Journal articles on the topic 'Army, gendarmerie and colonial police'

The article discusses the limited intelligence capabilities of the gendarmerie departments of the Warsaw Governor General (Lomzinska, Warsaw, Kielce, Lublin, and Radom provinces) in the fight against German and Austrian spies in the second half of 1914 and the first half of 1915. One reason for the secret police’s lack of readiness is the reluctance of the gendarmerie-police authorities to organize counter-response work on an appropriate basis. The rare, fragmentary, and not always valuable information received by agents of the investigating authorities did not allow the gendarmes to organize full-scale and successful operational work on a subordinate territory to identify hidden enemies of the state. The low potential, and, in some cases, the complete uselessness of secret service personnel for the interests of the military wanted list led to the fact that most politically disloyal persons were accidentally identified by other special services. In most cases, spies were detected either due to information from army intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, or due to the vigilance of military personnel of the advanced units of the Russian army. The authors conclude that the gendarmerie departments were unable to organize a systematic operational escort of military personnel of the Russian armies deployed in the Warsaw Military District. Despite the fact that the duty of the gendarmerie police included not only criminal procedures, but also operational searches, there was no qualified identification of spies with the help of secret officers.

The article considers some aspects of the history of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russian Federation through the bios of its three outstanding representatives: the first head of the St. Petersburg police Ivan Putilin, the head of the St. Petersburg gendarmerie lieutenant-general Ivan Volkov and the minister of internal affairs of the USSR army general Nikolai Shchelokov.

During the nineteenth century, the maintaining of internal order took place without any real theoretical body of thought to guide its practice. The police, the gendarmerie and the National Guard simply did the job. When normal means proved inadequate to the task, the army would be drawn in. With the lack of any doctrine or specialist units, the intervention of soldiers using firearms caused the deaths of large numbers of demonstrators. After France’s defeat in 1870-71 and the events of the Paris Commune a series of studies, chiefly emanating from military circles, recommended setting up specialist units. The key question was how could the Republic, founded on democratic lines, embrace the preservation of public order by violence ? This recurring question terrified the politicians, however, who feared a praetorian body that might be susceptible to staging a coup d’Etat. Moreover, a sizeable part of the gendarmerie was also opposed to the creation of such a force, whereas the army was seeking to give up its public order role. France would have to wait till the aftermath of the First World War to witness the creation of the Gendarmerie Mobile, a force specifically designed for the internal security mission.

ABSTRACTThe British Section of the Palestine Gendarmerie was raised in early 1922 by the colonial secretary, Winston Churchill, as a striking force and riot squad for Palestine. Through the agency of the Irish police chief, General Hugh Tudor, this British Gendarmerie was recruited almost entirely from amongst the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) and its Auxiliary Division, then in the process of disbanding as part of the recent Anglo-Irish settlement. The international notoriety of the Black and Tans led to official efforts to obscure the fact that the force was to be drawn from RIC ranks but these were entirely unsuccessful. Indeed, the British Gendarmerie itself quickly acquired a reputation for Black and Tan-type behaviour but an examination of its four-year career indicates that this derived more from preconceptions about the force's composition than from its actual conduct. In fact, in terms of force discipline and levels of police brutality, the British Gendarmerie's record compared very favourably with those of its ‘parent’ forces in Ireland, lending support to recent claims that historians have tended to over-value character-based explanations at the expense of circumstance-based assessments when analysing police behaviour both during the Irish revolution and the Palestine Mandate.

Recruitment in the chaukidari forces under colonial police administration was an alternative to the colonial army for Dalits to get socio-political status, consciousness, ‘economic freedom’ (cash salary, rewards, lands and concessions), education and ‘civic equality’. Therefore, the chaukidari in the colonial police administration was a positive source of support for a section of Dalits, despite the limitation of numbers.

The article presents the beginnings of military police in the Polish territory, which are closely related to the Napoleonic era. It was then that French solutions in terms of internal security formations were adopted. The creation of military police formation, first in the liberated from Russian rule Lithuania, was closely connected with the events of the War of 1812. The failure of the plans to fight a decisive battle at the borders of Russia and the slackness of the Great Army, caused by weather breakdown and inadequate provisions, soon resulted in the disintegration of discipline, an unprecedented number of marauders, and ordinary banditry spreading at an alarming rate. The areas through which Napoleonic troops had marched were completely devastated. In this situation Napoleon, seeking a solution to the problems with ensuring peace at the rear, in his order of July 1st, 1812 appointing the authorities of the liberated Lithuania also commanded the formation of Lithuanian military police. The article discusses the organization of this formation and its participation in the campaign as well as attempts to create similar military police formation in the lands of the Duchy of Warsaw at the turn of 1812 and 1813, when they were threatened by the offensive of the victorious Russian army. It has been emphasized that successive gendarmerie and military police formations created in the Polish territory referred to the traditions of these units.

This article examines the period of Akhmet Baitursynov's life from 1907 to 1910, when he was under the supervision of the tsarist secret police, labeled “politically unreliable”.The article provides data from such sources as a letter from Baitursynov's wife Badrisafa to the Steppe Governor-General Shmit E. O. and articles by Alikhan Bukeikhanov, which provide arguments about the need to release Akhmet Baitursynov from the walls of the Semipalatinsk prison. Archival documents of the office of the Orenburg Governor are also subjected to scientific analysis, including data from the Orenburg gendarmerie about the need for “special supervision” of A. Baitursynov, as a result of his political calls to stop paying taxes and taxes to representatives ofthe colonial regime. The article indicates the reason why Baitursynov's surname was distorted in the police archives of the tsarist period. Thus, even before the events of the February Revolution of 1917 began, Akhmet Baitursynov aroused well-founded fears of the tsarist secret police.

The article explores the essence and content of the preparation and conduct of stabilization actions by military formations with law enforcement functions according to NATO standards. It discusses the activities of the NATO Centres of Excellence, substantiates the concepts, essence, and content of stabilization actions by the security forces of Ukraine. The NATO Advanced Civil-Military Interaction Training Center for Enhancing Qualifications in Law Enforcement Stabilization Actions serves as an international coordination and knowledge hub for the community of interests in the field of stabilization actions with law enforcement characteristics. Currently, the organization consists of the following structures specialized in the described activities: Carabinieri Corps of Italy, Czech Military Police, French Gendarmerie, Greek Army, Polish Military Gendarmerie, Romanian Gendarmerie, Spanish Civil Guard, Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, and Turkish Gendarmerie. The center examines the concept of stabilization actions with law enforcement characteristics applied by NATO member countries in unstable regions (states) in all types of conflicts, ranging from peacetime to high-intensity conflicts. The spectrum of conflicts encompasses four main types of campaigns in which stabilization actions are conducted. Typically, these actions occur both during the initial stages and throughout armed conflicts (combat operations), as well as after their conclusion. The article introduces the definition of law enforcement stabilization actions, which has not been previously reflected in the normative-legal framework of the security sector components of Ukraine. The implementation of a comprehensive set of law enforcement stabilization actions will play a crucial role in the post-war period during the restoration of constitutional order and territorial integrity of Ukraine, which have been affected by Russian occupation.

In interwar Poland, one of the tasks of the military counterintelligence was to combat communist influence, which was rightly judged as one of the most eminent dangers that threatened the state. The Communist Party of Poland carried out its sabotage through the Central Military Department, which the Polish counterintelligence considered an integral part and tool of the General Staff of the Soviet Army. This article discusses the activity of a communist cell in the 14th Infantry Regiment stationed in Włocławek, as well as the liquidation of that cell as a result of cooperation between the Polish State Police, military counterintelligence and gendarmerie. It also discusses the court proceedings against members of the cell at the Military Regional Court no. 8 in Grudziądz.

The archival documents confirm that the police department at the beginning of the 20th century carried out a deep analysis of the socio-political situation, primarily negative processes in the national outskirts of the Russian Empire, foreseeing their undesirable result for state development in the context of modernization and the simultaneous strengthening of the social and revolutionary movement in the Steppe region. The materials of the article confirm that, despite the defeat of the First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907, the general crisis of the autocratic form of government intensified, which resulted in the failure of the colonial policy on the territory of the national outskirts of the Russian Empire, including Kazakhstan. This can be seen on the example of studying the documents of the office of the Orenburg Governor, the Omsk gendarmerie department on the situation in the Karkaralinsky district at the beginning of the 20th century. At the same time, an analysis of archival materials is being carried out, how the police supervision of Akhmet Baitursynov was carried out. Sources identified in the course of work with the funds of the State Archives of the Russian Federation, the State Archives of the Orenburg Region, allowed the authors to study the details of the political investigation behind the leaders Alash, A. Baitursynov and his closest associates. The study allows us to understand the forms and methods of political investigation in the Russian Empire by the gendarmerie and the police, to find out who directly carried out this policy in the Orenburg province and the Steppe region. The general conclusion is the thesis that the Kazakh national intelligentsia, despite the opposition and repressive measures on the part of the tsarist authorities, became an integral part of the people's liberation movement in the countries of the East.

AbstractEmerging as a mission in East London in 1865, the Salvation Army quickly became known for its militant and unconventional evangelism on the streets of British towns and cities. Convinced that unrepentant souls were headed for hell, Salvationists employed sensational tactics to attract the attention of the lower working classes. This strategy did not change when the Salvation Army sent a small party of missionaries to Bombay in 1882. They not only arrived in Indian dress but held noisy processions through the city’s streets. While these methods reflected the Salvation Army’s revivalist theology, they brought Salvationists into collision with the colonial authorities. Fearing that the Army’s aggressive and sensational evangelism would lead to religious rioting and reduce the religion of the ruling race to ridicule, the Bombay police arrested the Salvationists on several occasions between September 1882 and April 1883. Although the city’s British residents generally approved of the actions of the police, many Indians and missionaries came to the defence of the evangelical organization, believing that imperial officials had acted unjustly towards the Army’s missionaries. Bolstered by this support, Salvationists repeatedly defied colonial authority for the sake of religious liberty, demonstrating through their words and actions that the Salvation Army could be anything but a benefit to imperial stability and prestige on the subcontinent.

It was in 1907 when Korea was annexed by Japan in the field of health care systems as the Gwangje Hospital, Uihakgyo the National Medical School and the Korean Red Cross Hospital were merged into the colonial Daehan Hospital, and massive cholera epidemic controls by the Japanese Army were enforced. However, despite their importance, the cholera epidemic of 1907 in Korea and preventive measures taken at that time have not yet been studied extensively as a single research subject. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to a more concrete and broader understanding of the Korea-Japan annexation of health care systems under the rule of the Japanese Resident-General of Korea by revealing new facts and correcting existing errors. In 1907, cholera was transmitted to Korea from China and Japan and spread across the Korean Peninsula, resulting in a major public health crisis, perhaps one of the most serious cholera outbreaks in the twentieth century Korea. Although Busan and Pyeongyang were the cities most infected with cholera, the targets for the most intensive interventions were Gyeongseong (Seoul) and Incheon, where the Japanese Crown Prince were supposed to make a visit. The Japanese police commissioner took several anti-cholera preventive measures in Gyeongseong, including searching out patients, disinfecting and blocking infected areas, and isolating the confirmed or suspected. Nevertheless, cholera was about to be rampant especially among Japanese residents. In this situation, Itō Hirobumi, the first Resident-General of Korea, organized the temporary cholera control headquarters to push ahead the visit of the Japanese Crown Prince for his political purposes to colonize Korea. To dispel Emperor Meiji’s concerns, Itō had to appoint Satō Susumu, the famous Japanese Army Surgeon General, as an advisor, since he had much credit at Court. In addition, as the Japanese-led Korean police lacked epidemic control ability and experience, the headquarters became an improvised organization commanded by the Japanese Army in Korea and wielded great influence on the formation of the colonial disease control systems. Its activities were forced, violent, and negligent, and many Korean people were quite uncooperative in some anti-cholera measures. As a result, the Japanese Army in Korea took the initiative away from the Korean police in epidemic controls, serving the heavy-handed military policy of early colonial period. In short, the cholera epidemic and its control in 1907 were important events that shaped the direction of Japan’s colonial rule.

The article examines the process of origin and formation of the political police of Kostroma Province in the mid-19th century. Special attention is paid to the issue of its staffi ng and the wide use of army offi cers for service in the political police. The chronological framework covers a little-studied period of activity of the political police in Kostroma Province. The authors of the article note that the Highest orders of military ranks that had a special place in the appointment of the headquarters and chief offi cers of the political police. On the basis of archival materials, the main directions of service activities of the highest ranks of the political police in the region are analysed. The article reveals the contribution of the gendarmes’ Corps chiefs to the protection of public order during the period under review. The author reveals the attitude of the authorities to literacy among the lower ranks of the gendarmerie. On the basis of historical and archival documents, it is concluded that the successful career of offi cers was promoted by conscientious performance of their offi cial duties, their «excellent-diligent and zealous service». It is concluded that special attention was paid to discipline among the gendarmes. The political police were independent of other branches of government, and were subordinate only to the headquarters of the gendarmes’ corps and the third division of His Imperial Majesty’s own offi ce. Gaps in the historical and legal coverage of the work of the state security Agency in the province of the Russian Empire at the fi rst stage of its existence are fi lled.

In 1919, one of the political parties in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Agricultural National Union, created an illegal militarized wing, which was called The Orange Guard by contemporaries. Having come to power in 1920, the Union, instead of relying on official power structures, such as the army, gendarmerie and police, was forced to continue developing its own paramilitary structure. There are very few documents of that period disclosing its composition, number, purpose and methods of solving problems. Information about it in historiography is fragmentary, despite the direct participation of the guard in all dramatic phases of the internal political struggle of that period. During the Second World War, the archives of the Inter-Allied Military Control Commission came to the disposal of the Red Army as a trophy of war. From 1920 to 1927, the delegates of the commission performed supervisory functions over the observance of the requirements of the military section of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine by the government of Bulgaria defeated in the First World War. A number of documents related to the activities of this formation were found in the Russian State Military Archives in the fonds 1707k. This article is devoted to an analysis of a document that is supposedly a charter on the staffing of The Orange Guard.

