Journal articles on the topic 'Auctions'
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1
Cao, Shengjie. "Analysis of the Interfering Factors about Auction Games." SHS Web of Conferences 188 (2024): 03013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202418803013.
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This essay simply explores the complex world of auctions and how they basically work. Start with a brief summary of auction’s history, from the Babylonian era to the present, the essay shows how auctions have evolved over the history. Then, four typical auctions are introduced by listing their rules and how they are played. Most importantly, at the main body, the essay revealed various factors that have impact on how an auction is played, such as sunk cost fallacy, information dynamics, auction rules, and the existence of bidders with distinct motivations. In addition, Candle and dollar auctions are used to show the impact of information and rules on an auction respectively. In the end, the essay argues that auctions are complicated rather than just contests for riches and emphasizes the significance of comprehending these factors. The essay aims to inform people to make wise decisions in both auctions and everyday life.
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Klemperer, Paul. "What Really Matters in Auction Design." Journal of Economic Perspectives 16, no. 1 (February 1, 2002): 169–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/0895330027166.
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The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behavior. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems. The Anglo-Dutch auctiona hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions-may perform better. Effective antitrust is also critical. Notable fiascoes in auctioning mobile-phone licenses, television franchises, companies, eletricty, etc., and especially the European “third-generation” (UMTS) spectrum auctions, show that everything depends on the details of the context. Auction design is not “one size fits all.”
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Morales-Camargo, Emmanuel, Orly Sade, Charles Schnitzlein, and Jaime F. Zender. "Divisible Good Auctions with Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Examination." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48, no. 4 (August 2013): 1271–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109013000409.
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AbstractAn experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when there is incomplete information concerning the common value of the auctioned good. In a symmetric information environment, the different auction formats provide the same average revenue. However, when information is asymmetric the discriminatory auction results in higher average revenue than the uniform-price auction. The volatility of revenue is higher in the uniform-price auctions in all treatments. The results, therefore, provide support for the use of the discriminatory format. Subject characteristics and measures of experience in recent auctions are found to be useful in explaining bidding behavior.
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Lucking-Reiley, David. "Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet." American Economic Review 89, no. 5 (December 1, 1999): 1063–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.5.1063.
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William Vickrey's predicted equivalences between first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions, and between second-price sealed-bid and English auctions, are tested using field experiments that auctioned off collectible trading cards over the Internet. The results indicate that the Dutch auction produces 30-percent higher revenues than the first-price auction format, a violation of the theoretical prediction and a reversal of previous laboratory results, and that the English and second-price formats produce roughly equivalent revenues. (JEL C93, D44)
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Rao, Cong Jun, and Yue Zheng. "Research on Multi-Unit Auction Theory and Application." Applied Mechanics and Materials 58-60 (June 2011): 376–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.58-60.376.
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Auctions usually involve the sale of many homogeneous or heterogeneous objects. Spectrum, treasury, and electricity auctions are examples. This kind of auctions is so-called multi-unit auctions. In order to know the research history and the newest research trends for the study on multi-unit auctions, this paper presents widespread theoretical and applications problems of multi-unit auctions. The multi-unit auction models are divided into two kinds (i.e. sequential auction and simultaneous auction). Assumptions, main ideas, and conclusions of literature related to these two kinds of models are reviewed and commented.
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Jia, Weijia. "Application of Game Theory in Different Auction Forms." Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences 10, no. 1 (September 13, 2023): 180–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2754-1169/10/20230462.
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Auctions are employed in many areas all across the world. It is a key topic of study in game theory. This article primarily summarizes the winning strategies in auctions from a game theory perspective. To examine this issue, this paper reviews the past literature from three auction angles. The winning strategies applied in English auctions, Dutch auctions, and first-price auctions will differ depending on the form of auction. During a customary English auction, the winning strategy is to bid at their genius willingness. However, when multiple goods and deadlines are added to the auction, the winning strategy becomes to bid lower than the valuation. In Dutch auctions, bidders should bid at the beginning at a lower price. In first-price auctions, bidders should bid for all combinations when there are many items, and overbid when there is standard information feedback. This article is a review of previous relevant articles and provides references to related articles.
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Qiu, Jier. "Comparison of Four Basic Types of Auctions." Journal of Education, Humanities and Social Sciences 2 (July 13, 2022): 193–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/ehss.v2i.786.
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Auction is a good way for people to exchange their goods and services and is essential to our daily life. Auctions can be classified into various genres and kinds depending on their unique rules. In this essay, I focused mainly on the four basic kinds of auctions: First-Price sealed-bid auction, Second-Price sealed-bid auction, Ascending-bid auction and descending-bid auction. I also tried to use several simple models to find out the characteristics and optimal strategies for each of the auction. Having their own advantages and weakness, different auctions should be used depending on specific situations to further maximize the efficiency of the auctions.
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Anita, Dewi, Herlin Nurdiani, Tasya Dania, and Umi Maskanah. "Perlindungan Hukum Para Pihak Apabila Terjadi Wanprestasi Lelang Non Eksekusi Sukarela Secara Online Tanpa Pejabat Lelang." As-Syar'i: Jurnal Bimbingan & Konseling Keluarga 6, no. 2 (July 16, 2024): 2266–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.47467/as.v6i2.7095.
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As explained, auctions basically adopt the characteristics of a sale and purchase agreement (1457 BW), where the elements of price and goods are important elements. The difference is that auctions require the presence of an Auction Officer, especially for execution auctions and mandatory non-execution auctions. Auctions have special regulations (Lex Specialis), namely Vendu Reglement and Vendu Instructie as auction regulations which are still valid today. Apart from that, the implementation of auctions is also regulated in PMK 213/PMK.06/2020 concerning Instructions for Implementing Auctions. Online auctions are carried out through the e-Marketplace Auction Platform where the implementation is usually carried out without an auction official, for example auctions on eBay. The purpose of this research is to determine protection for parties who experience losses due to default. This research is legal research with a statutory approach, conceptual approach and case approach. The research results obtained are that the validity of online voluntary non-execution auctions without the presence of an auction official is valid by adopting the characteristics of a sale and purchase agreement. And the protection for the parties is the legal protection of the parties in the event of default in a non-execution auction, there are 2 (two) namely regulated in the ITE law regarding electronic transactions and Consumer Protection which explains the existence of compensation, as well as by taking legal action to resolve disputes, where the parties can choose resolution either through court, arbitration or other alternative dispute resolution institutions (conventional/online dispute resolution) in accordance with the provisions of the Laws and Regulations as the default is related to responsibility.
