Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Antitrust, damages, private enforcement'

The present PhD thesis corcerns the perspectives of antitrust damages compensation in the light of EU Directive 2014/104. The work is focused on the likely developments of national and european private antitrust enforcement after the implementation of the Directive, considering how this will impact the level of private enforcement application. After a preliminary analysis of the national and european framework of private enforcement, the work reaches the conclusion that, currently, private enforcement in under-developped, mainly due to a general lack of “antitrust awareness”. That considered, the work tries to understand whether the implementation fo the Directive is likely to boost to the use of private enforcement instruments. To this end, the research focuses on the main instruments introduced or regulated by the Directive, with particular regard to the fields where the game between public and private enforcement is played (such as the topic concerning the binding effect of fining decisions in antitrust damages lawsuits), in order to catch the possible changes that should take to build a “two-pillars” system for the enforcement of antitrust rules. After an in-depth analysis, the work ends up to the conclusion that the implementation is not likely to sensitively boost the application of private antitrust enforcement instruments, as the Directive does not actually impact the main problem, i.e. the lack of antitrust awareness at individuals and undertakings level, therefore having a mere value of creating a level playing field for the application of the rules.

Afin d'assurer la plénitude des objectifs du droit de la concurrence, la majorité des systèmes juridiques s'appuient tout à la fois sur une mise en œuvre par les sphères privée et publique. Grâce au développement récent dans les règlements européens du rôle privé dans la mise en œuvre du droit de la concurrence, les interactions entre les exécutions privée et publique dans ce domaine sont devenues une réalité d'importance dans le contexte européen. Plus précisément, notre étude examinera les deux principales formes de décisions prises par les autorités de la concurrence, respectivement les « settlements » et les « litigation decisions ». Une « settlement decision », de façon générale, ne peut être utilisée utilement afin d'assurer le succès d'une action privée en dommages et intérêts. C'est pourquoi dans notre travail nous mettrons en lumière les possibles interactions entre l'exécution par les sphères publiques du droit de la concurrence et les compensations pour les victimes de comportements anticoncurrentiels. Les « litigation decisions » imposent habituellement des sanctions pécuniaires à l'encontre des violateurs du droit et pourraient être utilisées en faveur des demandeurs dans les actions de suivi en dommages et intérêts. Nous observerons les conséquences économiques et légales de ces interactions dans la cohabitation des amendes et du préjudice dans le domaine du droit de la concurrence. Dans notre thèse nous discuterons de la situation actuelle et récente de l'Europe, au regard du développement de ces interactions entre les deux sphères, en l'éprouvant à la lumière de l'expérience américaine en la matière
In order to achieve the various objectives of antitrust law, the majority of legal systems use both public and private enforcement. Because of the recent development of private enforcement under the European rules, the interaction between public and private enforcement has become a reality in the European context. More precisely, our study examines two main types of decisions made by antitrust authorities, namely settlements and litigation decisions. A settlement decision, generally speaking, cannot be used to help ensure the success of private action for damages. This is why, in our study, we highlight the possibility of an interaction between public settlement decisions and compensation of victims of anticompetition behaviors. The litigation decisions usually impose monetary sanctions on the infringer of the antitrust law and provide presumptions which are helpful for the claimant in follow-on action for damages before the court. We examine the legal and economic consequences of the interaction between the fines and damages in the antitrust legal area. We underline in more detail that, under the new European and the National rules of member states of the European Union, we will observe an increase in follow-on action. This increase will lead to more interaction between fines and damages. Finding the best means to evaluate this new monetary charge on infringers of antitrust law has become a very important legal and economic question. In this study, we discuss the recent European situation with regards to the monetary impact of the interaction between public and private enforcement in the light of the American experience with the matter

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O presente estudo aborda com detalhes obstáculos ao ajuizamento de ações privadas de reparação de danos de cartéis no Brasil, notadamente mediante análise dos institutos de direito envolvidos, comparação do tratamento dado a eles em outras jurisdições, análise da interpretação que as cortes brasileiras têm dado a eles nas poucas ações privadas de ressarcimento contra cartéis ajuizadas até o momento, bem como entrevistas de autoridade do CADE para trazer à pesquisa o ponto de vista da autoridade concorrencial, sobretudo no que diz respeito ao compartilhamento de documentos do processo administrativo. Ao final da abordagem de cada tema, buscou-se oferecer soluções propositivas para a superação dos referidos obstáculos e, com isso, fornecer substratos para desenvolvimento das ações privadas de ressarcimento de danos decorrentes de cartéis.
The present study addresses in detail the obstacles to private enforcement of cartels in Brazil, through the analysis of the applicable legal principles, comparing the treatment given to them in other jurisdictions, and analyzing the interpretation that Brazilian courts have given to them in the few private lawsuits for compensations of cartel damages filed in Brazil so far. Interviews with the Brazilian antitrust authority were also conducted in order to bring its point of view to the research, especially regarding the sharing of documents of the administrative proceeding. Concluding each topic of the study, we tried to offer propositive solutions to overcome these obstacles and, with this, to provide tools for the development of private enforcement of cartels in Brazil.

Tradizionalmente, tanto a livello nazionale quanto a livello comunitario, la tutela della concorrenza si è caratterizzata per l’impiego di strumenti di enforcement pubblicistico. Dopo un lungo iter, il 26 novembre 2014 è stata pubblicata la direttiva del Parlamento Europeo e del Consiglio UE 2014/104 relativa a determinate norme che regolano le azioni per il risarcimento del danno ai sensi del diritto nazionale per violazioni delle disposizioni del diritto della concorrenza degli Stati membri e dell'Unione europea. In Italia il recepimento della Direttiva è avvenuto il 19 gennaio 2017 con il d.lgs. n. 3/2017. Sebbene la normativa in parola intervenga a colmare il vuoto creato dall’assenza, sia ambito nazionale che comunitario, di norme di diritto positivo dirette a prevedere esplicitamente la possibilità di promuovere un’azione per il risarcimento del danno sulla base di una violazione delle disposizioni antitrust, essa lascia irrisolte problematiche di notevole importanza. L'obiettivo che ci si propone di raggiungere, pertanto, è quello di verificare i tratti fondamentali della disciplina dell'azione di risarcimento del danno conseguente alla violazione di norme antitrust alla luce della stratificazione di dottrina, giurisprudenza e prassi createsi intorno alla private litigation antitrust in anni recenti. Ciò anche al fine di offrire un contributo utile a fornire le coordinate atte a propiziare un corretto approccio ai tanti risvolti problematici che la nuova disciplina lascia insoluti.

The Supreme Court of the United States consented in its Empagran decision that the foreign antitrust injury that is in a dependency relationship with anticompetitive effects (antitrust injury) in the U.S. is to be litigated before the U.S. courts. Since this decision antitrust law litigation in an international context does not depend merely on anticompetitive effects in the U.S., but also on the relationship between anticompetitive effect and (foreign) private antitrust injury. This is something that was not present in pre-Empagran cases. The Supreme Court did not provide conditions on the basis of which the relationship between anticompetitive effects and private antitrust injury could be classified as one of dependency. This means that the Supreme Court left the determination of these conditions to lower U.S. courts. The lower U.S. courts, instead of attempting to determine these conditions, have made foreign private antitrust injury even more difficult to litigate before the U.S. courts. There are three factors that contributed to this development in U.S. case law: the understanding of the Empagran litigation; the understanding of the nature of the international context, and U.S. courts taking a pro-active role in delivering their decisions for which the reasoning is difficult to understand. The greatest obstacle that post-Empagran U.S. courts have placed in front of private antitrust litigants is the requirement that instead of ‘dependency connection’ there should be ‘direct causation’ between anticompetitive effects in the U.S. and litigated (foreign) private antitrust injury. This thesis considers the existing theoretical and practical problems of the current analytical framework under which antitrust violation is analysed in an international context. The thesis introduces the new legal concept of a ‘transborder standard’. This is necessitated by the starting position of this thesis that a factual situation under adjudication cannot be only either ‘domestic’ or ‘foreign’, but can also be ‘transborder’. The introduction of the transborder standard to the existing theoretical framework enables (and requires) the analysis of the factual situation under adjudication in its integrity, bearing in mind also the purpose of private antitrust law enforcement and the right of private parties to be compensated for suffered antitrust injury. The transborder standard provides a framework to analyse antitrust claims brought before the U.S. courts by those private parties who satisfy their private antitrust injury outside the U.S. At the same time, the transborder standard does not enable private litigants to take advantage of simultaneous antitrust litigation before U.S. courts and the courts of non-U.S. countries. ‘Transborder standard’ is a new legal concept. Nevertheless, the existing system of U.S. antitrust law enforcement does support it and, consequently, the transborder standard can be directly applied.