The subject of this article is the Serbian State Guard – an armed formation created in occupied Serbia in early March 1942. It arose out of the need of the occupiers and collaborators for a stronger and more organized unit that would more successfully confront the insurgent forces in the territory of Serbia. The primary objective of our research was the reconstruction of its creation, organization, mode of operation, combat activities, and make-up XXX. Created on the basis of the pre-war gendarmerie, in the specific conditions of wartime chaos in Serbia, it retained its primarily police character, although it formed larger and more mobile military units when needed. Finally, the fate of this formation after its inclusion in the ranks of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland (i.e., the Chetniks of Draža Mihailović) and its going into exile was presented. The source-materials used for this paper are kept mostly in the Military Archive in Belgrade. We have also used documents kept in the Belgrade Historical Archives, the State Archives of Serbia, as well as in the local historical archives in Niš.

By the spring of 1927 democratic institutions seemed to have secured a relatively firm footing in Austria. That appearance was deceptive. The same year saw the beginning of the deterioration of Austrian democracy.The achievement of a secure democratic political environment by 1927 appeared grounded in reality. Within eight years after the Austrian Social Democrats had quashed the threat of a Communist-inspired Soviet republic in Austria, the bourgeois-dominated democratic government had succeeded in building up a reliable police force, gendarmerie, and army adequate to protect it against any internal threats. Rent as it was by the endless power struggles of its leaders, the Heimwehr was still only a relatively weak force on the political horizon. The National Socialist Party, split into quarreling factions, amounted to little more than a noisy opposition group. With the marked improvement in the Austrian economy by the mid-1920s, Austrian anti-Semitism had noticeably declined by the end of 1926. Perhaps most important of all, the foreign financial assistance assured by the Geneva Protocol of 1922 and the subsequent economic stabilization measures under-taken by the government did much to put the country's financial house in good order.

This article looks at how Palestine has been a trope since 1948 for understanding forced refugee status of people who have been evicted from their own homes as a consequence of colonial policy. In this article, I look at the status of Kashmiri Pandits who were evicted by militant forces in the late 1980s. They then proceeded to make new lives elsewhere haunted by their longing for home. The militants are in turn targeted by the police and army, and ordinary bystanders become caught in the crossfire between separatists and Indian army. Using the work of Edward Said, in relation to the writing of Martin Buber and Hannah Arendt, I attempt to present the possibility of dialogue between conflicting groups as an existential problem, where intellectuals can play a mediating role.

The liberation of Korea by the Red Army in August 1945 brought an end to the Japanese colonial rule and opened a new page in the history of Korea. However, the circumstances in which Korea met its liberation played a fateful role in the developments after the liberation. Division of the country into Soviet and American occupation zones became an essential background for the creation of two different political regimes. Their confrontation eventually led to the devastating Korean war, the consequences of which still vividly felt today across the 38th parallel. This article focuses on the creation of the North Korean police force by the Soviet military administration. The police would become an important tool for establishing control over North Korea and will play important role in its political unification. Drawing from the Soviet archival evidence as well as several Korean-language sources this article argues that the creation of the North Korean police was not initially driven by political goals or goals of creating a military for the future North Korean regime. The evidence suggests that despite the direct nature of the Soviet control over North Korea, the creation of the police was primarily guided by the practical need of the Soviet command to overcome a number of serious issues that plagued North Korea from the very first days after the liberation. One of the primary tools for the creation of the North Korean police force was the commandant offices. As the grassroots level organisation of the Soviet military administration tasked with implementing its policies, the commandant offices were directly responsible for monitoring and controlling the work of the police. Equally important, however, was their role in fighting the crimes committed by the soldiers and officers of the Red Army.

This article addresses one of the least studied issues of the Great Patriotic War — German special services and collaborative security agencies using their agent assets in the occupied territory of the Kursk region. The chronological frameworks of the study cover the period from the seizure of the Kursk region by German troops to its liberation by the Red Army units. The corpus of sources on the subject is extremely limited. The authors draw on the materials of archival investigatory records on former active accomplices of the German occupiers from among Soviet citizens, who throughout the post-war period were actively sought by the Soviet state security organs. Among the defendants in this category of cases were former leaders, their assistants, senior investigators of the city and district departments of the Russian auxiliary police, created under direct supervision of the German occupation authorities in the territory. Analysis of archival investigatory records shows that the vast majority of heads of collaborative repressive bodies (police, gendarmerie, prisons) joined of the German invaders consciously and voluntarily. This circumstance contributed to their zealous service to German invaders. In order to prove their allegiance to the German command and to avoid punishment for failure, these officials actively recruited secret informants — their agents. These agents were mostly recruited from local residents who, for various reasons, agreed to cooperate with the leaders of Russian police agencies. The tasks of the agents included timely information on the anti-Nazi underground, Soviet intelligence, leaders and participants in the partisan movement in the occupied territory of the Kursk region in 1941–43. Quite often, agents were used by the directors of city and district prisons, which were opened by the German occupational commandant's offices in the region. Information about secret agents was carefully guarded. All agents were on allowance from the territorial bodies of the Russian auxiliary police. Due to scope and activity levels of the partisan movement in the occupied territory of the Kursk region, pro-Nazi agents were most active in the Valuyki, Grayvoron, Dmitriev, Rylsk, Sudzha, Shchigry, Shebekino districts.

The article deals with the biography of the peasant Andrii Sapsai, whose life came at a time of the great turmoil in the first half of the twentieth century.On the eve of the 1917 revolution his family successfully farmed in the village Pryyut of Katerynoslav province. In the post-revolutionary years they continued to farm: they kept cattle, cultivated land. The turning point for the family was the dislocation and eviction from the village.The whole family was deported to live in the Urals at the Lisna Vovchanka station. There Andrii was sentenced under a political article. On the eve of the German-Soviet war he returned to Ukraine and settled not far from the village Pryyut.With the arrival of German troops he volunteered with the police, moved to the village Pryyut where he settled down in his house. He was responsible for sending local youth to Germany, searching the villages of those in hiding, and sending them to the collection point in the village Friesendorf, and from there escorted to the train station. Aboveall, Andrii Sapsai participated in the execution of the Jews of the village Kamyana in the Berestianabalka.In May 1942, police officers from the area were summoned to the Friesendorf meeting, for a total of 50 men arrived. The police chief Keller ordered everyone to get into two trucks and to go to the village Zlatoustovka.The policemen were brought to the Berestiana balka, which was located near the village, where a hole up to 20 m long, 2 m wide and 2 m deep had already been dug.They were informed that the Jews were going to be brought now and they would have to be shot. Those who would refuse to participate in the shooting would face severe punishment. Following the police the chief of the Friesendorf Gendarmerie, who had organized the whole process, arrived. In 1934 he left the territory of Ukraine together with some German troops, reaching Romania and leaving them there. In the summer of 1944 local authorities gathered those who had retreated with the Germans at the camp and they worked to rebuild the airfield and then they were transferred to the Soviet command. Then Andrii was called to the ranks of the Red Army by the field enlistment office. To the 4th platoon of the 1st military company, 375 special assault battalion 41 rifle regiment of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.He participated in the battles for the liberation of Hungary, in January 1944 became a German prisoner, and in May 1945 in the territory of Austria he was liberated by Soviet troops and again drafted into the army, where he served until 1946.

Banditry was a serious social problem in the interwar period in Poland, and combating this phenomenon was of particular importance immediately after The Great War, during the early years of independence. Ensuring internal stability was a necessary condition for supporting the army fighting for the state's survival. The article presents the activities of public authorities in the western part of Lesser Poland that aimed at a reduction of levels of banditry. It was the territory of the former Austrian Partition, Galicia, where the power was first assumed by the Poles, as early as the end of October and beginning of November 1918. In the first part of this article the factors contributing to the spread of crime occurring in the last months of the Great War, during the transformation and in the following months, are characterized. Then, the process of creating public order and security services until their unification in the summer of 1921, is presented. The steps taken to combat banditry are described in two stages, the first of which covers the first several months of the stabilisation of the socio-political situation, while the other – the period after the creation of the State Police, whose units and stations in this area were first established in December 1919. They were created as a result of the transformation of the gendarmerie, a service that was previously the most important public order structure in the Lesser Poland. The article contains a description of a number selected criminal cases that concerned the suppression of criminal groups, in confrontation with which the gendarmes and police officers lost their lives.

The research goal is to discuss the organization and various aspects of Polish military intelligence in the second half of the 1930s in Subcarpatian Rus, which belonged to the Czechoslovak state in the interwar period. The research methodology: critical analysis of hitherto unpublished archival materials of Polish military intelligence and published scholarly works on the subject. In the present article the author systematizes and specifies the existing scholarly findings concerning the organization and little-known activity of Polish military intelligence in Subcarpatian Rus. Polish military secret services conducted intensive intelligence activity in Subcarpatian Rus in the second half of the 1930s. The beginnings of such activity date back to 1919. The interest of Polish intelligence in Subcarpatian Rus was primarily a consequence of plans to create a common Polish-Hungarian border and prevent the creation of a Ukrainian state there, which would pose a threat to the security of the Second Polish Republic. The Second Department of the Main Staff of the Polish Army kept the highest Polish authorities informed on the political and military situation as well as internal and economic situation in Subcarpatian Rus. Particular attention was paid to analyzing units of the Czechoslovak army as well as police, gendarmerie and border guards stationed there. In the second half of the 1930s, Polish intelligence reported any manifestations of Soviet presence in this area, which was a result of the cooperation between Prague and Moscow. In addition, attempts to penetrate various Ukrainian organizations were made, especially those of a military nature. The Second Department of the Main Staff of the Polish Army was very active in Subcarpatian Rus in the fall of 1938 and, first of all, in March 1939, when this region was taken over by the Hungarian army. It should be remembered, however, that Subcarpatian Rus and the whole Czechoslovakia played an important, but not a primary role in the activity of Polish military intelligence in the second half of the 1930s, because their main attention was focused on the threat from the two largest neighbors of Poland – Germany and the Soviet Union.

One can safely state that the «Andreas Schmidt era» (1940-1944) could be considered one of the most difficult periods of the history of the German minority in Romania. From the very beginning, the activity of Nazi controlled organization entitled the German Ethnic Group in Romania and its leader (Andreas Schmidt) was perceived by the Romanian authorities with suspicion and concern. This concern was legitimate since the aggressive policies of the leadership of the German Ethnic Group in Romania let to increasing tensions between the latter, on one side, and the Romanian authorities and the Romanian local population in mixed Romanian-German communities, on the other side. Consequently, the Special Intelligence Service (Serviciul Special de Informaţii, one of the Romanian secret services in the interwar period), the intelligence service of the Romanian army (entitled in Romanian: Secţia a II-a Informaţii a Marelui Stat Major), the General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie, and the General Directorate of the Police kept under close surveillance the hostile activities of the German Ethnic Group towards the Romanian state. The reports of these aforementioned intelligence institutions emphasized the totalitarian character of the German Ethnic Group in Romania and illustrates how this Nazi controlled organization turned under the leadership of Andreas Schmidt into an effective tool of the Third Reich in South Eastern Europe.

Democratic states should use democratic principles namely engagement, negotiation, discussion, persuasion and participation to resolve challenges in societies. This is in contrast to colonial and apartheid states which used police, army, imprisonment, exile or banishment from the country against blacks who demanded democratic rights. This study investigates whether democratic South Africa embraces democratic principles highlighted above to deal with its domestic problems or is merely an extension of colonial and apartheid states in addressing challenges it faces. The study makes use of literature to answer the question. This is a qualitative study. The study found that democratic South Africa uses the same undemocratic instruments as evidenced by its handling of the #FeesMustFall campaign. #FeesMustFall leaders and students are being shot at, arrested, and imprisoned in the same jails built and used by the apartheid state, stun grenades are being thrown at them and tear gas sprayed at them. The conclusion of this study is that by implementing similar instruments of maintaining security there is no difference between the means used by oppressive colonial and apartheid governments of the past and those used by democratic SA today.

Shireen Abu Akleh was a prominent Al-Jazeera Palestinian journalist who was killed by the Israeli on 11 May 2022 while she was wearing a blue press vest and covering an army raid on the Jenin refugee camp in the Israeli occupied West Bank. The funeral procession of Shireen Abu Akleh in Jerusalem in May 2022 saw Israeli police forcefully confiscating Palestinian flags. This act raises questions about the symbolism and implications of raising or removing flags. The following article explores the semiotic use of the Palestinian flag in Palestinian literature in Israel. I discuss the significance of the Palestinian flag in the narrative spaces created by Palestinians in Israel by examining various literary works, and the identity discourse presented by such works through the flag and its symbolic ability to deconstruct Israeli policy.

The article focuses on the level of prosperity of the ranks of the Special Gendarme Corps and its trends during the post-reform and late imperial period. It carries out comparative analysis of several categories of gendarme employees and identifies disparities in their financial standing. There were more than a dozen basic and supplementary allowances, which were both permanent and temporary and were paid for by the Treasury. During the period under review, there was the growth in the monetary income of gendarmes, which enabled them to see themselves as being superior to people of other socio-professional categories such as senior and mid-ranking army officers and police officers. This thesis implicitly confirms that bribery was not widely spread among gendarmes. However, there was impoverishment among the gendarmerie personnel because they did not have any other source of income besides service-related earnings. This made them rather vulnerable, resulting in revitalization measures of social support of gendarme employees. A characteristic feature of material provision for gendarmes during the period under review was a widening gap between allowances for the officers and lower ranks. Gendarmes of lower ranks usually had big families and therefore were often in want for money. In other words, they had a lower standard of well-being. As a result, many of them being unable to support their families had to leave the Special Gendarme Corps and search for other livelihoods. Partially, they managed to improve their predicament by using alternative sources of income such as renting out, subsistence farming and service-related odd jobs. However, these sources were not widely available.

