Academic literature on the topic 'Anti-competitive practice'
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Journal articles on the topic "Anti-competitive practice":
1
Geradin, Damien. "A Proposed Test for Separating Pro–competitive Conditional Rebates from Anti–competitive Ones." World Competition 32, Issue 1 (March 1, 2009): 41–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2009004.
Abstract:
While the granting of rebates is a common commercial practice largely used by dominant and non–dominant fi rms, the assessment of rebates is one of the most complex and unsettled areas of competition law. In the EU, the decisional practice of the European Commission and the case–law of the Community courts have been harshly criticized as unnecessarily strict, following a form–based approach that sits uneasily with modern economic theory. In response, DG COMP published in December 2005 a Discussion Paper that promotes an effects–based approach to the assessment of rebates. This approach was recently confi rmed in the Guidance Paper of the Commission on Article 82 EC published by in December 2008. US courts have generally shown greater deference to conditional rebates adopted by dominant fi rms, but the case–law remains unsettled, notably in the area of bundled rebates. Against this background, this paper proposes an analytical framework, based on a three–step test, designed to separate pro–competitive rebates from anticompetitive ones. A particular emphasis will be placed on the treatment of single product “retroactive” rebates, which create complex issues.
2
LASCOV, Victor, Ion MAXIM, and Constanta TIUHTII. "ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS. FORMS AND IMPACT ON THE COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT ON THE MARKET." Revista Economica 73, no. 3 (October 3, 2021): 110–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.56043/reveco-2021-0026.
Abstract:
Anti-competitive agreements are a form of collaboration between companies, aiming to reduce existing competitive pressures on the market that lead economic operators to innovate and improve their offers in terms of asking price and quality of offered goods and services that result in harming the consumers’ interests. This practice can take various forms and effects as alliances, anti-competitive arrangements, monopolistic agreements, cartel, and others. The paper contains an analysis of the forms of anti-competitive agreements, their impact on the market relations and the form of their regulation. The article 101 TFEU contains the main regulation providing for the interdiction and sanctioning of anti-competitive agreements at the European level.
3
Zhevnyak, Oxana Viktorovna. "Anti-competitive practices of digital platforms and response measures in the Russian and foreign legislation." Право и политика, no. 5 (May 2021): 14–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0706.2021.5.33888.
Abstract:
The goal of this research is to determine whether the Russian legislation on protection of competition contains the norms that allow preventing anti-competitive practices of digital platforms, and whether it is necessary to make corresponding amendments. The subject of this research is the anti-competitive practice of digital platforms, response measures of the state, antimonopoly legislation, and recommendations on its improvement. The research methodology is based on the analysis of relevant examples of anti-competitive behavior of digital platforms on the Russian and foreign markets, and qualification of such behavior from the perspective of Russian legislation. In the course of this research, the author solves the issue on the sufficiency of legal material for conducting qualification of such behavior; describes the response measures taken by the competent government authorities of various countries, as well as the measures proposed by the researchers. As a result, the author systematizes the data regarding the antimonopoly practice of digital platforms depending on the type of violations. All examples of antimonopoly practices can be qualified as anti-competitive in accordance with the effective legislation of the Russian Federation. If they are not listed as particular violations, then fall under the general categories of acts prohibited by law, considering the non-exhaustive nature of such lists. Misuse of “the platform authority” by the digital platform, reflected in the fact that it utilizes the transaction and customer data, should be qualified as unfair competition. For preventing the anti-competitive practices of digital platforms, it is proposed to develop the system of measures aimed at minimization of risks of the clash of interests and elimination of its consequences: ban of the owner of the digital platform for joint activity of his activity with the activity conducted the clients of the platform; restrict participation of the owner of the platform in companies that conduct types of activity that compete with the clients; disclosure of information on their affiliates engaged in the activity similar to such of the clients of the platform; introduction of the criteria for such affiliation, along with the obligation to compensate for the losses of clients inflicted by the clash of interest.
