Academic literature on the topic 'Army, Dutch, 1940'

Na de Eerste Wereldoorlog en de invoering van het enkelvoudig stemrecht voor mannen werd de socialistische partij bijna even groot als de katholieke. De verkiezingen verscherpten de regionale en ideologische asymmetrie. De katholieke partij behield de absolute meerderheid in Vlaanderen, de socialistische verwierf een gelijkaardige positie in Wallonië. Nationaal werden coalitieregeringen noodzakelijk. In de Kamer veroverden zowel de socialisten als de christendemocratische vleugel een machtsbasis, maar tot de regering doordringen bleek veel moeilijker. Die bleven gedomineerd door de conservatieve katholieke vleugel en de liberale partij, met steun van de koning en van de haute finance. Eenmaal het socialistische minimumprogramma uit angst voor een sociale revolutie aanvaard (1918-1921), werden de socialisten nog slechts getolereerd tijdens crisissituaties of als het niet anders kon (1925-1927, 1935-1940). Het verklaart een toenemende frustratie bij Waalse socialisten. Tevens bemoeilijkte hun antiklerikalisme de samenwerking van Vlaamse socialisten met christendemocraten en Vlaamsgezinden, zoals in Antwerpen, en dat gold ook voor de vorming van regeringen. In de BWP waren de verhoudingen veranderd. De macht lag nu gespreid over vier actoren: de federaties, het partijbestuur, de parlementsfractie en eventueel de ministers. De eenheid was bij momenten ver zoek. In 1919 was het Vlaamse socialisme veel sterker geworden. In Vlaanderen behaalde het 24 zetels (18 meer dan in 1914) en werd het met 25,5% de tweede grootste partij. Bovendien was de dominantie van Gent verschoven naar Antwerpen, dat met zes zetels de vierde grootste federatie van de BWP werd. Het aantrekken van Camille Huysmans als boegbeeld versterkte haar Vlaamsgezind profiel. In een eerste fase moest Huysmans nog de Vlaamse kwestie als een vrije kwestie verdedigen. Zelfs tegen de Gentse en de Kortrijkse federatie in, die de vooroorlogse Vlaamsgezinde hoofdeis – de vernederland-sing van de Gentse universiteit – hadden losgelaten. Naar 1930 toe, de viering van honderd jaar België, was de Vlaamse beweging opnieuw sterker geworden en werd gevreesd voor de electorale doorbraak van een Vlaams-nationalistische partij. Een globale oplossing voor het Vlaamse probleem begon zich op te dringen. Dat gold ook voor de BWP. Interne tegenstellingen moesten overbrugd worden zodat, gezien de financiële crisis, de sociaaleconomische thema’s alle aandacht konden krijgen. Daarbij stonden de eenheid van België en van de partij voorop. In maart 1929 leidde dit tot het ‘Compromis des Belges’ en een paar maanden later tot het minder bekende en radicalere partijstandpunt, het ‘Compromis des socialistes belges’. Voortbouwend op de vooroorlogse visie van het bestaan van twee volken binnen België, werd dit doorgetrokken tot het recht op culturele autonomie van elk volk, gebaseerd op het principe van regionale eentaligheid, ten koste van de taalminderheden. Voor de Vlaamse socialisten kwam dit neer op een volledige vernederlandsing van Vlaanderen, te beginnen met het onderwijs en de Gentse universiteit. Niet zonder enige tegenzin ging een meerderheid van Waalse socialisten daarmee akkoord. In ruil eisten zij dat in België werd afgezien van elke vorm van verplichte tweetaligheid, gezien als een vorm van Vlaams kolonialisme. Eentalige Walen hadden in Wallonië en in nationale instellingen (leger, centrale besturen) recht op aanwerving en carrière zonder kennis van het Nederlands, zoals ook de kennis ervan als tweede landstaal in Wallonië niet mocht worden opgelegd. De betekenis van dit interne compromis kreeg in de historiografie onvoldoende aandacht. Dat geldt ook voor de vaststelling dat beide nationale arbeidersbewegingen, de BWP vanuit de oppositie, in 1930-1932 mee de invoering van het territorialiteitsbeginsel hebben geforceerd. Een tussentijdse fase C uit het model van Miroslav Hroch.________‘Frenemies’? 2Communitarian tensions in the Socialist Party 1919-1940. Division, Compromise. Crisis. Part One: 1918-1935After the First World War and the introduction of simple universal male suffrage, the Socialist Party was almost as large as the Catholic Party. Elections sharpened the regional and ideological asymmetry. The Catholic Party maintained an absolute majority in Flanders; the Socialists acquired a similar position in Wallonia. Coalition gov-ernments were a necessity at the national level. In the Chamber, both the Socialists and the Christian Democratic wing of the Catholics had a strong base of power, but entering in the government turned out to be much more difficult. Governments remained dominated by the conservative wing of the Catholic Party and by the Liberal Party, with support from the king and high finance. Once the Socialist minimum program had been accepted out of fear of a social revolution in the years 1918-1921, the Socialists were only tolerated in government during crises or in case there was no other possibility (1925-1927, 1935-1940). This explains an increasing frustration among Walloon Socialists. At the same time, Flemish Socialists’ anticlericalism hindered their cooperation with Christian Democrats and members of the Flemish Movement, as in Antwerp, and that also held true for the forming of national governments.In the Belgian Workers’ Party (BWP), balance had changed. Power now lay spread among four actors: the federations, the party administration, the parliamentary faction, and sometimes, government ministers. Unity was sometimes hard to find. In 1919 Flemish socialism became much stronger. In Flanders it took 25 seats (18 more than in 1914) and, with 25.5% of the vote, was the second-largest party. In addition, the centre of gravity moved from Ghent to Antwerp, which with six seats became the fourth-largest federation in the BWP. Camille Huysmans’s appeal as the figurehead strengthened its profile with regard to the Flemish Movement. At first, Huysmans had to defend the treatment of the Flemish Question as a matter of individual conscience for party members, even against the Ghent and Kortrijk federations, which had abandoned the foremost pre-war demand of the Flemish Movement, the transformation of the University of Ghent into a Dutch-language institution. As 1930, the centenary of Belgium, approached, the Flemish Movement became stronger once again and an electoral breakthrough by a Flemish nationalist party was feared. An overall solution to the Flemish problem was pressing, also in the BWP. Internal divisions needed to be bridged in order to give full attention to socioeconomic questions, in light of the financial crisis. The unity of Belgium and of the party came first and foremost. In 1929 this led to the ‘Compromis des Belges’ (Compromise of the Belgians) and a few months later to the lesser-known but more radical position of the party, the ‘Compromise of the Belgian Socialists’. Building on the pre-war vision of the existence of two peoples within Belgium, this point of view was imbued with the right of each people to cultural autonomy, based on the principle of regional monolingualism, at the expense of linguistic minorities. For Flemish socialists this came down to a full transformation of Flanders into a Dutch-speaking society, beginning with education and the University of Ghent. The majority of Walloon socialists went along with this, though not without some reluctance. In return, they demanded the elimination of any form of required bilingualism in Belgium, which they saw as a form of Flemish colonialism. In Wallonia and in national institutions (the army, the central administration), monolingual Walloons had a right to be recruited and have a career without a knowledge of Dutch, just as knowledge of Dutch as a second national language was not supposed to be imposed in Wallonia. The significance of this internal compromise has received insufficient attention in the historiography. The same observation applies to the finding that both national workers’ movements – the BWP from the ranks of the opposition – forced the introduction of the principle of territoriality in 1930-1932: an interim phase C of Miroslav Hroch’s model.