This article reveals the circumstances of the presence of the Forward detachment of Lieu- tenant General Iosif V. Gurko in the city of Eski-Zagra (now Stara-Zagora) (July 10–19, 1877) and recreates a multifaceted panorama of contacts between soldiers, offi cers, and the city’s inhabitants. The article is based on published sources (many facts from which are fi rst introduced here). The Forward detachment, which included the Bulgarian militia, was solemnly met in Eski-Zagra. Russian offi cers contributed to the organization of the city council, police, gendarmerie, and hospitals. For their part, the Bulgarians provided broad assistance to the Russians (in baked bread preparation, sale of food to the troops and fodder for the cavalry, as well as the delivery of information about the Turkish troops). The city managed to suppress the outbreaks of mutual hatred between Christians and Muslims, but in the surrounding district the Bulgarians slaughtered and plundered the Muslim population, burning houses and villages. The defeat at Plevna did not allow the command of the Danube army to send reinforcements to General Gurko. A small detachment left in Eski-Zagra had to fi ght the superior forces of Suleiman Pasha and retreat to Kazanlak. During the battle, armed citizens stayed behind the Russian reserves and, at critical moments, despite their previous statements, chose to escape and not to support their compatriot militiamen. A terrible fate — the revenge of Muslims — was expected by the residents — Bulgarians and wounded soldiers who could not manage to leave the city. Russian offi cers, noting the positive qualities of the Bulgarian character, predicted an enviable future for the nation after its release from power of the Turks.

Little has been written about General Chui (1927–1956), the unique and charismatic fighter during Kenya’s war of independence, yet he worked hand-in-hand with Field Marshall Dedan Kimathi Wachiuri, the overall commander of Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA), also called Mau- Mau fighters. Kibara wa Mararo, later General Chui, who came from Meiria residence, Mugaya state, Kamuiru village of Mutira location, Ndia Division of the present day Kirinyaga County, Kenya, became a household name, and a hero to the then marginalised African populace, after the famous Mbaara ya Rui Ruiru (battle of river Ruiru). In this war of 1953, which took place on the border of Nyeri district (which was elevated to a County in 2010) and the old Embu district (which constitutes Kirinyaga and Embu counties), Kibara wa Mararo disguised himself as a regional inspector of the police. Clad in full colonial army uniform, he was able to trick some security officers and the loyalists who were derogatorily called Tukonia (empty sacks). This made them quickly rush to meet their boss. In a twinkle of an eye, the coded language (kebunoko) was sounded calling the Mau-Mau fighters who eventually turned their guns on the officers thereby wiping them clean in one blow. It is from there that the Mau-Mau high command declared him an army general. Since then, he became known as General Chui – ‘Chui’ meaning the sharp leopard. As Kenya marked its 50 years of independence (1963–2013), with pomp and colour, the sacrificial role of General Chui re-appears as one wonders: how was such a military genius finally ambushed at River Rwamuthambi’s Riakiania mushy cave and subsequently shot dead by the colonial forces? Did the surrendering Mau-Mau soldiers betray him, General Magazine and the other fighters who died of gun shot wounds at the Riakiania scene? Again, what were his political ideals? In its methodology, the article begins by retracing the nature of Mau-Mau movement citing the key issues that possibly caused it. It then moves on to chronicle General Chui wa Mararo as a case study. The materials in this presentation are largely gathered through interviews and archival sources.

<p><em>This article examines European defence expenditure and more specifically the question of whether there is sufficient financial leeway to establish a European defence initiative.</em></p><p><em>In view of the numerous defence threats on Europe’s external borders: Russia, Turkey, growing migration pressures and the ineffectiveness of the external borders of the “Schengen-zone”, this article will examine the following: </em></p><p><em>- What are the defence expenditures of the European members of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and of non-NATO members in Europe;</em></p><p><em>- Would it be possible to establish a European army with these financial resources?</em></p><p><em>The current figures are primarily based on NATO financial sources (see references). These NATO figures refer to defence spending, including military pensions and militarized police forces such as the “Gendarmerie” in France and the “Koninklijke Marechaussee” in The Netherlands.</em></p><p><em>In conclusion the article tries to respond to the question of which states would be necessary and/or potentially available for the creation of a European defence force?</em></p><em>First, this study gives a short overview of the defence history in western Europe after the second world war, followed by the European attempts concerning this item. Finally, this article examines the topic of this article in point three; namely: which European countries are potential partners for an European defence system.</em>

Based on archival material and relevant literature, this text analyses and presents the activities of the labour movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the first years after the end of the First World War. During this period, the struggle for workers'rights, mostly through strike actions, resulted, among other things, in an increase in wages, the introduction of eight-hour working days in most companies, the exercise of the right to elect workers' commissioners and trade unions. The workers managed to get other benefits related to the economic position of the workers, such as retail co-operatives, apartments, assistance in purchasing work suits, etc. Workers' representatives fought for a radically better position and a new place in society. In addition to eight-hour working days, higher wages and other demands to improve the material position of workers, strikes against the political disenfranchisement of workers were conducted during this period, as well as for political freedoms and democratisation of political life in the country. During 1919 and 1920, several strikes about pay were organised by miners, construction workers and metalworkers in the forest industry, catering workers and employees in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bijeljina, Brčko, Zenica, Breza, Mostar, Zavidovići, Dobrljin, Lješljani, Maslovarama and Rogatica. It was part of over 125 strikes by workers in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the period of legal activity of the Socialist Labour Party of Yugoslavia (SLPY) (c), i.e. the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) and its close trade unions. At the initiative of the SLPY (c) and united syndicates, public political assemblies were organised in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, Mostar, Brčko, Derventa, Vareš and Drvar, at which demands were put forward to dissolve the authorities, and organise democratic elections for the Constituent Assembly and demobilise the army. The aggravation of the political situation in the first post-war years was noticeable in many local communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a number of cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were physical confrontations between workers and security bodies of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. One such example occurred, in Zenica in mid-October 1920, when police banned the Communists' attempt to hold an assembly despite a previously imposed ban. On that occasion, the gathered mass of 2,500 workers refused to disperse and demanded that the assembly be held. After the police and the gendarmerie tried to disperse the gathered workers, there was open conflict. Workers threw stones at security officials, and they responded by firing firearms. The rally was eventually broken up, one worker was wounded and twelve workers were hurt during a clash with police. Owing to the increasing engagement of workers' representatives, the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina worsened. It was not uncommon to have open conflicts between workers and government officials. After the collapse of the Husino uprising, the position of workers deteriorated. Also, this paper discusses the impact of the revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe on the labour movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In November of 1934, Algerian Governor General Jules Carde asked the Algiers Police Prefecture to investigate a rumor circulating through the French bureaucracy that “natives” in the Arab cafés (café maures) of the city were tuning in to biweekly Arabic broadcasts transmitted by an unspecified Italian radio station that featured “commentaries unfavorable to France” and “openly attacked France's Muslim policy.” As the governor of three overseas Frenchdépartements, Carde had already received notification that the airwaves over North Africa were becoming dangerous. A few months earlier, Jean Berthoin, the director of national security, or Sûreté, in France's Interior Ministry, warned regional prefects, “In a number of cities a large portion of the radio-electric industry—sales and the construction of devices—is in the hands of foreigners.” Berthoin feared that the dominance of France's radio-electric market by large, multinational firms would allow enemy agents to mask radio transmitters beneath the cover of radio sales and report clandestinely on troop maneuvers and defense preparations. He therefore instructed prefects to begin “discreet investigations” into the civil status, political affiliation, and nationality of radio merchants and their personnel. While ostensibly directed at metropolitan prefects, these Sûreté directives resonated in Algeria—a strategic periphery of “Greater France” and home to a sizeable European population of German and Italian descent and to multiple garrisons of France's indigenous-based African Army (Armée d'Afrique). By 1935, rumors about radio espionage and subversive auditory propaganda circulating through the Algerian colonial bureaucracy compelled Governor Carde to construct a colony-wide surveillance web to monitor radio sales, investigate Algerian listening habits, and assess the effects of radio propaganda on the “native mentality.”

The rapid transformation of the current world order excites renewed interest of the expert community in the phenomenon of empire (as a form of the organization of political life). And since the United States plays a central role in this transformation, the history of the Pax Americana, its formation and development, both at the level of the idea and in the field of real politics is of particular relevance. The author argues that clarification of the role and significance of the colonial background in the projection of US military-political power in the late 19th — early 21st centuries allows for better understanding of the theory and practice of international relations both in the era of ‘high imperialism’ and world wars of the 20th century, and in the context of transition from global colonial empires to nuclear superpowers. It may also be instrumental in addressing the deepening contradictions between advocates of a ‘global leadership’ concept and proponents of a multipolar world during the post-Cold War period. In this regard, the paper examines the works of the US military theorists of the late 19th − first half of the 20th centuries that focused on the colonial experience of the leading European powers, as well as the experience gained from interventions involving the US Army and Marine Corps. Special emphasis is given to the concept of ‘small wars’. Building on a wide array of primary sources, presented both by the works of military experts, direct participants in various counterinsurgency operations in the colonies, as well as by the teaching materials and field manuals of the US Marine Corps, the author traces the evolution of this concept which implied establishment of external management and/or control through military and police measures. This allows the author to restore the historical genealogy of current models of internal security promoted in American foreign policy in conditions of proliferating, protracted, and increasingly hybrid civil conflicts. The author concludes that in the interwar period the US law enforcement agencies pragmatically implemented the relevant experience of global empires in Latin American countries within the framework of the Monroe Doctrine, while regarding European powers as political rivals. It is noted that conflicting imperatives of asymmetric and conventional threats to US national security urge researchers and practitioners to revisit after a post-Vietnam period of neglect the approaches of colonial empires to the conduct of small wars and to adapt them to modern conditions. The findings broaden the understanding of the modern leading powers’ approaches to internal security models transfer, as well as of its limits.

Cannabis sativa has a fascinating history and has been used by mankind for millennia. Many societies such as Greek, Roman, Chinese, African, Indian and Arabic take advantage of the plant's qualities, which are consumed as food, medicine, fuel, fibers or tobacco. The first reference found related to the therapeutic use of the plant data from 2700 B.C. and is present in the pharmacopoeia of the Chinese Emperor Shen-Nung, where this plant was recommended in the treatment of malaria, rheumatic pain, in irregular and painful menstrual cycles. The book “De Matéria Médica”, written by the doctor Pedânio Dioscórides considered thefounder of pharmacology, exposes Cannabis as one of the natural substances that can relieve inflammatory pain. In Brazil, African slaves brought a cannabis during the colonial period, around 1549. Then, its use spread quickly among black slaves and Indians, who started to cultivate it. Once the plant was popularized among French intellectuals and English doctors in the Indian imperial army, it started to be considered in our country as an excellent medicine for men, until it was suppressed by the police authorities in the 1930s. Only 60 years later important findings were highlighted around Cannabis with the System Endocannabinoid and its receptors, neurotransmitters such as anandamide and 2-AG, revolutionizing the understanding of molecular signaling that modulates pain and analgesia, inflammation, appetite, gastrointestinal motility and sleep cycles, immune cell activity and hormones among others.We are in front of a huge revolution in the therapeutic area, in which phytocabinoids represent one of the great therapeutic options of the century. We need a widespread disclosure that CBD is not marijuana and that its use for recreational purpose has nothing to do with the use of medical cannabis. Scientific research is seriously committed to the use of the substance in various pathologies. The role of information is absolute, being the main tool to clarify a society.

Прояснение ряда аспектов северокавказского мухаджирства 2-й половины XIX – начала ХХ в. остается довольно актуальной задачей. В настоящей статье кратко характеризуются основные вопросы иммиграции, колонизации и адаптации северокавказцев в Османской империи в свете в основном данных турецких архивных источников. Предложена периодизация миграционного движения в зависимости от его интенсивности и масштабов, которые, в свою очередь, коррелировали со степенью жесткости российского подхода к проблеме выселения нелояльных горцев. Уточняются некоторые внешнеполитические мотивы выбора Портой мест расселения иммигрантов, обусловленные, в частности, требованиями и интересами России и Англии. Обращается внимание на то обстоятельство, что, несмотря на несомненную нацеленность османских властей на скорейшее превращение переселенцев в производительный аграрный элемент, происходило неуклонное сокращение объемов предоставляемой им материальной помощи и сроков налоговых и конскрипционных льгот вследствие вызванного этими расходами давления на государственный бюджет. Рассмотрены некоторые недостатки османской колонизационной политики, проистекавшие из недостаточности выделяемых финансовых средств, неэффективности административно-бюрократического аппарата и др. и порождавшие неблагополучие поселенцев, их требования о смене районов проживания, земельные и иные конфликты с местным населением, обращение к криминальной активности и т.п. Изначальное рассмотрение имперской элитой северокавказцев в качестве лояльного элемента оказывало существенное влияние на процессы их адаптации и интеграции на новой родине, открывая им широкий доступ в регулярные и нерегулярные армейские подразделения, полицию и жандармерию, а также на гражданскую государственную службу. The clarification of a number of aspects of the North Caucasian muhajirism of the 2nd half of the 19th and early 20th centuries remains a fairly urgent task. This article briefly characterizes the major issues of immigration, colonization and adaptation of the North Caucasians in the Ottoman Empire chiefly in the light of Turkish archival sources. A periodization of the migration movement is proposed depending on its intensity and scale, which, in turn, correlated with the degree of rigidity of the Russian approach to the problem of eviction of disloyal highlanders. Some foreign policy motives for the choice of places for immigrant settlement by the Porte, determined, in particular, by the requirements and interests of Russia and England, are clarified. Attention is drawn to the fact that, despite the undoubted focus of the Ottoman authorities on the fast transformation of the settlers into a productive agrarian element, there was a steady reduction in the volume of material assistance provided to them and the terms of tax and conscription exemption due to the pressure on the state budget caused by these expenditures. Some shortcomings of the Ottoman colonization policy are considered, which stemmed from the insufficiency of allocated financial resources and the inefficiency of the administrative-bureaucratic apparatus and which produced the ill-being of the settlers, their demands to change their areas of residence, land and other conflicts with the local population, resort to criminal activity, etc. The initial perception by the imperial elite of the North Caucasians as a loyal element had a significant impact on the processes of their adaptation and integration in their new homeland, opening up wide access for them to regular and irregular army units, the police and gendarmerie, as well as to the civil state service.