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Watts, Alison. "Generalized Second Price Auctions over a Network." Games 9, no. 3 (September 8, 2018): 67. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g9030067.
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We consider the problem of how to apply a generalized second price (GSP) auction to a buyer–seller network. GSP auctions are often used to sell online ads where buyers care about the position or placement of the ad. GSP auctions can also be applied to wireless data transmissions with congestion where buyers care about the speed of data transmission; however, such an auction would take place over a network as a buyer could only purchase from a seller (or cell tower) that he was linked to (or was close to). Two GSP auctions over a network are considered: separate GSP auctions, and integrated GSP auctions with pauses. The efficiency of these auctions is examined with efficiency favoring the integrated auction with pauses.
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Jumanah, Jumanah, KN Sofyan Hasan, and Muhammad Syaifuddin. "Reconstruction of The Principle of Legal Certainty Fair Auction For Joint Assets After Divorce Decision." SASI 29, no. 1 (March 11, 2023): 151. http://dx.doi.org/10.47268/sasi.v29i1.1291.
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Introduction: This article is about analyzing the implementation of joint property auctions after a divorce decision that has not yet received fair legal certainty. The number of cases after the divorce decision results in the distribution of joint assets between the parties submitted to the Court after not getting peace in the distribution of joint assets, the Court can take over the matter by way of auction.Purposes of the Research: To analyze the principle of legal certainty in auctions in the implementation of auctions after divorce decisions in laws and regulations. Explain the legal problems in applying the legal principle of joint property auctions after the divorce decision. Finding reconstruction as the basis for setting up a bill on joint property auction laws after divorce decisions in the future.Methods of the Research: Based on hermeneutic paradigmatic which is based on philosophy and the scientific nature of law. This hermeneutic paradigm is carried out through a methodological strategy approach to learn from people, namely studying law by exploring and researching the meanings of law from the perspective of users or seekers of justice in the Religious Courts.Results of the Research: In the reconstruction of the principle of legal certainty in an equitable auction of joint assets after the divorce decision in future laws and regulations in legal considerations regarding joint assets that must be auctioned, through an auction procedure in accordance with applicable regulations.
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Azevedo, Eduardo M., David M. Pennock, Bo Waggoner, and E. Glen Weyl. "Channel Auctions." Management Science 66, no. 5 (May 2020): 2075–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3487.
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Standard auction formats feature either an upper bound on the equilibrium price that descends over time (as in the Dutch auction) or a lower bound on the equilibrium price that ascends over time (as in the English auction). We show that in some settings with costly information acquisition, auctions featuring both (viz., a narrowing channel of prices) outperform the standard formats. This Channel auction preserves some of benefits of both the English (truthful revelation) and Dutch (security for necessary information acquisition) auctions. Natural applications include housing, online auction sites like eBay, recording transactions on blockchains, and spectrum rights. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy.
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Heck, Eric van. "Innovative electronic auctions in supply and demand chains: Empirical research in the flower industry." Journal on Chain and Network Science 1, no. 1 (June 1, 2001): 65–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.3920/jcns2001.x006.
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Exploiting the Internet for commercial ends has become a key theme for most organizations. There are significant advantages for both buyers and sellers in using this medium. Savings are made as a result of reducing transaction costs, increasing the circle of potential customers, and improving the search-and-find capabilities for all parties concerned. At the moment there are several hundred Web-based auctions. And yet the place to see state-of-the-art auctions is not on the Web but rather in one of the dozen or so auction halls in Holland. This article analyses different electronic auction initiatives in the Dutch flower industry. These auctions use the "Dutch auction" as price discovery process. In a Dutch auction the auctioneer offers products at successively lower prices until his offer is accepted. Most auctions on the Web today use the English method. An English auction process involves a succession of increasing bids by potential buyers until the highest (and final) bid is accepted by the auctioneer. But the Dutch method offers advantages, as the flower auctions reveal. The Dutch method is much faster and tends to generate higher prices. This is illustrated by presenting the results of experimental economic research with different Web-based auctions. One of the analysed electronic auction initiatives, Tele Flower Auction, shows that electronic auctions have an impact on the chain configuration and its performance. Conclusions are formulated and further research is discussed.
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Szyszka, Adrianna. "Charity auctions from an economic perspective — literature review." Studenckie Prace Prawnicze, Administratywistyczne i Ekonomiczne 36 (August 18, 2021): 98–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/1733-5779.36.7.
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One of the most common means of raising funds is the charity auction. At charity auctions, money is collected for a good cause, and the products are purchased for private consumption — the bidders may achieve both public and private gains. The charitable nature of this type of auction makes them different from standard auctions. The paper aims to present the main characteristics of this fundraising strategy as well as make a comparison with other formats of raising money for a good cause, i.a. lotteries. Furthermore, the main differences between charity and non-charity auctions will be explained. The studies do not clearly demonstrate whether the charity auction is a more effective mechanism of raising funds than the lottery. However, there is evidence that both formats outperform voluntary contributions. From the perspective of charity organizations, the most effective charity auction format seems to be the all-pay auction. The studies have also revealed that revenues at charity auctions are higher than at standard auctions.
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Fitch-Roy, Oscar W., David Benson, and Bridget Woodman. "Policy Instrument Supply and Demand: How the Renewable Electricity Auction Took over the World." Politics and Governance 7, no. 1 (March 28, 2019): 81–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v7i1.1581.
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The selection and design of renewable electricity support instruments is an important part of European Union (EU) energy policy and central to the governance of the Energy Union. In 2014, the European Commission published updated guidelines for state aid that effectively mandate the EU-wide implementation of auctions for allocating revenue support to commercial scale renewable electricity generation. This article argues that the RES auction’s rapid ascent towards dominance is explained by a coincidence of an activist interpretation of EU state aid law creating demand for knowledge about the instrument and the emergence of a ready source of supply from a burgeoning community of a RES auction specialists and experts. Knowledge gained through EU-wide implementation of auctions further adds to supply of auctions expertise among the community. The implications of positive feedback between instrument demand and the growing supply of knowledge about an instrument reinforces the importance of critical engagement between policymakers and policy experts.