4
Svetlicinii, Alexandr. "The Judicial Review of the Standard of Proof in Cartel Cases: Raising the Bar for the Croatian Competition Authority Case comment to the Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia No. U-III-2791/2016 of 1 February 2018 (Sokol Marić d.o.o.)." Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 11, no. 18 (2018): 311–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2018.11.18.13.
Abstract:
The Security agencies case represents another example of the procedural diversity among Member States in applying national competition rules that mirror Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. In its infringement decision the Croatian NCA specified that the presence at the meeting with competitors and participation in the discussion concerning minimum prices was sufficient to impute to the parties participation in an anti-competitive agreement prohibited under the national equivalent of Article 101 TFEU. As the Croatian NCA investigated an agreement ‘by object’, it considered itself relieved of the burden to demonstrate the anti-competitive effects. The Constitutional Court has taken a different approach and held that the fact that the participants of the meeting have not publicly denounced the results of the meeting, cannot serve as evidence of an anti-competitive agreement. The court also found that the Croatian NCA did not manage to provide a reasonable explanation why the ‘hourly cost of service’ apparently discussed by competitors is the same as ‘hourly price of service’ that appears in the NCA’s decision. As a result, the Constitutional Court’s approach deviated from several substantive presumptions developed by the EU Commission and the EU courts when applying competition rules in relation to anti-competitive agreements. This places a heavier burden of proof on the Croatian NCA in cartel cases when compared to its own preceding practice or the enforcement practices of the EU Commission or other European NCAs.
5
Targański, Bartosz. "Antitrust Liability in the Context of Online Platforms. Case Comment to the Preliminary Ruling of the Court of Justice of 21 January 2016 ‘Eturas’ UAB v Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba (Case C-74/14)." Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 9, no. 14 (2016): 293–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2016.9.14.15.
Abstract:
In its judgment of 21 January 2016 in Case C-74/14 (hereinafter, judgment), the Court of Justice (hereinafter, CJ) responded to a preliminary question submitted by the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania. The latter asked whether the mere dispatch of an email relating to the maximum level of rebates may constitute sufficient evidence to establish that its addressees can be found liable for illegal concerted practices within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU. The CJ judgment raises novel issues specific to antitrust enforcement in e-commerce in two areas: (i) can users of a third party online booking platform be found liable for an anti-competitive practice purely on the basis of receiving unprompted email messages, even if they were not aware of their content, and (ii) what steps should they take in order to distance themselves from anti-competitive actions in an e-commerce environment.
6
Kinev, A. Yu, and E. E. Konopkina. "Hub and Spoke Agreements: Theoretical Novella or an Independent Type of Anti-Competitive Agreement?" Russian competition law and economy, no. 1 (August 20, 2021): 38–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.47361/2542-0259-2021-1-25-38-43.
Abstract:
The article discusses questions of theory, as well as foreign practice of qualification of the so-called “Hub and Spoke” agreements, considered as agreements that limit competition between competitors in the absence of direct agreement between them. According to the authors, a “Hub and Spoke” agreement should be qualified as an “other” agreement that leads or may lead to restriction of competition (part 4 of article 11 of the Federal Law № 135 “On the Protection of Competition”).
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Panarin, R. S. "Features of Actions Qualification of Economic Entities Belonging to the Same Group of Entities under Article 11 of the Law on Competition Protection." Russian competition law and economy, no. 3 (August 20, 2021): 88–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.47361/2542-0259-2020-3-23-88-92.
Abstract:
The article deals with certain features of legal qualification of anti-competitive agreements concluded by participants of one group of entities. The author considers the possibility of applying antitrust immunity to anti-competitive agreements concluded between economic entities, including the problem of establishing control between the parties of the agreement on the example of specific antitrust cases.It is concluded that, despite the existence in law enforcement practice of cases of application of immunity to agreements restricting competition between economic entities belonging to the same group of persons, in the absence of a relationship of control between them, this immunity should be applied only if there are grounds provided for by law. The author’s position may not coincide with the official position of the FAS Russia.