Abstract With a negotiated decolonisation and a steadfast friendship between Félix Houphouët-Boigny and General Charles de Gaulle, Côte d’Ivoire, which had become independent, maintained excellent relations with France, its former colonial power. These close relations allowed it to benefit, within the framework of the Franco-Ivorian cooperation agreements, from French military assistance in setting up its armed forces. With this help, the Ivorian Army and Gendarmerie were thus taking their first steps under France’s military leadership. But divergences appeared at certain levels and the question of extra-military tasks or, more precisely, the importance granted to them in the missions of the Ivorian Armed Forces was the subject of heated debates between the two partners. The crux of the issue was the establishment and development of the Ivorian Civic Service, for which Abidjan had turned to Israel in the belief that this would not jeopardise French influence in the Ivorian defence establishment. This article revisits this issue by highlighting the intricacies and challenges in the creation of the Ivorian Civic Service.

The past ten years have witnessed a revival in scholarship on militarism, through which scholars have used the concept to make sense of the embeddedness of warlike relations in contemporary liberal societies and to account for how the social, political and economic contours of those same societies are implicated in the legitimation and organization of political violence. However, a persistent shortcoming has been the secondary role of race and coloniality in these accounts. This article demonstrates how we might position racism and colonialism as integral to the functioning of contemporary militarism. Centring the thought and praxis of the US Black Panther Party, we argue that the particular analysis developed by Black Panther Party members, alongside their often-tense participation in the anti–Vietnam War movement, offers a strong reading of the racialized and colonial politics of militarism. In particular, we show how their analysis of the ghetto as a colonial space, their understanding of the police as an illegitimate army of occupation and, most importantly, Huey Newton’s concept of intercommunalism prefigure an understanding of militarism premised on the interconnections between racial capitalism, violent practices of un/bordering and the dissolving boundaries between war and police action.

The term “Arab World” is used to denote the geographical and nation-state entities in the modern West Asian and North African region popularly referred in its abbreviated version WANA. Democratic waves encapsulate the popular civilian uprisings, revolts, resistance, revolutionary upsurge, rebellion taking place from time to time in Arab world leading to political - regime transitions and profound convulsions in economy, society, culture ,literature, art and ideas. The contemporary WANA took birth in the interregnum of two world wars involving the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and emergence of new nation-states as designed by the European colonial masters. The new political restructuring fundamentally replaced the ancient tribalism. The characteristics of modern states like bureaucracy, organized army, police force and other coercive apparatuses, hierarchical judicial system, municipal administrative units made their historic appearance. Across the Arab world, the political system has been largely authoritarian and dictatorial in nature. The implanted monarchies referred to as the Sheikhdoms, military dictators usurping power through bloody coups and individual dictators based on popular revolutionary upsurge have been the characteristics of regimes of the Arab world. The popular democratic sentiments were crushed by the state apparatus leading to large scale bloodsheds. The modern Arab political history is replete with such instances of popular civilian democratic waves impacting the entire spectrum of their society. Undoubtedly, these upsurges didn't take place in any vacuum but were largely conditioned by contemporary political and economic changes. Besides this, these democratic waves were based on ideological frameworks containing the elements of Marxian socialism, Arab nationalism and Islam. These democratic waves have also been approached by construction of some typologies involving regional pattern, economic system and regime types. This paper is an humble attempt to understand those ideological frameworks inspiring, instigating, guiding and reinvigorating democratic sentiments and revolutionary movements against authoritarian regimes demanding freedom, liberty, rights, equality, justice, rule of law, representative institutions, responsible and accountable governance. Further, it also endeavors to analyse patterns and typology of those democratic waves convulsing the polities, economies and societies of the Arab world.

Introduction In any list of dictators and antagonists of the West the name of Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi will always rank highly as one of the most memorable, colourful and mercurial. The roles he played to his fellow Libyans, to regional groupings, to revolutionaries and to the West were complex and nuanced. These various roles developed over time but were all grounded in his self-belief as a messianic revolutionary figure. More importantly, these roles and behaviours that stemmed from them were instrumental in preserving Qaddafi’s rule and thwarting challenges to it. These facets of Qaddafi’s public self accord with the model of “persona” described by Marshall. Whilst the nature of political persona and celebrity in the Western world has been explored by several scholars (for example Street; Wilson), little work has been conducted on the use of persona by non-democratic leaders. This paper examines the aspects of persona exhibited by Colonel Qaddafi and applied during his tenure. In constructing his role as a revolutionary leader, Qaddafi was engaging in a form of public performance aimed at delivering himself to a wider audience. Whether at home or abroad, this persona served the purpose of helping the Libyan leader consolidate his power, stymie political opposition and export his revolutionary ideals. The trajectory of his persona begins in the early days of his coming to power as a charismatic leader during a “time of distress” (Weber) and culminates in his bloody end next to a roadside drainage culvert. In between these points Qaddafi’s persona underwent refinement and reinvention. Coupled with the legacy he left on the Libyan political system, the journey of Muammar Qaddafi’s personas demonstrate how political personality can be the salvation or damnation of an entire state.Qaddafi: The Brotherly RevolutionaryCaptain Muammar Qaddafi came to power in Libya in 1969 at the age of just 27. He was the leader of a group of military officers who overthrew King Idris in a popular and relatively bloodless coup founded on an ideology of post-colonial Arab nationalism and a doing away with the endemic corruption and nepotism that were the hallmarks of the monarchy. With this revolutionary cause in mind and in an early indication that he recognised the power of political image, Qaddafi showed restraint in adopting the trappings of office. His modest promotion to the rank of Colonel was an obvious example of this, and despite the fact that in practical terms he was the supreme commander of Libya’s armed forces, he resisted the temptation to formally aggrandize himself with military titles for the ensuing 42 years of his rule.High military rank was in a way irrelevant to a man moving to change his persona from army officer to messianic national leader. Switching away from a reliance on military hierarchy as a basis for his authority allowed Qaddafi to re-cast himself as a leader with a broader mission. He began to utilise titles such as “Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council” (RCC) and “Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution.” The persona on display here was one of detached impartiality and almost reluctant leadership. There was the suggestion that Qaddafi was not really acting as a head of state, but merely an ordinary Libyan who, through popular acclaim, was being begged to lead his people. The attraction of this persona remained until the bitter end for Qaddafi, with his professed inability to step aside from a leadership role he insisted he did not formally occupy. This accords with the contention of Weber, who describes how an individual favoured with charisma can step forward at a time of crisis to complete a “mission.” Once in a position of authority, perpetuating that role of leadership and acclamation can become the mission itself:The holder, of charisma seizes the task that is adequate for him and demands obedience and a following by virtue of his mission. His success determines whether he finds them. His charismatic claim breaks down if his mission is not recognized by those to whom he feels he has been sent. If they recognize him, he is their master—so long as he knows how to maintain recognition through ‘proving’ himself. But he does not derive his ‘right’ from their will, in the manner of an election. Rather, the reverse holds: it is the duty of those to whom he addresses his mission to recognize him as their charismatically qualified leader. (Weber 266-7)As his rule extended across the decades, Qaddafi fostered his revolutionary credentials via a typical cult of personality approach. His image appeared on everything from postage stamps to watches, bags, posters and billboards. Quotations from the Brother Leader were set to music and broadcast as pop songs. “Spontaneous” rallies of support would occur when crowds of loyalists would congregate to hear the Brotherly Leader speak. Although Qaddafi publicly claimed he did not like this level of public adoration he accepted it because the people wanted to adore him. It was widely known however that many of these crowds were paid to attend these rallies (Blundy and Lycett 16).Qaddafi: The Philosopher In developing his persona as a guide and a man who was sharing his natural gifts with the people, Qaddafi developed a post-colonial philosophy he called “Third Universal Theory.” This was published in volumes collectively known as The Green Book. This was mandatory reading for every Libyan and contained a distillation of Qaddafi’s thoughts and opinions on everything from sports to politics to religion to the differences between men and women. Whilst it may be tempting for outsiders to dismiss these writings as the scribbling of a dictator, the legacy of Qaddafi’s persona as political philosopher is worthy of some examination. For in offering his revelations to the Libyan people, Qaddafi extended his mandate beyond leader of a revolution and into the territory of “messianic reformer of a nation.”The Green Book was a three-part series. The first instalment was written in 1975 and focuses on the “problem of democracy” where Qaddafi proposes direct democracy as the best option for a progressive nation. The second instalment, published in 1977, focuses on economics and expounds socialism as the solution to all fiscal woes. (Direct popular action here was evidenced in the RCC making rental of real estate illegal, meaning that all tenants in the country suddenly found themselves granted ownership of the property they were occupying!) The final chapter, published in 1981, proposes the Third Universal Theory where Qaddafi outlines his unique solution for implementing direct democracy and socialism. Qaddafi coined a new term for his Islamically-inspired socialist utopia: Jamahiriya. This was defined as being a “state of the masses” and formed the blueprint for Libyan society which Qaddafi subsequently imposed.This model of direct democracy was part of the charismatic conceit Qaddafi cultivated: that the Libyan people were their own leaders and his role was merely as a benevolent agent acceding to their wishes. However the implementation of the Jamahiriya was anything but benevolent and its legacy has crippled post-Qaddafi Libya. Under this system, Libyans did have some control over their affairs at a very local level. Beyond this, an increasingly complex series of committees and regional groupings, over which the RCC had the right of veto, diluted the participation of ordinary citizens and their ability to coalesce around any individual leader. The banning of standard avenues of political organisation, such as parties and unions, coupled with a ruthless police state that detained and executed anyone offering even a hint of political dissent served to snuff out any opposition before it had a chance to gather pace. The result was that there were no Libyans with enough leadership experience or public profile