Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Auctions'
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Li, Zhen. "Optimal design of Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2010. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc28450/.
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The theory of auction has become an active research area spanning multiple disciplines such as economics, finance, marketing and management science. But a close examination of it reveals that most of the existing studies deal with ascending (i.e., English) auctions in which it is assumed that the bid increments are continuous. There is a clear lack of research on optimal descending (i.e., Dutch) auction design with discrete bid levels. This dissertation aims to fill this void by considering single-unit, open-bid, first price Dutch auctions in which the bid levels are restricted to a finite set of values, the number of bidders may be certain or uncertain, and a secret reserve price may be present or absent. These types of auctions are most attractive for selling products that are perishable (e.g., flowers) or whose value decreases with time (e.g., air flight seats and concert tickets) (Carare and Rothkopf, 2005). I began by conducting a comprehensive survey of the current literature to identify the key dimensions of an auction model. I then zeroed in on the particular combination of parameters that characterize the Dutch auctions of interest. As a significant departure from the traditional methods employed by applied economists and game theorists, a novel approach is taken by formulating the auctioning problem as a constrained mathematical program and applying standard nonlinear optimization techniques to solve it. In each of the basic Dutch auction model and its two extensions, interesting properties possessed by the optimal bid levels and the auctioneer's maximum expected revenue are uncovered. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the major propositions where appropriate. The superiority of the optimal strategy recommended in this study over two commonly-used heuristic procedures for setting bid levels is also demonstrated both theoretically and empirically. Finally, economic as well as managerial implications of the findings reported in this dissertation research are discussed.
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Hungria-Gunnelin, Rosane. "Real Estate Auctions - An Empirical Analysis of Auction Strategies." Licentiate thesis, KTH, Bygg- och fastighetsekonomi, 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-159473.
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Lorenzon, Emmanuel. "Sponsored Search and Sequential Auctions : Three Essays in Auction Theory." Thesis, Bordeaux, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016BORD0357/document.
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Cette thèse regroupe trois essais en théorie des enchères. Le chapitre 1 introduit de ladélégation dans le mécanisme d’enchère GSP. Dans un jeu impliquant des transferts monétaires et unepolitique de rémunération mise en place par une agence, un équilibre collusif efficace est atteint.Nousproposons une caractérisation du profil d’enchères collusif implémentable dans un jeu de positions `a troisjoueurs et deux positions. Le chapitre 2 considère des ventes séquentielles d’un objet `a deux acheteurs: l’unconnaît son évaluation privée tandis que l’autre non. Les acheteurs ont une demande multi-unitaire et lesévaluations privées entre unit´es sont parfaitement corrélées. Un équilibre asymétrique existe dans lequelle joueur non-informé adopte une stratégie agressive tandis que le joueur informé joue de manière prudente.Le comportement du joueur non-informé est justifié par l’opportunité d’acquérir de l’informationgratuitement. Cette dynamique induit une décroissance des prix entre les ventes. Le chapitre 3, introduitun jeu de décision séquentielle dans la première enchère. Un équilibre séparateur existe dans lequel lejoueur informé est agressif lorsqu’il est le premier `a jouer impliquant une stratégie de non-participationde la part de son concurrent non-informé. A l’inverse, ce dernier adopte une attitude plus prudentelorsqu’il est le premier `a joueur. Un équilibre mélangeant dans lequel le joueur informé cache son informationprivée ne peut exister que si le joueur non-informé adopte une stratégie de non-participationThis thesis is a collection of three essays in theoretical auction analysis. Chapter 1 considersbid delegation in the GSP auction mechanism. In a game involving side-contracts and a compensationpolicy set by an agency, the first-best collusive outcome is achieved. We offer a characterization of the implementablebid profiles for the two-position game with three players. Chapter 2 considers the sequentialsale of an object to two buyers: one knows his private information and the other buyer does not. Buyershave a multi-unit demand and private valuations for each unit are perfectly correlated. An asymmetricequilibrium exists when the uninformed player adopts an aggressive bidding strategy. Conversely, hisinformed opponent behaves more conservatively by using bid shading. The bidding behaviour of theuninformed bidder is driven by the opportunity to learn his private valuation for free. This dynamic is atthe root of the decline in the equilibrium price across both sales. In chapter 3, information is observableduring the first-stage auction in a sequential-move game in which the first-mover bidder is observed byhis opponent. A separating equilibrium exists in which the informed bidder bids aggressively when he isthe first-mover which entails a non-participation strategy from his uninformed competitor. Conversely,the latter adopts a conservative behaviour when he is the first-mover. A pooling equilibrium in which theinformed bidder blurs his valuation can only exist if his uninformed opponent adopts a non-participatingstrategy
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Rose, Susan L. "Essays on almost common value auctions." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1149185948.
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Grigorieva, Elena. "Bisection auctions." [Maastricht] : Maastricht : Universitaire Pers Maastricht ; University Library, Universiteit Maastricht [host], 2007. http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=7932.
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Brown, Whitney E., and Lana D. Ray. "Electronic reverse auctions in the federal government." Thesis, Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/38037.
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MBA Professional ReportAproved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
In light of the limited recognition of electronic reverse auctions (e-RA) in the acquisition field, the purpose of this research paper is to further the use of e-RAs throughout the federal government and the Department of Defense (D0D). By exploring a multitude of auction types and designs that have been or are currently being used in the private sector, these practices set a basis for researching the auction types being used in the public sector. This paper further explores the regulations guiding the use of e-RAs and investigates the federal government's application of reverse auctions through studies, reports, and interviews with users of e-RAs. Details as to what attributes are prevalent in these e-RAs, what features are best suited for e-RAs, and what benefits have been derived from the use of e-RAs in the federal government are also included. Finally, the researchers found that e-RAs have increased transparency, cost savings, and efficiencies in the acquisition process. Although reverse auctions are being used effectively, the researchers found that there are still opportunities for improvement including incorporating a fully functional best-value tool into e-RA technology and developing more thorough federal guidance on e-RAs as an alternative pricing method.
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Rander, Robin. "Essays on auctions /." Lund: Univ., Dep. of Economics, 2007. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/561390959.pdf.
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Marszalec, Daniel. "Essays on auctions." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.543646.
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Khayyambashi, Mohammad-Reza. "Scalable Internet auctions." Thesis, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10443/1957.
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Current Internet based auction services rely, in general, on a centralised auction server; applications with large and geographically dispersed bidder client bases are thus supported in a centralised manner. Such an approach is fundamentally restrictive as too many users can overload the server, making the whole auction process unresponsive. Further, such an architecture can be vulnerable to server's failures, if not equipped with sufficient redundancy. In addition, bidders who are closer to the server are likely to have relatively faster access to the server than remote bidders, thereby gaining an unfair advantage. To overcome these shortcomings, this thesis investigates ways of enabling widely distributed, arbitrarily large number of auction servers to cooperate in conducting an auction. Allowing a bidder to register with anyone of the auction servers and place bids there, coupled with periodic exchange of auction information between servers forms the basis of the solution investigated to achieve scalability, responsiveness and fairness. Scalability and responsiveness are achieved since the total load is shared amongst many bidder servers; fairness is achieved since bidders are able to register with their local servers. The thesis presents the design and implementation of an hierarchically structured distributed Internet auction system. Protocols for inter-server cooperation are presented. Each server may be replicated locally to mask node failures. Performance evaluations of centralised and distributed configurations are performed to show the advantages of the distributed configuration over the centralised one.
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Kozlova. "INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AUCTIONS." Thesis, Київ 2018, 2018. http://er.nau.edu.ua/handle/NAU/33770.
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Jabs, Saral Krista. "Auctions with resale." Tallahassee, Florida : Florida State University, 2009. http://etd.lib.fsu.edu/theses/available/etd-11142009-111353/.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2009.Advisor: Timothy Salmon, Florida State University, College of Social Sciences, Dept. of Economics. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed on Mar. 22, 2010). Document formatted into pages; contains viii, 100 pages. Includes bibliographical references.
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VINIJSORN, KRIT. "Art auctions on eBay : An empirical study of bidders’ behavior on eBay." Thesis, Högskolan i Jönköping, Internationella Handelshögskolan, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-15890.
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This paper explores the determinants of the number of bidders and final price of 1900s oil paintings auctioned by resellers or dealers on eBay art auctions. We find that starting price has negative effect on bidder’s decision whether to enter the auctions or not while seller reputation variables such as seller´s feedback, being top rate seller has a positive effect. Furthermore, auction theory is introduced to study the bidder´s behavior through auction characteristics and final price. We find that, interestingly, the seller´s reputation variables have no significant effect to the final price and the number of bidders has positive effect toward final price of art work. This evidence means that art auctions on eBay has a private value auctions characteristic. However, some specific characteristics of online auctions, which are the last minute bidding and the presence of experienced bidders, significantly affect the final price. Being an experienced winner or using last minute bidding as a strategy substantially pay more than inexperienced winners or winners who do not use last minute bidding in auctioned painting. This could result from different preference of bidders toward auctioned painting or information on which each bidder is holding.
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Smedman, Gustaf, and Timo Kervinen. "Spectrum auctions in Sweden : A theoretical study of spectrum auctions in Sweden." Thesis, Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för ekonomi, samhälle och teknik, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mdh:diva-48728.
