Journal articles on the topic 'Attitudes anti-immigration'
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1
CAVAILLE, CHARLOTTE, and JOHN MARSHALL. "Education and Anti-Immigration Attitudes: Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Reforms across Western Europe." American Political Science Review 113, no. 1 (November 15, 2018): 254–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055418000588.
Abstract:
Low levels of education are a powerful predictor of anti-immigration sentiment. However, there is little consensus on the interpretation of this correlation: is it causal or is it an artifact of selection bias? We address this question by exploiting six major compulsory schooling reforms in five Western European countries—Denmark, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden—that have recently experienced politically influential anti-immigration movements. On average, we find that compelling students to remain in secondary school for at least an additional year decreases anti-immigration attitudes later in life. Instrumental variable estimates demonstrate that, among such compliers, an additional year of secondary schooling substantially reduces the probability of opposing immigration, believing that immigration erodes a country’s quality of life, and feeling close to far-right anti-immigration parties. These results suggest that rising post-war educational attainment has mitigated the rise of anti-immigration movements. We discuss the mechanisms and implications for future research examining anti-immigration sentiment.
2
Pettigrew, Thomas F., Ulrich Wagner, and Oliver Christ. "WHO OPPOSES IMMIGRATION?" Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race 4, no. 1 (2007): 19–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1742058x07070038.
Abstract:
AbstractAre the predictors of anti-immigration attitudes consistent across countries with diverse immigration histories and policies? We hypothesize that the key predictors of opposition to immigration are indeed relatively consistent across industrial nations. We test this hypothesis with two surveys using probability samples of German citizens. We then compare our findings with those obtained in recent studies of immigration opinions in Europe generally, and in two of the world's leading immigration-receiving nations: Canada and the United States. Striking similarities emerge in the findings across structural, demographic, contact, economic, political, personality, and threat predictors. Opposition to immigration is routinely found strongest among the older and less-educated segments of the population who live in areas with anti-immigration norms and little contact with immigrants. Anti-immigration attitudes also correlate with political conservatism and alienation, economic deprivation, and especially with authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and perceived collective threat.
3
Pellegrini, Valerio. "Populist ideology, ideological attitudes, and anti-immigration attitudes as an integrated system of beliefs." PLOS ONE 18, no. 1 (January 17, 2023): e0280285. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0280285.
Abstract:
A challenge for the identification of the core components of a beliefs system is the topological examination of these components within the overall structure of the said system. By modeling beliefs as nodes of interconnected networks, this research investigated the centrality of adherence to populist ideology and classical ideological attitudes in relation to voting behavior and negative feelings toward immigrants. Data from a sample of 774 Italian adults were examined by means of three Network Analysis models. Results showed four constitutive dimensions of populist ideology: People Sovereignty, Anti-elitism, People Homogeneity, and Manichaeism. The dimensions of Anti-elitism, People Sovereignty and Homogeneity were found to be the core. Analyses also highlighted the centrality of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) within the broader beliefs system, including voting, populist ideology dimensions, and anti-immigration. RWA was positively related to the core of populist ideology, whilst SDO was negatively associated with or unrelated to it. However, both RWA and SDO exceeded populist dimensions when associated with populist right-wing voting, representing the unique intermediate links in connecting it with anti-immigration. Five Star Movement voting emerged as a purer form of populist support, relating directly only to populist dimensions and placing itself at a greater distance from ideological attitudes and anti-immigration.
4
Theorin, Nora, and Jesper Strömbäck. "Some Media Matter More Than Others: Investigating Media Effects on Attitudes toward and Perceptions of Immigration in Sweden." International Migration Review 54, no. 4 (December 20, 2019): 1238–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0197918319893292.
Abstract:
Over the last decade, issues related to immigration have become increasingly salient across Western democracies. This increasing salience has made it more important to understand people’s attitudes toward immigration, including the effects of media use on those attitudes. Differentiating between attitudes toward different types of immigration, attitudes toward immigration from different parts of the world, and perceptions of immigration’s impact, this article investigates the effects of media use on attitudes toward and perceptions of immigration in Sweden. Based on a three-year, three-wave panel study, it investigates the effects of media use on the individual level. Among other things, results show that there are limited effects of using traditional news media but more substantial effects on people’s immigration attitudes of using anti-immigration, right-wing alternative media and pro-immigration, left-wing alternative media. These findings imply that it is highly relevant to account for media use, especially alternative media use, when studying public attitudes toward immigration. Further, we find that variations in people’s immigration attitudes, to a high degree, depend on the type of immigration and on where migrants are coming from. This finding underlines the importance of measuring both of these aspects when the aim is understanding general attitudes toward immigration and/or key predictors behind immigration attitudes.
5
Muno, Wolfgang, and Daniel Stockemer. "A Model for Right-Wing Populist Electoral Success?" Populism 4, no. 1 (March 8, 2021): 25–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/25888072-bja10014.
Abstract:
Abstract This article adds to the large literature on right-wing populist parties (RWPP), explaining how anti-immigrant sentiments become salient for vote choice. Within the large literature on RWPP, anti-immigration attitudes are the most important variable to explain the vote share of RWPP. Yet, recent research shows that there is not always an empirical effect between having anti-immigrant attitudes and voting for the RWPP. In this article, we develop a theoretical model that explains the conditions under which anti-immigration attitudes matter. We then test this model based on the case of the AfD in Germany, a typical case for a right-wing populist party exploiting anti-immigrant sentiment. Focusing on the AfD in Germany, we illustrate that the refugee crisis in 2015 in combination with a perception of high government unresponsiveness to stop the crisis provided the structural conditions necessary to activate latent anti-immigration sentiment among large parts of the population. Using a structural analysis and individual panel data for Germany’s general elections in 2013 and 2017, we find that immigration critical attitudes were already present among parts of the population in 2013 but immigration was a secondary topic in the 2013 election, even among AfD voters. Due to the immigration crisis in 2015, immigration became a salient topic. The combination of a perceived external crisis or shock combined with a perceived government’s unresponsiveness quickly offered a winning formula for the AfD. A probability probe for two other countries (Sweden and Italy) with different contexts also show salience for the model.
