Journal articles on the topic 'Australia Foreign relations Asia'
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1
Darmawan, Harry. "LONGING FOR KEVIN RUDD AND HIS LEGACY IN IMPROVING AUSTRALIA-INDONESIA RELATIONS." Journal of Social Political Sciences 2, no. 2 (May 29, 2021): 189–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.52166/jsps.v2i2.58.
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Indonesia misses Kevin Rudd's figure. The emergence and victory of Kevin Rudd in the 2007 Australian elections seemed to be a speck of light in the improvement of bilateral relations between Australia and Indonesia at that time. He succeeded in turning Australia's foreign policy into a more humanist and Asia-centric direction. A thing that was previously very rare in the era of Prime Minister John Howard. Various policies were able to reconcile the romanticism of Garuda and the Kangaroo, which is the largest ruler in Southeast Asia and the Oceania Zone. This paper examines the dynamics of Kevin Rudd's victory in the 2007 Australian Election, as well as his golden legacy in fighting for harmonization of relations between Australia and Indonesia.
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Benvenuti, Andrea, and David Martin Jones. "Engaging Southeast Asia? Labor's Regional Mythology and Australia's Military Withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia, 1972–1973." Journal of Cold War Studies 12, no. 4 (October 2010): 32–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00047.
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This article draws on previously classified Australian and British archival material to reevaluate Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam's foreign policy. The article focuses on the Whitlam government's decision in 1973 to withdraw Australian forces from Malaysia and Singapore—a decision that constitutes a neglected but defining episode in the evolution of Australian postwar diplomacy. An analysis of this decision reveals the limits of Whitlam's attempt to redefine the conduct of Australian foreign policy from 1972 to 1975, a policy he saw as too heavily influenced by the Cold War. Focusing on Whitlam's approach to the Five Power Defence Arrangement, this article contends that far from being an adroit and skillful architect of Australian engagement with Asia, Whitlam irritated Australia's regional allies and complicated Australia's relations with its immediate neighbors. Australia's subsequent adjustment to its neighborhood was not the success story implied in the general histories of Australian diplomacy. Whitlam's policy toward Southeast Asia, far from being a “watershed” in foreign relations, as often assumed, left Australia increasingly isolated from its region and more reliant on its chief Cold War ally, the United States.
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Abdullah, Anzar. "Diplomatic Relations between Indonesia-Australia Since Whitlam, Fraser, Until Hawke Era in An Attempt To Establish Political Stability in Southeast Asia." Jurnal Ilmiah Peuradeun 5, no. 2 (May 27, 2017): 237. http://dx.doi.org/10.26811/peuradeun.v5i2.135.
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Talking about foreign policy relations of a country, it cannot be explained without adapting to the changes that occur in the growing environment or situation of both countries. Adjustments to the environment and the situation, especially the foreign policy are done in order to maintain the physical, economic, politic and social culture of the country in the midst of the real conditions of the situation occurred, like the history of bilateral relations between Indonesia and Australia). This is a study of the history of Australian foreign policy towards Indonesia since Whitlam government in 1972 until Hawke. The goal of the study is to explain how the foreign policy of the Australian Prime Ministers during their reigns. Although in reality in the course of its history, Australian and Indonesian diplomatic relations were full of intrigues, turmoil and conflicts, but it did not severe the relation of the two nations. Eventually, the conclusion of this study explicitly states that Australia and Indonesia still need each other in an attempt to establish political stability, economic and security in Southeast Asia and the Pacific peacefully.
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Garin, Artyom. "THE FEATURES OF MODERN SINO-AUSTRALIAN TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATION IN THE CONTEXT OF CHANGING ASIA-PACIFIC." Eastern Analytics, no. 2 (2021): 32–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.31696/2227-5568-2021-02-032-042.
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Australia successfully combines a unique geopolitical position in the Asia- Pacific, as well as economic potential. At the same time, the emerging trade dependence of the Fifth Continent on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is increasingly affecting Canberra’s foreign policy year by year. The aggravation of Sino- U.S. relations has also led to tension between Australia and China. In 2020, the world faced the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused negative impacts on the global economy, and trade tensions began between the two states. In early 2021 Beijng also suspended all activity under the China- Australia Strategic Economic Dialogue for an indefinite period. All these events give the research of trade and economic relations between Australia and the PRC a great practical focus, including allowing us to more specifically identify the degree of dependence of the economy of the Fifth Continent on the situation in China or the degree of Sino- Australian relation. This article examines the consequences of the suspension China- Australia Strategic Economic Dialogue, in particular, its impact on the future prospects for the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two countries. Special attention is paid to the impact of China’s economic growth rates on the Australian economy. At the same time, the author aggregates the trade and economic strategies of Australia as a middle power, considering Canberra’s response to the transformation of the regional architecture in the Asia- Pacific. The provisions and conclusions presented in this article are based on the study of the works of leading international researchers specializing in foreign policy and economic issues of Australia, as well as Sino- Australian relations.
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Vietrynskyi, I. "Australian Foreign Policy during the World War II." Problems of World History, no. 18 (November 8, 2022): 65–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.46869/2707-6776-2022-18-3.
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The article is related to the establishment of Australian foreign policy tradition and becoming of Australia as a subject of international relations. The significant role of the dominions during First World War Great and their help for Great Britain victory, intensified their struggle for independence. As the result of long-term efforts, dominions reached the proclamation of the Balfour Declaration in 1926 by London, which was later confirmed by the Statute of Westminster (1931), which established the authority for dominions for an independent foreign policy. The development of Australian foreign policy before and during World War II was analyzed. The evolution of the relations of the Australia and Great Britain in the context of the events of the World War II is traced, in particular the peculiarities of the allied relations of the two countries. There is shown the regional dimension of the World War II within the Asia-Pacific region, in the context of Australia and the United States actions against Japanese aggression. There are analyzed the peculiarities of external threats effect on the transformation of the Australian foreign policy strategy, in particular in the national security sphere. The main threat for Australia in that period become Japanise aggressive and expansionist policy in the Asia-Pacific region. A lot of Australian soldiers and military equipment were sent to Great Britain to support traditional allie. But in actual strategic situation in Europe there were great doubts that British troops and the navy would be able to effectively help Australians in case of an attack by Japan. Politics of national security and defense of Australia in the context of its participation in World War II is considered. In the conditions of real threat of Japanese invasion, as well as the lack of sure to receive necessary support from Great Britain, the Australian government start to find a military alliance with the USA. There were identified the key implications of World War II for Australian socio-economic system.
