Relevant bibliographies by topics / Auctions

Academic literature on the topic 'Auctions'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 14 September 2024

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Journal articles on the topic "Auctions"

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Cao, Shengjie. "Analysis of the Interfering Factors about Auction Games." SHS Web of Conferences 188 (2024): 03013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202418803013.

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This essay simply explores the complex world of auctions and how they basically work. Start with a brief summary of auction’s history, from the Babylonian era to the present, the essay shows how auctions have evolved over the history. Then, four typical auctions are introduced by listing their rules and how they are played. Most importantly, at the main body, the essay revealed various factors that have impact on how an auction is played, such as sunk cost fallacy, information dynamics, auction rules, and the existence of bidders with distinct motivations. In addition, Candle and dollar auctions are used to show the impact of information and rules on an auction respectively. In the end, the essay argues that auctions are complicated rather than just contests for riches and emphasizes the significance of comprehending these factors. The essay aims to inform people to make wise decisions in both auctions and everyday life.
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Klemperer, Paul. "What Really Matters in Auction Design." Journal of Economic Perspectives 16, no. 1 (February 1, 2002): 169–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/0895330027166.

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The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy-preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behavior. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems. The Anglo-Dutch auctiona hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions-may perform better. Effective antitrust is also critical. Notable fiascoes in auctioning mobile-phone licenses, television franchises, companies, eletricty, etc., and especially the European “third-generation” (UMTS) spectrum auctions, show that everything depends on the details of the context. Auction design is not “one size fits all.”
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Morales-Camargo, Emmanuel, Orly Sade, Charles Schnitzlein, and Jaime F. Zender. "Divisible Good Auctions with Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Examination." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48, no. 4 (August 2013): 1271–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109013000409.

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AbstractAn experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when there is incomplete information concerning the common value of the auctioned good. In a symmetric information environment, the different auction formats provide the same average revenue. However, when information is asymmetric the discriminatory auction results in higher average revenue than the uniform-price auction. The volatility of revenue is higher in the uniform-price auctions in all treatments. The results, therefore, provide support for the use of the discriminatory format. Subject characteristics and measures of experience in recent auctions are found to be useful in explaining bidding behavior.
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Lucking-Reiley, David. "Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet." American Economic Review 89, no. 5 (December 1, 1999): 1063–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.5.1063.

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William Vickrey's predicted equivalences between first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions, and between second-price sealed-bid and English auctions, are tested using field experiments that auctioned off collectible trading cards over the Internet. The results indicate that the Dutch auction produces 30-percent higher revenues than the first-price auction format, a violation of the theoretical prediction and a reversal of previous laboratory results, and that the English and second-price formats produce roughly equivalent revenues. (JEL C93, D44)
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Rao, Cong Jun, and Yue Zheng. "Research on Multi-Unit Auction Theory and Application." Applied Mechanics and Materials 58-60 (June 2011): 376–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.58-60.376.

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Auctions usually involve the sale of many homogeneous or heterogeneous objects. Spectrum, treasury, and electricity auctions are examples. This kind of auctions is so-called multi-unit auctions. In order to know the research history and the newest research trends for the study on multi-unit auctions, this paper presents widespread theoretical and applications problems of multi-unit auctions. The multi-unit auction models are divided into two kinds (i.e. sequential auction and simultaneous auction). Assumptions, main ideas, and conclusions of literature related to these two kinds of models are reviewed and commented.
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Jia, Weijia. "Application of Game Theory in Different Auction Forms." Advances in Economics, Management and Political Sciences 10, no. 1 (September 13, 2023): 180–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.54254/2754-1169/10/20230462.