6
Palma, Paolo A., Vanessa M. Sinclair, and Victoria M. Esses. "Facts versus feelings: Objective and subjective experiences of diversity differentially impact attitudes towards the European Union." Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 23, no. 5 (September 4, 2019): 726–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1368430219854805.
Abstract:
This research used secondary data sources to examine how objective and subjective experiences of diversity and immigration are associated with voting and attitudes toward the European Union. Using objective measures of diversity and migration, England’s electorate regions with the most diversity and highest levels of projected migration had the lowest proportion of “Leave” voters in the 2016 Brexit vote (Study 1). Using subjective assessments of intergroup contact and immigration attitudes (Study 2), higher perceived immigrant population size was associated with greater perceived competition with immigrants and Euroscepticism, whereas intergroup contact had the opposite effect. Surprisingly, the explicit desire to reduce immigration was not associated with anti-EU attitudes. This research highlights the importance of combining objective and subjective measures of diversity and immigration in analyzing political motivations, as objective measures suggested immigration did not adversely affect Brexit votes (Study 1), whereas some subjective perceptions of immigration led to greater anti-EU attitudes.
7
Bandelj, Nina, and Christopher W. Gibson. "Contextualizing Anti-Immigrant Attitudes of East Europeans." Review of European Studies 12, no. 3 (August 4, 2020): 32. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/res.v12n3p32.
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This paper article examines attitudes toward immigrants by analyzing data from the 2010 and 2016 waves of the EBRD’s Life in Transition Survey among respondents from 16 East European countries. Logistic regressions with clustered standard errors and country fixed effects show significantly higher anti-immigrant sentiments after the 2015 immigration pressures on the European Union borders compared with attitudes in 2010. Almost two thirds of the respondents agreed in 2016 that immigrants represented a burden on the state social services, even when the actual immigrant population in these countries was quite small. In addition, East Europeans expressed greater negative sentiments when the issue of immigration was framed as an economic problem—a burden on state social services—than as a cultural problem—having immigrants as neighbors. On the whole, these results point to the importance of contextualizing anti-immigrant attitudes and understanding the effect of external events and the framing of immigration-related survey questions.
8
Sandovici, Maria Elena, Tor Georg Jakobsen, and Zan Strabac. "Political Nationalism and Attitudes towards Immigration: The Interaction of Knowledge and Policy." International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 19, no. 2 (2012): 115–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157181112x639041.
Abstract:
The issue of immigration is highly salient to citizens of industrialised democracies. Globalisation and the emergence of an international human rights regime, among other reasons, led to high levels of immigration to industrialised countries in recent decades. Immigrant-receiving states have shown only limited ability to control the size and composition of their immigrant population. Immigration has therefore emerged as a prominent political issue in practically all economically developed countries, and there are raising concerns over anti-immigration sentiments and nationalist tendencies that seem to be taking hold among modern publics. We argue that anti-immigration attitudes are not merely a response to increased immigration, but rather that these attitudes mirror governments’ nationalistic and anti-immigration stance. In addition, people who are interested in politics are expected to be more influenced by their governments’ policies than those who show less interest. We use data from the European Social Survey and the Comparative Manifesto Project to test these claims. Results from our multilevel models show that people living in countries where the government is right wing are more opposed to immigration than people living in countries where the government exhibits less right-wing tendencies. The effect of government policy positions is also found to be conditioned by political interest at the individual level.
9
Erkut, Burak. "Germany’s Challenges: Immigration Barriers in Minds, Economic Concerns and Subjective Well Being." Migration Letters 13, no. 3 (September 1, 2016): 468–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.33182/ml.v13i3.297.
Abstract:
The analysis aims to provide the hypothesis that the emerging anti-immigration movements in Germany made use of people’s concerns on the issues of immigration, trust in the political system of Germany and economic insecurity to find support. It shows on which ground anti-immigration movements in Germany reached popularity. The democratic deficit problem is a perceived problem in Germany. The European-level problem can be seen as rooted in Germany’s role in the EU. Three channels are identified which shape the attitude on migration: Dislike of immigrants, economic concerns and trusting other people. The analysis provides empirical evidence within a theoretical framework to a current topic in economics which was mainly restricted to people’s attitudes towards migration. Furthermore, the analysis provides empirical evidence for the corporatism hypothesis and channels shaping the attitude towards migration.
10
Hopkins, Daniel J. "The Upside of Accents: Language, Inter-group Difference, and Attitudes toward Immigration." British Journal of Political Science 45, no. 3 (February 4, 2014): 531–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123413000483.
Abstract:
Many developed democracies are experiencing high immigration, and public attitudes likely shape their policy responses. Prior studies of ethnocentrism and stereotyping make divergent predictions about anti-immigration attitudes. Some contend that culturally distinctive immigrants consistently generate increased opposition; others predict that natives’ reactions depend on the particular cultural distinction and associated stereotypes. This article tests these hypotheses using realistic, video-based experiments with representative American samples. The results refute the expectation that more culturally distinctive immigrants necessarily induce anti-immigration views: exposure to Latino immigrants with darker skin tones or who speak Spanish does not increase restrictionist attitudes. Instead, the impact of out-group cues hinges on their content and related norms, as immigrants who speak accented English seem to counteract negative stereotypes related to immigrant assimilation.
11
Vuk, Mateja, Dalibor Doležal, and Ena Jovanović. "The Impact of Characteristics of Immigrant Offenders on Attitudes Towards Immigrant Crime." Drustvena istrazivanja 30, no. 1 (March 19, 2021): 51–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.5559/di.30.1.03.
Abstract:
Minority threat theory and existing research show that public attitudes towards certain types of offenders (e.g. ethnic and racial minorities) are often more punitive. Research also reveals that a significant proportion of the public associates the increase of immigration with higher crime rates. Negative attitudes, as well as an overall anti-immigration sentiment, have been increasing internationally. Therefore, we hypothesise that the public will have more negative and punitive attitudes towards immigrant offenders than towards citizens. Using a sample of students from the University of Zagreb, this research tested the above-mentioned hypothesis and explored whether factors like immigration status, ethnic identity, type of offense, and the age of the hypothetical offender impact student attitude on immigrant crime. To test this proposition, we used online surveys with factorial vignettes. The results show that participants ask for harsher sentences for undocumented immigrants, but immigrant status and the national origin of the immigrant are not associated with the perception of recidivism, dangerousness, or criminal typicality of offender.
