Journal articles on the topic 'Assassination Targeted'

The targeted killing of the Iranian military leader Qassem Soleimani in an American drone strike in January 2020 marked a novel development in the operation of the United States' drone programme; targeting a member of a state's armed forces as opposed to a member of a non-state armed group. Soleimani's killing offers an opportunity to re-examine the scope of Executive Order 12,333, which prohibits employees of the United States Government from committing assassinations. This article applies Executive Order 12,333's "assassination ban" to the Soleimani strike. The assassination ban's scope varies depending on whether it is applied in a wartime or peacetime context. This article concludes from the surrounding factual and legal context that the strike should be analysed according to the peacetime definition of assassination, which necessitates an analysis of the strike's compliance with the jus ad bellum, the legal framework applicable to uses of interstate force. It finds that the strike's non-compliance with the jus ad bellum, in addition to its likely political motive create a strong argument that the strike would constitute a prohibited assassination under the terms of the Executive Order, but the legal framework surrounding the Executive Order limits its direct enforceability with respect to presidentially authorised uses of force. It ultimately concludes that, despite the assassination ban's lack of direct enforceability, it nevertheless creates a strong normative counterbalance against an increasing tendency toward expansive uses of extraterritorial force.

Israel's efforts to quell violence during the recent conflict with the Palestinians include targeted assassinations of militia leaders. The international community permits the use of lethal force in only two cases, law enforcement and just war, and assassination cannot be justified in either. In the context of law enforcement, assassination remains prohibited as a form of extra-legal execution, regardless of Israel's status as an occupying power. In the context of just war, assassination violates the proscription against perfidious and treacherous means of warfare. In the current conflict, assassination cannot be accomplished without collaborators, a practice that not only is prohibited by convention but seriously undermines Palestinian society. As a result, assassination provokes violent retaliation and corrodes the basis necessary to renew peace negotiations. Nevertheless, assassination may be defensible as a last resort in some cases. These include tyrannicide, killing a murderous and brutal leader to protect innocent civilians, together with instances of ‘ticking bombs’ – that is, immediate and otherwise unavoidable grievous threats to noncombatants. In each case a modified argument from necessity offers grounds for the defensible, although limited, use of assassination.

I argue that widely accepted just war theory precepts morally allow and require the assassination of politically powerful individuals under some circumstances instead of waging a just war or implementing any other policy such as non-targeted economic sanctions that would very likely severely harm more innocents. While all just war theory precepts permit just assassinations under certain circumstances, proportionality, necessity, and last resort make just assassinations required whenever they would cause severe harm to the fewest innocents. There are several implications of my argument. First, there are fewer circumstances when wars and other policies that foreseeably but unintentionally harm innocents are just than is commonly thought. Second, the realm of morally permissible violent and non-violent action for powerful individuals is more limited than many presume and politicians are more often morally liable to actions that would mitigate or end objectively unjust serious threats for which they are culpable, although this does not always include lethal force.

This article begins by presenting a biopolitical account of assassination and targeted killing events carried out by liberal regimes. It argues that forms of political violence are understood and made meaningful beyond the administrative frameworks and technical rationalizations often privileged in biopolitical analyses. Deploying Alan Feldman’s (1991) argument that political violence is an ‘emplotted action’ alongside William Connolly’s (2005 ) notion of resonance, it provides a genealogical account of how forms of assassination have been positioned within Western cultural understandings of political violence. The focal point of examination is the biblical heroine Judith, whose story has resonated as a preferred narrative structure for understanding and (de)legitimating acts of assassination among Western publics. Through its reading of the book of Judith, the article highlights the importance of ambivalence for understanding assassination as a form of political violence. The legacy of the moral problematique enabled by Judith is then illustrated in relation to US President Barak Obama’s May 2011 speech announcing the killing of Osama Bin Laden. The article concludes by suggesting that although the story of Judith may underpin contemporary assassination practices, it also offers a means of critically engaging with them.

Osama Bin Laden was killed on 2 May 2011 in the course of an operation by US special forces (Navy Seals) in Abbottabad, Pakistan.1 The US forces were flown by helicopter from neighbouring Afghanistan. The death of Bin Laden renewed questions about the legality of such operations during armed conflicts and during peacetime.2 The potentially applicable law includes international humanitarian law, international human rights law, jus ad bellum and the domestic law of the US and Pakistan.3

This article explains the emergence and institutionalization of the US’s targeted killing practices as a case of norm transformation. I argue that international and domestic US prohibitions on assassination have not disappeared, but have changed as a result of practitioner-led changes in the conventions, technologies, and bureaucratic structures governing the use of force in counterterrorism activities. After discussing the limits of alternative explanations, and drawing inspiration from practice theory, pragmatist social theory, and relational sociology, I posit three causal mechanisms as responsible for the transformation: convention reorientation, which was the redefinition of targeted killing to distinguish it from assassination; technological revision, which was the development and use of unmanned aerial vehicles (“drones”) to bypass normative and strategic concerns over precision; and network synthesis, which was the support of the Bush administration and especially of the Obama administration, overruling dissenters from within the Central Intelligence Agency (who were often very highly placed). I trace the processes by which these mechanisms operated and interacted in simultaneous and mutually reinforcing ways from the start of the millennium until now. Finally, I discuss some of the ways in which this contributes to institutional analysis and the study of norm change more generally, and, in particular, how it considers the role of technology and the reciprocity of means and ends.

Not until the Second Intifada did assassination emerge as an explicit, legally codified, and publicly announced doctrine of so-called targeted killing in Israel. This study, the first of a two-part series, explores the doctrine's historical roots and ideological lineage and tracks its rise under the premiership of Ariel Sharon. Targeted killing became institutionalized not just to reduce direct and imminent threats against Israelis but also to mobilize electoral support, field-test weapons and tactics, and eliminate key figures in order to sow chaos and stunt the development of an effective Palestinian national movement. The study frames the analysis within a wider meditation on Israel's idolatry of force. As much symbolic performance as military technique, targeted killing reenacts and ritualizes Palestinian humiliation and helplessness in the face of the Zionist state's irresistible power, making this dynamic appear a fact of life, ordained and immutable.