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This paper seeks to find whether the spectrum auctions in Sweden have been conducted efficiently and if there is a de facto model that suits all auctions. The efficiency is conditions that emphasise truthful bidding, price discovery and limits collusive behaviour. The paper compares three different auction models used in Sweden, a beauty contest used in the allocation of 3G spectrums, and the auction model selected for the upcoming 5G spectrum auction. The auction models are as follows: first and second-price sealed-bid auction, SMRA and CCA. We found that beauty contests should not be used in any spectrum allocation as it did not meet the criteria of efficiency outlined in this paper. The first-price sealed-bid auction is not a suitable format for spectrum auctions. According to the theory, it generates equivalent revenues on average as the second-price format, which shows a higher degree of efficient allocation. We found that depending on the blocks sold, both SMRA and CCA can result in somewhat efficient results, but they are not suitable for a single object auction. We found that no de facto auction format is suitable for every spectrum auction to be conducted in the future, but instead that the auction format is dependent on the characteristics of the individual auctions.
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Ferenc, Veszteg Róbert. "Auctions, Mechanisms and Uncertainty." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/4057.
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Los mecanismos que permiten la interacción de los individuos tienen un gran impacto sobre los resultados de esta interacción. La teoría económica de diseño de mecanismos estudia el diseño de procedimientos de decisión social en situaciones en la cuales los agentes económicos guardan información privada y se comportan, la utilizan, de forma estratégica.Como ejemplo, considérese el caso en el cual la autoridad central de un país está considerando la posibilidad de declarar como "reserva nacional" una determinada área geográfica. Para poder tomar la decisión óptima, por ejemplo la que maximiza el bienestar social, ésta se tiene que basar en la información individual de las ciudades, estados, o agentes, cuya opinión sobre el problema que se considera se puede preguntar directamente, pero la verdad no se expresará sin los incentivos adecuados. Estos pueden aparecen como transferencias monetarias u otros instrumentos controlados por la autoridad. Con otras palabras, la teoría de diseño de mecanismos estudia la harmonización de los incentivos que se tienen que aplicar cuando un conjunto de agentes interactúa para que estos muestren un comportamiento deseado, es decir para que el resultado sea el intencionado.
La primera formalización de este problema se encuentra en el trabajo de Hurwitz (1972). No obstante, una de las primeras aplicaciones que se puede considerar como parte de la literatura de diseño de mecanismos lleva el nombre de Hayek, quien empezó a estudiar las limitaciones, en cuanto a la cantidad de información, de los planificadores centrales en los años 20. Él consideró un problema de gran escala al centrar su atención en el mecanismo del mercado libre. Se opuso firmemente al sistema socialista y describió su fallo principal como un problema de información.
Una aplicación similar es el diseño de una constitución que determina las acciones que los agentes pueden realizar (espacio de estrategias) y las reglas de votación que transforman votos en decisiones (funciones de pago). Al lado de la literatura sobre cómo reducir los fallos del mercado, sobre impuestos óptimos y teoría de bienes públicos, el diseño de subastas también aparece entre los sujetos del diseño de mecanismos.
Esta tesis está dividida en tres capítulos que presentan estudios completos y separados de situaciones económicas en las cuales la información, la incertidumbre, juega un papel importante. Los resultados se han obtenido con la ayuda de la teoría de juegos y el enfoque estándar de la literatura del diseño de mecanismos. El primer capítulo propone el uso del mecanismo "multipujas" ("multibidding game"; veáse Pérez-Castrillo y Wettstein (2002)) en situaciones con información imperfecta y desarrolla sus propiedades teóricas. El segundo capítulo es un trabajo empírico, utiliza datos experimentales y contrasta las predicciones teóricas del primero. La tesis se finaliza con el estudio de los conceptos de justicia en un marco donde los agentes toman sus decisiones bajo incertidumbre.
Mechanisms through which individuals interact may have important impact on the outcomes of this interaction. The economic theory of mechanism design is concerned with the design of social decision procedures for situations in which economic agents own relevant private information and behave, i.e. use it, strategically.
As an example, consider the case in which the central authority of a country is studying the possibility of declaring national reserve a given geographic area. In order to come up with the optimal decision, that for instance maximizes social welfare, it should be conditioned on the related information owned by cities, states, or individuals. They might be asked directly for their opinion on the underlying problem, but will not report their information truthfully unless proper incentives are given to them through monetary transfers or some other instruments controlled by the authority. In other words, mechanism design theory is concerned with the harmonization of incentives that must be applied to a set of agents that interact in order to get those agents to exhibit some desired behavior, i.e. in order the schemes to work as intended. The central authority, or social planner, of this example who acts on behalf of the whole society can also be replaced by an imaginary social goal or by a principal who is pursuing his own interest.
The formalization of this problem can be find in the seminal work by Hurwicz (1972). Nevertheless, one of the first applications that can be considered as from the theory of mechanism design is due to Hayek who started to study the limitations on the amount of information that central planners can acquire in the early 1920s. He considered a large scale problem focusing his attention on the free market mechanism. He fiercely opposed to the socialist system from every angle and described the main problem as a problem of information.
A similar application is the design of a constitution that determines the actions that agents may take (strategy space) and the electoral rules that transform votes into decisions (outcome function). Along with the literature on the ways of reducing market failures, on optimal taxation and public good theory, the design of auctions is also subject of the field of mechanism design.
This thesis dissertation is divided into three chapters that present self-contained studies of economic situations in which private information, i.e. uncertainty, plays an important role. In deriving the results game theoretic tools and the approach taken by the mechanism design literature are used. The first chapter proposes the use of the multibidding mechanism (check Pérez-Castrillo y Wettstein (2002)) in situations with imperfect information and explores its theoretical properties. The second chapter is an empirical work, it uses experimental data and tests the theoretical predictions of the first. The thesis ends with the study of fairness concepts in an environment in which agents take their decisions under uncertainty.
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Wilenius, Jim. "Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions." Doctoral thesis, Uppsala universitet, Avdelningen för datalogi, 2009. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-102960.
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This thesis concerns the interdisciplinary field of combinatorial auctions, combining the fields of computer science, optimization and economics. A combinatorial auction is an auction where many items are sold simultaneously and where bidders may submit indivisible combinatorial bids on groups of items. It is commonly believed that good solutions to the allocation problem can be achieved by allowing combinatorial bidding. Determining who wins in a combinatorial auction is fundamentally different from a traditional single-item auction because we are faced with a hard and potentially intractable optimization problem. Also, unless we are limited to truthful mechanisms, game theoretic analysis of the strategic behavior of bidders is still an open problem. We have chosen primarily to study the first-price combinatorial auction, a natural auction widely used in practice. Theoretical analysis of this type of auction is difficult and little has been done previously. In this thesis we investigate and discuss three fundamental questions with significant practical implications for combinatorial auctions. First, because the number of possible bids grows exponentially with the number of items, limitations on the number of bids are typically required. This gives rise to a problem since bidders are unlikely to choose the "correct" bids that make up the globally optimal solution. We provide evidence that an expressive and compact bidding language can be more important than finding the optimal solution. Second, given a first-price (sealed-bid) combinatorial auction, the question of equilibrium bidding strategies remains an open problem. We propose a heuristic for finding such strategies and also present feasible strategies. And finally, is a first-price combinatorial auction worth pursuing compared to the simpler simultaneous (single-item) auction? We prove, through a model capturing many fundamental properties of multiple items scenarios with synergies, that the first-price combinatorial auction produces higher revenue than simultaneous single-item auctions. We provide bounds on revenue, given a significantly more general model, in contrast to previous work.
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Holmes, William B. "Exploring Environmental Service Auctions." Digital Archive @ GSU, 2010. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/econ_diss/63.
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The chapters of this dissertation explore related aspects of the procurement of conservation services from private landowners. In the first chapter, heuristic laboratory experiments reveal the impact of potential government regulation on strategic forces and efficiency properties in conservation procurement auctions. In the second chapter, data from past procurement auctions are analyzed to discover the existence and magnitude of premiums received by auction participants.
The first Chapter, “Procurement Auctions Under Regulatory Threat,” examines how strategic forces and efficiency properties are impacted in auctions for the procurement of environmental services when a threat of regulation is levied. Laboratory experiments examining different regulatory environments demonstrate that a threat of regulation will reduce the amount of public funds necessary to purchase a given level of environmental services. However, adverse selection costs and equity are negatively impacted by threat implementation.
The second Chapter, “Estimating Bid Inflation in Procurement of Environmental Services,” studies the size of premiums received by program participants in conservation programs. Predictions informed by economic literature and theory elicit the underlying value distribution for a unique dataset of procurement auctions. Average premiums for auction participants range from almost 50 percent to less than 1 percent across auction periods and institutions. The results demonstrate that both repetition and rule variation may improve the efficiency of procurement auctions. The auctions studied here are shown to yield efficiency improvements of more than 32 percent over standard fixed-payment schemes for service procurement.
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Troncoso-Valverde, Cristián Andrés. "Essays on competing auctions." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/44542.