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Benvenuti, Andrea, and David Martin Jones. "Myth and Misrepresentation in Australian Foreign Policy: Menzies and Engagement with Asia." Journal of Cold War Studies 13, no. 4 (October 2011): 57–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00168.
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The prevailing orthodoxy in the academic literature devoted to the history of Australia's post-1945 international relations posits that a mixture of suspicion and condescension permeated the attitude of the governments headed by Robert Menzies (1949–1966) toward the Asia-Pacific region. Menzies's regional policies, according to this view, not only prevented Australia from engaging meaningfully with its Asian neighbors but also ended up antagonizing them. This article rejects the conventional view and instead shows that the prevailing left-Labor assessments of Menzies's regional policy are fundamentally marred by an anachronistic disregard of the diplomatic dynamics, political challenges, and economic realities of Cold War Asia.
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Benvenuti, Andrea, and David Martin Jones. "With Friends Like These: Australia, the United States, and Southeast Asian Détente." Journal of Cold War Studies 21, no. 2 (May 2019): 27–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00876.
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A generation of scholars has depicted the premiership of Labor Party leader Gough Whitlam as a watershed in Australian foreign policy. According to the prevailing consensus, Whitlam carved out a more independent and progressive role in international affairs without significantly endangering relations with Western-aligned states in East and Southeast Asia or with Australia's traditionally closest allies, the United States and the United Kingdom. This article takes issue with these views and offers a more skeptical assessment of Whitlam's diplomacy and questions his handling of Australia's alliance with the United States. In doing so, it shows that Whitlam, in his eagerness to embrace détente, reject containment, and project an image of an allegedly more progressive and independent Australia, in fact exacerbated tensions with Richard Nixon's Republican administration and caused disquiet among Southeast Asian countries that were aligned with or at least friendly toward the West.
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Antonopoulos, Paul. "The Kangaroo, the Bear, and the Dragon: Australia-Russia-China Relations in the “Asian Century”." China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies 03, no. 03 (January 2017): 411–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2377740017500208.
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With Australia and Russia increasingly seeing their future in the Asia-Pacific, neither can reach its full economic potential except under the guidance of Beijing’s control of ports on its “Maritime Silk Road.” Cold War clichés of the “Yankee lapdog” and the big bad “Russian bear” continue to dominate how Canberra and Moscow view each other. Yet when it comes to the future of Australia-Russia-China relations, one must look beyond Moscow, Beijing, and Canberra, but rather at Vladivostok and Darwin, symbols of an as-yet unrealized goal to shift emphasis onto each country’s sparsely-populated regions bordering the Asia-Pacific. With the dawning of the “Asian Century,” how does the United States change the geopolitical dynamics of the region, and how do China, Russia, and Australia react to “America’s Pacific Century”? Rather than a capitulation to America’s aggressive posture in the Asia-Pacific, China and Russia have consolidated the integration of their economies and militaries to counter such penetration. This emerging rivalry creates a challenge for Australia to balance its military alliance with the United States and its economic reliance on China. The necessity of finetuning this balance should be Canberra’s primary foreign policy issue.
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Pramanta, Rio Akbar, Roihanatul Maziyah, Dela Karisma, Putri Rahma Asri, Ayu Tiara Karel Bua, Dimas Bagas Priambodo, and Bayu Mahendra. "Kemitraan Strategis Non-Zero Sum Game: Hubungan ASEAN-Australia dalam Konteks Geopolitik." Indonesian Perspective 3, no. 2 (March 12, 2019): 111. http://dx.doi.org/10.14710/ip.v3i2.22347.
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ASEAN and Australia has a long history of mutual partnership. It is a strategic foreign policy for both parties. ASEAN needs to maintain its power and influence with their neighboring countries to maintain the political stability in the Southeast Asian region. On the other hand, Australia needs Southeast Asia because it serves as a strategic and crucial pivot of numerous benefits and interests for them, including but not limited to security and economics. However, ASEAN-Australia relations is not separated from the geopolitical implications. The geopolitical factors determine the strategic partnership between ASEAN and Australia, thus leading to the hypothesis in this article where Australia needs ASEAN more than the vice versa, and Australia is the one who benefits more in terms of relative gain, relative to ASEAN.Keywords: ASEAN-Australia relations, neorealism, relative gain, geopolitics
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Rimmer, Susan Harris. "Australian experiments in creative governance, regionalism, and plurilateralism." International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis 71, no. 4 (December 2016): 630–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020702016686383.
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The previous Abbott government had prioritized a general attitude to foreign policy captured by the phrase “Jakarta not Geneva,” which signified a preference for bilateral or minilateral interactions with the region rather than United Nations-based multilateralism. With Julie Bishop MP as Australia’s first female foreign minister, the Coalition also prioritized economic diplomacy, as exemplified by the repeated refrain that Australia is “open for business.” This approach led to a preference for diplomatic venues and processes that focused on continuing investments in regional architecture, new emphasis on minilateral dialogues such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and Australia (MIKTA), and more effort directed to bilateral and plurilateral processes such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade negotiations. This approach has been continued under Prime Minister Turnbull, with a renewed focus on innovation. Part 1 considers minilateral and regional investments in the Indo-Pacific region, primarily, IORA, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). I consider MIKTA a unique vehicle for Australian diplomacy. Part 2 considers what issues Australia should be pursuing through these forums, with a focus on the two themes of gender equality (as an example of niche diplomacy) and trade (multilateralism under pressure) as case studies. Beeson and Higgott argue that middle powers have the potential to successfully implement “games of skill,” especially at moments of international transition. How skilful have Australia’s efforts been in these minilateral dialogues, enhanced regionalism, and plurilateral processes, and what more can be achieved in these forums? Are these efforts creating more fragmentation of the rules-based order, or are they a way to overcome global governance stalemates? I set out the arguments for whether Australia, as a pivotal power, should generate more global options, or be more focused on inclusion in the Asia-Pacific region.
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GARIN, Artyom A. "AUKUS AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC: FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR AUSTRALIA." Southeast Asia: Actual Problems of Development, no. 1 (54) (2022): 223–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.31696/2072-8271-2022-1-1-54-223-233.