This study aims to analyze whether the socio-economic conditions of Pontianak people at the time of the arrival of Japanese troops were a factor in their unpreparedness to face attacks. The method used in this study is the historical method. The sources used were newspapers, among others, West Borneo Shimbun, Akcaya Daily, and Evening Post. The results showed that Pontianak society at the beginning of the arrival of the Japanese was very diverse in terms of war preparedness. Some of the residents of Pontianak City at that time were traders. They were busy trading and were unaware of the changing political situation of Asia in general and the Dutch East Indies in particular. The Japanese landing in Pontianak caused the destruction of the social and economic infrastructure of trade due to the mistakes of the Japanese army in dropping bombs on target targets. However, the destruction was also triggered by the lack of preparation of the Dutch colonial government for the arrival of Japanese troops in Pontianak.

Rond 1910 werd in de BWP de Vlaamse kwestie een vrije kwestie. De ‘versmelting’ van twee volken in een ‘âme belge’, via tweetaligheid, werd afgewezen. Onder impuls van Huysmans beriep het Vlaamse socialisme zich op de idee van culturele autonomie: het recht op onderwijs in de moedertaal van de lagere school tot de universiteit en dus de vernederlandsing van de Gentse Rijksuniversiteit. Daarmee behoorde het Vlaamse socialisme tot de voorhoede van de Vlaamse beweging. Het Waalse socialisme daarentegen verdedigde nog de superioriteit van het Frans en de mythe van een tweetalig Vlaanderen, en kantte zich tegen die Vlaamse hoofdeis.Tijdens de tweede fase (1919-1935) was de Vlaamse beweging verzwakt en het Vlaamse socialisme verdeeld. Huysmans slaagde er slechts met moeite in om een ongunstig partijstandpunt ter zake te verhinderen en de Vlaamse kwestie als een vrije kwestie te behouden. Het ‘Compromis des socialistes belges’ van november 1929 was gebaseerd op regionale eentaligheid en een minimale tweetaligheid in het leger en de centrale besturen. Het legde mee de fundamenten van de evolutie naar het beginsel van de territorialiteit inzake bestuur en onderwijs (1930 en 1932).Tijdens de derde fase (1935-1940) hield die pacificatie geen stand. Conflicten versterkten elkaar. De partijleiding kwam in handen van de Brusselaar Spaak en de Vlaming De Man, die met zijn Plan van de Arbeid in 1933 de BWP even uit de impasse had gehaald. Het ging om een nieuwe generatie die het socialisme een andere inhoud wilde geven: streven naar een volkspartij in plaats van klassenstrijd, een ‘socialisme national’, een autoritaire democratie als antwoord op een aanhoudende politieke crisis. Vooral aan Waalse kant werd daartegen gereageerd. Tevens werd de evolutie in het buitenlandse beleid, de zelfstandigheid los van Frankrijk, bekritiseerd. De Spaanse burgeroorlog en de eventuele erkenning van generaal Franco dreef de tegenstellingen op de spits. Voor het eerst had de partij met Spaak een socia-listische eerste minister (mei 1938-januari 1939). Hoewel alle socialisten tegen Franco waren, verschilden de Waalse socialisten van mening met de meeste Vlaamse socialisten over de vraag of de regering daarover moest vallen. Er was ook de tegenstelling over een al dan niet toenadering tot de christelijke arbeidersbeweging vanwege een dan noodzakelijke schoolvrede en een subsidiëring van de katholieke ‘strijdscholen’. Daarop entte zich de taalkwestie. In de Kamer viel de fractiecohesie terug tot 53%.De Vlaamse socialisten waren niet alleen veel sterker vertegenwoordigd in de fractie (40% in 1936), hun zelfbewustzijn nam ook sterk toe. Ze ergerden zich steeds meer aan het bijna exclusieve gebruik van het Frans in de fractie, in het partijbestuur en vooral tijdens congressen. Wie geen of weinig Frans kende, wilde niet langer als minderwaardig worden behandeld. Zeker als dat samenviel met een andere visie. Het eerste aparte Vlaams Socialistisch Congres ging door in maart 1937. Het wilde de culturele autonomie zo veel mogelijk doortrekken, maar keerde zich tegen elke vorm van federalisme, waardoor de Vlaamse socialisten in een klerikaal Vlaanderen een machteloze minderheid zouden worden. Bij de Waalse socialisten groeide de frustratie. Ze organiseerden aparte Waalse Congressen in 1938 en 1939. Ze benadrukten drie vormen van Vlaams imperialisme. De ongunstige demografische evolutie maakte een Vlaamse meerderheid in het parlement en politieke minorisering mogelijk. De financieel-economische transfers van Wallonië naar Vlaanderen verarmden Wallonië. Het verlies aan jobs voor ééntalige Walen in Wallonië en in Brussel was discriminerend. Dat laatste zorgde voor een francofone toenadering en een gezamenlijke framing. Het flamingantisme