This thesis seeks to address the question: to what extent is the EU Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions sufficiently framed in its terms to achieve its underlying aims and objectives? It is argued that the Directive has one overriding goal: to make it easier for the victims of infringements of EU competition law - typically end-consumers - to claim compensation from the infringers. It is also argued that the authors of the Directive present a convincing case that one of the main reasons for the lack of victims claiming - let alone being awarded - compensation, prior to the adoption of the Directive, is weaknesses with the existing legal framework governing competition law damages actions at national level. The thesis examines four of the main areas covered by the Directive: disclosure of evidence; the effect of NCA decisions; limitation periods; and indirect purchaser standing and the passing-on defence. In each case, the relevant rules from the Directive are set out and an assessment is carried out. A crucial part of this assessment consists of seeking to ascertain the problems facing potential claimants prior to the adoption of the Directive and asking whether the Directive appears well-framed in terms of addressing those problems. As well as considering case law of the EU courts, the legal rules and jurisprudence of two leading Member States - the United Kingdom and Italy - are used as primary case studies in carrying out this assessment. The assessment of the measures considered in this thesis is a nuanced one. It is argued that the measures set out in Chapter II of the Directive on disclosure of evidence are generally well-framed and beneficial for claimants, crucially showing a keen understanding of the relationship between private and public enforcement. The assessment of Article 9, on the effect of NCA decisions is much less positive. It is argued that the measures are drafted in vague terms and compare unfavourably with existing rules and practices in the two case-study Member States. It is argued that while the measures set out in Article 10 on limitation periods do represent an improvement for claimants in certain respects, there are a number of key issues that they fail to address. Finally, the assessment of Articles 12 to 15 on indirect purchaser standing and the passing-on defence is positive in some respects, but it is argued that many of the measures do not adequately address the issues that they purport to tackle. It is also argued that these measures are unlikely to bear fruit, without certain issues which are not covered by the Directive, being addressed. Ultimately it is concluded that the Directive makes some important strides towards the realisation of its underlying aims and objectives, but that many of the measures examined are found to be too vague, too weak or too incomplete to fully address the key issues and that the Directive also fails to address some important issues at all.

This thesis identifies the major evidential issues of EU competition law enforcement and the principles and rules on proof followed by the CJEU and the national courts to solve them. Analising the case law, the thesis considers how the decisions of the Luxembourg Courts influence the evaluation of evidence of English and Italian judges, both in the public and the private enforcement. Chapter I, after clarifying which rules govern evidential issues before the different authorities, tackles the nature of evidence and criticises its characterisation according to the traditional substance-procedure dichotomy. Chapter II explores the reasons why a significant degree of convergence is reached, well beyond the effet utile standard, by the case law of the CJEU and that of the analysed countries (England/Wales and Italy). It also shows that the peculiarities of the enforcement of EU competition law and the crucial role played by evidence in this field are important factors promoting the process of convergence. In Chapter III, the analysis is extended to the gathering of evidence. In this phase, despite the diversity characterising the national administrative procedures, convergence is promoted, on the one hand, by the coordination mechanisms provided by EU law to foster the free movement of evidence and, on the other, by the fundamental rights standards that Member States are bound to follow. The conclusions show how, having been tested by means of judicial integration, the adoption of uniform rules of evidence in EU competition law, complementing Article 2 of Regulation (EC) 1/2003, is conceivable and desirable.
La tesi esamina vari aspetti relativi alla prova nel diritto europeo della concorrenza, riguardo ai quali principi e regole comuni vengono adottate sia dalla Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione Europea che dalle corti nazionali. Attraverso l’analisi delle decisioni in materia di concorrenza, la tesi considera l’influenza esercitata dalla giurisprudenza della Corte di Lussemburgo sulla valutazione delle prove in due giurisdizioni nazionali, quella inglese e quella italiana, sia nel public che nel private enforcement. Il primo capitolo, dopo aver illustrato i regimi probatori applicati dalle diverse autorità, affronta il problema della natura della prova e propone una critica della tradizionale rigida distinzione tra profili sostanziali e procedurali. Il secondo capitolo esplora le ragioni per le quali un considerevole livello di convergenza viene raggiunto tra la giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione Europea e la giurisprudenza delle corti degli Stati membri analizzati, ben oltre il rispetto del principio dell’effetto utile. Secondo la ricostruzione riproposta, il ruolo cruciale giocato dalla prova in questo campo e le peculiarità del sistema europeo della concorrenza sono fattori determinanti nel processo di ravvicinamento delle discipline probatorie. Nel terzo capitolo, l’analisi si sofferma sull’acquisizione e formazione della prova. In fase di raccolta della prova, nonostante la diversità che caratterizza i procedimenti amministrativi nazionali, la convergenza è stimolata, da un lato, dagli strumenti europei che promuovono la libera circolazione della prova e, dall’altro, dalla tutela dei diritti fondamentali che gli Stati membri sono tenuti a rispettare. L’analisi porta a concludere che alcuni principi uniformi in tema di prova nel diritto europeo della concorrenza siano già osservati dai giudici nazionali e che un corpo di norme comuni dovrebbe essere adottato, ad integrazione della scarna disciplina della prova contenuta nel Regolamento (CE) 1/2003.

Denna uppsats undersöker tillämpningen av artikel 8 i Rådets förordning (EG) nr 1/2003 av den 16 december 2002 om tillämpning av konkurrensreglerna i artiklarna81 och 82 i fördraget (härefter ”Förordningen”). Enligt nämnda artikel får interimistiska åtgärder tillgripas för att motverka en överhängande risk för allvarlig och irreparabelskada på konkurrensen. I detta sammanhang anser Konkurrensverket att begreppetskada på konkurrensen behöver klargöras, och undrar om det kan likställas medbegreppet konkurrensskada. Därför har vi definierat begreppen i förhållande till varandra för att kunna dra slutsatser angående tillämpningen av artikel 8 i Förordningen. Vår utredning visar att konkurrensskada är ett snävt begrepp som syftar på en ren förmögenhetsskadasom drabbar individuella skadelidande på grund av en konkurrensrättsligöverträdelse. Begreppet utgår i allra högsta grad från ett individperspektiv ochkan, men behöver inte, sammanfalla med skadan som åsamkas konkurrensen, ekonomineller samhället. Skada på konkurrensen däremot, är ett allomfattande begrepp somåsyftar den allmänna skadan som åsamkas ekonomin i stort på grund av en överträdelseav konkurrensrätten. Trots att begreppet är allmänt hållet och öppet för fri tolkning av rättstillämparen, ställs specifika krav för förordnande av interimistiska åtgärder enligt artikel 8 i Förordningen, nämligen en prima facie konkurrensrättslig överträdelse som medför en risk för allvarlig och irreparabel skada på konkurrensen. Risken för att konkurrensenskadas måste preciseras på ett konkret och trovärdigt sätt och allvarlighetskravetinnebär till exempel att en konkurrent riskerar att försättas i konkurs. För attvara irreparabel får inte en skada kunna läkas av ett senare beslut av konkurrensmyndigheten. Skadan får inte heller endast vara av ekonomisk art. Slutsatsen är att det ställs höga krav för tillämpningen av artikel 8 i Förordningen,vilket kan förklara den nuvarande avsaknaden av praxis. Behovet för interimistiskaåtgärder anses dock vara stort, inte minst på grund av de långa handläggningstiderna i konkurrensmål. Därför anser vi att konkurrensmyndigheterna bör överväga att tillförordnainterimistiska åtgärder oftare, och att de kan förlita sig på den rättspraxis somfinns för att säkerställa att besluten kommer att motstå en överklagan.

