Journal articles on the topic 'Australia Armed Forces Reorganization'

Avtor v članku pregledno obravnava nastanek in razvoj Slovenske vojske, njeno vlogo v slovenski osamosvojitvi in ob izzivih, ki nas čakajo ob vključitvi v Nato in EU. V prvem delu besedila obravnava vzroke, ki so povzročili razpad JLA in oblikovanje slovenskih oboroženih sil, njihov razvoj iz TO in MSNZ v Slovensko vojsko, v drugem pa razmišlja o reorganizaciji in profesionalizaciji Slovenske vojske ter njeni vlogi v spremenjenih varnostnih okoliščinah prihodnosti. The author discusses in his article the foundation and development of the Slovenian Armed Forces, its role in the War for Slovenia and various challenges that our country has to cope with upon joining NATO and the EU. The first part of the article deals with the reasons for the disintegration of the Yugoslav People’s Army and the formation of the Slovenian Armed Forces, their development from the Territorial Defence and National Defence Manoeuvre Structure to the Slovenian Armed Forces. In the second part, the author provides some reflections about the reorganization and professionalization of the Slovenian Armed Forces and its role in the altered future security situation.

Natural justice — Judicial review — Armed forces — Air force officer — Power to dismiss where appointment held at pleasure — Governor-General in Council — Air Force Regulations 1927 (Cth) regulations 72(1), 628(1)

A discussion is given of the arrangements that have been made for aeronautical and aerospace engineering education of members of the armed forces in the United Kingdom, the United States of America, West Germany and Australia. A striking feature of the comparisons is shown to be the extent of the differences in the arrangements in the various countries. A less detailed and less rigorous version of the paper was presented at the Aerotech 92 conference (1).

The period after the end of the Cold War and the reorganization of the world order brought new challenges to modern military organizations. Total technological progress and completely new threats and opponents in the form of nonlinearity have influenced modern warfare to change its shape and form to such an extent that most theorists believe that we are witnessing revolutionary changes in the character of war. The development of information technology particularly influences the development of new concepts of the use of the armed forces, with the most technologically advanced countries naturally leading the way. The development of information technology has a huge impact on the modernization and transformation of the armed forces, primarily in the West. In order to achieve a qualitatively new, higher level of precision and higher speed in conducting military operations, in the early 1990s, many segments of the US armed forces were specially equipped with modern technology, which is based on information networks. The revolution in military affairs and its implementation in the concept of network-centric warfare have become new military strategic models for the US armed forces, along with the process of redefining security policy, in line with the new situation. Network-centric warfare has set new standards in warfare, relying on information superiority. In this paper, the relation of military strategy and its principles to network-centric warfare is considered.

A number of States lawfully enlist persons younger than eighteen (but at least sixteen) into their national armed forces. While such enlistment is consistent with the relevant States’ international law obligations, a number of additional obligations are triggered that the State owes towards the child enlistee by virtue of international children’s rights. This article engages with these additional obligations as they apply to child members of the armed forces who are in conflict with the law. In particular, focus is placed on States that maintain a separate and distinct military justice system, and the examples of Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom are relied upon for illustrative purposes. In order to properly engage with State obligations, in this regard, the article also endeavors to address the nature of the duty of care owed by the armed forces in respect of child members.

In South America in the 1960s and 1970s the contradictions of economic, social and political structures were deepening. In order to surmount the structural crisis the different political forces, tendencies and governments elaborated various strategies. These attempts aiming at reorganizing the society led to undermining the hegemony of ruling governing block and radical transformation of state apparatus. Progressive and regressi-ve forms of military dictatorship and excepcional states of the new militarism appeared on the continent because of the Brazilian military takeover of April, 1964. Formally these state systems were set up by the institutional takeover of the armed forces. The military governments strove for the total reorganization and modernization of the societies in their all - economic, political and ideological - territories. The study aims at analizing the diffe-rent models of modernization during the past sixty years.

Between 1941 and 1945, as the U.S. military machine sent millions of Americans——and American culture——around the world, several thousand African Americans spent time in Australia. Armed with little knowledge of Australian racial values and practices, black Americans encoutered a nation whose long-standing commitment to the principle of "White Australia" appeared to rest comfortably with the segregative policies commonly associated with the American South. Nonetheless, while African Americans did encounter racism and discrimination——practices often encouraged by the white Americans who were also stationed in Australia during the war——there is compelling evidence that their experiences were not always negative. Indeed, for many black Americans, Australians' apparent open-mindedness and racial views of white Britons and others with whom African Americans came into contact during the war. Making use of U.S. Army censors' reports and paying attention to black Americans' views of their experiences in Australia, this article not only casts light on an aspect of American-Australian relations that has hitherto recieved scant scholarly attention and reveals something about the African American experience, but also offers insights into race relations within the U.S. armed forces.

The reorganization of the Armed Forces, which has been realized for the last decade, touched over the sexual structure of defenders of our Motherland: one can witness an increasing tendency of employing women on military service.Legal equality of sexes doesnt allow to avoid the differences between the man and the woman, which are genetically conditioned. One of the actual problems of the Army today is the task of providing optimal conditions of military service for women. The realization of this task depends first of all on principal position of the commanders of all levels. This implies the necessity of hygienic education of the commanders under the management of hygienists with the aim of radical change of their attitude to military women.

During the government of AK Party army leaders underprivileged to act as an exclusive guarantor preserving a secular regime in the country. The political balance between Secular and Islamite elites was essentially removed after Erdogan was elected Turkish President. Consistently toughening authoritarian regime of a ruling party deeply accounts for a military coup attempt and earlier periodically occurred disturbance especially among the young. The methods of a coup showed the profundity of a split and the lack of cohesion in Turkish armed forces. Erdogan made the best use of a coup attempt’s opportunities to concentrate all power in his hands and to consolidate a present regime. The mass support of the population during a coup attempt ensured opportunities for a fundamental reorganization of a political system. Revamped Constitution at most increases political powers of the President.

Radio broadcasting has played an important role as a medium of information, news and entertainment for Australian military personnel in wartime and conflict situations. However, while many nations have comprehensive units tasked to the full-time provision of broadcasting services, such as the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) in the United States and the British Forces Broadcasting Service (BFBS) in the United Kingdom, Australia has relied on more ad hoc measures. As contingencies have required, the Australian military has introduced radio broadcasting elements into its table of organisation, the most comprehensive having been the Australian Army Amenities Service (AAAS) during World War II. Now, in a new technological era, perhaps specialised radio for troops will fade completely from the agenda.

LAY SUMMARY Military service can affect the psychological health and well-being of ex-service members and their families. Most research prioritizes active duty families or Veterans, with spouses/intimate partners and adult children of Veterans often overlooked. This study reviewed all previous research on the psychological health of Veteran families within the Five Eyes alliance countries of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It found spouses/intimate partners had higher rates of anxiety, depression, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) compared to national rates and were more likely to feel distress when their Veteran partner had mental health issues. Adult children were at higher risk for anxiety, depression, alcohol/substance misuse, and PTSD compared to national rates. Four themes identified were: personal feelings and internal emotions, Veteran-oriented, help and support, and acting as a unit. Due to the scarce available research, further studies are needed to address psychological outcomes among military Veteran families.

The Japanese Armed Forces did not take a long time to occupy the southern regions. Invading the southern regions was the Japanese’s ambition to build “The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”. Through Kalijati treaty, the Government of Dutch East Indies declared its unconditional surrender to the Japanese Armed Forces. Banyuwangi is an area located in the most eastern part of Java and considered as a strategic place as a defense fortress for all Java regions from the allied attacks from the south (Australia). The Japanese 16th Army implemented various policies as a part of the Greater East Asia War plan. The purpose of this study was to describe the policies made by the Japanese military government when occupying Banyuwangi, East Java. This study used a historical research method consisting of five steps: topic selection, heuristics, criticism, interpretation, and historiography. The result of this study shows that Banyuwangi is a strategic area where the Japanese 16th Army directly or indirectly implemented various policies for mass mobilization in supporting the Greater East Asia War. Through its propaganda, the Japanese military said that the Banyuwangi people’s sacrifice was for a mutual victory in the war to build a new, safe, and prosperous Asia.

The purpose of the study is to find ways to solve the current problem of improving the military education system. The needs in the formation and development of digital competencies of military management officers in different competence areas were studied: information and data literacy, communication and collaboration, digital content creation, safety and problem solving are studied. Possession of a high level of competence in these areas, according to the authors, significantly affects the professional development of officers during their military careers. The attention is focused on the possibility of implementing transdisciplinary integration in the system of advanced training of officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The subject of the study, among other things, was the formation of readiness to use STEM-technologies in professional activities. The study reviewed modern STEM-approaches in the educational process and analyzed the experience of countries such as the United States, Australia, China, Britain, Israel, Korea, Singapore. The results of the survey among the students of advanced training courses at The National Defence University of Ukraine named after Ivan Cherniakhovskyi are highlighted. In particular, the attitude and needs of military management officers to training and professional development were clarified; identified their educational interests. In particular, the need for effective ownership of tools for planning and organizing project work, analysis and evaluation of achieved results is identified.

The formation of the West Ukrainian People's Republic in November 1918, was a natural consequence of the long-standing struggle of Ukrainians of Halychyna for statehood. In a difficult situation of the Ukrainian-Polish war 1918–1919, started by Poland, the West Ukrainian People's Republic carried out state and military formation. Close relations with the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR) were established; the Ukrainian Halychyna's Army (UHA) was reorganized on the European way and was ready for the West Ukrainian People's Republic armed defense. It was proved that compared to the Polish state, the military potential of the Ukrainians was much weaker. However, a bright demonstration of the UHA's combat readiness was the Vovchukhiv Strategic Offensive Operation in February–March 1919, which put the Polish troops in Lviv, in particular, and in Halychyna, in general in a tough situation. The main purpose of this article is to analyze the background of the Vovchukhiv operation, its course, and the causes of UHA's defeat. The author states that two factors caused the UHA's offensive strategic operation in February 1919. Firstly, the reorganization of the West Ukrainian People's Republic armed forces with weighty strengthening increased their combat capability and readiness for offensive operations. Also, the hard work of governing structures increased morale and combat capabilities of the army. The military successes of the Ukrainian troops, which caused worry and panic in Warsaw, are described. It is noted that the break in the fightings, organized by the Entente mission, was successfully used by the Polish command to reinforcement on the Halychyna Front with reserves from abroad. Specific examples show that in spring 1919, UHA brigades were forced to resist the numerically larger Polish forces. Because of this, they soon lost the results of the offensive operation. Keywords West Ukrainian People's Republic, Ukrainian Halychyna's Army, Poland, Vovchukhiv operation, Polish-Ukrainian war.

This article studies one of the components of the history of modernization processes in the countries of South-Eastern Europe in the latter half of the 19th century – the early 20th century – military modernization. The purpose of research is to analyze the role of foreign military assistance in formation of military forces of Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Albania and Greece. Separate directions of military assistance provided to the countries of South-Eastern Europe in the form of military missions, training of officers in Europe, arms export and other aspects are disclosed. One of the markers of military development during the period in question was the military instructor activity of the developed European countries in the framework of military modernization of possible military allies in these countries. The lower limit of research is the Bosnian crisis in 1908 caused by annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary. The conflict was the reason of rapid militarization of the region. Military missions from the countries of Europe began their activity in Greece, Montenegro, Turkey. Thousands of officers from Balkan army studied in military establishments of Europe. The top limit of the research is the First world war І 1914-1918. The obvious success was attained with modernization of the armed forces of allies by military missions from Germany in Turkey and from France in Romania in that time. The work deals with the process of military modernization, i.e. the activities of military instructor missions of the leading European countries during the interwar period. The time interval of the study ranges within 1908-1918. This was the period marked by modernization of new national armies in Eastern Europe. Military missions played an important role in this complex process. The comparison of the results of transformations provides for better understanding of the regional specifics and concrete results of this form of military modernization of armed forces during the twenty-year interwar period. The method for comparing variations of military modernization of armies of Oriental countries occurring at the turn of the 20th centuries and reorganization of military forces of the countries of South-Eastern Europe is used. This method instantiates results, consequences, failures and success of military modernization. The research is relevant for studying modern processes of military modernization.

The development of a system of therapeutic, diagnostic, and organizational measures to improve specialized medical care for members of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with urolithiasis is scientifically substantiated. The study was conducted in 3 stages. At the first stage, the principal functions of the system of specialized urological care for patients with urolithiasis were singled out, and possible ways of their realization were determined. At the second stage, planning options for the system were formulated and described. In the third stage, the criteria for analyzing the system, estimation of their superiority, and scientific substantiation of the rational concept were elaborated. Three systems of providing specialized urological care to patients with urolithiasis with the conditional names, including proposed, real, and adaptive, were formulated and put forward. The proposed system was based on the principle of the maximum volume of specialized medical care according to the urology profile in the district hospitals of each military district and hospital of the Northern Fleet. The real system has a four-stage structure, which was based on staged treatment of patients with urolithiasis receiving the maximum treatment in organizations of central subordination. In the adaptive system, its conceptual basis is the central military medical organizations, and the volume of care in the remaining hospitals is determined by the chief urologist of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Using hierarchy analysis, a pairwise comparison of each concept was performed, and the proposed system has the highest priority index. Generally, to improve the specialized care for members of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with urolithiasis, we have developed and scientifically proved the system of the organizational treatment and diagnostic measures that assume the decentralization and standardization of the urological care for patients with urolithiasis, staff reorganization, provision of modern equipment, professional training of the medical staff, improvement of research potential, and interaction with medical institutions of the civilian population.