had zich al meester gemaakt van Vlaanderen, bedreigde via tweetaligheid nu de Brusselse agglomeratie, waarna Wallonië aan de beurt zou komen. Op 2 februari 1939 stonden Vlaamse en Waalse socialisten tegenover elkaar. De unitaire partij dreigde, naar katholiek voorbeeld, in twee taalgroepen uiteen te vallen. Zover kwam het niet. De wallinganten, die een politiek federalisme nastreefden, hadden terrein gewonnen, maar de meeste Waalse socialisten bleven voorstander van een nationale solidariteit. Mits een nieuw ‘Compromis’ dat met de Waalse grieven rekening hield. De mythe van het Vlaamse socialisme als Vlaams vijandig of onverschillig is moeilijk vol te houden. Wel ontstond na de Tweede Wereldoorlog een andere situatie. Tijdens de jaren 1960 behoorde de Vlaamse kwestie tot de ‘trein der gemiste kansen’ . Na de Eerste Wereldoorlog en de invoering van het enkelvoudig stemrecht voor mannen werd de socialistische partij bijna even groot als de katholieke. De verkiezingen verscherpten de regionale en ideologische asymmetrie. De katholieke partij behield de absolute meerderheid in Vlaanderen, de socialistische verwierf een gelijkaardige positie in Wallonië. Nationaal werden coalitieregeringen noodzakelijk. In de Kamer veroverden zowel de socialisten als de christendemocratische vleugel een machtsbasis, maar tot de regering doordringen bleek veel moeilijker. Die bleven gedomineerd door de conservatieve katholieke vleugel en de liberale partij, met steun van de koning en van de haute finance. Eenmaal het socialistische minimumprogramma uit angst voor een sociale revolutie aanvaard (1918-1921), werden de socialisten nog slechts getolereerd tijdens crisissituaties of als het niet anders kon (1925-1927, 1935-1940). Het verklaart een toenemende frustratie bij Waalse socialisten. Tevens bemoeilijkte hun antiklerikalisme de samenwerking van Vlaamse socialisten met christendemocraten en Vlaamsgezinden, zoals in Antwerpen, en dat gold ook voor de vorming van regeringen. In de BWP waren de verhoudingen veranderd. De macht lag nu gespreid over vier actoren: de federaties, het partijbestuur, de parlementsfractie en eventueel de ministers. De eenheid was bij momenten ver zoek. In 1919 was het Vlaamse socialisme veel sterker geworden. In Vlaanderen behaalde het 24 zetels (18 meer dan in 1914) en werd het met 25,5% de tweede grootste partij. Bovendien was de dominantie van Gent verschoven naar Antwerpen, dat met zes zetels de vierde grootste federatie van de BWP werd. Het aantrekken van Camille Huysmans als boegbeeld versterkte haar Vlaamsgezind profiel. In een eerste fase moest Huysmans nog de Vlaamse kwestie als een vrije kwestie verdedigen. Zelfs tegen de Gentse en de Kortrijkse federatie in, die de vooroorlogse Vlaamsgezinde hoofdeis – de vernederland-sing van de Gentse universiteit – hadden losgelaten. Naar 1930 toe, de viering van honderd jaar België, was de Vlaamse beweging opnieuw sterker geworden en werd gevreesd voor de electorale doorbraak van een Vlaams-nationalistische partij. Een globale oplossing voor het Vlaamse probleem begon zich op te dringen. Dat gold ook voor de BWP. Interne tegenstellingen moesten overbrugd worden zodat, gezien de financiële crisis, de sociaaleconomische thema’s alle aandacht konden krijgen. Daarbij stonden de eenheid van België en van de partij voorop. In maart 1929 leidde dit tot het ‘Compromis des Belges’ en een paar maanden later tot het minder bekende en radicalere partijstandpunt, het ‘Compromis des socialistes belges’. Voortbouwend op de vooroorlogse visie van het bestaan van twee volken binnen België, werd dit doorgetrokken tot het recht op culturele autonomie van elk volk, gebaseerd op het principe van regionale eentaligheid, ten koste van de taalminderheden. Voor de Vlaamse socialisten kwam dit neer op een volledige vernederlandsing van Vlaanderen, te beginnen met het onderwijs en de Gentse universiteit. Niet zonder enige tegenzin ging een meerderheid van Waalse socialisten daarmee akkoord. In ruil eisten zij dat in België werd afgezien van elke vorm van verplichte tweetaligheid, gezien als een vorm van Vlaams kolonialisme. Eentalige Walen hadden in Wallonië en in nationale instellingen (leger, centrale besturen) recht op aanwerving en carrière zonder kennis van het Nederlands, zoals ook de kennis ervan als tweede landstaal in Wallonië niet mocht worden opgelegd. De betekenis van dit interne compromis kreeg in de historiografie onvoldoende aandacht. Dat geldt ook voor de vaststelling dat beide nationale arbeidersbewegingen, de BWP vanuit de oppositie, in 1930-1932 mee de invoering van het territorialiteitsbeginsel hebben geforceerd. Een tussentijdse fase C uit het model van Miroslav Hroch.___________ ‘Frenemies’? 