Journal articles on the topic 'Army Infantry Battalion'

This article explores officer capability and culture of the Australian army before the First World War, in particular those officers who held infantry battalion commands. Although the men who served in Australia’s part-time citizen army as infantry battalion commanders showed dedication and enthusiasm for soldiering, they were under-developed as infantry commanders, owing to time constraints and general under-investment in officer education and training. Officers who became battalion commanders were also relatively old, and their rise through the ranks was facilitated more by social position, rather than competence or experience. As a result, those Citizen Forces battalion commanders who enlisted in the Australian Imperial Force largely failed to carry out commands effectively in wartime, an indictment on the state of the Australian Army before the First World War.

The problem in this research are motivated by importance of the Mental Development which is interpreted as an activity to form, maintain, improve and strengthen the mentality of soldiers and civil servants of the Army and their families based on religion, Pancasila, Saptamarga, Soldier Oath, 8 mandatory TNI and Panca Prasetya Korpri and values the nation's struggle through spiritual mental development, mental ideology and mental struggle so as to have a strong mentality in every task implementation. This research is classified as field research, using quantitative methods. The population in this study were Indonesian Army Soldiers in the Infenteri Battalion 131/Brs, Payakumbuh as many as 84 people. Data collection techniques used are questionnaires and documentation. While the data analysis technique used is the Unvariate and Bivariate uni test. The results showed that (1) the results of statistical tests obtained P value (0.023), because P value (0.023) < (0.05), it means that there is a relationship between Islamic Spiritual Mental Development and Marriage Age Resilience in the Infantry Battalion 131/ Brs, Payakumbuh, Result OR = 1.125. Therefore, the implementation of Islamic Spiritual Mental Development in the 131st Infantry Battalion/Brs Payakumbuh is good so that the level of resilience at the age of marriage is also good. (2) The results of statistical tests did not get P value = 0.000, because P value = 0.000 < (0.05), then there is a relationship between Islamic Spiritual Mental Development and the divorce rate in the Infantry Battalion 131/Brs, Payakumbuh and the results OR = 0.800. Therefore, Islamic Spiritual Mental Development in the 131st Infantry Battalion/Brs Payakumbuh is good so that the divorce rate is low. (3) The statistical test results obtained P value (0.018), because P value (0.018) < (0.05), meaning there is The relationship between Islamic Spiritual Mental Development and Concurrent Levels (Marriage Age Resilience and Divorce Rate) in the Infantry Battalion 131/Brs, Payakumbuh and the results of OR = 0.875. Because of that, Islamic Spiritual Mental Development in the Infantry Battalion 131/ Brs, Payakumbuh is good so that the Joint Level (Marriage Age Resilience and Divorce Rate) is also good.

<p>The Indonesian Army (TNI AD) is improving its main capabilities to meet the demand of the changing form of armed conflict. As for human capabilities, leadership is still counted as the main capabilities. To develop its capabilities as an organization, TNI AD must focus on its soldiers' readiness to change. Based on the previous research findings and the need to change in TNI AD, research must be conducted to demonstrate the effect of leadership style on TNI AD soldiers' readiness to change This study aims to determine the effect of battalion commander’s leadership style on soldiers’ readiness to change in Xth Infantry Battalion. Data collection using questionnaires has been completed for both variables, the commander's leadership style and soldiers’ readiness to change. The analytical tool used in this study is simple linear regression analysis, correlation test, and t-test using SPSS for windows 23.0. The result showed that the transformational leadership of the Xth Infantry Battalion Commander has positive effects on readiness to change of soldiers from Xth Infantry Battalion. The coefficient determinant demonstrated from this study is 50,2%, meaning that the Xth battalion commander's transformational leadership effect on soldiers' readiness to change is 50,2%. This study is preliminary and has its limitations. However, this study can be developed in many ways for the benefit of the Indonesian Army to change to meet the ever-changing dynamics of armed conflict.</p>

Leonid Mendeleevich Demner was born in August 3, 1923. In February 1944, he was drafted into the Red Army on the Leningrad front and served as a troop of 286th infantry division separate ski battalion, later - as a military translator of the 286th Infantry Division 996th Infantry regiment and in division headquarters of the same division in the 1st Ukrainian Front. He w as awarded with the Order of «Red Star», «World War II degree», the medal «For courage», «For Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War» and other awards. Discharged in May 1946, he worked as a dental technician trainee, dental technician and caster prosthodontist in denture clinic of Chernivtsi, and as a dentist, prosthetist in aviation hospital in Lviv. Since 1951 to 1956 he was a student of Molotov’s State Medical University. In 1956-1959 he worked in Izhevsk as the children’s department head and an orthodontist. In 1959-1962 he was a postgraduate student at the Department of Prosthetic Dentistry of Kazan Medical Institute. In 1963 he presented his PhD thesis, and in 1972 - doctoral dissertation. In 1969-1990 he worked as the head of the Prosthetic Dentistry Department of Kazan Medical Institute. Gabdulkhak Gil’mullovich Nasibullin was born in November 30, 1923. In 1937 he entered the Kazan midwifery school. In May 1942 he was drafted into the Soviet Army and sent as a battalion physician assistant to the 383rd Infantry Regiment. He served as a combat medic of the 7th Guards Army 167th separate tank battalion, medical platoon commander of the 81st Guards Division 233rd Infantry Regiment Battalion at the Steppe Front and 2nd Ukrainian Front. He was awarded with the Order of «Red Star» and «World War II degree», 12 medals. In 1950 he graduated from Kazan Dental Institute. Later, he worked as a dentist in the Perm region. In 1953-1956 he was trained as a clinical resident at the Department of Prosthetic Dentistry of Perm Medical Institute. In 1956-1976, he worked at the Department of Prosthetic Dentistry of Kazan Medical Institute. In 1964 he presented his PhD thesis, and in 1975 - his doctoral dissertation. In 1976-1982, he headed the department of orthopedic surgery and dentistry of the Institute of Postgraduate Medical Education named after V.I. Lenin in Kazan. In 1982-1993, he headed the Department of Prosthetic Dentistry at the Kazan State Medical Academy.

Abstract This article examines the main tactical characteristics of the Romanian infantry during the interwar period under the influence of the French principles, in the context in which the First World War proved the need to consider providing the units with a variety of technical equipment for a greater firepower on the battlefield. This article presents the basic forms of warfare according to the regulations of the time, defining the tactical rules of the battalion, presenting the new concepts that have emerged in the infantry tactics after the great world conflagration. It also presents aspects of subunit training, as well as the main technical characteristics of the infantry weaponry compared to that of the French army. On the other hand, it identifies the difficulties encountered in adapting the tactical principles of the French Regulations to the specificities of the Romanian infantry which had to take into account the physiognomy of a possible war, the troops available, but also the differences in army industry development.

