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Journal articles on the topic "Arendt, Hannah, 1906-1975 – Philosophy"
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Alhashmi, Rawad. "The Grotesque in Frankenstein in Baghdad: Between Humanity and Monstrosity." International Journal of Language and Literary Studies 2, no. 1 (March 16, 2020): 90–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.36892/ijlls.v2i1.120.
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This paper analyzes Ahmed Saadawi’s Frankenstein in Baghdad (2018) with a special emphasis on the grotesque bodily images of the monster, the novel’s exploration of justice, and the question of violence. I draw on the theoretical framework of the Russian philosopher and literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975), the ethics philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995), and the German-American philosopher and political thinker Hannah Arendt (1906–1975). Saadawi’s unnamed monster, “The Whatsitsname,” comes into being via an accidental if honorably intentioned act, when the main character, Hadi, compiles remnant corpses that he finds in the streets of Bagdad into one body with the aim of conducting “a proper burial” in order to dignify the dead. Interestingly, while the monster is the enemy in the eyes of the Iraqi government, he is a savior for the ordinary people— their only hope of putting an end to the violence and achieving justice. In this paper, I argue that Saadawi draws on the metaphor of Frankenstein’s monster not only to capture the dystopian mood in post-2003 Baghdad, but also to question the tragic realities, and the consequence of war, as well as the overall ramification of colonialism. In addition, Saadawi’s embodiment of the metaphor of Frankenstein’s monster actualizes a new literary role for Frankenstein in literature—the representation of the Other: In this instance, the entire Iraqi community is literary represented in Frankenstein’s body. Of equal importance, is the fragmented nature of his body, which is literally compiled of different body parts from different people, perhaps symbolizing the urgent need for unity in Iraq.
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Wallach, John R. "Democracy in Ancient Greek Political Theory: 1906–2006." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 23, no. 2 (2006): 350–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000101.
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The notion of ‘democracy’ as found in ancient Athens and the work of ancient Greek political theorists has crucially functioned as a critical, distant mirror for major authors of twentieth-century political thought — starting importantly with Ernest Barker but continuing along diverse paths in the works of Karl Popper, Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt in the wake ofWorld War II, as well as for recent theorists of democracy who have read Athenian practices and critical discourses against the grain of contemporary philosophy, politics, and culture. In all of them, images of ‘democracy’ in ancient Greek political theory operate simultaneously as historical discoveries, theoretical constructions, and rhetorical supplements for critical renditions of the political realm. As such, they evidence the slippery centrality of ideas of democracy in ancient Greek political thought for the necessary, problematic, and divergent efforts of recent political theorists to justify their ideas as historically rooted, philosophically true, and politically relevant.
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Villa, Dana. "Hannah Arendt, 1906–1975." Review of Politics 71, no. 1 (2009): 20–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670509000035.
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AbstractThis essay provides an overview of the life and theoretical concerns of Hannah Arendt. It traces the way her experience as a German Jew in the 1930s informed her analysis of totalitarianism in The Origins of Totalitarianism and her idea of the “banality of evil” in Eichmann in Jerusalem. The essay takes issue with those of Arendt's critics who detect a lack of “love of the Jewish people” in her writing. It also traces the way Arendt's encounter with totalitarian evil led to a deeper questioning of the anti-democratic impulses in the Western tradition of political thought—a questioning that finds its fullest articulation in The Human Condition and On Revolution. Throughout, my concern is to highlight Arendt's contribution to thinking “the political” in a way friendly to the basic phenomenon of human plurality. I also highlight her recovery and extension of the main themes of the civic republican tradition.
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Canonne, Justine, and Céline Bagault. "Hannah Arendt (1906-1975). Penser les maux de la modernité." Sciences Humaines N° Hors-série, HS20 (June 1, 2015): 64–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/sh.hs20.0064.
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Bordignon Benedetti, Eduardo Jose, and Sônia Maria Schio. "Os caminhos da Ação Política: o pensamento de Arendt e Butler, a partir de dois “recortes” da atualidade." RELACult - Revista Latino-Americana de Estudos em Cultura e Sociedade 2, no. 4 (December 31, 2016): 408. http://dx.doi.org/10.23899/relacult.v2i4.298.