Dopo 44 anni di applicazione continua delle regole di concorrenza dell'UE da parte della CGUE, la Courage Ltd contro Crehan (2001) ha riconosciuto il diritto delle persone a chiedere il risarcimento dei danni derivanti da comportamenti anticoncorrenziali. Inoltre, il regolamento n. 1/2003 ha suggerito, tra l'altro, la possibilità per le persone di chiedere il risarcimento del danno ai sensi degli articoli 101 e 102 TFUE. Da allora in poi, la Commissione si è impegnata attivamente a promuovere il dibattito ed a incoraggiare l'istituzione di un vero sistema europeo di applicazione a livello privatistico. L’adozione della Direttiva 2014/104 / UE ‘relativa a determinate norme che regolano le azioni per il risarcimento del danno ai sensi del diritto nazionale per violazioni delle disposizioni del diritto della concorrenza degli Stati membri e dell'Unione europea’ rappresenta un passo significativo verso l'armonizzazione minima delle principali norme procedurali tra gli Stati membri dell'UE. Questa tesi sostiene che il processo di integrazione europea (europeizzazione) sta spingendo gli Stati membri e i paesi candidati verso una maggiore convergenza con l'acquis sulla concorrenza dell'UE. Attraverso il recepimento della Direttiva 2014/104 / UE, gli Stati membri hanno armonizzato le norme sostanziali e procedurali che sono vantaggiose per le persone e le imprese poiché offrono una protezione minima in tutti gli Stati membri. Inoltre, è universalmente concordato, in ambito accademico, che la prospettiva dell'adesione all'UE porti a cambiamenti interni nei paesi candidati. Al momento, l'Albania è in attesa di aprire i negoziati per i capitoli dell'acquis dell'UE. A causa degli obblighi di adesione all'UE derivanti dall'accordo di stabilizzazione e di associazione, l'Albania deve recepire la direttiva 2014/104 / UE nell'ordinamento interno. La legge 9121/2003, cosi come modificata, stabilisce la possibilità per i privati di agire contro un ostacolo alla concorrenza presso il tribunale distrettuale di Tirana. L'esistenza di questo diritto potrebbe e dovrebbe essere un incentivo per incoraggiare l'applicazione a livello privatistico del diritto della concurrenza in Albania. Tuttavia, in pratica, nessun caso è stato finora citato. In questo contesto, al fine di valutare lo sviluppo dell'applicazione a livello privatistico e il suo impatto sul sistema giuridico albanese rispetto all'attuazione in alcuni Stati membri dell'UE selezionati, questa tesi affronta: in primo luogo, l'evoluzione dell'esecuzione privata a livello europeo esaminando gli obiettivi, le modalità e gli attori che hanno contribuito allo sviluppo dell'applicazione privata; in secondo luogo, la tesi analizza la Direttiva 2014/104 / UE e il modo in cui i tre Stati membri dell'UE selezionati hanno recepito la direttiva nel loro ordinamento giuridico nazionale considerando il margine di discrezionalità creato dall'articolo 288 TFUE e un livello minimo di armonizzazione stabilito dalla Direttiva; in terzo luogo, la tesi fornisce uno sviluppo storico dell'applicazione a livello privatistico in Albania e il modo in cui l'autorità albanese della concorrenza ha affrontato il recepimento della Direttiva 2014/104 / UE. La tesi conclude che l'applicazione a livello privatistico dell'UE del diritto della concorrenza è lontana dall' essere completata. Sono necessarie misure più decisive a livello dell'UE per le questioni che rientrano nel sistema giuridico nazionale degli Stati membri dell'UE. Inoltre, l'Albania, in quanto paese candidato, dovrebbe recepire correttamente la Direttiva 2004/104 / UE e, soprattutto, sensibilizzare l'opinione pubblica sulla cultura dell'applicazione a livello privatistico
After CJEU’s 44 years of continuous application of the EU competition rules, the Courage Ltd v Crehan (2001) recognised the right of the individuals to claim compensation for damages resulting from anti-competitive behavior. Furthermore, Regulation 1/2003 suggested, inter alia, the possibility of the individuals to claim compensation for damages according to the infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. From then on, the Commission has been actively committed to foster the debate and encourage the establishment of a genuine European private enforcement system. The adoption of the Directive 2014/104/EU ‘On certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and the European Union’ represents a significant step towards the minimum harmonisation of the key substantive and procedural rules among the EU Member States. This thesis argues that the European integration process (Europeanisation) is pushing the Member States and candidate countries towards a greater convergence with the EU competition acquis. Through the transposition of the Directive 2014/104/EU, the Member States have harmonised substantive and procedural rules which is beneficial to individuals and enterprises because it provides a minimum protection across all Member States. In addition, it is commonly agreed, in academia, that the prospect of the EU membership brings domestic changes in the candidate countries. At the moment, Albania is waiting to open the negotiations for the chapters of the EU acquis. Due to the EU membership obligations stemming from the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, Albania has to transpose the Directive 2014/104/EU into the domestic legal system. Law 9121/2003, as amended, sets out the possibility of private persons taking action against an obstacle to competition in the District Court of Tirana. The existence of this right could and should be an incentive to encourage private enforcement in Albania. However, in practice, no case has been referred to so far. In this context, in order to assess the development of private enforcement and its impact on the Albanian legal system compared with the implementation in some selected EU Member States, this thesis addresses: firstly, the evolution of private enforcement at European level by examining the objectives, modalities, and actors that contributed to the development of private enforcement; secondly, the thesis analyses the Directive 2014/104/EU and how the three selected EU Member States have transposed the directive into their domestic legal system considering the discretion margin left by Article 288 TFEU and a minimum harmonisation level set out by the directive; thirdly, the thesis provides a historical development of private enforcement in Albania and how the Albanian Competition Authority addressed the transposition of the Directive 2014/104/EU. The thesis concludes that the EU private enforcement of competition law is far from being completed. More decisive steps are required to be taken at the EU level for issues that fall under the national legal system of EU Member States. Moreover, Albania, as a candidate country, should properly transpose the Directive 2004/104/EU and, most importantly, raise the awareness of the private enforcement culture.

Il s'agira de démontrer dans quelle mesure les réformes récentes relatives à l'action en réparation du dommage résultant de pratiques anticoncurrentielles influencent la stratégie de l'entreprise. Outre les stratégies destinées à contenir ce risque nouveau, cette dernière pourrait également tirer parti du contentieux privé afin d'améliorer ses performances sur le marché
Following the recent reforms regarding anticompetitive practices private enforcement, my research aims at studying the influence of these new rules on companies' legal strategies. If companies will have to adapt their strategy to avoid legal exposure, they can also use those very same rules as a tool to improve their performance

L’actualisation des données sur le contentieux privé des pratiques anticoncurrentielles fait naître laconviction que l’état de sous-développement souvent pointé est aujourd’hui dépassé. Les statistiquessont nettes : des dizaines d’affaires sont plaidées chaque année. Toutefois, ce contentieux s’esquissesous des traits qui ne sont pas exactement ceux du contentieux indemnitaire de masse faisant suite àla commission d’ententes internationales. C’est un fait majeur qui doit être noté car l’essentiel desprojets de réforme furent bâtis sur cet idéal type. Trois des caractères les plus saillants de la réalitéjudiciaire témoignent de cette fracture entre droit positif et droit prospectif. D’abord, le contentieuxprivé est majoritairement un contentieux contractuel entre professionnels aux forces déséquilibrées. Ensuite, c’estun contentieux national – voire local – plus qu’un contentieux international. Enfin, c’est plutôt uncontentieux autonome se déployant devant les juridictions judiciaires sans procédure préalable oupostérieure des autorités de concurrence (stand alone). Paradoxalement, les actions complémentaires(follow-on), pourtant réputées d’une mise en oeuvre aisée, sont plus rares. Ces observations invitentalors à réviser l’ordre des priorités de toute réflexion prospective. Ainsi, la lutte contre l’asymétried’informations et de moyens entre litigants, l’essor de sanctions contractuelles efficaces, larecomposition du rôle des autorités juridictionnelles et administratives dans le procès civil ou encorele développement des procédures de référé s’imposent avec urgence. Mais s’il paraît légitime desoutenir ce contentieux autonome déjà existant, il n’en reste pas moins utile de participer à laréflexion déjà amorcée pour développer le contentieux indemnitaire de masse tant attendu et dont onne peut négliger les atouts. De lege ferenda, le contentieux privé de demain présenterait donc uncaractère bicéphale ; il serait à la fois autonome et complémentaire. Il faut alors tenter de concevoir unrégime efficace pour ces deux moutures du contentieux privé en tenant compte de leurs exigencesrespectives. Or l’analyse positive et prospective de leurs fonctions révèlent que contentieuxautonome et contentieux complémentaire s’illustrent autant par les fonctions qu’ils partagent que parcelles qui les distinguent. Il serait donc excessif de vouloir en tous points leur faire application derègles particulières ou, à l’inverse, de règles identiques. C’est donc vers l’élaboration d’un régime commun complété par un régime particulier à chacun d’eux que s’orientera la présente recherche.PREMIÈRE PARTIE. Le régime commun aux contentieux privés autonome et complémentaireSECONDE PARTIE. Le régime particulier à chacun des contentieux privés autonome et complémentaire
Pas de résumé en anglais