Since the beginning of the second intifada in the fall of 2000, Israel has pursued a policy in which alleged Palestinian terrorists have been hunted down and killed by government order. The policy is not one of assassination and is consistent with international law because Israel is engaged in armed conflict with terrorists, those targeted are usually killed by conventional military means, not through deception, and the targets of the attacks are not civilians but combatants or are part of a military chain of command. Targeted killing has also been affirmed by Israel's High Court.Although targeted killing has been pursued by Israel throughout its history, the scale of the present effort and the use of sophisticated military assets such as helicopter gunships and jet fighters set it apart from earlier practices. The effectiveness of the policy is called into doubt because it has not prevented–and may have contributed to–record numbers of Israeli civilians being killed. The policy has also resulted in informers being revealed, intelligence resources diverted, potential negotiating partners eliminated. It has also produced murderous retaliation and international condemnation of Israel. Benefits of the policy include impeding the effectiveness of terrorist operations, keeping terrorists on the run, and deterring some attacks. In addition, it affords the Israeli public a sense of revenge and retribution.Because it targets the actual perpetrators of terrorism, targeted killing provides a proportionate and discriminate response to the threat Israel faces. Improving the policy will require better civilian oversight, greater care to eliminate harm to innocent bystanders, and refraining from killing political leaders. Despite its many shortcomings, Israel is justified in pursuing this policy so long as it faces a terrorist threat that the Palestinian Authority will not or cannot control.

Abstract The concept “targeted killing” has been increasingly adopted in scholarship, policy, and media discourses, particularly in the context of US armed drone attacks. While “targeted killing” is often understood as something new, there are strong historical continuities with more traditional concepts such as “assassination” and “extra-judicial execution,” as well as with the colonial concept “police bombing.” This paper builds on an analysis of over nine hundred Security Council debates, Human Rights Council reports, legal papers, and policy documents. Tracing the conceptual continuities, I argue that the peculiar novelty of “targeted killing” does not mainly stem from the novelty of the practices and claims it describes but from the contradictory modes in which the term has been used, which has problematic repercussions for recent counterterrorism discourses. Posed as a new category that reacts to a new situation, the adoption of the concept “targeted killing” has, I argue, played an important role in the promotion of claims that were long considered unlawful and illegitimate. Demonstrating the importance of language in setting political struggles up in a particular way, the paper contributes to a growing body of critical work on counterterrorism use of force.

AbstractThe spring of 1894 was an important period for Constantinople's Armenian community. Two assassination attempts targeted the Armenian patriarch Khoren Ashekian, and the chairperson of the Armenian Political Assembly Maksudzade Simon Bey, respectively. In both cases, the assailants were partisans of the Hunchakian Party, an Armenian revolutionary organization established in 1887. Analyzing the reasons behind these two attacks, and the imperial context in which they took place, this article challenges aspects of mainstream Armenian and Turkish historiography on the Hamidian period. It argues that a critical look at these two attacks through a socio-economic paradigm rather than an ethno-political one provides a viable analytical framework for deconstructing the notion of the “Armenian millet” as an undifferentiated community. More generally, the article explores the role of violence in shaping intracommunal relationships in the early 1890s.

This publication introduces document on preparation and realization of the terrorist act of far-right Russian monarchists P. N. Shabelsky-Bork and S.V. Taboritzky into the scientific use and offers their analysis. On March 28, 1922 Shabelsky-Bork and Taboritzky attempted to assassinate P. N. Milyukov in Berlin. In the attempt Taboritsky killed V. D. Nabokov, several people were wounded. This political murder was a result of the split within Russian emigration that sprang from contradictions inherited from Russian political life in the revolutionary 1917. Despite common hostility towards the Soviet regime, the Kadet leaders targeted by the assassins and the monarchists, to whom the latter belonged, were in harsh opposition and blamed one another for the catastrophe of the revolution, the following victory of the Bolsheviks, and the crash of old Russia. The introductory article assesses the person of Shabelsky, the investigation, and the changes of his testimonies in the course of inquiry and trial. Defendants attempted to acquit Taboritsky; it was more difficult to prove his guilt. Changing his testimonies, Shabelsky irritated the court and was sentenced longer than the prosecution insisted. The court made use of the evidence of witnesses and the testimony of the accused obtained on March 29, which was judged most truthful. The investigation and the court found no trace of accomplices. According to the testimonies of the accused, they committed the crime on the grounds of personal hate towards Milyukov and organized the assassination themselves, without accomplices. From the moment of assassination attempt until today there have been many doubts about the official version. However, the published document and other evidence (testimonies of witnesses), as well as the court decision corroborate it. This allows to consider it reasonable that the assassins acted for themselves and there was no monarchist plot against the Kadets, as many contemporaries assumed.

Abstract This article historicizes the transnational counterinsurgency that the U.S.-Philippine governments have conducted against diasporic Filipino/a/x activists. In examining the period of the Cold War to the early 2020s, it makes a case for recognizing existing continuities of counterinsurgency tactics targeted at Filipinos in the United States, such as extradition, deportation, surveillance, and assassination. The Philippine state’s resort to red-baiting during the Cold War and contemporary “red-tagging” has aimed at the elimination of communism and terrorism at home and beyond its national borders, at the expense of human rights. This long history of counterinsurgency also highlights the acceleration and formalization of diasporic Filipino organizations dedicated to promoting democracy in the Philippines during the period of martial law under President Ferdinand E. Marcos, showing how diasporic Filipinos organized opposition not only to dictatorship, but also U.S. support for violent regimes. The transnational opposition against Marcos and then President Rodrigo R. Duterte has characterized diasporic Filipinos as a primary component of democratic movements in both the United States and the Philippines who have linked domestic racial oppression to U.S. imperialism and state fascism in the Philippines.

AbstractScholars have credited the victory of Edward Brooke, America's first popularly elected black U.S. senator, to a “deracialized” or “color-blind” election strategy in which both the candidate and the electorate ignored racial matters. This article revises this prevailing historical explanation of Brooke's election. Drawing from the historical-ideational paradigm of Desmond King and Rogers Smith, this paper argues that Brooke was much more of a “race-conscious” candidate than is generally remembered. Primary documents from the 1966 campaign reveal that Brooke spoke openly against racial inequality, argued in favor of racially targeted policies, and called for stronger racial equality legislation. In addition, this paper argues that Brooke's appeals were not targeted primarily to the state's small black population but to liberal whites. Far from ignoring race, internal campaign documents and interviews with campaign staff reveal that Brooke's campaign strategists sought to appeal to white desires to “do the right thing” by electing an African American candidate. Internal polling documents from the Brooke campaign and newspaper commentaries further demonstrate that a proportion of the white electorate cited Brooke's race as the reason for supporting his candidacy. This paper suggests that Brooke's election was extremely well timed—coming soon after the passage of the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act but before the urban riots of the “long hot summer of 1967”, the King assassination riots, and anti-busing riots in Boston. The first half of Brooke's 1966 campaign slogan “Proudly for Brooke: A Creative Republican” signals the race-conscious dynamics of his candidacy.