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O texto parte de acontecimentos políticos da atualidade para, na esfera do pensamento político, refletir brevemente acerca dos rumos da ação política. Para tanto, o referencial teórico de Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) é utilizado em diálogo com as obras de Judith Butler (1956-), especialmente no livro Who sings the Nation State? (2007).
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Garrett, Paul Michael. "Hannah Arendt and social work: A critical commentary." Qualitative Social Work 19, no. 1 (November 15, 2019): 38–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1473325019887778.
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Although social work engagement with Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) has been meagre, it has been recently suggested that her conceptualisations are significant for the profession. This article seeks to problematise the presentation of Arendt to a social work readership, highlighting the failure to adequately historicise her work. In terms of her ideas, there is much to gain in examining this intellectual’s prolific and often controversial contributions, and seven dimensions are identified as significant for the times in which we live. Nevertheless, there are still major criticisms which can be levelled at her core conceptualisations. The article dwells on Arendt’s theorisation of the ‘private’, the ‘public’ and the ‘social’, and it is suggested that she is unaligned with sociologically informed theorisation underpinning critical and radical social work.
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Sousa, Joelson Pereira de. "ESFALECIMENTO DA TRADIÇÃO E RECUSA DA CONCEPÇÃO DIALÉTICA DA HISTÓRIA EM HANNAH ARENDT." Dialektiké 2 (October 11, 2015): 118. http://dx.doi.org/10.15628/dialektike.2015.2793.
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O objetivo deste trabalho é discutir a recusa da compreensão dialética da história empreendida pela filósofa alemã Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) nas obras Entre o passado e o futuro (1954) e Sobre a violência (1970), destacando, por meio da problematização dos argumentos trazidos pela autora, a crítica da tentativa hegeliana de reconciliação com a realidade através da compreensão do significado mais profundo de todo o processo histórico, a qual Hannah Arendt denomina de filosofia utilitarista que visa impor à realidade o significado e a lei preconcebidos pelo homem. Tal posição da autora favorece uma análise mais aprofundada das relações entre poder e força, política e violência, tão imbricadas na atual condição dos conflitos entre governos e populações que ocorrem ao redor do mundo. Conforme Hannah Arendt, a maior questão a ser enfrentada nestes casos é o fato dos dois lados do conflito encararem a política do ponto de vista da glorificação da violência.
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RUBIN, GIL. "From Federalism to Binationalism: Hannah Arendt's Shifting Zionism." Contemporary European History 24, no. 3 (July 6, 2015): 393–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777315000223.
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AbstractThe German-Jewish intellectual Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) had famously opposed the establishment of a Jewish nation state in Palestine. During the Second World War, however, Arendt also spoke out repeatedly against the establishment of a binational Arab-Jewish state. Rejecting both alternatives, Arendt advocated for the inclusion of Palestine in a multi-ethnic federation that would not consist only of Jews and Arabs. Only in 1948, in an effort to forestall partition, did Arendt revise her earlier critique and endorse a binational solution for Palestine. This article offers a new reading of the evolution of Arendt's thought on Zionism and argues that her support for federalism must be understood as part of a broader wartime debate over federalism as a solution to a variety of post-war nationality problems in Europe, the Middle East and the British Empire. By highlighting the link between debates on wartime federalism and the future of Palestine, this article also underscores the importance of examining the legacy of federalism in twentieth century Europe for a more complete understanding of the history of Zionism.
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Amaral, Juliana Scherdien. "Hannah Arendt e a Liberdade na Política." RELACult - Revista Latino-Americana de Estudos em Cultura e Sociedade 2, no. 4 (December 31, 2016): 929. http://dx.doi.org/10.23899/relacult.v2i4.331.