In 1989, the process of Westernization and Europeanization began in Hungary, which, in the conditions of global reorganization of relations in the world, resulted in a change of foreign and domestic political paradigms, and managed to put national interests in the forefront in the past decade. In such as context, the analysis of the strategic culture of Hungary is approached from a perspective that will frame the cultural and ahistorical view of the international policy of the neorealists with its own cultural and historical dimension. The subject of this paper is to examine the changes in the strategic culture of Hungary under the influence of changes in the international political and security scene. By determining the patterns of "fine" changes in the strategic culture at the level of statements of the practical activity of the security policy, the analysis of the strategic documents of Hungary on the security policy is realized. The changes in the statements of the security policy were a necessary consequence of the changed circumstances on the international scene and the need to reconcile the fundamental elements that came into the relationship of conflict. Defining the role of the armed forces appears as a central segment of the change in strategic culture in the post-Cold War era.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the British Commonwealth faced the twin ‘threats’ of decolonisation and communism, with many across the Commonwealth seeing decolonisation as the first step towards communist dictatorship. Recent scholarship has shown that the British attempted to ‘manage’ the decolonisation process to prevent socialist movements or national liberation movements sympathetic to the Soviet Bloc from coming to power. Therefore Britain, along with the Dominions, co-ordinated their intelligence services to combat the communist threat across the Commonwealth. This paper explores how this co-ordination of anti-communist efforts was implemented in Britain, Australia and South Africa in the early Cold War era, which involved the breaking of strikes using the armed forces, the close monitoring of ‘persons of interest’ and the (attempted) banning of the Communist Party. It also seeks to demonstrate that the history of anti-communism, similar to communism, has an international dimension that is only starting to be investigated by historians.

The article deals with the pivot to Asia started in the USA in 2011, now becoming a part of US military strategy. Asian-Pacific region will be playing increasingly important role in securing of political, economic and defence interests of the USA seeking to consolidate world order based on “American leadership from the position of strength” – which is the main principle of New National Security Strategy. Pivot to Asia is understood as modernization and reinforcement of traditional “security alliances”. The old policy of “deterrence” of China as main geopolitical competitor is still being pursued.Military presence of the USA on Japanese islands is used for rearmament of Japanese self-defence forces. New bilateral treaty is being prepared, thus creating the possibility of joint actions of armed forces of Japan and US on the territories in- and outside Pacific region. Threat for North Korea is used as a good pretext for build-up of US military forces and deployment of THAAD complexes on the territory of South Korea. China and Russia express same attitude in this respect regarding THAAD as an instrument for increase tension in the region. Defence co-operation between Australia and US has incentives for development as well as limitations: Australia is not sure US are able to fulfill its obligations in case of crisis and at the same time economic co-operation with Beijing is of crucial interest for Australia. The involvement of Philippines in the territorial dispute with China made possible for US to strengthen cooperation in the sphere of defence. After power shift in Thailand military cooperation with US stopped. Seeking new partners in the region, US is lifting embargo to supply of weapons to Vietnam and gradually unfreezing relations with Myanmar. US moves in SEA can be regarded as reaction to Chinese promotion of “Maritime silk route of the 21st century” concept. Relations with India are viewed in the USA as means of deterrence of China ambitions and competition with Russia in military co-operation.The article contains practical recommendations how Russia should act when purpose of increasing its influence in the region is on the agenda.

This article offers the first empirical study of the origins, nature and effects of Australian Defence Force (ADF) opinions about the Australian media's coverage of Defence issues and ADF operations. It summarises the history of fractious military–media relations in Australia, and looks at the principal contributors to the current antipathy between the parties. It argues that while the media routinely denounce the military's motivations in its dealings with the fourth estate, they have no means of understanding its rationale, as until now there has been no empirical analysis of what the military thinks of the media's treatment of it and how these opinions have been shaped. The article then presents and examines the results of its survey of the 2011 intake at the Australian Command and Staff College. From an analysis of these results, it proposes why the ADF has such a low opinion of Australian media coverage of the armed forces, and examines the consequences of these opinions for current and future military–media relations.

The article deals with the main provisions that are being investigated within the framework of the research work “Development of the methodology for conducting forensic military examinations related to the level of defence capability of the state”. The authors investigate the inconsistency between the Strategic Planning of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Defence Planning measures conducted in the country during 1991-2014. In order to restore military registration throughout the country in 2016, district (city) MC were further formed in administrative-territorial units of the district type, where they were reduced in previous years. Thus, one of the main indicators of the mobilization readiness of the MC is their real capacity for the full and timely deployment of mobilization resources to the troops. However, the results of the implementation of the MC tasks for lifting and submitting part of the mobilization resources during 1-6 phases of partial mobilization in 2014-2015, confirm the existence of significant problems and inconsistencies between the real and necessary capabilities of the MC to fulfil the assigned tasks. In the opinion of the authors of the article, the necessary and necessary techniques for conducting judicial military examinations, which are an important tool for objective evaluation of actions (inaction) of military officials (commanders, commanders, commanders, commanders) in matters of construction, development, training and implementation of the AF, are needed and required. The establishment of a causal link between the violations by the abovementioned officials of the requirements of the current legislation and the occurrence of grave consequences related to the death of personnel, the loss of arms, military equipment, material means, etc.

This article examines a series of worker strikes that culminated in the takeover of the Deutz Argentina tractor factory in October 1980. These mobilizations occurred under the most violent military regime in modern Argentine history—the Proceso de Reorganización Nacional (Process of National Reorganization, 1976–83)—yet they did not provoke legal or extralegal repression. Instead, over a week of highly visible conflicts, the Deutz workforce challenged the company’s decision to close the plant and publicly attacked the dictatorship’s economic policies and failure to defend Argentina’s national interest. This episode has been largely ignored within the history of labor relations during the Proceso. In this article, I advance two related arguments. First, I suggest that while several factors contributed to the lack of violence, the workers’ discourse demands serious analysis and shows important continuities with historical Peronist ideologies. Rather than passive victims or heroic revolutionaries, I demonstrate that Deutz workers pursued a pragmatic and occasionally aggressive strategy centered around ideas of patriotism, family, and religion—all ideas that the Armed Forces rhetorically celebrated. Second, I argue that this case challenges accepted notions related to the “state of exception” that nominally suspended the normal functioning of the law. Instead, I show, the law and legal precedent remained critically important to workers, trade unionists, management, and state actors as they navigated this situation. Labor legislation played a key role in the development, understanding, and resolution of the confrontation. This reading takes seriously the Proceso as a government and offers new insight into authoritarian legality.

Zaradi okoliščin, v katerih so se znašle zahodne vojaške organizacije pri izvajanju po- konfliktnih operacij, je bilo nujno najti ustrezne načine obveščevalne priprave bojišča, ki bi zamenjali osredotočenost na nasprotnika z osredotočenostjo na prebivalstvo. Kot del širše reorganizacije in evolucije obveščevalne dejavnosti so oborožene sile ZDA uveljavile koncept družbene geografije, ki vključuje znanstvenike s področja druž- boslovja. Namen prispevka je predstaviti in osvetliti sistem znanstvene analize druž- benega okolja v podporo poveljevanja (HTS) in pomen družboslovnih znanosti ter poudariti vlogo sistema pri podpori bojnemu odločanju. Avtor predstavi dosežke in uporabnost sistema znanstvene analize družbenega okolja na primeru Afganistana ter sklene z ugotovitvijo, da je treba kljub očitnim pomanjkljivostim sistema nadaljevati njegov razvoj, še posebno z večjo udeležbo vseh držav članic Nata. Due to the circumstances encountered by western military organizations when executing post conflict operations, the urgent need for more adequate intelligen- ce preparation of the battlefield arose, where the enemy-orientated intelligence should be replaced by a population-centric one. As part of a broad reorganization and evolution of the intelligence community, the US Armed Forces introduced the concept of Human Terrain System based on the active participation of social science academia. The aim of the article is to present the Human Terrain System and the im- portance of the social sciences, as well as to highlight its importance in support of military decision making. The author uses Afghanistan as a model to demonstrate the system’s results and utility. In the conclusion, he argues that, regardless of its obvious shortcomings, the development of the Human Terrain System should continue with special emphasis being put on greater involvement of all NATO member states

By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet armed forces were no match in overall power terms to the fully mobilized Wehrmacht, but in terms of the number of major weapons they surpassed it. By the summer of 1941, they totaled 5.7 million people. Ground troops of the Red Army included 303 Division 3 separate rifle and 16 airborne brigades. However, all of them, except the cavalry, were in the process of reorganization and formation and were unprepared to repel aggression. Incompleteness of reforms and a number of other reasons, led from the first days of the war to serious losses in the ranks of the Red Army. To make up for the losses it was required to mobilize significant resources, a substantial part of which has been lost in the abandonment of the western Soviet territories. The situation at the front in the first month of military operations required to supply the army with new compounds. In view of the fact that the mobilization plan did not provide for the formation of new compounds, it had to solve the problem from scratch. In addition to organizing training it had to urgently address the issue of creation of new military units. The task has been assigned primarily to internal military districts, including the Siberian Military District. In general, during the Great Patriotic War in the Siberian Military District 4 tactical formations, 43 infantry and 6 cavalry divisions, 30 infantry, mortar and ski teams were formed. Many of them have distinguished themselves in battle and have been awarded orders and honorary titles Guard names.

Nephrotic Syndrome (NS) is a clinical condition characterized by massive proteinuria, hypoalbuminemia, hypercholesterolemia, and generalized oedema. It occurs more commonly in children than in adults, and usually manifests as one of two usually idiopathic diseases: Minimal change NS (MCNS) or focal segmental glomerulosclerosis (FSGS). It has also an incidence of three new cases per 100000 each year in adults. During 70s and 80s membranous nephropathy was considered to be the prime cause of adult NS worldwide. In USA, Brazil, Singapore and South East Asian countries specially in India and Pakistan FSGS has exceeded all other causes of adult NS during last three decades. While in most of the countries of Europe, Australia, Japan, Iran IgA nephropathy has become the main cause of adult NS. Membranoproliferative glomerulonephritis (MPGN) is the predominant cause in certain countries like Russia, South Africa, Singapore etc. In some countries like UAE and Nepal MN is still found to be the main cause of adult NS. In Bangladesh only a few studies are documented which show variable predominant causes of adult NS. It is possibly due to inconsistent renal pathology facilities available in the countries and lack of dedicated renal pathologists. Journal of Armed Forces Medical College Bangladesh Vol.12(1) 2016: 100-108

Este artigo tem por objetivo evidenciar os fundamentos do Poder Aeroespacial e identificar as principais atribuições da Força Aérea Brasileira estabelecidas na Estratégia Nacional de Defesa (END). O autor traz a lume aspectos doutrinários do Poder Aéreo, ou Poder Aeroespacial, bem como a sua importância como projeção do poder militar, uma das expressões do poder nacional, como preconizado na doutrina da Escola Superior de Guerra. A Estratégia Nacional de Defesa (END) é analisada em seus aspectos mais relevantes, destacando-se os seus três eixos estruturantes, que tratam, respectivamente, da: reorganização das Forças Armadas; da reorganização da indústria nacional de defesa e da composição dos efetivos das Forças Armadas. O autor evidencia as atribuições da Força Aérea Brasileira previstas no referido documento, que em síntese são as seguintes: prioridade da vigilância aérea; poder para assegurar a superioridade aérea local; capacidade para levar o combate a pontos específicos do território nacional; e domínio do potencial aeroestratégico. Assim, com vistas a dar cumprimento à sua missão institucional, o Comando da Aeronáutica elaborou o Plano Estratégico Militar da Aeronáutica (PEMAER), bem como o Projeto “Força Aérea 100”, o qual contém as diretrizes necessárias para orientar o futuro da Força Aérea Brasileira (FAB) nas próximas décadas. This article aims to highlight the fundamentals of Aerospace Power and to identify the main attributions of the Brazilian Air Force established in the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The author brings to light doctrinal aspects of Air Power, or Aerospace Power, as well as its importance as a projection of military power, one of the expressions of national power, as prescribed in the doctrine of the Brazilian War College. The National Defense Strategy is analyzed in its most relevant aspects, highlighting its three structuring point facets, which deal respectively with: reorganization of the Armed Forces; the reorganization of the national defense industry; and the composition of the Armed Forces personnel. The author highlights the attributions of the Brazilian Air Force provided in the aforementioned document, which in summary are the following: priority of aerial surveillance; power to ensure local air superiority; ability to take combat to specific points in the national territory; and controlling of the strategic aviation potential. Thus, in order to fulfill its institutional mission, the Aeronautics Command elaborated the Aeronautical Military Strategic Plan (PEMAER- acronym in Portuguese), as well as the “Air Force 100” Project, which contains the necessary plans to guide the future of the Air Force (FAB) in the coming decades. Este artículo tiene por objetivo evidenciar los fundamentos del Poder Aeroespacial e identificar las principales atribuciones de la Fuerza Aérea Brasileña establecidas en la Estrategia Nacional de Defensa (END). El autor trae a la luz aspectos doctrinarios del Poder Aéreo, el Poder Aeroespacial, así como su importancia como proyección del poder militar, una de las expresiones del poder nacional, como preconizado en la doctrina de la Escuela Superior de Guerra. La Estrategia Nacional de Defensa (END) se analiza en sus aspectos más relevantes, destacándose sus tres ejes estructurantes, que tratan, respectivamente, de la: reorganización de las Fuerzas Armadas; de la Reorganización de la industria nacional de defensa y de la composición de los efectivos de las Fuerzas Armadas. El autor evidencia las atribuciones de la Fuerza Aérea Brasileña previstas en dicho documento, que en síntesis son las siguientes: prioridad de la vigilancia aérea; poder para asegurar la superioridad aérea local; capacidad para llevar el combate a puntos específicos del territorio nacional; dominio del potencial aeroespacial. El Comando de la Aeronáutica elaboró el Plan Estratégico Militar de la Aeronáutica (PEMAER), así como el Proyecto “Fuerza Aérea 100”, que contiene las directrices necesarias para orientar el futuro de la Fuerza Aérea Brasileña (FAB) en las próximas décadas.