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This dissertation studies two elements of auction design that are important to understand environments where multiple auctioneers compete against each other: heterogeneity in bidders' preferences, and endogenous information structures. The first research chapter studies a model of competing auctions in which bidders have heterogeneous preferences. I provide a novel characterization of the set of participation rules and show that contrary to results in models with homogeneous goods, bidders' selection of trading partners is non random. I also show that changes in reserve prices affect not only the distribution of valuations of participants but also the probability with which every bidder visits the auctions. This introduces a novel trade-off between screening and traffic effect not present in models with homogeneous goods. The second research chapter examines a model of competing auctions in which sellers can release information that allows bidders to learn their valuations before choosing trading partners. I provide a set of sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique equilibrium in which both sellers supply information. These conditions involve restrictions on the prior distribution of bidders valuations. The existence of this equilibrium is independent of the number of bidders, which differs considerably from results in models with a single auctioneer where releasing information is optimal for the auctioneer only if the number of bidders is sufficiently large. The last chapter re-examines the problem of information provision in competing auctions in a framework where sellers can also post reserve prices. The inclusion of reserve prices makes the existence of an equilibrium in which both sellers do not supply information less likely because sellers can use reserve prices to appropriate of some of the surplus generated by information provision. I show the existence of a threshold number of bidders such that the information provision game admits a unique equilibrium in which both sellers release information provided that the actual number of bidders is above this threshold.
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ANDRADE, DIOGO VIEIRA. "DETERMINING PRICES IN AUCTIONS." PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2002. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=3619@1.
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COORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOREsta dissertação apresenta um modelo de programação linear para mercados virtuais, que tem como objetivo principal incentivar vendedores a oferecerem preços mais baixos e compradores a pagarem mais pelos produtos. Esse incentivo é feito através de compensações aos participantes do mercado que agirem desta forma. O modelo funciona basicamente como um leilão bi-lateral, onde tanto vendedores quanto compradores podem dar seus lances. Para este modelo básico foram modeladas extensães como: existência de custo de transporte entre vendedores e compradores; economia de escala no preço do comprador; possibilidade de múltiplos produtos em um mesmo leilão. Para o modelo básico e cada uma das extensões propostas foi elaborado o sistema de compensações baseados em princípios da Teoria dos Jogos. Em cada caso, foi verificada a existência de soluções de núcleo e como essas soluções determinam as características do mercado.
This work presents a linear programming model for virtual markets. The main objective is to encourage sellers to offer lower prices and buyers to pay more for products. This is done through a system where the agents are awarded for acting this way. The basic version of the model works as an auction where buyers and sellers can make their bids. Some extensions were developed for this basic model, to allow situations like: transportation cost between buyers and sellers; scale economy for the buyer's price; multiples products in the same auction. For the basic model and each of its extensions, the system of awards has been developed based on Game Theory principles. In each case, the model was reinterpreted as a game and its core solutions were found. It was also verified how these solutions determine market's behavior.
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Branco, Fernando Manuel Ribeiro. "Essays on optimal auctions." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/13193.
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Groeger, Joachim. "Participation in dynamic auctions." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2010. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3022/.
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We study participation decisions and bidding behaviour in Michigan Department of Transportation procurement auctions. Patterns in the bidding data suggest that bidders' participation behaviour has a forward looking component. To fully understand the extent of these effects on auction outcomes, we construct and estimate a dynamic asymmetric auction model with endogenous participation. We develop an estimation approach which builds on Guerre et al. (2000) and recently developed dynamic discrete game estimators. We then quantify the level of inefficiencies under the current auction rules and then consider how alternative auction rules affect efficiency. We also analyse the effect of ignoring dynamics in this market by estimating a static version of our model. This approach results in misleading conclusions concerning auction efficiency.
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Shahriar, Quazi Hasnat. "Auctions with Buy Prices." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194708.
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The major internet auction sites eBay and Yahoo have developed innovative hybrid auction designs that incorporate buy prices. My dissertation focuses on the Buy It Now (BIN, hereafter) version of the auctions on eBay, the largest online auction site. The BIN hybrid auction combines a standard ascending bid auction with a posted-price offer. A seller in a BIN auction lists his auction with a "buy price". A bidder may purchase the item immediately at the buy price and end the auction. If he places a bid instead, the option to purchase the item at the buy price disappears and the subsequent bidders participate in the standard eBay auction. This auction format has been very popular with both buyers and sellers. In 2005 eBay's sales in fixed price platform (BIN and Half.com) totaled $13.8 billion, which was 33.1% of eBay's total sales.The dissertation explores the BIN auctions using theory, experiments and field data. Chapter 1 theoretically analyzes BIN auctions within the common values framework. An equilibrium is characterized, shown to exist, and the revenues generated by BIN and standard eBay auctions are compared. Chapter 2 compares the bidding behavior and the revenue implications of BIN auctions in lab experiments under common and private value assumptions. The third develops an "incomplete" theoretical model of BIN auctions within the private values framework. An "incomplete" empirical specification is derived and then field data collected from eBay's BIN auctions are used to estimate the primitives of the model, including the bidders' risk aversion and time preference. I then explore how heterogeneity of sellers and items influence these primitives. Chapter 1 (Common Values Auctions with a Buy Price: the case of eBay): Several explanations for the popularity of buy price have been provided for independent private value auctions. Risk aversion and impatience of either the bidders or the seller have mainly been used to explain the popularity of buy prices in IPV models. This paper, using a pure common value framework, models auctions with eBay-style "temporary" buy prices, when the bidders and the seller are either risk neutral or risk averse. It characterizes equilibrium bidding strategies in a general setup and then analyzes a seller's incentive to post a buy price when there are two bidders. When bidders are either risk neutral or risk averse there is no incentive to post a buy price for a risk neutral seller. But when the seller is risk averse, a suitably chosen buy price can raise the seller's expected utility when the bidders are either risk neutral or risk averse. Chapter 2 (An Experimental Study of Auctions with a Buy Price Under Private and Common Values): We use experiments to examine several predictions from the theoretical studies of buy prices. The theoretical predictions from Wooders and Reynolds (2003) and Chapter 1 show that the introduction of a buy price causes the seller's revenue to move in opposite directions in private value and common value settings. Meanwhile, Mathews and Katzman (2006) find that risk averse sellers might find buy prices advantageous because they reduce the variance in seller revenue in eBay auctions with risk-neutral bidders. The lab experiments are used to answer three key questions. (a) Can a buy price raise seller revenue and lower the variance of seller revenue in an independent private value auction? (b) Does a buy price lower seller revenue in common value auctions? (c) If the theoretical predictions do not hold, can a behavioral model explain the patterns observed in the data? Using a between-subjects design the results show that the use of a buy price has a positive and statistically significant effect on seller revenue in private value auctions. The buyers are risk averse. The estimate of the Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) index of 1.11 for the bidders is equivalent to a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) index of 0.62 which is centered within the range of other estimates of relative risk aversion. As predicted by the theory when buyers are risk averse, the use of a buy price yields a statistically significant reduction in the variance of seller revenue. Hence, as predicted, the use of a buy price is advantageous to the seller when either the bidders or the seller are risk averse. The results for common value auctions are inconsistent with the theoretical predictions. Use of a buy price did not lower seller revenue, and the bidders' behavior departed from theoretical predictions in several respects. As a result, we develop and estimate a behavioral model of common value BIN auctions based on the winner's curse and overweighting of a bidder's private information. We find statistically significant evidence of overweighting of the bidder's own signal and estimated a CARA index of 0.001. This behavioral model explains all the departures from the rational model we found in the common values experiments. Chapter 3 (The Buy-it-now Option, Risk Aversion, and Impatience in an Empirical Model of eBay Bidding): Haile and Tamer (2003) first used an incomplete econometric model in an auction context, assuming that bidders bid up to their values and do not allow an opponent to win at a price they are willing to beat. Canals-Cerda and Pearcy (2004) used a similar incomplete econometric model to study eBay auctions while adding the assumption that the maximum of all the bids placed by the bidder with the second highest value is exactly equal to his value. Chapter 3 extends these incomplete models to eBay's BIN auctions. We develop and estimate an equilibrium model for BIN independent private value auctions with a stochastic and unknown number of potential bidders who enter the auction sequentially. In the model risk averse and time impatient bidders buy at the BIN price because it allows them to avoid the uncertainties and delay of the ascending bid auction that takes place if no one chooses the BIN option. As a result, the bidders' decisions to choose the BIN option in BIN auctions of different lengths can be used to identify the bidders' risk aversion and time preference parameters. Our model is "incomplete" in the sense that we do not impose any stylized structure on bidding in the ascending bid auction and, although bid revision is allowed, the process is not explicitly described. Our "incomplete" econometric model uses a partial likelihood approach proposed by Cox (1975) that allows the analysis to bypass modeling bidding and the bid revision process. The model is estimated using a new data set of 3245 eBay auctions of Pentium-3 laptops that ran between 22 July to 10 August 2005.
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Peterson, Madeleine. "New Technology, Old Ways? The Gender Price Discount in Online Contemporary Art Auctions." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2019. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/1265.