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The United States, the UK and Australia continue to enhance defence cooperation in the dual space of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. These powers announced the establishing of a trilateral security pact AUKUS on September 15, 2021. The U.S. will transfer nuclear submarine technology to Australia but the nature of AUKUS implies a broader technological interaction between the parties. Despite the Anglosphere's attempts to indicate that their actions aren't directed against any power, all their actions reveal intensifying rivalry with the People's Republic of China (PRC). This article examines the nature of AUKUS and the reasons for its appearance. Special attention is paid to the influence of the alliance on the Fifth Continent's defense capabilities and its domestic policy dimension. At the same time, the author analyzes the impact of AUKUS on Australia's relations with the countries of Southeast Asia and Oceania.
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Taylor, Brendan. "Is Australia's Indo-Pacific strategy an illusion?" International Affairs 96, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 95–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz228.
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Abstract Australia has been among the most prominent advocates of the increasingly popular Indo-Pacific concept. This article argues that Canberra's enthusiasm for the concept stems from its appeal to the two dominant traditions of Australian foreign policy—a ‘dependent ally’ tradition and a ‘middle power’ approach. While these two traditions are typically seen as being in tension, the Indo-Pacific concept provides a rare point of convergence between them. The article begins by outlining the appeal of the Indo-Pacific concept to each of these traditions. Using a case-study of recent Australian policy toward the South China Sea disputes, however, the article then demonstrates that Australia has in practice implemented its stated Indo-Pacific strategy far less consistently than its very vocal support would appear to suggest. This disjuncture is attributed to the growing influence of a third, generally understudied, ‘pragmatic’ Australian foreign policy tradition. Because Australia has been such a prominent champion of the Indo-Pacific concept, the article concludes that this divergence between the rhetoric and the reality of Australia's Indo-Pacific strategy threatens to have a negative impact on the concept's broader international appeal and sustainability, particularly among Australia's south-east Asian neighbours.
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Khudoliy, Anatoliy. "Modern challenges in the Asia-Pacific." American History & Politics Scientific edition, no. 6 (2018): 72–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2521-1706.2018.06.72-82.
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The article deals with American-Chinese and American-Indian relationships in the 21st century. The researcher focused on political, military and economic aspects of cooperation between Washington and Beijing, Washington and New Deli over the last few years of the twenty-first century. The author of the article has analyzed major tendencies of development of American-Chinese relationships in the context of bilateral cooperation during the presidency of Barack Obama and Donald Trump. The economic and security activities of China, oriented to a strengthening of leadership positions of Beijing, as a key actor, in the regional policy were detailed. Along with it, the author shifted attention to Washington priorities in bilateral relations considering its pragmatic purposes and national interests which considerably influence foreign policy course of the United States. Despite close relations between the USA and the People’s Republic of China, there are factors that set limits for the strategic partnerships between the two countries. The author analyzed not only foreign policy of the United States but also the foreign policy strategy of China that hides interventionism behind the economic policy, trade, economic activity and projects such as ‘One belt, one road’. Some cases of conflict situations between China and its neighbors are analyzed in order to highlight problems. The author analyzed definite political and economic steps made by President Trump in order to strengthen American positions and regional security. Under the support of Washington, India, Japan, and Australia play more important roles as regional actors. India’s role in the regional confrontation between the United States and China is well depicted. Since 2017 India increased its positions in exporting goods and services to the United States, which is one of the main markets after China and the EU. Nevertheless, the USA is still a key player in the region. So, developing trade, financial and military relations, the USA is attempting not only to preserve, but also to strengthen its own positions in the Asia-Pacific and, as a result, to contain China.
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West, Rachel. "Does pragmatism always work?" Politikon: The IAPSS Journal of Political Science 13, no. 2 (October 31, 2007): 54–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.22151/politikon.13.2.4.
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As with any country, the political objectives of Australian foreign policy are based on Australian national values. Yet, because such values are inherently based on governmental interpretation, political leanings have created legitimate differences in the objectives pursued in Australian foreign policy over time. This article will explore these differences through Australia’s position as a Western, liberal democracy located in the Asia-Pacific. This will be done by examining Australia’s relations with those countries which represent the convergence of the Asia-Pacific’s most significant economic, strategic, and political links – Northeast Asia. What will be apparent is that, while determined in its resolve, the political objectives pursued by the current Howard government have proved to be both contentious and potentially damaging to Australia’s standing in the region.
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Toyoda, Tetsuya, Ekaterina Vaseneva, and Ryo Takahama. "Security Policy Options for Japan in Three Time Frameworks." RUDN Journal of World History 14, no. 4 (December 15, 2022): 410–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2312-8127-2022-14-4-410-426.
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This paper examines security policy options for Japan at the present stage that may be worth considering in the short term, the midterm, and the long term, respectively. Hence, the aim of the paper is to examine foreign policy security options for Japan in the foreseeable future. While providing a comprehensive overview of the Japanese foreign and security policy at the present stage, the article employs the case study methodological framework to analyze Japan’s foreign policy objectives in case of Tokyo’s relations with the most critical partners in the Asia-Pacific Region - namely, the United States, China, Russia, ASEAN, and Taiwan. Examining the origin and further development of the QUAD, the authors highlight the absence of ASEAN members and India’s hesitation to institutionalize the grouping, while analyzing the Russia-Japan relations they focus on common interests in security cooperation, as well on its limitations. As a result, in the short term, the expansion of the Japan-US alliance to the Indo-Pacific region is the most plausible option. However, without involving the ASEAN countries, the Free and Open IndoPacific (FOIP) strategy can only add Australia and India to the existing Japan-US alliance. In the midterm, an alliance with Russia may be, with some serious limitations, geographically a natural option. In the long term, Japan might need to find a proper place in a China-centered order in East Asia. Therefore, the authors conclude that the relative decline of US influence in East Asia is unavoidable in the coming decades, Japan must adjust or even reconsider its security policy.
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Snyder, Craig A. "Southeast Asian Perceptions of Australia´ s Foreign Policy." Contemporary Southeast Asia 28, no. 2 (August 2006): 322–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1355/cs28-2g.
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Abbott, Jason P., and Kevin Fahey. "The State and Direction of Asian Comparative Politics: Who, What, Where, How?" Journal of East Asian Studies 14, no. 1 (April 2014): 109–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1598240800009607.