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Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) a partir do "Fenômeno do Totalitarismo", refletiu sobre a importância da política e do agir político, momento em que é necessário que haja “liberdade política”, nos termos dela. A liberdade é entendida por Arendt como a manifestação do ser humano no espaço público, cujo aparecimento é mediado pela linguagem sem coação, na pluralidade, na singularidade, visando a ação. A ausência da liberdade pode provocar experiências nada edificantes para a existência do homem, como os fatos do Nazismo, por exemplo – campos de concentração e de extermínio, a mentira política, entre outros. Nesse sentido, é preciso compreender como Arendt entende a liberdade, momento em que surge a questão: como a liberdade é (ou pode ser) condição para a política? Por quê? Na concepção dela, "o sentido da política é a liberdade". Para tanto, ela distingue a liberdade política da filosófica. A liberdade política precisa da presença de seres humanos que pensem e julguem, que escolham e ajam, e seu exercício será efetivo, e não um mero comportamento. Arendt enfatiza, em seus estudos, a liberdade política, pois para ela a liberdade corresponde à possibilidade de agir.
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Rossatti, Gabriel Guedes. "Hannah Arendt e a filosofia política na era atômica." Veritas (Porto Alegre) 61, no. 3 (January 5, 2017): 535. http://dx.doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2016.3.18187.
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A filósofa política Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) é mundialmente conhecida como uma das principais teóricas do fenômeno do totalitarismo. Não obstante, há também como questão estrutural a atravessar seu pensamento a não menos importante questão não apenas das armas ditas nucleares (bomba atômica, bomba de hidrogênio), mas mais geralmente da ciência nuclear. Neste sentido, o presente artigo objetiva explorar, em um primeiro momento, a recepção filosófica dos acontecimentos ligados ao lançamento das primeiras bombas atômicas; num segundo, a interpretação arendtiana das questões acima aludidas para, por fim, tomando como ponto de partida a reflexão arendtiana sobre a relação entre modernidade e domínio da ciência/tecnologia atômica, pensar a nossa situação contemporânea em face de tais questões.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Arendt, Hannah, 1906-1975 – Philosophy"
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Guezengar, Arthur. "Hannah Arendt et la rupture totalitaire." Thesis, Université Grenoble Alpes, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020GRALP001.
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La pensée arendtienne est marquée par deux thèses fortes : l’idée selon laquelle l’homme est conditionné par le milieu dans lequel il se trouve pris et qu’il contribue à modifier par ses paroles et par ses actes d’une part ; et de l’autre l’idée selon laquelle le totalitarisme constitue une rupture avec le monde et la tradition politique, au point d’apparaître comme un système ontologiquement hostile à la condition humaine. Or la cohabitation de ces deux thèses ne va pas de soi. Hannah Arendt fait de l’activité politique un mode d’être spécifique de l’existence humaine, fondé sur la liberté d’agir, pour finalement nous décrire un système politique où cette dimension a perdu tout son sens. En mettant en perspective ces deux dimensions, cette thèse cherche dès lors à résoudre ce paradoxe d’un régime politique capable de rompre avec tout ce qui constitue l’action politique. En procédant à une remontée méthodologique des textes arendtiens, depuis les plus récents jusqu’à ses premiers travaux sur l’impérialisme, elle montre de plus que la conception du totalitarisme comme rupture avec la condition humaine va de pair avec une autre approche faisant du totalitarisme la continuité de processus déjà en germe dans le système colonialThe Arendtian thought is marked by two strong theses: the idea according to which man is conditioned by the environment in which he finds himself caught and that he contributes to modifying by his words and his acts on the one hand; and on the other the idea that totalitarianism constitutes a break with the world and the political tradition, to the point of appearing as a system ontologically hostile to the human condition. But the coexistence of these two theses is not self-evident. Hannah Arendt makes political activity a mode of being specific to human existence, based on the freedom to act, to finally describe a political system where this dimension has lost all meaning. By putting these two dimensions into perspective, this thesis seeks to resolve this paradox of a political regime capable of breaking with all that constitutes political action. By proceeding with a methodological review of the Arendtian texts, from the most recent to his first works on imperialism, it shows moreover that the conception of totalitarianism as a break with the human condition goes hand in hand with another approach making totalitarianism. the continuity of processes already germinated in the colonial system
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Brito, Renata Romolo 1980. "Ação Política em Hannah Arendt." [s.n.], 2007. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/279524.