V prispevku predstavljamo pojav transformacije in njene paradigme ter transformacije na obrambno-vojaškem področju. Najprej se lotevamo mejnih pojmov in zatem opredelimo transformacijo, njeno paradigmo in proces. Pri tem zajamemo izraze konsolidacija, konverzija, modernizacija, preoblikovanje, prestrukturiranje, reforma in reorganizacija, nadalje revolucijo na vojaškem področju in reinženiring ter posebej preobrazbo in transformacijo. Izhajamo iz dejstva, da se ti pojavi spreminjanja po koncu hladne vojne v različnih strokovnih in znanstvenih virih ter obrambno-vojaški praksi opisujejo z izrazi, ki so lahko sinonimi za opis enakih pojavov, večkrat pa so uporabljeni za opis povsem različnih, čeprav so si na prvi pogled precej podobni. V razpravi nas zanima, ali je transformacijska paradigma hibrid, katere so stične točke z revolucionarno in evolucijsko paradigmo ter kam jo umestiti. K temu dodajamo ugotovitve in stališča o primerjavi revolucij na vojaškem področju in v transformaciji. Vse za boljše razumevanje transformacijske paradigme in transformacije oboroženih sil, tako v nacionalnem kot širšem okolju. Treba je namreč priznati, da sta transformacijska paradigma in njena filozofija še nedodelani in premalo raziskani ter preizkušeni v praksi, čeprav ravno na obrambno-vojaškem področju zasledimo pomembne korake. The article presents the phenomenon of transformation and its paradigm as well as the transformation in the fields of defence and the military. First, we address border concepts and later define the transformation process and its paradigm with the terms such as consolidation, conversion, modernization, modification, restructuring, reform and reorganization, further on revolution in the military field and re-engineering, and particularly alteration and transformation. In doing so, we procees from the fact that at the end of the Cold War these phenomena of changing have been described in a variety of technical and scientific resources, as well as the defense and military practice with the terms that may be synonymous in describing the same phenomena, but are often used to describe completely different ones, although seeming similar at first. In the debate, we are interested in whether the transformational paradigm is a hybrid; which are the common points of the revolutionary and evolutionary paradigm, and where to place it. Additionally, we provide the findings and observations on the comparison of revolutions in the military sphere and the transformation, all with the aim to enable better understanding of the transformative paradigms and transformation of the armed forces, both nationally and wider. It is important to recognise that the transformational paradigm and its philosophy are still incomplete and insufficiently researched and tested in practice, although important steps have been noted just in the defence and military fields.

Unlike other civilian leaders, Xi Jinping pushed ahead with sweeping military reforms after taking office as General Secretary of the Communist Party and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. This was a reaction to the situation in which the chairman had not been able to secure control of the military since Deng Xiaoping. Through anti-corruption, Xi Jinping eliminated high-ranking officials who used the military as a tool for personal gain, and tried to eliminate trafficking of official posts and factions within the military. In addition, through structural reorganization, the power of command of the military commander, who had been ineffective, was clarified. The 4 headquarters that interfered with the commander's command system were dismantled and reconstituted as an organization that assisted the military commission. The defense- oriented 7 military districts were also reorganized into 5 theater to prepare for both peacetime and wartime. And the army was established to break the grand army principle, strengthen the status of other forces necessary for modern warfare, and rearrange the composition of troops for them. The theater is not just a defense system, but a system responsible for operations. Accordingly, the eastern theater was responsible for Taiwan, the southern theater was responsible for the South China Sea and Vietnam, the western theater was responsible for India and Central Asia, the northern theater was responsible for the Korean Peninsula, and the central theater was responsible for the mission of the strategic reserve force. In general, it is evaluated that the risk of war in the Taiwan Strait, which is in charge of the Eastern Front, is the highest. However, the area where the largest number of troops are actually deployed is in the Western Front. There are two group army, as well as Xinjiang and Xizang military district. This is because west operation area is vast and its borders are very long, even though China has continuously pushed for weapon modernization. In addition, India is the only country that China does not have a border agreement with, and continues to confront each other across the LAC. In addition, the region should be responsible for operations in Central Asia in case of emergency. Therefore, west are organizing units and distributing weapons with the possibility of a small-scale armed clash or conflict rather than a large-scale war. In fact, it is judged that the possibility of an armed conflict in this area is much higher than in the Taiwan Strait.

Two scientific methodical approaches are singled out to research military economics: as a constituent part of military business which provides for the defence (military) potential of the state, and as a science which studies regularities of economic provision for military business in the state (defence, building, maintenance of armed forces, etc.). It is to be noted out that the competition at the world market of weapons takes place mainly between the USA, Russia, Germany, China and France, the share of which constitutes 74% of military production export. Within the framework of researching military economics are singled out branches manufacturing planes-fighters and production for cosmic sphere. Advantages were shown of planes-fighters of the fifth generation of the USA F-22, F-22 and F-35 Lightning 11 (project is financed by the USA together with Italy, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, Turkey, Norway and Denmark) over Rus-sian-Indian project T-50 and Chinese Chengdu J-20 and J-31. The evaluation is made that leading countries are able by 2030 to build planes-fighters of the sixth generation. The opinion is expressed that the geopolitical position of Ukraine and, in particular, the aggression and annexation of Crimea by Russia make a priority of restoring the fighting capability of the military aviation of Ukraine and of increasing the level of its combat power. It is stressed that for this purpose it is necessary to systematically and rather rapidly substitute the Soviet-Russian aviation technology for American one. The possible ways for equipping armed forces of Ukraine with new planes-fighters are determined the following: their development and manufacture in cooperation with other countries or the organization of licensed manufacturing, import, rent or lease of present-day fighting planes of foreign make. Taking into account that Ukraine enters the club of cosmic states and through the lacking finances it at present is unable to compete on equal terms in manufacturing aerocosmic technology it is suggested to re-orient the economic policy of the country at integrating into European cosmic branch. It is pointed out that for this purpose it is necessary to load the capacities of the State enterprise «Production association «Southern machine building plant named after O.M.Makarov» and designing bureau «Pivdenne». It is recommended to develop the cooperation of Ukraine in manufacturing rocket-carriers «Zenith» for projects «Sea start» and «Land start» and the cooperation with American companies (Orbital ATK - RH «Antares») and European (AVIO, Italy - PH «Vega»); to implement ambitious Ukrainian-Brazilian project «Cyclone-4». It is made more precise that Ukraine may propose to partners the cooperation in continuing the development of multifunctional rocket operative- tactical complex «Sapsan».

Until recently, Oceania was on the periphery of Indian foreign policy. This was due to a number of historical, political and economic reasons: the polities of Oceania historically weren’t a part of the Indian Ocean world; they gained independence too late, and the volume of India's trade with most of them is insignificant. The situation began to change after Narendra Modi came to power in 2014, but this process soon stalled. However, in recent months, there has been a sharp surge in Indian interest in Oceania. In the author's opinion, this is due to three processes: India's desire to enlist the support of its solar energy initiatives, the awareness of the weakness of its strategy of containing China in the Indian Ocean and and the formation of a triple informal alliance with the participation of India, Australia and France, which seems beneficial for these countries. The article analyzes the main imperatives and tasks of India, shows the process of their changes. The author points out that Fiji has historically played a major role in Indian politics in Oceania, but notes that in the near future Indian interest in Papua New Guinea and Tonga, two other island countries with their own armed forces, will grow. The article describes the existing interaction between India and the countries of the South Pacific and promising fields of cooperation. The author notes that Indian expansion in the region opens up new prospects for Russia and puts before it the question of formulating its own Indo-Pacific strategy, which would be combined with the Indian vision.

The regional concept - "Indo-Pacific region" has become a popular topic for research in modern international politics with the active promotion of four countries (USA, Japan, India and Australia). The Indo-Pacific strategy championed by the US Trump administration is the most significant among them and has strengthened the use of the emerging regional term "Indo-Pacific region". After the trade war, relations between China and the United States deteriorated, and Sino-American relations have become one of the most important relations in the field of international relations in this century, and the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, developed under Trump, remains one of the concrete manifestations of the Sino-American great power game. This article explains the evolution of the concept of the "Indo-Pacific region", and the formation and development of the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States, as well as explains the fundamental goals of the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States and the structural conflict in the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region through generalizing the views and opinions of Chinese academia about the U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region. The strategy and policy of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region pursues the main goal of maintaining US hegemony, and this is also closely related to the rise of the PRC. Massive military commitments and a large number of US armed forces in the Indo-Pacific region and the growth of the military power of the PRC will become the most central contradiction in the geopolitical structural conflict between the PRC and the USA in this region. The US military policy in this region will cause discontent of the PRC and even regional conflicts, but at the same time it should be noted that due to the firm strategic determination of the PRC, the PRC's own economic development and the limitations of internal factors of the USA, the US Indo-Pacific strategy will not hinder the peaceful growth of the PRC in this region.

Abstract Introduction Major depression is a leading cause of morbidity in military personnel and an important impediment to operational readiness in military organizations. Although treatment options are available, a large proportion of individuals with depression do not access mental health services. Quantifying and closing this treatment gap is a public health priority. However, the scientific literature on the major depression treatment gap in military organizations has never been systematically reviewed. Methods We systematically searched the EMBASE, MEDLINE, and PsychINFO databases for studies measuring recent mental health service use in personnel serving in the armed forces of a Five-Eye country (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, or the United States). We excluded studies conducted with retired veterans. Because of the substantial heterogeneity in included studies, we did not pool their results. Instead, we computed median period prevalence of mental health service use. Results Twenty-eight studies were included in the systematic review; 12 had estimated mental health service use in personnel with depression, and another 16 had estimated mental health service use in personnel with depression or another mental health disorder. The period prevalence of mental health service use in depressed military personnel ranged from 20 to 75% in 12 included studies, with a median of 48%, over 2–12 months. The other 16 studies yielded similar conclusions; they reported period prevalence of mental health service use in personnel with any mental health disorder ranging from 14 to 75%, with a median of 36%, over 1–12 months. The median was higher in studies relying on diagnostic interviews to identify depressed personnel, compared to studies relying on screening tools (60% vs. 44%). Conclusions There is a large treatment gap for major depression in particular, and for mental health disorders in general, among military personnel. However, our results highlight the association between the use of measurement tools and treatment gaps: estimated treatment gaps were larger when depressed patients were identified by screening tools instead of diagnostic interviews. Researchers should be wary of overestimating the mental health treatment gap when using screening tools in future studies.

Введение. На основе лингвостилистического анализа статей из англоязычных военных журналов изучаются языковые средства выразительности публикаций военной направленности, глубокое знание которых позволяет читающему понимать не только информативный, но и эмоциональный элемент их содержания. Цель – описать многообразие и особенности применения языковых средств выразительности в современных англоязычных военных публикациях. Материал и методы. Изучены диссертационные работы и научные статьи в периодических изданиях по филологии германских языков за последние 10 лет, а также публикации в таких англоязычных журналах военной направленности, как Air Force News, Australian Defence Force Journal, Canadian Military Journal, Defence Turkey, Raider, освещающие деятельность и состояние вооруженных сил Великобритании, США, Австралии, Турции, Канады и других государств. Использованы общенаучные методы теоретического анализа, наблюдения, обобщения, конкретизации.Результаты и обсуждение. Обзор публикаций по филологии германских языков за последнее десятилетие подтверждает недостаточную изученность проблематики использования языковых средств выразительности в англоязычных военных публикациях и актуальность проведения более глубоких исследований в этой области языкознания.Анализ содержания англоязычных военных журналов указывает на то, что в статьях военной направленности доминируют военно-политический и научно-технический стили, хотя в них также комбинируются элементы художественного, разговорного и рекламного текста, а соединение элементов различных функциональных стилей в публицистических текстах придает им не только типичные черты, но и выразительность.Языковые средства выразительности, используемые в военных публикациях, можно разделить на три группы: фонографические (аллитерация, ритм, морфологические и лексические повторы), лексические (эпитеты, метафора, обыгрывание фразеологизмов, жаргонизмы) и синтаксические (односоставные предложения, эмфатические конструкции, инверсия, антитеза, прямая речь, цитата), основной функцией которых является информирование, привлечение внимания, влияние на читателя, внедрение в его подсознание определенных психологических установок. Наиболее распространенными стилистическими тропами, используемыми в рассмотренных в рамках данной работы военных журналах, оказались односоставные предложения, эмфатические и параллельные конструкции, цитаты и прямая речь, метафоры, аллитерация, рифма и ритм.Заключение. В данной работе впервые были проанализированы особенности применения языковых средств выразительности в современных англоязычных военных публикациях. Результаты проведенного исследования могут быть практически применимы как для дальнейшего теоретического изучения рассматриваемой проблемы, так и практически для повышения качества иноязычного образования курсантов и слушателей военных образовательных учреждений в рамках как основной программы подготовки, так и в ходе обучения на курсах военных переводчиков по программе дополнительного профессионального образования. Introduction. On the basis of a linguo-stylistic analysis of articles from English-language military journals, the authors study the language means of expressiveness of military publications, a deep knowledge of which allows the reader to understand not only the informative, but also the emotional element of their content.The aim of the work is to describe the variety and features of the use of linguistic means of expressiveness in modern English-language military publications.Material and methods. The authors studied dissertations and scientific articles in periodicals on the philology of Germanic languages over the past 10 years, as well as publications in such English-language military journals as Air Force News, Australian Defense Force Journal, Canadian Military Journal, Defense Turkey, Raider, covering the activities and state of the armed forces of Great Britain, the United States, Australia, Turkey, Canada and other states. General scientific methods of theoretical analysis, observation, generalization, and concretization are used. Results and discussion. A review of publications on the philology of Germanic languages over the past decade confirms the insufficient knowledge of the problems of the use of language means of expressiveness in English-language military publications and the relevance of conducting more in-depth research in this field of linguistics. Analysis of the content of English-language military journals indicates that military-political and scientific-technical styles dominate in articles of military orientation, although they also combine elements of artistic, conversational and advertising text, and the combination of elements of various functional styles in journalistic texts gives them not only typical features, but also expressiveness. The language means of expressiveness used in military publications can be divided into three groups: phonographic (alliteration, rhythm, morphological and lexical repetitions), lexical (epithets, metaphor, playing phraseological units, jargon) and syntactic (one-part sentences, emphatic constructions, inversion, antithesis, direct speech, quotation), the main function of which is to inform, attract attention, influence the reader, introduce certain psychological attitudes into his subconscious. Conclusion. In this paper, for the first time, the features of the use of language means of expressiveness in modern English-language military publications were analyzed. The results of the conducted research can be practically applied both for further theoretical study of the problem under consideration, and practically for improving the quality of foreign language education of cadets and students of military educational institutions within the framework of both the main training program and during training at military translators ‘ courses under the program of additional professional education.

This article highlights the pivotal nature of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 regarding reforms made in the armed forces of the United States. The unified combatant command system is often seen as the centerpiece of these reforms. The goal of this study is to examine whether the unified combatant command system, which consists of 11 Joint combatant commands within the U.S. Department of Defense, indeed constitutes the centerpiece of these reforms. To fully answer this research question, the study presented here first examines the modern reforms of the U.S. armed forces to provide a solid foundation for subsequent research. It will be concluded that Goldwater-Nichols was the reform most directly relevant to this study. The majority of the article is then devoted to an examination of the 11 combatant commands, identifying how each contributes to the achievement of the goals laid out by Goldwater-Nichols. The author concludes that these 11 unified combatant commands constitute the centerpiece of, and provide the most essential toolset for, the achievement of Goldwater-Nichols.