2Communitarian tensions in the Socialist Party 1919-1940. Division, Compromise. Crisis. Part Two: 1935-1940 Around 1910, the Flemish question became a free question in the BWP. The ‘merging’ of two peoples in a Belgian soul (âme belge) through bilingualism was rejected. According to Huysmans, Flemish socialism appealed to the idea of cultural autonomy: the right to education in one’s native language from primary school to university, and therefore, the transformation of the state University of Ghent into a Dutch-speaking institution. Hence, Flemish socialism became part of the vanguard of the Flemish Movement. Walloon socialism, on the contrary, continued to support the superiority of French in Belgium and the myth of a bilingual Flanders. It turned against this key Flemish demand.The next stages were dominated by the introduction of simple universal male suffrage in 1919. The Catholic Party maintained an absolute majority in Flanders, the Socialist Party acquired a similar position in Wallonia. During the second phase (1919-1935) initially the Flemish Movement was weakened and Flemish socialism divided. Huysmans hardly managed to keep the Flemish question a free question. The ‘Compromise of the Belgian Socialists’ (Compromis des socialistes belges) of November 1929 was based on regional monolingualism and a minimal bilingualism in the army and the central administration. The territorial principle in administration and education (1930 and 1932) was accepted. Dutch became the official language in Flanders.During the third phase (1935-1940) pacification did not hold. Conflicts strengthened one another. The party leadership fell into the hands of the Brussels politician Spaak and the Fleming De Man. The latter had just offered the BWP an answer to the socio-economic depression with his ‘Labour Plan’ (Plan van de Arbeid). This new generation wanted a different socialism: rather a people’s party than stressing class conflict, a ‘national socialism’, an authoritarian democracy as a response to a persistent political crisis. In particular Walloons reacted against these developments. At the same time, they critisized the foreign policy of diplomatic independence from France (‘los van Frankrijk’). The Spanish Civil War and the possible recognition of General Franco stressed the divisions. With Spaak, the party had a Socialist Prime Minister for the first time (May 1938-January 1939). While all socialists were opposed to Franco, Walloon socialists had a conflicting view with most Flemish socialists on whether the govern-ment should be brought down on this subject. There was also a conflict over the question of rapprochement with the Christian labour movement concerning a truce over the school question and subsidies for the Catholic ‘propaganda’ schools. The language question worsened the situation. In the Chamber, party cohesion dropped down to 53%.Not only were the Flemish socialists much more strongly represented in the socialist parliamentary group (40% in 1936), their assertiveness also increased. They became more and more annoyed with the quasi-exclusive use of French in their parliamentary group, in the party administration, and mostly during party congresses. Those who knew little or no French no longer wanted to be treated as inferior. Especially, when they had different opinions. The first separate Flemish Socialist Congress was held in March 1937. The Congress wanted to pursue cultural autonomy as far as possible, but opposed any form of federalism, as Flemish socialists would become a powerless minority in a clerical Flanders.Frustration grew among Walloon socialists. They organised separate Walloon Congresses in 1938 and 1939. They emphasized three forms of Flemish imperialism. Unfavourable demographic developments made a Flemish majority in Parliament and political minoritisation likely. Financial-economic transfers impoverished Wallonia to the benefit of Flanders. The loss of jobs for monolingual Walloons in Wallonia and Brussels was discriminatory. This contributed to common framing among Francophones: “Flemish radicalism” was accepted in Flanders, presently threatening the Brussels agglomeration via bilingualism, and Wallonia would be next.On 2 February 1939 Flemish and Walloon socialists opposed one another. The unitary party was in danger of splitting into two language groups, following the Catholic example. It did not come to that. The Walloon radicals, who pursued political federalism, had won some ground, but most Walloon socialists remained supporters of national solidarity, provided the adoption of a new ‘Compromise’ that took account of Walloon grievances.The myth of Flemish socialism as hostile or indifferent to Flemish issues is hard to maintain. After the Second World War, however, the situation became different.