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Orientador: Yara Adario FrateschiDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
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Resumo: Neste trabalho, pretendemos analisar a premissa arendtiana de que a categoria de meios e fins não é uma categoria política. Pretendemos mostrar que a recusa de Arendt em aceitar essa categoria no âmbito político não significa negar que a ação tenha propósitos e objetivos específicos, mas sim que a independência em relação a propósitos e fins intencionados é constitutiva da ação. Para tanto, pretendemos analisar a crítica arendtiana ao utilitarismo, para em seguida abordar a noção de grandeza da ação no pensamento arendtiano, partindo de uma analogia com a noção de beleza na esfera da arte. Retomaremos, então, duas análises de Arendt de ações propriamente políticas, com a intenção de mostrar a natureza da ação: sua capacidade de transcender motivos e objetivos. Refletiremos ainda sobre algumas críticas dirigidas à sua obra. A idéia central desta dissertação é que a ação, segundo Arendt, baseia-se na pluralidade humana e que a possibilidade de manutenção dessa pluralidade (que só se manifesta através da ação) é a fonte da sua especificidade
Abstract: The present work intends to analyze Arendt¿s claim that politics is not a means to an end. We aim to show that Arendt¿s refusal in accepting the category of ends and means in the political realm does not mean that action has no purpose or specific objectives, but, on the contrary, that action¿s constitution does not depend on its suitability in achieving its purposes or objectives. To achieve this, we intend to analyze Arendt¿s critique of utilitarianism, and then to reflect on Arendt¿s notion of the greatness of action, based on an analogy with the notion of the beauty. We then reflect upon two events examined by Arendt as proper political actions, in order to demonstrate the nature of these said actions and its capacity of transcending motives and objectives. We also examine some critiques directed at her philosophy. The main idea of this dissertation is that action, according to Arendt, is based in human plurality and that the possibility of the continual of this plurality is the source of action¿s constitution
Mestrado
Mestre em Filosofia
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Graham, Nicholas. "An analysis of Hannah Arendt's concept of worldlessness /." Thesis, McGill University, 1990. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=60536.
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This thesis explores the theme of "worldlessness" in the political thought of Hannah Arendt.The thesis analyzes "worldlessness" by way of Arendt's reflections on the sub-themes of "contemporary crisis," the "Western tradition," the "modern age" and the modern phenomenon of "thoughtlessness." These sub-themes are examined in chapters one, two, four and five respectively. Chapter three examines Arendt's conception of politics and "the world."
The analysis proceeds on the basis of Arendt's stated conviction that political thought must take its bearings from "incidents of living experience" if it is to be adequate to its subject matter. More specifically, it investigates the basis and significance of Arendt's contention that the modern condition of "worldlessness" has produced a rupture between thought and experience which has radically altered the character of contemporary understanding. In general terms, the thesis examines the origins of modern worldlessness and the implications of this for contemporary thinking.
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Brito, Renata Romolo 1980. "Direito e Política na filosofia em Hannah Arendt." [s.n.], 2007. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/281329.
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Orientador: Yara Adario FrateschiTese (doutorado) ¿ Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Filosofia
Doutor em Filosofia
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Carmona, Hurtado Jordi. "Patience de l’action, Hannah Arendt." Paris 8, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012PA083638.