I arrived home from Australia at the start of the summer recess. I was told that the Prime Minister could not see me until the House sat again in the autumn but that the only qualification that Churchill insisted on for his junior Ministers was that they had served at some time during the war in the Armed Forces. I was fortunately able to satisfy this requirement by my short period of service in the R.A.M.C and the Intelligence Corps.

Abstract After decades of refusal, neglect, and tacit admittance, the service of Indigenous people in the national armed forces of settler colonial states such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States is finally gaining acknowledgment. Indigenous people are now integrated in the regular forces and represented in national war commemoration. This article maintains that while inclusion and recognition of Indigenous military service is a positive transformation in the direction of post-colonial reconciliation, it still operates within the logics of settler colonialism intended to eradicate Indigenous stories of connection to land and assimilate Indigenous people in settler society. Using the case study of Indigenous militarization in Australia, this article argues that, under conditions of settler colonialism, the inclusion and recognition of Indigenous people in national militaries advances the settler colonial project intended to dispossess Indigenous people from their land and assimilate them in the new settler society. It highlights that historically, military organization has supported settler colonialism, and positions the present inclusion and recognition of Indigenous people in the military as a continuation of this history.

Abstract The escalation of violence by Myanmar’s military forces against ethnic Rohingya populations in Rakhine State in 2017 served as a test case for Australia’s commitment to R2P, and its capacity to protect populations from widespread and systematic atrocities in its own regional neighbourhood. Australia’s response to the crisis in Myanmar was mixed; it co-sponsored a UN Human Rights Council resolution to establish the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar that was instrumental in determining the extent and nature of violence committed by Myanmar’s armed forces during the so-called ‘clearance operations’, and provided substantial humanitarian aid for affected Rohingya populations. Australia has, however, been criticised for not doing enough to pressure the government of Myanmar on the issue, for maintaining defence cooperation with Myanmar throughout the crisis, and for its reluctance to accept Rohingya refugees fleeing the violence. This article examines Australia’s response to the Rohingya crisis in the areas of international, regional, and bilateral diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, and defence cooperation. It asks why Australia did not take a more proactive role in confronting atrocities committed by the Myanmar government, and identifies lessons learnt and recommendations for strengthening Australia’s atrocity prevention architecture that is consistent with Australia’s pragmatic approach to regional assistance and its principled international advocacy.

The purpose of this paper was to look at developments which have occurred in ethical behaviour in a nation’s armed forces. The paper begins with the Greeks and their concept of arête ‘manly virtue’, and concludes with reference to courses in ethics conducted in various military academies. In Australia, the Department of Defence and the RAN have played a role in developing codes of conduct for all ranks, from senior officer to junior recruit. The paper suggests that developing an understanding of ethics in a military/naval context should be addressed at four levels. Criteria should be identified for identifying relevant ethical behaviour; agreement should be reached about what constitutes ethical behaviour; programs should be developed at recruit and officer cadet level; and finally, curricula in military/naval ethics should be an integral part of the program in military training establishments.

After five years of pursuing a policy of appeasement towards China, the Philippines is incrementally and reluctantly shifting to “limited hard balancing.” The goal is to constrain China's revisionist agenda in the South China Sea. This strategy entails building up the Philippine military's territorial defence capabilities, maintaining its alliance with the U.S., and forging security partnerships with other middle power like South Korean, Japan, and Australia. During his six-year term, the late President Benigno Aquino III stood up to China's expansive claim in the South China Sea. When Rodrigo Roa Duterte assumed the presidency in June 2016, he unravelled his predecessor's balancing policy towards China. Nonetheless, recent developments such as the People's Liberation Army Navy's hostile moves against the Armed Forces of the Philippines units on Philippine-occupied islands in the South China Sea and the delays in the promised Chinese public investments in the country prompted the Duterte Administration to review the appeasement approach and to mull over on a limited hard balancing policy. In conclusion, this article contends that the Duterte Administration is at the crossroads, figuring out if it will continue its appeasement stance or adopt a limited hard balancing policy towards China.

Defence is the largest item of physical expenditure in the Union budget presented by the Government of India every year. A substantial portion of the budget is allocated for equipping the army, a task which is performed by a very complex and extended supply chain. Therefore, it is essential that the performance of the military’s supply chain is measured and monitored, so that the nation derives value from the expenditure made on the supply chain. Moreover, the effectiveness of the supply chain provides the defence forces competitive advantage, and thus its performance has a direct bearing on the country’s security. The wars in future are more likely to be a competition between the rival supply chains. Development of a suitable framework for measuring the performance of any extended supply chain is a challenging task. The challenge arises from the very design and nature of the supply chain construct. The entities which constitute the supply chain invariably have varied goals and objectives, and therefore more than often, they indulge in adversarial practices and operate in an environment of mutual distrust. The paper dwells upon the conceptual development of an ideal performance measurement framework for the military supply chain. It compares the military and commercial supply chains, and discusses some of the principal performance measurement frameworks, like the Balanced scorecard, Supply Chain Operations Reference model amongst others used by the commercial supply chains. It also discusses the endeavours made towards supply chain performance evaluation by some of the modern militaries to include that of the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. It also briefly covers the Indian approach to evaluation of supply chain performance. The paper brings out the relevance of the subject, challenges there in, and its importance to the country’s armed forces.

Human civilizations on the earth have a curious history. In the initial phases it is common that different human groups in the different parts of the world initiated their struggles to establish their stable, safe and secure habitats. In this their struggle went on with the natural phenomenon and overpowering them. But the very next phase on the timeline displays the horrible part of colonialism in which the powerful nations under their pride, and in order to prove their sovereignty tried to crush and overpower those who were weak, gullible or unorganized. The colonial powers firstly entered the foreign land with either mercantile purpose, then took charge of the political authorities and lastly took the reins of the entire administration of those nations in their hands. In general understandings and opinions the Western especially the European Nations ransacked the globe and established their colonies in all corners of the world. The rest of the world was on the receiving end. Be it Africa, America, Australia or Asia, the European hegemony ruled supreme in the domain of political establishments during the 18th, 19th and the major part of 20th centuries on the map of the world. In compare to the European atrocities towards the colonized subjects, the other cultures seemed honest and self sufficient who never tried to gulp down the territories of other nation or cultures through their armed forces or through their political sagacity. Adverse to this kind of generalizations, Japan exercised her atrocious military powers on her neighboring, peace loving nation Korea. This comes as a shock to the writer, when he studies the oppressive measures undertaken by the Japanese Administration to suppress the non-violent, disciplined movement of the 20 million Koreans to free their ‘Mother Korea’ from the shackles of oppressive foreign rulers. And he undertakes an exercise to write down a full length book depicting this struggle of Koreans in a vernacular Indian Language, Gujarati. This author is Zaverchand Meghani and his book is Asia Nu Kalank. (The Infamy of Asia)

The Virtual and the Physical A wide range of ritual practices have accompanied the ‘rise of the network society’. This is witnessed in the secular and non-secular magic and mysticism that is endemic in contemporary science fiction, in war-chalking, in new forms of compulsion, neurosis and addiction, or just in the everyday use of networked technologies. Such ritual practices are often only seen as interesting diversions or attachments to the main social issues involved in networking. Indeed, some might see these diversions precisely as attempts to cope with the network society, or even to flee from its apparent technicity and reassert identity against the network (Castells). Yet many of these ritual activities suggest complex ritual engagements with the network. What happens when we consider these ‘diversions’ as central to the ongoing dynamic of networks – technical and social?I shall not be providing an anthropology of these ritual activities. Neither shall I be documenting case studies of the shamanistic, the mystical, neuroses, and so on, as all these find their accommodations with the network society. I shall only, via the work of philosopher of anthropology José Gil, give reasons for the importance of the understanding of ritual to a more general understanding of networks. For networks bring together not just copper wires, Ethernet, optic fibre and electromagnetic radiation, but also other fibres (such sinew and neurons), and other radiations (such as affects, the chemicals and hormones of the nervous system). Ritual is at the heart of this ‘bringing together’. Following Gil, I will suggest that rituals do not just facilitate network operations, they also translate and transform networks in the process. For Gil, ritual space 'has a symbolically overloaded, polysemic topography' (80) in which every site (paralleling neurons in the brain or points in the P2P network) is 'overdetermined'. This allows an over-riding of linear 'technical causality' with ritual ‘magic’, something akin to the over-riding of logical theories of cognition with theories of emergence and the superpositionality of potentials throughout the circuits of the brain or network. Within this superpositionality, symbolism is not so much a series of meanings as a series of actions. Symbols, as enacted in rituals (or in the firing of the patterns of the brain, the movement of packets through Internet), 'designate realities, they set forces into motion, they are "in the present"' (81). Gil also points out that these ritual acts are accompanied by 'particularly intense affective experience' (81). When signs are not focussed directly upon the production of meaning, but are over-determined in ritual, this is 'in order that powerful energies are released that will become the main power source for the cure'. Indeed, in ritual there is a 'regime of energies' along with the 'regimes of signs'. Moreover, the meshing of the two suggests that either term is probably inadequate to explain what is occurring. Signs form constellations of forces that partner other constellations of forces (including other signs), 'separating' or 'condensing' energy fluxes' (82), or enabling 'translation' between them (and between signs as forces). Both the flow of these forces and