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Auctions are employed in many areas all across the world. It is a key topic of study in game theory. This article primarily summarizes the winning strategies in auctions from a game theory perspective. To examine this issue, this paper reviews the past literature from three auction angles. The winning strategies applied in English auctions, Dutch auctions, and first-price auctions will differ depending on the form of auction. During a customary English auction, the winning strategy is to bid at their genius willingness. However, when multiple goods and deadlines are added to the auction, the winning strategy becomes to bid lower than the valuation. In Dutch auctions, bidders should bid at the beginning at a lower price. In first-price auctions, bidders should bid for all combinations when there are many items, and overbid when there is standard information feedback. This article is a review of previous relevant articles and provides references to related articles.
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Qiu, Jier. "Comparison of Four Basic Types of Auctions." Journal of Education, Humanities and Social Sciences 2 (July 13, 2022): 193–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/ehss.v2i.786.

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Auction is a good way for people to exchange their goods and services and is essential to our daily life. Auctions can be classified into various genres and kinds depending on their unique rules. In this essay, I focused mainly on the four basic kinds of auctions: First-Price sealed-bid auction, Second-Price sealed-bid auction, Ascending-bid auction and descending-bid auction. I also tried to use several simple models to find out the characteristics and optimal strategies for each of the auction. Having their own advantages and weakness, different auctions should be used depending on specific situations to further maximize the efficiency of the auctions.
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Anita, Dewi, Herlin Nurdiani, Tasya Dania, and Umi Maskanah. "Perlindungan Hukum Para Pihak Apabila Terjadi Wanprestasi Lelang Non Eksekusi Sukarela Secara Online Tanpa Pejabat Lelang." As-Syar'i: Jurnal Bimbingan & Konseling Keluarga 6, no. 2 (July 16, 2024): 2266–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.47467/as.v6i2.7095.

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As explained, auctions basically adopt the characteristics of a sale and purchase agreement (1457 BW), where the elements of price and goods are important elements. The difference is that auctions require the presence of an Auction Officer, especially for execution auctions and mandatory non-execution auctions. Auctions have special regulations (Lex Specialis), namely Vendu Reglement and Vendu Instructie as auction regulations which are still valid today. Apart from that, the implementation of auctions is also regulated in PMK 213/PMK.06/2020 concerning Instructions for Implementing Auctions. Online auctions are carried out through the e-Marketplace Auction Platform where the implementation is usually carried out without an auction official, for example auctions on eBay. The purpose of this research is to determine protection for parties who experience losses due to default. This research is legal research with a statutory approach, conceptual approach and case approach. The research results obtained are that the validity of online voluntary non-execution auctions without the presence of an auction official is valid by adopting the characteristics of a sale and purchase agreement. And the protection for the parties is the legal protection of the parties in the event of default in a non-execution auction, there are 2 (two) namely regulated in the ITE law regarding electronic transactions and Consumer Protection which explains the existence of compensation, as well as by taking legal action to resolve disputes, where the parties can choose resolution either through court, arbitration or other alternative dispute resolution institutions (conventional/online dispute resolution) in accordance with the provisions of the Laws and Regulations as the default is related to responsibility.
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Watts, Alison. "Generalized Second Price Auctions over a Network." Games 9, no. 3 (September 8, 2018): 67. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g9030067.

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We consider the problem of how to apply a generalized second price (GSP) auction to a buyer–seller network. GSP auctions are often used to sell online ads where buyers care about the position or placement of the ad. GSP auctions can also be applied to wireless data transmissions with congestion where buyers care about the speed of data transmission; however, such an auction would take place over a network as a buyer could only purchase from a seller (or cell tower) that he was linked to (or was close to). Two GSP auctions over a network are considered: separate GSP auctions, and integrated GSP auctions with pauses. The efficiency of these auctions is examined with efficiency favoring the integrated auction with pauses.
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Jumanah, Jumanah, KN Sofyan Hasan, and Muhammad Syaifuddin. "Reconstruction of The Principle of Legal Certainty Fair Auction For Joint Assets After Divorce Decision." SASI 29, no. 1 (March 11, 2023): 151. http://dx.doi.org/10.47268/sasi.v29i1.1291.