Notre étude a pour objectif d'une part de comprendre pourquoi dans notre système juridique, certaines fautes peuvent profiter à leur auteur et d'autre part de les empêcher. Pour ce faire, dans une première partie, nous qualifierons la faute lucrative. Cette étape de qualification nous permettra de mettre en lumière l'unité de la notion de faute lucrative, en dépit de sa diversité de visages ; unité reposant sur des caractéristiques qui lui sont propres. A travers l'examen de chaque composante de la faute lucrative, nous mettrons en exergue les failles du Droit qui alimentent les stratégies spéculatives sur la violation de la règle de droit. La diversité de l'élément légal nous amènera à ausculter différentes disciplines du droit privé, dont principalement le droit pénal, le droit de la concurrence et le droit de la responsabilité civile. Les insuffisances de chacune de ces disciplines nous conduiront à proposer la reconnaissance par le Droit, de la faute lucrative, dans toute son singularité afin d'en ajuster le régime. Cette consécration en droit positif s'effectuera par la création d'une nouvelle circonstance aggravante, le dol lucratif, en droit répressif et l'assimilation de la faute lucrative à la faute intentionnelle ou dolosive en droit de la responsabilité civile. Cette réception de la faute lucrative en Droit justifiera l'élaboration d'un régime adéquat à la faute lucrative, poursuivant un objectif de dissuasion. Dans une seconde partie, nous proposerons donc un régime dissuasif, conçu à la lumière de la théorie économique de la dissuasion. Ce dernier reposera sur des modalités substantielles et procédurales, garantissant à la fois l'efficacité et l'effectivité de la sanction dissuasive. Au titre des premières, il s'agira d'augmenter le quantum chiffrable de la sanction, afin qu'il devienne au moins égal au profit illicite. Mais pas seulement : il s'agira également d'aggraver le quantum non chiffrable de la sanction, de sorte que le coût d'une faute ne puisse pas être intégralement anticipé, maîtrisé par les opérateurs économiques. Inévitablement, l'objectif de dissuasion des sanctions aura pour effet d'aggraver la responsabilité de l'auteur d'une faute lucrative. Aussi les modalités confiscatoires et dissuasives devront être passées au crible de la qualification de sanction répressive. Il en résultera une distinction nette entre le champ de la dissuasion et celui de la répression, le premier étant plus large que le second. Une sanction civile non répressive, simplement normative pouvant donc être dissuasive. Notre thèse a donc pour objectif de proposer une méthode de traitement des fautes lucratives afin de renverser le rapport coût-avantage d'une violation de l'ordre public
Under french law, some faults can provide to their author more than the fault costs to them. In others words, some faults can procure an illegal profit because Law doesn't confiscate it or not efficiently. For example, it can be a cartel on prices, a violation of private life by a paparazzi magazine, or a fraud on consumer goods.... The aim of our thesis is twice. Fistly, we will try to understand why such behaviour is possible : what is the legal classification stage, after which we will propose a definition of lucrative fault in tort law, criminal law and competition law. Secondly, we are going to suggest a legal processing, method to deter this misbehaviour, what is the second step of our demonstration. Thus, in support of the economic model of deterrence by Gary Becker, we will determinate the conditions of effectiveness of a public punishment and of a private punishment. Among them, we will make the difference between the choice of the punishment and the probability of being decided

Le Livre Vert et le Livre Blanc de la Commission Européenne sur les actions en dommages-intérêts en cas d'infraction au droit communautaire de la concurrence ont constaté « le sous-développement total » de l'action en réparation des infractions au droit de la concurrence et proposé certaines réformes afin de remédier aux obstacles identifiés. L'étude empirique remet toutefois partiellement en cause ce constat, car il convient de distinguer réparation des concurrents (contentieux horizontal) et réparation des consommateurs (contentieux collectif). Les actions en réparation du préjudice d'éviction engagées entre concurrents apparaissent raisonnablement efficaces. Elles donnent lieu assez fréquemment à des décisions favorables et le montant des dommages-intérêts alloués est parfois significatif. Ainsi, les réformes proposées en matière probatoire pour l'accès aux documents n'apporteraient aucun progrès sensible, pas plus que l'adoption d'un instrument non-contraignant sur la quantification du préjudice. En revanche, les actions en réparation du préjudice de surcoût engagées par les acheteurs directs ou indirects paraissent vouées à l'échec dans le cadre actuel de la responsabilité civile, en l'absence de mécanisme de recours collectif et de distribution efficaces. La réflexion engagée au niveau national et européen ne paraît guère pouvoir contourner l’obstacle de la distribution massive de dommages-intérêts diffus, et les options envisagées ne semblent guère convaincantes. Il est donc proposé alternativement au bénéfice des consommateurs, un mécanisme public de recours collectif, confié aux autorités de concurrence nationales et à la Commission européenne. Cette réforme peut être engagée à droit constant dans le cadre des pouvoirs existants de la Commission européenne et de l'Autorité de la concurrence. Il conviendrait à cet effet de réviser la politique d’amende afin de sanctionner le défaut d’indemnisation des consommateurs, et d’affecter une partie du produit des amendes à des mesures de réparation directes ou indirectes, pécuniaires ou en nature, des consommateurs affectés par l’infraction
The Green Paper and the White Paper on damages actions for breach of EU competition law found private antitrust enforcement in a state of “total underdevelopment” and proposed reforms to adress the identified obstacles. Empirical study of french case law does not support entirely these findings, because it’s important to distinguish between actions brought against competitors, and actions brought by consumers. Exclusionary practices litigated between competitors show reasonable success compared to similar cases. The reforms proposed by the European Commission concerning access to documents and quantification of damages would not bring any significant improvement to french law. However, damages actions in compensation of overcharges brought by direct and indirect purchasers seem doomed to failure, in the absence of a collective action and distribution mechanism. Debate is storming at EU and national level, but the considered options appear unconvincing. It is proposed a public mechanism for collective redress. Within their existing powers, competition authorities should review the fine policy to achieve collective compensation as private penalty. Substantial amount of fines should be inflicted when infringers cannot show they have taken active steps to provide compensation to consumers. In that case, a partial amount of the total fine should be dedicated to compensate consumer, directly or indirectly, in pecuniary or non-pecuniary form. Competition authorities should have the power to order infringers to create trust funds for that purpose