their translations are, of course, seldom ‘smooth’. There is rather a constant re-writing – or in the context of networks, better, re-wiring – of shifting, contingent and contesting networks of forces. The constant heterogeneous flow of forces only adds to both the intensity of networks and the drive towards more forms of active ‘translation’ found in the proliferation of rituals within networks. It is in this dialogics of intensity and translation that we find the politics of networks. This is a politics that is far from being a politics of pure information. Returning to Gil, it is not only that signs translate forces on behalf of the body. I would add that it is not only the technical nodes in general (and signs are precisely technical nodes) that translate these forces on behalf of the body. The body is itself the crucial 'operator translating signs [and forces] in the ritual'. With this devaluing of symbolic processing qua symbols (so long crucial to so many of the myths and sciences of cognition and information), the brain becomes participant in (though not director of) this bodily translation of signs - and the forces assembled and disassembled. Through, and as, networks of assembled and disassembled forces, brain/body relations and distributions are assembled and disassembled within the concatenation of brain, body and world that is technics. This occurs over the time of evolution but equally over the time of the formations of habits, in the body in general, or as weights of connection between neurons or nodes in the network. It is partnered in the formation of socio-technical evolutions, specific socio-technical assemblages and the weights according to connections between these assemblages. Of course, the more networked things are, the faster the weights of connection change. The network takes the ritual place of the gods. As Gil writes, 'the gods can do what people can't do. They can make energy circulate freely, since they embody both loose and overcoded energy, the loosest and most overcoded of all' (84). This is why we still find magic - or at least something that is effectively like magic - at the heart of any exercise of power. Indeed, the ambiguity of the relations between ‘secular’ and variations of ‘spiritualist’ magic have long been an under-recognised part of media/technological development (as recently documented with regard to the nineteenth century development of the cinema and the entertainment industries in general by Simon During, or in Chris Chesher’s notion of computers as ‘invocational media’). This is not so much a question of metaphysics versus a more directly materialist approach to technical power as a question of directing forces by the necessary means. In order for 'action to have effects…words must release forces in the body; these forces must react directly on the organs' (143). Indeed, Gil claims that it is only with the notion of 'magical-symbolic thought' that we can resolve some of the ambiguities surrounding the material operation of forces and signs, where cultural analysis quite contradictorily seems at one time to assume the priority of one, and at another time the other. Gil points out that ritual magic is precisely that which works at the border between power and discourse, force and sign. This is not an unintelligible border. Even at its apparently most disorganized in terms of its philosophical or scientific coherence (in ritual ecstasy for example), ritual magic is in reality extremely organised (although an organisation of forces and translations rather than one of stable states). As Gil writes, even the 'gestures, words, or cries of the possessed are coded' (137). Indeed, the codes involved are precisely those of possession, but of a possession by networks rather than of them (thus the legal and commercial confusion surrounding file-sharing and so on, in that networks may be undone, but they cannot be possessed). Yet if those subject to ritual – or to networks – are coded, this is not initially within a semiotic structure but within a structure of active transformations. Therefore, 'magical words are action' (84) and ritual (the rituals of science and materialist metaphysics as much as 'primitive' ritual) is an 'actual activity' (137). In ritual there is 'more than a text, more than a semiotic structure [and more than information or communication]…one had to keep in mind the link that unites forces to signs, and the investment of energy that the body imposes on symbols'. Gil's conceptual envelope for this 'more than text' is 'infralanguage'. The 'infralanguage is the [real but] abstract body' (136). I would suggest that this ‘infralanguage’ is also, at least in part, the body registering its immersion in technics – a registration that occurs before cognition, before communication. Or, it is the body – considered in the posthuman sense as any dynamic assemblage. Infralanguage is the assumed of networked engagement, perhaps the libidinal condition of the network (science fiction is clear on this – why else the fascination with plugging leads into our heads and closing our eyes to enter a different world – a different libidinal economy). Like a posture or a series of movements in rituals, infralangage is 'both learned and given' as it translates 'codes and contexts'. Moreover, as here we are talking about a networked learning (and perhaps a dynamic archive as ‘given’), we are not just talking about human learning, or the distribution of weights within the network of the brain, but also about the way that there is a distribution of weights across nodes between brain, body and world – across networks. Particularly important here are 'abstract rhythms' (Felix Guattari has labelled these 'refrains') as these are basic elements of processual structure that can cross codes and contexts, bring them together, translate them in, we could say, polyrhythms, syncopation or simple rhythmic transformation and variation. It is perhaps no wonder that computer games and music have been so central to the expansion of networks – both deal intensely with these rhythmic transformations of codes and posture at the interface of the networks of technics, brain and body. Infralanguage works with codes, bodies, the organs of the body and with a 'complicity' between 'bodily forms and the form of things'. Fibre meets fibre. The shifting investments and assemblages of the body meet a network cast precisely as the enhanced ability of technics (including technics as the human) to shift and reassemble its own investments. Again it is important to note that these investments never come together smoothly – not even, perhaps, into Baudrillard’s smooth if vapid ‘ecstasy of communication’. Rather the constant reconstitution and reassemblage of investments only adds to the intensification of the drive towards connection – and further reassemblage, translation of heterogeneous and contesting aspects of these investments. Thus reassemblage – in a parallel to ‘real-time’ media’s ongoing reformulation of time – is ongoing within networks, as the intensification of connection brought about by enhanced networking constantly reconfigures networks themselves. Infralanguage only gains more importance. It performs the necessary work with the 'condensation of energy on an exfoliated surface' (exfoliation is the opening of the body into spaces as it structurally and dynamically couples with them). Within networks surfaces are exfoliating in more and more complexity. In this ongoing reorganization there is a surprising immanence to networked cognition, situated perhaps in what Pierre Lévy has called ‘collective intelligence’. This is a technically enabled - but not technically delimited - reorganisation of cognitive forces within a heterogeneous collectivity. Lévy’s work possesses the advantage of demonstrating that, although the flow of networks is always in flux, always ‘political’, this in itself contains the positive political potential of intensity and heterogeneity. In these multi-directional flows, the collective intelligence that could emerge (but it would always be a struggle) would be a ‘fractal’ collectivity of: ‘macrosocieties, transindividual psyches of small groups, individuals, intra-individual modules (zones of the brain, unconscious ‘complexes’), agencies which traverse intra-individual modules that move between different people (sexual relations, complementary neuroses)’ (107-108). For Lévy, ‘the collective hypercortex contains … a living psychism, a sort of dynamic hypertext traversing the tensions and energies of affective qualities, conflicts, etc’. In this networked cognition, that beyond the brain seems to take up many of the functions often ascribed to the brain. And the thought that eludes the individual - the thought that for the individual is famously withdrawing in time and space even as it appears - does not elude the network or the activity of ritual magic as a working with these networks. Gil notes that in ritual, …thought coincides with being… time and space do not impede the grasping of the thing in itself - because, on the contrary, they [time and space] are organized in such as manner that they can be transformed by appropriate techniques and at the same time remain linked to their normal perception—in order to create from it the conditions of possibility and the formal framework for knowledge of the absolute. (84) What is this knowledge of the absolute through 'magic words' and rituals? It relates to 'the possibility of capturing the free forces that traverse bodies' (85). In other words, the absolute is reworked immanence rather than a totality that is given once and for all. Throughout his book Cyberculture, Lévy calls this the ethic of ‘universality without totalization’ – global coverage that is receptive to every local difference. Feedback and autopoiesis - crucial terms within many investigations of the cognitive and informational - become the very affective substance of ritual techno-magic. For Gil, ritual autopoiesis addresses the famous 'failure to understand how to know the "thing in itself"' as per Kant. For Gil, this failure is in fact a 'negative proof' of 'the success of magical-symbolic thought in capturing fleeting time in the links of its spatial representations, making it a recurrent or a cyclic system'. Perhaps it is a matter of loving the network through ritual at the junction of perceptual and world, spaces and affective or cognitive fields. I mean ‘loving’ in the sense taken up by John Scannell in M/C when he remarks that ‘graffiti writers love the city more than you ever will’. All acts of love are drenched in ritual (such as graffiti writing) because all acts of love are intense translations of forces. Perhaps those who embrace the network through ritual show others the way. Hackers, war-chalkers, technopagans utopians, perceptual experimentalists, the new techno-neurotics – all these are willing to explore the affective, intensity of the new rituals. All ‘love’ the network with all the difficulties and complexity that love implies. For them, the network is not just an information or communications conduit, but a partner in ritual becoming. Works Cited Baudrillard, Jean (1988) “L’Extase de la Communication” trans. Bernard Schutze and Caroline Schutze, in Mediamatic 3, 2:81-5. Castells, Manuel (2000) The Rise of the Network Society 2nd Edition, Oxford:Blackwell. Chesher, Chris (1996) ‘CD-ROM Multimedia's Identity Crisis’ in Media International Australia 81, August. During, Simon (2002) Modern Enchantments: The Cultural Power of Secular Magic, Cambridge MA:Harvard University Press. Gil, José (1998) Metamorphoses of the Body, trans. Stephen Muecke Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press. Lévy, Pierre (1995) Qu’est-ce que le virtuel? La Decouverte:Paris. Lévy, Pierre (2001) Cyberculture, trans. Robert Bononno Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press. Scannell, John (2002) 'Becoming-City: Why Graffiti Writers Love the City More than You Ever Will' in M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 5, 2 < http://www.media-culture.org.au/0205/becoming.php> (accessed June 12th, 2002). Links http://www.media-culture.org.au/0205/becoming.html Citation reference for this article Substitute your date of access for Dn Month Year etc... MLA Style Murphie, Andrew. "When Fibre Meets Fibre " M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture< http://www.media-culture.org.au/0308/04-fibremeetsfibre.php>. APA Style Murphie, A. (2003, Aug 26). When Fibre Meets Fibre . M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture, 6,< http://www.media-culture.org.au/0308/04-fibremeetsfibre.php>