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Leung, Timothy L. Y., and William J. Knottenbelt. "Consumer-to-Consumer Internet Auction Models." International Journal of Online Marketing 1, no. 3 (July 2011): 17–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijom.2011070102.
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Internet auctions have become an increasingly common method for exchanging goods and services across the world both among consumers themselves, as well as between businesses and consumers. These Internet auction mechanisms have the scope of incorporating procedures of much greater complexity and variety, and they exhibit characteristics and properties that are quite distinct from conventional auctions. In this paper, the authors provide an experimental study of the performance characteristics and operational behaviour of a number of online auction models, including the fixed time forward auctions, the Vickrey auctions, and models with soft close variable auction times. These online auction models are studied through systematic simulation experiments, based on a series of operational assumptions, which characterize the arrival rate of bids, as well as the distribution from which the private values of buyers are sampled. Suggestions for efficient online auction design and procedures for improving auction performance are given, and the behaviour of the average auction income and average auction duration are quantified and compared.
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Li, Xiaohui, and Hongbin Dong. "A Transaction Trade-Off Utility Function Approach for Predicting the End-Price of Online Auctions in IoT." Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing 2021 (February 2, 2021): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6656421.
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To stimulate large-scale users to participate in the big data construction of IoT (internet of things), auction mechanisms based on game theory are used to select participants and calculate the corresponding reward in the process of crowdsensing data collection from IoT. In online auctions, bidders bid many times and increase their bid price. All the bidders want to maximize their utility in auctions. An effective incentive mechanism can maximize social welfare in online auctions. It is complicated for auction platforms to calculate social welfare and the utility of each bidder’s bidding items in online auctions. In this paper, a transaction trade-off utility incentive mechanism is introduced. Based on the transaction trade-off utility incentive mechanism, it can make the forecasting process consistent with bidding behaviors. Furthermore, an end-price dynamic forecasting agent is proposed for predicting end prices of online auctions. The agent develops a novel trade-off methodology for classifying online auctions by using the transaction trade-off utility function to measure the distance of auction items in KNN. Then, it predicts the end prices of online auctions by regression. The experimental results demonstrate that an online auction process considering the transaction utility is more consistent with the behaviors of bidders, and the proposed prediction algorithm can obtain higher prediction accuracy.
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Bourron, Christine. "How Has COVID-19 Affected the Public Auction Market?" Arts 10, no. 4 (November 1, 2021): 74. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/arts10040074.
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The day of the last live auction at Sotheby’s in the spring of 2020 was on 19 March 2020 as multiple coronavirus lockdowns forced auction rooms to close worldwide. In the following months, hundreds of live auctions were cancelled or postponed, and combined revenue at Christie’s, Sotheby’s, and Phillips for the second Quarter 2020 plummeted 79% year on year from USD 4.4 bn in Q2 2019 to USD 0.9 bn in Q2 2020. This article focuses on public auctions at Christie’s, Sotheby’s, and Phillips and uses primary research to demonstrate how leading auction houses responded to the unprecedented challenges posed by the COVID-19 crisis. Leveraging Pi-eX’s public auction results database and its 12-month-rolling methodology, our analysis shows (1) the surge of online only auctions while the number of live auctions plummeted; (2) the limitations of online only auctions and the rise of new opportunities; and (3) a comparison of the COVID-19 crisis with previous art market crisis in the past 15 years.
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Dodi Setiawan and Miftakhul Huda. "Evaluasi Peranan Pejabat Lelang dalam Sistem Lelang di Indonesia." JURNAL PENDIDIKAN DAN ILMU SOSIAL (JUPENDIS) 2, no. 2 (February 19, 2024): 330–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.54066/jupendis.v2i2.1661.
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The auction system in Indonesia is the process of selling goods or services through a bargaining method where potential buyers or bidders compete to obtain the goods or services by offering the highest price. In recent years, online auctions have become popular in Indonesia, allowing people to participate in auctions via online platforms. Some well-known online auction platforms in Indonesia are Bukalapak, Tokopedia, and special auction platforms such as Invaluable or Christie's. Auctions in Indonesian legislation are regulated by various laws and regulations covering aspects such as government auctions, property auctions, and general regulations regarding the auction process. The role of an auction in auction procedures in Indonesia usually involves several important tasks related to auction transactions. A auction can be asked to examine documents related to the auction process, including the auction agreement, sale and purchase agreement, and other related documents. The aim of this research is to explain the evaluation of the role of auctions in the auction system in Indonesia. The approach used in this research is a juridical-empirical approach. The results of the research in this paper show that evaluating the role of notaries in the auction system in Indonesia can involve several aspects related to integrity, transparency, and legal compliance in the auction process. Meanwhile, the evaluation must include the extent to which the auction ensures that the auction process complies with applicable laws and regulations in Indonesia. The auction must accurately and independently certify the auction transaction. The evaluation should check whether they have performed this role well. It is important to evaluate the accuracy of the documents prepared by the auction, including the auction deed and other records that record the details of the auction transaction. In addition, the evaluation must consider whether the auction has helped in increasing transparency in the auction process, especially in terms of announcements, access to information, and reporting of auction results.
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Farnia, Farnoush, Jean-Marc Frayret, Luc Lebel, and Catherine Beaudry. "Agent-based simulation of multiple-round timber combinatorial auction." Canadian Journal of Forest Research 47, no. 1 (January 2017): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1139/cjfr-2015-0125.
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This paper presents a simulation-based analysis of a multiple-round timber combinatorial auction in the timber industry. Currently, most timber auctions are single-unit auctions (i.e., each forest stand is sold separately). However, other types of auctions could be applied to take advantage of the various needs of the bidders with respect to species, volumes, and quality. This study aims to analyze the use of combinatorial auction to this specific context using a simulation approach. Various number of auctions per year, periodicity, lot size, and number of bidders are considered as parameters to set up the different market configurations. The outcomes of both combinatorial auction and single-unit auction are compared with respect to different setup configurations. This analysis shows that combinatorial auction can bring more profit for both seller and buyer when the market is less competitive.