This article describes the process of the development of Madrasah Jam'iyah Mahmudiyah to become a modern Islamic educational institution in Langkat in 1921-1950. The results of this study indicate that the Madrasah Jam'iyah Mahmudiyah experienced rapid progress throughout the years 1912-1942. With the number of students reaching 2,000 in 1930, the Madrasah Jam'iyah Mahmudiyah was able to compete with formal educational institutions established by Dutch colonial governments, such as Langkatsche School, Europese Lagere School (ELS) and Holland Chinese School (HCS). The progress of Madrasah Jam'iyah Mahmudiyah is inseparable from the role of Sultan Abdul Aziz who is very concerned about the progress of Islamic education in the area of the Langkat Sultanate. However, the condition of the madrasa began to decline since 1942, when Japan took over the authority of the Dutch. Even in 1950, this madrasah experienced a fire that consumed all classrooms. The fire was triggered by the explosion of weapons ammunition belonging to the Indonesian National Army which was stored in one of the classrooms.

The Japanese occupation period in Indonesia began in 1942 and ended on August 17, 1945. The entry of Japan into Indonesia brought broader changes for the Indonesian people, especially in education, which during the Dutch colonial period was discriminatory. Japan realizes that the majority of Indonesian people adheres Islam, at first this was not a problem, as evidenced by Japan's cooperation with Muslims in the early days of entering Indonesia. Japan established PETA (Defender of the Motherland) an institution consisting of Indonesians. In this organization Indonesians were educated and trained to hold arms, the Office of Religious Affairs (Shumubu), the Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, and Hezbollah were established. Although furthermore Japan must consider which of the Muslims could fulfill its colonial interests in Indonesia.