Since 2016, there has been an increase in cases of malaria sufferers mostly from the Army Infantry Battalion 411 Pandawa based in Salatiga City. Based on data from the Salatiga District Health Service, number of cases reached 93 people who were positively malaria in 2016 and 84 positive cases in 2017. The purpose of this study was to determine the potential for malaria transmission to the the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) 411 Pandawa Battalion in Salatiga City. This research was a descriptive analytic type research with crossectional approach. The results of the study obtained a blood sample of 66 people and were willing to be interviewed. Chi-square test results are known to travel outside the area significantly associated with the incidence of malaria with a value of p <0,05. The results of this study interview, most of the soldiers were exposed to malaria while serving in the inland of Papua Province, in 2015. The results of blood tests found the Plasmodium vivax malaria parasite with a young trophozoite stage in the blood of three soldiers. The potential for transmission in the Infantry Battalion 411 in Salatiga City is nothing and the location of the soldier's dormitory does not reseptive because there are no malaria vectors.

Battalion Battle Group (Bn BG) (U.S. Army term Task Force) is a tool to improve combat capabilities of the entire Slovenian Armed Forces, since it is not just an Infantry battalion, but it includes all the branches and support that comes with it. The main mission of the Bn BG is the training cycle as part of the operation cycle, which is in line with what Defence Law, Military Doctrine and other strategic documents stipulate – “maintaining readiness to execute military defence”. Even though U.S. Army is a much larger force, it still has to go through the same stages of battalion collective training as SAF battalion, which is one of the reasons why U.S. Army battalion cycle was used as comparison. On the other hand it has much more training and war experience, and the SAF has a lot of experience with U.S. Army training. In order to be successful, it is necessary to have a clear Mission Essential Task List (METL), which gives guidance and constitutes a basis for the development of the Unit Training Plan (UTP). It is a waste to perform any training without evaluation, which is why BG evaluation is the final stage of every training. With the assigned mission and METL, developed UTP and clear evaluation standards, SAF Battalion BG training cycles were compared with the U.S. Army in order to improve SAF Bn BG training cycle. Bataljonska bojna skupina (v kopenski vojski ZDA angl. Task Force, NATO – Battle Group) je orodje za izboljšanje bojnih zmogljivosti celotne Slovenske vojske, saj ne gre le za pehotni bataljon, temveč za enoto, ki vključuje vse zvrsti in nujno podporo. Cikel usposabljanja kot del operativnega cikla pomeni poslanstvo bataljonske bojne skupine, kar je skladno z določili Zakona o obrambi, Vojaške doktrine in drugih strateških dokumentov – ohranjanje pripravljenosti za zagotavljanje vojaške obrambe. Čeprav je ameriška kopenska vojska veliko večja, mora skozi enake stopnje kolektivnega usposabljanja bataljona kot bataljon SV, kar je tudi eden izmed vzrokov, da smo za primerjavo izbrali cikel bataljonskega usposabljanja kopenske vojske ZDA. Po drugi strani imajo ameriške enote več izkušenj z usposabljanjem in bojevanjem, SV pa veliko izkušenj z usposabljanji kopenske vojske ZDA. Za zagotovitev uspeha je treba jasno določiti seznam bistvenih nalog (SBN) za izvedbo poslanstva (Mission Essential Task List – METL), ki daje ustrezne usmeritve in podlago za razvoj načrta za usposabljanje enot (Unit Training Plan – UTP). Usposabljanje brez evalvacije je brez pomena, zato je evalvacija sklepna faza vsakega usposabljanja. Na podlagi predpisanega poslanstva, SBN in UTP ter jasnih evalvacijskih standardov smo usposabljanje bataljonske skupine SV primerjali s kopensko vojsko ZDA, da bi tako izboljšali cikel usposabljanja bataljonske skupine SV.

The army has always played a major role in the performance of defence tasks in Hungary. This article presents the development of Hungary’s national defence from the collapse of the Austro–Hungarian Monarchy in 1918 to the present day. It describes the ground, cavalry and air units of the Royal Hungarian Army stationed in Debrecen since 1920, the military facilities used by the Soviet Red Army in Debrecen, and the units of the Hungarian Defence Forces operating in the city. It presents the work, activities, tasks and military facilities of the following entities: HDF 5th “István Bocskai” Infantry Brigade, HDF 24th “Gergely Bornemissza” Reconnaissance Regiment, HDF 2nd “vitéz Antal Vattay” Territorial Defence Regiment, 3rd “Sándor Oláh” Territorial Defence Battalion and the HDF Military Administration and Central Registry Command 2nd Augmentation and Recruitment Centre, and the 3rd Augmentation and Recruitment Office, the last two of which being responsible for providing supplies.

Abstract In this article, a comparison study was done on the tactical principles of the Romanian infantry and the Soviet one around the beginning of the Second World War, in the context of developing and perfecting the weaponry. In order to reach this objective, there was an analysis of the regulations of the infantry emerged after the end of the First World War, emphasizing the differences and the parallels in tactical norms for the battalion and the infantry regiment. Likewise, the differences concerning the wording, content, appendices and the mission report are presented in an order of operations between the two armies. Having considered that during the Eastern Campaign, the Romanian army had suffered human losses due to the cold and lack of protection equipment, it was analyzed whether the Romanian regulations had foreseen protective measurements during winter time. At the same time, the article presents the operations during winter envisioned in the Soviet regulation, both for offense and defense, and also the measures that had to be taken in order to prevent frostbite.