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There is evidence there is a global gender price gap in traditional global art auctions. Taking into account recent technological advances in the secondary art market, this study examines if there is a gender gap for the sale prices of female artists’ work in the contemporary, online art auction market. The analysis uses a unique data set of art works sold in Christie’s Online-Only Auctions for the year of 2018. We regress measures of price on gender and controls for various characteristics of the art work and artist. We find that while there is discount in prices of 17% for artwork created by female artists, further analysis indicates the difference is not necessarily the result of bidder’s biased prices, but rather rooted in the pre-sale estimates given by the auction houses.
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Sugiyarto, Wawan. "An analysis of the performance of the Indonesian treasuries market." Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2020. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/206023/1/Wawan_Sugiyarto_Thesis.pdf.
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This thesis examines the performance of the discriminatory-price auction relative to the uniform-price auction in the Indonesian treasuries’ market. Employing a counterfactual analysis, it derives optimal bidding conditions for both auction methods. For a large sample of Islamic (Sukuk) and conventional treasury bill auctions between 2003 and 2017, the results show that switching from a discriminatory-price auction to a uniform-price auction is expected to improve both auction revenue and efficiency. These benefits are especially pronounced during times of high market uncertainty, but decline with the level of bidder competition.
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Melo, André de Araujo. "Discriminatory versus uniform-price auctions : an empirical analysis of the brazilian treasury auctions." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UnB, 2014. http://repositorio.unb.br/handle/10482/16679.
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Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia, 2014.Submitted by Larissa Stefane Vieira Rodrigues (larissarodrigues@bce.unb.br) on 2014-10-30T17:46:55Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_AndréDeAraujoMelo.pdf: 1223215 bytes, checksum: 26935c93b8835b2da1d22e2abfcdd7b3 (MD5)
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Este trabalho tem como objetivo determinar qual o melhor desenho para os leilões de títulos públicos da Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional em termos de geração de receita: leilões de preço uniforme ou leilões de preços múltiplos. Desde a década de 60, economistas têm debatido sobre o desenho ótimo para leilões de múltiplas unidades. Desde então, a literatura teórica tem desenvolvido argumentos a favor de ambos os tipos de leilão. Além disso, literatura empírica vem aplicando repetidas vezes métodos empíricos a dados de leilões de títulos públicos, também chegando a resultados ambíguos. Após realizar uma cuidadosa revisão da literatura, empregamos métodos empíricos a dados dos leilões do Tesouro Nacional, de modo a determinar o melhor formato de leilão para o Tesouro Nacional. ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT
Our research aims to determine the best auction format for the Brazilian National Treasury auctions in terms of revenue: uniform-price or discriminatory auctions. Since the 1960’s, economists have debated the optimal design of Treasury auctions. Since then, theoretical literature has developed arguments favoring either type of auctions. Furthermore, empirical literature has repeatedly applied empirical methods to data from Treasury auctions, also reaching ambiguous results. After conducting a careful literature review, we apply empirical methods to Brazilian Treasury auction data and determine the best auction format for the Brazilian Treasury.
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Ehrenbergerová, Lucia. "Internetová aukce a její právní aspekty." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2009. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-17160.
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The aim of this thesis is to give a comprehensive overview about the internet auctions from several different perspectives, but mainly form the law-related perspective. The relation of the internet auctions to other branches of law is examined -- especially to the consumer protection or the questions of counterfeit goods. Part of this thesis is devoted to pay-per-bid auctions and their place in legal regulations in Czech Republic. The German regulations are also introduced a compared to the Czech ones. In the end there is an introduction to some interests from the auction world.
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Vanden, Bos Steven W. "Improving the efficiency of defense auctions multi-stage auctions as a market research tool /." Monterey, Calif. : Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/hyperion-image.exe/07Dec%5FVanden%5FBos%5FMBA.pdf.
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"Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Business Administration from the Naval Postgraduate School, December 2007."Advisor(s): Gates, William R. ; Coughlan, Peter J. "December 2007." "MBA professional report"--Cover. Description based on title screen as viewed on January 10, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 77-79). Also available in print.
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Hu, Xiaorui. "Three essays on auction, retail risk management and market share evolution /." Full text (PDF) from UMI/Dissertation Abstracts International, 2000. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/fullcit?p3004291.
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Tobias, Mark Joseph. "Resource and requirement schemas applied to auctioning in a computational market." [Gainesville, Fla.] : University of Florida, 2001. http://purl.fcla.edu/fcla/etd/UFE0000359.
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Thesis (M.S.)--University of Florida, 2001.Title from title page of source document. Document formatted into pages; contains x, 115 p.; also contains graphics. Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references.
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Azacis, Helmuts. "Essays on Implementation and Auctions." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/4063.
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Aparte del primer capítulo que es la introducción, la tesis consiste de tres ensayos. En el segundo capítulo estoy analizando el problema de implementación en el mercado de bienes indivisibles. El modelo trata de asignar un conjunto de bienes indivisibles a los agentes donde cada agente tiene que pagar el precio por el bien que reciba y la suma de los precios tiene que ser igual a un valor determinado. Un ejemplo estándar es el problema de inquilinos donde ha de determinar quien recibe que habitación y que precio tiene que pagar dado que la suma de los precios de las habitaciones que los inquilinos pagan por un piso tiene que ser igual al arriendo. El objetivo consiste en, desconociendo las verdaderas valoraciones de los bienes que tengan los agentes, seleccionar la asignación de los bienes y los precios correspondientes que sea eficaz y que los agentes no tengan envidia. En general, los agentes no tendrán los incentivos para revelar sus verdaderas valuaciones sino otras que permitirían conseguir una asignación más favorable. Como consecuencia, los criterios de eficiencia y sin-envidia no estarán logrados. Sin embargo, he demostrado que las posibilidades de los agentes manipular las asignaciones y los precios están limitadas en el equilibrio. Es decir, he demostrado que seleccionando la asignación con los precios correspondientes que sea eficaz y sin-envidia con respecto a las valoraciones anunciadas, y no necesariamente verdaderas, asegura que en los equilibrios de Nash y Nash Fuerte la asignación seleccionada también es eficaz y sin-envidia con respecto a las valoraciones verdaderas.El tercer capítulo se trata de subastas cuando hay un comprador dominante que desalienta la participación de otros compradores en la subasta, y como la consecuencia los precios suban poco. El objetivo consiste en comparar varias formas de subastas que han sido diseñadas para fomentar la participación. En literatura se han propuesto una mezcla de la subasta inglesa y holandesa. El uso de la subasta holandesa beneficia a los participantes desfavorecidos y por lo tanto aumenta su participación y los ingresos del vendedor. Eso ocurre a coste de eficiencia, se puede ganar la subasta no teniendo la valoración más alta entre los compradores. Nosotros hemos propuesto una subasta alternativa para fomentar la participación y que consiste de la subasta inglesa en dos etapas. En la primera etapa se fija un precio de reserva y si nadie está dispuesto a pagarlo hay la segunda etapa sin precio de reserva. Los participantes potenciales en la segunda etapa aprenden que los que ya han entrado en la primera etapa no tienen las valoraciones altas, por lo tanto tienen mayor probabilidad de ganar. Eso, en vez, atrae mayor participación. Eligiendo un precio de reserva apropiado genera al vendedor más ingresos y además es más eficaz que la otra subasta.
El último capítulo consiste del análisis empírico de las subastas que lleva a cabo la compañía "Bosques Estatales de Letonia" para vender el derecho de talar los árboles en los bosques del estado a empresas privadas. La compañía en cada subasta ofrece varios lotes de bosque, y los lotes se venden en secuencia. Los compradores que estén interesados en la dicha lote, compiten en la subasta inglesa. La teoría económica sugiere que el orden en que se venden los lotes es importante cuando los lotes son heterogéneos - los ingresos del vendedor son mayores si empiezan con los lotes más valiosos y venden en el orden decreciente por valor. Mi objetivo es contrastar la dicha hipótesis. El análisis econométrico prosigue en dos etapas. Primero, dado el supuesto que se vende la lote siempre y cuando su valor supera el precio inicial que el vendedor ha fijado, he estimado un modelo de Probit para inferir las valuaciones de los lotes. En la segunda etapa yo contrasto la hipótesis que el orden de la venta no afecta los ingresos del vendedor y no encuentro la evidencia para rechazar la dicha hipótesis.
Besides the introductory chapter, my thesis consists of three essays. In the first essay of my thesis I consider the problem of assigning agents to indivisible objects in which each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. A standard example is the housemate problem where a group of tenants is sharing an apartment and they must decide who gets which room and how much each must pay, subject to the constraint that the sum of their contributions must equal the rent of the apartment. Previous research concentrated on mechanisms that select an assignment-price pair, which is envy-free and efficient, assuming the knowledge of agents' valuations. However, it is well known that for any mechanism agents have incentives to misrepresent their true valuations if it leads to higher utility. I treat the assignment problem as a game and prove that the mechanism, in which agents are simply required to announce their (possibly false) valuations and an envy-free allocation is selected with respect to these announced valuations, will implement the set of envy-free allocations both in Nash and strong Nash. This means that, in equilibrium, the selected allocation will be envy-free also with respect to the true preferences. I demonstrate that by choosing an efficient and envy-free allocation a social planner does not need to worry about strategic issues, that is, the scope for agents to manipulate the allocations is limited in equilibrium. This result provides a justification on strategic grounds for the use of social choice functions selecting envy-free allocations.