to take over when Qaddafi was ousted in 2011.Qaddafi: The Liberator In a further plank of his revolutionary persona Qaddafi turned to the world beyond Libya to offer his brotherly guidance. This saw him champion any cause that claimed to be a liberation or resistance movement struggling against the shackles of colonialism. He tended to favour groups that had ideologies aligned with his own, namely Arab unity and the elimination of Israel, but ultimately was not consistent in this regard. Aside from Palestinian nationalists, financial support was offered to groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Moro National Liberation Front (Philippines), Umkhonto we Sizwe (South Africa), ETA (Spain), the Polisario Front (Western Sahara), and even separatist indigenous Australians. This policy of backing revolutionary groups was certainly a projection of his persona as a charismatic enabler of the revolutionary mission. However, the reception of this mission in the wider world formed the basis for the image that Qaddafi most commonly occupied in Western eyes.In 1979 the ongoing Libyan support for groups pursuing violent action against Israel and the West saw the country designated a State-Sponsor of Terror by the US Department of State. Diplomatic relations between the two nations were severed and did not resume until 2004. At this point Qaddafi seemed to adopt a persona of “opponent of the West,” ostensibly on behalf of the world’s downtrodden colonial peoples. The support for revolutionary groups was changing to a more active use of them to strike at Western interests. At the same time Qaddafi stepped up his rhetoric against America and Britain, positioning himself as a champion of the Arab world, as the one leader who had the courage of his convictions and the only one who was squarely on the side of the ordinary citizenry (in contrast to other, more compliant Arab rulers). Here again there is evidence of the charismatic revolutionary persona, reluctantly taking up the burden of leadership on behalf of his brothers.Whatever his ideals, the result was that Qaddafi and his state became the focus of increasing Western ire. A series of incidents between the US and Libya in international waters added to the friction, as did Libyan orchestrated terror attacks in Berlin, Rome and Vienna. At the height of this tension in 1986, American aircraft bombed targets in Libya, narrowly missing Qaddafi himself. This role as public enemy of America led to Qaddafi being characterised by President Ronald Reagan (no stranger to the use of persona himself) as the “mad dog of the Middle East” and a “squalid criminal.” The enmity of the West made life difficult for ordinary Libyans dealing with crippling sanctions, but for Qaddafi, it helped bolster his persona as a committed revolutionary.Qaddafi: Leader of the Arab and African Worlds Related to his early revolutionary ideologies were Qaddafi’s aspirations as a pan-national leader. Inspired by Egypt’s Gamel Abdul Nasser from a young age, the ideals of pan-Arab unity were always a cornerstone of Qaddafi’s beliefs. It is not therefore surprising that he developed ambitions of being the person to bring about and “guide” that unity. Once again the Weberian description of the charismatic leader is relevant, particularly the notion that such leadership does not respect conventional boundaries of functional jurisdictions or local bailiwicks; in this case, state boundaries.During the 1970s Qaddafi was involved in numerous attempts to broker Arab unions between Libya and states such as Egypt, Syria and Tunisia. All of these failed to materialise once the exact details of the mergers began to be discussed, in particular who would assume the mantle of leadership in these super-states. In line with his persona as the rightly-guided revolutionary, Qaddafi consistently blamed the failure of these unions on the other parties, souring his relationship with his fellow Arab leaders. His hardline stance on Israel also put him at odds with those peers more determined to find a compromise. Following the assassination of Egypt’s Anwar Sadat in 1981 Qaddafi praised the act as justified because of Sadat’s signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel.Having given up on the hope of achieving pan-Arab Unity, Qaddafi sought to position himself as a leader of the African bloc. In 2009 he became Chairperson of the African Union and took to having himself introduced as “The King of Kings of Africa.” The level of dysfunction of the African Union was no less than that of the Arab League and Qaddafi’s grandiose plans for becoming the President of the United States of Africa failed to materialise.In both his pan-Arab and pan-Africa ambitions, we see a persona of Qaddafi that aims at leadership beyond his own state. Whilst there may be delusions of grandeur apparent in the practicalities of these goals, this image was nevertheless something that Qaddafi used to leverage the next phase of his political transformation.Qaddafi: The Post-9/11 Statesman However much he might be seen as erratic, Qaddafi’s innate intelligence could result in a political astuteness lacking in many of his Arab peers. Following the events of 11 September 2001, Qaddafi was the first international leader to condemn the attacks on America and pledge support in the War on Terror and the extermination of al-Qaeda. Despite his history as a supporter of terrorism overseas, Qaddafi had a long history of repressing it at home, just as with any other form of political opposition. The pan-Islamism of al-Qaeda was anathema to his key ideologies of direct democracy (guided by himself). This meant the United States and Libya were now finally on the same team. As part of this post-9/11 sniffing of the wind, Qaddafi abandoned his fledgling Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) program and finally agreed to pay reparations to the families of the victims of the Pan Am 107 flight downed over Lockerbie in 1987.This shift in Qaddafi’s policy did not altogether dispel his persona of brotherly leadership amongst African nations. As a bloc leader and an example of the possibility of ‘coming in from the cold’, Qaddafi and Libya were reintegrated into the world community. This included giving a speech at the United Nations in 2009. This event did little to add to his reputation as a statesman in the West. Given a 15-minute slot, the Libyan leader delivered a rambling address over 90 minutes long, which included him tearing up a copy of the UN Charter and turning his back to the audience whilst continuing to speak.Qaddafi: The Clown From the Western point of view, performances like this painted Qaddafi’s behaviour as increasingly bizarre. Particularly after Libya’s rapprochement with the West, the label of threatening terrorist supporter faded and was replaced with something along the lines of a harmless clown prince. Tales of the Libyan leader’s coterie of virgin female bodyguards were the subject of ridicule, as was his ardour for US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Perhaps this behaviour was indicative of a leader increasingly divorced from reality. Surrounded by sycophants dependent on his regard for their tenure or physical survival, as well as Western leaders eager to contrast his amiability with that of Saddam Hussein, nobody was prepared to draw attention to the emperor’s new clothes.Indeed, elaborate and outlandish clothing played an increasing role in Qaddafi’s persona as the decades went on. His simple revolutionary fatigues of the early years were superseded by a vast array of military uniforms heavily decorated with medals and emblems; traditional African, Arab or Bedouin robes depending on the occasion; and in later years a penchant for outfits that included images of the African continent or pictures of dead martyrs. (In 2009 Vanity Fair did a tongue-in-cheek article on the fashion of Colonel Qaddafi entitled Dictator Chic: Colonel Qaddafi—A Life in Fashion. This spawned a number of similar features including one in TIME Magazine entitled Gaddafi Fashion: The Emperor Had Some Crazy Clothes.)The Bedouin theme was an aspect of persona that Qaddafi cultivated as an ascetic “man of the people” throughout his leadership. Despite having many palaces available he habitually slept in an elaborate tent, according once again with Weber’s description of the charismatic leader as one who eschews methodical material gain. This predisposition served him well in the 1986 United States bombing, when his residence in a military barracks was demolished, but Qaddafi escaped unscathed as he was in his tent at the time. He regularly entertained foreign dignitaries in tents when they visited Libya and he took one when travelling abroad, including pitching it in the gardens of a Parisian hotel during a state visit in 2007. (A request to camp in New York’s Central Park for his UN visit in 2009 was denied; “Inside the Tents of Muammar Gaddafi”).The role of such a clown was unlikely to have been an aim for Qaddafi, but was instead the product of his own increasing isolation. It will likely be his most enduring character in the Western memory of his rule. It should be noted though that clowns and fools do not maintain an iron grip on power for over 40 years.The Legacy of Qaddafi’s Many Personas Colonel Muammar Qaddafi was a clever and complex leader who exhibited many variations of persona during his four decades of rule. These personas were generally facets of the same core self-belief of a charismatic leader, but could be conflicting, and often confusing, to observers. His eccentricities often hid a layer of deeper cunning and ambition, but ultimately led to his marginalisation and an impression by world leaders that he was untrustworthy.His erratic performance at the UN in 2009 perhaps typifies the end stages of Qaddafi’s leadership: a man increasingly disconnected from his people and the realities of what was going on around him. His insistence that the 2011 Libyan revolution was variously a colonial or terrorist inspired piece of theatre belied the deep resentment of his rule. His role as opponent of the Western and Arab worlds alike meant that he was unsupported in his attempts to deal with the uprising. Indeed, the West’s rapid willingness to use their airpower was instrumental in speeding on the rebel forces.What cannot be disputed is the chaotic legacy this charismatic figure left for his country. Since the uprising climaxed in his on-camera lynching in October 2011, Libya has been plunged in to turmoil and shows no signs of this abating. One of the central reasons for this chaos is that Qaddafi’s supremacy, his political philosophies, and his use of messianic persona left Libya completely unprepared for rule by any other party.This ensuing chaos has been a cruel, if ironic, proof of Qaddafi’s own conceit: Libya could not survive without him.References Al-Gathafi, Muammar. The Green Book: The Solution to the Problem of Democracy; The Solution to the Economic Problem; The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory. UK: Ithaca Press, 2005.Blundy, David, and Andrew Lycett. Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution. Boston and Toronto: Little Brown & Co, 1987.Marshall, P. David. “Persona Studies: Mapping the Proliferation of the Public Self”. Journalism 15.2 (2014): 153-170.Qaddafi, Muammar. Speech at the United Nations 2009. ‹http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BKMyY2V0J0Y›. Street, John. “Celebrity Politicians: Popular Culture and Political Representation.” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 6 (2004): 435-52.Street, John. “Do Celebrity Politics and Celebrity Politicians Matter?” The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 14.3 (2012): 346-356.TIME Magazine. “Gaddafi Fashion: The Emperor Had Some Crazy Clothes.” ‹http://content.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,2055860,00.html›.TIME Magazine. “Inside the Tents of Muammar Gaddafi.” ‹http://content.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,2058074,00.html›.Totman, Sally, and Mat Hardy. “In the Green Zone: 40 years with Colonel Qaddafi.” Ed. Geoffrey Hawker. APSA 2009: Proceedings of the APSA Annual Conference 2009. Sydney: Macquarie University, 2009. 1-19.Totman, Sally, and Mat Hardy. “The Rise and Decline of Libya as a Rogue State.” OCIS 2008: Oceanic Conference on International Studies. Brisbane: University of Queensland, 2008. 1-25.Vanity Fair. “Dictator Chic: Colonel Qaddafi—A Life in Fashion.” ‹http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/08/qaddafi-slideshow200908›.Weber, Max, Hans Heinrich Gerth, and C. Wright Mills. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. London: Routledge, 2009.Wilson, J. “Kevin Rudd, Celebrity and Audience Democracy in Australia.” Journalism 15.2 (2013): 202-217.