Wilayah perbatasan darat Indonesia dengan Malaysia berada di Provinsi Kalimantan Barat, Kalimantan Timur, dan Provinsi Kalimantan Utara. Wilayah ini sangat rawan terjadinya berbagai pelanggaran batas wilayah. TNI sebagai alat pertahanan negara wajib melakukan pengamanan terhadap wilayah perbatasan. Satgas Pamtas Yonif Raider 301/PKS merupakan satuan TNI AD yang diberikan tugas untuk mengamankan wilayah perbatasan darat Indonesia-Malaysia, dengan wilayah penugasan di Provinsi Kalimantan Barat, khususnya di Kabupaten Sanggau, Kabupaten Sintang, dan Kabupaten Kapuas Hulu, mulai 1 Maret 2019–30 November 2019. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk menganalisis apa saja peran Satgas Pamtas Yonif Raider 301/PKS dalam mengamankan wilayah perbatasan darat Indonesia-Malaysia. Kerangka teoritis yang digunakan adalah teori peran, dimana peran terbagi menjadi peran aktif dan peran partisipatif. Penelitian dilakukan dengan metode kualitatif, melalui teknik pengumpulan data berupa wawancara, observasi, dan studi dokumentasi. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa peran Satgas Pamtas Yonif Raider 301/PKS dalam mengamankan wilayah perbatasan darat Indonesia-Malaysia diwujudkan dengan peran aktif dan peran partisipatif. Peran aktif berupa pengamanan wilayah perbatasan dari ancaman militer dan non-militer, seperti pengamanan patok batas, pengamanan yang dilakukan satgas pamtas terhadap kejahatan transnasional, illegal logging, illegal mining, kejahatan narkoba, penyelundupan barang. Peran partisipatif berupa kegiatan sosial kemanusiaan (civic mission) yang dilakukan satgas pamtas dalam bidang pendidikan, bidang kesehatan, bidang sosial, dan bidang infrastruktur, sehingga sangat dirasakan oleh masyarakat di wilayah perbatasan. Kata kunci: peran, TNI, perbatasan darat, Indonesia-Malaysia The land border between Indonesia and Malaysia is in the Province of West Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, and North Kalimantan. This region is very prone to various violations of territorial boundaries. The Indonesian Military as a means of national defense is obliged to carry out security against border areas. The task force of Raider Infantry Battalion 301/PKS is an army unit assigned to secure the Indonesia-Malaysia land border area, with assignment areas in West Kalimantan Province, specifically in Sanggau, Sintang, and Kapuas Hulu Regencies, starting March 1, 2019-30 November 2019. The purpose of this study is to analyze the role of the task force of Raider Infantry Battalion in securing the Indonesia-Malaysia land border area. The theoretical framework used is role theory, where roles are divided into active roles and participatory roles. The study was conducted using qualitative methods, through data collection techniques in the form of interviews, observation, and documentation studies. The results showed that the role of the task force of Raider Infantry Battalion 301/ PKS in securing the Indonesia-Malaysia land border area was realized with an active and participatory role. An active role in the form of securing border areas from military and non-military threats, such as security carried out by the task force for transnational crime, illegal logging, illegal mining, drug crimes, smuggling of goods. Participatory role in the form of humanitarian social activities (civic mission) carried out by the task force in the field of education, health sector, social field, and infrastructure, so it is very much felt by the people in the border areas. Keywords: border, Indonesian military, role, Indonesia-Malaysia

Spiro Munayyer's account begins immediately after the United Nations General Assembly partition resolution of 29 November 1947 and culminates in the cataclysmic four days of Lydda's conquest by the Israeli army (10-14 July 1948) during which 49,000 of Lydda's 50,000 inhabitants ("swollen" with refugees) were forcefully expelled, the author himself being one of those few allowed to remain in his hometown. Although the author was not in a position of political or military responsibility, he was actively involved in Lydda's resistance movement both as the organizer of the telephone network linking up the various sectors of Lydda's front lines and as a volunteer paramedic, in which capacity he accompanied the city's defenders in most of the battles in which they took part. The result is one of the very few detailed eye-witness accounts that exists from the point of view of an ordinary Palestinian layman of one of the most important and tragic episodes of the 1948 war. The conquest of Lydda (and of its neighbor, Ramla, some five kilometers to the south) was the immediate objective of Operation Dani-the major offensive launched by the Israeli army at the order of Ben-Gurion during the so-called "Ten Days" of fighting (8-18 July 1948), between the First Truce (11 June-8 July) and the Second Truce (which started on 18 July and lasted, in theory, until the armistice agreements of 1949). The further objective of Operation Dani was to outflank the Transjordanian Arab Legion positions at Latrun (commanding the defile at Bab al-Wad, where the road from the coast starts climbing toward Jerusalem) in order to penetrate central Palestine and capture Rumallah and Nablus. Lydda and Ramla and the surrounding villages fell within the boundaries of the Arab state according to the UNGA partition resolution. Despite their proximity to Tel Aviv and the fall of many Palestinian towns since April (Tiberias, Haifa, Jaffa, Safad, Acre, and Baysan), they had held out until July even though little help had reached them from the Arab armies entering on 15 May. Their strategic importance was enormous because of their location at the intersection of the country's main north-south and west-east road and rail lines. Palestine's largest British army camp at Sarafand was a few kilometers west of Lydda, its main international airport an equal distance to the north, its central railway junction at Lydda itself. Ras al-Ayn, fifteen kilometers north of Lydda, was the main source of Jerusalem's water supply, while one of the largest British depots was at Bayt Nabala, seven kilometers to its northeast. The Israeli forces assembled for Operation Dani were put under the overall command of Yigal Allon, the Palmach commander. They consisted of the two Palmach brigades (Yiftach and Harel, the latter under the command of Yitzhak Rabin), the Eighth Armored Brigade composed of the Second Tank Battalion and the Ninth Commando Battalion (the former under the command of Yitzhak Sadeh, founder of the Palmach, the latter under that of Moshe Dayan), the Second Battalion Kiryati Brigade, the Third Battalion Alexandroni Brigade, and several units of the Kiryati Garrison Troops (Khayl Matzav). The Eighth Armored Brigade had a high proportion of World War II Jewish veterans volunteering from the United States, Britain, France, and South Africa (under the so-called MAHAL program), while its two battalions also included 700 members of the Irgun Zva'i Le'umi (IZL). The total strength of the Israeli attackers was about 8,000 men. The only regular Arab troops defending Lydda (and Ramla) was a minuscule force of 125 men-the Fifth Infantry Company of the Transjordanian Arab Legion. The defenders of Lydda (and Ramla) were volunteer civilian residents, like the author, under the command of a retired sergeant who had served in the Arab Legion. The reason for the virtual absence of Arab regular troops in the Lydda-Ramla sector was that the Arab armies closest to it (the Egyptian in the south, the Arab Legion in the east, and the Iraqi in the north) were already overstretched. The Egyptian northernmost post was at Isdud, thirty-two kilometers north of Gaza and a like distance southeast of Ramla-Lydda as the crow flies. The Iraqi southernmost post was at Ras al-Ayn, where they were weakest. And although the Arab Legion was in strength some fifteen kilometers due east at Latrun, the decision had been taken not to abandon its positions on the hills between Ras al-Ayn and Latrun for fear of being outflanked and cut off by the superior Israeli forces in the plains where Lydda and Ramla were situated. Indeed, as General Glubb, commander of the Arab Legion, informs us, he had told King Abdallah and the Transjordanian prime minister Tawfiq Abu Huda even before the end of the Mandate on 15 May that the Legion did not have the forces to hold and defend Lydda and Ramla against Israeli attacks despite the fact that these towns were in the area assigned to the Arabs by the UNGA partition resolution. This explains the token force of the Arab Legion-the Fifth Infantry Company. Thus, the fate of Lydda (and Ramla) was sealed the moment Operation Dani was launched. The Israeli forces did not attack Lydda from the west (where Lydda's defenses facing Tel Aviv were strongest), as the garrison commander Sergeant Hamza Subh expected. Instead, they split into two main forces, northern and southern, which were to rendezvous at the Jewish colony of Ben Shemen east of Lydda and then advance on Lydda from there. After capturing Lydda from the east they were to advance on Ramla, attacking it from the north while making feints against it from the west. Operation Dani began on the night of 9-10 July. Simultaneously with the advance of the ground troops, Lydda and Ramla were bombed from the air. In spite of the surprise factor, the defenders in the eastern sector of Lydda put up stout resistance throughout the 10th against vastly superior forces attacking from Ben Shemen in the north and the Arab village of Jimzu to the south. In the afternoon, Dayan rode with his Commando Battalion of jeeps and half-tracks through Lydda in a hit-and-run raid lasting under one hour "shooting up the town and creating confusion and a degree of terror among the population," as the Jewish brothers Jon and David Kimche put it. This discombobulated the defenders, some of whom surrendered. But the following morning (11 July) a small force of three Arab Legion armored cars entered Lydda, their mission being to help in the evacuation of the beleaguered Fifth Infantry Company. Their sudden appearance both panicked the Israeli troops and rallied the defenders who had not surrendered. The Israeli army put down what it subsequently described as the city's "uprising" with utmost brutality, leaving in a matter of hours in the city's streets about 250 civilian dead in an orgy of indiscriminate killing. Resistance continued sporadically during the 12th and 13th of July, its focus being Lydda's police station, which was finally overrun. As of 11 July, the Israeli army began the systematic expulsion of the residents of Lydda and Ramla (the latter having fallen on 12 July) toward the Arab Legion lines in the east. Also expelled were the populations of some twenty-five villages conquered during Operation Dani, making a total of some 80,000 expellees-the largest single instance of deliberate mass expulsion during the 1948 war. Most of the expellees were women, children, and elderly men, most of the able-bodied men having been taken prisoner. Memories of the trek of the Lydda and Ramla refugees is branded in the collective consciousness of the Palestinians. The Palestinian historian Aref al-Aref, who interviewed survivors at the time, estimates that 350 died of thirst and exhaustion in the blazing July sun, when the temperature was one hundred degrees in the shade. The reaction of public opinion in Ramallah and East Jerusalem at the sight of the new arrivals was to turn against the Arab Legion for its failure to help Lydda and Ramla. Arab Legion officers and men were stoned, loudly hissed at and cursed, a not unintended outcome by the person who gave the expulsion order, David Ben-Gurion, and the man who carried it out, Yitzhak Rabin, director of operations for Operation Dani.