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In this article we explore the state of the discipline of comparative Asian politics. In particular we analyze five aspects of research on Asia: whether the empirical scope of research is largely noncomparative; the extent to which that research is empirical rather than theory-generative; whether it pertains to public or foreign policy; if it relies on qualitative rather than quantitative methods; and the gender and geographic concentration of those conducting the research. After coding and analyzing data from 461 articles from eight different journals, we demonstrate that research on comparative Asian politics is more likely to be empirical, qualitative, focused on the country as unit of analysis, and disproportionately written by male academics educated and/or working in North America, Western Europe, or Australia.
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CHEN, PING-KUEI. "The Prospects of the US Alliance System in Asia: Managing from the Hub." Issues & Studies 56, no. 03 (September 2020): 2040012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1013251120400123.
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This paper examines the implications of the United States’ “hub-and-spoke” alliance system in Asia. It argues that the US enjoys a bargaining advantage in the current bilateral security relations with its Asian allies. In contrast to a multilateral alliance, the US can better prevent free riders and joint resistance in its bilateral relations. It can effectively restrain the behavior of its allies and compel them to accommodate American interests. The hub-and-spoke system helps the US consolidate its policy influence over the Asian allies, supervise inter-alliance cooperation, and increase defense cooperation between allies and non-allies. This paper uses episodes of defense cooperation between the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and India to illustrate the American alliance management techniques since 2016. During this time, the US allies have increasingly participated in regional security affairs due to US demands and guidance rather than autonomous decisions. Facing strong US pressure, allies have found it hard to challenge the US under the hub-and-spoke system despite common grievances. This leads to two implications for the future: First, the US allies may have less autonomy in their foreign policies, restraining their ability to pursue neutral positions and policies in regional affairs such as the South China Sea dispute. Second, the US may discourage or even undermine the emergence of multilateral security institutions in Asia. The US is likely to maintain the “hub-and-spoke” system to safeguard its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific.
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Kumar, Ashutosh. "Changing Dynamics of Nihon-Indo Diplomatic Ties :." Jindal Journal of International Affairs 1, no. 5 (June 1, 2021): 28–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.54945/jjia.v1i5.54.
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The geopolitical scenario in the Indo-Pacific2 region is changing rapidly. India, Japan and other oceanic states are facing new multidimensional challenges manifested in the unpeaceful3 rise of China. In this shadow, India-Japan ties have witnessed unprecedented growth in the last decade. Outgoing Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his counterpart in India have been instrumental for India-Japan bilateral relations taking a dramatic leap forward. Abe's visionary approach recognised India's strategic importance, as he worked tirelessly to take the relations to its new heights with his personal chemistry with the Indian Prime Minister. His proactive policy transformed South Block's expectations of Japan as a strong, influential and dependable partner in East Asia. Yoshihide Suga has succeeded Shinzo Abe as Japanese Prime minister. The initial days of Suga's foreign policy began by prioritising Vietnam, the USA and Australia, pointing out a different approach to Japan's foreign policy. Suga's political commitment to foreign affairs is secondary to the focus on domestic issues. The article is a comparative study of the foreign policy approaches of two Japanese Prime Ministers Abe and Suga towards India. In view of Abe's accomplishments, it is natural that India might be concerned about the transition to a new leader. The paper will try to analyse the reliability of Japan in the vulnerable security architecture of the Indo-Pacific region and the Suga government's willingness to engage actively in the Asian order for democratic values and the rule of law. Though India may not be Suga's top priority, India needs to actively leverage the strengths of the Abe-era partnership to keep it relevant.
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Baykov, A. A., and V. A. Gnevasheva. "Econometric Estimates of Russia's Turn to the East." MGIMO Review of International Relations 13, no. 6 (December 31, 2020): 175–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2020-6-75-175-207.
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The emerging trend in Russia’s foreign policy is its reorientation from active interstate and socio-economic interaction with the states of the "collective West" to the countries that make up the Asian macroregion. The article presents the qualitative and quantitative assessment of the emerging relations between Russia and the countries of the East, namely the ASEAN countries, Northeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region. Assuming that the prerequisites for the strengthening of such relationships between countries should be reflected in changes in trade relations, increased migration flows, and changes in policy in terms of countries' military spending, the study attempts to evaluate such changes econometrically. We use the method of constructing multiple linear regression, as well as indicators for assessing country-by-country correlation and cluster analysis. The object of the research is the countries of Northeast Asia (China, Japan, Republic of Korea); ASEAN countries (Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore); India; Australia and Oceania. The empirical base of the study is the official statistics of World Bank, SIPRI, FSGS. The findings indicate the emerging conditions for Russia's turn to the East. The analysis reveals a number of stable features indicating the possibility of modeling a reasonable predictive scenario. The proposed estimates can also be used for further study of the directions of interaction between Russia and the East, methodological and empirical clarification of the emerging relationships, determination of significant factors strengthening the noted interactions.
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Clapton, William. "Island off the Coast of Asia: Instruments of Statecraft in Australian Foreign Policy." RUSI Journal 164, no. 5-6 (September 19, 2019): 147–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2019.1694268.
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Cotton, James. "The Near North, the East Asian hemisphere, the Asia‐Pacific: seeking direction in Australian foreign policy." Australian Journal of International Affairs 58, no. 1 (March 2004): 143–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1035771032000184818.
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Brouwer, Gordon de. "Financial Markets, Institutions, and Integration in East Asia." Asian Economic Papers 2, no. 1 (January 2003): 53–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/153535103322022896.
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East Asia has enormous scope to upgrade and integrate its financial markets, covering the spectrum of equity, bond, foreign-exchange, and derivatives markets. Financial markets and institutions in East Asia tend to be narrow and undeveloped, although there are important exceptions. Japan dominates the top tier of the region's markets by virtue of its size, but its markets are not advanced, and many of its private institutions are weak. Although the markets in Australia, Hong Kong SAR, and Singapore are smaller than those of Japan, they are more innovative, market-oriented, and technologically advanced. Markets in Malaysia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand have made substantial progress to varying degrees; but China, Indonesia, and the Philippines have a considerable way to go in developing the information and governance infrastructure that financial markets need to function well. For all these countries, there is a clear role for regional cooperation among policymakers in building capacity in, and links between, financial markets in East Asia, as well as in encouraging stable speculation and the participation of nonresident and institutional investors in domestic financial markets. ASEAN+3 is an important and welcome advance in regional cooperation, but its membership does not span the depth of experience in financial markets and institutions that exists in East Asia.
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Beeson, Mark. "Island off the Coast of Asia: Instruments of Statecraft in Australian Foreign Policy." Australian Journal of Politics & History 65, no. 1 (March 2019): 141–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajph.12544.