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La politique, pour Arendt, nomme une expérience précise, infiniment pratique : le politeuein. C’est l’expérience de l’agir. Mais on ne saurait agir qu’au pluriel, et il y a une radicale autonomie de la praxis. La politique, au pluriel agissant, effectue une révélation du-monde : elle change le « désert » en « monde ». Parce qu’agir est fondamentalement commencer quelque chose, la politique se laisse le mieux approcher aux moments révolutionnaires, aux moments de hiatus dans les temps historiques, où la capacité originaire des hommes apparaît à la lumière du jour. L’expérience de la politique nous montre que l’agir humain est la seule figure véritable de ce que les philosophes ont appelé l’arkhè. La pensée politique recherchée par Arendt est une pensée qui saurait s’exercer en conditions de pluralité. Cela exige de décentrer le dispositif philosophique dans son ensemble : du théorique, le séjour du singulier-universel, vers l’Öffentlichkeit, le séjour du pluriel-mondial. Penser politiquement, cela suppose d’endurer le Faktum de la pluralité en développant une patience de l’action. La pensée politique prend la forme d’une compréhension, ce qui nomme le moment principal de ce décentrement. Si l’action commence à chaque fois quelque chose de nouveau, si elle est fondamentalement une rupture, la patience de l’action définit le travail, l’effort et la discipline du commencement — du miracle. Cette patience définit une philosophie de l’initium, de l’initiative. Le défi principal de ce mode de la pensée consiste à soustraire le moment du « au commencement » de l’emprise du mythe. Ainsi, la pensée politique arendtienne est une pensée critique, ou plutôt une pensée AufklärerPolitics, as Arendt understands it, is the name of an specific experience, infinitely practical : the politeuein, the experience of acting. Thus, plurality is the condition of acting and so there is a radical autonomy of praxis. Politics, as a plural action, accomplishes a revelation of the-world : it transforms the no man’s land into a world. If acting means primarily beginning something, the revolutionnary periods teach us with particular acuity about acting : the periods of an hiatus in historical time, when the originating capacity of men appears in an explicit way. The experience of politics shows that human acting is the mere genuine figure of that thing that philosophers called arkhè. The political thinking which Arendt has investigated is a specific way of thinking to put in practice in conditions of plurality. That means to off-center the philosophical device altogether : from the theoretical, the place of the singular-universal, to the Öffentlichkeit, the place of the plural-earthly. Political thinking means acomplishing the task of enduring plurality and developping a patience of the action. Political thinking is mainly a means of comprehension, which is the name of the crucial moment of this off-centering process. If acting starts something new each time, if it’s primarily a rupture, the patience of the action defines the labor, the effort and the discipline of beginning, of miracle. This patience defines a philosophy of initium, of initiative. The main challenge of this way of thinking consists on substracting the moment of « in the beginning » from mythic power. Therefore, Arendt’s political thinking is a critical thinking, or rather an Auflkärer thinking
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Eloff, Philip Rene. "Kompleksiteit en begronding in die werk van Hannah Arendt en Jaques Derrida." Thesis, Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/6541.
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Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2011.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this mini-thesis I explore Hannah Arendt’s engagement with the problem of foundation in relation to the work of Derrida and complexity theory. In Arendt the problem of foundation takes shape as the attempt to develop a thinking of foundation that does not repress political freedom. The American Revolution is an important point of reference in Arendt’s attempt to develop such a notion of authority. According to Arendt the American republic could, however, not entirely succeed in realizing this conception of authority. I draw on Derrida and complexity theory in order to show that the shortcomings Arendt points to are structural to institutions as such. Following Derrida and complexity theory, I further that the recognition of this structural limitation is an indispensable step in the attempt to think political authority as something stable, but which nevertheless keeps open the possibility of political change.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In hierdie skripsie ondersoek ek Hannah Arendt se ommegang met die probleem van begronding deur dit in verband te bring met die werk van Jacques Derrida en kompleksiteitsteorie. Die probleem van begronding neem vir Arendt vorm aan in die poging om politieke gesag op so wyse te bedink dat dit nie politieke vryheid onderdruk nie. Die Amerikaanse rewolusie vorm ’n sentrale verwysingspunt in Arendt so poging om gesag op hierdie manier te bedink. Dit slaag volgens haar egter nie heeltemal daarin om hierdie alternatiewe vorm van gesag te verwesenlik nie. Ek steun op Derrida en kompleksiteitsteorie om te wys dat die tekortkominge waarop Arendt wys in ’n sekere sin struktureel is tot enige instelling. Ek argumenteer voorts in navolging van Derrida en kompleksiteitsteorie dat ’n erkenning van hierdie strukturele beperking ’n belangrike moment is in die poging om politieke gesag te bedink as iets wat stabiel kan wees, maar terselftertyd ruimte laat vir politieke verandering.
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Straehle, Porras Edgar. "Hannah Arendt: Una lectura desde la autoridad." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/399927.