The second essay studies auctions when the presence of a strong buyer deters the entry of other potential bidders, preventing competition in the auction and leading to a low sales price. For example, the issue arose during third-generation mobile communication licenses auctions where incumbent firms could effectively discourage entry by threatening to outbid new entrants. As a response, the so-called Anglo-Dutch auction has been proposed to promote entry since the Dutch auction favors weak bidders relative to a pure English auction. However, that is achieved at the cost of efficiency. We propose an alternative two-stage English auction in order to encourage entry. In the first stage there is a reserve price, and if nobody bids at that price, then a second stage is conducted without the reserve price. Potential entrants of the second stage learn that those who entered in the first stage but did not bid have low valuations. This provides incentives for weak bidders to enter in the second stage. We show that by setting an appropriate reserve price it is possible to generate higher revenues for the seller than in the Anglo-Dutch auction and at the same time maintain efficiency. The latter implies that the two-stage English auction is superior to the Anglo-Dutch auction both from the seller's perspective and from a social welfare point of view.
Many real life auctions sell more than one object; objects are usually different and often are sold sequentially; hence the questions arise of how the order of sales affects revenue and what the optimal order of sales is. The last essay addresses these issues. It consists of an empirical analysis of auctions conducted by the Latvian state company selling rights to harvest timber in state forests. In each auction the company offers several lots of forest, and they are sold sequentially through oral, ascending price auctions. Theory suggests that the revenues of the seller are highest when objects are sold in the order of decreasing value. My objective is to test empirically this hypothesis. Since we do not observe the valuations of lots the bidders have, first I estimate them, using a discrete choice model, based on the assumption that a lot will be sold if and only if its valuation exceeds the reserve price. Next, I test the order of sales effect on the revenues of the seller. I do not reject the hypothesis that the order does not have effect on the revenues of seller.
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Herrera, Dappe Matias. "Essays on uniform price auctions." College Park, Md.: University of Maryland, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/1903/9482.
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Thesis (Ph. D.) -- University of Maryland, College Park, 2009.Thesis research directed by: Dept. of Economics. Title from t.p. of PDF. Includes bibliographical references. Published by UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, Mich. Also available in paper.
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Bilge, Betul. "A Study In Combinatorial Auctions." Master's thesis, METU, 2004. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12605162/index.pdf.
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By the emergence of electronic commerce and low transaction costs on the Internet, an interest in the design of new auction mechanisms has been arisen. Recently many researchers in computer science, economics, business, and game theory have presented many valuable studies on the subject of online auctions, and auctions theory.
When faced from a computational perspective, combinatorial auctions are perhaps the most challenging ones. Combinatorial auctions, that is, auctions where bidders can bid on combinations of items, tend to lead to more efficient allocations than traditional auction mechanisms in multi-item multi-unit situations where the agents&rsquovaluations of the items are not additive. However, determining the winners to maximize the revenue is NP-complete. In this study, we first analyze the existing approaches for combinatorial auction problem. Based on this analysis, we then choose three different approaches, which are search approach, descending simultaneous auctions approach, and IP (Integer Programming) formulation approach to build our models. The performances of the models are compared using computer simulations, where we model bandwidth allocation system. Finally a combinatorial auction tool is built which can be used for online auctions and e-procurement systems.
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Karakaya, Gulsah. "Approaches For Multi-attribute Auctions." Master's thesis, METU, 2009. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/2/12610780/index.pdf.
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There is a growing interest in electronic auctions in the literature. Many researchers work on the single attribute version of the problem. Multi-attribute version of the problem is more realistic. However, this brings a substantial difficulty in solving the problem. In order to overcome the computational difficulties, we develop an Evolutionary Algorithm (EA) for the case of multi-attribute multi-item reverse auctions.
We generate the whole Pareto front using the EA. We also develop heuristic procedures to find several good initial solutions and insert those in the initial population of the EA. We test the EA on a number of randomly generated problems and compare the results with the true Pareto optimal front obtained by solving a series of integer programs.
We also develop an exact interactive approach that provides aid both to the buyer and the sellers for a multi-attribute single item multi round reverse auction. The buyer decides on the provisional winner at each round. Then the approach provides support in terms of all attributes to each seller to be competitive in the next round of the auction.
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Yaari-Tikochinsky, Osnat. "Promoting entry in telecom auctions." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2005. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1446757/.
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This study is situated at the junction between the theoretical and the practical aspects of auction theory. We are particularly interested in the question of participation (or entry) of bidders in auctions. This is essentially a theoretical question, however the motivation for studying it stems from the observation of real auction situations. In the case of high-profile telecom auctions - auctions of licences for operating telecommunications technology - the problem of bidder participation poses a particularly acute challenge, that needs to be addressed in the design of the auction. The thesis contains five chapters; first an introduction that follows the appearance of the entry-problem in telecom auctions, and the motivation for studying it is provided (chapter 1), then the related theoretical literature is surveyed (chapter 2). The main body of the thesis is brought in chapters 3,4 and 5. Chapters 3 develops a theoretical model in which the use of royalty-bidding in telecom auctions is studied. The aim of capturing the main aspects of a real-life telecom auction environment, imposes a certain structure on the task of modelling it for the purpose of theoretical analysis. Our main interest is to examine whether the entry of weak bidders (in telecom auctions these are usually newcomers), could be promoted by the introduction of royalties to the auction, and to study the effects of such actions on other participants in the market. For that purpose a 'second-price royalty auction with a fixed-fee element' is modelled. Chapter 4 expands the analysis of chapter 3 by changing the basic setting of the model. In particular, the assumptions at the basis of the model, regarding the knowledge at the auctioneer's disposal when she designs the auction, are made less restrictive. In chapter 5 we abandon the use of royalties in auctions altogether, and turn to an experimental examination of the question of entry within two of the most common auction formats in the telecom industry - the ascending price auction and the first-price sealed bid auction. Our aim in this chapter is to compare the entry-promoting properties of the two auctions by observing the entry behaviour of bidders in a monitored environment where the only variable is the auction format.
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Abdullaev, Sarvar Ravshanovich. "Pricing options via double auctions." Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2016. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/pricing-options-via-double-auctions(918450fa-0dc2-4b3c-a011-eeee351d2815).html.
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This research develops and analyses a new set of agent-based models for pricing European options and option portfolios in the context of double auctions. After the financial crisis of 2008, it became obvious that the banking industry had been over-reliant on mathematical models such as Black-Scholes in pricing financial derivatives despite their major assumptions such as the efficiency of markets, the homogeneity and the risk-neutrality of traders, and the limitations in evaluating the risk itself. Although the Black-Scholes framework is regarded as the cornerstone of arbitrage-free pricing of financial derivatives, it does not involve market microstructure in forming option prices. In this research, I add a simulated market component to the existing option pricing methodology through modelling automated option traders and running them on various auction-based mechanisms. My simulation model consists of three consecutive steps: asset pricing, automated traders, and market mechanisms. Firstly, I simulate asset prices beyond Black and Scholes’ initial assumption which also involve fat-tailed distributions and mean-reverting aspects of risk-free interest rates that are common in most underlying markets. Secondly, I design option traders according to my extended version of Information- Inventory-Knowledge-Behaviour (IIKB) framework. While the information and knowledge layers of the framework involve gathering and computing basic statistical parameters of the market, the behavioural layer is designed using three sublayers which are responsible for determining the option price, the quantity to bid/ask and the proxy trading algorithm. I also use Zero- Intelligence (ZI) and indifference pricing techniques along with the Black- Scholes formula to generate heterogeneous option prices. For proxy trading algorithms, I re-purposed well-known inventory- and information-based trading models to deal with options. I also use popular ZIP and GD trading algorithms to model the behaviour of speculative option traders. Finally, in the third step, I feed the orders generated from automated traders to different mechanisms and analyse the obtained option prices. First, I consider direct double auction which has the Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility (DSIC) property, so that traders submit only truthful orders. I develop option prices. I also analyse the allocative efficiency and budget-balance of the mechanism. Then, I run trading agents with proxy trading algorithms in an online double auction. I evaluate the obtained option prices and the performance of each proxy trading algorithm used. Another important aspect of the research is the new perspective on pricing of compound financial contracts such as option portfolios using a combinatorial exchange. I explain the substitutability and complementarity of options in given option portfolios, and apply these concepts to the design of the combinatorial exchange for option portfolios. I also illustrate the expressiveness and flexibility of using combinatorial exchanges through a Tree-Based Bidding Language. The main contributions of this research are the design and implementation of a direct double auction for multi-unit and atomic orders, revealed mechanisms for forecasting traders, inventory- and information-based option traders, Logarithmic Market Scoring Rule (LMSR) option pricing based on option portfolios, and the application of combinatorial exchanges to the realm of option pricing.
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Wu, Christopher. "Combinatorial auctions: allocation and communication." Thesis, McGill University, 2004. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=18265.