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Robb, Thomas K., and David James Gill. "The ANZUS Treaty during the Cold War: A Reinterpretation of U.S. Diplomacy in the Southwest Pacific." Journal of Cold War Studies 17, no. 4 (October 2015): 109–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00599.
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This article explains the origins of the Australia–New Zealand–United States (ANZUS) Treaty by highlighting U.S. ambitions in the Pacific region after World War II. Three clarifications to the historiography merit attention. First, an alliance with Australia and New Zealand reflected the pursuit of U.S. interests rather than the skill of antipodean diplomacy. Despite initial reservations in Washington, geostrategic anxiety and economic ambition ultimately spurred cooperation. The U.S. government's eventual recourse to coercive diplomacy against the other ANZUS members, and the exclusion of Britain from the alliance, substantiate claims of self-interest. Second, the historiography neglects the economic rationale underlying the U.S. commitment to Pacific security. Regional cooperation ensured the revival of Japan, the avoidance of discriminatory trade policies, and the stability of the Bretton Woods monetary system. Third, scholars have unduly played down and misunderstood the concept of race. U.S. foreign policy elites invoked ideas about a “White Man's Club” in Asia to obscure the pursuit of U.S. interests in the region and to ensure British exclusion from the treaty.
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Vartanyan, A. "International Student Migration: Regional Aspect." World Economy and International Relations 60, no. 2 (2016): 113–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2016-60-2-113-121.
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The article provides a profound analysis of the main trends of international student migration for tertiary education, discusses the key factors influencing the choice of destination for studying abroad, and reveals the regional peculiarities of instruments for student migration regulation. The first part of the paper highlights the official statistics showing that in recent decades the world witnessed the steady increase in the number of international students, concentrating mainly in the USA and the European Union. Almost 48% of all international students in the world study in the European Union. This region also shows the highest internal student mobility. Among others, such countries as Austria, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand demonstrate the biggest shares of foreign students in the total number of university students. As for donor countries, the dynamics proves the major role of the Asia region, with a half of all international students originated from it. The largest number of foreign students come from China, India and South Korea. Nonetheless, the Asia region becomes a popular destination of student mobility nowadays. The second part of the article concerns different coordination policies of tertiary migration in the regional context. Mostly in developed countries, practices of attracting foreign students to study in professional programs and degree programs with a perspective to enter a national labor market after graduation become more and more popular. Postgraduate migration remains a priority. Most countries encourage job-searching for foreign graduate students, as they are considered to have a high-skill level, international views and an opportunity to live and work in a variety of socio-cultural conditions. Further analysis refers to the main factors determining the choice of destination for foreign students, which are: geographical proximity, language skills, cultural proximity, the cost of education, and a country's reputation in the field of higher education. The paper reveals the leading role of the EU in the developed intraregional educational mobility, the regional asymmetry of migration processes in other regions of the world, and Asian countries actively promoting temporary educational and labor migration to developed countries with incentives to return to a home-country in the future. In recent years, due to positive dynamics of the return migrants number, an interest in the creation of the returnees strategy grows as well as desire of developed and developing countries to benefit most from the return migration.
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Woolcott *, Richard. "Foreign policy priorities for the Howard government's fourth term: Australia, Asia and America in the post-11th September world." Australian Journal of International Affairs 59, no. 2 (June 2005): 141–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357710500134491.
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Hartwell, John. "2009 Release of offshore petroleum exploration acreage." APPEA Journal 49, no. 1 (2009): 463. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/aj08030.
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John Hartwell is Head of the Resources Division in the Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Canberra Australia. The Resources Division provides advice to the Australian Government on policy issues, legislative changes and administrative matters related to the petroleum industry, upstream and downstream and the coal and minerals industries. In addition to his divisional responsibilities, he is the Australian Commissioner for the Australia/East Timor Joint Petroleum Development Area and Chairman of the National Oil and Gas Safety Advisory Committee. He also chairs two of the taskforces, Clean Fossil Energy and Aluminium, under the Asia Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate (AP6). He serves on two industry and government leadership groups delivering reports to the Australian Government, strategies for the oil and gas industry and framework for the uranium industry. More recently he led a team charged with responsibility for taking forward the Australian Government’s proposal to establish a global carbon capture and storage institute. He is involved in the implementation of a range of resource related initiatives under the Government’s Industry Action Agenda process, including mining and technology services, minerals exploration and light metals. Previously he served as Deputy Chairman of the Snowy Mountains Council and the Commonwealth representative to the Natural Gas Pipelines Advisory Committee. He has occupied a wide range of positions in the Australian Government dealing with trade, commodity, and energy and resource issues. He has worked in Treasury, the Department of Trade, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Department of Primary Industries and Energy before the Department of Industry, Science and Resources. From 1992–96 he was a Minister Counsellor in the Australian Embassy, Washington, with responsibility for agriculture and resource issues and also served in the Australian High Commission, London (1981–84) as the Counsellor/senior trade relations officer. He holds a MComm in economics, and Honours in economics from the University of New South Wales, Australia. Prior to joining the Australian Government, worked as a bank economist. He was awarded a public service medal in 2005 for his work on resources issues for the Australian Government.
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Won, Tae Joon. "Britain's Retreat East of Suez and the Conundrum of Korea 1968–1974." Britain and the World 9, no. 1 (March 2016): 76–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/brw.2016.0215.
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This article examines the discussions and decisions which occurred within the British government concerning Britain's military involvement in the Korean peninsula at a time when Britain was pulling out of its military obligations in Asia – colloquially known as the ‘retreat East of Suez’ – in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. After the end of the Korean War, Britain created the Commonwealth Liaison Mission in Seoul and provided a frigate for use in Korean waters by the American-led United Nations Command and British soldiers for the United Nations Honour Guard. When relations between North and South Korea reached crisis point at the end of the 1960s, London was concerned that Britain could be entangled in an unaffordable military conflict in the Korean peninsula. The Ministry of Defence therefore argued for the abolition of the commitment of the British frigate, but the Foreign Office opposed this initiative so as to mitigate the blow to Anglo-American relations caused by Britain's refusal to commit troops to Vietnam. When Edward Heath's government negotiated a Five Power Defence Agreement with Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand in April 1971, the Ministry of Defence was, despite the objections of the Foreign Office, finally successful in repealing the frigate commitment for reasons of overstretching military resources. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence then called for the abolition of the Commonwealth Liaison Mission altogether when it was then discovered that the British contingent of the United Nations Honour Guard would have to fight under the command of the United Nations Commander in case of a military conflict in the Korean peninsula. But this proposal too was rebuffed by the Foreign Office, concerned that such a move would greatly damage Anglo-Korean relations at a time when Britain was considering establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea.