This paper is an overview of the early discoveries of the geology of Sulawesi, from the first naturalist expeditions in the 1820s until the 1930s. Most of the contributions to the knowleddge of the geology of Sulawesi during the Dutch colonial era came between the late 1880s and 1930, after which geological and mining investigations essentially stopped for four-decades. Before Indonesian Independence in the 1940s, Sulawesi island had been called Celebes, a name introduced by Portuguese explorers in the early 1500s.Geographically, Sulawesi is rather unique among the larger islands of Indonesia. Unlike the other three large islands Sumatra, Borneo and Java, Sulawesi has four ‘arms’, which are all surrounded by deep seas, and virtually the entire island is mountainous terrain without major rivers or delta systems. Active volcanism is limited to the eastern half of the North Arm and the lone Una-Una volcano in the Tomini Gulf, while Miocene and recently extinct volcanoes are present in SW Sulawesi.Geologic exploration was challenging. Surveys into uncharted territories before 1920 (before the arrival of detailed topographic maps, air photos and satellite imagery), required topographic surveying of all itineraries with chain and compass, and with a barometer for estimating altitudes.

Conventional wisdom in the Netherlands holds that the Dutch military began developing night vision accessories for firearms in 1949. However, a discovery of technical drawings in the Dutch Nationaal Militair Museum (NMM) collection has recently revealed that a series of experiments were conducted with infrared viewers for firearms earlier in the 1940s. This discovery, as well as the Museum’s recent acquisition of a Dutch carbine fitted with a first-generation infrared telescopic sight, has spurred this author’s investigation into the history of infrared rifle sight development in the Netherlands. With evocative code names like ‘Hansel & Gretel’ and ‘Cyclops’, Dutch military development of infrared weapon sights included some novel approaches. A wealth of new material, recently rediscovered in Dutch archives, underpins the findings presented herein.

[Title: The Nica War Equipment in Facing Patriots in Physical Revolution in Bali In 1945 – 1950] Giving up without the conditions of Lieutenant General H. Ter Poorten (Commander of the Dutch East Indies) on behalf of the United States Army in Indonesia to Liuetenant General Hiroshi Imamura (Japanese Army Leader). Since the Dutch East Indies government ended in Indonesia. At that time Dutch soldiers who were Japanese prisoners of war because they did not have time to flee to Australia were sent to the interior of Siam and Birma to clear forests and make bridges and railways. On August 15th 1945, Japan finally surrendered to allies. This defeat of Japan caused the captives of the Dutch to quickly hold preparatory exercises back to Indonesia. The arrival of the Dutch in Bali received resistance from the fighters under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel I Gusti Ngurah Rai. Although the weapons possessed by fighters in Bali is limited but the struggle is long enough to survive. NICA in the face of fighters in Bali during the physical revolution has used modern war equipment such as: pipercub airplanes, lucked airplanes, motorbikes, jeeps, telephones, bren, mitraliur, stengun, mortar, lichthalon and others but not easy can beat him. This is because the fighters with the people in Bali are united.