12
Hinojosa Ojeda, Raul, and Edward Telles. "Trump Paradox: How Immigration and Trade Affected White Voting and Attitudes." Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 7 (January 2021): 237802312110019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/23780231211001970.
Abstract:
Donald Trump presented immigration and trade as the cause of the diminished prospects of white working-class voters, the core of his political base. The authors’ research—the first that examines actual immigration and trade exposure with attitudes and Trump voting—demonstrates that white voting for Trump was unrelated to immigration levels and, paradoxically, strongest in counties with low levels of trade. Anti-immigrant and antitrade attitudes more consistently and strongly explain voting for Trump and Republicans in 2016 and 2018 than actual immigration and trade. The authors also find descriptive support that over four years, Trump’s false narrative unraveled as his support declined in those counties most exposed to immigration and trade. Although Trump elaborated a white nationalist narrative on the basis of anti-immigrant and antitrade politics that was widely accepted as truth, the authors show that virtually no aspects of Trump’s simple narrative have any factual basis in actual reality.
13
Stockemer, Daniel, Arne Niemann, Johannes Rabenschlag, Johanna Speyer, and Doris Unger. "Immigration, anti-immigrant attitudes and Eurosceptism: a meta-analysis." French Politics 16, no. 3 (June 4, 2018): 328–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41253-018-0065-x.
14
Gul, Sami. "Parliamentary representation of radical right and anti-immigration attitudes." Electoral Studies 86 (December 2023): 102680. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2023.102680.
15
Nassar, Rita. "Threat, Prejudice, and White Americans’ Attitudes toward Immigration and Syrian Refugee Resettlement." Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics 5, no. 1 (September 23, 2019): 196–220. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/rep.2019.37.
Abstract:
AbstractThe literature on immigration is divided between theories that highlight the importance of prejudice and theories that emphasize realistic threat as the primary driver of anti-immigration attitudes. This study examines how prejudice and realistic threat impact White Americans’ attitudes toward accepting refugees and immigrants in general. Using data from the 2016 American National Election Study and the 2016 Chicago Council Survey, I show that even though refugees differ from other immigrants in terms of their legal status and the rhetoric pertaining to them, attitudes toward immigration policies relating to both refugees and immigrants in general are primarily driven by prejudice.
16
BEN-NUN BLOOM, PAZIT, GIZEM ARIKAN, and MARIE COURTEMANCHE. "Religious Social Identity, Religious Belief, and Anti-Immigration Sentiment." American Political Science Review 109, no. 2 (April 23, 2015): 203–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055415000143.
Abstract:
Somewhat paradoxically, numerous scholars in various disciplines have found that religion induces negative attitudes towards immigrants, while others find that it fuels feelings of compassion. We offer a framework that accounts for this discrepancy. Using two priming experiments conducted among American Catholics, Turkish Muslims, and Israeli Jews, we disentangle the role of religious social identity and religious belief, and differentiate among types of immigrants based on their ethnic and religious similarity to, or difference from, members of the host society. We find that religious social identity increases opposition to immigrants who are dissimilar to in-group members in religion or ethnicity, while religious belief engenders welcoming attitudes toward immigrants of the same religion and ethnicity, particularly among the less conservative devout. These results suggest that different elements of the religious experience exert distinct and even contrasting effects on immigration attitudes, manifested in both the citizenry's considerations of beliefs and identity and its sensitivity to cues regarding the religion of the target group.
17
Karapınar Kocağ, Esra, and Simonetta Longhi. "Individual Attitudes towards Immigration in Turkey: Evidence from the European Social Survey." Societies 12, no. 6 (December 19, 2022): 194. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/soc12060194.
Abstract:
One of the reasons why people hold anti-immigration attitudes is the fear that immigrants “rob jobs” of natives and decrease wages. However, academic literature finds that this is not the case. Nevertheless, in various countries, people still tend to oppose immigration. Opposition to immigration was particularly high in Turkey in the early 2000s, where almost half of the respondents to the Turkish part of the European Social Survey reported they would prefer to allow no immigrants into Turkey. This is although immigration to Turkey is very low. Turkey is becoming an important destination country as conflicts in neighboring countries force many people to flee. Therefore, understanding the opposition to immigration in Turkey is crucial for managing age immigration flows efficiently. For this purpose, we investigate the determinants of attitudes towards immigration in Turkey using the European Social Survey and Turkish population census data. The findings of the ordered probit model reveal that Turkish people tend to hold more negative attitudes towards immigration where the regional share of immigrants is higher. The little chance of contact with immigrants in Turkey through a lower share of immigrants compared to other European countries seems to influence natives’ pro-immigrant attitudes negatively.
18
Utych, Stephen M. "How Dehumanization Influences Attitudes toward Immigrants." Political Research Quarterly 71, no. 2 (December 5, 2017): 440–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1065912917744897.
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Immigrants, as a group, are frequently described in ways, such as vermin or disease, that portray them as less than human. This type of dehumanizing language leads to negative emotional responses and negative attitudes toward the dehumanized group. This paper examines how the dehumanization of immigrants influences immigration policy attitudes. I use original experimental data to show that dehumanization leads to more negative immigration attitudes. I further find that these negative attitudes are mediated by the role of emotion. Dehumanization increases anger and disgust toward immigrants, which causes anti-immigrant sentiment.
19
Breton, Charles. "Making National Identity Salient: Impact on Attitudes toward Immigration and Multiculturalism." Canadian Journal of Political Science 48, no. 2 (June 2015): 357–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423915000268.