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TOROPCHIN, GLEB. "U.S. INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY: THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION." History and modern perspectives 3, no. 1 (February 28, 2020): 54–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.33693/2658-4654-2021-3-1-54-58.
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The given article is dedicated to scrutinising the role of nuclear factor in the U.S. policy in the Asia Pacific region lately. The work is written based on the analysis of the official doctrinal documents defining U.S. foreign policy. The aim of the paper is defining the significance of the nuclear dimension in Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy and trends in its evolution in late 2010s and early 2020s. The author dwells upon the features of conceptualising the term “Indo-Pacific” in the U.S. foreign policy strategy taking into account its transition from the expert discourse to the official one. Three layers of analysis are singled out: doctrinal, operational and institutional. Special attention is paid to the relations between the U.S. and its allies in the macroregion, including parties to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (i.e. India, Japan and Australia), as well as other countries, such as South Korea. The influence of China’s growing power and its claims for regional and global leadership on the shift in Washington’s foreign policy is also unveiled. The author discovers a direct correlation between the role of the maritime constituent in the “Indo-Pacific security” and the intention of the U.S. to develop the sea and air components in its nuclear triad. Various directions of the U.S. advancing its nuclear forces in the Asia Pacific are shown, as well as the role of adjacent projects in the field of security (such as “Global ABM”). Apart from this, the article demonstrates the factors that might have an impact on the U.S. nuclear policy in the region during J. Biden’s presidency. An attempt is made to predict possible scenarios in the near future.
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Surya Diarta, I. Ketut. "Promotion Strategy of Borobudur World Cultural Heritage Site for International Tourists." Udayana Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities (UJoSSH) 1, no. 2 (September 29, 2017): 190. http://dx.doi.org/10.24843/ujossh.2017.v01.i02.p12.
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The poor promotion strategies of Borobudur caused the low international tourists’ arrival. Therefore, this study aimed to develop promotion strategies for the Borobudur world cultural heritage site as a tourist attraction for foreign tourists. Respondents were selected by accidental sampling of 50 tourists combined with FGD of local tourism stakeholders. Data were analyzed using descriptive qualitative method and SWOT analysis. The results showed that: (1) Strategy SO can be reached by public relations by making online publicity and using endorser to reach international coverage, (2) Strategy WO achieved through the financial support for advertising, sales promotion, personal selling, and direct marketing ( 3) Strategies ST approached with the digital promotion supported by strong branding and assisted personal selling and direct marketing, and (d) Strategies WT by promoting Borobudur market in Asia, America, and especially Australia through increasing frequency of sales promotio.n and direct marketing supported by advertising to the target market.
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Ryazantsev, S. V., and L. S. Ruban. "GEOPOLITICAL TRANSFORMATION AND NEW TRENDS OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE CONDITIONS OF GLOBALIZATION." BULLETIN 2, no. 390 (April 15, 2021): 235–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.32014/2021.2518-1467.75.
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The article analyzes the process of globalization and the role of the Russian Federation in this process. The relevance of considering the current stage of globalization is due to the strengthening of the inter-connectedness and interdependence of the world, which requires the improvement of interstate relations and mechanisms of global governance with the primacy of the economic aspect of the development of society in the conditions of the functioning of the global scale of production. The historiography presents the regulation of international relations from the Westphalian system (state-centrist model of the world) to the Vienna Congress and the attempt to create a system of collective security and regulation of international relations: to the League of Nations and the United Nations. The formation of global governance institutions is shown: the largest international intergovernmental organizations (UN, WTO, IMF, IBRD, G-8, G-20, etc.), the most important function of which is to determine the norms and rules of interstate interaction. The main idea of the authors of the article is to show the historical conditionality of the transition to a polycentric model of development, as it most fully meets the needs of society on a global scale. The main purpose of this work was to substantiate and confirm the characteristics of the role of Russia in the international arena at the present stage of development by empirical material obtained during international surveys of experts from sixteen APR countries (VIPs and decision-makers). Thus, among the current trends in global development, the authors highlight the dilemma globalism - sovereignty and the correlation of globalism - transregionalism, in particular, the concept of the Indian-Pacific region (Indo-Pacific) instead of the Asia-Pacific region, put forward by the United States, Japan, Australia and India and the concept of "One belt is one road ”, initiated by China. Another trans-regional structure, such as BRICS, remains largely insufficiently structured, institutionalized and little realized in the specific political and economic activities of the countries that gave the name to this abbreviation.
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Nash, Marian. "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law." American Journal of International Law 86, no. 3 (July 1992): 547–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2203968.
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The material in this section is arranged according to the system employed in the annual Digest of United States Practice in International Law, published by the Department of State.Alan J. Kreczko, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State, appeared before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on April 8, 1992, to testify in support of various pending treaties, among them four extradition treaties: the Extradition Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas, signed at Nassau on March 9, 1990; the Protocol Amending the Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and Australia, signed on September 4, 1990, at Seoul, Republic of Korea (where the Asia-Pacific Attorneys General Conference was being held); the Supplementary Treaty to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning Extradition, signed at Washington on October 21, 1986; and the Second Supplementary Treaty on Extradition between the United States and Spain, signed at Madrid on February 9, 1988.
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He, Kai, and Mingjiang Li. "Understanding the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific: US–China strategic competition, regional actors, and beyond." International Affairs 96, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz242.
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Abstract As a geographical concept, ‘Indo-Pacific’ has existed for decades. As a political and strategic concept, it has since 2010 gradually become established in the foreign policy lexicon of some countries, especially Australia, India, Japan and the United States. However, China seems to be reluctant to identify itself as part of the Indo-Pacific; Chinese leaders believe that the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy aims to contain China's rise. While the battle between the two geographical concepts ‘Indo-Pacific’ and ‘Asia–Pacific’ may be fairly easily settled in the future, US–China strategic competition has just begun. Will the Indo-Pacific become a battlefield for US–China rivalry? How will China cope with the US ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy? How will other regional actors respond to the US–China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific? What are the strategic implications of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept for regional order transformation? How will the Indo-Pacific be institutionalized, economically, politically and strategically? This article introduces the January 2020 special issue of International Affairs, which aims to address those questions, using both country-specific and regional perspectives. Seven articles focus on the policy responses of major players (Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan and ASEAN) to the US FOIP strategy and related US–China rivalry in the region. A further three articles examine the profound implications of Indo-Pacific dynamics for regional institution-building and for geopolitical and geo-economic architecture.