Cornellis de Houtman is a Dutch sailor who first came to meet the Balinese people. Then followed by the second Dutch visit, namely Cornellis Heemskerck. The purpose of this second visit was to bring Prince Maurits Van Nasau's letter to King Dalem Bekung at the Gelgel palace. The contents of the letter conveyed, namely stating friendship and asking for permission to trade with the king. It turned out that he received permission from Raja Dalem Bekung. In the 19th century this condition changed, the Dutch, who at first declared friendship and asked for permission to trade, instead wanted to control this island. As a result, there was resistance from the kings in Bali, and this resistance continued under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel I Gusti Ngurah Rai. The weapons used by the fighters in Bali to fight against the Dutch (NICA) were of limited nature both in terms of quality and quantity. The weapons used to fight during the physical revolution in Bali were formerly owned by prayodas, aid from Java, booty belonging to the Dutch (NICA), and made by themselves. The types of weapons that were used by the fighters in Bali during the physical revolution against the Dutch (NICA), such as: Keris, sharpened bamboo, samurai, firecrackers, kitchen ashes, kentongan, yellow iron, bayonet, command knife, keki, stengun, firearms, mortars, hand grenades, carbines, bren, handguns, and heavy submachine guns (12.7). Even though the weapons they had were limited, the Dutch did not dare to underestimate the abilities of the Balinese fighters because they had experience in military education. It is proven that almost every battle was won by Balinese fighters, not a few Dutch soldiers (NICA) died during the physical revolution in Bali. Keywords: NICA; weapons; physical revolution;

Abstract: The history of the Indonesian nation is a long historical journey. In general, the Indonesian people were colonized for three and a half centuries by European countries, such as the Portuguese, Spanish, British, Dutch, and occupied for three and a half years by the Japanese. Indonesia at that time was a country that had rich and abundant natural resources. The Japanese have entered Indonesia since March 1, 1942. The Japanese territory the Island of Sumatera was centered in Bukittinggi.The Japanese successed in taking control of South Bengkulu on February 24, 1942. During 1942 Japan lauched its colonial action in South Bengkulu by expanding its territory. This research uses historical research methods. The results of the research on the role of Abdur Rahim Damrah in the fight against Japanese Colonalism in South Bengkulu in 1943-1945 were initiated by Abdur Rahim Damrah attending Gyugun education in Pagaralam. Abdur Rahim Damrah becomes the leader Penjaga Keamanan Rakyat (PKR) in South Bengkulu, he led the battles against the Japanese army. Armed with Gyuguns previous military education, he fought against the Japanese occupation in South Bengkulu. Discussion and consolidation of the leaders and people of South Bengkulu was carried out, after the consolidation was completed they immediately moved to attack Japan. Because of the attack, Abdur Rahim Damrah was arrested and punished.

Abstract Having easily overrun Poland in September 1939, German forces remained quiet through the winter. In April 1940, however, they roared back into action with surprise offensives into Denmark and Norway. Denmark surrendered in a matter of hours; Norway lasted several weeks. In early May, German forces violated Belgian and Dutch neutrality on their way into France. This maneuver bypassed the strong French defenses of the Maginot line, and rapidly moving armored columns drove deep into France heading for Paris. The British army, stunned by the speed of the offensive, found themselves separated from French forces and driven back to the coastline. There at Dunkirk, they stood isolated as German panzers bore down on them. Only the shift from a ground to an air attack saved the British, as a massive flotilla arrived to spirit the British away from under the noses of the German tanks.