Learned Czechs on the Galician front: the experiences of the art historian Zdeňek Wirth and the lawyer Emil Svoboda The problems of the relations between science and war have belonged recently to the topics which are constantly present in Czech historiography. The same can not be stated, however, with reference to the problems connected with the participation of Czech representatives of the humanities in the Galician campaigns during the First World War. The aim of the article is to look at this topic and present the example of two learned men, who were called up to the front at the mature age of 36 years old as reserve officers. The first part of the text represents an introduction to the situation as well as a description of the basic bibliographic positions. Attention is mainly paid to the negative attitude of Czechs to the War, which had objectives that were in contrast with the Slavic feeling of the majority of Czech society. In a short essay, the perception of Galicia during the War is shown, with Czech soldiers valuing Galician towns more than villages. From a few sources, it can be stated that Krakow made the greatest impression, being regarded as a wonderful town, and its historic character was emphasized. The second part of the article concentrates on the wartime fate of the art historian and conservation specialist Zdeňek Wirth (1878–1961), which has been reconstructed based on correspondence. He was called up to the Galician front as a Landsturm officer (infantry battalion no. 214). He took part in the 1914 campaign, and later found himself mainly working in the support organizations for the front lines in Galicia and Lubelszczyzna, where his organizational and administrative skills were used. During the War (he was relieved of his duties in 1918), Wirth attempted to conduct as much scientific activity as possible; he wrote some articles on the current topics connected with conservation work (the confiscation of bells). He learnt Polish and also read Polish scientific literature. The third part of the article presents the half-year participation of the lawyer and philosopher Emil Svoboda (1878–1948) in the first Galician campaign of 1914–1915. The basic sources of information are his unpublished Memories with their strong anti-military character. Svoboda was also called up for military service as an officer of the Landsturm reserves (infantry battalion no. 213). Svoboda, as a company leader, took part in the fighting around Krakow, later in the offensive near Limanowa and, finally, spent part of the winter in the towns of Nowy Targ and Czarny Dunajec. In February 1915, he travelled to Prague on sick leave, and later was released from the army after an application by the University and Polytechnic of Prague.

I am deeply conscious of the fact, as I consider the subject of torture, that I have led a very sheltered life. I have never been tortured. I have never seen anybody being tortured. Nor have I ever met anyone who has undergone this dreadful practice. But I cannot say that I have never met anyone who has had anything to do with it. The Cyprus emergency was at its height during my period of national service. My attempt to persuade the military authorities that my knowledge of classical Greek was a suitable qualification for me to be sent to the island to act as an interpreter was unsuccessful. I was sent instead to serve with an infantry battalion in the British Army of the Rhine in West Germany. I did not think so at the time as we endured one of the coldest winters in living memory in Nordrhein-Westphalia, but I was to discover later that this may well have been the better option. When I went up to university I met someone who had indeed been sent to Cyprus. He had acted as an interpreter when Greek Cypriot members of the Eoka organization were being interrogated. Conscious of the constraints of the Official Secrets Act, he never revealed to me the details of what was done to them during this process. But I had the distinct impression, as we talked, that he had been revolted by it and that things were done which were and would always remain a scar on his memory.

Besides the combat-arms assets, the rapid troops of the Royal Hungarian Defence Forces also had field artillery (light howitzers), air defence artillery and anti-tank guns. The order of battle of the motorised units required the existence of one (after the autumn of 1941, two) artillery battalion(s) with vehicle-drawn assets for providing combat support. The motorised artillery battalions initially had four batteries with light howitzers, while the armoured divisions had two motorised artillery battalions. There were two artillery battalions with four (six) batteries in the mobilised organisation of the cavalry brigades (division). For ensuring defence against air attacks, vehicle-drawn air defence artillery battalions were introduced in the armoured divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division with one light and one heavy battery. Against tank attacks, there were 4–6 anti-tank guns in service used by each of the anti-tank companies of the infantry and reconnaissance battalions (in the motorised rifle brigades and hussar regiments of the armoured divisions) and the 1st Cavalry Division.

