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1

Gauthier, Annie. Pink link, ou, La proposition rose. Montréal]: La Centrale Galerie Powerhouse, 2001.

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2

M, Herbert Lynn, Porter Jenelle, Heon Laura Steward, and Contemporary Arts Museum (Houston), eds. Matthew Ritchie: Proposition player. Houston, Tex: Contemporary Arts Museum in association with Hatje Cantz, 2003.

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3

Besson, Pierre. Qui est là?: Une proposition. [Paris]: J.M. Place, 2001.

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4

Vortex of silence: Proposition for an art criticism beyond aesthetic categories. Milano: Charta, 2004.

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5

Conseil des communautés culturelles et de l'immigration du Québec. La proposition de politique culturelle du Québec: "une politique de la culture et des arts", mémoire. [Montréal]: Conseil des communautés culturelles et de l'immigration, 1991.

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6

Conseil des communautés culturelles et de l'immigration du Québec. La proposition de politique culturelle du Québec: Une politique de la culture et des arts : mémoire présenté à la Commission parlementaire sur l'énoncé de politique en matière de culture, le 30 octobre 1991. Montréal, Québec: Le Conseil, 1991.

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7

Hoptman, Laura J. Drawing now: Eight propositions. New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2003.

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8

Museum of Modern Art (New York, N.Y.)., ed. Drawing now: Eight propositions. New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2002.

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9

Images fixes: Propositions pour la sémiologie des messages visuels. Paris: Harmattan, 2008.

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10

Leconte, Bernard. Images fixes: Propositions pour la sémiologie des messages visuels. Paris: Harmattan, 2008.

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11

Willats, Stephen. Artwork as social model: A manual of questions and propositions. Sheffield: RGAP (Research Group for Artists), 2012.

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12

California. Legislature. Senate. Committee on Local Government. November 1996 ballot, Proposition 218, Right to Vote on Taxes Act. Sacramento, CA: Senate Publications, 1996.

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13

California. Proposition 13: Safe Drinking Water, Watershed Protection, and Flood Protection Act. [Sacramento, Calif.?]: Printed by Department of Water Resources, 2000.

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14

d'Ivry, Centre d'art, ed. Seven diamonds: Needs : in the exact spot : propositions for a landscape. Paris: B42, 2010.

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15

Labarrère-Delorme, Marie. La Colombe de Glozel: Propositions pour une lecture des inscriptions de Glozel. Cessy, France: M. Labarrère-Delorme, 1992.

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16

California. Proposition 13: Safe Drinking Water, Clean Water, Watershed Protection, and Flood Protection Act. [Sacramento, CA: Dept. of Water Resources, 2000.

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17

Images animées: Propositions pour la sémiologie des messages visuels. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2008.

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18

Leconte, Bernard. Images animées: Propositions pour la sémiologie des messages visuels. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2008.

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19

Nordman, Maria. De civitate: Dessins/plans, projets réalisés en Europe et propositions de constructions pour les villes, 1987-82 [sic]. Lyon: Musée Saint Pierre Art contemporain, 1987.

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20

Jennings, Bruce H. California's experience with Proposition 65: Implementing the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act. Sacramento, CA (State Capitol, Box 942849, Sacramento 94249-0001): May be purchased from Joint Publications, 1990.

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21

1941-, ʻAbdulḥaq, and National Mission for Manuscripts (India), eds. Dīvān zādah. Naʼī Dihlī: Naishnal Mishan fār Menuskripṭs, 2011.

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22

California. Legislature. Senate. Committee on Local Government. Proposition 65: Local Taxpayers and Public Safety Protection Act : the summary report from the informational hearing. Sacramento, CA: Senate Publications, 2004.

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23

California. Legislature. Senate. Committee on Local Government. Proposition 51: Traffic Congestion Relief and Safe School Bus Act : the summary report from the informational hearings. [Sacramento, Calif.]: Senate Publications, 2002.

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24

Abrego, Lisandro. How often are propositions on the effects of customs unions theoretical curiosa and when should they guide policy? Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001.

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25

Mayo, Marti, Matthew Ritchie, Thyrza Nichols Goodeve, and Laura Heon. Matthew Ritchie: Proposition Player. Hatje Cantz Publishers, 2004.

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26

Shaked, Nizan. Synthetic Proposition: Conceptualism and the Political Referent in Contemporary Art. Manchester University Press, 2017.

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27

Synthetic Proposition: Conceptualism and the Political Referent in Contemporary Art. Manchester University Press, 2017.