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Jain, Purnendra. "Hesitant Realism: China–India Border Tensions and Delhi’s Deepening Strategic Ties with Tokyo and Canberra." Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 8, no. 1 (February 28, 2021): 77–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2347797021992529.
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The deadly conflict on the Ladakh border in June 2020 will force India to re-evaluate its approach to foreign policy. This dangerous turn, despite decades of mutual restraint, border talks, agreements and recent bonhomie between the Indian and Chinese leaders, has intensified the strategically tense environment of the Indo-Pacific region. China’s assertiveness in the South China and East China seas and its technology and trade tensions with a number of neighbouring Asian and Western nations have already raised political temperatures in global politics. In that light, this article considers how the June 2020 border incident may influence India’s strategic rethink, especially in relation to two key nations of the Indo-Pacific, Japan and Australia. The article suggests that forcing a re-evaluation of the strategic challenge posed by China, the June 2020 border confrontation has inspired a more realist edge to India’s security thinking. India is continuing the strategic autonomy with a multi-alignment approach it has favoured, but with a keener sense of realpolitik it is pressing ahead to deepen its defence and strategic alignments with like-minded nations in the Indo-Pacific region. This means that India is not abandoning its relations with traditional partners such as Russia to instead pursue a more formal alliance with one or a group of other powers. Rather, India is further developing strategic partnerships with the United States and its allies, while continuing strong relations with Russia and other long-standing partners to ‘balance’ its national security position. This article identifies India’s approach as ‘hesitant realism’, an explanatory term to explore India’s moves to balance its external relations through growing ties with Japan and Australia—two US allies that are key Indo-Pacific nations.
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Leonova, Olga. "The Impact of the Strategic Partnership AUKUS on the Geopolitical Situation in the Indo-Pacific Region." International Organisations Research Journal 17, no. 3 (October 1, 2022): 194–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-08.
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The purpose of the AUKUS strategic alliance is to develop cooperation between the member countries (U.S., UK and Australia) in the field of security and defence in the Indo-Pacific region. The agreement provides for the supply of submarines powered by nuclear reactors to Australia. The emergence of this new strategic alliance was caused by the following factors: the increased power of China in the region; the weakening of the U.S. position in the Indo-Pacific; the desire of the UK to implement the “global Britain” strategy in practice; and the need for the U.S. to have reliable allies to contain China. These factors reveal the true purpose of AUKUS—containment of China and opposition to its active policy in the region. In this article, the author uses comparative analysis to reveal the different goals and geopolitical interests of the AUKUS countries. The systematic approach helps to describe the essence of the complex developing geopolitical system of the Indo-Pacific region.The theories of new institutionalism and constructivism make it possible to identify both continuity and gaps in the security policy and foreign policy of regional actors. Australia’s participation in the AUKUS allows it to: strengthen its political ties with influential partners—the United States and Great Britain; receive additional security guarantees from them in the context of increased activity of Chinese policy in the region; raise the country’s status in the regional hierarchy; and strengthen its defence capability. Australia’s entry into the AUKUS means the formation of a new, anti-Chinese strategy in the region. For the UK, membership in the AUKUS allows it to: expand its naval presence in the Indo-Pacific region; strengthen its special relations with the United States; improve its image, which was shaken after the country’s exit from the EU; and restore traditional ties with Australia. For the United States, AUKUS is the implementation of the strategy of “pivot” to Asia and the creation of a new alliance that has greater opportunities for military-strategic cooperation in the face of the threat from China to use the Pacific Ocean to oust the United States from a leading position. There are some possible geopolitical consequences of creating AUKUS for the region. They are escalation of tension and the nuclear arms race of the opposing parties; a new cold war with China; expansion of the club of nuclear powers because of Australia; imbalance of geopolitical forces in the region; undermining transatlantic unity; and a common strategy in the foreign policy of European countries and the United States.
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Leonova, Olga. "The Impact of the Strategic Partnership AUKUS on the Geopolitical Situation in the Indo-Pacific Region." International Organisations Research Journal 17, no. 3 (October 1, 2022): 194–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2022-03-08.
Full textAbstract:
The purpose of the AUKUS strategic alliance is to develop cooperation between the member countries (U.S., UK and Australia) in the field of security and defence in the Indo-Pacific region. The agreement provides for the supply of submarines powered by nuclear reactors to Australia. The emergence of this new strategic alliance was caused by the following factors: the increased power of China in the region; the weakening of the U.S. position in the Indo-Pacific; the desire of the UK to implement the “global Britain” strategy in practice; and the need for the U.S. to have reliable allies to contain China. These factors reveal the true purpose of AUKUS—containment of China and opposition to its active policy in the region. In this article, the author uses comparative analysis to reveal the different goals and geopolitical interests of the AUKUS countries. The systematic approach helps to describe the essence of the complex developing geopolitical system of the Indo-Pacific region.The theories of new institutionalism and constructivism make it possible to identify both continuity and gaps in the security policy and foreign policy of regional actors. Australia’s participation in the AUKUS allows it to: strengthen its political ties with influential partners—the United States and Great Britain; receive additional security guarantees from them in the context of increased activity of Chinese policy in the region; raise the country’s status in the regional hierarchy; and strengthen its defence capability. Australia’s entry into the AUKUS means the formation of a new, anti-Chinese strategy in the region. For the UK, membership in the AUKUS allows it to: expand its naval presence in the Indo-Pacific region; strengthen its special relations with the United States; improve its image, which was shaken after the country’s exit from the EU; and restore traditional ties with Australia. For the United States, AUKUS is the implementation of the strategy of “pivot” to Asia and the creation of a new alliance that has greater opportunities for military-strategic cooperation in the face of the threat from China to use the Pacific Ocean to oust the United States from a leading position. There are some possible geopolitical consequences of creating AUKUS for the region. They are escalation of tension and the nuclear arms race of the opposing parties; a new cold war with China; expansion of the club of nuclear powers because of Australia; imbalance of geopolitical forces in the region; undermining transatlantic unity; and a common strategy in the foreign policy of European countries and the United States.