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Introduction: This article is about analyzing the implementation of joint property auctions after a divorce decision that has not yet received fair legal certainty. The number of cases after the divorce decision results in the distribution of joint assets between the parties submitted to the Court after not getting peace in the distribution of joint assets, the Court can take over the matter by way of auction.Purposes of the Research: To analyze the principle of legal certainty in auctions in the implementation of auctions after divorce decisions in laws and regulations. Explain the legal problems in applying the legal principle of joint property auctions after the divorce decision. Finding reconstruction as the basis for setting up a bill on joint property auction laws after divorce decisions in the future.Methods of the Research: Based on hermeneutic paradigmatic which is based on philosophy and the scientific nature of law. This hermeneutic paradigm is carried out through a methodological strategy approach to learn from people, namely studying law by exploring and researching the meanings of law from the perspective of users or seekers of justice in the Religious Courts.Results of the Research: In the reconstruction of the principle of legal certainty in an equitable auction of joint assets after the divorce decision in future laws and regulations in legal considerations regarding joint assets that must be auctioned, through an auction procedure in accordance with applicable regulations.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Auctions"

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Li, Zhen. "Optimal design of Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2010. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc28450/.

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The theory of auction has become an active research area spanning multiple disciplines such as economics, finance, marketing and management science. But a close examination of it reveals that most of the existing studies deal with ascending (i.e., English) auctions in which it is assumed that the bid increments are continuous. There is a clear lack of research on optimal descending (i.e., Dutch) auction design with discrete bid levels. This dissertation aims to fill this void by considering single-unit, open-bid, first price Dutch auctions in which the bid levels are restricted to a finite set of values, the number of bidders may be certain or uncertain, and a secret reserve price may be present or absent. These types of auctions are most attractive for selling products that are perishable (e.g., flowers) or whose value decreases with time (e.g., air flight seats and concert tickets) (Carare and Rothkopf, 2005). I began by conducting a comprehensive survey of the current literature to identify the key dimensions of an auction model. I then zeroed in on the particular combination of parameters that characterize the Dutch auctions of interest. As a significant departure from the traditional methods employed by applied economists and game theorists, a novel approach is taken by formulating the auctioning problem as a constrained mathematical program and applying standard nonlinear optimization techniques to solve it. In each of the basic Dutch auction model and its two extensions, interesting properties possessed by the optimal bid levels and the auctioneer's maximum expected revenue are uncovered. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the major propositions where appropriate. The superiority of the optimal strategy recommended in this study over two commonly-used heuristic procedures for setting bid levels is also demonstrated both theoretically and empirically. Finally, economic as well as managerial implications of the findings reported in this dissertation research are discussed.
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Hungria-Gunnelin, Rosane. "Real Estate Auctions - An Empirical Analysis of Auction Strategies." Licentiate thesis, KTH, Bygg- och fastighetsekonomi, 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-159473.

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Lorenzon, Emmanuel. "Sponsored Search and Sequential Auctions : Three Essays in Auction Theory." Thesis, Bordeaux, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016BORD0357/document.