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An auction is a well-known mechanism for reallocating items between buyers and sellers. An extension of the standard single-item auction is the combinatorial auction where multiple items are handled simultaneously. The focus of this thesis is to address the problem of allocating items in the setting of a combinatorial auction. We consider some of the computational work that has been done in recent years for combinatorial auctions. A fundamental problem in auction theory is how one represents the bidders and their preferences. Another issue is to address the cost of communications between bidders and the auctioneer. The main tool of interest is the structure of the submodular function which has the economic interpretation of decreasing marginal values and has been well-studied since the early 60s. We show some inapproximability results for allocations on submodular functions. Finally, we present some new approximation guarantees for restricted set functions and functions stemming from graph properties.Une enchère est une procédure bien-connue pour redistribution de biens matériaux entre des vendeurs et des acheteurs. Une extension de l’enchère où plusieurs acheteurs sont en compétition pour un seul itème est l’enchère combinatoire, où plusieurs itèmes sont redistribués simultanément. Ce mémoir a pour but d’adresser le problème de l’allocation de biens dans le contexte d’une enchère combinatoire. Nous considérons les résultats déjà obtenus dans la théorie computationnel des enchères combinatoires. Un problème primordial dans la théorie des enchères est la représentation des enchérisseurs et leurs préférences. Une autre question concerne le coût des communications entre les enchérisseurs et le commissaire-priseur. L’outil principal à ces fins est la structure de la fonction sousmodulaire, qui représente du point de vu économique les valeurs marginales décroissantes. Nous donnons quelques résultats d’inapproximabilité pour les allocations sur des fonctions sousmodulaires. Finalement, nous donnons des nouvelles garanties d’approximation pour des fonctions sur des ensembles restreints et sur des fonctions qui drivent de propriétées de graphes. fr
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McCabe, Antony. "Frugality in set-system auctions." Thesis, University of Liverpool, 2012. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.569225.
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We study the topic Frugality in Set System auctions; examining the payments that are given by truthful mechanisms when buying selections of items at auction. Firstly, we examine a simple single-commodity auction, where the auctioneer wishes to buy some given quantity of identical items. We show methods of quickly computing a winning set, as well as the benchmark NTUmin. We then show, for certain special cases, a mechanism that improves on the frugality of VCG, and is within a constant factor of optimal for mechanisms in its class. We then consider the general case, and see a relatively large lower-bound for a class of similar mechanisms. We propose a new type of auction, based on finding the shortest-path in a graph with 'bundles' of edges. We show that finding an optimal solution to this problem is NP-hard, for any bundle-size (k) of 2 or more, showing that there is no polynomial time algorithm that can compute an exact solution, subject to the commonly-held assumption that P! =NP. However, we give a simple k approximation and use this to design a truthful mechanism and give its frugality ratio. We consider the benchmarks that have been used in the literature as first-price auctions, and examine a range of other possibilities that should aim to meet the same 'fairness' criteria. We show that not all of the proposals will meet these criteria, and give the ranges of values possible for these other benchmarks. We also give information on their computational complexity, including a new result showing approximation hardness for a new benchmark as well as an existing one used in the literature. We then briefly examine the meaning of the benchmarks we used for frugality if they are rewritten for use in the more traditional 'forward' auctions (that is, selling items by auction).
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Szerman, Dimitri. "Public procurement auctions in Brazil." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2012. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/681/.
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This thesis provides an empirical analysis of data generated by ComprasNet, the online procurement bidding platform developed and used by the Brazilian federal government. ComprasNet is a large bidding platform used since 2001 by more than 2200 public purchasing units who list around one million lots each year. Over 70,000 unique bidders have participated in these auctions. In 2010, 46 percent of all procurement for the federal government was conducted through ComprasNet, totaling R$ 27 billion, or 0.7 percent of Brazil’s GDP. In short, these auctions represent a large share of federal tenders and a substantial amount is contracted through them each year. Chapter 1 provides an overview of ComprasNet. After reviewing the literature on various topics which this dissertation contributes to, I describe the institutional background surrounding ComprasNet. I then present the baseline data used throughout the remainder of this dissertation. Chapter 2 addresses one important aspect of designing an online ascending auction, namely how to end the auction. ComprasNet varied its ending rules over time, providing an unique opportunity to test theories of bidder behaviour, as well as assessing the impact of ending rules on auction outcomes. Chapter 3 analyses a two-stage auction format which ComprasNet uses. Two-stage designs have long been proposed by the theoretical literature, but there are virtually no empirical works apart from experimental studies. Finally, chapter 4 analyses a bid preference programme targeted at small and micro enterprises (SMEs). The programme consists of setting aside eligible lots for SMEs. We first use eligibility rules as a source of exogenous variation in the treatment assignment to estimate the effects of the programme on auction outcomes. We then set up an open auction model with endogenous entry and asymmetric bidders and estimate the model’s primitives. In particular, we estimate entry costs, which we interpret as red tape costs.
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Sanches, Nathalie C. Gimenes Miessi. "Quantile regression approaches for auctions." Thesis, Queen Mary, University of London, 2014. http://qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/123456789/8146.
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The goal of this thesis is to propose a new quantile regression approach to identify and estimate the quantiles of the private value conditional distribution in ascending and rst price auctions under the Independent Private Value (IPV) paradigm. The quantile regression framework provides a exible and convenient parametrization of the private value distribution, which is not a ected by the curse of dimensionality. The rst Chapter of the thesis introduces a quantile regression methodology for ascending auctions. The Chapter focuses on revenue analysis, optimal reservation price and its associated screening level. An empirical application for the USFS timber auctions suggests an optimal reservation price policy with a probability of selling the good as low as 58% for some auctions with two bidders. The second Chapter tries to address this issue by considering a risk averse seller with a CRRA utility function. A numerical exercise based on the USFS timber auctions shows that increasing the CRRA of the sellers is su cient to give more reasonable policy recommendations and a higher probability of selling the auctioned timber lot. The third Chapter develops a quantile regression methodology for rst-price auction. The estimation method combines local polynomial, quantile regression and additive sieve methods. It is shown in addition that the new quantile regression methodology is not subject to boundary issues. The choice of smoothing parameters is also discussed.
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Beil, Damian. "Two topics in online auctions." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/17578.
Full textAbstract:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, Operations Research Center, 2003.Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-85).
This thesis studies two operations management topics in online auctions, and is divided into two parts. Motivated by the increasing use of ShopBots to scan Internet auctions, the first part of the thesis analytically examines whether or not two competing auctioneers selling the same commodity should share, or pool, some or all of their bidders. Under pooling, the bidding population is represented by three compartments: bidders dedicated to auction 1, bidders dedicated to auction 2, and pooled bidders participating in both auctions simultaneously. Under a bidder strategy shown to induce a Bayesian equilibrium, a closed form expression for the auctioneers' expected revenue under pooling is found, and pooling is recommended where it produces a greater expected revenue than no pooling (i.e., our objective is revenue maximization). Pooling is generally found to be beneficial as long as the two auctions are not too asymmetric and the underlying valuation distribution has certain concavity characteristics. Asymptotic order statistic arguments are used where explicit characterizations are intractable. The second part of the thesis considers a manufacturer who uses a reverse, or procurement, auction to determine which supplier will be awarded a contract. Each bid consists of a price and a set of non-price attributes (e.g., quality, lead time). The manufacturer is assumed to know the suppliers' cost functions (in terms of the non-price attributes). We analyze how the manufacturer chooses a scoring rule (i.e., a function that ranks the bids in terms of the price and non-price attributes) that attempts to maximize his own utility. Under the assumption that suppliers submit their myopic best-response bids (i.e., they choose their minimum-cost bid to achieve any given score), our proposed scoring rule indeed maximizes the manufacturer's utility within the open-ascending format.
(cont.) The analysis reveals connections between the manufacturer's utility maximization problem and various geometric aspects of the manufacturer's utility and the suppliers' cost functions.
by Damian Ronald Beil.
Ph.D.
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Gupta, Shobhit. "Buyout prices in online auctions." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/36223.
Full textAbstract:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, Operations Research Center, 2006.Includes bibliographical references (p. 149-154).
Buyout options allow bidders to instantly purchase at a specified price an item listed for sale through an online auction. A temporary buyout option disappears once a regular bid above the reserve price is made, while a permanent option remains available until it is exercised or the auction ends. Buyout options are widely used in online auctions and have significant economic importance: nearly half of the auctions today are listed with a buyout price and the option is exercised in nearly one fourth of them. We formulate a game-theoretic model featuring time-sensitive bidders with independent private valuations and Poisson arrivals but endogenous bidding times in order to answer the following questions: How should buyout prices be set in order to maximize the seller's discounted revenue? What are the relative benefits of using each type of buyout option? While all existing buyout options we are aware of currently rely on a static buyout price (i.e. with a constant value), what is the potential benefit associated with using instead a dynamic buyout price that varies as the auction progresses?
(cont.) For all buyout option types we exhibit a Nash equilibrium in bidder strategies, argue that this equilibrium constitutes a plausible outcome prediction, and study the problem of maximizing the corresponding seller revenue. In particular, the equilibrium strategy in all cases is such that a bidder exercises the buyout option provided it is still available and his valuation is above a time-dependent threshold. Our numerical experiments suggest that a seller may significantly increase his utility by introducing a buyout option when any of the participants are time-sensitive. Furthermore, while permanent buyout options yield higher predicted revenue than temporary options, they also provide additional incentives for late bidding and may therefore not be always more desirable. The numerical results also imply that the increase in seller's utility (over a fixed buyout price auction) enabled by a dynamic buyout price is small and does not seem to justify the corresponding increase in complexity.
by Shobhit Gupta.