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Borole, Prathamesh, Yoges Dhawale, Pranav Kaple, Utkarsh Gadhave, and Asst Prof Amol Take. "Online Auction System Using Python, Blockchain and Cloud Computing." International Journal for Research in Applied Science and Engineering Technology 12, no. 4 (April 30, 2024): 1165–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.22214/ijraset.2024.58991.
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Abstract: The "Advanced Online Auction System Using Python, Cloud Computing, and Block chain Integration” is a pioneering project designed to transform the landscape of online auctions. This project leverages the synergistic power of Python programming, cloud computing infrastructure, and Block chain technology to create an innovative online auction platform. Our system offers a secure and transparent environment for auction participants, ensuring trust and credibility throughout the auction process. Through the integration of cutting-edge technologies, it addresses the evolving needs and challenges of online auctions, providing an efficient and user- friendly experience. With a focus on security, transparency, scalability, and user engagement, this project aims to revolutionize the online auction industry, setting new standards for efficiency and trustworthiness. By combining these technologies, it represents a significant step forward in the world of online auctions and promise store shape the way auctions are conducted and experienced.
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Malmendier, Ulrike, and Young Han Lee. "The Bidder's Curse." American Economic Review 101, no. 2 (April 1, 2011): 749–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.2.749.
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We employ a novel approach to identify overbidding in auctions. We compare online auction prices to fixed prices for the same item on the same webpage. In detailed data on auctions of a board game, 42 percent of auctions exceed the simultaneous fixed price. The result replicates in a broad cross-section of auctions (48 percent overbidding). A small fraction of overbidders, 17 percent of bidders, suf fices to generate the large fraction of auctions with overbidding. We show that the observed behavior is inconsistent with rational behavior, even allowing for uncertainty about prices and switching costs, since the expected auction price also exceeds the fixed price. Limited attention best explains our results. (JEL D12, D44)
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Andriana, Nina, Rama Giovanni, and Akhmad Priharjanto. "Analysis Implementation of Online Auction (E-Auction) at the State Assets and Auction Service Office (KPKNL) Jakarta." IJESS International Journal of Education and Social Science 4, no. 1 (April 30, 2023): 57–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.56371/ijess.v4i1.165.
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This research aims to analyze the implementation of e-auctions, the obstacles that occur, and efforts to overcome obstacles at the State Assets and Auction Service Office (KPKNL) Jakarta. The method used by the author is a qualitative method, with research specifications being analytical descriptive. The data analysis method used is descriptive qualitative. The research was carried out at KPKNL Jakarta. Qualitative research method with data acquisition techniques through surveys and in-depth interviews using purposive sampling techniques. The results of the research state that the public's understanding of the implementation of e-auction auctions is less than their understanding of the implementation of conventional auctions. Public understanding regarding auction administration is also still very limited. Besides that, there are still many people who think that holding auctions is State Tax Revenue, not Non-Tax State Revenue (PNBP). Even though in implementing the e-auction at KPKNL Jakarta there are still several obstacles originating from external factors, KPKNL Jakarta continues to make efforts to overcome these obstacles to optimize the implementation of e-auctions at KPKNL Jakarta.
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Emiris, Dimitrios M., and Charis A. Marentakis. "A Unified Classification Ecosystem for Auctions." International Journal of Operations Research and Information Systems 1, no. 3 (July 2010): 53–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/joris.2010070104.
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Auctions have known considerable and continuous growth during the last decades due to their interesting properties in price formation when the value of goods traded is not known or varies. The systematic research in the area of auctions has advanced considerably since William Vickrey’s seminal paper on 1961. Although earlier research has been based mainly on Microeconomics and Games Theory, recent advances extended relevant research in Operational Research and Information Technology. Today, auctions and their applications form a challenging topic not only for economists but for operational researchers, marketers, logisticians and management engineers as well. This paper provides an overview of recent literature in auction theory, focusing on contemporary auction techniques and proposes an Auctions Classification Ecosystem (ACE) that encompasses previous works and new developments in the area. The proposed unified classification approach encompasses auction features and mechanism design parameters in a single scheme. This scheme facilitates the understanding of auction characteristics and supports auction practitioners in designing the appropriate format depending on the application requirements.
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Reid, Judson, Derek Simmonds, and Elizabeth Newbold. "Wholesale produce auctions and regional food systems: The case of Seneca produce auction." Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems 34, no. 03 (March 26, 2018): 259–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1742170518000133.
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AbstractProduce auctions are local aggregation points that facilitate access for small-scale fruit, flower and vegetable farmers to wholesale buyers from a broader geography. Buyers purchase lots from multiple farmers to fulfill wholesale demand and then retail the product to the consumers. Sales are held multiple times per week to create a consistent supply for buyers and a regular market for the farmers. With over 70 produce auctions located in eastern North America, this is a growing trend of intermediated markets. Currently, there are six active produce auctions in New York State, with two more in planning stages. Produce auctions have a positive economic impact on the communities in which they are located, as well as on those who sell and/or buy at the auction. Community values inherent to these populations contribute to the success of produce auctions as an intermediated market. As the auction market channel continues to grow, buyer and consumer education on the benefits of local auctions is important. As these auctions are based in horse-and-buggy communities, extension education needs to be tailored to Amish and Mennonite populations. Auction houses, as well as farmers, will need to stay current with federal food safety regulations and market-based requirements to remain competitive.
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Yang, Zan, Rongrong Ren, Hongyu Liu, and Huan Zhang. "Land leasing and local government behaviour in China: Evidence from Beijing." Urban Studies 52, no. 5 (April 15, 2014): 841–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0042098014529342.
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Since 2004, two auction mechanisms – listing auctions and tender auctions – have played a dominant role in land lease arrangements for real estate development in Beijing. Listing auctions in land markets are similar to general English auctions, where bidders offer the highest price to win. However, in tender auctions, winners are determined by the bidding price and the bidder’s financial capability and reputation. Based on granted land parcels from 2006 to 2012 in Beijing, this paper attempts to examine the price differences between the two auctions and the role of land auction in urban development and price stabilisation. We find that land policy in Beijing, which aims to stabilise land prices and to provide low-price residences, has been integrated with urban development planning in terms of spatial and density pattern. Land leasing in Beijing is not only a land policy but also a part of the strategy framework of local development.