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AbstractDoes national identity necessarily have exclusionary effects when it comes to immigration attitudes or is it possible that some national identities act as inclusive forces? While research in Europe and in the US points to the former, one of the long-standing explanations for Canada's success with immigration has been the central place played by immigration and multiculturalism in its national identity. Using the Canadian case, this research tests the possibility that some national identities might represent an inclusive force. It does so through a nationally representative survey experiment (N = 1500) where respondents' national identity was primed before answering questions on immigration and multiculturalism. The analysis shows that contrary to previous results obtained in the Netherlands, priming Canadian identity does not increase anti-immigration attitudes. A new prime designed to isolate the effect of national identity even decreased these exclusionary attitudes.
20
Pellegrini, Valerio, Valeria De Cristofaro, Marco Salvati, Mauro Giacomantonio, and Luigi Leone. "Social Exclusion and Anti-Immigration Attitudes in Europe: The mediating role of Interpersonal Trust." Social Indicators Research 155, no. 2 (January 31, 2021): 697–724. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11205-021-02618-6.
Abstract:
AbstractManaging immigration is a challenge at the political, economic, and social levels. Clarifying the social psychological antecedents behind the onset of negative attitudes towards immigrants might help overcome this challenge. The present study investigates the relationships between people’s experience of social exclusion, feelings of generalized interpersonal trust, and anti-immigrant attitudes across 23 European countries. We used data from the European Social Survey 8 (2016), employing a representative sample of the European population. A 1–1–1 multilevel mediation model showed that: (a) the higher the experience of social exclusion, the lower the generalized trust towards others; (b) the experience of social exclusion related positively and directly with anti-immigration attitudes; and (c) generalized interpersonal trust mediated the relationship between experienced social exclusion and anti-immigrant attitudes so that the experience of being socially excluded reduced feelings of generalized interpersonal trust that, in turn, promoted hostile attitudes towards immigrants. Taken together, these results create a platform for future research on the emergence of negative attitudes towards immigrants and factors that might facilitate the development of a climate of integration and acceptance.
21
Kentmen-Cin, Cigdem, and Cengiz Erisen. "Anti-immigration attitudes and the opposition to European integration: A critical assessment." European Union Politics 18, no. 1 (February 8, 2017): 3–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116516680762.
Abstract:
The aim of this overview is to critically examine the state of research on the relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and attitudes toward European integration. We argue that the two most commonly used measures of anti-immigrant attitudes do not fully capture perceived threats from immigrants and opinion about different immigrant groups. Future research should pay more attention to two particular issues: first, scholars could employ methodological techniques that capture the underlying constructs associated with attitudes and public opinion; second, researchers could differentiate between groups within the overall immigrant population. This overview identifies themes in the literature while drawing attention to the need for more research on the behavioral underpinnings of anti-immigrant attitudes and public opinion on European integration.
22
Alves, Sara G., Isabel R. Pinto, and José M. Marques. "The terrible unknown: How uncertainty fosters nationalist and anti-immigration attitudes." Journal of Social and Political Psychology 12, no. 1 (March 6, 2024): 23–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.5964/jspp.9953.
Abstract:
Uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg, 2000, 2007, 2012) postulates that people strengthen their adherence to, and identification with, extreme ideologies when they undergo an enduring uncertainty regarding their self-definition. Concomitantly, nationalist and extreme right-wing ideologies have been associated with the attribution of a threatening character to immigrant and refugee groups. We propose that self-uncertainty precedes the perceived threat posed by the latter groups, which in turn predicts adherence to nationalist attitudes. In one correlational (Study 1; n = 169) and one experimental study (Study 2; n = 309), we tested the mediational effects of perceived realistic and symbolic threat towards immigrants on the association between self-uncertainty and nationalist attitudes (belief in national superiority, support for anti-immigration laws and intention to vote for an anti-immigration party). In both studies, perceived realistic threat emerged as the most reliable mediator between self-uncertainty and nationalist attitudes. In addition (Study 2), we found a causal effect of self-uncertainty on realistic threat. We discuss the implications of these findings for social inclusion policies based on the reduction of uncertainty generated by immigration.
23
Gorinas, Cédric, and Mariola Pytliková. "The Influence of Attitudes toward Immigrants on International Migration." International Migration Review 51, no. 2 (June 2017): 416–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/imre.12232.
Abstract:
We investigate whether anti-immigrant attitudes affect migrant inflows in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Using longitudinal exhaustive data, we find that natives’ hostility, particularly natives’ propensity to discriminate on the labor market, reduces immigration. This effect is comparable to more conventional migration factors. We obtain robust results when we, for example, capture hostility with far-right parties’ popularity instead and control for tighter immigration policies or multilateral resistance to migration. We find a stronger effect for EU-to-EU migrants, migrants from developed countries and linguistically close countries. Our results raise a challenge for policy makers when the demand for foreign workers and anti-immigrant sentiment are present.
24
Karyotis, Georgios, and Stratos Patrikios. "Religion, securitization and anti-immigration attitudes: The case of Greece." Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 1 (January 2010): 43–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343309350021.
25
BOOMGAARDEN, HAJO G., and RENS VLIEGENTHART. "How news content influences anti-immigration attitudes: Germany, 1993-2005." European Journal of Political Research 48, no. 4 (June 2009): 516–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.01831.x.
26
Richey, Sean. "The Impact of Anti-Assimilationist Beliefs on Attitudes toward Immigration." International Studies Quarterly 54, no. 1 (March 2010): 197–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00583.x.
27
Kawalerowicz, Juta. "Too many immigrants: How does local diversity contribute to attitudes toward immigration?" Acta Sociologica 64, no. 2 (March 24, 2021): 144–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0001699320977592.
Abstract:
This paper investigates the link between residential context, perceptions and attitudes toward immigrants by linking data from the British Election Study with Census statistics on composition of electoral constituencies in 2001 and 2011. I consider which type of local diversity is most salient for natives’ attitudes by combining information on ethnicity, religion and skills. Second, I look at whether base levels of and changes in local diversity affect anti-immigration attitudes in the same way. I find that immigration is more salient when defined by ethnic criteria, rather than criteria that combine ethnicity and religion or skills. Anti-immigrant attitudes are more likely to be expressed by natives who live in constituencies where there has been a large change in diversity between 2001 and 2011, but these responses depend on initial diversity levels. For non-whites and skilled ethnic minorities higher residential segregation is associated with more negative attitudes toward immigrants among natives.
