Chinese people from all ethnic groups” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). In contrast to the Chinese approach of emphasising national public goods as a justification for fighting the virus, the U.S. Trump Administration used nationalism, deflection, and “culture war” discourse to undermine health responses — an unprecedented response in American public health policy. The seriousness of the disease as well as the statistical evidence of its course through the American population was disputed. The President and various supporters raged against the COVID-19 “hoax”, social distancing, and lockdowns, disparaged public health institutions and advice, and encouraged protesters to “liberate” locked-down states (Russonello). “Our federal overlords say ‘no singing’ and ‘no shouting’ on Thanksgiving”, Representative Paul Gosar, a Republican of Arizona, wrote as he retweeted a Centers for Disease Control list of Thanksgiving safety tips (Weiner). People were encouraged, by way of the White House and Republican leadership, to ignore health regulations and not to comply with social distancing measures and the wearing of masks (Tracy). This encouragement led to threats against proponents of face masks such as Dr Anthony Fauci, one of the nation’s foremost experts on infectious diseases, who required bodyguards because of the many threats on his life. Fauci’s critics — including President Trump — countered Fauci’s promotion of mask wearing by stating accusingly that he once said mask-wearing was not necessary for ordinary people (Kelly). Conspiracy theories as to the safety of vaccinations also grew across the course of the year. As the 2020 election approached, the Administration ramped up efforts to downplay the serious of the virus by identifying it with “the media” and illegitimate “partisan” efforts to undermine the Trump presidency. It also ramped up its criticism of China as the source of the infection. This political self-centeredness undermined state and federal efforts to slow transmission (Shear et al.). At the same time, Trump chided health officials for moving too slowly on vaccine approvals, repeated charges that high infection rates were due to increased testing, and argued that COVID-19 deaths were exaggerated by medical providers for political and financial reasons. These claims were amplified by various conservative media personalities such as Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity and Laura Ingraham of Fox News. The result of this “COVID-19 Denialism” and the alternative narrative of COVID-19 policy told through the lens of culture war has resulted in the United States having the highest number of COVID-19 cases, and the highest number of COVID-19 deaths. At the same time, the underlying social consensus and social capital that have historically assisted in generating positive public health outcomes has been significantly eroded. According to the Pew Research Center, the share of U.S. adults who say public health officials such as those at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are doing an excellent or good job responding to the outbreak decreased from 79% in March to 63% in August, with an especially sharp decrease among Republicans (Pew Research Center 2020). Social Capital and COVID-19 From the perspective of social or community capital, it could be expected that the American response to the Pandemic would be more effective than the Chinese response. Historically, the United States has had high levels of social capital, a highly developed public health system, and strong governmental capacity. In contrast, China has a relatively high level of governmental and public health capacity, but the level of social capital has been lower and there is a significant presence of traditional values which emphasise parochial and particularistic values. Moreover, the antecedent institutions of social capital, such as weak and inefficient formal institutions (Batjargal et al.), environmental turbulence and resource scarcity along with the transactional nature of guanxi (gift-giving and information exchange and relationship dependence) militate against finding a more effective social and community response to the public health emergency. Yet China’s response has been significantly more successful than the Unites States’. Paradoxically, the American response under the Trump Administration and the Chinese response both relied on an externalisation of the both the threat and the justifications for their particular response. In the American case, President Trump, while downplaying the seriousness of the virus, consistently called it the “China virus” in an effort to deflect responsibly as well as a means to avert attention away from the public health impacts. As recently as 3 January 2021, Trump tweeted that the number of “China Virus” cases and deaths in the U.S. were “far exaggerated”, while critically citing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's methodology: “When in doubt, call it COVID-19. Fake News!” (Bacon). The Chinese Government, meanwhile, has pursued a more aggressive foreign policy across the South China Sea, on the frontier in the Indian sub-continent, and against states such as Australia who have criticised the initial Chinese response to COVID-19. To this international criticism, the government reiterated its sovereign rights and emphasised its “victimhood” in the face of “anti-China” foreign forces. Chinese state media also highlighted China as “victim” of the coronavirus, but also as a target of Western “political manoeuvres” when investigating the beginning stages of the pandemic. The major difference, however, is that public health policy in the United