Notre étude cherche à démontrer pourquoi les agents économiques sont incités à enfreindre le droit de la concurrence. Le choix de l’infraction dépend de l’avantage retiré du manquement comparé au coût subi. La notion de « faute lucrative » illustre parfaitement l’espoir d’un lucre tiré du manquement à la loi. L’économie comportementale nous enseigne cependant que les déterminants de la conformité au droit sont autres que la recherche du profit. Selon cette discipline, l’incitation – c’est-à-dire la motivation principale de l’agent qui fait le choix d’enfreindre la loi – est détachée d’un calcul coût-avantage. L’agent économique est sujet à des « biais cognitifs » : le défaut d’information disponible ne lui permet pas de faire toujours le choix susceptible de maximiser son intérêt. Appliquée au droit de la concurrence, la théorie de l’agent rationnel, fût-elle critiquable, reste néanmoins la plus pertinente pour examiner la dissuasion car elle permet de comparer la règle de droit à un « prix » qui pèse sur le choix d’enfreindre la loi. L’influence des règles juridiques comme un ensemble de normes incitatives ou dissuasives qui influencent le comportement des agents sur le marché est moins pris en compte par l’économie comportementale qui se concentre davantage sur les biais cognitifs des agents.L'agent économique rationnel qui entend retirer un profit de son manquement peut spéculer sur les multiples failles propres au droit de la concurrence, lesquelles affaiblissent le risque juridique de l’infraction. Deux limites fondamentales affectent la dissuasion : d’une part, celles relatives à l’effectivité des règles de concurrence. La probabilité, pour le fautif, d’échapper à l’application du droit génère des infractions « rentables ». D’autre part, celles relatives à l’efficacité des règles de concurrence favorisent aussi la conservation des gains illicites retirés du manquement, car la sanction imposée par le déclenchement de l’action publique et/ou privée n’est pas adaptée à la dissuasion du comportement déviant.Ces limites concernent aussi bien l’application de l’action publique que l’application de l’action privée en réparation. La fonction dissuasive du « private enforcement » est limitée en l’absence de dommages-intérêts confiscatoires. De même, les vices congénitaux à la loi Hamon paralysent la portée dissuasive de l’action de groupe. S’agissant de l’action publique, le développement des ententes algorithmiques et la spécificité des marchés numériques compliquent le travail de détection des autorités de concurrence. Même en cas de détection, la sanction appliquée à l’agent économique semble sous-dissuasive car, comme le démontre notre étude empirique, l’amende et/ou les dommages-intérêts imposés sont souvent inférieurs aux gains retirés des infractions de concurrence.Par ailleurs, le faible risque pénal pesant sur les dirigeants responsables de pratiques illicites affaiblit la dissuasion, car ceux-ci forment aussi des calculs sur l’avantage qu’ils ont personnellement à tirer du manquement à la loi. Il ressort de nos travaux que la création d’un test de légitimité de l’emprisonnement permet de répondre à la question de savoir, pour chaque type d’infraction de concurrence, si la prison est ou non une peine légitime.En somme, l’étude propose la construction d’un régime dissuasif par étapes, visant à renforcer à la fois l’effectivité et l’efficacité des règles de concurrence. Considérant que l’agent économique opère des prédictions sur le droit applicable, il faut non seulement faire en sorte que le droit de la concurrence s’applique effectivement, c’est-à-dire que le contrevenant soit confronté aux coûts de sa violation, mais efficacement, ce qui signifie que le coût du manquement doit être supérieur à son éventuel bénéfice
This study explores the reasons why economic agents are likely to break the rules of competition law. This paper demonstrates that main reasons are related to a cost-benefit calculation, also known as the concept of “lucrative infringement”. Our results are conflicting with the findings of behavioural economics, which reject the theory of cost-benefit calculations incentives and argues that economic agents are subject to “cognitive biases”. However, the theory of the rational agent, despite its limitations, remains the most relevant for assessing the competition law ability to deter anticompetitive practices because it compares the rule of law to a "price" that weighs on the choice to break the law. The influence of legal rules as a set of incentive or deterrent norms that influences agents' behaviour on the market is less considered by behavioural economics that focuses more on agents' cognitive biases.Economic agents are rational and look for a “lucrative infringement”. They speculate on the multiple loopholes of competition law, which weakens the legal risk of the infringement. In this regard, two fundamental limits affect deterrence: on the one hand, the low probability of getting caught which generates “lucrative faults,” and on the other hand, the retention of all unlawful gains derived from the infringement.These limits concern both the application of public and private enforcement. First, the dissuasive function of "private enforcement" is limited by the absence of confiscatory damages. Similarly, the restrictive standard of proof to admit a collective class action hinders its dissuasive nature. When it comes to enforcement, the development of algorithmic cartels and the specificity of digital markets reduce competition authorities’ ability to detect illegal practices. Even when they manage to detect such practices, the sanction applied to the economic agent seems under-dissuasive. As our empirical study shows, fines and/or compensatory damages imposed are often lower than the benefit derived from the infringement.In addition, deterrence is weakened by the absence of criminal punishments for business leaders who have coordinated anticompetitive practices. This study demonstrates that they also make calculations about the benefit they may derive from violating the law. Our study develops a “legitimacy test of imprisonment” to provide an answer to the question of when imprisonment is a legitimate penalty.This study builds a step-by-step deterrent legal regime to daunt anticompetitive practices. Deterrence requires a twofold analysis on the application of competition law and the adequacy of sanctions to deter anticompetitive conducts. It is necessary not only to make competition law effective, i.e. that no infringer can escape with the costs of its violation, but also – to achieve an adequate level of deterrence – that fines and/or compensatory damages exceed any potential gains that may be expected from the infringement