Introduction In any list of dictators and antagonists of the West the name of Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi will always rank highly as one of the most memorable, colourful and mercurial. The roles he played to his fellow Libyans, to regional groupings, to revolutionaries and to the West were complex and nuanced. These various roles developed over time but were all grounded in his self-belief as a messianic revolutionary figure. More importantly, these roles and behaviours that stemmed from them were instrumental in preserving Qaddafi’s rule and thwarting challenges to it. These facets of Qaddafi’s public self accord with the model of “persona” described by Marshall. Whilst the nature of political persona and celebrity in the Western world has been explored by several scholars (for example Street; Wilson), little work has been conducted on the use of persona by non-democratic leaders. This paper examines the aspects of persona exhibited by Colonel Qaddafi and applied during his tenure. In constructing his role as a revolutionary leader, Qaddafi was engaging in a form of public performance aimed at delivering himself to a wider audience. Whether at home or abroad, this persona served the purpose of helping the Libyan leader consolidate his power, stymie political opposition and export his revolutionary ideals. The trajectory of his persona begins in the early days of his coming to power as a charismatic leader during a “time of distress” (Weber) and culminates in his bloody end next to a roadside drainage culvert. In between these points Qaddafi’s persona underwent refinement and reinvention. Coupled with the legacy he left on the Libyan political system, the journey of Muammar Qaddafi’s personas demonstrate how political personality can be the salvation or damnation of an entire state.Qaddafi: The Brotherly RevolutionaryCaptain Muammar Qaddafi came to power in Libya in 1969 at the age of just 27. He was the leader of a group of military officers who overthrew King Idris in a popular and relatively bloodless coup founded on an ideology of post-colonial Arab nationalism and a doing away with the endemic corruption and nepotism that were the hallmarks of the monarchy. With this revolutionary cause in mind and in an early indication that he recognised the power of political image, Qaddafi showed restraint in adopting the trappings of office. His modest promotion to the rank of Colonel was an obvious example of this, and despite the fact that in practical terms he was the supreme commander of Libya’s armed forces, he resisted the temptation to formally aggrandize himself with military titles for the ensuing 42 years of his rule.High military rank was in a way irrelevant to a man moving to change his persona from army officer to messianic national leader. Switching away from a reliance on military hierarchy as a basis for his authority allowed Qaddafi to re-cast himself as a leader with a broader mission. He began to utilise titles such as “Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council” (RCC) and “Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution.” The persona on display here was one of detached impartiality and almost reluctant leadership. There was the suggestion that Qaddafi was not really acting as a head of state, but merely an ordinary Libyan who, through popular acclaim, was being begged to lead his people. The attraction of this persona remained until the bitter end for Qaddafi, with his professed inability to step aside from a leadership role he insisted he did not formally occupy. This accords with the contention of Weber, who describes how an individual favoured with charisma can step forward at a time of crisis to complete a “mission.” Once in a position of authority, perpetuating that role of leadership and acclamation can become the mission itself:The holder, of charisma seizes the task that is adequate for him and demands obedience and a following by virtue of his mission. His success determines whether he finds them. His charismatic claim breaks down if his mission is not recognized by those to whom he feels he has been sent. If they recognize him, he is their master—so long as he knows how to maintain recognition through ‘proving’ himself. But he does not derive his ‘right’ from their will, in the manner of an election. Rather, the reverse holds: it is the duty of those to whom he addresses his mission to recognize him as their charismatically qualified leader. (Weber 266-7)As his rule extended across the decades, Qaddafi fostered his revolutionary credentials via a typical cult of personality approach. His image appeared on everything from postage stamps to watches, bags, posters and billboards. Quotations from the Brother Leader were set to music and broadcast as pop songs. “Spontaneous” rallies of support would occur when crowds of loyalists would congregate to hear the Brotherly Leader speak. Although Qaddafi publicly claimed he did not like this level of public adoration he accepted it because the people wanted to adore him. It was widely known however that many of these crowds were paid to attend these rallies (Blundy and Lycett 16).Qaddafi: The Philosopher In developing his persona as a guide and a man who was sharing his natural gifts with the people, Qaddafi developed a post-colonial philosophy he called “Third Universal Theory.” This was published in volumes collectively known as The Green Book. This was mandatory reading for every Libyan and contained a distillation of Qaddafi’s thoughts and opinions on everything from sports to politics to religion to the differences between men and women. Whilst it may be tempting for outsiders to dismiss these writings as the scribbling of a dictator, the legacy of Qaddafi’s persona as political philosopher is worthy of some examination. For in offering his revelations to the Libyan people, Qaddafi extended his mandate beyond leader of a revolution and into the territory of “messianic reformer of a nation.”The Green Book was a three-part series. The first instalment was written in 1975 and focuses on the “problem of democracy” where Qaddafi proposes direct democracy as the best option for a progressive nation. The second instalment, published in 1977, focuses on economics and expounds socialism as the solution to all fiscal woes. (Direct popular action here was evidenced in the RCC making rental of real estate illegal, meaning that all tenants in the country suddenly found themselves granted ownership of the property they were occupying!) The final chapter, published in 1981, proposes the Third Universal Theory where Qaddafi outlines his unique solution for implementing direct democracy and socialism. Qaddafi coined a new term for his Islamically-inspired socialist utopia: Jamahiriya. This was defined as being a “state of the masses” and formed the blueprint for Libyan society which Qaddafi subsequently imposed.This model of direct democracy was part of the charismatic conceit Qaddafi cultivated: that the Libyan people were their own leaders and his role was merely as a benevolent agent acceding to their wishes. However the implementation of the Jamahiriya was anything but benevolent and its legacy has crippled post-Qaddafi Libya. Under this system, Libyans did have some control over their affairs at a very local level. Beyond this, an increasingly complex series of committees and regional groupings, over which the RCC had the right of veto, diluted the participation of ordinary citizens and their ability to coalesce around any individual leader. The banning of standard avenues of political organisation, such as parties and unions, coupled with a ruthless police state that detained and executed anyone offering even a hint of political dissent served to snuff out any opposition before it had a chance to gather pace. The result was that there were no Libyans with enough leadership experience or public profile to take over when Qaddafi was ousted in 2011.Qaddafi: The Liberator In a further plank of his revolutionary persona Qaddafi turned to the world beyond Libya to offer his brotherly guidance. This saw him champion any cause that claimed to be a liberation or resistance movement struggling against the shackles of colonialism. He tended to favour groups that had ideologies aligned with his own, namely Arab unity and the elimination of Israel, but ultimately was not consistent in this regard. Aside from Palestinian nationalists, financial support was offered to groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines), Umkhonto we Sizwe (South Africa), ETA (Spain), the Polisario Front (Western Sahara), and even separatist indigenous Australians. This policy of backing revolutionary groups was certainly a projection of his persona as a charismatic enabler of the revolutionary mission. However, the reception of this mission in the wider world formed the basis for the image that Qaddafi most commonly occupied in Western eyes.In 1979 the ongoing Libyan support for groups pursuing violent action against Israel and the West saw the country designated a State-Sponsor of Terror by the US Department of State. Diplomatic relations between the two nations were severed and did not resume until 2004. At this point Qaddafi seemed to adopt a persona of “opponent of the West,” ostensibly on behalf of the world’s downtrodden colonial peoples. The support for revolutionary groups was changing to a more active use of them to strike at Western interests. At the same time Qaddafi stepped up his rhetoric against America and Britain, positioning himself as a champion of the Arab world, as the one leader who had the courage of his convictions and the only one who was squarely on the side of the ordinary citizenry (in contrast to other, more compliant Arab rulers). Here again there is evidence of the charismatic revolutionary persona, reluctantly taking up the burden of leadership on behalf of his brothers.Whatever his ideals, the result was that Qaddafi and his state became the focus of increasing Western ire. A series of incidents between the US and Libya in international waters added to the friction, as did Libyan orchestrated terror attacks in Berlin, Rome and Vienna. At the height of this tension in 1986, American aircraft bombed targets in Libya, narrowly missing Qaddafi himself. This role as public enemy of America led to Qaddafi being characterised by President Ronald Reagan (no stranger to the use of persona himself) as the “mad dog of the Middle East” and a “squalid criminal.” The enmity of the West made life difficult for ordinary Libyans dealing with crippling sanctions, but for Qaddafi, it helped bolster his persona as a committed revolutionary.Qaddafi: Leader of the Arab and African Worlds Related to his early revolutionary ideologies were Qaddafi’s aspirations as a pan-national leader. Inspired by Egypt’s Gamel Abdul Nasser from a young age, the ideals of pan-Arab unity were always a cornerstone of Qaddafi’s beliefs. It is not therefore surprising that he developed ambitions of being the person to bring about and “guide” that unity. Once again the Weberian description of the charismatic leader is relevant, particularly the notion that such leadership does not respect conventional boundaries of functional jurisdictions or local bailiwicks; in this case, state boundaries.During the 1970s Qaddafi was involved in numerous attempts to broker Arab unions between Libya and states such as Egypt, Syria and Tunisia. All of these failed to materialise once the exact details of the mergers began to be discussed, in particular who would assume the mantle of leadership in these super-states. In line with his persona as the rightly-guided revolutionary, Qaddafi consistently blamed the failure of these unions on the other parties, souring his relationship with his fellow Arab leaders. His hardline stance on Israel also put him at odds with those peers more determined to find a compromise. Following the assassination of Egypt’s Anwar Sadat in 1981 Qaddafi praised the act as justified because of Sadat’s signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel.Having given up on the hope of achieving pan-Arab Unity, Qaddafi sought to position himself as a leader of the African bloc. In 2009 he became Chairperson of the African Union and took to having himself introduced as “The King of Kings of Africa.” The level of dysfunction of the African Union was no less than that of the Arab League and Qaddafi’s grandiose plans for becoming the President of the United States of Africa failed to materialise.In both his pan-Arab and pan-Africa ambitions, we see a persona of Qaddafi that aims at leadership beyond his own state. Whilst there may be delusions of grandeur apparent in the practicalities of these goals, this image was nevertheless something that Qaddafi used to leverage the next phase of his political transformation.Qaddafi: The Post-9/11 Statesman However much he might be seen as erratic, Qaddafi’s innate intelligence could result in a political astuteness lacking in many of his Arab peers. Following the events of 11 September 2001, Qaddafi was the first international leader to condemn the attacks on America and pledge support in the War on Terror and the extermination of al-Qaeda. Despite his history as a supporter of terrorism overseas, Qaddafi had a long history of repressing it at home, just as with any other form of political opposition. The pan-Islamism of al-Qaeda was anathema to his key ideologies of direct democracy (guided by himself). This meant the United States and Libya were now finally on the same team. As part of this post-9/11 sniffing of the wind, Qaddafi abandoned his fledgling Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program and finally agreed to pay reparations to the families of the victims of the Pan Am 107 flight downed over Lockerbie in 1987.This shift in Qaddafi’s policy did not altogether dispel his persona of brotherly leadership amongst African nations. As a bloc leader and an example of the possibility of ‘coming in from the cold’, Qaddafi and Libya were reintegrated into the world community. This included giving a speech at the United Nations in 2009. This event did little to add to his reputation as a statesman in the West. Given a 15-minute slot, the Libyan leader delivered a rambling address over 90 minutes long, which included him tearing up a copy of the UN Charter and turning his back to the audience whilst continuing to speak.Qaddafi: The Clown From the Western point of view, performances like this painted Qaddafi’s behaviour as increasingly bizarre. Particularly after Libya’s rapprochement with the West, the label of threatening terrorist supporter faded and was replaced with something along the lines of a harmless clown prince. Tales of the Libyan leader’s coterie of virgin female bodyguards were the subject of ridicule, as was his ardour for US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Perhaps this behaviour was indicative of a leader increasingly divorced from reality. Surrounded by sycophants dependent on his regard for their tenure or physical survival, as well as Western leaders eager to contrast his amiability with that of Saddam Hussein, nobody was prepared to draw attention to the emperor’s new clothes.Indeed, elaborate and outlandish clothing played an increasing role in Qaddafi’s persona as the decades went on. His simple revolutionary fatigues of the early years were superseded by a vast array of military uniforms heavily decorated with medals and emblems; traditional African, Arab or Bedouin robes depending on the occasion; and in later years a penchant for outfits that included images of the African continent or pictures of dead martyrs. (In 2009 Vanity Fair did a tongue-in-cheek article on the fashion of Colonel Qaddafi entitled Dictator Chic: Colonel Qaddafi—A Life in Fashion. This spawned a number of similar features including one in TIME Magazine entitled Gaddafi Fashion: The Emperor Had Some Crazy Clothes.)The Bedouin theme was an aspect of persona that Qaddafi cultivated as an ascetic “man of the people” throughout his leadership. Despite having many palaces available he habitually slept in an elaborate tent, according once again with Weber’s description of the charismatic leader as one who eschews methodical material gain. This predisposition served him well in the 1986 United States bombing, when his residence in a military barracks was demolished, but Qaddafi escaped unscathed as he was in his tent at the time. He regularly entertained foreign dignitaries in tents when they visited Libya and he took one when travelling abroad, including pitching it in the gardens of a Parisian hotel during a state visit in 2007. (A request to camp in New York’s Central Park for his UN visit in 2009 was denied; “Inside the Tents of Muammar Gaddafi”).The role of such a clown was unlikely to have been an aim for Qaddafi, but was instead the product of his own increasing isolation. It will likely be his most enduring character in the Western memory of his rule. It should be noted though that clowns and fools do not maintain an iron grip on power for over 40 years.The Legacy of Qaddafi’s Many Personas Colonel Muammar Qaddafi was a clever and complex leader who exhibited many variations of persona during his four decades of rule. These personas were generally facets of the same core self-belief of a charismatic leader, but could be conflicting, and often confusing, to observers. His eccentricities often hid a layer of deeper cunning and ambition, but ultimately led to his marginalisation and an impression by world leaders that he was untrustworthy.His erratic performance at the UN in 2009 perhaps typifies the end stages of Qaddafi’s leadership: a man increasingly disconnected from his people and the realities of what was going on around him. His insistence that the 2011 Libyan revolution was variously a colonial or terrorist inspired piece of theatre belied the deep resentment of his rule. His role as opponent of the Western and Arab worlds alike meant that he was unsupported in his attempts to deal with the uprising. Indeed, the West’s rapid willingness to use their airpower was instrumental in speeding on the rebel forces.What cannot be disputed is the chaotic legacy this charismatic figure left for his country. Since the uprising climaxed in his on-camera lynching in October 2011, Libya has been plunged in to turmoil and shows no signs of this abating. One of the central reasons for this chaos is that Qaddafi’s supremacy, his political philosophies, and his use of messianic persona left Libya completely unprepared for rule by any other party.This ensuing chaos has been a cruel, if ironic, proof of Qaddafi’s own conceit: Libya could not survive without him.References Al-Gathafi, Muammar. The Green Book: The Solution to the Problem of Democracy; The Solution to the Economic Problem; The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory. UK: Ithaca Press, 2005.Blundy, David, and Andrew Lycett. Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution. Boston and Toronto: Little Brown & Co, 1987.Marshall, P. David. “Persona Studies: Mapping the Proliferation of the Public Self”. Journalism 15.2 (2014): 153-170.Qaddafi, Muammar. Speech at the United Nations 2009. ‹http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BKMyY2V0J0Y›. Street, John. “Celebrity Politicians: Popular Culture and Political Representation.” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 6 (2004): 435-52.Street, John. “Do Celebrity Politics and Celebrity Politicians Matter?” The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 14.3 (2012): 346-356.TIME Magazine. “Gaddafi Fashion: The Emperor Had Some Crazy Clothes.” ‹http://content.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,2055860,00.html›.TIME Magazine. “Inside the Tents of Muammar Gaddafi.” ‹http://content.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,2058074,00.html›.Totman, Sally, and Mat Hardy. “In the Green Zone: 40 years with Colonel Qaddafi.” Ed. Geoffrey Hawker. APSA 2009: Proceedings of the APSA Annual Conference 2009. Sydney: Macquarie University, 2009. 1-19.Totman, Sally, and Mat Hardy. “The Rise and Decline of Libya as a Rogue State.” OCIS 2008: Oceanic Conference on International Studies. Brisbane: University of Queensland, 2008. 1-25.Vanity Fair. “Dictator Chic: Colonel Qaddafi—A Life in Fashion.” ‹http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/08/qaddafi-slideshow200908›.Weber, Max, Hans Heinrich Gerth, and C. Wright Mills. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. London: Routledge, 2009.Wilson, J. “Kevin Rudd, Celebrity and Audience Democracy in Australia.” Journalism 15.2 (2013): 202-217.