Między 2 i 22 sierpnia w 1914 roku najstarsze miasto Polski – Kalisz – z bogatą tradycją histo-ryczną, zabytek architektury średniowiecznej, zostało barbarzyńsko zniszczone i zrujnowane. To był czyn popełniony na bezbronnym, „otwartym mieście” opuszczonym przez armię rosyjską bez walki. Wojska pruskie najechały Kalisz z pobliskiego Ostrowa 2 sierpnia 1914 r. Drugim batalio-nem 155 pułku piechoty dowodził Hermann Preusker, dowódca miasta w czasie wojny, który przy-czynił się do zniszczenia centrum Kalisza. Wszystkie domy mieszkalne w granicach średniowiecz-nego miasta zostały doszczętnie spalone. Jedynymi budynkami, które przetrwały były kościoły i urzędy. Wielka liczba obywateli została rozstrzelana. Kalisz, z ludnością 65 400 przed wojną, miał tylko 5000 mieszkańców po sierpniowym exodususie. 4 sierpnia 1914 armia niemiecka najechała Belgię, naruszając jej neutralność. Belgowie stawili słaby opór niemieckiej inwazji na Liege, Namur i Leuven. Po porażce na zachód od miasta nie-mieckiego korpusu wrócił do Leuven. Garnizon miasta, myląc go z Belgami, otworzył ogień. W celu ukrycia własnego błędu Niemcy ogłosili, że to mieszkańcy cywilni Leuven, strzelali. W dniu 24 sierpnia aresztowany został prezydent i wzięto zakładników. Niemcy rozpoczęli represje, doko-nując grabieży domów, cennego sprzętu oraz aktów gwałtu na kobietach. Cywilna ludność miasta ze spokojem przyjmowała te represje. W dniu 25 sierpnia, popołudniu i przez noc Niemcy ostrzeli-wali miasto i jego mieszkańców. Zginęło 209 obywateli Leuven, a kilkuset zostało rannych. Te działania trwały od 25 do 28 sierpnia. Ponad 2000 budynków zostało zniszczonych. Kalisz - Leuven 1914 - the destruction of the town Between 2nd and 22nd August in 1914 the oldest town in Poland with rich historical tradition, the monument of mediaeval architecture, was barbarously destroyed and ruined. It was a barbarous act committed on a defenceless “open town” left by the Russian army without a fight. The Prussian army invaded Kalisz from the nearby Ostrów in August 2nd. The second battalion of 155 infantry regiment was commanded by major Hermann Preusker, the commanding officer of the town during the war, who contributed to the destruction of 95 % of Kalisz centre. All residential houses within the borders of the mediaeval town were burnt to the ground. The only buildings which survived were churches and public offices. A great number of citizens were shot. Kalisz, with the population of 65,400 before the war, had only 5,000 inhabitants after the August exodus. On 4th August 1914 German army invaded Belgium, violating its neutrality. The Belgians shortly 38 suppressed German invasion upon Liege, Namur and Leuven. After their defeat west of the city German corps in dispersion went back towards Leuven. The city garrison, mistaking them for Belgians, opened fire. In order to cover their mistake the Germans announced that there were civil inhabitants of Leuven that had been shooting at their troops. On the 24th August the mayor was arrested and hostages were taken. Germans began repressions brutally entering houses plundering precious equipment, raping women. The civilians were acting calmly, aware of the repressions. On 25th August, in the afternoon and through the night, the Germans strafed the city, killing many of its inhabitants. 209 citizens were killed that way, a couple of hundred were wounded. These actions lasted from 25th to 28th August. Over 2000 buildings were destroyed.

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 marks the turning point in Lithuania’s defence policy. Previously, Lithuanian armed forces developed expeditionary capabilities in line with NATO’s out-of-area requirements and had to face substantial manning and equipment shortages as a result of the financial crisis. After 2014 clarion call, Lithuania responded with the most comprehensive measures of all the Eastern Flank states to strengthen its military capabilities. Lithuania’s main strategic concerns encompass both the Russian A2/AD bubble in Kaliningrad as well as the development of Russian offensive capabilities in the Baltic Sea region. The Lithuanian strive for security included a big hike in defence spending and a gradual increase in military personnel, with the reinstatement of conscription, faster modernisation of armed forces, development of military infrastructures, investments in combat readiness and an update of military exercises. This was supplemented by the strengthening of defence co-operation with key partners – both bilaterally and within the NATO framework. Lithuania’s main goal was to convince Allies to establish permanent military presence on its territory in order to strengthen deterrence against Russia. Between the NATO Wales Summit in 2014 and the Warsaw Summit in 2016, Lithuania was focused mainly on a closer military collaboration with the US – a country which then took a leading role in the military reassurance of the Eastern Flank. In Lithuania, the US has traditionally been perceived as the main security provider. The Warsaw Summit constituted a milestone in bolstering the Allied defence posture vis-à-vis Russia, which influenced Lithuania’s defence policy. American rotational company-size units in the Baltic states were subsequently replaced by NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, i.e. the deployment of German-led battalion-size battlegroup in Lithuania. Therefore, between 2016 and 2018 Lithuania tried to augment its strong defence ties with US while deepening military integration with Germany. The most significant sign of a closer military co-operation with Germany was the procurement of 88 Boxer infantry fighting vehicles. Recently, Germany has become the biggest supplier of military equipment to the Lithuanian army. Although Lithuania prefers to develop military co-operation primarily with US and Germany, Poland remains its important orientation point (mainly due to a similar threat perception and Poland’s geographic location). The core dimensions of the Polish-Lithuanian defence collaboration are the strengthening of air defence, including Grom systems deliveries, training of special forces and development of the trilateral brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG) together with Ukraine. In the coming years, the ongoing depopulation will remain the biggest internal challenge for the Lithuanian defence policy. Emigration and an ageing society result not only in a decreasing number of citizens reaching the enlistment age, but may also adversely affect the economic situation and - as a consequence - defence expenditure.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to help optimize sustainment logistics for US Army brigade combat teams, which may face challenges in transporting their assigned assets. Design/methodology/approach This paper develops a simulation framework with an integrated integer programming optimization model. The integer-programming model optimizes sustainment outcomes of supported battalions on a daily basis, whereas the simulation framework analyzes risk associated with shortfalls that may arise over the entire duration of a conflict. Findings This work presents a scenario reflecting the steady resupply of an infantry brigade combat team during combat operations and presents an in-depth risk analysis for possible fleet compositions. Originality/value The risk curves obtained allow decision-makers and commanders to optimize vehicle fleet design in advance of a conflict.