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En este trabajo se examina el concepto de autoridad desde el pensamiento de Hannah Arendt. El objetivo consiste en repensar y reivindicar la importancia de esta categoría política central que ha sido insuficientemente estudiada por la tradición del pensamiento político y cuyo olvido debe ser reparado para comprender adecuadamente la crisis política del presente. Abordar de nuevo la autoridad supone disociarla del poder y también del autoritarismo, nociones con las que habitualmente se la confunde, y rescatar su dimensión específica. En este sentido, se hace hincapié en este trabajo en que la autoridad es incompatible con una concepción del poder como la que está encarnada en la noción de soberanía. Frente a ésta, lo que se expone es que la autoridad comporta una forma de obediencia que no se sustenta sobre la imposición, la coerción o la violencia, sino sobre otros factores como el reconocimiento y que por ello se define inevitablemente por poseer un carácter frágil. La autoridad es lo que implícitamente declara la incompletitud del poder y lo que desvela que éste requiere una instancia exterior que le sirva como fuente de legitimidad.
Para acometer este examen de la autoridad, se ha realizado un estudio exhaustivo de la obra de Arendt desde la perspectiva de este concepto y se muestra que éste no ocupa un rol secundario ni aislado en el conjunto de su pensamiento. La autoridad enlaza con una cuestión central en esta autora como es la del mundo y se relaciona de manera íntima con otras de sus preocupaciones principales. La autoridad se sitúa asimismo en el centro de otras cuestiones de primer orden en Arendt como son el poder, la violencia, la soberanía, la ley, la fundación, la memoria, la revolución, el juicio, el sentido común, la república de consejos o sobre todo el mundo, al mismo tiempo que dialoga con otras como son el totalitarismo, la desobediencia civil, el perdón, la promesa o las actividades del trabajo y la acción.
En Arendt, la autoridad se define por rasgos como su dimensión relacional, su carácter dinámico o por aparecer como una suerte de contrapeso a la dimensión imprevisible y desbordante de la acción que sin embargo no conduce a la negación de ésta. Por otro lado, la autoridad también provee un horizonte de permanencia que no se encuentra presente en la categoría arendtiana de poder y que resulta fundamental para la posibilidad y viabilidad de una fundación política. Como extensión de estas consideraciones, en las páginas siguientes se desarrollará lo que hemos llamado un poder de recepción y se hará una reconsideración del concepto de autor desde las reflexiones de esta pensadora. Finalmente, este trabajo pretende encarar el que para Arendt consistía en uno de los problemas fundamentales del pensamiento político: cómo reconciliar no la libertad y la igualdad, sino ésta y la autoridad.This work will examine the concept of authority, taking Hannah Arendt‘s political thinking as a cue. My aim is to rethink and vindicate the importance of this political category, which has been insufficiently examined by the tradition of political thought. In my opinion, its specific dimension needs to be further studied so that we can better understand the current political crisis. In order to fulfil this new approach, we need to dissociate or disentangle the notion of authority from those of power and authoritarianism, concepts with which it has usually been confused. In this regard, this work highlights the fact that authority is incompatible with a conception of power that is embodied in the notion of sovereignty. Contrary to this conception, authority implies a form of obedience which does not stand on imposition, coercion or violence, but on other factors, such as recognition, and consequently it is inevitably defined by its fragile character. Implicitly, authority reveals the incompleteness of power and thus discloses that power needs an exterior instance as a source of legitimacy. In order to complete this task, this research rests upon a deep and exhaustive examination of the works of Hannah Arendt from the perspective of authority and argues that this concept does not play a secondary or isolated role in her thinking. Authority is linked with one of the central problems for this thinker, that of the question of the world. Furthermore, authority is located at the very heart of other major issues, such as the concepts of power, violence, sovereignty, law, foundation, memory, revolution, judgment, common sense or, above all, the world. At the same time the concept of authority plays an important role in the understanding of Arendt‘s position in regard to the council system and it is useful to delve more deeply into other phenomena such as totalitarianism, civil disobedience, forgiveness, promise or both the activities of work and action. In Arendt, authority is defined by characteristics such as its relational dimension and its dynamic character. In addition, authority is seen as a kind of resource which can counterbalance the unpredictable character inherent to action that at the same time does not negate its freedom or its spontaneity. On the other hand, authority provides a horizon of permanence that is not present in the Arendtian category of power and is crucial for the possibility or viability of the political foundation. As a result of this consideration, in the following pages I develop what I call a ―power of reception‖ and I will reconsider the concept of the author on the basis of Arendt‘s reflections. Finally, this work aims to tackle what the thinker considered as one of the major challenges for the current political thinking: the reconciliation of not freedom and equality but of equality and authority.