Повредом права конкуренције Европске уније (ЕУ) наноси се, по правилу, штета великом броју лица. Тиме се угрожава остваривање не само општих или јавних интереса, већ се угрожавају и интереси и права појединаца. Међутим, у праву ЕУ је дуго времена након оснивања Европске економске заједнице (ЕЕЗ) основна пажња била посвећена заштити јавних интереса, чему је био подешен и механизам јавно-правне или административне заштите, као и висина и карактер санкција. Из тих разлога су све до последњих деценија и теоријска истраживања углавном била усмерена на анализу дејства јавно-правне примене прописа о конкуренцији на непосредне учеснике на тржишту. Имајући то у виду, предмет овог рада је усмерен на други аспект заштите која се остварује у поступку приватно-правне примене, у коме накнада штете представља грађанско правну санкцију због повреде ЕУ права конкуренције.Тема је подједнако значајна у практичном и у теоријском смислу. У практичном смислу, јер се повредом правила о заштити конкуренције угрожава успостављање и несметано функционисање унутрашњег тржишта, као општег циља оснивања ЕЕЗ/ЕУ. Са аспекта интереса појединаца, њима се онемогућава да користе погодности таквог тржишта на коме би према правилима слободне конкуренције и закона понуде и тражње, остали само најуспешнији, са најбољом робом и услугама. Будући да се не могу спречити повреде конкуренције, у раду су анализиране превентивне и компензаторне мере заштите. У случају повреде јавних интереса, то се остварује високим казнама и заштитним мерама. У случају повреде индивидуалних интереса, оштећеним појединцима је признато право на потпуну накнаду настале штете.У теоријском смислу, питање накнаде штете је у ЕУ крајем деведесетих година прошлог века анализирано и у контексту отклањања демократског дефицита у склопу "конституционалазације и легитимизације" ЕЗ/ЕУ, кад су у центар интересовања постављени интереси појединаца и заштита њихових субјективних права пред националним судовима држава чланица. Разумевање овог процеса подразумева налажење одговора на питање да ли Уговор о функционисањуЕвропске уније (УФЕУ), као врста вишестраног међународног уговора, ствара субјективна права на која се непосредно могу позивати појединци и тражити њихову заштиту пред националним судовима. У питању је дејство одредби чланова 101. и 102. УФЕУ, којима су забрањени рестриктивни споразуми и злоупотреба доминантног положаја учесника на тржишту. Питање је важно јер се забраном закључивања рестриктивних споразума и санкционисањем понашања на тржишту које се сматра злоупотребом доминантног положаја у значајној мери ограничава дејство општепризнатог начела аутономије воље привредних субјеката и начело предузетништва.Како тзв. "неведљива рука тржишта" није у стању да омогући адекватну заштиту и јавноправних и приватноправних интереса, као и да није могуће спречити закључивање рестриктивних споразума, у раду се полази од тезе да држава има тзв. "регулаторну одговорност" да појединцима омоогући остваривање права на накнаду штете, као неотуђиво субјективно право. Признање оваквог субјективног права је образложено садржином и карактером посебних начела права ЕУ, као што је начело директног дејства и начело делотворне примене. Кандидат се залаже да се у складу са начелом делотворне примене у државама чланицама успостави механизам колективне заштите индивидуалних интереса путем репрезентативних тужби по opt-out моделу.У раду су наведена питања анализирана у три дела, који су насловљени као: општа разматрања, садржина и природа права на накнаду штете и поступак остваривања права на накнаду
Povredom prava konkurencije Evropske unije (EU) nanosi se, po pravilu, šteta velikom broju lica. Time se ugrožava ostvarivanje ne samo opštih ili javnih interesa, već se ugrožavaju i interesi i prava pojedinaca. Međutim, u pravu EU je dugo vremena nakon osnivanja Evropske ekonomske zajednice (EEZ) osnovna pažnja bila posvećena zaštiti javnih interesa, čemu je bio podešen i mehanizam javno-pravne ili administrativne zaštite, kao i visina i karakter sankcija. Iz tih razloga su sve do poslednjih decenija i teorijska istraživanja uglavnom bila usmerena na analizu dejstva javno-pravne primene propisa o konkurenciji na neposredne učesnike na tržištu. Imajući to u vidu, predmet ovog rada je usmeren na drugi aspekt zaštite koja se ostvaruje u postupku privatno-pravne primene, u kome naknada štete predstavlja građansko pravnu sankciju zbog povrede EU prava konkurencije.Tema je podjednako značajna u praktičnom i u teorijskom smislu. U praktičnom smislu, jer se povredom pravila o zaštiti konkurencije ugrožava uspostavljanje i nesmetano funkcionisanje unutrašnjeg tržišta, kao opšteg cilja osnivanja EEZ/EU. Sa aspekta interesa pojedinaca, njima se onemogućava da koriste pogodnosti takvog tržišta na kome bi prema pravilima slobodne konkurencije i zakona ponude i tražnje, ostali samo najuspešniji, sa najboljom robom i uslugama. Budući da se ne mogu sprečiti povrede konkurencije, u radu su analizirane preventivne i kompenzatorne mere zaštite. U slučaju povrede javnih interesa, to se ostvaruje visokim kaznama i zaštitnim merama. U slučaju povrede individualnih interesa, oštećenim pojedincima je priznato pravo na potpunu naknadu nastale štete.U teorijskom smislu, pitanje naknade štete je u EU krajem devedesetih godina prošlog veka analizirano i u kontekstu otklanjanja demokratskog deficita u sklopu "konstitucionalazacije i legitimizacije" EZ/EU, kad su u centar interesovanja postavljeni interesi pojedinaca i zaštita njihovih subjektivnih prava pred nacionalnim sudovima država članica. Razumevanje ovog procesa podrazumeva nalaženje odgovora na pitanje da li Ugovor o funkcionisanjuEvropske unije (UFEU), kao vrsta višestranog međunarodnog ugovora, stvara subjektivna prava na koja se neposredno mogu pozivati pojedinci i tražiti njihovu zaštitu pred nacionalnim sudovima. U pitanju je dejstvo odredbi članova 101. i 102. UFEU, kojima su zabranjeni restriktivni sporazumi i zloupotreba dominantnog položaja učesnika na tržištu. Pitanje je važno jer se zabranom zaključivanja restriktivnih sporazuma i sankcionisanjem ponašanja na tržištu koje se smatra zloupotrebom dominantnog položaja u značajnoj meri ograničava dejstvo opštepriznatog načela autonomije volje privrednih subjekata i načelo preduzetništva.Kako tzv. "nevedljiva ruka tržišta" nije u stanju da omogući adekvatnu zaštitu i javnopravnih i privatnopravnih interesa, kao i da nije moguće sprečiti zaključivanje restriktivnih sporazuma, u radu se polazi od teze da država ima tzv. "regulatornu odgovornost" da pojedincima omoogući ostvarivanje prava na naknadu štete, kao neotuđivo subjektivno pravo. Priznanje ovakvog subjektivnog prava je obrazloženo sadržinom i karakterom posebnih načela prava EU, kao što je načelo direktnog dejstva i načelo delotvorne primene. Kandidat se zalaže da se u skladu sa načelom delotvorne primene u državama članicama uspostavi mehanizam kolektivne zaštite individualnih interesa putem reprezentativnih tužbi po opt-out modelu.U radu su navedena pitanja analizirana u tri dela, koji su naslovljeni kao: opšta razmatranja, sadržina i priroda prava na naknadu štete i postupak ostvarivanja prava na naknadu
Violation of the EU competition law makes damage to a large number of persons: direct competitors, customers and end-users of services. This endangers the implementation of not only public interests, but also the interests and subjective rights of individuals. However, long after the founding of the EEC, community law focused on the protection of public interests, to which the mechanism of public law or administrative enforcement, as well as the amount and character of the sanction, was adjusted. For these reasons, until the last decades, theoretical research mainly focused on analysing the effects of public law enforcement on the immediate participants in the market as well. Therefore, the subject of this paper is focused on another aspect, the so-called private enforcement, whose part is the right to compensation of damages as a civil law sanction for violation of the EU competition law.The subject is equally important in practical and theoretical sense. Practical importance is reflected in the fact that by violating the rules on the protection of competition, damage is caused to a large number of participants on the market, thus jeopardizing the achievement of both general and individual goals. As a general economic objective in the EC/EU Treaties, proclaim the establishment of an internal market. On the other hand, individuals want to make full use of the benefits of such a market in which, according to the rules of free competition and rules of supply and demand, only the most successful, with the best goods and services, would remain. Practice, however, has shown that market participants often violate competition rules and thus the question is raised of how to eliminate the harmful consequences of the violation in the best possible way. When it comes to public interests, this is achieved through high penalties and protective measures, which are decided by the European Commission and national regulatory bodies. In the event of a violation of individual interests, this can be achieved by recognition of the full compensation of damages.The issue of compensation for damages in the EU was set in parallel with the elimination of the democratic deficit and in the context of the "institutionalization and legitimization" of the EC/EU in the late 1990s, when the interests of individuals and the protection of their subjective rights were placed before the national courts of the member states.Understanding of this process implies finding the answer to the question of whether the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as a type of multilateral international treaty, creates subjective rights to which individuals can directly refer and request their protection before national courts.These are the provisions of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU that regulate the issue of restrictive agreements and the dominant position of participants in the market by banning and automatically considering null and void the first ones, while the abuse of a dominant position is considered prohibited and punishable. The prohibition of the conclusion of restrictive agreements and the sanctioning of market behaviour which is considered to be the abuse of a dominant position is significantly limited to the generally accepted principle of autonomy of the will of business entities and the raight of establishement.Since it is impossible to prevent the conclusion of restrictive (cartel) agreements, the solution was found in the recognition of the right to compensation as one of the inalienable subjective rights belonging to individuals. The recognition of this subjective right, due to the particular and dual nature of EU law, as supranational and national, is explained by the new principles of EU law, such as the principle of direct effect and the principle of effectiveness. The principle of effectiveness will also serve as a theoretical basis for establishing the principles of procedural autonomy, as a legal framework for judicial protection.The author analyses the subject issues in three parts, which are addressed as: general considerations, content and nature of the right to compensation of damage and the procedure for enforcement the right to compensation. The paper starts from the thesis that the public law and private law enforcement of the EU competition law are complementary and that the compensation of damages should be implemented not only in individual lawsuits, but also by introducing collective redress mechanism for the protection of collective interests.