States was superimposed on other more fundamental political and cultural cleavages, and part of this externalisation process included the assignation of “otherness” and demonisation of internal political opponents or characterising political opponents as bent on destroying the United States. This assignation of “otherness” to various internal groups is a crucial element in the culture wars. While this may have been inevitable given the increasingly frayed nature of American society post-2008, such a characterisation has been activity pushed by local, state, and national leadership in the Republican Party and the Trump Administration (Vogel et al.). In such circumstances, minimising health risks and highlighting civil rights concerns due to public health measures, along with assigning blame to the democratic opposition and foreign states such as China, can have a major impact of public health responses. The result has been that social trust beyond the bubble of one’s immediate circle or those who share similar beliefs is seriously compromised — and the collective action problem presented by COVID-19 remains unsolved. Daniel Aldrich’s study of disasters in Japan, India, and US demonstrates that pre-existing high levels of social capital would lead to stronger resilience and better recovery (Aldrich). Social capital helps coordinate resources and facilitate the reconstruction collectively and therefore would lead to better recovery (Alesch et al.). Yet there has not been much research on how the pool of social capital first came about and how a disaster may affect the creation and store of social capital. Rebecca Solnit has examined five major disasters and describes that after these events, survivors would reach out and work together to confront the challenges they face, therefore increasing the social capital in the community (Solnit). However, there are studies that have concluded that major disasters can damage the social fabric in local communities (Peacock et al.). The COVID-19 epidemic does not have the intensity and suddenness of other disasters but has had significant knock-on effects in increasing or decreasing social capital, depending on the institutional and social responses to the pandemic. In China, it appears that the positive social capital effects have been partially subsumed into a more generalised patriotic or nationalist affirmation of the government’s policy response. Unlike civil society responses to earlier crises, such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, there is less evidence of widespread community organisation and response to combat the epidemic at its initial stages. This suggests better institutional responses to the crisis by the government, but also a high degree of porosity between civil society and a national “imagined community” represented by the national state. The result has been an increased legitimacy for the Chinese government. Alternatively, in the United States the transformation of COVID-19 public health policy into a culture war issue has seriously impeded efforts to combat the epidemic in the short term by undermining the social consensus and social capital necessary to fight such a pandemic. Trust in American institutions is historically low, and President Trump’s untrue contention that President Biden’s election was due to “fraud” has further undermined the legitimacy of the American government, as evidenced by the attacks directed at Congress in the U.S. capital on 6 January 2021. As such, the lingering effects the pandemic will have on social, economic, and political institutions will likely reinforce the deep cultural and political cleavages and weaken interpersonal networks in American society. Conclusion The COVID-19 pandemic has devastated global public health and impacted deeply on the world economy. Unsurprisingly, given the serious economic, social, and political consequences, different government responses have been highly politicised. Various quarantine and infection case tracking methods have caused concern over state power intruding into private spheres. The usage of face masks, social distancing rules, and intra-state travel restrictions have aroused passionate debate over public health restrictions, individual liberty, and human rights. Yet underlying public health responses grounded in higher levels of social capital enhance the effectiveness of public health measures. In China, a country that has generally been associated with lower social capital, it is likely that the relatively strong policy response to COVID-19 will both enhance feelings of nationalism and Chinese exceptionalism and help create and increase the store of social capital. In the United States, the attribution of COVID-19 public health policy as part of the culture wars will continue to impede efforts to control the pandemic while further damaging the store of American community social capital that has assisted public health efforts over the past decades. References Adger, W. Neil. “Social Capital, Collective Action, and Adaptation to Climate Change.” Economic Geography 79.4 (2003): 387-404. Bacon, John. “Coronavirus Updates: Donald Trump Says US 'China Virus' Data Exaggerated; Dr. Anthony Fauci Protests, Draws President's Wrath.” USA Today 3 Jan. 2021. 4 Jan. 2021 <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2021/01/03/COVID-19-update-larry-king-ill-4-million-december-vaccinations-us/4114363001/>. Berry, Kate A. “Beyond the American Culture Wars.” Regions & Cohesion / Regiones y Cohesión / Régions et Cohésion 7.2 (Summer 2017): 90-95. 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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Australian army equipment"