An emerging consensus holds that achieving successful counter-movement outcomes requires combining overt repression (e.g. raids, arrests, and targeted assassination) with covert repression (e.g. monitoring, agents provocateurs, and wiretapping). Research in this article disputes the presumed complementarity between overt and covert repressive tactics. When overt repression signals new information about the state’s covert intelligence collection program, challengers respond in ways that frustrate efforts to accumulate new intelligence. These propositions are investigated using original, weekly panel data on a black nationalist insurgent organization, the Republic of New Africa (RNA), and US Red Squad counter-movement activities directed against this group (between 1968 and 1971). Using archived materials generated by various policing agencies and their rivals in the RNA, the analyses provide new understanding of dynamics rarely observed or analyzed systematically. Findings reveal that the two methods of political repression can work at cross purposes. Overt repression motivates challenger adaption towards less readily observable tactics and organizational forms; covert repression subsequently fails to identify challengers’ actions or identities. These findings hold even while controlling for challenger mobilization and government investment in covert repression. In addition to advancing our understanding of what happens to behavioral challengers when governments repress, the results help to shed light on some of the factors that make defeating domestic challengers so difficult. Each ‘step forward’ taken by counter-movement forces potentially makes the next one more difficult.

Risks to journalists are rising with disasters, epidemics, physical, mental and digital harassment all increasing globally. Some 1382 journalists have been killed since 1992 and 246 are imprisoned. However, the threat type has been changing, with the majority of journalists killed annually being ones working in their own country, often who are targeted for assassination. In response, UNESCO and others have called for research into best practice for safety education to halt this and the consequential decline in global media freedom. This five-year award winning project, A Holistic Humanitarian Approach to Enhance the Safety and Resilience of Journalists Globally, tested the hypothesis that a new pedagogy based on a ‘holistic humanitarian’ philosophy would be more effective in protecting journalists working in dangerous domains globally than existing provisions. The little-changed 30-year-old dominant international provision, the ‘military battlefield’ pedagogy, is used by the world’s major news organizations like BBC, CNN and the New York Times. This new pedagogy adapted and customized best practice from other professions and used Taylor’s 2020 Competencies for Disaster Healthcare professionals. A new program was devised and the two international cohorts who took it in 2018 and 2019 judged that it ‘very significantly’ enhanced their resilience and safety skills. Its concentration on group and individual physical and mental resilience building, risk mitigation, psychology, communication, self-defence, and digital security skill acquisition was a paradigm shift in training internationally for news professionals in dangerous environments. The research, thus, proved the study’s hypotheses.

The images of Afghanistan are quite often occupied with the long history of conflicts since late 1970s. Even some knew the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud on the eve of 911 attacks on the US soil in 2001. The year of 2001 was a historic turning point for the country to re-start state building from the ashes of two decades of war. In other words, 2001 can be seen as a new beginning of peacebuilding in Afghanistan. This article will examine a possible peacebuilding in Afghanistan from the perspective of rural life after 2001. It is often argued that peacebuilding means to establish state institutions and rule of laws and to introduce a democratic system. This paper, however, aims to highlight the rural daily life and local governance system in order to lead a stable and effective peacebuilding in Afghanistan. For that purpose, based on the interviews conducted between 2003 and 20131 it is, therefore, emphasised that the importance of peacebuilding in rural area, not the top-down peacebuilding, is critical to materialise peace in the country. This article will investigate the life in rural Afghanistan and based on that, highlights the descent and humble needs of villagers, farmers and ex-combatants for life that directly indicate a way to establish peace from rural area. It would also imply the gap between the reconstructions of state system and the needs of the people in rural area. This article, therefore, (1) touches upon brief background of the targeted rural districts, and (2) examines the needs of the people in the rural area and finally (3) highlights the community structure and local governance in rural Afghanistan.

The question of how to contend with terrorism in keeping with our preexisting moral and legal commitments now challenges Europe as well as Israel and the United States: how do we apply Just War Theory and International Law to asymmetrical warfare, specifically to our counter terrorism measures? What can the classic moral argument in Just and Unjust Wars teach us about contemporary targeted killings with drones? I begin with a defense of targeted killing, arguing for the advantages of pin pointed attacks over any alternative measure available for combatting terrorism. Assuming the legitimacy of killing combatants in wartime, I argue, there is nothing wrong, and in fact much that is right, with targeting particular terrorists selected by name, as long as their assassinations can be reasonably expected to reduce terrorist hostilities rather than increase it. Subsequently, I offer some further thoughts and comments on the use of remotely piloted aircrafts to carry out targeted killings, and address the various sources for discomfort with this practice identified by Michael Walzer and others.

Foreign policy is embodied in the pursuit of national interests by States in their interaction with other countries. The attainment of Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress (ANC) led majority rule statehood and its relationship with the midwife, the United States, provides us with one of the most complex case study examined between the late 1980s until the present. At the end of the Cold War, a period which coincided with the decolonisation of several countries in Southern Africa including Namibia and South Africa, following mediation by the US, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Affairs, Chester Crocker United States, predicted on its new found relationship with the then United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its presence in Angola, informed the decolonization of the sub-regional in which the US targeted South Africa’s apartheid regime towards abandoning its military destabilisation activities and providing security guarantees to the white minority community under the new African majority regime.The result was the withdrawal of Cuban forces in Angola, Namibia independence and finally, the ANC led by the long imprisoned Nelson Mandela at the head of the first coalition government. Consequently, this immediate post-independence arrangement constrained the freedom of action of the ANC during its first term in power. In the subsequent era, the evidence reveals tension and clashes of interests between Washington and Pretoria manifest in at least three areas: creating an African coalition during 2006 against US policy preferences such as the deployment of Africa Command (AFRICOM) on the continent; the 2010 entering into an international political economy of BRICS against Washington’s global dominance and finally, the 2011 coalition attempts under the auspices of the African Union (AU) challenge towards Western intervention in Libya and the deposition of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi on 23 October 2011.Based on secondary sources, newspaper, academic thesis and other official reports this article examines the tensions that developed between Washington and Tshwane/Pretoria over their intentions over Africa. This assesses three areas of foreign policy relationships depicting: contestation, belligerence and finally belated confrontation.These phases begin with the 2006 US intention to locate AFRICOM in Africa, a development openly opposed by President Thabo Mbeki through the AU. This is followed by South Africa joining the global economic competitors made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) at the invitation by China. This competitive relationship not only challenged the existing World Bank and IMF dominance but created an entry point for China in Africa. Finally, the article examines the US policy on Libya of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 after adopting UN Resolution 1973 in a subsequent development that went against the AU and South Africa, culminating in the capture and assassination of Gaddaffi on 23 October 2011. Conclusively, the US-South Africa relationship over Africa has been characterised by phases of belligerence, collegial neutrality and uncooperative behaviour.