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28

Shaked, Nizan. Synthetic Proposition: Conceptualism and the Political Referent in Contemporary Art. Manchester University Press, 2017.

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29

Roland, Arpin, Groupe-conseil sur la politique culturelle du Québec., and Québec (Province). Ministère des affaires culturelles., eds. Une Politique de la culture et des arts: Proposition présentée à Liza Frulla-Hébert, ministre des Affaires culturelles du Québec. 2nd ed. [Québec]: Groupe-conseil sur la politique culturelle du Québec, 1991.

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30

Une Politique de la culture et des arts: Proposition présentée à madame Liza Frulla-Hébert, ministre des Affaires culturelles du Québec. 2nd ed. (Québec): Groupe-conseil sur la politique culturelle du Québec, 1991.

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31

Bacon, Andrew. Vagueness and Precision. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198712060.003.0012.

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The proposition that Patrick Stewart is bald is vague, but not borderline. According to the orthodox view, a proposition is vague iff it is metaphysically possible that it is borderline, allowing us to define vagueness from borderlineness. This chapter argues that according to the orthodox view there are precise propositions that entail the exact locations of cutoff points for vague properties. It argues, moreover, that there are vague, but necessarily determinate propositions, such as the proposition that Patrick Stewart is actually bald. The chapter uses these sorts of considerations to motivate the view that vagueness should be taken as primitive, and that borderlineness should be defined in terms of it. Along the way, one surprising upshot of a conception of propositional vagueness is examined: that the propositions of physics are not precise.
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32

Jacques, du Plessis. Ch.3 Validity, s.2: Grounds for avoidance, Art.3.2.14. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198702627.003.0068.

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This commentary focuses on Article 3.2.14 of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) concerning the retroactive effect of avoidance of a contract. Under Art 3.2.14, avoidance takes effect retroactively; that is, the contract is regarded as never having existed, and not merely as non-existent from the moment of avoidance. Unfulfilled obligations fall away and performances made in fulfilment of obligations have to be returned, according to Art 3.2.15. However, this is only a general proposition. Where avoidance only relates to certain terms of the contract, the other terms, whether fulfilled or unfulfilled, are left undisturbed, unless it would be unreasonable to do so. This commentary discusses the effect of retroactive avoidance in general, as well as its effect on contractual obligations, including unfulfilled and unaffected obligations and fulfilled obligations.
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33

Bacon, Andrew. Beyond Vagueness. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198712060.003.0017.

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On the view of this book, sentential vagueness is a derivative notion: a sentence is vague iff it expresses a vague proposition. According to an alternative account, sentential vagueness consists in semantic indecision: the way in which a sentence is used does not determine which of several candidate propositions it expresses. However, even if ordinary vagueness does not consist in semantic indecision, it does not mean that the phenomenon of semantic indecision doesn’t exist. In this chapter, several putative examples of genuine semantic indecision are investigated. The chapter considers modal and epistemic ways of spelling out the sense in which semantic facts are ‘undecided’, but both are found to be inadequate. It is argued, instead, that semantic indecision can be explained within a theory of propositional vagueness: a sentence is semantically undecided when it is propositionally borderline which of several propositions the sentence expresses. Semantically, indefiniteness arises when some of those propositions are true and others false.
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34

Rochechouart, Musée départemental de, ed. Propositions. Rochechouart: Le Musée, 1996.

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35

Bacon, Andrew. Vagueness and Uncertainty. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198712060.003.0008.

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Recent forms of expressivism attempt to explain the sense in which certain propositions are ‘non-factual’ in terms of principles about attitudes towards those propositions. Following recent expressivist accounts of conditionals and modals, a version of expressivism about vagueness is explored, which maintains that to have a credence in a vague proposition is just to have your credences in the precise propositions distributed in a certain way. Whilst this form of expressivism is ultimately rejected, a consequence of the view can be exploited to partially capture the intuition that certain subject matters are non-factual. This principle, Rational Supervenience’, effectively states that all disagreements about the vague ultimately boil down to disagreements about the precise: any two rational priors that agree about all precise propositions agree about everything. While the Principle of Plenitude states that there is a proposition occupying every evidential role, Rational Supervenience entails conversely that every proposition occupies some evidential role.
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36

Swanson, Eric. Probability in Philosophy of Language. Edited by Alan Hájek and Christopher Hitchcock. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199607617.013.39.