When we think of United Nations (UN) peacekeepers, the first image that is conjured in our mind is of an individual sporting a blue helmet or a blue beret (fig. 1). While simple and uncomplicated, these blue accessories represent an expression and an embodiment resembling that of a warrior, sent to bring peace to conflict-torn communities. UN peacekeeping first conceptually emerged in 1948 in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war that ensued following the United Kingdom’s relinquishing of its mandate over Palestine, and the proclamation of the State of Israel. “Forged in the crucible of practical diplomacy” (Rubinstein 16), unarmed military observers were deployed to Palestine to monitor the hostilities and mediate armistice agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbours. This operation, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), significantly exemplified the diplomatic and observational capabilities of military men, in line with the UN Charter’s objectives of international peace and security, setting henceforth a basic archetype for international peacekeeping. It was only in 1956, however, that peacekeeping formally emerged when armed UN forces deployed to Egypt to supervise the withdrawal of forces occupying the Suez Canal (informally known as the ‘Second Arab-Israeli’ war). Here, the formation of UN peacekeeping represented an international pacifying mechanism comprised of multiple third-party intermediaries whereby peaceful resolution would be achieved by transcending realist instincts of violence for political attainment in favour of applying a less-destructive liberal model of persuasion, compromise, and perseverance (Howard). ‘Blue helmet’ peacekeeping operations continue to be regarded by the UN as an integral subsidiary instrument of its organisation. At present, there are 12 active peacekeeping operations led by the UN Department of Peacekeeping across the world (United Nations Peacekeeping). Fig. 1: United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) sporting blue berets (https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-troops-awarded-un-medals-for-south-sudan-peacekeeping-mission) But where did the blue helmets and berets originate from? Rubinstein details a surprisingly mundane account of the origins of the political accessory that is now a widely recognised symbol for UN peacekeepers’ uniforms. Peacekeepers’ uniforms initially emerged from the ad hoc need to distinguish UN troops from those of the armed forces in a distinctive dress during the 1947 UNTSO mission by any means and material readily available, such as armbands and helmets (Henry). The era of early peacekeeping operations also saw ‘observers’ carry UN flags and paint their vehicle white with ‘UN’ written in large black letters in order to distinguish themselves. The blue helmets specifically came to be adorned during the first peacekeeping operation in 1956 during the Suez crisis. At this time, Canada supplied a large number of non-combatant troops whose uniform was the same as the belligerent British forces, party to the conflict. An effort to thus distinguish the peacekeepers was made by spray-painting surplus World War II American plastic helmet-liners, which were available in quantity in Europe, blue (Urquhart; Rubenstein). The two official colours of the UN are ‘light blue’ and ‘white’. The unique light “UN” blue colour, in particular, was approved as the background for the UN flag in the 1947 General Assembly Resolution 167(II), alongside a white emblem depicting a map of the world surrounded by two olive branches. While the UN’s use of the colour was chosen as a “practical effect of identifying the Organization in areas of trouble and conflict, to any and all parties concerned”, the colour blue was also specifically chosen at this time as “an integral part of the visual identity of the organisation” representing “peace in opposition to red, for war” (United Nations). Blue is seen to be placed in antithesis to the colour red across several fields including popular culture, and even within politics, as a way to typically indicate conflict between two warring groups. Within popular culture, for example, many films in the science fiction, fantasy, or horror genres, use a clearly demarcated, dichotomous ‘red vs. blue’ colour scheme in their posters (fig. 2). This is also commonly seen in political campaign posters, for example during the 2021 US presidential election (fig. 3). Fig. 2: Blue and red colour schemes in film posters (left to right: Star Wars: The Force Awakens (2015), Captain Marvel (2019), and The Dead Don’t Die (2019)) Fig. 3: Biden (Democratic party) vs. Trump (Republican party) US presidential election (https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-10-15/us-election-political-parties-explained-democrats-vs-republicans/12708296) This dichotomy can be traced back to the high Middle Ages between the fourteenth and seventeenth century where the colour blue became a colour associated with “moral implications”, rivalling both the colours black and red which were extremely popular in clothing during the eras of the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance (Pastoureau 85). This ‘moral metamorphosis’ in European society was largely influenced by the views of Christian Protestant reformers concerning the social, religious, and artistic use of the colour blue (Pastoureau). A shift in the use of blue and its symbolic connotations may also be seen, for example, in early Christian art and iconography, specifically those deriving from depictions of the Virgin Mary; according to Pastoureau (50), this provides the “clearest illustration of the social, religious, and artistic consequences of blue's new status”. Up until the eighteenth century, the colour blue, specifically ‘sky blue’ or light blue tones resemblant of the “UN” shade of blue, had minimal symbolic or aesthetic value, particularly in European culture and certainly amongst nobility and the upper levels of society. Historically, light blue was typically associated with peasants’ clothing. This was due to the fact that peasants would often dye their clothes using the pigment of the woad herb; however, the woad would poorly penetrate cloth fibres and inevitably fade under the effects of sunlight and soap, thereby resulting in a ‘bland’ colour (Pastoureau). Although the blue hues worn by the nobility and wealthy were typically denser and more solid, a “new fashion” for light blue tones gradually took hold at the courts of the wealthy and the bourgeoisie, inevitably becoming deeply anchored in Western European counties (Pastoureau). Here, the reorganisation of the colour hierarchy and reformulation of blue certainly resembles Pastoureau’s (10) assertion that “any history of colour is, above all, a social history”. Within the humanities, colour represents a social phenomenon and construction. Colour thus provides insights into the ways society assigns meaning to it, “constructs its codes and values, establishes its uses, and determines whether it is acceptable or not” (Pastoureau, 10). In this way, although colour is a naturally occurring phenomenon, it is also a complex cultural construct. That the UN and its subsidiary bodies, including the Department of Peacekeeping, deliberately assigned light blue as its official organisational colour therefore usefully illustrates a significant social process of meaning-making and cultural sociology. The historical transition of light blue’s association from one of poverty in and around the eighteenth century to one of wealth in the nineteenth century may perhaps also be indicative of the next transitional era for light blue in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, representative of the amalgamation or unity between the two classes. Representing the ambitions not only of the organisation, but rather of the 193 member-states, of attaining worldwide peace, light blue may be seen as a colour of peace, as well as one of the people, for the people. This may be traced back, according to Pastoureau, as early as the Middle Ages where the colour blue was seen a colour of ‘peace’. Colours, however, do not solely determine social and cultural relevance in a given historical event. Rather, fabrics and clothing too offer “the richest and most diverse source of artifacts” in understanding history and culture. Artifacts such as UN peacekeepers’ blue berets and helmets necessarily incorporate economic, social, ideological, aesthetic, and symbolic aspects of both colour and material into the one complete uniform (Pastoureau). While the ‘UN blue’ is associated with peace, the beret, on the other hand, has been described as “an ally in the battlefield” (Kliest). The history of the beret is largely rooted in the armed forces – institutions typically associated with conflict and violence – and it continues to be a vital aspect of military uniforms worn by personnel from countries all around the globe. Given that the large majority of UN peacekeeping forces are made up of military personnel, peacekeeping, as both an action and an institution, thus adds a layer of complexity when discussing artifact symbolism. Here, a peacekeeper’s uniform uniquely represents the embodiment of an amalgamation of two traditionally juxtaposing concepts: peace, nurture, and diplomacy (often associated with ‘feminine’ qualities) versus conflict, strength, and discipline (often associated with ‘masculine’ qualities). A peacekeeper’s uniform thus represents the UN’s institutionalisation of “soldiers for peace” (Howard) who are, as former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold proclaimed, “the front line of a moral force” (BBC cited in Howard). Aside from its association with the armed forces, the beret has also been used as a fashion symbol by political revolutionaries, such as members of the ‘Black Panther Party’ (BPP) founded in the 1960s during the US Civil Rights Movement, as well as Che Guevara, prominent Leftist figure in the Cuban Revolution (see fig. 4). For, Rosabelle Forzy, CEO of beret and headwear fashion manufacturing company ‘Laulhère’, the beret is “emblematic of non-conformism … worn by people who create, commit, militate, and resist” (Kliest). Fig. 4: Berets worn by political revolutionaries (Left to right: Black Panthers Party (BPP) protesting outside of a New York courthouse (https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2988897/Black-Panther-double-cop-killer-sues-freedom-plays-FLUTE-Murderer-demands-parole-changed-fury-victim-s-widow.html), and portrait of Che Guevara) In a way, the UN’s ‘blue beret’ too bears a ‘non-conformist’ visage as its peacekeepers neither fit categorisations as ‘revolutionaries’ nor as traditional ‘soldiers’. Peacekeepers personify a cultural phenomenon that operates in a complex environment (Rubinstein). While peacekeepers retain their national military (usually camouflage) uniforms during missions, the UN headwear is a symbol of non-conformity in response to sociological preconceptions regarding military culture. In the case of peacekeeping, the implementation and longevity of peacekeepers’ uniforms has occurred through a process of what Rubinstein (50) refers to as ‘cultural’ or ‘symbolic inversion’ wherein traditional notions of military rituals and symbolism have been appropriated or ‘inverted’ and given a new meaning by the UN. In other words, the UN promotes the image of soldiers acting without the use of force in service of peace in order to encode an image of a “world transformed” through the contribution of peacekeeping toward the “elaboration of an image of an international community acting in a neutral, consensual manner” (Rubinstein, 50). Cultural inversion therefore creates a socio-political space wherein normative representations are reconfigured and conditioned as acceptable. Rubinstein argues, however, that the UN’s need to integrate individuals with such diverse backgrounds and perceptions into a collective peacekeeper identity can be problematic. Rubinstein (72) adds that the blue beret is the “most obvious evidence” of an ordinary symbol investing ‘legitimacy’ in peacekeeping through ritual repetition which still holds its cultural relevance to the present day. Arguably, institutional uniforms are symbols which profoundly shape human experience, validating contextual action according to the symbol’s meanings relevant to those wearing it. In this way, uniform symbolism not only allows us to make sense of our daily experiences, but allows us to construct and understand our identities and our interactions with others who are also part of the symbolic culture we are situated in. Consider, for example, a police officer. A police officer’s uniform not only grants them membership to the policing institution but also necessarily grants them certain powers, privileges, and jurisdictions within society which thereby impact on the way they see the world and interact with it. Necessarily, the social and cultural identity one acquires from wearing a specific uniform only effectively functions by “investing differences”, however large or small, into these symbols that “distinguish us from others” (Rubinstein, 74). For example, a policeman’s badge is a signifier that they are, in fact, part of an exclusive group that the majority of the citizenry are not. To this extent, the use of uniforms is not without its controversies or without the capacity to be misused as a tool of discrimination in a ‘them’ versus ‘us’ scenario. Referring to case regarding the beret, for example, in 2000 then US Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shineski, announced that the black beret – traditionally worn exclusively by specialised US Army units such as ‘Rangers’ – would become a standardised part of the US Army uniform for all soldiers and would denote a “symbol of unity”. General Shineski’s decision for the new headgear symbolised “the half-million-strong army’s transition to a lighter, more agile force that can respond more rapidly to distant trouble spots” (Borger). This was, however, met with angry backlash particularly from the Rangers who stated that they “were being robbed of a badge of pride” as “the beret is a symbol of excellence … that is not to be worn by everybody” (Borger). Responses to the proposition pointed to the problem of ‘low morale’ that the military faced, which could not be fixed just by “changing hats” (Borger). In this case, the beret was identified and isolated as a tool for coordinating perceptions (Rubinstein, 78). Here, the use of uniforms is as much about being external identifiers and designating a group from another as it is about sustaining a group by means of perpetuating what Rubinstein conceptualises as ‘self-legitimation’. This occurs in order to ensure the survival of a group and is similarly seen as occurring within UN peacekeeping (Joseph & Alex). Within peacekeeping the blue beret is an effective symbol used to perpetuate self-legitimacy across various levels of the UN which construct systems, or a ‘community’, of reinforcement largely rooted on organisational models of virtue and diplomacy. In the broadest sense, the UN promotes “a unique responsibility to set a global standard” in service to creating a unified and pacific world order (Guterres). As an integral instrument of international action, peacekeeping is, by extension, necessarily conditioned and supported by this cultural model whereby the actions of individual peacekeepers are strategically linked to the symbolic capital at the broadest levels of the organisation to manage the organisation’s power and legitimacy. The image of the peacekeeper, however, is fraught with problems and, as such, UN peacekeepers’ uniforms represent discrepancies and contradictions in the UN’s mission and organisational culture, particularly with relation to the UN’s symbolic construction of community and cooperation amongst peacekeepers. Given that peacekeeping troops are made up of individuals from different ethnic, cultural, and professional backgrounds, conditions for cultural interaction become challenging, if not problematic, and may necessarily lead to cross-cultural misunderstandings, miscommunication, and conflict. This applies to the context of peacekeeper deployment to host nations amongst local communities with whom they are also culturally unfamiliar (Rubinstein, "Intervention"). According to Rubinstein ("Intervention", 528), such operations may “create the conditions under which criminal activities or the institution of neo-colonial relationships can emerge”. Moncrief adds to this by also suggesting that a breakdown in conduct and discipline during missions may also contribute to peacekeepers engaging in violence during missions. Consequently, multiple cases of misdemeanour by UN peacekeepers have been reported across the years including peacekeeper involvement in bribery, weapons trading, and gold smuggling (Escobales). One of the most notorious acts of misconduct and violence that continues to be reported in the present day, however, is of peacekeepers perpetrating sexual exploitation and abuse against host women and children. Between 2004 and 2016, for example, “the UN received almost 2,000 allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse” (Essa). According to former chief of operations at the UN’s Emergency Co-ordination Centre, Andrew Macleod, this figure may be, however, much more disturbing, estimating in general that approximately “60,000 rapes had been carried out by UN staff in the past decade” (Zeffman). An article in the Guardian reported that a 12-year-old girl had been hiding in a bathroom during a house search in a Muslim enclave of the capital, Bangui [in the Central African Republic] … . A man allegedly wearing the blue helmet and vest of the UN peacekeeping forces took her outside and raped her behind a truck. (Smith & Lewis) In the article, the assailant’s uniform (“the blue helmet and vest”) is not only described as literal imagery to contextualise the grave crime that was committed against the child. In evoking the image of the blue helmet and vest, the author highlights the uniform as a symbolic tool of power which was misused to perpetuate harm against the vulnerable civilian ‘other’. In this scenario, like many others, rather than representing peace and hope, the blue helmet (or beret) instead illustrates the contradictions of the UN peacekeeper’s uniform. Here, the uniform has consequently come to be associated as a symbol of violence, fear, and most significantly, betrayal, for the victim(s) of the abuse, as well as for much of the victim’s community. This discrepancy was also highlighted in a speech presented by former Ambassador of the UK Mission to the UN, Matthew Rycroft, who stated that “when a girl looks up to a blue helmet, she should do so not in fear, but in hope”. For many peacekeepers perpetrating sexual exploitation and abuse, particularly transactional sex, however, they “do not see themselves as abusing women”. This is largely to do with the power and privileges peacekeepers are afforded, such as ‘immunity’ – that is, a peacekeeper is granted immunity from trial or prosecution for criminal misconduct by the host nation’s judicial system. Over the years, scholarly research regarding peacekeepers’ immunity has highlighted a plethora of organisational problems within the UN, including lack of perpetrator accountability, and internal investigation or follow-up. More so, it has undoubtedly “contributed to a culture of individuals committing sexual violence knowing that they will get away with it” (Freedman). When a peacekeeper wears their uniform, they are thus imbued with the power and charged with the responsibility to properly embody and represent the values of the UN; “if [peacekeepers] don’t understand how powerful a position they are in, they will never understand what they do is actually wrong” (Elks). As such, unlike other traditional institutional uniforms, such as that of a soldier or a police officer, a peacekeeper’s uniform stands out as an enigma. One the one hand, peacekeepers channel the peaceful and passive organisational values of the UN by wearing the blue beret or helmet, whilst at the same time, they continue to sport the national military body uniform of their home country. Questions pertaining to the peacekeeper’s uniform arise and require further exploration: how can peacekeepers disassociate from their disciplined military personas and learnt combat skills if they continue to wear military camouflage during peacekeeping missions? Is the addition of the blue beret or helmet enough to reconfigure the body of the peacekeeper from one of violence, masculinity, and offence to that of peace, nurture, and diplomacy? Certainly, a range of factors are pertinent to an understanding of peacekeepers’ behaviour and group culture. But whether these two opposing identities can cohesively create or reconstitute a third identity using the positive skills and attributes of both juxtaposing institutions remains elusive. Nonetheless, the blue beret is a symbol of international hope, not only for vulnerable populations, but also for the world population collectively, as it represents neutral third-party member states working together to rebuild the world through non-combative means. References Borger, Julian. “Elite Forces Fear the Coming of the Egalitarian Beret.” The Guardian 19 Oct. 2000. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/oct/19/julianborger>. Elks, Sonia. “Haitians Say Underaged Girls Were Abused by U.N. Peacekeepers.” Reuters 19 Dec. 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-haiti-women-peacekeepers-idUSKBN1YM27W>. Escobales, Roxanne. “UN Peacekeepers 'Traded Gold and Guns with Congolese rebels'.” The Guardian 28 Apr. 2008. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/28/congo.unitednations>. Essa, Azad. “Why Do Some Peacekeepers Rape? The Full Report.” Al Jazeera 10 Aug. 2017. <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/8/10/why-do-some-peacekeepers-rape-the-full-report>. Freedman, Rosa. “Why Do peacekeepers Have Immunity in Sex Abuse Cases?” CNN 25 May 2015. <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/22/opinions/freedman-un-peacekeepers-immunity/index.html>. Guterres, António. Address to High-Level Meeting on the United Nations Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. United Nations. 18 Sep. 2017. <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2017-09-18/secretary-generals-sea-address-high-level-meeting>. Henry, Charles P. Ralph Bunche: Model Negro or American Other? New York: New York UP, 1999. Howard, Lise Morjé. Power in Peacekeeping. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2019. Joseph, Nathan, and Nicholas Alex. "The Uniform: A Sociological Perspective." American Journal of Sociology 77.4 (1972): 719-730. Kliest, Nicole. “Why the Beret Never Goes Out of Style.” TZR 6 April 2021. <https://www.thezoereport.com/fashion/history-berets-hat-trend>. Rubinstein, Robert A. "Intervention and Culture: An Anthropological Approach to Peace Operations." Security Dialogue 36.4 (2005): 527-544. DOI: 10.1177/0967010605060454. ———. Peacekeeping under Fire: Culture and Intervention. Routledge, 2015. Rycroft, Matthew. "When a Girl Looks Up to a Blue Helmet, She Should Do So Not in Fear, But in Hope." 10 Mar. 2016. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/when-a-girl-looks-up-to-a-blue-helmet-she-should-do-so-not-in-fear-but-in-hope>. Smith, David, and Paul Lewis. "UN Peacekeepers Accused of Killing and Rape in Central African Republic." The Guardian 12 Aug. 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/11/un-peacekeepers-accused-killing-rape-central-african-republic>. United Nations. :United Nations Emblem and Flag." N.d. <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-emblem-and-flag>. United Nations Peacekeeping. “Where We Operate.” N.d. <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate>. Urquhart, Brian. Ralph Bunche: An American Life. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 1993. Zeffman, Henry. “Charity Sex Scandal: UN Staff ‘Responsible for 60,000 rapes in a Decade’.” The Times 14 Feb. 2018. <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/un-staff-responsible-for-60-000-rapes-in-a-decade-c627rx239>.