Category: 1.01 Original scientific paper Language: Original in Slovenian (Abstract in Slovenian and English, Summary in English) Key words: First World War, Brežice earthquake and its surroundings, January 29, 1917, restoration of earthquake zone, collection of funds for reconstruction, Aleksander Tornquist, Franciscan monastery Excerpt: Towards the end of the First World War, in the middle of winter, on January 29, 1917, Brežice and its surroundings was devastated by a severe earthquake, one of the worst in recent Slovenian history. Written exclusively on the basis of primary archival sources, this paper speaks of the suffering of the local population brought about by this natural disaster, of the difficult restoration of the affected area, of collection of resources for the affected population, and the response of local, provincial and state authorities, including the Habsburg dynasty, to the situation. It especially touches on the role and importance of military authorities (e.g. the Fifth Army, or the replacement battalion of the 87th infantry regiment), which were, in wartimes, the only authorities in charge of helping the affected population. Additionally, this paper highlights the field work of one of the most important seismologist in the monarchy at the time, Prof. Dr. Aleksander Tornquist, and the problem of restoration of the completely collapsed Franciscan monastery in Brežice.

The general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. — Sun TzuWorld War II saw a proliferation of maps. From command posts to the pages of National Geographic to the pages of daily newspapers, they were everywhere (Schulten). The era also saw substantive developments in cartography, especially with respect to the topographical maps that feature in our selected films. This essay offers a preliminary examination of the battle-map as depicted in two films about the Second World War: Franklin J. Shaffner’s biopic Patton (1970) and Jack Smight’s epic Midway (1976). In these films, maps, charts, or tableaux (the three-dimensional models upon which are plotted the movements of battalions, fleets, and so on) emerge as an expression of both martial and cinematic strategy. As a rear-view representation of the relative movements of personnel and materiel in particular battle arenas, the map and its accessories (pins, tape, markers, and so forth) trace the broad military dispositions of Patton’s 2nd Corp (Africa), Seventh Army (Italy) and Third Army (Western Europe) and the relative position of American and Japanese fleets in the Pacific. In both Patton and Midway, the map also emerges as a simple mode of narrative plotting: as the various encounters in the two texts play out, the battle-map more or less contemporaneously traces the progress of forces. It also serves as a foreshadowing device, not just narratively, but cinematically: that which is plotted in advance comes to pass (even if as preliminary movements before catastrophe), but the audience is also cued for the cinematic chaos and disjuncture that almost inevitably ensues in the battle scenes proper.On one hand, then, this essay proposes that at the fundamental level of fabula (seen through either the lens of historical hindsight or through the eyes of the novice who knows nothing of World War II), the annotated map is engaged both strategically and cinematically: as a stage upon which commanders attempt to act out (either in anticipation, or retrospectively) the intricate, but grotesque, ballet of warfare — and as a reflection of the broad, sequential, sweeps of conflict. While, in War and Cinema, Paul Virilio offers the phrase ‘the logistics of perception’ (1), in this this essay we, on the other hand, consider that, for those in command, the battle-map is a representation of the perception of logistics: the big picture of war finds rough indexical representation on a map, but (as Clausewitz tells us) chance, the creative agency of individual commanders, and the fog of battle make it far less probable (than is the case in more specific mappings, such as, say, the wedding rehearsal) that what is planned will play out with any degree of close correspondence (On War 19, 21, 77-81). Such mapping is, of course, further problematised by the processes of abstraction themselves: indexicality is necessarily a reduction; a de-realisation or déterritorialisation. ‘For the military commander,’ writes Virilio, ‘every dimension is unstable and presents itself in isolation from its original context’ (War and Cinema 32). Yet rehearsal (on maps, charts, or tableaux) is a keying activity that seeks to presage particular real world patterns (Goffman 45). As suggested above, far from being a rhizomatic activity, the heavily plotted (as opposed to thematic) business of mapping is always out of joint: either a practice of imperfect anticipation or an equally imperfect (pared back and behind-the-times) rendition of activity in the field. As is argued by Tolstoj in War and Peace, the map then presents to the responder a series of tensions and ironies often lost on the masters of conflict themselves. War, as Tostoj proposes, is a stochastic phenomenon while the map is a relatively static, and naive, attempt to impose order upon it. Tolstoj, then, pillories Phull (in the novel, Pfuhl), the aptly-named Prussian general whose lock-stepped obedience to the science of war (of which the map is part) results in the abject humiliation of 1806:Pfuhl was one of those theoreticians who are so fond of their theory that they lose sight of the object of that theory - its application in practice. (Vol. 2, Part 1, Ch. 10, 53)In both Patton and Midway, then, the map unfolds not only as an epistemological tool (read, ‘battle plan’) or reflection (read, the near contemporaneous plotting of real world affray) of the war narrative, but as a device of foreshadowing and as an allegory of command and its profound limitations. So, in Deleuzian terms, while emerging as an image of both time and perception, for commanders and filmgoers alike, the map is also something of a seduction: a ‘crystal-image’ situated in the interstices between the virtual and the actual (Deleuze 95). To put it another way, in our films the map emerges as an isomorphism: a studied plotting in which inheres a counter-text (Goffman 26). As a simple device of narrative, and in the conventional terms of latitude and longitude, in both Patton and Midway, the map, chart, or tableau facilitate the plotting of the resources of war in relation to relief (including island land masses), roads, railways, settlements, rivers, and seas. On this syntagmatic plane, in Greimasian terms, the map is likewise received as a canonical sign of command: where there are maps, there are, after all, commanders (Culler 13). On the other hand, as suggested above, the battle-map (hereafter, we use the term to signify the conventional paper map, the maritime chart, or tableau) materialises as a sanitised image of the unknown and the grotesque: as apodictic object that reduces complexity and that incidentally banishes horror and affect. Thus, the map evolves, in the viewer’s perception, as an ironic sign of all that may not be commanded. This is because, as an emblem of the rational order, in Patton and Midway the map belies the ubiquity of battle’s friction: that defined by Clausewitz as ‘the only concept which...distinguishes real war from war on paper’ (73). ‘Friction’ writes Clausewitz, ‘makes that which appears easy in War difficult in reality’ (81).Our work here cannot ignore or side-step the work of others in identifying the core cycles, characteristics of the war film genre. Jeanine Basinger, for instance, offers nothing less than an annotated checklist of sixteen key characteristics for the World War II combat film. Beyond this taxonomy, though, Basinger identifies the crucial role this sub-type of film plays in the corpus of war cinema more broadly. The World War II combat film’s ‘position in the evolutionary process is established, as well as its overall relationship to history and reality. It demonstrates how a primary set of concepts solidifies into a story – and how they can be interpreted for a changing ideology’ (78). Stuart Bender builds on Basinger’s taxonomy and discussion of narrative tropes with a substantial quantitative analysis of the very building blocks of battle sequences. This is due to