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Bakalinska, Olga, Olena Belianevych, and Olena Honcharenko. "Advocacy of Competition in the Mechanism of State Regulation of the Economy." International Journal of Financial Research 11, no. 1 (October 10, 2019): 425. http://dx.doi.org/10.5430/ijfr.v11n1p425.
Abstract:
The multifaceted competitive policy promotes awareness of the importance of competition by society, ensures maximum transparency of state regulation, reduces the level of corruption and increases public confidence within activities of the competition authorities, helps developing self-regulation of economic entities. At the same time the mechanism of state regulation and self-regulation has its own instruments for improving the efficiency of advocating competition. Research of their peculiarities, instruments, role and interaction are important directions of modern scientific investigations and the purpose of this article.In this article a comparative method to study is usedfor common and distinctive features of advocating of competition in different countries and Ukraine. The results show that it is extremely important to create a system for advocating of competition in order to inform society, protect the attained level of competition in entrepreneurial activity, prevent or suspend, and then stop the abuses of monopoly position, the anti-competitive concerted actions of business entities, the anti-competitive actions of state authorities and unfair competition. The experience of economically developed countries convincingly suggests that such practices have a positive effect on the functioning of the competitive environment in which the interaction of economic agents takes place. The results show that there was a gap in implementation of economic policy in Ukraine and there is a gap between legally established norms on the implementation of competition policy and the practice of their application. To a large extent, this is due to the lack of well-developed strategy for economic development in Ukraine and, accordingly, the strategy for the development of competition policy.
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Nishimura, Shohei. "Giving Meaning To Limitations." Journal of World Trade 58, Issue 2 (April 1, 2024): 223–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2024019.
Abstract:
This article analyses the functions and disciplines of the cumulative injury assessment under Article 3.3 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (‘Anti-Dumping Agreement’). Since the text calls for cumulation only if ‘appropriate’, this article refers to the treaty context, the preparatory works, the precedent dispute settlement cases, as well as the relevant practice of the WTO member countries, to understand the purpose of cumulation and to give meaning to this key element of the treaty text. The analyses lead to the interpretation of Article 3.3 that, in order to ‘determine’ that cumulation is ‘appropriate’, an investigating authority needs to identify the factual circumstances where the subject products from all of the cumulated sources compete so intensively that the market position of dumped imports from all but one of the cumulated sources can be realistically taken over by the imports from one remaining source rather than the domestic like products. This article later calls such circumstances the ‘competitive overlaps’. While Article 3.3 gives an authority a certain degree of discretion, the authority’s determination must be based on the factual elements relevant for the competitive overlap in each case. GATT, WTO, Anti-dumping Agreement, anti-dumping, cumulation, cumulative assessment, conditions of competition, competitive overlap
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Istomin, V. G. "Class Action Lawsuits in Competition Cases in the US and UK and Prospects for their Development in Russia." Actual Problems of Russian Law 17, no. 9 (August 23, 2022): 174–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.17803/1994-1471.2022.142.9.174-186.
Abstract:
The need to protect the rights and legitimate interests of entities affected by anti-competitive actions, to compensate for the losses caused to them, as well as to suppress illegal behavior in relation to a wide range of people, requires states to search for various measures to counteract such abuse by companies of their market power. One possible measure is class action, which is currently used in the US and UK as an effective mechanism to protect businesses and consumers from anti-competitive behavior. Taking into account the fact that the procedure of group proceedings has been developed in modern Russian legislation, the experience of implementing the relevant norms in other countries is of undoubted interest for study. The author analyzes the provisions on class actions contained in the legislation of the United States and Great Britain, the practice of their application in the field of competition protection, as well as the prospects for class proceedings in Russia. The conclusion is made about the insufficiency of legally fixed economic incentives for filing class actions, which may prevent the widespread use of this institution in Russian practice, including in antimonopoly disputes.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Anti-competitive practice":
1
Quintana, Sánchez Eduardo. "Hazards on sanctioning the Recommendations as an anti-competitive practice in the Peruvian Law." IUS ET VERITAS, 2016. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/123645.