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Cette thèse regroupe trois essais en théorie des enchères. Le chapitre 1 introduit de ladélégation dans le mécanisme d’enchère GSP. Dans un jeu impliquant des transferts monétaires et unepolitique de rémunération mise en place par une agence, un équilibre collusif efficace est atteint.Nousproposons une caractérisation du profil d’enchères collusif implémentable dans un jeu de positions `a troisjoueurs et deux positions. Le chapitre 2 considère des ventes séquentielles d’un objet `a deux acheteurs: l’unconnaît son évaluation privée tandis que l’autre non. Les acheteurs ont une demande multi-unitaire et lesévaluations privées entre unit´es sont parfaitement corrélées. Un équilibre asymétrique existe dans lequelle joueur non-informé adopte une stratégie agressive tandis que le joueur informé joue de manière prudente.Le comportement du joueur non-informé est justifié par l’opportunité d’acquérir de l’informationgratuitement. Cette dynamique induit une décroissance des prix entre les ventes. Le chapitre 3, introduitun jeu de décision séquentielle dans la première enchère. Un équilibre séparateur existe dans lequel lejoueur informé est agressif lorsqu’il est le premier `a jouer impliquant une stratégie de non-participationde la part de son concurrent non-informé. A l’inverse, ce dernier adopte une attitude plus prudentelorsqu’il est le premier `a joueur. Un équilibre mélangeant dans lequel le joueur informé cache son informationprivée ne peut exister que si le joueur non-informé adopte une stratégie de non-participation
This thesis is a collection of three essays in theoretical auction analysis. Chapter 1 considersbid delegation in the GSP auction mechanism. In a game involving side-contracts and a compensationpolicy set by an agency, the first-best collusive outcome is achieved. We offer a characterization of the implementablebid profiles for the two-position game with three players. Chapter 2 considers the sequentialsale of an object to two buyers: one knows his private information and the other buyer does not. Buyershave a multi-unit demand and private valuations for each unit are perfectly correlated. An asymmetricequilibrium exists when the uninformed player adopts an aggressive bidding strategy. Conversely, hisinformed opponent behaves more conservatively by using bid shading. The bidding behaviour of theuninformed bidder is driven by the opportunity to learn his private valuation for free. This dynamic is atthe root of the decline in the equilibrium price across both sales. In chapter 3, information is observableduring the first-stage auction in a sequential-move game in which the first-mover bidder is observed byhis opponent. A separating equilibrium exists in which the informed bidder bids aggressively when he isthe first-mover which entails a non-participation strategy from his uninformed competitor. Conversely,the latter adopts a conservative behaviour when he is the first-mover. A pooling equilibrium in which theinformed bidder blurs his valuation can only exist if his uninformed opponent adopts a non-participatingstrategy
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Rose, Susan L. "Essays on almost common value auctions." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1149185948.

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Grigorieva, Elena. "Bisection auctions." [Maastricht] : Maastricht : Universitaire Pers Maastricht ; University Library, Universiteit Maastricht [host], 2007. http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=7932.

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Brown, Whitney E., and Lana D. Ray. "Electronic reverse auctions in the federal government." Thesis, Monterey, California, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/38037.

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In light of the limited recognition of electronic reverse auctions (e-RA) in the acquisition field, the purpose of this research paper is to further the use of e-RAs throughout the federal government and the Department of Defense (D0D). By exploring a multitude of auction types and designs that have been or are currently being used in the private sector, these practices set a basis for researching the auction types being used in the public sector. This paper further explores the regulations guiding the use of e-RAs and investigates the federal government's application of reverse auctions through studies, reports, and interviews with users of e-RAs. Details as to what attributes are prevalent in these e-RAs, what features are best suited for e-RAs, and what benefits have been derived from the use of e-RAs in the federal government are also included. Finally, the researchers found that e-RAs have increased transparency, cost savings, and efficiencies in the acquisition process. Although reverse auctions are being used effectively, the researchers found that there are still opportunities for improvement including incorporating a fully functional best-value tool into e-RA technology and developing more thorough federal guidance on e-RAs as an alternative pricing method.
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Rander, Robin. "Essays on auctions /." Lund: Univ., Dep. of Economics, 2007. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/561390959.pdf.

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Marszalec, Daniel. "Essays on auctions." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.543646.

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Khayyambashi, Mohammad-Reza. "Scalable Internet auctions." Thesis, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10443/1957.

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Current Internet based auction services rely, in general, on a centralised auction server; applications with large and geographically dispersed bidder client bases are thus supported in a centralised manner. Such an approach is fundamentally restrictive as too many users can overload the server, making the whole auction process unresponsive. Further, such an architecture can be vulnerable to server's failures, if not equipped with sufficient redundancy. In addition, bidders who are closer to the server are likely to have relatively faster access to the server than remote bidders, thereby gaining an unfair advantage. To overcome these shortcomings, this thesis investigates ways of enabling widely distributed, arbitrarily large number of auction servers to cooperate in conducting an auction. Allowing a bidder to register with anyone of the auction servers and place bids there, coupled with periodic exchange of auction information between servers forms the basis of the solution investigated to achieve scalability, responsiveness and fairness. Scalability and responsiveness are achieved since the total load is shared amongst many bidder servers; fairness is achieved since bidders are able to register with their local servers. The thesis presents the design and implementation of an hierarchically structured distributed Internet auction system. Protocols for inter-server cooperation are presented. Each server may be replicated locally to mask node failures. Performance evaluations of centralised and distributed configurations are performed to show the advantages of the distributed configuration over the centralised one.
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Kozlova. "INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AUCTIONS." Thesis, Київ 2018, 2018. http://er.nau.edu.ua/handle/NAU/33770.