28
Bonilla, Tabitha, and Cecilia Hyunjung Mo. "Bridging the Partisan Divide on Immigration Policy Attitudes through a Bipartisan Issue Area: The Case of Human Trafficking." Journal of Experimental Political Science 5, no. 2 (2018): 107–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/xps.2018.3.
Abstract:
AbstractTo date, while there is a rich literature describing the determinants of anti-immigrant sentiment, researchers have not identified a mechanism to reduce antipathy toward immigrants. In fact, extant research has shown that efforts to induce positive attitudes toward immigrants often backfire. What if a bridging frame strategy were employed? Can a bipartisan issue area in which there is general support act as a bridging frame to elicit more positive sentiment toward immigration among those who oppose more open immigration policies? We explore this question by conducting two survey experiments in which we manipulate whether immigration is linked with the bipartisan issue area of human trafficking. We find that in forcing individuals to reconcile the fact that a widely accepted issue position of combating trafficking also requires a reassessment of immigration policies, we can positively shift attitudes on immigration.
29
Wong, Janelle S. "Race, Evangelicals and Immigration." Forum 17, no. 3 (October 25, 2019): 403–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/for-2019-0031.
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Abstract White evangelicals constitute the core of President Trump’s electoral base. The loyalty of White evangelical Trump supporters to the President is grounded in racial anxieties expressed well before Trump’s 2016 campaign. White evangelicals’ anti-immigration agenda runs deep, and it is as important to understanding the current political moment as their anti-abortion agenda. Perceptions of discrimination against Whites drives the group’s conservative views on immigration. Even as growing numbers of Black, Asian, and Latinx evangelicals exhibit political attitudes and behavior that stand in sharp contrast to their White evangelical counterparts, White evangelicals’ overrepresentation in the electorate relative to dwindling population share creates a pathway to continued political influence.
30
Burgoon, Brian, and Matthijs Rooduijn. "‘Immigrationization’ of welfare politics? Anti-immigration and welfare attitudes in context." West European Politics 44, no. 2 (January 13, 2020): 177–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2019.1702297.
31
Hadarics, Márton, and Anna Kende. "Politics Turns Moral Foundations Into Consequences of Intergroup Attitudes." Social Psychology 52, no. 3 (May 2021): 185–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000447.
Abstract:
Abstract. Applying a longitudinal design, we tested the directions of the relationships between moral foundations and attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. The study was conducted during the official campaign period of the Hungarian parliamentary elections in 2018. It was found that moral foundations are consequences of intergroup attitudes. Latent change modeling showed that while individualizing foundations were independent of anti-Muslim attitudes, longitudinal change in binding foundations was predicted by prior anti-Muslim attitudes, but not the other way around. Furthermore, this relationship was moderated by exposure to the anti-Muslim and anti-immigration campaigns led by the government. These results suggest that people are motivated to harmonize their moral concerns with their prior social beliefs, and they actively utilize available political messages in this process.
32
Schmidt, Katja. "The dynamics of attitudes toward immigrants: Cohort analyses for Western EU member states." International Journal of Comparative Sociology 62, no. 4 (August 2021): 281–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00207152211052582.
Abstract:
Public opinion climates on immigrants are subject to certain dynamics. This study examines two mechanisms for such dynamics in Western EU member states for the 2002–2018 period. First, the impact of cohort replacement and, second, the impact of periodic threat perceptions, namely, changing macroeconomic conditions and shifts in immigration rates. To date, empirical research on anti-immigrant sentiments rarely combines these two concepts simultaneously to disentangle the interplay of period and cohort effects and determine the factors for long- and short-term attitude changes in societies. Motivated by this gap in the literature, I conduct multiple linear regression analyses of pooled data from all waves of the European Social Survey to show that the process of cohort replacement has led to a substantially more positive opinion climate toward immigrants since the 2000s. However, results indicate that in the future, this positive development is likely to come to a halt since younger cohorts no longer hold significantly more immigrant-friendly attitudes than their immediate predecessors. Furthermore, we observe different period effects to impact cohorts’ attitudes. Fixed-effects panel analyses show that the effect of changing macroeconomic conditions on cohorts’ attitudes is low. Changes in immigration rates, however, lead to significantly more dismissive attitudes when immigrants originate from the Global South as opposed to when they enter from EU countries. These insights suggest that it is less economic or cultural threat perceptions, but ethnic prejudice that plays a key role for natives to oppose immigration. Overall, findings suggest that it is not either cohort or period effects driving large-scale attitude changes, but rather we observe an interplay of both.
33
Dražanová, Lenka, and Jérôme Gonnot. "Attitudes toward immigration in Europe: Cross-regional differences." Open Research Europe 3 (April 28, 2023): 66. http://dx.doi.org/10.12688/openreseurope.15691.1.
Abstract:
Background: This article investigates how European public opinion has responded to short-term variations in regional immigration over the past decade (2010-2019). Methods: Combining data from the European Social Survey and the European Union Labour Force Survey and using multilevel modelling, we test how natives’ opinions over migration policy and the contribution of immigrants to society have changed with the net rate of international migrants in 183 EU regions from 21 countries. Results: We find that while European natives living in regions with a higher share of foreign-born populations are generally less anti-immigrant, a short-term increase in the number of immigrants within a given region is associated with more negative attitudes. Conclusion: Our findings demonstrate the importance of temporal dynamics for attitudes to immigration. They also point to the relevance of regional variations in attitudes beside cross-country differences.
34
Erisen, Elif. "Seeking refuge in a superordinate group: Non-EU immigration heritage and European identification." European Union Politics 18, no. 1 (February 8, 2017): 26–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116516680301.