Between 2005 and 2015, organized criminal groups murdered 209 politicians in Mexico. This paper explains why. It argues that the two interwoven trends of political and criminal pluralization in Mexico fostered the conditions for a new type of criminal violence against politicians. Mexican politicians are now targeted for accepting illicit money as well as for standing up to criminals. Moreover, this violence is evidence of an alarming and persistent pattern in Mexico of politicians enlisting criminal organizations to eliminate their political competition. Using a zero-inflated negative binomial model, this paper shows there is a strong statistical relationship between the increase in assassinations and the increases in political pluralization and criminal fragmentation. The article concludes that the failure to protect local public officials creates greater opportunities for the emergence of subnational authoritarian enclaves and threatens democratic consolidation.

The picture of everyday life in besieged Nablus that emerges from this essay is one of simultaneous fragmentation and social cohesion: fragmentation in the class and generational tensions, factional power struggles, estrangement between townsmen and camp dwellers; social cohesion in the enduring family and solidarity networks, well-organized grassroots committees, and the unifying impact of Israeli military pressures. While shedding light on the radical cultural, demographic, and structural transformations underway, this closely observed personal narrative also conveys the sense of imprisonment that characterizes this virtually sealed off town subjected to individual and collective punishments, from targeted assassinations to selective curfews and the intentional destruction of infrastructure and architectural patrimony.

In this essay, researcher Paul Gaston Aaron reviews Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations, by Israeli military and intelligence affairs journalist Ronen Bergman. Drawing on his deep knowledge of the subject, Aaron lauds the book for its fine-grained and chilling accounts of the mechanisms of clandestine warfare. Aaron also points out that Bergman offers no critique of the moral dilemma entrenched in policies that violate international law even when it becomes clear that the mantra to kill or be killed has little to do with state security and much more to do with raising the Israeli public's morale, destabilizing Palestinian society, and thwarting Palestinians' attempts at self-determination by disrupting their ruling structures. While Bergman does not question the underlying premise of the targeted killing policy, which assumes a threat, to which what Israel does is a response, he tries to redeem a few individuals by making a distinction between what he sees as an ethically responsible warrior class and an opportunistic political elite.

The foundation of social order, the primary essence and basic nucleus of every political organization, rests in the family, without whose stable and healthy development, the prosperity of the nation is impossible. On the afternoon of August 10, 1959, several dozen Dominican and Cuban women gathered in the streets of Havana. Dressed in black as though headed to a funeral, they mourned the political situation in the neighboring Dominican Republic. Specifically, they targeted the dictator Rafael Trujillo, calling him the “Jackal of the Caribbean.” As they paraded through the streets carrying placards and visiting newspaper offices, tliey were focusing attention on their specific struggles as women and motliers. Their posters read, “Dominican Women Support the Revolutionary Government”; “We Ask for the Expulsion of Trujillo from the OAS”; and “We Represent the Mourning of the Assassinations Committed by Trujillo.”

The foundation of social order, the primary essence and basic nucleus of every political organization, rests in the family, without whose stable and healthy development, the prosperity of the nation is impossible.On the afternoon of August 10, 1959, several dozen Dominican and Cuban women gathered in the streets of Havana. Dressed in black as though headed to a funeral, they mourned the political situation in the neighboring Dominican Republic. Specifically, they targeted the dictator Rafael Trujillo, calling him the “Jackal of the Caribbean.” As they paraded through the streets carrying placards and visiting newspaper offices, tliey were focusing attention on their specific struggles as women and motliers. Their posters read, “Dominican Women Support the Revolutionary Government”; “We Ask for the Expulsion of Trujillo from the OAS”; and “We Represent the Mourning of the Assassinations Committed by Trujillo.”

Abstract Territorial displacements, stolen lands, repression, targeted assassinations, and forced disappearances among rural communities in Mexico and Colombia are constant threats that generate complex and urgent questions on the fragile conditions in which the residents of these communities live their day-to-day lives. In this article, I examine recent graphic novels that take an ethical stand to discuss local events in their connections to drug-trafficking, para-State, and other contemporary forms of violence. While there are divergent reasons, conditions and challenges for the creation, distribution, and reception of these graphic novels in such contexts, their authors use similar semiotic and literary mechanisms to imagine and represent these types of violence, and aim to include voices usually omitted, and/or displaced in the narration of these conflicts. I argue that it is precisely due to these inclusions that the role of these works in the politics of narrative and memory of armed conflicts in these Latin American countries is essential for the recognition of new human geographies and cartographies generated by the forced disappearance and uprooting of these communities using violence.

Abstract In June 1835, the Brazilian parliament promulgated a stringent law which punished enslaved persons convicted of assassinating their masters with capital punishment. Called the “law of necessity,” the regulation targeted the leaders of slave rebellions and established the death penalty as punishment against slave resistance. Research on the enforcement of the law demonstrated that while the regulation increased public hangings of the enslaved, overall fewer convict slaves were executed because of the law than had their sentences commuted to galé perpétua or a lifetime of penal servitude in public works. Analyzing slave petitions to commute death penalty sentences to penal servitude, this article intervenes in the debates on punishing the enslaved which connects labor history with the history of punishment. The research probes convicts’ understanding of the construction of Brazilian legal culture while analyzing the tensions between slave-owners and imperial authorities on punishing the enslaved.