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CH’NG, KEAN SIANG, and SUET LENG KHOO. "MARKET MECHANISMS TO ALLOCATE HERITAGE CONSERVATION FUND: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY." Singapore Economic Review 60, no. 05 (December 2015): 1550024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217590815500241.
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The under-provision of efforts in built heritage conservation was due to market failure to allocate cost and benefit efficiently. Conservation agency could facilitate conservation effort, which was considered not beneficial from the point of view of the private owners of the heritage houses, by providing conservation subsidy. In this paper, we conducted three different experimental auctions, namely, (i) discriminative price auction, (ii) uniform price auction, and (iii) random nth price auction to investigate bidding behaviors and efficiency levels in allocating conservation subsidies. Both uniform and random nth price auctions were able to encourage cost revealing bids. Random nth price auction was able to engage the off-margin bidders. However, discriminative price auction was more cost efficient compared to the other two auctions.
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Rao, Cong Jun, and Jin Hui Dong. "Applications of the Network and Computer Technology in the Model Optimization of Multi-Object E-Auctions." Applied Mechanics and Materials 631-632 (September 2014): 1211–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.631-632.1211.
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With the development of computer technology and network, e-Auctions are widely applied in the field of engineering technology. How to use the computer technology and network to optimize the models of multi-object e-auctions is a hot topic. Regarding the e-auction as a background, this paper presents many widespread theoretical and applied problems, and summarizes and reviews the main conclusions and progress of existing studies related to the computer technology and network in the e-auctions, and then gives several new research topics to e-auctions. It tries to promote the applications of e-auction theories in real engineering technology problems.
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Bergemann, Dirk, Benjamin Brooks, and Stephen Morris. "Revenue Guarantee Equivalence." American Economic Review 109, no. 5 (May 1, 2019): 1911–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180773.
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We revisit the revenue comparison of standard auction formats, including first-price, second-price, and English auctions. We rank auctions according to their revenue guarantees, i.e., the greatest lower bound of revenue across all informational environments, where we hold fixed the distribution of bidders’ values. We conclude that if we restrict attention to the symmetric affiliated models of Milgrom and Weber (1982) and monotonic pure-strategy equilibria, first-price, second-price, and English auctions are revenue guarantee equivalent: they have the same revenue guarantee, which is equal to that of the first-price auction as characterized by Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2017). If we consider all equilibria or if we allow more general models of information, then first-price auctions have a greater revenue guarantee than all other auctions considered. (JEL D44, D83)
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Hafalir, Isa, and Vijay Krishna. "Asymmetric Auctions with Resale." American Economic Review 98, no. 1 (February 1, 2008): 87–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.1.87.
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We study first- and second-price auctions with resale in a model with independent private values. With asymmetric bidders, the resulting inefficiencies create a motive for post-auction trade which, in our model, takes place via monopoly pricing—the winner makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the loser. We show (a) a first-price auction with resale has a unique monotonic equilibrium; and (b) with resale, the expected revenue from a first-price auction exceeds that from a second-price auction. The inclusion of resale possibilities thus permits a general revenue ranking of the two auctions that is not available when these are excluded. (JEL D44)
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HOGG, TAD, PAVITHRA HARSHA, and KAY-YUT CHEN. "QUANTUM AUCTIONS." International Journal of Quantum Information 05, no. 05 (October 2007): 751–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219749907003183.
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We present a quantum auction protocol using superpositions to represent bids and distributed search to identify the winner(s). Measuring the final quantum state gives the auction outcome while simultaneously destroying the superposition. Thus, non-winning bids are never revealed. Participants can use entanglement to arrange for correlations among their bids, with the assurance that this entanglement is not observable by others. This protocol is useful for information hiding applications, such as partnership bidding with allocative externality or concerns about revealing bidding preferences. The protocol applies to a variety of auction types, e.g. first or second price, and to auctions involving either a single item or arbitrary bundles of items (i.e. combinatorial auctions). We analyze the game-theoretical behavior of the quantum protocol for the simple case of a sealed-bid quantum, and show how a suitably designed adiabatic search reduces the possibilities for bidders to game the auction. This design illustrates how incentive rather that computational constraints affect quantum algorithm choices.
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Alonso, Estrella, Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano, and Juan Tejada. "Mixed Mechanisms for Auctioning Ranked Items." Mathematics 8, no. 12 (December 15, 2020): 2227. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math8122227.
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This paper deals with the problem of designing and choosing auctioning mechanisms for multiple commonly ranked objects as, for instance, keyword auctions in search engines on Internet. We shall adopt the point of view of the auctioneer who has to select the auction mechanism to be implemented not only considering its expected revenue, but also its associated risk. In order to do this, we consider a wide parametric family of auction mechanisms which contains the generalizations of discriminatory-price auction, uniform-price auction and Vickrey auction. For completeness, we also analyze the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction which is not in the family. The main results are: (1) all members of the family satisfy the four basic properties of fairness, no over-payment, optimality and efficiency, (2) the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the corresponding value at risk for the auctioneer are obtained for the considered auctions, (3) the GSP and all auctions in the family provide the same expected revenue, (4) there are new interesting auction mechanisms in the family which have a lower value at risk than the GSP and the classical auctions. Therefore, a window opens to apply new auction mechanisms that can reduce the risk to be assumed by auctioneers.
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Miller, Joshua J. "From English to First-Price Sealed Bid: An Empirical Assessment of the Change in Auction Type on Experienced Bidders." Review of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 2 (June 1, 2014): 105–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/revecp-2014-0006.
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Abstract This paper estimate the differential impact of first-price sealed-bid (first-price) auctions relative to English auctions on auction revenue. While there is a theoretical literature on the potential outcomes of first-price relative to English auction, there is a paucity of articles that empirically estimate this relationship. The answer to this question is important not only to economists but also those designing auction for practical application. Using a unique dataset from tax lien auctions in Illinois, I empirically test the effect of a switch in auction type from English to first-price. I find auction revenue is greatly increased, by as much as 22 percent, under the first-price auction. The results are supported by a within county difference-in-difference model specification and are robust when restricting the sample across various specifications
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S. Wu, Irene. "Maximum impact for minimum subsidy: reverse auctions for universal access in Chile and India." info 16, no. 5 (August 5, 2014): 46–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/info-06-2013-0037.