Abstract:
The attitudes of the European Union (EU) citizens towards immigration and the impact of their national identification on attitudes towards the EU have received ample attention in the literature. However, the immigrants’ identification with Europe has not been adequately studied. This article investigates the impact of non-EU immigration heritage on European identification. Based on social identity theory and using Eurobarometer cross-sectional data, it compares the European identification of those with a first generation non-EU immigration heritage to that of EU country natives. Moreover, it focuses on salient aspects of immigrant experience such as country policies directed at reducing discrimination and personal experience of discrimination. The results show that those with non-EU immigration heritage have higher European identification compared to the natives. Furthermore, in line with social identity theory, this article shows that successful anti-discrimination policies pull immigrants towards national identification rather than European identification.
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Heinrich, Horst-Alfred. "Causal Relationship or Not? Nationalism, Patriotism, and Anti-immigration Attitudes in Germany." Sociology of Race and Ethnicity 6, no. 1 (August 2, 2018): 76–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2332649218788583.
Abstract:
Despite broad research on the connection between in-group and out-group attitudes, empirical studies dealing with the relationship between nation-related and anti-immigration attitudes rarely provide a consistent theoretical framework. On one hand, it is assumed that if persons agree with nationalistic statements, they might develop an orientation against strangers. On the other hand, one might imagine the existence of simple factor correlations among nationalism, patriotism, and anti-immigration attitudes. It can be argued that if people form a group, they will be automatically confronted with out-group members. Both proposals can claim some plausibility. But as several empirical studies mirror varying theoretical assumptions, the author compares different structure models on the basis of German International Social Survey Programme data. Two models lead to satisfactory solutions. Their respective theoretical meaning is discussed in detail. As a result, personal construct theory is integrated here as a theoretical framework with which to explain the correlational structure of a model with three factors without assuming any causality between them.
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Ponce, Aaron. "Gender and Anti-immigrant Attitudes in Europe." Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 3 (January 1, 2017): 237802311772997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2378023117729970.
Abstract:
Gender emerges as a key site of contestation with respect to immigrants’ integration and public presence in Europe. The recent politicization of gender and Islam in immigration debates marks an increasingly salient constructed opposition between egalitarian European values and traditional immigrant cultures. Against this background, this study investigates how gender structures attitudes toward immigrants of different economic and cultural profiles. Prior research finds that women are usually less likely to exhibit anti-immigrant attitudes than are men. Using 2014 European Social Survey data, results show that women are no less likely to hold anti-immigrant attitudes. However, in a significant reversal of traditional gender patterns, women are more likely to hold targeted anti-Muslim attitudes. Further, social trust moderates this gendered anti-Muslim effect. I interpret findings as a shift in how gender structures xenophobia resulting from the increased salience of gender ideology as a boundary-defining feature and growing demonization of Muslims as gender inegalitarian.
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Halikiopoulou, Daphne, and Tim Vlandas. "When economic and cultural interests align: the anti-immigration voter coalitions driving far right party success in Europe." European Political Science Review 12, no. 4 (May 20, 2020): 427–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s175577392000020x.
Abstract:
AbstractThis article contests the view that the strong positive correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and far right party success necessarily constitutes evidence in support of the cultural grievance thesis. We argue that the success of far right parties depends on their ability to mobilize a coalition of interests between their core supporters, that is voters with cultural grievances over immigration and the often larger group of voters with economic grievances over immigration. Using individual level data from eight rounds of the European Social Survey, our empirical analysis shows that while cultural concerns over immigration are a stronger predictor of far right party support, those who are concerned with the impact of immigration on the economy are important to the far right in numerical terms. Taken together, our findings suggest that economic grievances over immigration remain pivotal within the context of the transnational cleavage.
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van der Brug, Wouter, and Eelco Harteveld. "The conditional effects of the refugee crisis on immigration attitudes and nationalism." European Union Politics 22, no. 2 (February 1, 2021): 227–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1465116520988905.
Abstract:
What was the impact of the 2014–2016 refugee crisis on immigration attitudes and national identification in Europe? Several studies show that radical right parties benefitted electorally from the refugee crisis, but research also shows that anti-immigration attitudes did not increase. We hypothesize that the refugee crisis affected right-wing citizens differently than left-wing citizens. We test this hypothesis by combining individual level survey data (from five Eurobarometer waves in the 2014–2016 period) with country level statistics on the asylum applications in 28 EU member states. In Western Europe, we find that increases in the number of asylum applications lead to a polarization of attitudes towards immigrants between left- and right-leaning citizens. In the Southern European ‘arrival countries’ and in Central-Eastern Europe we find no significant effects. Nationalistic attitudes are also not affected significantly.
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HAINMUELLER, JENS, and MICHAEL J. HISCOX. "Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment." American Political Science Review 104, no. 1 (February 2010): 61–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055409990372.
Abstract:
Past research has emphasized two critical economic concerns that appear to generate anti-immigrant sentiment among native citizens: concerns about labor market competition and concerns about the fiscal burden on public services. We provide direct tests of both models of attitude formation using an original survey experiment embedded in a nationwide U.S. survey. The labor market competition model predicts that natives will be most opposed to immigrants who have skill levels similar to their own. We find instead that both low-skilled and highly skilled natives strongly prefer highly skilled immigrants over low-skilled immigrants, and this preference is not decreasing in natives' skill levels. The fiscal burden model anticipates that rich natives oppose low-skilled immigration more than poor natives, and that this gap is larger in states with greater fiscal exposure (in terms of immigrant access to public services). We find instead that rich and poor natives are equally opposed to low-skilled immigration in general. In states with high fiscal exposure, poor (rich) natives are more (less) opposed to low-skilled immigration than they are elsewhere. This indicates that concerns among poor natives about constraints on welfare benefits as a result of immigration are more relevant than concerns among the rich about increased taxes. Overall the results suggest that economic self-interest, at least as currently theorized, does not explain voter attitudes toward immigration. The results are consistent with alternative arguments emphasizing noneconomic concerns associated with ethnocentrism or sociotropic considerations about how the local economy as a whole may be affected by immigration.
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Keating, Avril, and Jan Germen Janmaat. "Immigrants, inclusion, and the role of hard work: Exploring anti-immigrant attitudes among young people in Britain." Sociological Review 68, no. 6 (April 16, 2020): 1212–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0038026120915160.