La régulation de la concurrence est dualiste en France et au Canada. D’un côté, des autorités publiques de régulation encadrent le marché et sanctionnent le cas échéant les pratiques contraires aux dispositions législatives en vigueur, et, d’un autre côté, les victimes de pratiques anticoncurrentielles, c'est-à-dire les consommateurs et les entreprises, peuvent intenter des poursuites privées sur le fondement d’une action en responsabilité civile afin d’obtenir la réparation du préjudice concurrentiel subi. Il s’agit respectivement de l’action publique et de l’action privée en matière de concurrence, qualifiées aussi de public enforcement et de private enforcement du droit de la concurrence. Cependant, dans l’Union européenne, et en France particulièrement, le préjudice concurrentiel reste sans réparation effective. En effet, en France, les consommateurs n’avaient pas, jusqu’à l’adoption de l’action de groupe, de moyen procédural d’accéder au juge de la réparation. De plus, le droit civil français se montre trop rigide pour permettre l’indemnisation d’un préjudice économique aussi complexe que le préjudice concurrentiel. Pour alimenter sa réflexion à ce sujet, le législateur français s’est souvent tourné vers les modèles canadien et québécois pour réformer son droit civil bicentenaire. En effet, le droit civil québécois se montre particulièrement souple dans les litiges liés au droit de la concurrence. De plus, la Loi sur la concurrence canadienne offre un droit à réparation adapté aux contraintes des victimes de pratiques anticoncurrentielles. L’auteur a ainsi cherché à comprendre comment fonctionne le mécanisme canadien de private enforcement pour évaluer si ce modèle, par le truchement du droit civil québécois, pourrait inspirer une réforme du modèle civiliste français adopté par le législateur notamment lors de l’introduction de l’action de groupe. L’analyse se situe principalement en droit civil pour permettre une lecture de l’action privée qui s’éloigne des stéréotypes classiques tirés de l’expérience américaine dans ce domaine. L’objectif ultime de cette comparaison est de rendre effectif le recours privé des entreprises et des consommateurs en droits français et canadien à la suite d’un préjudice découlant d’une violation du droit des pratiques anticoncurrentielles
Regulation of competition is dualistic in France and Canada. On one side, public authority frame the market and impose sanction, if appropriate, to the practices contrary to existing legislation, and, on other side, the victims injured by antitrust practices, that is consumers and company, may bring a private procecussion based on the liability to obtain a compensation for the antitrust injury. They are respectively of public action and private action, also referred to as public enforcement and private enforcement of competition law. However, in the European Union, and particularly in France, the antitrust harm has no effective remedy. Indeed, in France, consumers had not, until the adoption of the collective redress, procedural means to access the judge of compensation. In addition, the French civil law proves too rigid to allow compensation for something as complex as the competitive harm. For its thinking about it, the French legislator has often turned to the Canadian and Quebec models to reform its bicentenary civil law. Indeed, the Quebec civil law is particularly flexible in disputes related to competition law. In addition, the Canadian Competition Act provides a right to compensation adapted to the constraints of the victims of anticompetitive practices. The author has sought to understand how the Canadian private enforcement mechanism works to assess whether this model, through the Quebec civil law, could inspire a reform of French civil law model adopted by the legislature in particular during the introduction of collective redress. The analysis is primarily civil law to allow a reading of private action that departs from conventional stereotypes of the American experience in this field. The ultimate goal of this comparison is to make effective use of the private businesses and consumers in French and Canadian rights following an injury resulting from a violation of anti-competitive practices

Private enforcement follow-on actions may discourage cartel members from applying to leniency. To prevent the undermining of this public enforcement tool, it is necessary to find a proper articulation between damages actions and leniency programmes. This paper investigates, in light of the Damages Directive on actions for damages for infringements of competition law, what can be expected from the new framework for the disclosure of evidence and, particularly, from the application of Article’s 6(4) proportionality test to decide the disclosure of leniency documets. It starts off by analysing the state of the art before 2015 and continues to assess the novelties in disclosure of evidence brought by the Directive. It will evaluate the changes on access to leniency material under Portuguese Law, by examining the current Portuguese competition law and the Portuguese Private Damages Act, and the effect it can have in this Member State’s legal system. This paper further examines the principles which should be considered by national judges when striking the proportionality test, comparing European fundamental rights with the principles found in rulings from the Court of Justice of the European Union. This contribution will result in a suggestion of some criteria to be considered by national civil courts when determining third party access to leniency documents.

Com a recente Proposta de Diretiva relativa a certas regras que regem as ações de indemnização antitrust, a regra de Courage e Manfredi, que reconhece o direito à reparação a qualquer lesado, é expressamente consagrada e é introduzido o mecanismo da defesa baseada na repercussão. Este estudo pretende, à luz da Proposta, analisar este mecanismo no âmbito do nosso ordenamento jurídico.
With the recent proposal for a Directive on certain rules governing antitrust damages actions, the rule of Courage and Manfredi, which recognizes full compensation to any injured person, is expressly recognized and the passing-on defence mechanism is introduced. This study aims, in light of the proposal, to analyse this mechanism in our legal system.

La tesi affronta le peculiarità del rimedio risarcitorio a tutela della concorrenza nel sistema della responsabilità civile. Si ripercorre l'evoluzione giurisprudenziale e normativa del private enforcement nell'ordinamento dell'UE sino alla Direttiva 2014/104/UE, evidenziandone le caratteristiche rispetto al modello americano. Il bene protetto, la concorrenza, quale interesse generale e l'illecito concorrenziale, intangibile e plurioffensivo rendono sovrapponibili i confini tra la funzione compensativa e quella afflittivo-deterrente proprie della responsabilità civile.

V ANGLICKÉM JAZYCE Private-law consequences of a breach of competition law and their enforcement in the Czech Republic The private-law consequences of a breach of competition law, Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU and Sections 3 and 11 of the Czech Competition Act, may affect many entities, irrespective of whether they are competitors or consumers. Recently, emphasis has been placed on private enforcement of competition law that is intended to serve as an important complement to public law enforcement. The first part of the dissertation defines basic concepts and principles of competition law including "public rules on restriction of competition". The history of the enforcement of competition law in the Czech Republic and the dynamic development in this area at the EU level are outlined in the second part. The third crucial part of this work deals with the right to damages caused by a breach of competition law in the Czech Republic. In 2014, the EU adopted Directive 2014/104 on certain rules in damages actions with the view, inter alia, to increase the effectiveness of private enforcement of competition rules by civil courts of EU Member States. On August 18, 2017, new Act No. 262/2017 Coll. which implements the Directive into Czech law was adopted. The dissertation...

Award date: 30 November 2016
Supervisor: Giorgio Monti
The European enforcement landscape is undergoing significant changes that are leading to a departure from the actors, tools and processes traditionally associated with delivering justice. This thesis examines these themes while developing a solution to the private enforcement gap that continues to leave a large number of victims without a remedy, particularly if they have suffered low-value individual harm as a result of competition infringements. In order to ensure that the private enforcement of EU competition law leads to the effective enforcement of EU rights and to the full compensation of all victims, a collective redress device must be developed. In particular, this thesis will explore whether optimal private enforcement outcomes could be achieved through the integration of collective alternative dispute resolution (‘collective ADR’) into a regulatory enforcement architecture as a first choice redress avenue. To date, the use of collective ADR as a private enforcement mechanism has not been considered as a serious policy option on the European level. While this thesis focuses on the use of collective ADR in the context of competition enforcement, it also confronts issues that could be expanded to private enforcement in other fields. Ultimately, the enforcement toolbox should be diversified not only to ensure the successful fulfilment of the regulatory goals, but also to facilitate the transformations that are occurring in the enforcement landscape more broadly.

La tesi ha ad oggetto la Direttiva 2014/104/UE sul private antitrust enforcement e si divide in due parti: la prima si concentra sulla genesi ed evoluzione del private antitrust enforcement; la seconda, invece, si articola in tre capitoli e tende ad analizzare tre diversi profili critici della Direttiva. In particolare, si procede innanzitutto ad un’analisi sulla funzione del risarcimento del danno e si affronta la questione relativa al divieto di risarcimenti punitivi nel private antitrust enforcement; si approfondisce, poi, il discorso legato all’accesso alle prove nel procedimento relativo all’azione di risarcimento del danno antitrust; infine, si affronta la delicata questione concernente l’effetto delle decisioni delle Autorità di concorrenza e dei giudici del ricorso nei confronti dei giudici nazionali chiamati ad esprimersi sul risarcimento del danno antitrust. Ciascuno di questi tre capitoli si divide a sua volta in tre parti: la prima si sofferma sulla dimensione sovranazionale, la seconda su quella nazionale e la terza contiene delle riflessioni aventi ad oggetto possibili modifiche della Direttiva che potrebbero migliorare il sistema di antitrust enforcement, svolte in vista del riesame che la Commissione europea dovrà effettuare – a norma dell’articolo 20 della Direttiva stessa – e della presentazione della relazione al Parlamento europeo ed al Consiglio entro il 27 dicembre 2020.

Defence date: 12 January 2007
Examining Board: Prof. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann (Supervisor, European University Institute) ; Prof. Laurence Idot (Ext. co-supervisor, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne) ; Sir Francis Jacobs (King's College London) ; Prof. Christian Joerges (European University Institute)
First made available online 11 September 2018
This dissertation, written by an academic-cum-practitioner with substantial experience in the field of antitrust enforcement, presents the rise of private enforcement of competition law in Europe, especially in the context of the recent modernisation and decentralisation of EC competition law enforcement. In particular, the study examines the role of courts in the application of the EC competition rules and views that role in the broader system of antitrust enforcement. The author starts from the premise of private enforcement's independence of public enforcement and after examining the new institutional position of national courts and their relationship with the Court of Justice, the Commission, and public enforcement in general, proceeds to deal with the detailed substantive and procedural law framework of private antitrust actions in Europe. The author describes the current post-decentralisation state of affairs but also refers to the latest proposals to enhance private antitrust enforcement in Europe both at the Community level, where reference is made to the December 2005 Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions and its aftermath, and at the national level, where reference is made to recent and forthcoming relevant initiatives.