For the past twenty years, academics and other social commentators have, by and large, shared the view that the phase of modernity through which we are currently passing is defined by two interrelated catalysts of change: the physical movement of people and the virtual movement of information around the globe. As we enter the second decade of the new millennium, it is certainly a timely moment to reflect upon the ways in which the prognoses of the scholars and scientists writing in the late twentieth century have come to pass, especially since—during the time this special issue has been in press—the revolutions that are gathering pace in the Arab world appear to be realising the theoretical prediction that the ever-increasing “flows” of people and information would ultimately bring about the end of the nation-state and herald an era of transnationalism (Appadurai, Urry). For writers like Arjun Appadurai, moreover, the concept of diaspora was key to grasping how this new world order would take shape, and how it would operate: Diasporic public spheres, diverse amongst themselves, are the crucibles of a postnational political order. The engines of their discourse are mass media (both interactive and expressive) and the movement of refugees, activists, students, laborers. It may be that the emergent postnational order proves not to be a system of homogeneous units (as with the current system of nation-states) but a system based on relations between heterogeneous units (some social movements, some interest groups, some professional bodies, some non-governmental organizations, some armed constabularies, some judicial bodies) ... In the short run, as we can see already, it is likely to be a world of increased incivility and violence. In the longer run, free from the constraints of the nation form, we may find that cultural freedom and sustainable justice in the world do not presuppose the uniform and general existence of the nation-state. This unsettling possibility could be the most exciting dividend of living in modernity at large. (23) In this editorial, we would like to return to the “here and now” of the late 1990s in which theorists like Arjun Appaduri, Ulrich Beck, John Urry, Zygmunt Bauman, Robert Robertson and others were “imagining” the consequences of both globalisation and glocalisation for the twenty-first century in order that we may better assess what is, indeed, coming to pass. While most of their prognoses for this “second modernity” have proven remarkably accurate, it is their—self-confessed—inability to forecast either the nature or the extent of the digital revolution that most vividly captures the distance between the mid-1990s and now; and it is precisely the consequences of this extraordinary technological revolution on the twin concepts of “glocality” and “diaspora” that the research featured in this special issue seeks to capture. Glocal Imaginaries Appadurai’s endeavours to show how globalisation was rapidly making itself felt as a “structure of feeling” (Williams in Appadurai 189) as well as a material “fact” was also implicit in our conceptualisation of the conference, “Glocal Imaginaries: Writing/Migration/Place,” which gave rise to this special issue. This conference, which was the culmination of the AHRC-funded project “Moving Manchester: Literature/Migration/Place (2006-10)”, constituted a unique opportunity to gain an international, cross-disciplinary perspective on urgent and topical debates concerning mobility and migration in the early twenty-first century and the strand “Networked Diasporas” was one of the best represented on the program. Attracting papers on broadcast media as well as the new digital technologies, the strand was strikingly international in terms of the speakers’ countries of origin, as is this special issue which brings together research from six European countries, Australia and the Indian subcontinent. The “case-studies” represented in these articles may therefore be seen to constitute something of a “state-of-the-art” snapshot of how Appadurai’s “glocal imaginary” is being lived out across the globe in the early years of the twenty-first century. In this respect, the collection proves that his hunch with regards to the signal importance of the “mass-media” in redefining our spatial and temporal coordinates of being and belonging was correct: The third and final factor to be addressed here is the role of the mass-media, especially in its electronic forms, in creating new sorts of disjuncture between spatial and virtual neighborhoods. This disjuncture has both utopian and dystopian potentials, and there is no easy way to tell how these may play themselves out in the future of the production of locality. (194) The articles collected here certainly do serve as testament to the “bewildering plethora of changes in ... media environments” (195) that Appadurai envisaged, and yet it can clearly also be argued that this agent of glocalisation has not yet brought about the demise of the nation-state in the way (or at the speed) that many commentators predicted. Digital Diasporas in a Transnational World Reviewing the work of the leading social science theorists working in the field during the late 1990s, it quickly becomes evident that: (a) the belief that globalisation presented a threat to the nation-state was widely held; and (b) that the “jury” was undecided as to whether this would prove a good or bad thing in the years to come. While the commentators concerned did their best to complexify both their analysis of the present and their view of the future, it is interesting to observe, in retrospect, how the rhetoric of both utopia and dystopia invaded their discourse in almost equal measure. We have already seen how Appadurai, in his 1996 publication, Modernity at Large, looks beyond the “increased incivility and violence” of the “short term” to a world “free from the constraints of the nation form,” while Roger Bromley, following Agamben and Deleuze as well as Appadurai, typifies a generation of literary and cultural critics who have paid tribute to the way in which the arts (and, in particular, storytelling) have enabled subjects to break free from their national (af)filiations (Pearce, Devolving 17) and discover new “de-territorialised” (Deleuze and Guattari) modes of being and belonging. Alongside this “hope,” however, the forces and agents of globalisation were also regarded with a good deal of suspicion and fear, as is evidenced in Ulrich Beck’s What is Globalization? In his overview of the theorists who were then perceived to be leading the debate, Beck draws distinctions between what was perceived to be the “engine” of globalisation (31), but is clearly most exercised by the manner in which the transformation has taken shape: Without a revolution, without even any change in laws or constitutions, an attack has been launched “in the normal course of business”, as it were, upon the material lifelines of modern national societies. First, the transnational corporations are to export jobs to parts of the world where labour costs and workplace obligations are lowest. Second, the computer-generation of worldwide proximity enables them to break down and disperse goods and services, and produce them through a division of labour in different parts of the world, so that national and corporate labels inevitably become illusory. (3; italics in the original) Beck’s concern is clearly that all these changes have taken place without the nation-states of the world being directly involved in any way: transnational corporations began to take advantage of the new “mobility” available to them without having to secure the agreement of any government (“Companies can produce in one country, pay taxes in another and demand state infrastructural spending in yet another”; 4-5); the export of the labour market through the use of digital communications (stereotypically, call centres in India) was similarly unregulated; and the world economy, as a consequence, was in the process of becoming detached from the processes of either production or consumption (“capitalism without labour”; 5-7). Vis-à-vis the dystopian endgame of this effective “bypassing” of the nation-state, Beck is especially troubled about the fate of the human rights legislation that nation-states around the world have developed, with immense effort and over time (e.g. employment law, trade unions, universal welfare provision) and cites Zygmunt Bauman’s caution that globalisation will, at worst, result in widespread “global wealth” and “local poverty” (31). Further, he ends his book with a fully apocalyptic vision, “the Brazilianization of Europe” (161-3), which unapologetically calls upon the conventions of science fiction to imagine a worst-case scenario for a Europe without nations. While fourteen or fifteen years is evidently not enough time to put Beck’s prognosis to the test, most readers would probably agree that we are still some way away from such a Europe. Although the material wealth and presence of the transnational corporations strikes a chord, especially if we include the world banks and finance organisations in their number, the financial crisis that has rocked the world for the past three years, along with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the ascendancy of Al-Qaida (all things yet to happen when Beck was writing in 1997), has arguably resulted in the nations of Europe reinforcing their (respective and collective) legal, fiscal, and political might through rigorous new policing of their physical borders and regulation of their citizens through “austerity measures” of an order not seen since World War Two. In other words, while the processes of globalisation have clearly been instrumental in creating the financial crisis that Europe is presently grappling with and does, indeed, expose the extent to which the world economy now operates outside the control of the nation-state, the nation-state still exists very palpably for all its citizens (whether permanent or migrant) as an agent of control, welfare, and social justice. This may, indeed, cause us to conclude that Bauman’s vision of a world in which globalisation would make itself felt very differently for some groups than others came closest to what is taking shape: true, the transnationals have seized significant political and economic power from the nation-state, but this has not meant the end of the nation-state; rather, the change is being experienced as a re-trenching of whatever power the nation-state still has (and this, of course, is considerable) over its citizens in their “local”, everyday lives (Bauman 55). If we now turn to the portrait of Europe painted by the articles that constitute this special issue, we see further evidence of transglobal processes and practices operating in a realm oblivious to local (including national) concerns. While our authors are generally more concerned with the flows of information and “identity” than business or finance (Appaduri’s “ethnoscapes,” “technoscapes,” and “ideoscapes”: 33-7), there is the same impression that this “circulation” (Latour) is effectively bypassing the state at one level (the virtual), whilst remaining very materially bound by it at another. In other words, and following Bauman, we would suggest that it is quite possible for contemporary subjects to be both the agents and subjects of globalisation: a paradox that, as we shall go on to demonstrate, is given particularly vivid expression in the case of diasporic and/or migrant peoples who may be able to bypass the state in the manufacture of their “virtual” identities/communities) but who (Cohen) remain very much its subjects (or, indeed, “non-subjects”) when attempting movement in the material realm. Two of the articles in the collection (Leurs & Ponzanesi and Marcheva) deal directly with the exponential growth of “digital diasporas” (sometimes referred to as “e-diasporas”) since the inception of Facebook in 2004, and both provide specific illustrations of the way in which the nation-state both has, and has not, been transcended. First, it quickly becomes clear that for the (largely) “youthful” (Leurs & Ponzanesi) participants of nationally inscribed networking sites (e.g. “discovernikkei” (Japan), “Hyves” (Netherlands), “Bulgarians in the UK” (Bulgaria)), shared national identity is a means and not an end. In other words, although the participants of these sites might share in and actively produce a fond and nostalgic image of their “homeland” (Marcheva), they are rarely concerned with it as a material or political entity and an expression of their national identities is rapidly supplemented by the sharing of other (global) identity markers. Leurs & Ponzanesi invoke Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the “rhizome” to describe the way in which social networkers “weave” a “rhizomatic path” to identity, gradually accumulating a hybrid set of affiliations. Indeed, the extent to which the “nation” disappears on such sites can be remarkable as was also observed in our investigation of the digital storytelling site, “Capture Wales” (BBC) (Pearce, "Writing"). Although this BBC site was set up to capture the voices of the Welsh nation in the early twenty-first century through a collection of (largely) autobiographical stories, very few of the participants mention either Wales or their “Welshness” in the stories that they tell. Further, where the “home” nation is (re)imagined, it is generally in an idealised, or highly personalised, form (e.g. stories about one’s own family) or through a sharing of (perceived and actual) cultural idiosyncrasies (Marcheva on “You know you’re a Bulgarian when …”) rather than an engagement with the nation-state per se. As Leurs & Ponzanesi observe: “We can see how the importance of the nation-state gets obscured as diasporic youth, through cultural hybridisation of youth culture and ethnic ties initiate subcultures and offer resistance to mainstream cultural forms.” Both the articles just discussed also note the shading of the “national” into the “transnational” on the social networking sites they discuss, and “transnationalism”—in the sense of many different nations and their diasporas being united through a common interest or cause—is also a focus of Pikner’s article on “collective actions” in Europe (notably, “EuroMayDay” and “My Estonia”) and Harb’s highly topical account of the role of both broadcast media (principally, Al-Jazeera) and social media in the revolutions and uprisings currently sweeping through the Arab world (spring 2011). On this point, it should be noted that Harb identifies this as the moment when Facebook’s erstwhile predominantly social function was displaced by a manifestly political one. From this we must conclude that both transnationalism and social media sites can be put to very different ends: while young people in relatively privileged democratic countries might embrace transnationalism as an expression of their desire to “rise above” national politics, the youth of the Arab world have engaged it as a means of generating solidarity for nationalist insurgency and liberation. Another instance of “g/local” digital solidarity exceeding national borders is to be found in Johanna Sumiala’s article on the circulatory power of the Internet in the Kauhajoki school shooting which took place Finland in 2008. As well as using the Internet to “stage manage” his rampage, the Kauhajoki shooter (whose name the author chose to withhold for ethical reasons) was subsequently found to have been a member of numerous Web-based “hate groups”, many of them originating in the United States and, as a consequence, may be understood to have committed his crime on behalf of a transnational community: what Sumiala has defined as a “networked community of destruction.” It must also be noted, however, that the school shootings were experienced as a very local tragedy in Finland itself and, although the shooter may have been psychically located in a transnational hyper-reality when he undertook the killings, it is his nation-state that has had to deal with the trauma and shame in the long term. Woodward and Brown & Rutherford, meanwhile, show that it remains the tendency of public broadcast media to uphold the raison d’être of the nation-state at the same time as embracing change. Woodward’s feature article (which reports on the AHRC-sponsored “Tuning In” project which has researched the BBC World Service) shows how the representation of national and diasporic “voices” from around the world, either in opposition to or in dialogue with the BBC’s own reporting, is key to the way in which the Commission has changed and modernised in recent times; however, she is also clear that many of the objectives that defined the service in its early days—such as its commitment to a distinctly “English” brand of education—still remain. Similarly, Brown & Rutherford’s article on the innovative Australian ABC children’s television series, My Place (which has combined traditional broadcasting with online, interactive websites) may be seen to be positively promoting the Australian nation by making visible its commitment to multiculturalism. Both articles nevertheless reveal the extent to which these public service broadcasters have recognised the need to respond to their nations’ changing demographics and, in particular, the fact that “diaspora” is a concept that refers not only to their English and Australian audiences abroad but also to their now manifestly multicultural audiences at home. When it comes to commercial satellite television, however, the relationship between broadcasting and national and global politics is rather harder to pin down. Subramanian exposes a complex interplay of national and global interests through her analysis of the Malayalee “reality television” series, Idea Star Singer. Exported globally to the Indian diaspora, the show is shamelessly exploitative in the way in which it combines residual and emergent ideologies (i.e. nostalgia for a traditional Keralayan way of life vs aspirational “western lifestyles”) in pursuit of its (massive) audience ratings. Further, while the ISS series is ostensibly a g/local phenomenon (the export of Kerala to the rest of the world rather than “India” per se), Subramanian passionately laments all the progressive national initiatives (most notably, the campaign for “women’s rights”) that the show is happy to ignore: an illustration of one of the negative consequences of globalisation predicted by Beck (31) noted at the start of this editorial. Harb, meanwhile, reflects upon a rather different set of political concerns with regards to commercial satellite broadcasting in her account of the role of Al-Jazeera and Al Arabiya in the recent (2011) Arab revolutions. Despite Al-Jazeera’s reputation for “two-sided” news coverage, recent events have exposed its complicity with the Qatari government; further, the uprisings have revealed the speed with which social media—in particular Facebook and Twitter—are replacing broadcast media. It is now possible for “the people” to bypass both governments and news corporations (public and private) in relaying the news. Taken together, then, what our articles would seem to indicate is that, while the power of the nation-state has notionally been transcended via a range of new networking practices, this has yet to undermine its material power in any guaranteed way (witness recent counter-insurgencies in Libya, Bahrain, and Syria).True, the Internet may be used to facilitate transnational “actions” against the nation-state (individual or collective) through a variety of non-violent or violent actions, but nation-states around the world, and especially in Western Europe, are currently wielding immense power over their subjects through aggressive “austerity measures” which have the capacity to severely compromise the freedom and agency of the citizens concerned through widespread unemployment and cuts in social welfare provision. This said, several of our articles provide evidence that Appadurai’s more utopian prognoses are also taking shape. Alongside the troubling possibility that globalisation, and the technologies that support it, is effectively eroding “difference” (be this national or individual), there are the ever-increasing (and widely reported) instances of how digital technology is actively supporting local communities and actions around the world in ways that bypass the state. These range from the relatively modest collective action, “My Estonia”, featured in Pikner’s article, to the ways in which the Libyan diaspora in Manchester have made use of social media to publicise and support public protests in Tripoli (Harb). In other words, there is compelling material evidence that the heterogeneity that Appadurai predicted and hoped for has come to pass through the people’s active participation in (and partial ownership of) media practices. Citizens are now able to “interfere” in the representation of their lives as never before and, through the digital revolution, communicate with one another in ways that circumvent state-controlled broadcasting. We are therefore pleased to present the articles that follow as a lively, interdisciplinary and international “state-of-the-art” commentary on how the ongoing revolution in media and communication is responding to, and bringing into being, the processes and practices of globalisation predicted by Appadurai, Beck, Bauman, and others in the 1990s. The articles also speak to the changing nature of the world’s “diasporas” during this fifteen year time frame (1996-2011) and, we trust, will activate further debate (following Cohen) on the conceptual tensions that now manifestly exist between “virtual” and “material” diasporas and also between the “transnational” diasporas whose objective is to transcend the nation-state altogether and those that deploy social media for specifically local or national/ist ends. Acknowledgements With thanks to the Arts and Humanities Research Council (UK) for their generous funding of the “Moving Manchester” project (2006-10). Special thanks to Dr Kate Horsley (Lancaster University) for her invaluable assistance as ‘Web Editor’ in the production of this special issue (we could not have managed without you!) and also to Gail Ferguson (our copy-editor) for her expertise in the preparation of the final typescript. References Appadurai, Arjun. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1996. Bauman, Zygmunt. Globalization. Cambridge: Polity, 1998. Beck, Ulrich. What is Globalization? Trans. Patrick Camiller. Cambridge: Polity, 2000 (1997). Bromley, Roger. Narratives for a New Belonging: Diasporic Cultural Fictions. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2000. Cohen, Robin. Global Diasporas. 2nd ed. London and New York: Routledge, 2008. Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987. Latour, Bruno. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995. Pearce, Lynne, ed. Devolving Identities: Feminist Readings in Home and Belonging. London: Ashgate, 2000. Pearce, Lynne. “‘Writing’ and ‘Region’ in the Twenty-First Century: Epistemological Reflections on Regionally Located Art and Literature in the Wake of the Digital Revolution.” European Journal of Cultural Studies 13.1 (2010): 27-41. Robertson, Robert. Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. London: Sage, 1992. Urry, John. Sociology beyond Societies. London: Routledge, 1999. Williams, Raymond. Dream Worlds: Mass Consumption in Late Nineteenth-Century France. Berkeley: U of California P, 1982.