Ph.D.
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Catepillan, Tessi Jorge Francisco. "Auctions, Negotiation and Information Acquisition." Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2010. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/102391.
Full textAbstract:
En esta tesis se estudian remates en los cuales los oferentes compiten por el derecho
a negociar con un agente. Estos remates están presentes en adquisiciones deportivas y
licitaciones con alto impacto en las comunidades con intereses particulares distintos al
vendedor de los derechos. En particular, se estudia cómo afectan diferentes estructuras de
remates al excedente social, la utilidad de los oferentes, de los agentes y los incentivos de
los agentes a invertir en información.
Se consideró un modelo con tres tipos de agentes: el rematador, los oferentes, y el
agente con que el ganador de la subasta negocia. En una primera etapa a cada oferente se
le revela una señal con información sobre cuanto valora los servicios del agente. Con esto
se realizan las ofertas. Se anuncia el ganador y cuanto tiene que pagar de forma inmediata
y cuanto en caso que la negociación con el agente sea exitosa. Después, al ganador se
le revela su verdadera valoración (afiliada con la señal). El agente le hace una oferta al
ganador y éste decide si aceptar o no. En caso de aceptar debe pagar lo acordado al agente,
y de acuerdo a la reglas del remate, lo acordado al rematador. Para distintos remates se
buscaron equilibrios simétricos en los cuales las funciones de oferta fueran crecientes en
la señal recibida.
Se demuestra que para cierta familia de remates se sigue cumpliendo el teorema de
Equivalencia de Ingresos. Además, que para una familia amplia es posible ordenar los
remates de acuerdo al excedente social y la utilidad del agente negociador. En efecto, es
mejor en términos sociales que siempre pague su oferta al rematador a que sólo pague
en caso de que la negociación sea exitosa. Por otro lado, para ciertas distribuciones de la
señal y la valoración, se demuestra que las funciones de oferta en equilibrio son lineales,
al igual que en un remate clásico con distribución uniforme. Por último, la tesis estudia
los incentivos a adquirir información. En este modelo adquirir información tiene también
un efecto negativo pues el agente puede extraer más renta del ganador del remate. Se
demuestra que en ciertos ambientes no existe adquisición de información, aún cuando es
socialmente óptimo hacerlo.
Como futura investigación se plantea el estudio de la monotonía de las ofertas al
aumentar el pago que se hace en forma inmediata, lo que implicaría un orden total en el
excedente social. Además, explorar cuales son los supuestos que condicionan la existencia
de equilibrio en este tipo de juegos, y por último, investigar la clase general en la cual el
efecto negativo de adquirir información es mayor al positivo.
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Poole, Isaac Kirby. "Empirical essays in NSW auctions." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/12148.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis empirically examines why an agent, a seller or a buyer, will choose to hold or attend one particular sales mechanism over another. I examine this question using housing sales data and government bond auction data from the Australian State of NSW. In Chapter one I test whether auction or private treaty achieves higher revenue for a seller of a house in NSW, using an hedonic framework of house valuations. I hypothesise that auctions perform better when the value of the object is more dispersed. My results show that auctions do achieve higher revenue, and that more unique properties benefit even more from auctions over private treaty. In Chapter two I test whether a certain type of buyer or seller can achieve a better bargaining outcome through auction and private treaty sale. I use a regression model that explains the bargaining outcome with reference to a combination of property-related characteristics. I find that certain seller types do achieve better bargaining outcomes for private treaty sales, but there is no significant advantage for auction sales. Chapters three through five test whether discriminatory price government bond auctions achieve higher revenue than uniform-price auctions in NSW. I use a resampling method to estimate bidder valuations. I find that on average, discriminatory-price auctions achieve lower revenue than a counterfactual auction. But I then extend the analysis to include secondary market prices in the estimation of bidder valuations. When I account for the presence of secondary markets, I find that the original result is reversed and revenue raised using discriminatory-price auctions is higher than could be achieved in a counterfactual auction.
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Nagy, Lindsey Danielle. "Mitigating Sniping in Internet Auctions." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/293592.
Full textAbstract:
My dissertation discusses a mechanism that thwarts sniping and improves efficiency in ascending Internet auctions with fixed ending times, specifically eBay. The first research chapter proposes a design of the bidding mechanism and the second chapter tests the effectiveness of the mechanism in a controlled environment. In addition, it presents an innovative theoretical representation of the eBay bidding environment. The first chapter investigates theoretically whether sellers can improve their profits in eBay-like auctions via the implementation of bidder credits. The analysis predicts that providing a credit, similar to a coupon or discount, for early bidding can thwart sniping and increase seller profit. The paper formulates and analyzes a multi-stage auction model with independently and identically distributed private values, where bidders place proxy bids. I show that sniping can emerge as a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy so long as late bids run the risk of not being successfully received by the auctioneer; extending the prior work of Ockenfels and Roth. This equilibrium is inefficient and yields the worst outcome for sellers. The proposed credit mechanism awards a single early bidder a reduction, equal to the value of the credit, in the final price if he wins the auction. The optimal credit satisfies two necessary conditions; first, it increases seller ex-ante profit and second, it incentivizes bidders to deviate from the sniping equilibrium. Relative to the surplus generated by the sniping equilibrium, implementing the credit increases seller surplus and improves welfare. The second chapter experimentally investigates the effectiveness of the credit mechanism. In particular, it compares bidding strategies, seller profit, and overall efficiency in auction environments similar to eBay with and without credit incentives. I observe a significant decline in the frequency of sniping when subjects have the opportunity to receive the credit. The credit also improves auction efficiency primary because subjects overbid in auctions with the credit regardless of which subject has the credit. A within-subjects design allows me to directly compare differences across treatments conditional on the subjects being snipers. Auctions with snipers yield significantly lower profits to sellers because non-sniping rivals are bidding less aggressively when competing against a sniper.
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Tran, Hoang-Hai. "Auctions for competitive network providers." Rennes 1, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012REN1S014.
Full textAbstract:
La tarification des réseaux de communication a une longue histoire et un impact sur le développement des réseaux et les services de communication. Dans la littérature, les stratégies de prix sont utilisées par les fournisseurs de réseau pour le contrôle de congestion et la signalisation, la maximisation du profit et l'amélioration des services offerts à leurs clients. L'évolution de l'interconnexion des fournisseurs de réseaux égoïstes devant transférer le trafic des concurrents requiert la mise en place de mécanismes adaptés. Dans cette thèse, nous proposons de définir des mécanismes d'incitation économique pour encourager les ISPs à coopérer afin de créer un réseau efficace. Nous concentrons notre attention sur l'application de mécanismes d'enchères pour résoudre ces problèmes. Dans la littérature, le mécanisme d'enchères VCG a été appliqué aux problèmes d'allocation des ressources en raison de ses propriétés de rationalité individuelle, compatibilité d'incitation et d'efficacité (en termes de maximisation des profits nets de tous les utilisateurs). Le défaut le plus important de VCG est qu'il ne vérifie pas l'équilibre budgétaire pour des enchères double faces. Nous avons montré qu'il y a d'autres questions oubliées dans les travaux précédents et que VCG n'est pas pratique à appliquer à la tarification de l'inter-domaine. Dans cette thèse, nous proposons un algorithme distribué pour l'allocation de ressources sur les chemins basé sur le mécanisme d'enchères. Le mécanisme de tarification proposé est équilibré budgétairement, individuellement rationnel, BGP-compatible, mais relâche légèrement les propriétés de compatibilité d'incitation et d'efficacité. Nous étudions aussi l'application d'un mécanisme d'enchères combinatoires aux opérateurs de réseaux sans fil en concurrence. Nous formulons la décision de "han- dover" (VHD) entre opérateurs pour des clients mobiles par un problème de tarification. La tarification proposée utilise le rapport signal-bruit plus interférences (SINR), la puissance de transmission et le coût monétaire comme critères de décision. Plusieurs mécanismes d'enchères combinatoires sont proposés afin de maximiser le bien)être social, ainsi que des incitations pour les utilisateurs mobiles et les opérateurs à dire la vérité sur leurs valuations et coûtsPricing communication networks has a long history and a strong impact on the development of network technologies and communication services. In the literature, pricing strategies are used by network providers for congestion control and signaling, profit maximization and improved offered services to their customers. The evolution of inter-connected and selfish network providers requiring to forward traffic of others brings mechanism design issues. This thesis aims at defining economics incentives to encourage the ISPs to be cooperative in order to create a working and efficient network. We focus on the application of auction mechanism to solve the problem. In the literature, VCG auctions have been widely applied in resource allocation problems since they have the properties of individual rationality, incentive compatibility and efficiency (in terms of maximizing the net profits of all users). The most important drawback of VCG auctions is that it does not verify budget balance. We have shown that there are other issues forgotten in previous works and that it is not practical to apply VCG auctions to inter-domain pricing. In this thesis, we propose a distributed algorithm for allocating bandwidth over paths based on double-sided auction. The proposed pricing mechanism is strongly budget-balanced, individually rational, BGP-compatible, but relaxes incentive compatibility and efficiency. We also study the application of combinatorial double-sided auctions to competitive mobile wireless network operators. We formulate the vertical handover decision (VHD) strategies between competitive mobile operators and mobile users as a pricing problem. The proposed pricing schemes make use of signal-to-noise-interference (SINR), power transmission allocation, achievable data rates and monetary cost as decision criteria. Several combinatorial double-sided auctions are proposed to maximize the social welfare and to provide incentives to mobile users and mobile operators to be truth telling in terms of valuations or cost
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Pu, Junyi. "Optimal procurement auctions with endogenous quantity." Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 2009. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B4322409X.