Abstract On 10 May 1940 German ground forces invaded Holland. It was expected, and when it happened the Dutch army, small as it was, put up an honourable resistance for a few days, but obviously did not have a chance. Niko was not directly involved in this; in 1939 there had been a mobilization of young males, but he had escaped it, as his elder brother Jan had been an approved conscientious objector, and under the law all his siblings were exempt from military service. On 14 May, Rotterdam was destroyed by the Luftwaffe. It was firebombed, with many thousands killed; this was the end of the fight, the army capitulated, and German jackboots overran every corner of Holland.

Abstract On May 10, 1940, Germany began a series of coordinated offensives which brought about the surrender of Holland, Belgium, and France. It was an astonishingly successful military campaign. In a few weeks the Wehrmacht accomplished what it had failed to achieve in four years of trench warfare during the First World War. Germany destroyed the French army and set Britain’s expeditionary force on an ignominious retreat. Newly won air bases and submarine pens left Berlin in a position to increase its attacks on Great Britain. Germany accomplished all of this with remarkably few casualties. Many observers came to see the Wehrmacht’s victories as a partial product of Trojan Horse operations. The Germans opened their campaign in Holland with several coordinated strikes. In the eastern part of the country special Abwehr units were asked to seize control of bridges along the Maas and Waal rivers. These troops included Dutch-speaking Germans and thirty Dutch Nazis; their special mission was code-named “Trojan Horse.” The Abwehr commando units largely failed to accomplish their assignments as Dutch soldiers successfully destroyed several important bridges in eastern Holland. However, the Nazis secured a bridgehead at Gennep and they immediately took advantage of this achievement, pouring infantrymen and tanks through the Dutch defensive lines. The deployment of German airborne forces in the Dutch rear proved even more disastrous.

Charles Boxer, the most distinguished scholar of seventeenth-century Portuguese and Dutch colonial history of his generation, was a Fellow of the British Academy. He had been an army officer and in 1930 was seconded to the Far East as a language officer to specialise in Japanese. Boxer combined his duties with scholarly study and survived imprisonment by the Japanese during World War II. After the War, he held the Camõese Chair of Portuguese at King's College London. Boxer's most influential book was Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire 1415–1825. Obituary by M.D.D. Newitt.

Abstract Introduction: Acheson’s Effort and Failure in Asia Dean Acheson inherited a thick Asian diplomatic record that added up to something like a strategy. General Douglas MacArthur, following Washington’s instructions, was reforming the Japanese state, George Marshall had vainly attempted mediating the Chinese civil war, and the army was overseeing the creation of a state in South Korea. Washington had supervised the advent of Philippine independence. After first accepting continuation of Dutch imperialism in Indonesia, it moved to end it. It had urged Britain to resolve the festering dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. And it was beginning to give Paris unwelcome advice about reestablishing order in Indochina.

Shortly after the end of the First World War, the German Navy learned that its encrypted communications had been read throughout the hostilities by both Britain and Russia. The German military realized that its approach to cipher security required a fundamental overhaul, and from 1926 different branches of the military began to adopt the encryption machine known as Enigma. By the start of the Second World War a series of modifications to military Enigma had made the machine yet more secure, and Enigma was at the centre of a remarkably effective military communications system. It would take some of the best minds in Britain—and before that, in Poland—to crack German military Enigma. The exact origins of the encryption machine that played such an important role in the Second World War are not entirely clear. In the early 1920s patent applications for a wheel-based cipher machine were filed by a Dutch inventor, Hugo Koch, as well as by a German engineer, Arthur Scherbius. In 1923, a company called Chiffrienmaschinen AG exhibited a heavy and bulky encryption machine at the International Postal Congress in Bern, Switzerland. This machine had a standard typewriter keyboard for input, and its design followed Scherbius’s original patent closely. Scherbius had named his machine ‘Enigma’, and this ‘Model A’ was the first of a long line of models to emerge. Models B, C, and D soon followed, and by 1927 Model D was selling widely for commercial use. A number of governments purchased Enigma machines in order to study them, and Edward Travis—the deputy head of Britain’s signals intelligence unit, the Government Code and Cypher School—bought one on behalf of the British government in the mid-1920s. In 1925, the German Navy decided to put Enigma into use the following year, despite having rejected one of Scherbius’s previous encryption mechanisms in 1918. Meanwhile, the German Army began to redesign Enigma, with the intention of strengthening its security. By 1928, Model G was in use, and in June 1930 Model I (Eins) became the standard version, deployed first by the army, then the navy in October 1934, and the air force in August 1935.