In democratic countries, the so-called covert actions are the most controversial element of the intelligence services activities. Covert actions are secret operations aimed, inter alia, at influencing the political, economic or military situation of other countries (e.g., inspiring coups d’état, paramilitary actions, assassinations, training and financing of armed troops or the use of “black” propaganda). Covert actions are a powerful tool in the hands of the executive, but they should be effectively controlled by the legislative authority. The purpose of the article is to analyze the powers of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States of America to control covert actions. The author presents current legal and organizational solutions and also indicates how, under the influence of successive covert action scandals, legal provisions have changed in the direction of extending the powers of the Congress in the field of control. At the same time, the author presents problems with the interpretation of some legal solutions in the context of the supervision of the Congress after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the extension of covert actions to include actions of special forces and targeted killings of terrorists.

The insurgent group known as Boko Haram have carried out targeted assassinations, shootings and bombings, which led to deaths, destructions and displacements of Millions in north-eastern Nigeria. These crippled the region’s economic, cultural and social status, which attracted various forms of humanitarian supports from philanthropists, governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It is against this backdrop that this paper examines the adverse effects of humanitarian supports by NGOs on socioeconomic development in Maiduguri, Nigeria. The study adopted qualitative approach using FGD in generating data from beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of humanitarian support in selected communities of Maiduguri. The study revealed government reluctances and over-reliance of people on the support provided by the NGOs. The standard of living has ascended because of the operations of NGOs. Supports provided by NGOs have further distorted the community’s social cohesion as it created various forms of domestic violence and conflict between displaced persons and host communities. In addition, it has increased social vice such as sexual exploitation and abuse in an effort to get provisions/employment. There are further continuous accusations that NGOs are supporting Boko Haram group with food and logistics. The study concluded that the operations of NGOs would contribute in prolonging the physical and social insecurity in crises ravaged areas if not adequately regulated/monitored. Thus, recommended that NGOs do more capacity building programmes than emergency relief supports. Governments should regulate the operations of NGOs by introducing strict policies that will force them to be transparent and accountable, and operate in line with counter-insurgency strategies.

The importance of big data is widely accepted in various fields. Organisations spend a lot of money to collect, process and mine the data to identify patterns. These patterns facilitate their future decision-making process to improve the organisational performance and profitability. However, among discovered patterns, there are some meaningless and misleading patterns which restrict the effectiveness of decision-making process. The presence of data discrepancies, noise and outliers also impacts the quality of discovered patterns and leads towards missing strategic goals and objectives. Quality inception of these discovered patterns is vital before utilising them in making predictions, decision-making process or strategic planning. Mining useful and credible patterns over social media is a challenging task. Often, people spread targeted content for character assassination or defamation of brands. Recently, some studies have evaluated the credibility of information over social media based on users’ surveys, experts’ judgement and manually annotating Twitter tweets to predict credibility. Unfortunately, due to the large volume and exponential growth of data, these surveys and annotation-based information credibility techniques are not efficiently applicable. This article presents a data quality and credibility evaluation framework to determine the quality of individual data instances. This framework provides a way to discover useful and credible patterns using credibility indicators. Moreover, a new Twitter bot detection algorithm is proposed to classify tweets generated by Twitter bots and real users. The results of conducted experiments showed that the proposed model generates a positive impact on improving classification accuracy and quality of discovered patterns.

Abstract Background: The on-going Russo-Ukrainian war has resulted in a renewed global interest in the safety and security of nuclear installations and the possibility of nuclear disasters caused by warfare and terrorism. The objective of this study was to identify and characterize all documented terrorist attacks against nuclear transport, nuclear facilities, and nuclear scientists as reported to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) over a 50-year period. Methods: The GTD was searched for all terrorist attacks against nuclear facilities, nuclear scientists, nuclear transport, and other nuclear industry-related targets in the period from 1970-2020. Analyses were performed on temporal factors, location, target type, attack and weapon type, perpetrator type, number of casualties, and property value loss. Results: Ninety-one incidents that occurred from 1970 through 2020 were included. Incidents took place in 25 countries and nine world regions, with most (42; 46.1%) occurring in Western Europe. During these 50 years, 91 incidents resulted in 19 fatalities and 117 injuries. One perpetrator was killed during an incident and one other assailant was injured. Bombings and explosions were the most frequently identified attack type (n = 40; 44.0%), followed by facility/infrastructure damage (n = 24; 26.4%) and armed assaults and assassinations (both n = 7; 7.7%). Nuclear power plants and reactors under construction were targeted in 13 (14.3%) and eight (8.8%) incidents, respectively. Most of the attacks took place on other nuclear industry-related sites. Conclusion: Terrorist attacks carried out by non-state perpetrators against nuclear facilities, nuclear scientists, nuclear transport, and other nuclear industry-related targets are rare, with only 91 incidents in a 50-year period. None of the attacks resulted in radioactive fallout or environmental contamination. Most of the attacks took place outside a nuclear power plant.