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Purpose – The purpose of this article is to discuss how minimum subsidy auctions have been implemented in Chile and India for Internet and mobile phone infrastructure to and identify lessons for governments considering reverse auctions as a tool. In a minimum subsidy auction (also known as a reverse auction), the government starts by offering the maximum funds available for a given public project; the company requiring smallest subsidy wins. Design/methodology/approach – The article investigates several case studies of subsidy auctions in both Chile and India. Findings – When firms compete for subsidies in reverse auctions, they have incentives to get the most result for the least funds. This furthers the government’s goal to achieve maximum public policy impact with minimum budget. Originality/value – For developing countries, very little research has been done on implementation of auctions in the communications sector.
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Alevy, Jonathan E., Oscar Cristi, and Oscar Melo. "Right-to-Choose Auctions: A Field Study of Water Markets in the Limari Valley of Chile." Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 39, no. 2 (April 2010): 213–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1068280500007255.
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Field experiments were conducted with farmers in the Limari Valley of Chile to test extant theory on right-to-choose auctions. Water volumes that differed by reservoir source and time of availability were offered for sale by the research team. The auctions were supplemented by protocols to elicit risk and time preferences of bidders. We find that the right-to-choose auctions raise significantly more revenue than the benchmark sequential auction. Risk attitudes explain a substantial amount of the difference in bidding between auction institutions, consonant with received theory. The auction bidding revealed distinct preferences for water types, which has implications for market re-design.
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Trifunovic, Dejan. "Optimal auction mechanisms with private values." Ekonomski anali 55, no. 184 (2010): 71–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/eka1084071t.
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This paper reviews equilibrium behavior in different auction mechanisms. We will deal with two types of open auctions, English and Dutch, and two types of sealed-bid auctions, first-price and second-price, when there is a single object for sale and bidders have private values. We show that under certain conditions all four auctions yield the same expected revenue to the seller, but once these assumptions are relaxed revenue equivalence does not hold. We will also study auctions by using standard tools from demand theory. Finally, we will analyze collusive behavior of bidders. The two goals that an auction mechanism has to achieve are efficient allocation and maximization of the seller's expected revenue.
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GAVISH, BEZALEL. "COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS MATHEMATICAL FORMULATIONS AND OPEN ISSUES." International Journal of Information Technology & Decision Making 02, no. 01 (March 2003): 5–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219622003000495.
Full textAbstract:
The widespread use of the Internet fostered the establishment of hundreds of sites that support on-line auctions of products and services, some of which also support combinatorial auctions. Finding the optimal combination of winning bids in combinatorial auctions is a difficult task. This paper presents the combinatorial auction problem, classifies combinatorial auctions by the different procedures used during the bidding process, presents some of the applications of combinatorial auctions, and develops mathematical models of combinatorial auctions. The mathematical models are used to identify some of the problem properties and prove that winner determination in combinatorial auctions has the same level of difficulty as solving the allocation problem facing an auctioneer. The paper concludes with the discussion on some of the complexities involved in combinatorial auctions.
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Wisen, Craig H., Kevin C. H. Chiang, Michael P. Pippenger, and James C. Collins. "Pricing A Pig In A Poke: Endogenous Valuations And Storage Unit Auctions." Journal of Business & Economics Research (JBER) 12, no. 4 (September 24, 2014): 323. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jber.v12i4.8859.
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Storage unit auctions have recently received widespread attention from reality shows and get rich easy business models. This study examines the pitfalls associated with winning storage unit auctions, commonly observed bidding strategies, participant behavior and auction methods. Storage unit auctions present a classic example of endogenous valuation using incomplete information and imperfect secondary markets. The examination of the contents of a storage unit auction yields a novel use for the facility and sheds light on the process that leads to a lien and sale.
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Torres-Valderrama, Henry Camilo, and Luis Eduardo Gallego-Vega. "Modeling Dynamic Procurement Auctions of Standardized Supply Contracts in Electricity Markets including Bidders Adaptation." DYNA 82, no. 192 (August 25, 2015): 168–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.15446/dyna.v82n192.48612.
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<p>Descendant Clock Auctions have been increasingly used in power markets. Traditional approaches are focused on discovering the bidders’ best response but neglecting the bidders’ adaptation. This paper presents an algorithm based on decision theory to estimate the bidders’ behavior along the auction. The proposed model uses portfolio concepts and historical data of spot market to estimate a long term contract supply curve. This model was applied to evaluate the Colombia’s Organized Market (MOR). Demand curve parameters and round size were varied to evaluate their impact over auction outputs. Results show that demand curve has a quite small impact over bidders’ decisions and round size management is useful to avoid non-competitive bidders’ behavior. In addition, it is shown that auction’s starting prices strongly influence auction’s clearing prices. These results are extremely helpful to design market structures in power markets.</p>
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Cohen, Jeffrey H., and Susan M. Klemetti. "The Social and Economic Production of Greed, Cooperation, and Taste in an Ohio Food Auction." Economic Anthropology 1, no. 1 (January 2014): 80–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/sea2.12005.
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Monthly food auctions in Saint Mary's, Ohio, are events where individuals and their families have the opportunity to purchase a variety of foods at bargain prices. We might assume that the opportunity to fill the pantry while saving money would encourage greed and hoarding. An individual can bid strategically to amass resources (here defined as the supply of food available for consumption or resale) at the expense of others who are not as adept or willing to participate in the auction. We also might assume that the auction's suppliers and the auction house staff would look upon the event as a chance to earn a large return on their investments. Yet, the food auctions in Saint Mary's reveal an event where greed is managed and balanced against cooperation among bidders, suppliers, and auction house staff. In our article, we present data that confirm our assumptions of greed. Bidders do compete with each other, hoard purchases, and balance their bids against their ideas of what is good food and what that food should cost. Suppliers and auction house staff do manage bids to maximize their profits by encouraging competitive bidding. However, our data also demonstrate that the event as a whole works to check greed through community‐based expectations of the auction and its outcomes. The event allows us to examine what the auction says about the avarice and greed of the food industry and large‐scale, industrialized agriculture.