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Books on the topic "Auctions"

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1958-, Baye Michael R., ed. Auctions. Greenwich, Conn: JAI Press, 1996.

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Mochón, Asunción, and Yago Sáez. Understanding Auctions. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08813-6.

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Chattopadhyay, Srobonti, and Rittwik Chatterjee. Understanding Auctions. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge focus on management and society: Routledge, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351271080.

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Ockenfels, Axel. Online auctions. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.

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C, Cramton Peter, Shoham Yoav, and Steinberg Richard, eds. Combinatorial auctions. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005.

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O'Loughlin, Luanne. Online Auctions. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001.

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Inc, Consumer Information Services, ed. National auction catalog: Nationwide access to public & private auctions. 3rd ed. [United States]: Consumer Information Services, Inc., 1996.

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Prince, Dennis L. Auction this!: Your complete guide to the world of online auctions. Rocklin, Calif: Prima Tech, 1999.

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Artale, Angelo. Rings in Auctions. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-59158-7.

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Jank, Wolfgang, and Galit Shmueli. Modeling Online Auctions. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470642603.

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Book chapters on the topic "Auctions"

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Munoz-Garcia, Felix, and Daniel Toro-Gonzalez. "Auctions." In Springer Texts in Business and Economics, 355–79. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-11902-7_8.

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Hillier, Brian. "Auctions." In The Economics of Asymmetric Information, 153–74. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25485-9_11.

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Dickhaut, John, Steve Gjerstad, and Arijit Mukherji. "Auctions." In Computational Economics and Finance, 199–234. New York, NY: Springer New York, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4612-2340-5_9.

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Knieps, Günter. "Auctions." In Springer Texts in Business and Economics, 87–99. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11695-2_5.

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Pesendorfer, Martin. "Auctions." In Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, 1–14. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27737-5_669-1.

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Munoz-Garcia, Felix, and Daniel Toro-Gonzalez. "Auctions." In Springer Texts in Business and Economics, 237–55. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32963-5_8.

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Talluri, Kalyan T., and Garrett J. Van Ryzin. "Auctions." In The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, 241–97. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-27391-4_6.

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Engelstein, Geoffrey, and Isaac Shalev. "Auctions." In Building Blocks of Tabletop Game Design, 283–326. Boca Raton, FL : Taylor & Francis, 2019.: CRC Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/9780429430701-8.

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Smith, Vernon L. "Auctions." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 519–29. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95189-5_616.

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Berz, Gregor. "Auctions." In Game Theory Bargaining and Auction Strategies, 26–42. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137475428_3.

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Conference papers on the topic "Auctions"

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Li, Bin, Dong Hao, and Dengji Zhao. "Incentive-Compatible Diffusion Auctions." In Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Seventeenth Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-PRICAI-20}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/33.

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Diffusion auction is a new model in auction design. It can incentivize the buyers who have already joined in the auction to further diffuse the sale information to others via social relations, whereby both the seller's revenue and the social welfare can be improved. Diffusion auctions are essentially non-typical multidimensional mechanism design problems and agents' social relations are complicatedly involved with their bids. In such auctions, incentive-compatibility (IC) means it is best for every agent to honestly report her valuation and fully diffuse the sale information to all her neighbors. Existing work identified some specific mechanisms for diffusion auctions, while a general theory characterizing all incentive-compatible diffusion auctions is still missing. In this work, we identify a sufficient and necessary condition for all dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DSIC) diffusion auctions. We formulate the monotonic allocation policies in such multidimensional problems and show that any monotonic allocation policy can be implemented in a DSIC diffusion auction mechanism. Moreover, given any monotonic allocation policy, we obtain the optimal payment policy to maximize the seller's revenue.
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Guo, Yuhang, and Dong Hao. "Emerging Methods of Auction Design in Social Networks." In Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/605.