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Watson, Elizabeth Ann. "Experiments on decision making and auctions." [College Station, Tex. : Texas A&M University, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-1918.
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Martínez, López-Pardina Irene. "3 essays on first-price auctions." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/4033.
Full textAbstract:
En esta tesis se analizan tres mecanismos de subasta distintos, todos ellos bajo el supuesto de valoraciones privadas e independientes.El primer mecanismo que analizamos es una subasta de múltiples unidades en la que los objetos son vendidos secuencialmente por medio de subastas de precio descendente. La característica que hace a esta subasta diferente de la "estándar", analizada por Weber (1983) es que después de la venta del primer objeto el precio no vuelve a subir, sino que los objetos que quedan son ofrecidos al resto de los compradores al mismo precio. Si los objetos no se venden a ese precio, la subasta continúa dejando que el precio siga descendiendo. Esta subasta se analiza en dos contextos: con un modelo de valoraciones continuas y con uno de valoraciones discretas. Se demuestra que si existe un equilibrio simétrico con pujas monótonas, el resultado de la subasta es ineficiente con probabilidad positiva. Aplicando el teorema de equivalencia de rentas se concluye que la subasta no maximiza los beneficios esperados del vendedor. Para poder comparar los precios medios y las varianzas analizamos un modelo de valoraciones discretas. Demostramos que los precios esperados son menores en nuestra subasta y que también lo es la varianza de los beneficios del vendedor. Damos un ejemplo de una familia de funciones de utilidad von Neumann- Morgenstern tal que la utilidad esperada del vendedor es mayor en una u otra de las subasta dependiendo de los valores del parámetro a.
El segundo mecanismo que analizamos es una subasta asimétrica de primer precio donde la valoración de uno de los postores es conocida. Demostramos que no existe ningún equilibrio en estrategias puras y caracterizamos un equilibrio en estrategias mixtas en el que el postor cuya valoración es conocida randomiza su puja, mientras que los demás postores juegan una estrategia pura (y monótona). El resultado de la subasta es ineficiente con probabilidad positiva y el beneficio esperado del postor cuya valoración es conocida es menor que en una subasta estándar. Sin embargo, no es obvio que los demás postores mejoren su situación: el hecho de que uno de los postores juegue una estrategia mixta tiene el mismo efecto en sus rivales que un precio de reserva aleatorio. Esto puede obligarles a pujar más agresivamente de lo que pujarían en una subasta normal. El efecto en los beneficios del vendedor también es ambiguo. Tomando un ejemplo con la función de distribución uniforme y comparando los beneficios esperados del vendedor y de los compradores en las dos subastas, obtenemos que, en nuestro ejemplo (con 2 y con 3 postores) los beneficios esperados del vendedor son mas altos en la subasta asimétrica que en la normal.
Para terminar, hacemos un repaso de la literatura en subastas secuenciales cuando los compradores desean más de una unidad del bien que se subasta, y analizamos una subasta secuencial de primer precio con y sin opción de compra. Para ello usamos el mismo modelo que Black y de Meza (1992) usan para analizar la subasta secuencial de segundo precio. Demostramos que cuando las preferencias son unidimensionales no existe ningún equilibrio monótono y simétrico, lo cual implica que el resultado de la subasta no puede ser eficiente. Cuando se introduce una opción de compra que permita comprar la segunda unidad al mismo precio al que se adquirió la primera, existe un equilibrio en estrategias puras para algunos valores de los parámetros del modelo. En este caso la opción siempre se ejerce, lo cual lleva a una asignación de los bienes diferente que la que resulta en la subasta secuencial de segundo precio. Cuando la valoración por la segunda unidad es aleatoria, las subastas de primer y segundo precio sin opción de compra son equivalentes. Por último, exponemos las dificultades de caracterizar un equilibrio cuando cuando se introduce la opción de compra en este modelo.
In this thesis we analyze three different auction mechanisms, all of them under the private and independent valuations assumption.
The first auction we analyze is a multi-unit auction where the objects are sold sequentially by descending-price auctions. The feature that makes this auction different from the "standard" one is that after one object has been sold, the price does not return to a high level, but the remaining objects are offered to the rest of the bidders at the same price. If the objects fail to be sold at that price, the auction is resumed letting the price descend again. We analyze this auction in two different contexts: a continuous valuation model, and a discrete valuation one. We show that if a symmetric, monotone bidding functions equilibrium exists, the outcome of the auction is inefficient with positive probability. Applying the revenue equivalence theorem we conclude that the auction cannot maximize the seller's expected revenue. In order to be able to compare the averages expected prices and variances, we analyze a discrete-valuation model. We show that the average expected prices are lower in our auction, and that so is the variance of the seller's expected revenue. We give an example of a family of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions under which the seller's expected utility may be higher in each of the auctions depending on the value of a parameter a.
The second mechanism we analyze is an asymmetric first-price auction where the valuation of one of the bidders is common knowledge. We show that no pure strategy equilibrium exists and we characterize a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the bidder whose valuation is common knowledge randomizes his bid while the other bidders play a (monotone) pure strategy. The outcome of the auction is inefficient with positive probability, and the expected profit of the bidder whose valuation is common knowledge is lower than in a standard auction in which her valuation is private knowledge. However, it is not obvious that the other bidders are better off: the fact that one of the bidders plays a mixed strategy has the effect of on the other bidders as a random reserve price bidder. This may force all them to bid more aggressively than they would in the standard auction. The effect on the seller's expected revenue is also ambiguous. In an example with the uniform distribution, we compare the expected profits of seller and buyers in this auction with those in a standard symmetric private valuation model. In our example, with 2 and 3 bidders, the seller's expected revenue is higher in the asymmetric auction than in a standard auction.
To finish, we survey the literature on sequential auctions with multi-unit demand, and we analyze a sequential first-price auction with and without a buyer's option. To do it we use the same model that Black and de Meza (1992) used to analyze the secuencial second-price caution. We show that when the preferences are unidimensional, no monotone symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists, which implies that the outcome of the auction cannot be efficient. When an option to buy the second unit at the price paid for first one is introduced, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium for some values of the parameters of the model. In this case the option is always exercised, leading to a different allocation than that of the sequential second-price auction. When the valuations for the second unit is stochastic, the first-price and second-price auctions without a buyer's option are efficient and revenue equivalent. To finish, we give some insights into the difficulties of solving for an equilibrium when the buyer's option is introduced in this model.
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De, Smet Yves. "A multicreteria perspective on reverse auctions." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/210974.
Full textAbstract:
Investigate the use of partial relations for multicriteria reverse auctions. At first, a theoretical framework is introduced. Then, an extension of traditional multicriteria tools is considered. This is referred to as the Butterfly model. Finally, the concept of Bidding Niches partitions is formalized and tested.Doctorat en sciences appliquées
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
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Xu, Pai. "Endogenous entry in first-price auctions." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/5639.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis studies the first-price auction models with endogenous entry.
In the first chapter, we propose using the nearest neighbor estimation technique
to estimate the entry cost in the auction models. We study the large
sample properties of the proposed estimator to establish sets of conditions
sufficient for its consistency and asymptotic normality. To give an example,
we further apply the proposed method to estimate the cost of participation in the Michigan Highway Procurement Auctions. Our study rejects the
null hypothesis of zero participation costs. Based on our estimation result,
we infer how the optimal auction outcomes can be realized by using the
regular policy tools. We demonstrate the improvement that the Michigan
government could have made on payments if the optimal auctions had been
employed.
In the second chapter, we propose applying the simulated non-linear
least squares (SNLLS) method of Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995, LOV
hereafter) [28] to estimate the distribution of bidders' private values in the
estimation of a first-price auction model with endogenous entry. Unlike the
estimation problem of LOV , however, the valuation distribution of bidders is
truncated in our problem, due to the presence of the entry cost. This further
causes the absence of continuous differentiability in our statistical estimation
objective function, which was required in LOV's large sample analysis.
Therefore, we provide a separate analysis to study the large sample behavior
of the SNLLS estimator in such setup.
In the third chapter, we develop a nonparametric method that allows one
to discriminate among alternative models of entry in first-price auctions.
Three models of entry are considered: Levin and Smith (1994) [31], Samuelson
(1985) [53], and a new model in which the information received at the
entry stage is imperfectly correlated with valuations. We show that these
models impose different restrictions on the quantiles of active bidders' valuations,
and develop nonparametric tests of these restrictions. We perform
the tests using a dataset of highway procurement auctions in Oklahoma.
Depending on the project size, we find somewhat more support for the new
model.
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Cooper, William L. "Revenue management, auctions, and perishable inventories." Diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/25805.
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