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Bosch, Alfons Carles Salellas. "Hannah Arendt : uma filosofia da fragilidade." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/156985.
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Instigada pelos acontecimentos a dar resposta à experiência do totalitarismo, cujas consequências ela padeceu em primeira pessoa, a obra de Hannah Arendt é uma crítica categórica da filosofia política tradicional, iniciada por Platão. Resposta à negação da política que representaram os regimes totalitários do século XX e crítica à retirada da dignidade da política por parte da filosofia, que a submeteu à sua tutela. Segura de encontrar os fundamentos da política além do seu próprio âmbito, a tradição filosófica ocidental substituiu a reflexão e o exercício da liberdade, verdadeiro sentido da política segundo Arendt, por uma teoria do governo e da dominação que esconde a fragilidade inerente ao domínio dos assuntos humanos. Pretendemos defender que o pensamento político arendtiano tem como pressuposto básico e necessário o reconhecimento da fragilidade constitutiva da política, sem que isso implique qualquer paradoxo. Para tanto, seguimos o rastro dessa fragilidade num conjunto selecionado de textos da autora e defendemos que sua reflexão entra no campo do pósfundacionalismo. Como corolário, sugerimos que, apesar dos depoimentos da própria interessada, Hannah Arendt escreveu uma obra de filosofia política, alternativa à grande tradição, que nós chamamos de filosofia da fragilidade.Prompted by events to give response to the experience of totalitarianism the consequences of which she suffered in first person, the work of Hannah Arendt is a categorical critique of the great tradition of political philosophy initiated by Plato. Response to the negation of politics that represented the twentieth century totalitarian régimes and critique of the withdrawal of the dignity of politics practiced by philosophy that submitted it under tutelage. Sure to find the foundations of politics beyond its own realm, the Western tradition of philosophy replaced the reflection and the exercise of freedom, the true sense of politics according to Arendt, by a theory of government and domination that hides away the inherent frailty of the realm of human affairs. We intend to defend that Arendt’s political thinking has its basic and necessary requirement in the recognition of the constitutive frailty of politics, without this incurring in any paradox. Therefore, we follow the trail of this frailty across a selected set of the author's texts and argue that her reflection enters in the postfoundational field. As a corollary, we suggest that, despite her own testimony, Hannah Arendt wrote a work of political philosophy, an alternative one to the great tradition, that we may call philosophy of frailty.
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Cruz, Richard A. (Richard Alan). "Hannah Arendt: The Philosopher in History." Thesis, North Texas State University, 1986. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc500249/.
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This paper explores the major historical interpretations of Hannah Arendt and analyzes her philosophy of history. Chapter One includes an introduction and a brief survey of the life of Hannah Arendt. Chapters Two and Three examine The Origins of Totalitarianism. The discussion concludes that Arendt's loose use of terms and some of her evidence can be called into question. Nevertheless, her work contains original insights about modern European political history. Chapter Four, a discussion of Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, emphasizes her portrait of Adolph Eichmann as a shallow, Nazi bureaucrat. Although the work is flawed with inaccuracies, her portrait of Eichmann as a prototypical bureaucratic killer is thought provoking. Chapter Five, an analysis of Arendt's philosophy of history, concludes that Arendt understood the pitfalls of theories of historical causality.
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Giequelin, Bruna Perusato. "Pensamento e obediência : análises éticas em Hannah Arendt." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UCS, 2018. https://repositorio.ucs.br/11338/3907.