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In recent years, a new branch of auction models called diffusion auction has extended the traditional auction into social network scenarios. The diffusion auction models the auction as a networked market whose nodes are potential customers and whose edges are the relations between these customers. The diffusion auction mechanism can incentivize buyers to not only submit a truthful bid, but also further invite their surrounding neighbors to participate into the auction. It can convene more participants than traditional auction mechanisms, which leads to better optimizations of different key aspects, such as social welfare, seller’s revenue, amount of redistributed money and so on. The diffusion auctions have recently attracted a discrete interest in the algorithmic game theory and market design communities. This survey summarizes the current progress of diffusion auctions.
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Ose, Daina. "Nekustamā īpašuma atsavināšanas piespiedu izsolē atsevišķi problēmjautājumi." In Latvijas Universitātes 82. starptautiskā zinātniskā konference. LU Akadēmiskais apgāds, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.22364/juzk.82.11.

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The purpose of the article is to address the issues related to the consequences of forced auctions, arising in practice after the auction has taken place, including the rights and obligations of the acquirer before registering property rights in the land register. As evidenced by cases of jurisprudence and court practice, the process after an auction has already taken place is subject to the most extensive discussions and numerous interpretations, that is, until the auction act is approved in court and the owner’s property rights are corroborated in the land register. Ambiguities may arise because the acquirer has different terms when he has the right to income from the case and the obligation to answer for the auctioned real estate. The difference in terms can comprise several months.
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Xing, Yidan, Zhilin Zhang, Zhenzhe Zheng, Chuan Yu, Jian Xu, Fan Wu, and Guihai Chen. "Truthful Auctions for Automated Bidding in Online Advertising." In Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-23}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2023/325.

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Automated bidding, an emerging intelligent decision-making paradigm powered by machine learning, has become popular in online advertising. Advertisers in automated bidding evaluate the cumulative utilities and have private financial constraints over multiple ad auctions in a long-term period. Based on these distinct features, we consider a new ad auction model for automated bidding: the values of advertisers are public while the financial constraints, such as budget and return on investment (ROI) rate, are private types. We derive the truthfulness conditions with respect to private constraints for this multi-dimensional setting, and demonstrate any feasible allocation rule could be equivalently reduced to a series of non-decreasing functions on budget. However, the resulted allocation mapped from these non-decreasing functions generally follows an irregular shape, making it difficult to obtain a closed-form expression for the auction objective. To overcome this design difficulty, we propose a family of truthful automated bidding auction with personalized rank scores, similar to the Generalized Second-Price (GSP) auction. The intuition behind our design is to leverage personalized rank scores as the criteria to allocate items, and compute a critical ROI to transforms the constraints on budget to the same dimension as ROI. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed auction mechanism outperforms the widely used ad auctions, such as first-price auction and second-price auction, in various automated bidding environments.
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Caragiannis, Ioannis, and Georgios Kalantzis. "Randomized Learning-Augmented Auctions with Revenue Guarantees." In Thirty-Third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-24}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2024/297.

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We consider the fundamental problem of designing a truthful single-item auction with the challenging objective of extracting a large fraction of the highest agent valuation as revenue. Following a recent trend in algorithm design, we assume that the agent valuations belong to a known interval, and a prediction for the highest valuation is available. Then, auction design aims for high consistency and robustness, meaning that, for appropriate pairs of values γ and ρ, the extracted revenue should be at least a γ- or ρ-fraction of the highest valuation when the prediction is correct for the input instance or not. We characterize all pairs of parameters γ and ρ so that a randomized γ-consistent and ρ-robust auction exists. Furthermore, for the setting in which robustness can be a function of the prediction error, we give sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of robust auctions and present randomized auctions that extract a revenue that is only a polylogarithmic (in terms of the prediction error) factor away from the highest agent valuation.
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Shen, Weiran, Zihe Wang, and Song Zuo. "Ex-post IR Dynamic Auctions with Cost-per-Action Payments." In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/70.