Bender’s contention that ‘when a critic’s focus [is] on the narrative or ideological components of a combat film [this may] lead them to make assumptions about the style which are untenable’ (8). We seek with this research to add to a rich and detailed body of knowledge by redressing a surprising omission therein: a conscious and focussed analysis of the use of battle-maps in war cinema. In Patton and in Midway — as in War and Peace — the map emerges as an emblem of an intergeneric dialogue: as a simple storytelling device and as a paradigmatic engine of understanding. To put it another way, as viewer-responders with a synoptic perspective we perceive what might be considered a ‘double exposure’: in the map we see what is obviously before us (the collision of represented forces), but an Archimedean positioning facilitates the production of far more revelatory textual isotopies along what Roman Jakobson calls the ‘axis of combination’ (Linguistics and Poetics 358). Here, otherwise unconnected signs (in our case various manifestations and configurations of the battle-map) are brought together in relation to particular settings, situations, and figures. Through this palimpsest of perspective, a crucial binary emerges: via the battle-map we see ‘command’ and the sequence of engagement — and, through Greimasian processes of axiological combination (belonging more to syuzhet than fabula), elucidated for us are the wrenching ironies of warfare (Culler 228). Thus, through the profound and bound motif of the map (Tomashevsky 69), are we empowered to pass judgement on the map bearers who, in both films, present as the larger-than-life heroes of old. Figure 1.While we have scope only to deal with the African theatre, Patton opens with a dramatic wide-shot of the American flag: a ‘map’, if you will, of a national history forged in war (Fig. 1). Against this potent sign of American hegemony, as he slowly climbs up to the stage before it, the general appears a diminutive figure -- until, via a series of matched cuts that culminate in extreme close-ups, he manifests as a giant about to play his part in a great American story (Fig. 2).Figure 2.Some nineteen minutes into a film, having surveyed the carnage of Kasserine Pass (in which, in February 1943, the Germans inflicted a humiliating defeat on the Americans) General Omar Bradley is reunited with his old friend and newly-nominated three-star general, George S. Patton Jr.. Against a backdrop of an indistinct topographical map (that nonetheless appears to show the front line) and the American flag that together denote the men’s authority, the two discuss the Kasserine catastrophe. Bradley’s response to Patton’s question ‘What happened at Kasserine?’ clearly illustrates the tension between strategy and real-world engagement. While the battle-plan was solid, the Americans were outgunned, their tanks were outclassed, and (most importantly) their troops were out-disciplined. Patton’s concludes that Rommel can only be beaten if the American soldiers are fearless and fight as a cohesive unit. Now that he is in command of the American 2nd Corp, the tide of American martial fortune is about to turn.The next time Patton appears in relation to the map is around half an hour into the two-and-three-quarter-hour feature. Here, in the American HQ, the map once more appears as a simple, canonical sign of command. Somewhat carelessly, the map of Europe seems to show post-1945 national divisions and so is ostensibly offered as a straightforward prop. In terms of martial specifics, screenplay writer Francis Ford Coppola apparently did not envisage much close scrutiny of the film’s maps. Highlighted, instead, are the tensions between strategy as a general principle and action on the ground. As British General Sir Arthur Coningham waxes lyrical about allied air supremacy, a German bomber drops its payload on the HQ, causing the map of Europe to (emblematically) collapse forward into the room. Following a few passes by the attacking aircraft, the film then cuts to a one second medium shot as a hail of bullets from a Heinkel He 111 strike a North African battle map (Fig. 3). Still prone, Patton remarks: ‘You were discussing air supremacy, Sir Arthur.’ Dramatising a scene that did take place (although Coningham was not present), Schaffner’s intention is to allow Patton to shoot holes in the British strategy (of which he is contemptuous) but a broader objective is the director’s exposé of the more general disjuncture between strategy and action. As the film progresses, and the battle-map’s allegorical significance is increasingly foregrounded, this critique becomes definitively sharper.Figure 3.Immediately following a scene in which an introspective Patton walks through a cemetery in which are interred the remains of those killed at Kasserine, to further the critique of Allied strategy the camera cuts to Berlin’s high command and a high-tech ensemble of tableaux, projected maps, and walls featuring lights, counters, and clocks. Tasked to research the newly appointed Patton, Captain Steiger walks through the bunker HQ with Hitler’s Chief of Staff, General Jodl, to meet with Rommel — who, suffering nasal diphtheria, is away from the African theatre. In a memorable exchange, Steiger reveals that Patton permanently attacks and never retreats. Rommel, who, following his easy victory at Kasserine, is on the verge of total tactical victory, in turn declares that he will ‘attack and annihilate’ Patton — before the poet-warrior does the same to him. As Clausewitz has argued, and as Schaffner is at pains to point out, it seems that, in part, the outcome of warfare has more to do with the individual consciousness of competing warriors than it does with even the most exquisite of battle-plans.Figure 4.So, even this early in the film’s runtime, as viewer-responders we start to reassess various manifestations of the battle-map. To put it as Michelle Langford does in her assessment of Schroeter’s cinema, ‘fragments of the familiar world [in our case, battle-maps] … become radically unfamiliar’ (Allegorical Images 57). Among the revelations is that from the flag (in the context of close battle, all sense of ‘the national’ dissolves), to the wall map, to the most detailed of tableau, the battle-plan is enveloped in the fog of war: thus, the extended deeply-focussed scenes of the Battle of El Guettar take us from strategic overview (Patton’s field glass perspectives over what will soon become a Valley of Death) to what Boris Eichenbaum has called ‘Stendhalian’ scale (The Young Tolstoi 105) in which, (in Patton) through more closely situated perspectives, we almost palpably experience the Germans’ disarray under heavy fire. As the camera pivots between the general and the particular (and between the omniscient and the nescient) the cinematographer highlights the tension between the strategic and the actual. Inasmuch as it works out (and, as Schaffner shows us, it never works out completely as planned) this is the outcome of modern martial strategy: chaos and unimaginable carnage on the ground that no cartographic representation might capture. As Patton observes the destruction unfold in the valley below and before him, he declares: ‘Hell of a waste of fine infantry.’ Figure 5.An important inclusion, then, is that following the protracted El Guettar battle scenes, Schaffner has the (symbolically flag-draped) casket of Patton’s aide, Captain Richard N. “Dick” Jenson, wheeled away on a horse-drawn cart — with the lonely figure of the mourning general marching behind, his ironic interior monologue audible to the audience: ‘I can't see the reason such fine young men get killed. There are so many battles yet to fight.’ Finally, in terms of this brief and partial assessment of the battle-map in Patton, less than an hour in, we may observe that the map is emerging as something far more than a casual prop; as something more than a plotting of battlelines; as something more than an emblem of command. Along a new and unexpected axis of semantic combination, it is now manifesting as a sign of that which cannot be represented nor commanded.Midway presents the lead-up to the eponymous naval battle of 1942. Smight’s work is of interest primarily because the battle itself plays a relatively small role in the film; what is most important is the prolonged strategising that comprises most of the film’s run time. In Midway, battle-tables and fleet markers become key players in the cinematic action, second almost to the commanders themselves. Two key sequences are discussed here: the moment in which Yamamoto outlines his strategy for the attack on Midway (by way of a decoy attack on the Aleutian Islands), and the scene some moments later where Admiral Nimitz and his assembled fleet commanders (Spruance, Blake, and company) survey their own plan to defend the atoll. In Midway, as is represented by the notion of a fleet-in-being, the oceanic battlefield is presented as a speculative plane on which commanders can test ideas. Here, a fleet in a certain position projects a radius of influence that will deter an enemy fleet from attacking: i.e. ‘a fleet which is able and willing to attack an enemy proposing a descent upon territory which that force has it in charge to protect’ (Colomb viii). The fleet-in-being, it is worth noting, is one that never leaves port and, while it is certainly true that the latter half of Midway is concerned with the execution of strategy, the first half is a prolonged cinematic game of chess, with neither player wanting to move lest the other has thought three moves ahead. Virilio opines that the fleet-in-being is ‘a new idea of violence that no longer comes from direct confrontation and bloodshed, but rather from the unequal properties of bodies, evaluation of the number of movements allowed them in a chosen element, permanent verification of their dynamic efficiency’ (Speed and Politics 62). Here, as in Patton, we begin to read the map as a sign of the subjective as well as the objective. This ‘game of chess’ (or, if you prefer, ‘Battleships’) is presented cinematically through the interaction of command teams with their battle-tables and fleet markers. To be sure, this is to show strategy being developed — but it is also to prepare viewers for the defamiliarised representation of the battle itself.The first sequence opens with a close-up of Admiral Yamamoto declaring: ‘This is how I expect the battle to develop.’ The plan to decoy the Americans with an attack on the Aleutians is shown via close-ups of the conveniently-labelled ‘Northern Force’ (Fig. 6). It is then explained that, twenty-four hours later, a second force will break off and strike south, on the Midway atoll. There is a cut from closeups of the pointer on the map to the wider shot of the Japanese commanders around their battle table (Fig. 7). Interestingly, apart from the opening of the film in the Japanese garden, and the later parts of the film in the operations room, the Japanese commanders are only ever shown in this battle-table area. This canonically positions the Japanese as pure strategists, little concerned with the enmeshing of war with political or social considerations. The sequence ends with Commander Yasimasa showing a photograph of Vice Admiral Halsey, who the Japanese mistakenly believe will be leading the carrier fleet. Despite some bickering among the commanders earlier in the film, this sequence shows the absolute confidence of the Japanese strategists in their plan. The shots are suitably languorous — averaging three to four seconds between cuts — and the body language of the commanders shows a calm determination. The battle-map here is presented as an index of perfect command and inevitable victory: each part of the plan is presented with narration suggesting the Japanese expect to encounter little resistance. While Yasimasa and his clique are confident, the other commanders suggest a reconnaissance flight over Pearl Harbor to ascertain the position of the American fleet; the fear of fleet-in-being is shown here firsthand and on the map, where the reconnaissance planes are placed alongside the ship markers. The battle-map is never shown in full: only sections of the naval landscape are presented. We suggest that this is done in order to prepare the audience for the later stages of the film: as in Patton (from time to time) the battle-map here is filmed abstractly, to prime the audience for the abstract montage of the battle itself in the film’s second half.Figure 6.Figure 7.Having established in the intervening running time that Halsey is out of action, his replacement, Rear Admiral Spruance, is introduced to the rest of the command team. As with all the important American command and strategy meetings in the film, this is done in the operations room. A transparent coordinates board is shown in the foreground as Nimitz, Spruance and Rear Admiral Fletcher move through to the battle table. Behind the men, as they lean over the table, is an enormous map of the world (Fig. 8). In this sequence, Nimitz freely admits that while he knows each Japanese battle group’s origin and heading, he is unsure of their target. He asks Spruance for his advice:‘Ray, assuming what you see here isn’t just an elaborate ruse — Washington thinks it is, but assuming they’re wrong — what kind of move do you suggest?’This querying is followed by Spruance glancing to a particular point on the map (Fig. 9), then a cut to a shot of models representing the aircraft carriers Hornet, Enterprise & Yorktown (Fig. 10). This is one of the few model/map shots unaccompanied by dialogue or exposition. In effect, this shot shows Spruance’s thought process before he responds: strategic thought presented via cinematography. Spruance then suggests situating the American carrier group just northeast of Midway, in case the Japanese target is actually the West Coast of the United States. It is, in effect, a hedging of bets. Spruance’s positioning of the carrier group also projects that group’s sphere of influence around Midway atoll and north to essentially cut off Japanese access to the US. The fleet-in-being is presented graphically — on the map — in order to, once again, cue the audience to match the later (edited) images of the battle to these strategic musings.In summary, in Midway, the map is an element of production design that works alongside cinematography, editing, and performance to present the notion of strategic thought to the audience. In addition, and crucially, it functions as an abstraction of strategy that prepares the audience for the cinematic disorientation that will occur through montage as the actual battle rages later in the film. Figure 8.Figure 9.Figure 10.This essay has argued that the battle-map is a simulacrum of the weakest kind: what Baudrillard would call ‘simulacra of simulation, founded on information, the model’ (121). Just as cinema itself offers a distorted view of history (the war film, in particular, tends to hagiography), the battle-map is an over-simplification that fails to capture the physical and psychological realities of conflict. We have also argued that in both Patton and Midway, the map is not a ‘free’ motif (Tomashevsky 69). Rather, it is bound: a central thematic device. In the two films, the battle-map emerges as a crucial isomorphic element. On the one hand, it features as a prop to signify command and to relay otherwise complex strategic plottings. At this syntagmatic level, it functions alongside cinematography, editing, and performance to give audiences a glimpse into how military strategy is formed and tested: a traditional ‘reading’ of the map. But on the flip side of what emerges as a classic structuralist binary, is the map as a device of foreshadowing (especially in Midway) and as a depiction of command’s profound limitations. Here, at a paradigmatic level, along a new axis of combination, a new reading of the map in war cinema is proposed: the battle-map is as much a sign of the subjective as it is the objective.ReferencesBasinger, Jeanine. The World War II Combat Film: Anatomy of a Genre. Middletown, CT: Columbia UP, 1986.Baudrillard, Jean. Simulacra and Simulation. Ann Arbour: U of Michigan Press, 1994.Bender, Stuart. Film Style and the World War II Combat Genre. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013.Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Vol. 1. London: Kegan Paul, 1908.Colomb, Philip Howard. Naval Warfare: Its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically Treated. 3rd ed. London: W.H. Allen & Co, 1899.Culler, Jonathan. Structuralist Poetics. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975.Deleuze, Gilles. 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