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Lehmann, Frederick Denis, University of Western Sydney, of Science Technology and Environment College, and School of Environment and Agriculture. "Weight load carry : a review of the efficiency and effectiveness of the army backpack." THESIS_CSTE_EAG_Lehmann_F.xml, 2000. http://handle.uws.edu.au:8081/1959.7/663.

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Military load carrying has occupied the attention of military developers, researchers and commanders over centuries. The Army backpack remains the means of carriage for ammunition and rations for the soldier in the field. The traditional rationale for its use has been that the infantry soldier must be able to sustain himself in combat and live independently for days at a time without resupply. At the Royal Military College, Duntroon (RMC), the mission is to produce men and women who are capable and effective officers and soldiers. The weight of the pack with the items required at RMC is often in excess of 40 kg. In evaluating the effectiveness of current practice, this thesis takes an anthropometric perspective in exploring the historical, physiological and social context of current loads carried by Australian soldiers, It does not, however, evaluate the content of the load itself. Research methods include: a/. Systematic examination of past research findings on the social and physiological aspects of military load carrying since the Roman Centurions. b/. Biophysical tesing of nine soldiers, using a battery of physiological tests to determine heart rates and energy expenditure at various loads. c/. A survey of 100 soldiers from the Royal Military College, Duntroon and in-depth interviews with a sample of four experienced soldiers to obtain the views of the load carriers. The research concludes that the optimum approach to load carrying, and so to the design of the Army backpack, is that it be task-and soldier-specific. This runs directly counter to the longstanding Army traditions of preparing all soldiers for every possible contingency in battle and regarding all soldiers as equivalent units. The study findings offer some specific directions in which the design of the army backpack can be improved.
Master of Science (Hons)
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2

Faraday, Bruce Douglas History Australian Defence Force Academy UNSW. "Half the battle : the administration and higher organisation of the AIF 1914-1918." Awarded by:University of New South Wales - Australian Defence Force Academy. School of History, 1997. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/38693.

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Administration of armies has been sadly neglected in historical studies but the ability of the AIF to develop an efficient system of administration and to fit into the equally efficient British system, had much to do with the success of the AIF, especially late in the war. The various Empire governments had made some preparations for an alliance system of fighting in the event of a major war, but in practice these needed a great deal of adjustment. This thesis examines the manner in which the dominions and Britain planned for a possible war and the way in which changes had to be made in practice. It examines the manner in which the AIF developed a system and the many facets of this system, which had developed a remarkable degree of efficiency by the end of the war. Because the AIF and CEF were so alike in size, composition and in the problem they faced, a recurring theme of the thesis is a comparison between the two. It embraces the following: a. Prewar preparation for a combined empire army. b. The organisation of the administrative system of the AIF and the manner this improved through the war. c. The organisation and problems of the CEF administrative system d. The development of a system of capitation to pay for the services supplied to the AIF and CEF. e. Supply of equipment. f. Manner in which both forces worked to maintain their forces. g. The manner in which both forces catered for the needs of the individual soldiers. h. Supply in the field i. Medical administration in the AIF j. The administration in the AIF k. The administration of discipline in the AIF l. The demobilisation of the AIF.
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3

Lehmann, Frederick Denis. "Weight load carry : a review of the efficiency and effectiveness of the army backpack." Thesis, 2000. http://handle.uws.edu.au:8081/1959.7/663.