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Motivated by online ad auctions, we consider a repeated auction between one seller and many buyers, where each buyer only has an estimation of her value in each period until she actually receives the item in that period. The seller is allowed to conduct a dynamic auction but must guarantee ex-post individual rationality. In this paper, we use a structure that we call credit accounts to enable a general reduction from any incentive compatible and ex-ante individual rational dynamic auction to an approximate incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational dynamic auction with credit accounts. Our reduction obtains stronger individual rationality guarantees at the cost of weaker incentive compatibility. Surprisingly, our reduction works without any common knowledge assumption. Finally, as a complement to our reduction, we prove that there is no non-trivial auction that is exactly incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational under this setting.
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Nguyen, Johannes, Simon T. Powers, Neil Urquhart, Dominic Eckerle, Thomas Farrenkopf, and Michael Guckert. "Extending AGADE Traffic To Simulate Auctions In Shared Mobility Services." In 37th ECMS International Conference on Modelling and Simulation. ECMS, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.7148/2023-0201.

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With the number of individual vehicles meeting the capacity limit of urban road infrastructure, the deployment of new mobility services may help to achieve more efficient use of available resources and prevent critical overload. It may be observed that most of the seats in private vehicles remain unused during the journey. Therefore, increasing the number of passengers per vehicle may potentially reduce the overall number of vehicles on the road. For this purpose, ridesharing services can be an effective instrument, if supply and demand for rides are efficiently matched. The use of ridesharing depends on multiple factors, e.g. individual preferences, available infrastructure, alternative mode options (the quality of public transport). Auctions have been established successfully in comparably complex markets in which supply and demand of limited resources have to be matched efficiently. However, finding an appropriate auction design is difficult and can hardly be examined without experimentation that requires appropriate simulation instruments. In this paper, we extend the AGADE Traffic simulator with ridesharing options and implement functionality for simulating and evaluating auctions in shared mobility scenarios. We demonstrate application of the simulator with different auction designs on a ridesharing use case with commuter traffic.
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Curry, Michael, Tuomas Sandholm, and John Dickerson. "Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions." In Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-23}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2023/293.

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A recent approach to automated mechanism design, differentiable economics, represents auctions by rich function approximators and optimizes their performance by gradient descent. The ideal auction architecture for differentiable economics would be perfectly strategyproof, support multiple bidders and items, and be rich enough to represent the optimal (i.e. revenue-maximizing) mechanism. So far, such an architecture does not exist. There are single-bidder approaches (MenuNet, RochetNet) which are always strategyproof and can represent optimal mechanisms. RegretNet is multi-bidder and can approximate any mechanism, but is only approximately strategyproof. We present an architecture that supports multiple bidders and is perfectly strategyproof, but cannot necessarily represent the optimal mechanism. This architecture is the classic affine maximizer auction (AMA), modified to offer lotteries. By using the gradient-based optimization tools of differentiable economics, we can now train lottery AMAs, competing with or outperforming prior approaches in revenue.
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Bosshard, Vitor, Ye Wang, and Sven Seuken. "Non-decreasing Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions." In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/15.

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Combinatorial auctions are used to allocate resources in domains where bidders have complex preferences over bundles of goods. However, the behavior of bidders under different payment rules is not well understood, and there has been limited success in finding Bayes-Nash equilibria of such auctions due to the computational difficulties involved. In this paper, we introduce non-decreasing payment rules. Under such a rule, the payment of a bidder cannot decrease when he increases his bid, which is a natural and desirable property. VCG-nearest, the payment rule most commonly used in practice, violates this property and can thus be manipulated in surprising ways. In contrast, we show that many other payment rules are non-decreasing. We also show that a non-decreasing payment rule imposes a structure on the auction game that enables us to search for an approximate Bayes-Nash equilibrium much more efficiently than in the general case. Finally, we introduce the utility planes BNE algorithm, which exploits this structure and outperforms a state-of-the-art algorithm by multiple orders of magnitude.
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Balcan, Maria-Florina, Siddharth Prasad, and Tuomas Sandholm. "Learning Within an Instance for Designing High-Revenue Combinatorial Auctions." In Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/5.