(English) Regulation of damages in the field of competition law in Czech and French law with regard to European regulation The purpose of this thesis is to analyze particular elements of actions for damages for infringements of the competition law, mainly those, which are contained in the Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union. Given that a directive is source of law sui generis that needs to be transposed into national legislations, it seems convenient to attempt to illustrate its effects on particular national legislations. The paper deals with actual states of legislation in the Czech republic and in France and attempts firstly to discover existing elements of the legislation and secondly on the other hand to indicate some missing or problematic parts. The thesis is, besides introduction and conclusion, composed of five main chapters. Chapter two observes the conception and evolution of the competition law in the European Union and particularly the origin of thoughts about private enforcement of the competition law. Chapter three focuses on the case law of Court of justice of the European Union that is...

The purpose of the thesis is to answer the question whether the new legal rules set forth by the Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union and its transposition into Act. No. 262/2017 Coll., on Damages in the Field of Competition, as amended, is able to provide for more effective private enforcement of competition law by all injured parties compared to present. The thesis is composed of eight chapters, except from the introduction and the conclusion, each of them analyzes the current regulation of private enforcement of competition law, evaluates it and proposes the possible solutions for securing the rights of injured parties. The second chapter describes the main differences and relationship between public and private enforcement of competition law. Since the competition law cases often includes the international element, the third chapter deals with the questions of international jurisdiction and applicable law and its importance for facilitating claims for damages by injured parties. The fourth chapter examines the scope of application of the above mentioned regulations. The fifth...

Title: Selected Aspects of Private Enforcement of Competition Law The purpose of the study is to analyse and compare selected provisions and legislative proposals regarding to the rules of evidence and locus standi as they are codified in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in Czech Rules of Civil Procedure as well as selected aspects of Private Enforcement of Competition Law in UK. It should be stressed the fact that the rules of evidence and locus standi are seen through a prism of antitrust claims for damages. The study is composed of six chapters, each of them dealing with different aspect of Private Enforcement of Competition Law. Chapter One is introductory and defines basic terminology used in the study. Chapter Two focuses on legal basis for antitrust claims for damages. Chapter Three consists of three parts. Part One focuses on locus standi issue in US Law. Part Two is an analysis of proposals of EU Commission as well as relevant judgements of Court of Justice of European Union. Partial conclusions are drawn in Part Three. Chapter Four consists of three parts. Part One investigates the principles of rules of evidence as they are codified in Czech Law. Part Two discusses the American attitude to rules of evidence. Partial conclusions are drawn in Part Three. Chapter Five consists also of...

Defence date: 10 January 2009
Examining Board: Professor Hanns Ullrich, EUI (Thesis Supervisor) Professor Hans-W. Micklitz, EUI Professor Barry Rodger, University of Strathclyde Professor Mario Siragusa, College of Europe
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
The Thesis concerns the development of private enforcement of Community competition law following the judgment of the Court of Justice in Courage v. Crehan. The discussion focuses on the so-called 'Community right to damages' among individuals, established by the Court in that case. It begins with the Community statutory framework for private enforcement (the Treaty provisions and Council Regulation 1/2003) in the first chapter. Chapter Two continues with a brief history of the Community right to damages: from Van Gend en Loos through Francovich and Brasserie du Pêcheur and, finally, to Courage and, more recently, Manfredi. Chapter Three deals with ‘constitutional’ issues, mainly the competence of the Community to regulate actions for damages, not least in light of the ostensible principle of ‘national procedural autonomy.’ Chapter Four elaborates the meaning and content of the right to damages, with reference to case law of the Court. Chapter Five considers nullity and injunctions, as well as the unclear relationship between damages and restitution. Chapters Six and Seven address the problem of the ‘proper’ plaintiff. Finally, Chapter Eight tackles the relationship between decisions of competition authorities and civil proceedings, not least in light of the Commission’s recent proposal to introduce a 'binding effect' of decisions of national competition as a matter of Community law. The Commission’s recent White Paper on damages actions features prominently throughout. The author is broadly supportive of the Commission’s suggestions and considers that the Community does have competence to enhance the possibilities of private plaintiffs to enforce Community competition rules. The taboo of Community regulation of rules of enforcement (liability, remedies and procedure) is challenged and the idea that the Community is developing a private law of its own is endorsed. Similarly, the notion that the binding effect of decisions of competition authorities violates the separation of powers or the independence of the judiciary is dispelled, albeit with a caveat for proper safeguards for the rights of the defence. Generally, caution is recommended, as too much detailed regulation could stifle the flexible, creative development of the law. Lastly, it is noted that some potentially vital issues have been omitted by the Commission, while some of its proposed solutions may not be suitable for the competition context.

O desenvolvimento da aplicação privada do Direito da Concorrência na União Europeia deu resultado a várias tensões com a aplicação pública, de onde se destaca a tensão entre o private enforcement e o Regime de Clemência. Ora, a proibição, ou por outro lado, a necessidade de divulgação das declarações de clemência aos lesados por comportamentos anticoncorrenciais tem sido uma matéria amplamente discutida ao longo dos anos da evolução do private enforcement, tanto na jurisprudência como na doutrina, tendo como último desenvolvimento a proibição de divulgação instaurada pela Diretiva 2014/104/UE. A presente dissertação ambiciona discorrer e esclarecer alguns dos pontos mais críticos desta tensão, recorrendo para isso a uma descrição sintetizada do Regime de Clemência e do private enforcement para depois contrapor as várias teorias apresentadas pela doutrina para a resolução deste problema, culminando com a apreciação da atual solução legislativa. Neste sentido, resulta desta investigação a convicção pessoal de que as medidas implementadas pela Diretiva são as que melhor se coadunam com o objetivo de um Direito de Concorrência com uma aplicação complementar dos dois braços de enforcement, em detrimento de outras soluções apresentadas que, pelo facto de prejudicarem em demasia a aplicação pública, de não se poderem efetivar na União Europeia, ou por serem contrárias a normas fundamentais, levariam a situações prejudiciais ou contrárias ao Direito da União Europeia.
The development of Private Enforcement in the European’s Competition Law resulted in numerous tensions with Public Enforcement, from which is highlighted the tension between Private Enforcement and Leniency. Thus, the prohibition, or in contrast the necessity of the divulgation of leniency statements to third parties that have suffered damages from anticompetitive behaviours has been a wildly discussed matter in European case law and by numerous authors over the years of the development of Private Enforcement, with its last development being the prohibition implemented by the Directive 2014/104/EU. The present thesis aims at analysing and clarifying some of the most critical points of this tension, by resorting to a synthetized discretion of Leniency and Private Enforcement, followed by an opposition of the various theories put forward to resolve this problem, culminating with an appreciation of the actual legislative solution. In this regard, it results from this investigation the personal conviction that the measures implemented by the Directive are the most capable in obtaining the objective of a Competition Law with a complementary application of the “both arms” of enforcement, to the detriment of the other solutions put forward that would lead to prejudicial or unlawful situations, because they either take a heavy toll on Public Enforcement, cannot be implemented in the EU, or are contrary to fundamental regulations of the European Law.

1 Thesis Summary Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law Zuzana Šimeková 1. Starting points and goals of the thesis The main goal of my thesis is the application of the ever-evolving contemporary issues of private enforcement of the EU competition law, its developments in the legislative area and the decision- making practice of the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ECJ) to the pharmaceutical sector area. As regards the functioning of competition rules, the pharmaceutical sector found itself in the cross-hairs of the European Commission fairly recently. Its efforts resulted in the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Final Report of 8 July 2009 (the Final Report). The primary subject-matter of my thesis is the assessment of the competition relationship dynamic between the originator and generic pharmaceutical companies, especially the degree by which the conduct by the originator pharmaceutical companies can delay market entry by the generic pharmaceutical companies and thereby negatively affect the consumers by (among other things) limiting availability of cheaper drugs. Despite the expectations of legal practitioners and academia, the European Commission did not rule in the Final Report whether the discovered conducts constitute violations of the EU competition law. The...