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"DOCUMENTATION: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, Ministerial-Level Meeting, Summary Statement by the Chairman, Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, 7 November 1989, Canberra." Southeast Asian Economies 6, no. 3 (1990): 361–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1355/ae6-3l.
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"DOCUMENTATION: Statement by Senator Gareth Evans, Australian Foreign Minister, to the ASEAN PMC 7+1 Session, on Australia, ASEAN and the East Asian Hemisphere, Bandar Seri Begawan, 2 August 1995." Southeast Asian Economies 12, no. 3 (1996): 404–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1355/ae12-3h.
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Malik, J. Mohan. "South Asia in China's Foreign Relations." Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change 13, no. 1 (February 2001): 73–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13239100120036054.
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SINGH, Bhubhindar. "Japan-Southeast Asia Relations Amid US-China Competition in East Asia." East Asian Policy 13, no. 03 (July 2021): 71–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793930521000210.
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Japan has emerged as a critical strategic actor in East Asia amidst intensifying US-China structural competition since 2010. Southeast Asia/ASEAN is an important dimension of Japan’s foreign policy expansion. This paper argues that Japan’s foreign policy is driven by the aim of becoming an alternative source of strategic stability in Southeast Asia/ASEAN as opposed to the United States and China. This is explained by analysing Japan’s foreign policy in regional balance of power and ASEAN-led multilateralism.
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Allen, Kenneth W. "China's Foreign Military Relations with Asia‐Pacific." Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 29 (November 2001): 645–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670560120075046.
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Hamid, M. Obaidul, and Andy Kirkpatrick. "Foreign language policies in Asia and Australia in the Asian century." Language Problems and Language Planning 40, no. 1 (May 9, 2016): 26–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/lplp.40.1.02ham.
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This article provides a comparative analysis of foreign language policies in Asia and Australia with reference to policy contexts, motivations and processes. The analysis is specifically motivated by the recent publication of the Australia in the Asian Century White Paper that represents Australia’s renewed desire to engage with Asia by developing “Asia literacy” including the development of national proficiency in selected Asian languages. It is argued that, although foreign language policies in the two regions present interesting similarities in terms of policy contexts and goals, there is notable disconnect between Asia and Australia that potentially undermines Australian policy desire to connect with Asia. Furthermore, although languages, like other national resources, are planned to address social needs and aspirations, subjecting languages to economic imperative reflects not only misconceptions of languages but also misappropriation of their potential.
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Trinh, Dinh Thi. "Australia’s engagement with East Asia: Evolution of a re-orientation in foreign policy." Science & Technology Development Journal - Social Sciences & Humanities 1, no. X1 (June 30, 2017): 5–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.32508/stdjssh.v1ix1.427.
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The outbreak and warfare activities of World War II unintendedly forced Australia to re-orient their security and defense thinking. Having realized that the British security environment and that of their own were far diverged from each other, Australia began to re-orient their priority in foreign policy from European issues to East Asian ones. For the Bristish, East Asia is the Far East but in Australia’s new perspective it is the Near North; thus, the security matters in East Asia are closely linked with Australian national interests. Australian independent diplomacy has been shaped during the course following their re-orienting foreign and security thinking to East Asia. This paper examines the re-orienting of Australia’s strategic thinking from Europecentered problems to Asia-centered ones as well as changing orientation towards ‘Asia’ and ‘Asian engagement’. It also argues that since it had formed, Australia’s Asia-oriented foreign policy, despite minor constraints, has been continuously developed until today.
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Trinh, Dinh Thi. "Australia’s engagement with East Asia: Evolution of a re-orientation in foreign policy." Science & Technology Development Journal - Social Sciences & Humanities 1, no. X1 (June 30, 2017): 5–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.15419/stdjssh.v1ix1.427.
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The outbreak and warfare activities of World War II unintendedly forced Australia to re-orient their security and defense thinking. Having realized that the British security environment and that of their own were far diverged from each other, Australia began to re-orient their priority in foreign policy from European issues to East Asian ones. For the Bristish, East Asia is the Far East but in Australia’s new perspective it is the Near North; thus, the security matters in East Asia are closely linked with Australian national interests. Australian independent diplomacy has been shaped during the course following their re-orienting foreign and security thinking to East Asia. This paper examines the re-orienting of Australia’s strategic thinking from Europecentered problems to Asia-centered ones as well as changing orientation towards ‘Asia’ and ‘Asian engagement’. It also argues that since it had formed, Australia’s Asia-oriented foreign policy, despite minor constraints, has been continuously developed until today.
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Yahuda, Michael. "The Foreign Relations of Greater China." China Quarterly 136 (December 1993): 687–710. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741000032306.
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Greater China refers in the first instance to the close economic ties of trade, technology transfers and investment that have emerged since the second half of the 1980s linking Taiwan and Hong Kong with the rapid development of southern China. But it also suggests that the economic links are buttressed by familial, social, historical and cultural ties of a peculiarly Chinese kind. These ties and links have developed between different Chinese communities whose political divergences had until recently precluded such a development. Consequently the emergence of Greater China poses new challenges and opportunities to the political identities of its three constituent members and to the conduct of relations between them. Greater China and its possible future trajectory affects and is also affected by the rest of the Asia-Pacific region including the major powers of the United States and Japan as well as those in the immediate vicinity of South-east Asia.
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McDougall, Derek. "Foreign Policy Studies in Australia." Australian Journal of Politics & History 55, no. 3 (September 2009): 375–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2009.1523a.x.
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YUAN, Jingdong. "Australia–China Relations at 50." East Asian Policy 14, no. 02 (April 2022): 93–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793930522000149.
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Australia–China relations are at a turning point 50 years after diplomatic recognition. While the past five decades have witnessed extensive growth in economic exchanges, in recent years, bilateral ties have experienced serious deterioration. Australia’s alliance with the United States, domestic politics—in particular the two major parties’ approaches to foreign policy—and economic interdependence are important variables in Canberra’s approach to China. There will be no exception for the incoming Australian Labor Party government to deal with these.
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Richardson, Michael. "Australia-Southeast Asia relations and the East Asian Summit." Australian Journal of International Affairs 59, no. 3 (September 2005): 351–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357710500231149.
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Rubinoff, Arthur G. "Review: Asia: Misperceptions in Foreign Policymaking." International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis 41, no. 2 (June 1986): 462–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002070208604100211.
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