In George Orwell’s Animal Farm, the pigs infamously changed the law to read: “some animals are more equal than others” (108). From Charlotte’s Web to Babe, there are a plethora of contemporary cultural references, as well as expressions of their intelligence and worth, which would seem to support the pigs’ cause. However, simultaneously, the term “pig” is also synonymous with negative attributes—greed, dirtiness, disarray, brutality and chauvinism. Pigs are also used to name those out of favour, including police officers, the obese, capitalists and male chauvinists. Yet, the animal’s name is also used to express the most extraordinary and unlikely events as in “pigs might fly”. On the one hand, pigs are praised and represented as intelligent and useful, but then they are derided as unclean and slovenly. We are similarly paradoxical in our relationship with then, ranging from using them as a food source to keeping them as pets, and from seeing them as a valuable farm animal/resource or dangerous feral pest depending on which side of the farm gate they are on. Pigs also give a voice to many aspects of popular culture and feature in novels, fairytales, cartoons, comics and movies. As food, pigs are both for feasts and forbidden, their meat the site of both desire and disgust. They are smoked, roasted, fried, stewed and braised, and farmed in the worst of industrial food producing factories. They are also leading the charge in an eating revolution which is calling for heritage, free-range, organic and cruelty-free farming. Snuck into dishes during the Inquisition to expose false conversos, pigs are today seen by some as unclean, inedible and/or fattening and, yet, they provide the symbolic heart of tip-to-tail eating and some of the most expensive and desired of foodie products: heritage Spanish hams, for instance. In an age where to be slender is the goal of many, pigs have been bred and farmed to provide pork which is ever leaner, and yet, their fat—at its most unctuous and melting—is providing a space where the most celebrated of chefs revel. When more and more people are disconnected from what they eat, snout-to-tail eaters are dining on recognisable pigs’ ears, pig’s head filled pies and braised trotters. For many, pigs are the other white meat.Those of us who grew up with television muppet, Miss Piggy, are familiar with the mixed feelings that pigs can evoke. As the contributions to this issue attest, the idea of “pig” can evoke a similarly wide range of responses from scholars working in a variety of disciplines. While as editors we approached the idea of “pig” from an interdisciplinary food studies approach, the symbolic, and even iconic, significance of the pig is a central concern of all of the papers. As Claude Lévi-Strauss put it so elegantly “food has to be good to think as well as to eat” (1963: 128). A number of the authors in this issue have responded with a regional or country-specific focus, and include perspectives from, or about, places and cultures as diverse as Ireland, Tonga, New Zealand, the Soviet Union, the USA and China. “The Pig in Irish Cuisine and Culture”, the title and subject of Máirtín Mac Con Iomaire’s historical analysis, opens with the fact that more pork is eaten per capita than any other meat in Ireland but pigs themselves are almost invisible. Various themes confirm the importance of pigs in Irish culture—literature, folklore, the domestication of the animal and their value in household economics, their role in feasts and how they are raised, killed, prepared and consumed. How the history of the pig in Ireland complements that of the potato—the food item more widely recognised as a major contributor to Irish cuisine—is also included, as are an indication of the new interpretations of Irish pork and bacon dishes by contemporary chefs. In Tonga, conversely, pigs are killed to mark a special event, and are not eaten as everyday food by most people, although they are very significant in Tongan life and culture precisely because of this ceremonial importance. In “Pu‘aka Tonga,” ex-resident of Tonga Mandy Treagus, explains that this is one of the few things about the Tongan diet that has not changed since Cook visited the area and named it the “Friendly Islands”. Treagus also critiques the ways in which the Tongan diet has changed, and how food in Tonga is a neo-colonial issue with pervasive and, sometimes, negative ramifications for Tongans.Jeremy Fisher’s memoir “Tusk” similarly weaves personal and cultural history together, this time in New Zealand. “Tusk” orients the life story of the narrator’s father around the watershed moment he experienced when he killed a boar at 16. The tusks he took from the killing were mounted on gold and accompanied him throughout his life, as well as acting as a reminder to others of his act. The tusks thus function as a physical reminder of the night he spent out in the bush and killed the boar, but also a remembrance of both change and continuity over time. Jenny Smith moves us spatially, and temporally, to the Soviet Union in her “Tushonka: Cultivating Soviet Postwar Taste”. During the Second World War, the USA sent meat, cheese and butter overseas to help feed the Red Army. However, after receiving several shipments of SPAM, a more familiar canned pork product, Russian tushonka, was requested. Smith uses the example of tuskonka to trace how this pig-based product not only kept soldiers alive during the war, but how later the requirements for its manufacture re-prioritised muscle over fat and influenced pig breeding programs. Smith asserts that this had a significant influence on faming and food processing in the Soviet Union, as well as the relationship between the pig and the consumer.Pigs are at the centre of debates that have arisen from the growth of a number of social movements that are becoming increasingly mainstream, reminding us that they are also alive, and beings in their own right. These movements include environmentalism, vegetarianism and other alternative food movements advocating ethical eating. Thus, in his analysis of alien creatures with pig and human features in the science fiction series Dr Who, “Those Pig-Men Things”, Brett Mills explores our reactions to these characters and their fates. Discussing why pig-human representations are capable of being both “shocking and horrific”, but also of arousing our empathy, Mills’s analysis suggests the possibility of more complex notions of human/non-human interaction. It also assists in working towards, as he states, “helpfully destabilis[ing our] simplistic ideas of the superiority of the human race.” The deepest form of human-animal interaction underlies Peta S. Cook and Nicholas Osbaldiston’s “Pigs Hearts and Human Bodies: A Cultural Approach to Xenotransplantation”. Cook and Osbaldiston discuss how our categorisation of animals as a lower species has enabled their exploitation, arguing how, in the contemporary West, we largely attribute “a sacred high value to human bodies, and a low, profane quality to animal bodies.” The authors provide a compelling account of the social and cultural ramifications of the use of pigs in xenotransplantation (animal-to-human transplantation), a process in which the current “choice” animal source is pigs. The line dividing human and animal can at other times be a tenuous one, demonstrated by the anxiety generated over eating practices exposed in fears of eating “like a pig”. In her article, “Sugar Pigs: Children’s Consumption of Confectionery”, Toni Risson explains how rules about eating and concealing food in the mouth remind us that eating is an animal act that instruction is required to modify and control. Children’s lolly-eating rituals—sharing half-eaten food, monitoring the progress of its consumption and change, and using fingers to inspect this change or pull stuck lollies off teeth—can evoke disgust in adults, but can also create friendship networks, intimacy and a sense of belonging for children as they transgress the rules of civilised eating. As Risson puts it, as “the antithesis of civilisation, the pig is the means by which we understand ourselves as civilised beings, but the child with a lolly is an ever-present reminder that we may be animals after all”.Feminism can be added to this list of social movements, with Arhlene Ann Flowers drawing attention to the power of language in her article “Swine Semantics in U.S. Politics: Who Put Lipstick on the Pig?”. Flowers chronicles the linguistic battle between the presidential candidates in the US 2008 campaign over the colloquialism “lipstick on a pig”, used in a speech by then Democratic presidential candidate, Barack Obama. Flowers traces the history of this phrase, as well as the use of other porcine terms in political language including “pork barrelling” and “male chauvinist pig.”In her article about New York’s first gastrobpub, The Spotted Pig, one of the co-editors of this issue, Donna Lee Brien, has constructed a brief restaurant biography for the eatery famous for founding chef April Bloomfield’s nose-to-tail, locally sourced pork dishes. In this, Brien reflects upon the pig’s place in contemporary dining, whether as “raw foodstuff, fashionable comestible, brand, symbol or marketing tool.” In Lillian Ng’s novel, Swallowing Clouds, references to pigs are similarly closely related to food, but in her article, Spanish author Catalina Ribas Segura argues these references to flesh and meat evoke the concepts of freedom, transgression and desire. In “Pigs and Desire in Lillian Ng´s Swallowing Clouds”, Segura focuses on pork and the pig and what these reveal about the two main characters’ relationship. One of these, Zhu Zhiyee, is a butcher, which means that pigs and pork are recurrent topics throughout the novel, but other porcine expressions appear throughout. Pig-related terminology in the novel provides a means for Segura to consider the relationship between food and sex, and sex and literature, and includes a discussion about the connotations of pigs in Chinese culture, where pork is used in a variety of dishes. Lee McGowan’s “Piggery and Predictability: An Exploration of the Hog in Football’s Limelight” focuses in more closely on one of the uses to which we have put pigs, discussing how far “the beautiful game” of football (soccer) has come from the days when an inflated pigs bladder was used as the ball.Reversing this focus from use back to how we, as humans, relate to animals, can show that how we conceive of pigs in our human history reveals our own prejudices. It is known that pigs and humans have interacted for some 10,000 years. The history of that interaction and their own adaptability mean that pigs have a broad range of possible relationships with humans, wider and more complex than either that of many other species or our contemporary treatment of them would attest. The other co-editor of this issue, Adele Wessell, takes a historical perspective to restore pigs to the centre of the narrative in “Making a Pig of the Humanities.” Drawing on a growing body of work on nonhuman animals, Wessell is interested in what a history of pigs and our relationship with them reveals about humans more generally. She argues that all the significant themes in modern history—production, religion, the body, science, power, the national state, colonialism, gender, consumption, migration, memory—can be understood through a history of our relationships with pigs. Jim Hearn is a chef, a researcher and writer. Hearn’s article “Percy” is the story of a pig who, as the only pig in the farmyard, longs to “escape the burden of allegory”. All Percy wanted was to belong, but his pig-ness caused offence to all the other animals in the farm. Percy’s story is about belonging and identity, body-image and representation, told from a pig’s point of view. Percy is burdened with the layers of meaning that have built up around pigs and longs to escape, and this fable provides a fitting ending to this issue.Together, we hope the articles in this collection indicate the wide significance and large number of meanings of “pig” that are possible for different cultures and across historical periods, and the place that pigs inhabit in our national, popular and food cultures. They reveal how pigs are used and misused, as well as how they are understood and misunderstood. These interesting and diverse articles also show how pigs are both material and allegorical; how they are paradoxical in how they are revered, avoided and derided; and, commonly, how they are eaten. ReferencesOrwell, George. Animal Farm. Fairfield, IA: 1st World Library—Library Society, 2004.Lévi-Strauss, Claude. Totemism. Boston, Beacon Press, 1963.