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PENG, Yanyan, and Xinwang LIU. "BIDDING DECISION IN LAND AUCTION USING PROSPECT THEORY." International Journal of Strategic Property Management 19, no. 2 (June 19, 2015): 186–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/1648715x.2015.1047914.
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Land auction is widely practiced in company and government decisions, especially in China. Bidders are always faced with two or more auctions in the period of a decision cycle. The outcome of the auction is under high risk. The bidder's risk attitude and preference will have a great influence on his/her bidding price. Prospect theory is currently the main descriptive theory of decision under risk. In this paper, we will consider the preferences of the decision-makers in land bidding decisions with the multi-attribute additive utility and reference point method in cumulative prospect theory. Three land auction models are proposed based on the appearance time of the land auctions. The simultaneous model uses cumulative prospect theory without considering the relationships between the auctions. The time sequential model involves the exchange auction decisions at different time with the third-generation prospect theory. The event sequential model further considers the reference point prediction in sequential land auction decisions. The three models can help the decision-makers make better bidding price decision when they are faced with several land auctions in the period of a decision cycle. A case study illustrates the processes and results of our approaches.
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Blumrosen, L., N. Nisan, and I. Segal. "Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 28 (March 8, 2007): 233–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.2081.
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We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfare- and profit-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction and show that the loss incurred relative to unconstrained auctions is mild. We prove non-surprising properties of these kinds of auctions, e.g., that in optimal mechanisms bidders simply report the interval in which their valuation lies in, as well as some surprising properties, e.g., that asymmetric auctions are better than symmetric ones and that multi-round auctions reduce the communication complexity only by a linear factor.
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Trifunovic, Dejan, and Bojan Ristic. "Multi-unit auctions in the procurement of electricity." Ekonomski anali 58, no. 197 (2013): 47–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/eka1397047t.
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This paper reviews some multi-unit auction mechanisms that are used in the procurement of electricity. In ordinary multi-unit auctions bidders compete to buy several units of the same object from the seller, while in procurement or reverse auctions suppliers of electricity compete to sell a certain number of units. Reverse electricity auctions are used in numerous countries and they create a competitive market for electricity, instead of state-owned monopolies providing electricity at administratively set prices. In this paper we will present the most commonly used multi-unit auction forms in electricity markets. Auctions for electricity from renewable energy sources deserve special attention, since these suppliers cannot compete with large-scale producers at the present state of technology.
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Setiawan, Ferry Setiawan, and Soegiyanto Soegiyanto. "The Strength Of Legal Deed Auction Summary Of Burdened Of Confiscation Based On Regulation Of Finance Minister Number 27 / Pmk.06 / 2016 In The City Of Semarang." Jurnal Akta 7, no. 2 (August 17, 2020): 237. http://dx.doi.org/10.30659/akta.v7i2.7879.
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The purpose of this study was to: 1) To Know the Auction for Goods burdened Confiscation Based Finance Minister Regulation No. 27 / PMK.06 / 2016 in the city of Semarang. 2) To know the Power of Law Treatise Deed Auctions for Goods burdened Confiscation Based Finance Minister Regulation No. 27 / PMK.06 / 2016 in the city of Semarang. The data used in this study are primary data and secondary data and data that can support tertiary study, which was then analyzed by normative juridical method.Based on the results of data analysis concluded that: 1) How the Auction of Goods Seized Burdened By Finance Minister Regulation Number 27 / PMK.6 / 2016 in Semarang. In the official auction assisted by guides who guilty of employees DJKN, the auction progresses No offers the winning auction is bidders who bid the highest. Each implementation of the auction will be charged Customs Auction accordance with government regulations governing the types and rates of non-tax state revenue. Payment of the auction price and Customs Auction shall be made in cash or check or checking account, no later than five (5) working days. In the case of submission of official documents of the auction must submit the original document of title or goods are auctioned off to the buyer or winning bidder no later than 1 (one) working day. Buyers must show proof of payment of the form and submit proof of deposit Tax on Acquisition of Land and Building If items such as land and buildings. 2) How the Legal Power of The Minutes of the Auction the Seized Goods Burdened By Finance Minister Regulation Number 27 / PMK.6 / 2016 in Semarang. Deed Auctions treatise consists of body deed, deed and leg mid deed which contains about the day, date, type of goods, address of the seller, as well as goods sold. Minutes of Deed Auctions is an authentic deed made by officials of the auction and use the laws and legislation so this auction treatise deed has permanent legal force if there are problems in the future.Key Words: The Power of Law; the Deed of Auction; Goods Burdened Confiscation.
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Goldreich, David. "Underpricing in Discriminatory and Uniform-Price Treasury Auctions." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 42, no. 2 (June 2007): 443–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109000003343.
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AbstractThis paper compares the newer uniform-price U.S. Treasury auctions to the traditional discriminatory mechanism and examines the extent to which the auction mechanisms are responsible for underpricing. Empirically, I find that even for the newer uniform-price auctions, the average price received by the Treasury is less than the price of the same securities in the concurrent secondary market although this underpricing is reduced by half relative to the older mechanism. From the summary statistics released by the Treasury, I calibrate common value auction models for the two mechanisms and predict the level of underpricing in each auction. I find that the observed magnitude of underpricing in the auctions is consistent with the model's predictions.
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Saprykina, V. Yu, and V. F. Milvanov. "The auction trade in Russia." Scientific bulletin of the Southern Institute of Management, no. 1 (April 27, 2019): 81–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.31775/2305-3100-2019-1-81-86.