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This chapter uses four historically important approaches to conditionals to help illustrate ways of thinking about the language of subjective uncertainty more broadly construed. On the first, conditionals express propositions and `if' is a truth-functional connective. Problems here motivate the second hypothesis-that a conditional expresses a proposition the probability of which equals the probability of the consequent conditional on its antecedent. Problems for this approach in turn motivate a third kind of view on which conditionals do not express propositions that are true or false. According to one such approach, `if' has a non-compositional meaning: it is used to help express conditional beliefs in a special, non-semantic way. The costs of abandoning compositionality motivate the final family of views considered, on which compositional semantic interpretation functions output non-propositional objects; therefore semanticists can and should help themselves to tools developed by formal epistemologists.
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37

Grzankowski, Alex. A Relational Theory of Non-Propositional Attitudes. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198732570.003.0006.

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According to the “standard theory”, propositional attitudes are two-place relations holding between subjects and propositions. The present chapter considers the prospects of offering an analog for non-propositional attitudes. Many of the same types of motivations and advantages that have made the standard theory of propositional attitudes attractive apply to non-propositional attitudes as well. Of course, in the case of non-propositional attitudes, objects other than propositions are called for and the suggestion to be offered is that non-propositional attitudes are two-place relations holding between subjects and properties. At the end of the chapter, the view is defended against a seemingly obvious objection—namely that subjects don’t typically fear, like, love, and so on, properties.
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38

Bacon, Andrew. Vagueness and Evidence. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198712060.003.0006.

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If there are vague propositions it is natural to wonder what role they play in thought. A natural picture, given a linguistic theory of vagueness, is that one only learns a vague proposition via a public language sentence that expresses it (e.g. by hearing someone reliable asserting the sentence). This chapter argues that there are many ways to obtain vague evidence that do not involve language. It focuses on ‘inexact’ evidence acquired through imperfect perceptual faculties, and argues that the effect of inexact evidence on our credences is similar to the effect of conditioning on a vague proposition, and cannot easily be simulated by conditioning on any precise proposition. The chapter introduces the notion of an evidential role—a profile of the effects a certain piece of inexact evidence can have on your credences—and outlines the central principle of vague propositions: the Principle of Plenitude. This principle states that there is a vague proposition occupying every evidential role.
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39

Bacon, Andrew. Vague Propositions. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198712060.003.0011.

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If there are vague propositions, and the vague supervenes on the precise, then vague propositions cannot be represented by sets of metaphysically possible worlds. According to an alternative, broadly supervaluationist idea, propositions are sets of world-precisification pairs. To interpret this theory non-linguistically, precisifications are understood as assigning an extension to each vague property at each possible world. However, there are many other positions on propositional fineness of grain. The chapter investigates the general logic of propositional individuation. It gives an internal definition of the broadest notion of necessity, and shows that it is at least as broad as any combination of determinacy and necessity operators. It formulates a propositions-first account of vague propositions, in which propositions are taken as primitive and not constructed out of sets of things, and presents a theory of vague propositions in which they are individuated by their role in thought.
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40

Searle, John R. Are there Non-Propositional Intentional States? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198732570.003.0011.

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Intentionality is that feature of the mind by which it is directed at or about objects and states of affairs in the world. Intentionality is simply aboutness or directedness. “Proposition” is more difficult, but the essential idea is this: every intentional state has a content. Sometimes it seems that the content just enables a state to refer to an object. So if John loves Sally, then it appears that the content of his love is simply “Sally”. But if John believes that it is raining, then the specification of the content requires an entire “that” clause. “Are there non-propositional intentional states?” amounts to the question, “Are there intentional states whose content does not require specification with a ‘that’ clause?” This chapter explores whether there are any non-propositional states, and suggest that a very limited class, such as boredom, is in fact non-propositional.
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41

Hanks, Peter. Types of Speech Acts. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198738831.003.0005.

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Classical speech act theory, in the tradition of Austin and Searle, is based on a picture of propositional content due to Frege. This picture takes propositions to be the primary bearers of truth conditions, and it incorporates a sharp distinction between content and force. In this paper I defend an alternative picture of propositional content, on which the primary bearers of truth conditions are the actions we perform in thinking and speaking about the world. Propositions are types of these actions, and they inherit their truth conditions from them. This picture abandons the distinction between content and force and it leads to a three-way distinction between different kinds of propositions. Here I explore the consequences of this alternative picture for the nature and taxonomy of speech acts.
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42

Madoff, Steven Henry, Dennis Adams, and Marina Abramovic. Art School : (Propositions for the 21st Century). MIT Press, 2009.