In the 1960s, especially in the West, art that was revelatory and art that was revealing operated at opposite ends of the aesthetic spectrum. On the side of the revelatory we can think of encounters synonymous with modernism, in which an expressionist painting was revelatory of the Freudian unconscious, or a Barnett Newman the revelatory intensity of the sublime. By contrast, the impulse to reveal in 1960s art was rooted in post-Duchampian practice, implicating artists as different as Lynda Benglis and Richard Hamilton, who mined the potential of an art that was without essence. If revelatory art underscored modernism’s transcendental conviction, critically revealing work tested its discursive rules and institutional conventions. Of course, nothing in history happens as neatly as this suggests, but what is clear is how polarized the language of artistic revelation was throughout the 1960s. With the international spread of minimalism, pop art, and fluxus, provisional reveals eventually dominated art-historical discourse. Aesthetic conviction, with its spiritual undertones, was haunted by its demystification. In the words of Donald Judd: “a work needs only to be interesting” (184).That art galleries could be sites of timely socio-political issues, rather than timeless intuitions undersigned by medium specificity, is one of the more familiar origin stories of postmodernism. Few artists symbolize this shift more than Hans Haacke, whose 2019 exhibition All Connected, at the New Museum, New York, examined the legacy of his outward-looking work. Born in Germany in 1936, and a New Yorker since 1965, Haacke has been linked to the term “institutional critique” since the mid 1980s, after Mel Ramsden’s coining in 1975, and the increased recognition of kindred spirits such as Mierle Laderman Ukeles, Michael Asher, Martha Rosler, Robert Smithson, Daniel Buren, and Marcel Broodthaers. These artists have featured in books and essays by the likes of Benjamin Buchloh, Hal Foster, and Yve-Alain Bois, but they are also known for their own contributions to art discourse, producing hybrid conceptions of the intellectual postmodern artist as historian, critic and curator.Haacke was initially fascinated by kinetic sculpture in the early 1960s, taking inspiration from op art, systems art, and machine-oriented research collectives such as Zero (Germany), Gruppo N (Italy) and GRAV (France, an acronym of Groupe de Recherche d’Art Visuel). Towards the end of the decade he started to produce more overtly socio-political work, creating what would become a classic piece from this period, Gallery-Goers’ Birthplace and Residence Profile, Part 1 (1969). Here, in a solo exhibition at New York’s Howard Wise Gallery, the artist invited viewers to mark their birthplaces and places of residence on a map. Questioning the statistical demography of the Gallery’s avant-garde attendees, the exhibition anticipated the meticulous sociological character of much of his practice to come, grounding New York art – the centre of the art world – in local, social, and economic fabrics.In the forward to the catalogue of All Connected, New Museum Director Lisa Philips claims that Haacke’s survey exhibition provided a chance to reflect on the artist’s prescience, especially given the flourishing of art activism over the last five or so years. Philips pressed the issue of why no other American art institution had mounted a retrospective of his work in three decades, since his previous survey, Unfinished Business, at the New Museum in 1986, at its former, and much smaller, Soho digs (8). It suggests that other institutions have deemed Haacke’s work too risky, generating too much political heat for them to handle. It’s a reputation the artist has cultivated since the Guggenheim Museum famously cancelled his 1971 exhibition after learning his intended work, Shapolsky et al. Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, A Real Time Social System as of May 1, 1971 (1971) involved research into dubious New York real estate dealings. Guggenheim director Thomas Messer defended the censorship at the time, going so far as to describe it as an “alien substance that had entered the art museum organism” (Haacke, Framing 138). Exposé was this substance Messer dare not name: art that was too revealing, too journalistic, too partisan, and too politically viscid. (Three years later, Haacke got his own back with Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum Board of Trustees, 1974, exposing then Guggenheim board members’ connections to the copper industry in Chile, where socialist president Salvador Allende had just been overthrown with US backing.) All Connected foregrounded these institutional reveals from time past, at a moment in 2019 when the moral accountability of the art institution was on the art world’s collective mind. The exhibition followed high-profile protests at New York’s Whitney Museum and Metropolitan Museum of Art, as well as at Sydney’s Museum of Contemporary Art, the Louvre, and the British Museum. These and other arts organisations have increasingly faced pressures, fostered by social media, to end ties with unethical donors, sponsors, and board members, with activist groups protesting institutional affiliations ranging from immigration detention centre management to opioid and teargas manufacturing. An awareness of the limits of individual agency and autonomy undoubtedly defines this era, with social media platforms intensifying the encumbrances of individual, group, and organisational identities. Hans Haacke, Gallery-Goers’ Birthplace and Residence Profile, Part 1, 1969 Hans Haacke, Gallery-Goers’ Birthplace and Residence Profile, Part 2, 1969-71Unfinished BusinessUnderscoring Haacke’s activist credentials, Philips describes him as “a model of how to live ethically and empathetically in the world today”, and as a beacon of light amidst the “extreme political and economic uncertainty” of the present, Trump-presidency-calamity moment (7). This was markedly different to how Haacke’s previous New York retrospective, Unfinished Business, was received, which bore the weight of being the artist’s first museum exhibition in New York following the Guggenheim controversy. In the catalogue to Haacke’s 1986 exhibition, then New Museum director Marcia Tucker introduced his work as a challenge, cautiously claiming that he poses “trenchant questions” and that the institution accepts “the difficulties and contradictions” inherent to any museum staging of his work (6).Philips’s and Tucker’s distinct perspectives on Haacke’s practice – one as heroically ethical, the other as a sobering critical challenge – exemplify broader shifts in the perception of institutional critique (the art of the socio-political reveal) over this thirty-year period. In the words of Pamela M. Lee, between 1986 and 2019 the art world has undergone a “seismic transformation”, becoming “a sphere of influence at once more rapacious, acquisitive, and overweening but arguably more democratizing and ecumenical with respect to new audiences and artists involved” (87). Haacke’s reputation over this period has taken a similar shift, from him being a controversial opponent of art’s autonomy (an erudite postmodern conceptualist) to a figurehead for moral integrity and cohesive artistic experimentation.As Rosalyn Deutsche pointed out in the catalogue to Haacke’s 1986 exhibition, a potential trap of such a retrospective is that, through biographical positioning, Haacke might be seen as an “exemplary political artist” (210). With this, the specific political issues motivating his work would be overshadowed by the perception of the “great artist” – someone who brings single-issue politics into the narrative of postmodern art, but at the expense of the issues themselves. This is exactly what Douglas Crimp discovered in Unfinished Business. In a 1987 reflection on the show, Crimp argued that, when compared with an AIDS-themed display, Homo Video, staged at the New Museum at the same time, reviewers of Haacke’s exhibition tended to analyse his politics “within the context of the individual artist’s body of work … . Political issues became secondary to the aesthetic strategies of the producer” (34). Crimp, whose activism would be at the forefront of his career in subsequent years, was surprised at how Homo Video and Unfinished Business spawned different readings. Whereas works in the former exhibition tended to be addressed in terms of the artists personal and partisan politics, Haacke’s prompted reflection on the