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Auction trading is a form of market relations, it is a specially organized operating market in which transactions of purchase and sale are carried out by price competition between buyers. The auction is an open auction of various valuable items: collectible and antique items, precious products, coffee, tea, fur, other raw materials and various finished goods.Conclusion auction trade to a new level contributed to the rapid development of the Internet. Every year the number of online auctions and the number of their participants is growing. Online auctions are one of the most important and promising business models in the world economy. The importance of online auctions is determined by the fact that they are a cost-effective tool in the modern mechanism of market economy, and their implementation contributes to a significant increase in the effectiveness of foreign economic activity of enterprises, the formation of conditions for the development of modern infrastructure of foreign trade.To date, the share of online auctions in the turnover of e-Commerce is up to 25% in theUSand up to 40% inGermany. Despite the fact that the auction is widespread in the world, inRussiatheir conduct for a long time was extremely limited. The reform of the Russian economy has caused the rapid development of auction activities in all its forms.
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Camilleri, Silvio John. "Do call auctions curtail price volatility? Evidence from the National Stock Exchange of India." Managerial Finance 41, no. 1 (January 12, 2015): 67–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mf-10-2013-0292.
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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate whether call auctions which batch orders for simultaneous execution, may restrain stock market volatility. Design/methodology/approach – The authors use high-frequency data to investigate volatility changes following the suspension of opening and closing call auctions on the National Stock Exchange (NSE) of India in 1999. The authors evaluate this issue by considering both modelled and realised volatility. Using a GARCH approach the authors model intra-day volatility for the trading days preceding and succeeding the auction suspension. The authors also scrutinise return distributions to look for volatility changes during different parts of the day. Findings – When interpreted collectively, the empirical results suggest that the auction suspension was followed by reduced volatility particularly in the middle of the trading day and at the closing. Practical implications – Given that auctions are often incorporated in trading systems with the aim of curtailing volatility, the main conclusion, that the auction suspension was followed by lower volatility, has important practical inferences. Auctions cannot be automatically relied on to reduce volatility. The intricacies of the auction protocol and their interaction with ancillary market microstructure features may impact on auction efficacy. Originality/value – The paper adopts a novel approach towards assessing the effectiveness of auctions by considering an unusual occurrence of an auction suspension. The empirical setting enables a clear comparison of the respective regimes since these periods do not materially differ in other subsidiary aspects. This is a noteworthy factor, since the empirical contexts considered in prior studies, often feature several simultaneous changes.
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Arnosti, Nick, Marissa Beck, and Paul Milgrom. "Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet Display Advertising." American Economic Review 106, no. 10 (October 1, 2016): 2852–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141198.
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We model an online display advertising environment in which “performance” advertisers can measure the value of individual impressions, whereas “brand” advertisers cannot. If advertiser values for ad opportunities are positively correlated, second-price auctions for impressions can be inefficient and expose brand advertisers to adverse selection. Bayesian-optimal auctions have other drawbacks: they are complex, introduce incentives for false-name bidding, and do not resolve adverse selection. We introduce “modified second bid” auctions as the unique auctions that overcome these disadvantages. When advertiser match values are drawn independently from heavy-tailed distributions, a modified second bid auction captures at least 94.8 percent of the first-best expected value. In that setting and similar ones, the benefits of switching from an ordinary second-price auction to the modified second bid auction may be large, and the cost of defending against shill bidding and adverse selection may be low. (JEL D44, D82, L86, M37)
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Brünner, Tobias. "Price formation in call auctions with insider information." Studies in Economics and Finance 36, no. 3 (July 26, 2019): 408–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/sef-02-2018-0066.
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Purpose This study aims to investigate – theoretically and empirically – if call auctions incorporate asymmetric information into prices. Design/methodology/approach First, this study introduces a new model of price formation in a call auction with insider information. In this call auction model, insider trading gives rise to an asymmetric information component of transaction costs. Next, this study estimates the model using 20 stocks from Euronext Paris and investigates if the asymmetric information component is present. Findings The theoretical analysis reveals that call auctions incorporate asymmetric information into prices. The empirical analysis finds strong evidence for the asymmetric information component. Testable implications provide further support for the model. Practical implications Call auctions have recently been proposed as an alternative to continuous limit order book markets to overcome problems associated with high-frequency trading. However, it is still an open question whether call auctions efficiently aggregate asymmetric information. The findings of this study imply that call auctions facilitate price discovery and, therefore, are a viable alternative to continuous limit order book markets. Originality/value There is no generally accepted measure of trading costs for call auctions. Therefore, the measure introduced in this study is of great value to anyone who wants to quantify trading costs in call auctions, understand the determinants of trading costs in call auctions or compare trading costs and their components between continuous markets and call auctions. This study also contributes to the literature devoted to estimating the probability of information-based trading.
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Sugianto, M. Udik, Florianus Yudhi Priyo Amboro, and Rufinus Hotmaulana Hutauruk. "Pemenang Lelang Eksekusi terhadap Jaminan Tanah yang Belum Bersertifikat." Legal Spirit 7, no. 2 (November 30, 2023): 143. http://dx.doi.org/10.31328/ls.v7i2.4611.
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The large number of people who do not have proof of land ownership is an obstacle in obtaining credit from banks. However, responding to this, the bank allows the bank to be able to accept credit submitted to it. However, it becomes a problem when the auction winner wants to transfer the rights to the land, it cannot be done because the land has not been certified, which results in the auction winner not being able to pay the BPHTB. The research method used is normative legal research. Legal regulations regarding auctions for land that have not been certified are contained in Article 41 Paragraph 4 of the PP on land registration, Articles 76 and 108 of the Regulation of the Minister of Land Registration, Article 34 of PMK Implementation of auctions. Meanwhile, the conflict that occurred was Article 83 of the PMK for the Implementation of the Auction, which required the auction winner to pay BPHTB, while Article 2 of the BPHTB Law states that land that has not been certified does not include land rights. The solution provided by the author is: the head of the land office and the head of the KPKNL provide concessions for BPHTB payments and change the laws and regulations related to allowing uncertified land to be auctioned.
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Atukeren, Erdal, and Aylin Seçk.in. "Determinants of sales rates at Turkish art auctions." Acta Oeconomica 62, no. 4 (December 1, 2012): 489–503. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/aoecon.62.2012.4.4.
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We examine the determinants of the overall sales rates at art auctions in Turkey. We use a unique dataset that covers 79 auctions that took place between January 2005 and February 2008. After controlling for auction house differences, seasonal factors and the price levels of the auctions, we find that the expectations about the economic developments and consumption patterns play an important role in explaining the sales rates differentials across different auctions taking place over time.