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O presente estudo tem por escopo tratar da questão do pensamento (e sua ausência) e da obediência, sob a perspectiva ética em Hannah Arendt, buscando entrelaçar tais conceitos. Assim, ao debruçar-se sob a análise feita por Arendt, especialmente após o julgamento de Eichmann em Jerusalém, destaca-se a importância do pensamento no campo da ética. Identifica-se, nesse sentido, uma responsabilidade do homem de agir e não meramente comportar-se como uma peça de engrenagem, obedecendo cegamente às regras postas, sendo apenas mais um corpo da sociedade de massa. Tais observações são extremamente relevantes no contexto atual, especificamente no que diz respeito ao serviço público no Brasil, que impõe um comportamento padronizado de seus servidores, limitando a atividade espiritual de pensar do homem.The present study aims to address the question of think (and its absence) and obedience, from the ethical perspective of Hannah Arendt, seeking to interweave such concepts. Thus, under Arendt's analysis, especially after Eichmann's trial in Jerusalem, the importance of thinking in the field of ethics is emphasized. In this sense, man's responsibility to act is identified and not merely to behave as a piece of gear, obeying blindly to the rules, being just another body of mass society. Such observations are extremely relevant in the current context, specifically with regard to the public service in Brazil, which imposes a standardized behavior of its servants, limiting the spiritual activity of man's thinking.
Books on the topic "Arendt, Hannah, 1906-1975 – Philosophy"
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The hidden philosophy of Hannah Arendt. London: Routledge Curzon, 2002.
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David, Watson. Arendt. London: FontanaPress, 1992.
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Bowen-Moore, Patricia. Hannah Arendt's philosophy of natality. New York, USA: St. Martin's Press, 1989.
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Hannah Arendt's philosophy of natality. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989.
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The political philosophy of Hannah Arendt. London: Routledge, 1994.
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Hannah Arendt: Radical conservative. New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers, 2012.
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Hannah Arendt and the law. Oxford: Hart Pub.2, 2012.
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Hannah Arendt, totalitarianism, and the social sciences. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2010.
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Hannah Arendt: Life is a narrative. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2001.
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Benhabib, Seyla. The reluctant modernism of Hannah Arendt. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Arendt, Hannah, 1906-1975 – Philosophy"
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Waithe, Mary Ellen. "Hannah Arendt (1906–1975)." In A History of Women Philosophers, 243–59. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1995. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1114-0_11.
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Hutchings, Kimberly. "A Conversation with Hannah Arendt (1906–1975)." In The Return of the Theorists, 245–53. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137516459_29.
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Nixon, Jon. "Hannah Arendt (1906–1975): Embodying a Promise in the University." In Debating Higher Education: Philosophical Perspectives, 83–94. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31061-5_7.
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Ramel, Frédéric. "Hannah Arendt, 1906-1975." In Philosophie des relations internationales, 381–91. Presses de Sciences Po, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/scpo.ramel.2022.01.0381.
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Arneson, Pat. "Hannah Arendt (1906–1975): Biographical Sketch." In Series in Philosophy/Communication, 65–66. Purdue University Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philcomm20079.
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"37. Hannah Arendt 1906-1975." In Philosophie des relations internationales, 451–63. Presses de Sciences Po, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/scpo.ramel.2011.01.0451.
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Guilherme, Alexandre, and W. John Morgan. "Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) – dialogue as a public space." In Philosophy, Dialogue, and Education, 55–71. Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315736532-5.
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Fistetti, Francesco. "Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) : la banalité du mal." In Histoire raisonnée de la philosophie morale et politique, 656–60. La Découverte, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/dec.caill.2001.01.0656.
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Villa, Dana. "A life in dark times." In Hannah Arendt: A Very Short Introduction, 1—C1.F3. Oxford University PressOxford, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198806981.003.0001.
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Abstract This chapter traces Arendt’s trajectory from her birth in Königsberg, East Prussia in 1906 to her death in New York in 1975. It describes her study of philosophy with Heidegger and Jaspers in the 1920s; her initiation into politics with the rise of the Nazi movement in the early 1930s; her escape from Germany and her sojourn in Paris; and her eventual arrival in America in 1941. The chapter then provides context and background for some of her major works, including Origins of Totalitarianism, The Human Condition, Eichmann in Jerusalem, and The Life of the Mind.
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Gaudillière, Jean-Max. "Hannah Arendt (1906–1975)." In Madness and the Social Link, 159–89. Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003057468-7.
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