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43

Madoff, Steven Henry. Art School : (Propositions for the 21st Century). MIT Press, 2009.

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44

Madoff, Steven Henry, John Baldessari, and Michael Craig-Martin. Art School : (Propositions for the 21st Century). MIT Press, 2009.

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45

Johnsen, Bredo. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190662776.003.0012.

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Over half of Wittgenstein’s raw, unedited remarks in On Certainty were written in seven weeks ending two days before his death, and he often expresses dissatisfaction with his progress. Unsurprisingly, they are rife with tensions. The author focuses on two topics centering on his crucial notion of “the propositions that are beyond doubt”: what it is for a proposition to have that status for someone, and whether Wittgenstein thinks we can defend our beliefs in such propositions. The author argues that his struggles can be seen to be leading him to views much like Quine’s. Three points of agreement stand out: (i) One cannot be faulted either for retaining any particular belief or for taking any particular belief as fundamental if doing so does not violate (iii). (ii) One can be wrong about the truth of any proposition. (iii) One’s world view must be kept squared with experience.
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46

Bacon, Andrew. An Outline of a Theory of Propositional Vagueness. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198712060.003.0003.

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This chapter presents a series questions in the philosophy of vagueness that will constitute the primary subjects of this book. The stance this book takes on these questions is outlined, and some preliminary ramifications are explored. These include the idea that (i) propositional vagueness is more fundamental than linguistic vagueness; (ii) propositions are not themselves sentence-like; they are coarse grained, and form a complete atomic Boolean algebra; (iii) vague propositions are, moreover, not simply linguistic constructions either such as sets of world-precisification pairs; and (iv) propositional vagueness is to be understood by its role in thought. Specific theses relating to the last idea include the thesis that one’s total evidence can be vague, and that there are vague propositions occupying every evidential role, that disagreements about the vague ultimately boil down to disagreements in the precise, and that one should not care intrinsically about vague matters.
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47

Bacon, Andrew. Vagueness and Decision. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198712060.003.0009.

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If linguistic vagueness is more fundamental than propositional vagueness, it is natural to think that vague propositions won’t play a substantive role in decision theory. On a linguistic picture, what it is rational for an agent to do is completely determined by their attitudes towards precise propositions. This is vacuously true if all propositions are precise, but it also seems like a natural idea if, like the expressivist discussed in Chapter 8, a distinction is drawn between metaphysically ‘first-rate’ precise propositions and metaphysically ‘second-rate’ vague propositions. This chapter considers how to formulate decision theory in a setting where there are vague propositions, and discusses ways in which vague beliefs, desires, and actions can have concrete impacts on practical deliberation and action.
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48

Bacon, Andrew. Vagueness and Ignorance. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198712060.003.0005.

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According to a widely held intuition, it is not possible to know whether a borderline proposition is true. If vagueness is a linguistic phenomenon, however, it is hard to explain why this might be, since the sort of ignorance in question appears to be independent of language spoken and linguistic competence. In this chapter, these sorts of considerations are used to argue that linguistic theories cannot explain why borderline propositions are unknown. In response to this sort of challenge, some linguistic theorists have denied the intuition that borderline propositions are always unknown; the chapter raises some problems with these views as well.
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49

Atkins, Richard Kenneth. Peirce’s Reduction Thesis. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190887179.003.0004.

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Peirce’s reduction thesis—that the basic forms of propositions are three and only three, named firstness, secondness, and thirdness—is a point of scholarly contention, but it is also at the root of Peirce’s phenomenology. Peirce came to this thesis through his formal logical notation, the Existential Graphs. Peirce maintains that all n-adic propositional forms where n > 3 can be constructed from triadic propositional forms. All n-adic propositional forms where n > 3 can be decomposted into triadic propositional forms. Moreover, triadic propositional forms cannot be constructed from dyadic propositional forms, and dyadic propositional forms cannot be constructed from monadic propositional forms. Finally, all triadic propositional forms contain as abstractical logical ingredients dyadic and monadic propositional forms. These four theses, elucidated by his work in graphical logic, entail his reduction thesis.
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50

Ullmann-Margalit, Edna. Holding True and Holding as True. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198802433.003.0006.

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There is nothing absurd about holding a sentence true without believing the proposition it expresses. For example, people often hold Holy Scriptures to be true without necessarily understanding them. People display a kind division of epistemic labor. They hold many propositions as true because they trust others, such as scientists or priests, who are taken to understand them.
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