Abstract:
Previous research on youth attitudes towards immigration has tended to focus on explaining why young people are more accepting of immigrants than their elders. In this article, therefore, we focus on the young people that are opposed to immigration. First, we use nationally representative survey data from young adults in England to highlight that a substantial minority hold negative attitudes towards immigrants. In the second half of the article, we then turn to qualitative data (in-depth interviews) to explore how young people talk about and justify holding these negative attitudes. Both the qualitative and the quantitative data suggest that anti-immigrant attitudes among young people are linked to the perception that immigrants pose an economic and cultural threat, and to the spread of culturalised forms of citizenship. What the qualitative data also reveal, however, is how these distinct discourses reinforce one another and how they intersect with other types of prejudice. We will argue that the idea of Hard Work is central to understanding anti-immigrant attitudes, as this has become a deeply-embedded cultural norm that is being used to include and exclude (immigrants and others), and to distinguish between who is deserving of membership of British society and who is not.
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Baker, Anthony W. "Chinese Immigration to California: Welcomed Workers, Shunned Immigrants." Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Studies 2, no. 5 (September 29, 2020): 50–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.32996/jhsss.2020.2.5.7.
Abstract:
This paper explores the complex relationship linking the collapse of the mining and railroad industries, anti-Chinese sentiment, and the passage Chinese Exclusion Act. Although difficult to tease out, the paper also explores how these immigration issues, prompted primarily by domestic concerns, were intertwined with the diplomatic relationship between the United States and China, as it evolved over the period of 1858 through 1880. this paper looks at historical newspapers written in the early Californian state in the 1850s to the 1860s to understand how changing attitudes towards Chinese immigrants affected local anti-Chinese laws and how these local attitudes shaped national laws. This paper will show that while Chinese workers were welcomed early on for providing cheap labor, overtime they would be increasingly prejudiced against and blamed for growing labor disputes between white workers and corporations. Ultimately Chinese immigration would be scapegoated as the reason for declining wages by white workers in order to pass anti-Chinese laws. The United States moved towards exclusion as a domestic policy, an apparent contradiction of its diplomatic policy of forging closer ties in an attempt to take advantage of Chinese trade.
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Abascal, Maria, Tiffany J. Huang, and Van C. Tran. "Intervening in Anti-Immigrant Sentiments: The Causal Effects of Factual Information on Attitudes toward Immigration." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 697, no. 1 (September 2021): 174–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00027162211053987.
Abstract:
If preferences on immigration policy respond to facts, widespread misinformation poses an obstacle to consensus. Does factual information about immigration indeed affect policy preferences? Are beliefs about immigration’s societal impact the mechanism through which factual information affects support for increased immigration? To address these questions, we conducted an original survey experiment, in which we presented a nationally representative sample of 2,049 Americans living in the United States with facts about immigrants’ English acquisition and immigrants’ impact on crime, jobs, and taxes—four domains with common misperceptions. Three of these factual domains (immigration’s impact on crime, jobs, and taxes) raise overall support for increased immigration. These facts also affect beliefs that are directly relevant to that information. Moreover, those beliefs mediate the effect of factual information on support for increased immigration. By contrast, information about English acquisition affects neither policy preferences nor beliefs about immigration’s impact. Facts can leverage social cognitions to change policy preferences.
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García-Muñoz, Teresa María, and Juliette Milgram-Baleix. "Explaining Attitudes Towards Immigration: The Role of Economic Factors." Politics and Governance 9, no. 4 (October 28, 2021): 159–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.17645/pag.v9i4.4487.
Abstract:
In this article, we investigate the determinants of individuals’ opinions concerning the economic impact of immigrants. Unlike most previous studies, we use a large sample of 61 countries (Joint WVS/EVS 2017–2020 dataset) that are either net receivers or net emitters of migrants. Using a multilevel model, we test the effect of individuals’ characteristics and of several macroeconomic variables on the assessment of immigrants’ impact on development. We highlight that natives’ evaluation of the economic consequences of immigration is more influenced by age, trust, education, and income than by contextual variables such as growth, inflation, inequalities, income level, or number of immigrants in the country. Our results match with the hypothesis that immigrants are considered substitutes for low- and medium-skilled workers in capital-abundant countries. However, neither labour-market nor welfare-state considerations can be considered as the main drivers of the appraisals made about the economic impact of immigration. Our results tend to confirm the prediction that greater contact with immigrants reduces anti-immigrant opinions, in particular for skilled people. In contrast, immigrant inflows lead low- and medium-skilled people to make worse judgments concerning the economic consequences of immigration. All in all, our results validate the view that education comprises a major part of the cognitive assessment of the role played by immigrants in the economy, at least in high-income countries.
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Eger, Maureen A., and Nate Breznau. "Immigration and the welfare state: A cross-regional analysis of European welfare attitudes." International Journal of Comparative Sociology 58, no. 5 (February 1, 2017): 440–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020715217690796.
Abstract:
A growing body of research connects diversity to anti-welfare attitudes and lower levels of social welfare expenditure, yet most evidence comes from analyses of US states or comparisons of the United States to Europe. Comparative analyses of European nation-states, however, yield little evidence that immigration – measured at the country-level – reduces support for national welfare state programs. This is not surprising, given that research suggests that the impact of diversity occurs at smaller, sub-national geographic units. Therefore, in this article, we test the hypothesis that immigration undermines welfare attitudes by assessing the impact of immigration measured at the regional-level on individual-level support for redistribution, a comprehensive welfare state, and immigrants’ social rights. To do this, we combine data from the European Social Survey with a unique regional dataset compiled from national censuses, Eurostat, and the European Election Database (13 countries, 114 regions, and 23,213 individuals). Utilizing multilevel modeling, we find a negative relationship between regional percent foreign-born and support for redistribution as well as between regional percent foreign-born and support for a comprehensive welfare state. Objective immigration, however, does not increase opposition to immigrants’ social rights (i.e. welfare chauvinism). We discuss the implications of these results and conclude that traditional welfare state attitudes and welfare chauvinism are distinct phenomena that should not be conflated in future research.