Introduction The social roles of alcohol consumption are rich and varied, with different types of alcoholic beverages reflecting important symbolic and cultural meanings. Sparkling wine is especially notable for its association with secular and sacred celebrations. Indeed, sparkling wine is rarely drunk as a matter of routine; bottles of such wine signal special occasions, heightened by the formality and excitement associated with opening the bottle and controlling (or not!) the resultant fizz (Faith). Originating in England and France in the late 1600s, sparkling wine marked a dramatic shift in winemaking techniques, with winemakers deliberately adding “fizz” or bubbles to their product (Faith). The resulting effervescent wines were first enjoyed by the social elite of European society, signifying privilege, wealth, luxury and nobility; however, new techniques for producing, selling and distributing the wines created a mass consumer culture (Guy). Production of Australian sparkling wines began in the late nineteenth century and consumption remains popular. As a “new world” country – that is, one not located in the wine producing areas of Europe – Australian sparkling wines cannot directly draw on the same marketing traditions as those of the “old world”. One enterprising company, Treasury Wine Estates, markets a range of wines, including a sparkling variety, called 19 Crimes, that draws, not on European traditions tied to luxury, wealth and prestige, but Australia’s colonial history. Using Augmented Reality and interactive story-telling, 19 Crimes wine labels feature convicts who had committed one or more of 19 crimes punishable by transportation to Australia from Britain. The marketing of sparkling wine using convict images and convict stories of transportation have not diminished the celebratory role of consuming “bubbly”. Rather, in exploring the marketing techniques employed by the company, particularly when linked to the traditional drink of celebration, we argue that 19 Crimes, while fun and informative, nevertheless romanticises convict experiences and Australia’s convict past. Convict Heritage and Re-Appropriating the Convict Image Australia’s cultural heritage is undeniably linked to its convict past. Convicts were transported to Australia from England and Ireland over an 80-year period between 1788-1868. While the convict system in Australia was not predominantly characterised by incarceration and institutionalisation (Jones 18) the work they performed was often forced and physically taxing, and food and clothing shortages were common. Transportation meant exile, and “it was a fierce punishment that ejected men, women and children from their homelands into distant and unknown territories” (Bogle 23). Convict experiences of transportation often varied and were dependent not just on the offender themselves (for example their original crime, how willing they were to work and their behaviour), but also upon the location they were sent to. “Normal” punishment could include solitary confinement, physical reprimands (flogging) or hard labour in chain gangs. From the time that transportation ceased in the mid 1800s, efforts were made to distance Australia’s future from the “convict stain” of its past (Jones). Many convict establishments were dismantled or repurposed with the intent of forgetting the past, although some became sites of tourist visitation from the time of closure. Importantly, however, the wider political and social reluctance to engage in discourse regarding Australia’s “unsavoury historical incident” of its convict past continued up until the 1970s (Jones 26). During the 1970s Australia’s convict heritage began to be discussed more openly, and indeed, more favourably (Welch 597). Many today now view Australia’s convicts as “reluctant pioneers” (Barnard 7), and as such they are celebrated within our history. In short, the convict heritage is now something to be celebrated rather than shunned. This celebration has been capitalised upon by tourist industries and more recently by wine label 19 Crimes. “19 Crimes: Cheers to the Infamous” The Treasury Wine Estates brand launched 19 Crimes in 2011 to a target population of young men aged between 18 and 34 (Lyons). Two limited edition vintages sold out in 2011 with “virtually no promotion” (19 Crimes, “Canadians”). In 2017, 19 Crimes became the first wine to use an Augmented Reality (AR) app (the app was later renamed Living Wines Labels in 2018) that allowed customers to hover their [smart] phone in front of a bottle of the wine and [watch] mugshots of infamous 18th century British criminals come to life as 3D characters who recount their side of the story. Having committed at least one of the 19 crimes punishable by exile to Australia, these convicts now humor and delight wine drinkers across the globe. (Lirie) Given the target audience of the 19 Crimes wine was already 18-34 year old males, AR made sense as a marketing technique. Advertisers are well aware the millennial generation is “digitally empowered” and the AR experience was created to not only allow “consumers to engage with 19 Crimes wines but also explore some of the stories of Australia’s convict past … [as] told by the convicts-turned-colonists themselves!” (Lilley cited in Szentpeteri 1-2). The strategy encourages people to collect convicts by purchasing other 19 Crimes alcohol to experience a wider range of stories. The AR has been highly praised: they [the labels] animate, explaining just what went down and giving a richer experience to your beverage; engaging both the mind and the taste buds simultaneously … . ‘A fantastic app that brings a little piece of history to life’, writes one user on the Apple app store. ‘I jumped out of my skin when the mugshot spoke to me’. (Stone) From here, the success of 19 Crimes has been widespread. For example, in November 2020, media reports indicated that 19 Crimes red wine was the most popular supermarket wine in the UK (Lyons; Pearson-Jones). During the UK COVID lockdown in 2020, 19 Crimes sales increased by 148 per cent in volume (Pearson-Jones). This success is in no small part to its innovative marketing techniques, which of course includes the AR technology heralded as a way to enhance the customer experience (Lirie). The 19 Crimes wine label explicitly celebrates infamous convicts turned settlers. The website “19 Crimes: Cheers to the Infamous” incorporates ideas of celebration, champagne and bubbles by encouraging people to toast their mates: the convicts on our wines are not fiction. They were of flesh and blood, criminals and scholars. Their punishment of transportation should have shattered their spirits. Instead, it forged a bond stronger than steel. Raise a glass to our convict past and the principles these brave men and women lived by. (19 Crimes, “Cheers”) While using alcohol, and in particular sparkling wine, to participate in a toasting ritual is the “norm” for many social situations, what is distinctive about the 19 Crimes label is that they have chosen to merchandise and market known offenders for individuals to encounter and collect as part of their drinking entertainment. This is an innovative and highly popular concept. According to one marketing company: “19 Crimes Wines celebrate the rebellious spirit of the more than 160,000 exiled men and women, the rule breakers and law defying citizens that forged a new culture and national spirit in Australia” (Social Playground). The implication is that by drinking this brand of [sparkling] wine, consumers are also partaking in celebrating those convicts who “forged” Australian culture and national spirit. In many ways, this is not a “bad thing”. 19 Crimes are promoting Australian cultural history in unique ways and on a very public and international scale. The wine also recognises the hard work and success stories of the many convicts that did indeed build Australia. Further, 19 Crimes are not intentionally minimising the experiences of convicts. They implicitly acknowledge the distress felt by convicts noting that it “should have shattered their spirits”. However, at times, the narratives and marketing tools romanticise the convict experience and culturally reinterpret a difficult experience into one of novelty. They also tap into Australia’s embracement of larrikinism. In many ways, 19 Crimes are encouraging consumers to participate in larrikin behaviour, which Bellanta identifies as being irreverent, mocking authority, showing a disrespect for social subtleties and engaging in boisterous drunkenness with mates. Celebrating convict history with a glass of bubbly certainly mocks authority, as does participating in cultural practices that subvert original intentions. Several companies in the US and Europe are now reportedly offering the service of selling wine bottle labels with customisable mugshots. Journalist Legaspi suggests that the perfect gift for anyone who wants a sparkling wine or cider to toast with during the Yuletide season would be having a customisable mugshot as a wine bottle label. The label comes with the person’s mugshot along with a “goofy ‘crime’ that fits the person-appealing” (Sotelo cited in Legaspi). In 2019, Social Playground partnered with MAAKE and Dan Murphy's stores around Australia to offer customers their own personalised sticker mugshots that could be added to the wine bottles. The campaign was intended to drive awareness of 19 Crimes, and mugshot photo areas were set up in each store. Customers could then pose for a photo against the “mug shot style backdrop. Each photo was treated with custom filters to match the wine labels actual packaging” and then printed on a sticker (Social Playground). The result was a fun photo moment, delivered as a personalised experience. Shoppers were encouraged to purchase the product to personalise their bottle, with hundreds of consumers taking up the offer. With instant SMS delivery, consumers also received a branded print that could be shared so [sic] social media, driving increased brand awareness for 19 Crimes. (Social Playground) While these customised labels were not interactive, they lent a unique and memorable spin to the wine. In many circumstances, adding personalised photographs to wine bottles provides a perfect and unique gift; yet, could be interpreted as making light of the conditions experienced by convicts. However, within our current culture, which celebrates our convict heritage and embraces crime consumerism, the reframing of a mugshot from a tool used by the State to control into a novelty gift or memento becomes culturally acceptable and desirable. Indeed, taking a larrikin stance, the reframing of the mugshot is to be encouraged. It should be noted that while some prisons were photographing criminals as early as the 1840s, it was not common practice before the 1870s in England. The Habitual Criminals Act of 1869 has been attributed with accelerating the use of criminal photographs, and in 1871 the Crimes Prevention Act mandated the photographing of criminals (Clark). Further, in Australia, convicts only began to be photographed in the early 1870s (Barnard) and only in Western Australia and Port Arthur (Convict Records, “Resources”), restricting the availability of images which 19 Crimes can utilise. The marketing techniques behind 19 Crimes and the Augmented app offered by Living Wines Labels ensure that a very particular picture of the convicts is conveyed to its customers. As seen above, convicts are labelled in jovial terms such as “rule breakers”, having a “rebellious spirit” or “law defying citizens”, again linking to notions of larrikinism and its celebration. 19 Crimes have been careful to select convicts that have a story linked to “rule breaking, culture creating and overcoming adversity” (19 Crimes, “Snoop”) as well as convicts who have become settlers, or in other words, the “success stories”. This is an ingenious marketing strategy. Through selecting success stories, 19 Crimes are able to create an environment where consumers can enjoy their bubbly while learning about a dark period of Australia’s heritage. Yet, there is a distancing within the narratives that these convicts are actually “criminals”, or where their criminal behaviour is acknowledged, it is presented in a way that celebrates it. Words such as criminals, thieves, assault, manslaughter and repeat offenders are foregone to ensure that consumers are never really reminded that they may be celebrating “bad” people. The crimes that make up 19 Crimes include: Grand Larceny, theft above the value of one shilling. Petty Larceny, theft under one shilling. Buying or receiving stolen goods, jewels, and plate... Stealing lead, iron, or copper, or buying or receiving. Impersonating an Egyptian. Stealing from furnished lodgings. Setting fire to underwood. Stealing letters, advancing the postage, and secreting the money. Assault with an intent to rob. Stealing fish from a pond or river. Stealing roots, trees, or plants, or destroying them. Bigamy. Assaulting, cutting, or burning clothes. Counterfeiting the copper coin... Clandestine marriage. Stealing a shroud out of a grave. Watermen carrying too many passengers on the Thames, if any drowned. Incorrigible rogues who broke out of Prison and persons reprieved from capital punishment. Embeuling Naval Stores, in certain cases. (19 Crimes, “Crimes”) This list has been carefully chosen to fit the narrative that convicts were transported in the main for what now appear to be minimal offences, rather than for serious crimes which would otherwise have been punished by death, allowing the consumer to enjoy their bubbly without engaging too closely with the convict story they are experiencing. The AR experience offered by these labels provides consumers with a glimpse of the convicts’ stories. Generally, viewers are told what crime the convict committed, a little of the hardships they encountered and the success of their outcome. Take for example the transcript of the Blanc de Blancs label: as a soldier I fought for country. As a rebel I fought for cause. As a man I fought for freedom. My name is James Wilson and I fight to the end. I am not ashamed to speak the truth. I was tried for treason. Banished to Australia. Yet I challenged my fate and brought six of my brothers to freedom. Think that we have been nearly nine years in this living tomb since our first arrest and that it is impossible for mind or body to withstand the continual strain that is upon them. One or the other must give way. While the contrived voice of James Wilson speaks about continual strain on the body and mind, and having to live in a “living tomb” [Australia] the actual difficulties experienced by convicts is not really engaged with. Upon further investigation, it is also evident that James Wilson was not an ordinary convict, nor was he strictly tried for treason. Information on Wilson is limited, however from what is known it is clear that he enlisted in the British Army at age 17 to avoid arrest when he assaulted a policeman (Snoots). In 1864 he joined the Irish Republican Brotherhood and became a Fenian; which led him to desert the British Army in 1865. The following year he was arrested for desertion and was convicted by the Dublin General Court Martial for the crime of being an “Irish rebel” (Convict Records, “Wilson”), desertion and mutinous conduct (photo from the Wild Geese Memorial cited in The Silver Voice). Prior to transportation, Wilson was photographed at Dublin Mountjoy Prison in 1866 (Manuscripts and Archives Division), and this is the photo that appears on the Blanc de Blancs label. He arrived in Fremantle, Western Australia on 9 January 1868. On 3 June 1869 Wilson “was sentenced to fourteen days solitary, confinement including ten days on bread and water” (photo from the Wild Geese Memorial cited in The Silver Voice) for an unknown offence or breach of conduct. A few years into his sentence he sent a letter to a fellow Fenian New York journalist John Devoy. Wilson wrote that his was a voice from the tomb. For is not this a living tomb? In the tomb it is only a man’s body is good for the worms but in this living tomb the canker worm of care enters the very soul. Think that we have been nearly nine years in this living tomb since our first arrest and that it is impossible for mind or body to withstand the continual strain that is upon them. One or the other must give way. (Wilson, 1874, cited in FitzSimons; emphasis added) Note the last two lines of the extract of the letter have been used verbatim by 19 Crimes to create their interactive label. This letter sparked a rescue mission which saw James Wilson and five of his fellow prisoners being rescued and taken to America where Wilson lived out his life (Reid). This escape has been nicknamed “The Great Escape” and a memorial was been built in 2005 in Rockingham where the escape took place. While 19 Crimes have re-created many elements of Wilson’s story in the interactive label, they have romanticised some aspects while generalising the conditions endured by convicts. For example, citing treason as Wilson’s crime rather than desertion is perhaps meant to elicit more sympathy for his situation. Further, the selection of a Fenian convict (who were often viewed as political prisoners that were distinct from the “criminal convicts”; Amos) allows 19 Crimes to build upon narratives of rule breaking by focussing on a convict who was sent to Australia for fighting for what he believed in. In this way, Wilson may not be seen as a “real” criminal, but rather someone to be celebrated and admired. Conclusion As a “new world” producer of sparkling wine, it was important for 19 Crimes to differentiate itself from the traditionally more sophisticated market of sparkling-wine consumers. At a lower price range, 19 Crimes caters to a different, predominantly younger, less wealthy clientele, who nevertheless consume alcoholic drinks symbolic to the occasion. The introduction of an effervescent wine to their already extensive collection encourages consumers to buy their product to use in celebratory contexts where the consumption of bubbly defines the occasion. The marketing of Blanc de Blancs directly draws upon ideas of celebration whilst promoting an image and story of a convict whose situation is admired – not the usual narrative that one associates with celebration and bubbly. Blanc de Blancs, and other 19 Crimes wines, celebrate “the rules they [convicts] broke and the culture they built” (19 Crimes, “Crimes”). This is something that the company actively promotes through its website and elsewhere. Using AR, 19 Crimes are providing drinkers with selective vantage points that often sensationalise the reality of transportation and disengage the consumer from that reality (Wise and McLean 569). Yet, 19 Crimes are at least engaging with the convict narrative and stimulating interest in the convict past. Consumers are being informed, convicts are being named and their stories celebrated instead of shunned. Consumers are comfortable drinking bubbly from a bottle that features a convict because the crimes committed by the convict (and/or to the convict by the criminal justice system) occurred so long ago that they have now been romanticised as part of Australia’s colourful history. The mugshot has been re-appropriated within our culture to become a novelty or fun interactive experience in many social settings. For example, many dark tourist sites allow visitors to take home souvenir mugshots from decommissioned police and prison sites to act as a memento of their visit. The promotional campaign for people to have their own mugshot taken and added to a wine bottle, while now a cultural norm, may diminish the real intent behind a mugshot for some people. For example, while drinking your bubbly or posing for a fake mugshot, it may be hard to remember that at the time their photographs were taken, convicts and transportees were “ordered to sit for the camera” (Barnard 7), so as to facilitate State survelliance and control over these individuals (Wise and McLean 562). Sparkling wine, and the bubbles that it contains, are intended to increase fun and enjoyment. Yet, in the case of 19 Crimes, the application of a real-life convict to a sparkling wine label adds an element of levity, but so too novelty and romanticism to what are ultimately narratives of crime and criminal activity; thus potentially “making light” of the convict experience. 19 Crimes offers consumers a remarkable way to interact with our convict heritage. The labels and AR experience promote an excitement and interest in convict heritage with potential to spark discussion around transportation. The careful selection of convicts and recognition of the hardships surrounding transportation have enabled 19 Crimes to successfully re-appropriate the convict image for celebratory occasions. References 19 Crimes. “Cheers to the Infamous.” 19 Crimes, 2020. 14 Dec. 2020 <https://www.19crimes.com>. ———. “The 19 Crimes.” 19 Crimes, 2020. 14 Dec. 2020 <https://www.19crimes.com/en-au/the-19-crimes>. ———. “19 Crimes Announces Multi-Year Partnership with Entertainment Icon Snoop Dogg.” PR Newswire 16 Apr. 2020. 15 Dec. 2020 <https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/19-crimes-announces-multi-year-partnership-with-entertainment-icon-snoop-dogg-301041585.html>. ———. “19 Crimes Canadians Not Likely to Commit, But Clamouring For.” PR Newswire 10 Oct. 2013. 15 Dec. 2020 <https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/19-crimes-canadians-not-likely-to-commit-but-clamouring-for-513086721.html>. Amos, Keith William. The Fenians and Australia c 1865-1880. Doctoral thesis, UNE, 1987. <https://hdl.handle.net/1959.11/12781>. Barnard, Edwin. Exiled: The Port Arthur Convict Photographs. Canberra: National Library of Australia, 2010. Bellanta, Melissa. Larrikins: A History. University of Queensland Press. Bogle, Michael. Convicts: Transportation and Australia. Sydney: Historic Houses Trust of New South Wales, 2008. Clark, Julia. ‘Through a Glass, Darkly’: The Camera, the Convict and the Criminal Life. PhD Dissertation, University of Tasmania, 2015. Convict Records. “James Wilson.” Convict Records 2020. 15 Dec. 2020 <https://convictrecords.com.au/convicts/wilson/james/72523>. ———. “Convict Resources.” Convict Records 2021. 23 Feb. 2021 <https://convictrecords.com.au/resources>. Faith, Nicholas. The Story of Champagne. Oxford: Infinite Ideas, 2016. 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