Introduction: Technology EnthusiasmEnthusiasts are people who have a passion, keenness, dedication or zeal for a particular activity or hobby. Today, there are enthusiasts for almost everything, from genealogy, costume dramas, and country houses, to metal detectors, coin collecting, and archaeology. But to be described as an enthusiast is not necessarily a compliment. Historically, the term “enthusiasm” was first used in England in the early seventeenth century to describe “religious or prophetic frenzy among the ancient Greeks” (Hanks, n.p.). This frenzy was ascribed to being possessed by spirits sent not only by God but also the devil. During this period, those who disobeyed the powers that be or claimed to have a message from God were considered to be enthusiasts (McLoughlin).Enthusiasm retained its religious connotations throughout the eighteenth century and was also used at this time to describe “the tendency within the population to be swept by crazes” (Mee 31). However, as part of the “rehabilitation of enthusiasm,” the emerging middle-classes adopted the word to characterise the intensity of Romantic poetry. The language of enthusiasm was then used to describe the “literary ideas of affect” and “a private feeling of religious warmth” (Mee 2 and 34). While the notion of enthusiasm was embraced here in a more optimistic sense, attempts to disassociate enthusiasm from crowd-inciting fanaticism were largely unsuccessful. As such enthusiasm has never quite managed to shake off its pejorative connotations.The 'enthusiasm' discussed in this paper is essentially a personal passion for technology. It forms part of a longer tradition of historical preservation in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in the world. From preserved railways to Victorian pumping stations, people have long been fascinated by the history of technology and engineering; manifesting their enthusiasm through their nostalgic longings and emotional attachment to its enduring material culture. Moreover, enthusiasts have been central to the collection, conservation, and preservation of this particular material record. Technology enthusiasm in this instance is about having a passion for the history and material record of technological development, specifically here industrial archaeology. Despite being a pastime much participated in, technology enthusiasm is relatively under-explored within the academic literature. For the most part, scholarship has tended to focus on the intended users, formal spaces, and official narratives of science and technology (Adas, Latour, Mellström, Oldenziel). In recent years attempts have been made to remedy this imbalance, with researchers from across the social sciences examining the position of hobbyists, tinkerers and amateurs in scientific and technical culture (Ellis and Waterton, Haring, Saarikoski, Takahashi). Work from historians of technology has focussed on the computer enthusiast; for example, Saarikoski’s work on the Finnish personal computer hobby:The definition of the computer enthusiast varies historically. Personal interest, pleasure and entertainment are the most significant factors defining computing as a hobby. Despite this, the hobby may also lead to acquiring useful knowledge, skills or experience of information technology. Most often the activity takes place outside working hours but can still have links to the development of professional expertise or the pursuit of studies. In many cases it takes place in the home environment. On the other hand, it is characteristically social, and the importance of friends, clubs and other communities is greatly emphasised.In common with a number of other studies relating to technical hobbies, for example Takahashi who argues tinkerers were behind the advent of the radio and television receiver, Saarikoski’s work focuses on the role these users played in shaping the technology in question. The enthusiasts encountered in this paper are important here not for their role in shaping the technology, but keeping technological heritage alive. As historian of technology Haring reminds us, “there exist alternative ways of using and relating to technology” (18). Furthermore, the sociological literature on audiences (Abercrombie and Longhurst, Ang), fans (Hills, Jenkins, Lewis, Sandvoss) and subcultures (Hall, Hebdige, Schouten and McAlexander) has also been extended in order to account for the enthusiast. In Abercrombie and Longhurst’s Audiences, the authors locate ‘the enthusiast’ and ‘the fan’ at opposing ends of a continuum of consumption defined by questions of specialisation of interest, social organisation of interest and material productivity. Fans are described as:skilled or competent in different modes of production and consumption; active in their interactions with texts and in their production of new texts; and communal in that they construct different communities based on their links to the programmes they like. (127 emphasis in original) Based on this definition, Abercrombie and Longhurst argue that fans and enthusiasts differ in three ways: (1) enthusiasts’ activities are not based around media images and stars in the way that fans’ activities are; (2) enthusiasts can be hypothesized to be relatively light media users, particularly perhaps broadcast media, though they may be heavy users of the specialist publications which are directed towards the enthusiasm itself; (3) the enthusiasm would appear to be rather more organised than the fan activity. (132) What is striking about this attempt to differentiate between the fan and the enthusiast is that it is based on supposition rather than the actual experience and observation of enthusiasm. It is here that the ethnographic account of enthusiasm presented in this paper and elsewhere, for example works by Dannefer on vintage car culture, Moorhouse on American hot-rodding and Fuller on modified-car culture in Australia, can shed light on the subject. My own ethnographic study of groups with a passion for telecommunications heritage, early British computers and industrial archaeology takes the discussion of “technology enthusiasm” further still. Through in-depth interviews, observation and textual analysis, I have examined in detail the formation of enthusiast societies and their membership, the importance of the material record to enthusiasts (particularly at home) and the enthusiastic practices of collecting and hoarding, as well as the figure of the technology enthusiast in the public space of the museum, namely the Science Museum in London (Geoghegan). In this paper, I explore the culture of enthusiasm for the industrial past through the example of the Greater London Industrial Archaeology Society (GLIAS). Focusing on industrial sites around London, GLIAS meet five or six times a year for field visits, walks and a treasure hunt. The committee maintain a website and produce a quarterly newsletter. The title of my paper, “If you can walk down the street and recognise the difference between cast iron and wrought iron, the world is altogether a better place,” comes from an interview I conducted with the co-founder and present chairman of GLIAS. He was telling me about his fascination with the materials of industrialisation. In fact, he said even concrete is sexy. Some call it a hobby; others call it a disease. But enthusiasm for industrial archaeology is, as several respondents have themselves identified, “as insidious in its side effects as any debilitating germ. It dictates your lifestyle, organises your activity and decides who your friends are” (Frow and Frow 177, Gillespie et al.). Through the figure of the industrial archaeology enthusiast, I discuss in this paper what it means to be enthusiastic. I begin by reflecting on the development of this specialist subject area. I go on to detail the formation of the Society in the late 1960s, before exploring the Society’s fieldwork methods and some of the other activities they now engage in. I raise questions of enthusiast and professional knowledge and practice, as well as consider the future of this particular enthusiasm.Defining Industrial ArchaeologyThe practice of 'industrial archaeology' is much contested. For a long time, enthusiasts and professional archaeologists have debated the meaning and use of the term (Palmer). On the one hand, there are those interested in the history, preservation, and recording of industrial sites. For example the grandfather figures of the subject, namely Kenneth Hudson and Angus Buchanan, who both published widely in the 1960s and 1970s in order to encourage publics to get involved in recording. Many members of GLIAS refer to the books of Hudson Industrial Archaeology: an Introduction and Buchanan Industrial Archaeology in Britain with their fine descriptions and photographs as integral to their early interest in the subject. On the other hand, there are those within the academic discipline of archaeology who consider the study of remains produced by the Industrial Revolution as too modern. Moreover, they find the activities of those calling themselves industrial archaeologists as lacking sufficient attention to the understanding of past human activity to justify the name. As a result, the definition of 'industrial archaeology' is problematic for both enthusiasts and professionals. Even the early advocates of professional industrial archaeology felt uneasy about the subject’s methods and practices. In 1973, Philip Riden (described by one GLIAS member as the angry young man of industrial archaeology), the then president of the Oxford University Archaeology Society, wrote a damning article in Antiquity, calling for the subject to “shed the amateur train drivers and others who are not part of archaeology” (215-216). He decried the “appallingly low standard of some of the work done under the name of ‘industrial archaeology’” (211). He felt that if enthusiasts did not attempt to maintain high technical standards, publish their work in journals or back up their fieldwork with documentary investigation or join their county archaeological societies then there was no value in the efforts of these amateurs. During this period, enthusiasts, academics, and professionals were divided. What was wrong with doing something for the pleasure it provides the participant?Although relations today between the so-called amateur (enthusiast) and professional archaeologies are less potent, some prejudice remains. Describing them as “barrow boys”, some enthusiasts suggest that what was once their much-loved pastime has been “hijacked” by professional archaeologists who, according to one respondent,are desperate to find subjects to get degrees in. So the whole thing has been hijacked by academia as it were. Traditional professional archaeologists in London at least are running head on into things that we have been doing for decades and they still don’t appreciate that this is what we do. A lot of assessments are handed out to professional archaeology teams who don’t necessarily have any knowledge of industrial archaeology. (James, GLIAS committee member)James went on to reveal that GLIAS receives numerous enquiries from professional archaeologists, developers and town planners asking what they know about particular sites across the city. Although the Society has compiled a detailed database covering some areas of London, it is by no means comprehensive. In addition, many active members often record and monitor sites in London for their own personal enjoyment. This leaves many questioning the need to publish their results for the gain of third parties. Canadian sociologist Stebbins discusses this situation in his research on “serious leisure”. He has worked extensively with amateur archaeologists in order to understand their approach to their leisure activity. He argues that amateurs are “neither dabblers who approach the activity with little commitment or seriousness, nor professionals who make a living from that activity” (55). Rather they pursue their chosen leisure activity to professional standards. A point echoed by Fine in his study of the cultures of mushrooming. But this is to get ahead of myself. How did GLIAS begin?GLIAS: The GroupThe 1960s have been described by respondents as a frantic period of “running around like headless chickens.” Enthusiasts of London’s industrial archaeology were witnessing incredible changes to the city’s industrial landscape. Individuals and groups like the Thames Basin Archaeology Observers Group were recording what they could. Dashing around London taking photos to capture London’s industrial legacy before it was lost forever. However the final straw for many, in London at least, was the proposed and subsequent demolition of the “Euston Arch”. The Doric portico at Euston Station was completed in 1838 and stood as a symbol to the glory of railway travel. Despite strong protests from amenity societies, this Victorian symbol of progress was finally pulled down by British Railways in 1962 in order to make way for what enthusiasts have called a “monstrous concrete box”.In response to these changes, GLIAS was founded in 1968 by two engineers and a locomotive driver over afternoon tea in a suburban living room in Woodford, North-East London. They held their first meeting one Sunday afternoon in December at the Science Museum in London and attracted over 130 people. Firing the imagination of potential members with an exhibition of photographs of the industrial landscape taken by Eric de Maré, GLIAS’s first meeting was a success. Bringing together like-minded people who are motivated and enthusiastic about the subject, GLIAS currently has over 600 members in the London area and beyond. This makes it the largest industrial archaeology society in the UK and perhaps Europe. Drawing some of its membership from a series of evening classes hosted by various members of the Society’s committee, GLIAS initially had a quasi-academic approach. Although some preferred the hands-on practical element and were more, as has been described by one respondent, “your free-range enthusiast”. The society has an active committee, produces a newsletter and journal, as well as runs regular events for members. However the Society is not simply about the study of London’s industrial heritage, over time the interest in industrial archaeology has developed for some members into long-term friendships. Sociability is central to organised leisure activities. It underpins and supports the performance of enthusiasm in groups and societies. For Fine, sociability does not always equal friendship, but it is the state from which people might become friends. Some GLIAS members have taken this one step further: there have even been a couple of marriages. Although not the subject of my paper, technical culture is heavily gendered. Industrial archaeology is a rare exception attracting a mixture of male and female participants, usually retired husband and wife teams.Doing Industrial Archaeology: GLIAS’s Method and PracticeIn what has been described as GLIAS’s heyday, namely the 1970s to early 1980s, fieldwork was fundamental to the Society’s activities. The Society’s approach to fieldwork during this period was much the same as the one described by champion of industrial archaeology Arthur Raistrick in 1973:photographing, measuring, describing, and so far as possible documenting buildings, engines, machinery, lines of communication, still or recently in use, providing a satisfactory record for the future before the object may become obsolete or be demolished. (13)In the early years of GLIAS and thanks to the committed efforts of two active Society members, recording parties were organised for extended lunch hours and weekends. The majority of this early fieldwork took place at the St Katherine Docks. The Docks were constructed in the 1820s by Thomas Telford. They became home to the world’s greatest concentration of portable wealth. Here GLIAS members learnt and employed practical (also professional) skills, such as measuring, triangulations and use of a “dumpy level”. For many members this was an incredibly exciting time. It was a chance to gain hands-on experience of industrial archaeology. Having been left derelict for many years, the Docks have since been redeveloped as part of the Docklands regeneration project.At this time the Society was also compiling data for what has become known to members as “The GLIAS Book”. The book was to have separate chapters on the various industrial histories of London with contributions from Society members about specific sites. Sadly the book’s editor died and the project lost impetus. Several years ago, the committee managed to digitise the data collected for the book and began to compile a database. However, the GLIAS database has been beset by problems. Firstly, there are often questions of consistency and coherence. There is a standard datasheet for recording industrial buildings – the Index Record for Industrial Sites. However, the quality of each record is different because of the experience level of the different authors. Some authors are automatically identified as good or expert record keepers. Secondly, getting access to the database in order to upload the information has proved difficult. As one of the respondents put it: “like all computer babies [the creator of the database], is finding it hard to give birth” (Sally, GLIAS member). As we have learnt enthusiasm is integral to movements such as industrial archaeology – public historian Raphael Samuel described them as the “invisible hands” of historical enquiry. Yet, it is this very enthusiasm that has the potential to jeopardise projects such as the GLIAS book. Although active in their recording practices, the GLIAS book saga reflects one of the challenges encountered by enthusiast groups and societies. In common with other researchers studying amenity societies, such as Ellis and Waterton’s work with amateur naturalists, unlike the world of work where people are paid to complete a task and are therefore meant to have a singular sense of purpose, the activities of an enthusiast group like GLIAS rely on the goodwill of their members to volunteer their time, energy and expertise. When this is lost for whatever reason, there is no requirement for any other member to take up that position. As such, levels of commitment vary between enthusiasts and can lead to the aforementioned difficulties, such as disputes between group members, the occasional miscommunication of ideas and an over-enthusiasm for some parts of the task in hand. On top of this, GLIAS and societies like it are confronted with changing health and safety policies and tightened security surrounding industrial sites. This has made the practical side of industrial archaeology increasingly difficult. As GLIAS member Bob explains:For me to go on site now I have to wear site boots and borrow a hard hat and a high visibility jacket. Now we used to do incredibly dangerous things in the seventies and nobody batted an eyelid. You know we were exploring derelict buildings, which you are virtually not allowed in now because the floor might give way. Again the world has changed a lot there. GLIAS: TodayGLIAS members continue to record sites across London. Some members are currently surveying the site chosen as the location of the Olympic Games in London in 2012 – the Lower Lea Valley. They describe their activities at this site as “rescue archaeology”. GLIAS members are working against the clock and some important structures have already been demolished. They only have time to complete a quick flash survey. Armed with the information they collated in previous years, GLIAS is currently in discussions with the developer to orchestrate a detailed recording of the site. It is important to note here that GLIAS members are less interested in campaigning for the preservation of a site or building, they appreciate that sites must change. Instead they want to ensure that large swathes of industrial London are not lost without a trace. Some members regard this as their public duty.Restricted by health and safety mandates and access disputes, GLIAS has had to adapt. The majority of practical recording sessions have given way to guided walks in the summer and public lectures in the winter. Some respondents have identified a difference between those members who call themselves “industrial archaeologists” and those who are just “ordinary members” of GLIAS. The walks are for those with a general interest, not serious members, and the talks are public lectures. Some audience researchers have used Bourdieu’s metaphor of “capital” to describe the experience, knowledge and skill required to be a fan, clubber or enthusiast. For Hills, fan status is built up through the demonstration of cultural capital: “where fans share a common interest while also competing over fan knowledge, access to the object of fandom, and status” (46). A clear membership hierarchy can be seen within GLIAS based on levels of experience, knowledge and practical skill.With a membership of over 600 and rising annually, the Society’s future is secure at present. However some of the more serious members, although retaining their membership, are pursuing their enthusiasm elsewhere: through break-away recording groups in London; active membership of other groups and societies, for example the national Association for Industrial Archaeology; as well as heading off to North Wales in the summer for practical, hands-on industrial archaeology in Snowdonia’s slate quarries – described in the Ffestiniog Railway Journal as the “annual convention of slate nutters.” ConclusionsGLIAS has changed since its foundation in the late 1960s. Its operation has been complicated by questions of health and safety, site access, an ageing membership, and the constant changes to London’s industrial archaeology. Previously rejected by professional industrial archaeology as “limited in skill and resources” (Riden), enthusiasts are now approached by professional archaeologists, developers, planners and even museums that are interested in engaging in knowledge exchange programmes. As a recent report from the British think-tank Demos has argued, enthusiasts or pro-ams – “amateurs who work to professional standards” (Leadbeater and Miller 12) – are integral to future innovation and creativity; for example computer pro-ams developed an operating system to rival Microsoft Windows. As such the specialist knowledge, skill and practice of these communities is of increasing interest to policymakers, practitioners, and business. So, the subject once described as “the ugly offspring of two parents that shouldn’t have been allowed to breed” (Hudson), the so-called “amateur” industrial archaeology offers enthusiasts and professionals alike alternative ways of knowing, seeing and being in the recent and contemporary past.Through the case study of GLIAS, I have described what it means to be enthusiastic about industrial archaeology. I have introduced a culture of collective and individual participation and friendship based on a mutual interest in and emotional attachment to industrial sites. As we have learnt in this paper, enthusiasm is about fun, pleasure and joy. The enthusiastic culture presented here advances themes such as passion in relation to less obvious communities of knowing, skilled practices, material artefacts and spaces of knowledge. Moreover, this paper has been about the affective narratives that are sometimes missing from academic accounts; overlooked for fear of sniggers at the back of a conference hall. Laughter and humour are a large part of what enthusiasm is. Enthusiastic cultures then are about the pleasure and joy experienced in doing things. Enthusiasm is clearly a potent force for active participation. I will leave the last word to GLIAS member John:One meaning of enthusiasm is as a form of possession, madness. Obsession perhaps rather than possession, which I think is entirely true. It is a pejorative term probably. The railway enthusiast. But an awful lot of energy goes into what they do and achieve. Enthusiasm to my mind is an essential ingredient. If you are not a person who can muster enthusiasm, it is very difficult, I think, to get anything out of it. On the basis of the more you put in the more you get out. 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