aesthetics-politics juxtaposition itself. For Crimp, the fact that “there was no mediation between these two shows”, spoke volumes about the divisions between political and activist art at the time.New York Times critic Michael Brenson, reiterating a comment made by Fredric Jameson in the catalogue for Unfinished Business, describes the timeless appearance of Haacke’s work in 1986, which is “surprising for an artist whose work is in some way about ideology and history” (Brenson). The implication is that the artist gives a surprisingly long aesthetic afterlife to the politically specific – to ordinarily short shelf-life issues. In this mode of critical postmodernism in which we are unable to distinguish clearly between intervening in and merely reproducing the logic of the system, Haacke is seen as an astute director of an albeit ambiguous push and pull between political specificity and aesthetic irreducibility, political externality and the internalist mode of art about art. Jameson, while granting that Haacke’s work highlights the need to reinvent the role of the “ruling class” in the complex, globalised socio-economic situation of postmodernism, claims that it does so as representative of the “new intellectual problematic” of postmodernism. Haacke, according Jameson, stages postmodernism’s “crisis of ‘mapping’” whereby capitalism’s totalizing, systemic forms are “handled” (note that he avoids “critiqued” or “challenged”) by focusing on their manifestation through particular (“micro-public”) institutional means (49, 50).We can think of the above examples as constituting the postmodern version of Haacke, who frames very specific political issues on the one hand, and the limitless incorporative power of appropriative practice on the other. To say this another way, Haacke, circa 1986, points to specific sites of power struggle at the same time as revealing their generic absorption by an art-world system grown accustomed to its “duplicate anything” parameters. For all of his political intent, the artistic realm, totalised in accordance with the postmodern image, is ultimately where many thought his gestures remained. The philosopher turned art critic Arthur Danto, in a negative review of Haacke’s exhibition, portrayed institutional critique as part of an age-old business of purifying art, maintaining that Haacke’s “crude” and “heavy-handed” practice is blind to how art institutions have always relied on some form of critique in order for them to continue being respected “brokers of spirit”. This perception – of Haacke’s “external” critiques merely serving to “internally” strengthen existing art structures – was reiterated by Leo Steinberg. Supportively misconstruing the artist in the exhibition catalogue, Steinberg writes that Haacke’s “political message, by dint of dissonance, becomes grating and shrill – but shrill within the art context. And while its political effectiveness is probably minimal, its effect on Minimal art may well be profound” (15). Hans Haacke, MOMA Poll, 1970 All ConnectedSo, what do we make of the transformed reception of Haacke’s work since the late 1980s: from a postmodern ouroboros of “politicizing aesthetics and aestheticizing politics” to a revelatory exemplar of art’s moral power? At a period in the late 1980s when the culture wars were in full swing and yet activist groups remained on the margins of what would become a “mainstream” art world, Unfinished Business was, perhaps, blindingly relevant to its times. Unusually for a retrospective, it provided little historical distance for its subject, with Haacke becoming a victim of the era’s propensity to “compartmentalize the interpretive registers of inside and outside and the terms corresponding to such spatial­izing coordinates” (Lee 83).If commentary surrounding this 2019 retrospective is anything to go by, politics no longer performs such a parasitic, oppositional or even dialectical relation to art; no longer is the political regarded as a real-world intrusion into the formal, discerning, longue-durée field of aesthetics. The fact that protests inside the museum have become more visible and vociferous in recent years testifies to this shift. For Jason Farrago, in his review of All Connected for the New York Times, “the fact that no person and no artwork stands alone, that all of us are enmeshed in systems of economic and social power, is for anyone under 40 a statement of the obvious”. For Alyssa Battistoni, in Frieze magazine, “if institutional critique is a practice, it is hard to see where it is better embodied than in organizing a union, strike or boycott”.Some responders to All Connected, such as Ben Lewis, acknowledge how difficult it is to extract a single critical or political strategy from Haacke’s body of work; however, we can say that, in general, earlier postmodern questions concerning the aestheticisation of the socio-political reveal no longer dominates the reception of his practice. Today, rather than treating art and politics are two separate but related entities, like form is to content, better ideas circulate, such as those espoused by Bruno Latour and Jacques Rancière, for whom what counts as political is not determined by a specific program, medium or forum, but by the capacity of any actor-network to disrupt and change a normative social fabric. Compare Jameson’s claim that Haacke’s corporate and museological tropes are “dead forms” – through which “no subject-position speaks, not even in protest” (38) – with Battistoni’s, who, seeing Haacke’s activism as implicit, asks the reader: “how can we take the relationship between art and politics as seriously as Haacke has insisted we must?”Crimp’s concern that Unfinished Business perpetuated an image of the artist as distant from the “political stakes” of his work did not carry through to All Connected, whose respondents were less vexed about the relation between art and politics, with many noting its timeliness. The New Museum was, ironically, undergoing its own equity crisis in the months leading up to the exhibition, with newly unionised staff fighting with the Museum over workers’ salaries and healthcare even as it organised to build a new $89-million Rem Koolhaas-designed extension. Battistoni addressed these disputes at-length, claiming the protests “crystallize perfectly the changes that have shaped the world over the half-century of Haacke’s career, and especially over the 33 years since his last New Museum exhibition”. Of note is how little attention Battistoni pays to Haacke’s artistic methods when recounting his assumed solidarity with these disputes, suggesting that works such as Creating Consent (1981), Helmosboro Country (1990), and Standortkultur (Corporate Culture) (1997) – which pivot on art’s public image versus its corporate umbilical cord – do not convey some special aesthetico-political insight into a totalizing capitalist system. Instead, “he has simply been an astute and honest observer long enough to remind us that our current state of affairs has been in formation for decades”.Hans Haacke, News, 1969/2008 Hans Haacke, Wide White Flow, 1967/2008 Showing Systems Early on in the 1960s, Haacke was influenced by the American critic, artist, and curator Jack Burnham, who in a 1968 essay, “Systems Esthetics” for Artforum, inaugurated the loose conceptualist paradigm that would become known as “systems art”. Here, against Greenbergian formalism and what he saw as the “craft fetishism” of modernism, Burnham argues that “change emanates, not from things, but from the way things are done” (30). Burnham thought that emergent contemporary artists were intuitively aware of the importance of the systems approach: the significant artist in 1968 “strives to reduce the technical and psychical distance between his artistic output and the productive means of society”, and pays particular attention to relationships between organic and non-organic systems (31).As Michael Fried observed of minimalism in his now legendary 1967 essay Art and Objecthood, this shift in sixties art – signalled by the widespread interest in the systematic – entailed a turn towards the spatial, institutional, and societal contexts of receivership. For Burnham, art is not about “material entities” that beautify or modify the environment; rather, art exists “in relations between people and between people and the components of their environment” (31). At the forefront of his mind was land art, computer art, and research-driven conceptualist practice, which, against Fried, has “no contrived confines such as the