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We develop a new framework for designing truthful, high-revenue (combinatorial) auctions for limited supply. Our mechanism learns within an instance. It generalizes and improves over previously-studied random-sampling mechanisms. It first samples a participatory group of bidders, then samples several learning groups of bidders from the remaining pool of bidders, learns a high-revenue auction from the learning groups, and finally runs that auction on the participatory group. Previous work on random-sampling mechanisms focused primarily on unlimited supply. Limited supply poses additional significant technical challenges, since allocations of items to bidders must be feasible. We prove guarantees on the performance of our mechanism based on a market-shrinkage term and a new complexity measure we coin partition discrepancy. Partition discrepancy simultaneously measures the intrinsic complexity of the mechanism class and the uniformity of the set of bidders. We then introduce new auction classes that can be parameterized in a way that does not depend on the number of bidders participating, and prove strong guarantees for these classes. We show how our mechanism can be implemented efficiently by leveraging practically-efficient routines for solving winner determination. Finally, we show how to use structural revenue maximization to decide what auction class to use with our framework when there is a constraint on the number of learning groups.
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Reports on the topic "Auctions"

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Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta, and Sabine Kröger. Risk, Reward and Uncertainty in Buyer-Seller Transactions – The Seller’s View on Combining Posted Prices and Auctions –. CIRANO, June 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.54932/uqnh8875.

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In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature almost exclusively looks at buyers in such combined mechanisms, the current paper summarizes results from the sellers’ point of view. Buy-It-Now auctions are complex mechanisms and therefore quite challenging for sellers. The paper discusses the seller’s curse, a bias that sellers might fall prey to in such combined mechanisms, and how experience counterbalances this bias. Furthermore, the paper explores the role of information and bargaining power on behavior and profit prospects in Buy-It-Now auctions.
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Bajari, Patrick, and Jungwon Yeo. Auction Design and Tacit Collusion in FCC Spectrum Auctions. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14441.

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Ockenfels, Axel, David Reiley, and Abdolkarim Sadrieh. Online Auctions. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12785.

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Galetovic, Alexander, Eduardo Engel, and Ronald Fischer. Revenue-Based Auctions and Unbundling Infrastructure Franchises. Inter-American Development Bank, December 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0008875.

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This paper discusses privatization among investments in infrastructure. The goal of this paper is to present a new auction mechanism that solves many of the problems that have hindered the use of franchises. The first section of the paper discusses least present value of revenue (LPVR) auctions, where the regulator fixes user fees (according to some optimizing criterion) and asks for bids on the present value of revenue from user fees that franchise holders will accept in exchange for building, operating and maintaining the infrastructure. Section 2 of the paper classifies infrastructure projects according to their technological characteristics in order to establish conditions under which franchising is feasible and desirable. In Section 3, the authors discuss several conceptual issues that arise in franchising. Section 4 discusses the shortcomings of fixed-term mechanisms. Section 5 introduces and analyzes LPVR auctions. Section 6 discusses the unbundling of franchises. The authors' conclusions are presented in the final section.
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Levin, Jonathan, and Andrzej Skrzypacz. Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w20487.

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Bulow, Jeremy, and Paul Klemperer. Auctions vs. Negotiations. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w4608.

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Ostrovsky, Michael. Choice Screen Auctions. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, November 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w28091.

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Athey, Susan, Jonathan Levin, and Enrique Seira. Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14590.

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Hopenhayn, Hugo, and Maryam Saeedi. Bidding Dynamics in Auctions. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, October 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w22716.

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Platt, Brennan, Joseph Price, and Henry Tappen. Pay-to-Bid Auctions. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w15695.

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