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Saleh, Deena, and Hasan Vergil. "What determines public attitudes toward immigration in the Middle East: an analysis at the individual level." International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, May 8, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijssp-02-2024-0064.
Abstract:
PurposeSurveys in Europe show that immigration is more of a challenge than an opportunity for a significant number of people. However, little attention is given to attitudes toward immigration in the Middle East. This paper examines the effects of personal values and religiosity on the anti-immigration attitudes of citizens in the Middle East and North African countries.Design/methodology/approachUtilizing data from the World Values Survey, we analyze how personal values and religiosity affect anti-immigration attitudes in nine Middle Eastern countries. The data covers individual-level data of 9 MENA countries from the WVS Round 7 (2017–2022). Factor analysis is applied as a data reduction method. Afterward, an OLS regression analysis is conducted on the pooled data.FindingsAnti-immigration attitudes increase with age, education, and religiosity. Personal values such as national pride, support for nationals, and belongingness to one’s country significantly affect anti-immigration attitudes. Furthermore, the importance of religion as a measure of religiosity was found to be positively associated with anti-immigration attitudes.Originality/valueThis paper contributes to underexplored literature by investigating how individual-level determinants, such as demographic indicators, personal values, and religious factors, shape anti-immigration attitudes in the MENA context, distinct from European dynamics.
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Mustafaj, Matea, Guadalupe Madrigal, Jessica Roden, and Gavin W. Ploger. "Physiological threat sensitivity predicts anti-immigrant attitudes." Politics and the Life Sciences, August 16, 2021, 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/pls.2021.11.
Abstract:
Abstract Research finds that the perception that immigrants are culturally and economically threatening is associated with negative attitudes toward immigration. In a largely separate body of work, psychophysiological predispositions toward threat sensitivity are connected to a range of political attitudes, including immigration. This article draws together these two literatures, using a lab experiment to explore psychophysiological threat sensitivity and immigration attitudes in the United States. Respondents with higher threat sensitivity, as measured by skin conductance responses to threatening images, tend to be less supportive of immigration. This finding builds on our understanding of the sources of anti-immigrant attitudes.
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Laaker, Dillon. "Economic Shocks and the Development of Immigration Attitudes." British Journal of Political Science, May 17, 2023, 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000712342300011x.
Abstract:
Abstract How do immigration attitudes form? Drawing on the political socialization literature, I argue that growing up in a recession causes a lasting increase in anti-immigration attitudes. I delineate two mechanisms that emphasize the negative consequences of recessions for young workers and the anti-immigration narrative that often emerges during economic turmoil. Young adults are particularly vulnerable to these external shocks because they have minimal political experience and are developing their core political attitudes. Support is provided for this argument with evidence from the European Social Survey. An economic shock during young adulthood causes a significant increase in anti-immigration attitudes, a relationship not found for other ages. I find tentative evidence that growing up in a recession has a larger effect on the racial and cultural dimensions of immigration and causes a broader sociotropic response. Results highlight how economic crises affect the socialization of young adults and underscore their lasting political consequences.
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Yeung, Eddy SF. "Does immigration boost public Euroscepticism in European Union member states?" European Union Politics, July 14, 2021, 146511652110304. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/14651165211030428.
Abstract:
A number of studies have established a strong link between anti-immigration and Eurosceptic attitudes. But does this relationship necessarily imply that more immigration would increase public Euroscepticism in member states of the European Union? I evaluate this question by analyzing immigration data and Eurobarometer survey data over the period 2009–2017. The analysis shows no evidence that individual levels of Euroscepticism increase with actual levels of immigration. This result suggests that a strong link between anti-immigration and Eurosceptic attitudes does not necessarily translate into a strong link between immigration levels and public Euroscepticism. Public Euroscepticism can still be low even if immigration levels are high.
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Al-Kire, Rosemary L., Michael H. Pasek, Jo-Ann Tsang, Joseph Leman, and Wade C. Rowatt. "Protecting America’s borders: Christian nationalism, threat, and attitudes toward immigrants in the United States." Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, January 18, 2021, 136843022097829. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1368430220978291.
Abstract:
Attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies are divisive issues in American politics. These attitudes are influenced by factors such as political orientation and religiousness, with religious and conservative individuals demonstrating higher prejudice toward immigrants and refugees, and endorsing stricter immigration policies. Christian nationalism, an ideology marked by the belief that America is a Christian nation, may help explain how religious nationalist identity influences negative attitudes toward immigrants. The current research addresses this through four studies among participants in the US. Across studies, our results showed that Christian nationalism was a significant and consistent predictor of anti-immigrant stereotypes, prejudice, dehumanization, and support for anti-immigrant policies. These effects were robust to inclusion of other sources of anti-immigrant attitudes, including religious fundamentalism, nationalism, and political ideology. Further, perceived threats from immigrants mediated the relationship between Christian nationalism and dehumanization of immigrants, and attitudes toward immigration policies. These findings have implications for our understanding of the relations between religious nationalism and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policy in the US, as well as in other contexts.
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Ersanilli, Evelyn, and Patrick Präg. "Fixed-term work contracts and anti-immigration attitudes. A novel test of ethnic competition theory." Socio-Economic Review, December 14, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwab059.
Abstract:
Abstract Whether labor market competition is shaping anti-immigration attitudes is a contentious issue. We conduct a novel test of ethnic competition theory by comparing the attitudes toward immigration of workers with fixed-term contracts to those with permanent jobs in Europe. Fixed-term contract workers are particularly at risk of competition as they have to compete for jobs in the foreseeable future. In the first step of our investigation, we analyze cross-sectional data (European Social Survey, 2002–18) from 18 Western European countries. We find that—contrary to our expectation—fixed-term workers are less anti-immigration. The effect is substantively small. In the second step, we use a fixed-effects design with longitudinal data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP, 1999–2015) to rule out time-constant unobserved heterogeneity. We find that transitioning from a fixed to a permanent contract does not affect anti-immigration attitudes. Our combined results thus add to the growing body of studies that do not find evidence for labor market competition as an explanation of anti-immigrant attitudes.