theatre proscenium or picture frame” (32). In a 1969 lecture at the Guggenheim, Burnham confessed that his research concerned not just art as a distinct entity, but aesthetics in its broadest possible sense, declaring “as far as art is concerned, I’m not particularly interested in it. I believe that aesthetics exists in revelation” (Ragain).Working under the aegis of Burnham’s systems art, Haacke was shaken by the tumultuous and televised politics of late-1960s America – a time when, according to Joan Didion, a “demented and seductive vortical tension was building in the community” (41). Haacke cites Martin Luther King’s assassination as an “incident that made me understand that, in addition to what I had called physical and biological systems, there are also social systems and that art is an integral part of the universe of social systems” (Haacke, Conversation 222). Haacke created News (1969) in response to this awareness, comprising a (pre-Twitter) telex machine that endlessly spits out live news updates from wire services, piling up rolls and rolls of paper on the floor of the exhibition space over the course of its display. Echoing Burnham’s idea of the artist as a programmer whose job is to “prepare new codes and analyze data”, News nonetheless presents the museum as anything but immune from politics, and technological systems as anything but impersonal (32).This intensification of social responsibility in Haacke’s work sets him apart from other, arguably more reductive techno-scientific systems artists such as Sonia Sheridan and Les Levine. The gradual transformation of his ecological and quasi-scientific sculptural experiments from 1968 onwards could almost be seen as making a mockery of the anthropocentrism described in Fried’s 1967 critique. Here, Fried claims not only that the literalness of minimalist work amounts to an emphasis on shape and spatial presence over pictorial composition, but also, in this “theatricality of objecthood” literalness paradoxically mirrors (153). At times in Fried’s essay the minimalist art object reads as a mute form of sociality, the spatial presence filled by the conscious experience of looking – the theatrical relationship itself put on view. Fried thought that viewers of minimalism were presented with themselves in relation to the entire world as object, to which they were asked not to respond in an engaged formalist sense but (generically) to react. Pre-empting the rise of conceptual art and the sociological experiments of post-conceptualist practice, Fried, unapprovingly, argues that minimalist artists unleash an anthropomorphism that “must somehow confront the beholder” (154).Haacke, who admits he has “always been sympathetic to so-called Minimal art” (Haacke, A Conversation 26) embraced the human subject around the same time that Fried’s essay was published. While Fried would have viewed this move as further illustrating the minimalist tendency towards anthropomorphic confrontation, it would be more accurate to describe Haacke’s subsequent works as social-environmental barometers. Haacke began staging interactions which, however dry or administrative, framed the interplays of culture and nature, inside and outside, private and public spheres, expanding art’s definition by looking to the social circulation and economy that supported it.Haacke’s approach – which seems largely driven to show, to reveal – anticipates the viewer in a way that Fried would disapprove, for whom absorbed viewers, and the irreduction of gestalt to shape, are the by-products of assessments of aesthetic quality. For Donald Judd, the promotion of interest over conviction signalled scepticism about Clement Greenberg’s quality standards; it was a way of acknowledging the limitations of qualitative judgement, and, perhaps, of knowledge more generally. In this way, minimalism’s aesthetic relations are not framed so much as allowed to “go on and on” – the artists’ doubt about aesthetic value producing this ongoing temporal quality, which conviction supposedly lacks.In contrast to Unfinished Business, the placing of Haacke’s early sixties works adjacent to his later, more political works in All Connected revealed something other than the tensions between postmodern socio-political reveal and modernist-formalist revelation. The question of whether to intervene in an operating system – whether to let such a system go on and on – was raised throughout the exhibition, literally and metaphorically. To be faced with the interactions of physical, biological, and social systems (in Condensation Cube, 1963-67, and Wide White Flow, 1967/2008, but also in later works like MetroMobiltan, 1985) is to be faced with the question of change and one’s place in it. Framing systems in full swing, at their best, Haacke’s kinetic and environmental works suggest two things: 1. That the systems on display will be ongoing if their component parts aren’t altered; and 2. Any alteration will alter the system as a whole, in minor or significant ways. Applied to his practice more generally, what Haacke’s work hinges on is whether or not one perceives oneself as part of its systemic relations. To see oneself implicated is to see beyond the work’s literal forms and representations. Here, systemic imbrication equates to moral realisation: one’s capacity to alter the system as the question of what to do. Unlike the phenomenology-oriented minimalists, the viewer’s participation is not always assumed in Haacke’s work, who follows a more hermeneutic model. In fact, Haacke’s systems are often circular, highlighting participation as a conscious disruption of flow rather than an obligation that emanates from a particular work (148).This is a theatrical scenario as Fried describes it, but it is far from an abandonment of the issue of profound value. In fact, if we accept that Haacke’s work foregrounds intervention as a moral choice, it is closer to Fried’s own rallying cry for conviction in aesthetic judgement. As Rex Butler has argued, Fried’s advocacy of conviction over sceptical interest can be understood as dialectical in the Hegelian sense: conviction is the overcoming of scepticism, in a similar way that Geist, or spirit, for Hegel, is “the very split between subject and object, in which each makes the other possible” (Butler). What is advanced for Fried is the idea of “a scepticism that can be remarked only from the position of conviction and a conviction that can speak of itself only as this scepticism” (for instance, in his attempt to overcome his scepticism of literalist art on the basis of its scepticism). Strong and unequivocal feelings in Fried’s writing are informed by weak and indeterminate feeling, just as moral conviction in Haacke – the feeling that I, the viewer, should do something – emerges from an awareness that the system will continue to function fine without me. In other words, before being read as “a barometer of the changing and charged atmosphere of the public sphere” (Sutton 16), the impact of Haacke’s work depends upon an initial revelation. It is the realisation not just that one is embroiled in a series of “invisible but fundamental” relations greater than oneself, but that, in responding to seemingly sovereign social systems, the question of our involvement is a moral one, a claim for determination founded through an overcoming of the systemic (Fry 31).Haacke’s at once open and closed works suit the logic of our algorithmic age, where viewers have to shift constantly from a position of being targeted to one of finding for oneself. Peculiarly, when Haacke’s online digital polls in All Connected were hacked by activists (who randomized statistical responses in order to compel the Museum “to redress their continuing complacency in capitalism”) the culprits claimed they did it in sympathy with his work, not in spite of it: “we see our work as extending and conversing with Haacke’s, an artist and thinker who has been a source of inspiration to us both” (Hakim). This response – undermining done with veneration – is indicative of the complicated legacy of his work today. Haacke’s influence on artists such as Tania Bruguera, Sam Durant, Forensic Architecture, Laura Poitras, Carsten Höller, and Andrea Fraser has less to do with a particular political ideal than with his unique promotion of journalistic suspicion and moral revelation in forms of systems mapping. It suggests a coda be added to the sentiment of All Connected: all might not be revealed, but how we respond matters. 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