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Military load carrying has occupied the attention of military developers, researchers and commanders over centuries. The Army backpack remains the means of carriage for ammunition and rations for the soldier in the field. The traditional rationale for its use has been that the infantry soldier must be able to sustain himself in combat and live independently for days at a time without resupply. At the Royal Military College, Duntroon (RMC), the mission is to produce men and women who are capable and effective officers and soldiers. The weight of the pack with the items required at RMC is often in excess of 40 kg. In evaluating the effectiveness of current practice, this thesis takes an anthropometric perspective in exploring the historical, physiological and social context of current loads carried by Australian soldiers, It does not, however, evaluate the content of the load itself. Research methods include: a/. Systematic examination of past research findings on the social and physiological aspects of military load carrying since the Roman Centurions. b/. Biophysical tesing of nine soldiers, using a battery of physiological tests to determine heart rates and energy expenditure at various loads. c/. A survey of 100 soldiers from the Royal Military College, Duntroon and in-depth interviews with a sample of four experienced soldiers to obtain the views of the load carriers. The research concludes that the optimum approach to load carrying, and so to the design of the Army backpack, is that it be task-and soldier-specific. This runs directly counter to the longstanding Army traditions of preparing all soldiers for every possible contingency in battle and regarding all soldiers as equivalent units. The study findings offer some specific directions in which the design of the army backpack can be improved.
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Books on the topic "Australian army equipment"

1

Tilbrook, John D. To the warrior his arms: A history of the Ordnance Services in the Australian Army. Canberra: Royal Australian Army Ordnance Corps Committee, 1989.

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Shaw, Ian W. Rag Tag Fleet: The Unknown Story of the Australian Men and Boats That Helped Win the War in the Pacific. Hachette Australia, 2019.

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Book chapters on the topic "Australian army equipment"

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Care, Sheena, Shahd Al-Janabi, Amy Simpson, Jemma Coleman, and Sheena Davis. "Customising Human Factors Information for Better Australian Army Soldier Equipment Design and Acquisition." In Advances in Ergonomics in Design, 17–23. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51038-1_3.

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Conference papers on the topic "Australian army equipment"

1

Simmonds, K. E., A. Bagchi, P. Matic, A. C. Leung, W. M. Pogue, A. K. Thompson, J. C. Strain, and J. E. Gauvin. "Blast Response of Protective Armor Concepts Using an Arm Surrogate." In ASME 2010 International Mechanical Engineering Congress and Exposition. ASMEDC, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/imece2010-39025.

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Protection and comfort are two key armor requirements to the US warfighter. NRL has supported this effort by developing QuadGard extremity protection [1], and instrumented surrogate torso and brain to assess armor and helmet systems performance [2, 3], among others. Surrogate systems for analyzing personal protection equipment for torso and brain have also been developed by other researchers in US, Australia and Canada and are reported in the literature, but no publications were found on assessment of extremity armors.
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Auburtin, Erwan, Timothée Lefebvre, and Stéphane Paquet. "Improvement of Side-by-Side LNG Offloading Operability Calculations Using Monte Carlo Simulations and Scattered Data Multidimensional Interpolation." In ASME 2017 36th International Conference on Ocean, Offshore and Arctic Engineering. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/omae2017-61025.

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In order to properly design the mooring and offloading equipment, and assess the availability of Floating Liquefied Natural Gas (FLNG) units during the engineering phase, TechnipFMC has paid a particular attention to the operability prediction of LNG offloading operations. For the FLNG projects currently under construction, the chosen offloading solution is the Marine Loading Arms (MLA) technology with the LNG carrier (LNGC) moored in side-by-side (SBS) configuration. In this paper, an improved methodology using Monte Carlo simulations is proposed to create a representative sample of a typical hindcast for North West Australia, assuming the case of a 147,000 m3 LNGC moored side-by-side to a TechnipFMC in-house design FLNG. It is shown that the random sampling is very well suited for large number of dimensions implied by the driving parameters (e.g. significant height, peak period, relative heading) of multiple wave partitions. In a second step, different multidimensional scattered data interpolation techniques are evaluated in order to further improve the accuracy. Since this would not be practical in time-domain and because the objective for this study is to compare the sampling and interpolation techniques to a benchmark on the whole hindcast, the vessels’ motions and SBS offloading operability are calculated in frequency-domain. The conclusions could also be applied to time-domain simulations. The paper also presents the sensitivity studies to the different interpolation methods and their key parameters and discusses the suitability of the proposed solutions.
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