Abstract:
On this paper, the author disserts on the notion of recommendations as a method of collusion. First, he approaches it based on comparative law (Europe and Latin-America) and precedent case law from INDECOPI, followed by defining how the term is (and should be) understood in Peruvian regulations as a horizontal agreement (cartel). It also analyzes in which instances said application has been inaccurate and the issues surrounding it. Finally, the author illustrates the complexity of framing recommendations as vertical agreements in the absence of “collusion between two or more parties”En este artículo, el autor nos presenta la figura de las recomendaciones como práctica colusoria. Empieza por darnos una aproximación acorde a derecho comparado (Europa y América Latina) y desarrollo jurisprudencial de INDECOPI, para posteriormente definir cómo se aplica (y debería aplicarse) dicha prohibición como práctica colusoria horizontal (carteles) en nuestra legislación. En este punto, se analiza también los supuestos en los cuales dicha aplicación ha sido incorrecta y los problemas alrededor de esta. Finalmente, el autor demuestra la complejidadde enmarcar las recomendaciones como una práctica colusoria vertical debido a la falta del elemento de colusión de agentes económicos.
2
Wang, Yuting. "The application of the Chinese Anti-monopoly Law to anti-competitive practices of patent owners when exploiting their rights." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2018. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/30747/.
Abstract:
The thesis will examine the extent to which China’s Anti-monopoly Law effectively controls the anti-competitive practices of patent owners when exercising their patent rights. The relationship between intellectual property law and competition law is no longer contradictory but has evolved into a convergent and compatible one. The two bodies of law share the same goals to promote competition, encourage innovation and enhance consumer welfare in different ways. Therefore, it is appropriate and reasonable to apply competition law to regulate the exercise of intellectual property rights in certain circumstances. Given the specificity of patent rights and the legal and economic circumstances of China, the scope of the thesis will be limited to anti-competitive practices of patent owners when exercising their patent rights. The research demonstrates the necessity and importance for China to apply its own Antimonopoly Law to address anti-competitive exercise of patent rights. However, China’s Anti-monopoly Law came into effect in 2008 and it seems not to work as effectively as it was expected in regulating such conduct. Despite great achievements, there are still deficiencies and uncertainty influencing the effective and efficient competition enforcement in the anti-competitive exercise of patent rights. The problems not only arise from China’s internal competition enforcement system but also arise from the lack of clear guidance from the competition enforcement authorities. Facing the challenging competition concerns in the 21st century, there are no effective measures available in China. It is not clear in what circumstances the failure to disclose patent interest in the standard setting process can result in antitrust liabilities and to what extent China’s Anti-monopoly Law should intervene. It is also uncertain how to keep a balance between the protection of patent rights and the maintenance of market competition when considering the seeking of injunctions before national courts by the owners of standard essential patents or the reverse payment patent settlement agreements. Therefore, the thesis aims to provide some solutions to these problems to facilitate and improve the effective application of China’s Anti-monopoly Law to the exercise of patent rights. The proposals made in this thesis will be based on the valuable EU and US enforcement experience and case law but give significant consideration to the legal and economic context in China. The Law is stated as at 6 June 2018.
3
Pinto, Barrios Jean Paul, and Estrada Lucía Alejandra Guzmán. "Towards a New Competition Law: Some Comments on the Reform. Interview with Dr. Alejandro Falla Jara." Derecho & Sociedad, 2016. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/118521.
Abstract:
The present interview seeks to give some points of view about the reform of Competency regulation. In that line, the interviewee give us his general opinion about the reform, the main contribution to the matter and those aspects that were missed, focusing his opinion on anti-competitive practice and negative regulation of anticompetitive practices.La presente entrevista busca dar algunos puntos de vista respecto a la reforma a la Ley de Competencia. En esa línea, el entrevistado nos da su opinión general sobre la reforma, los aportes que brinda y aquellos aspectos que considera faltaron regularse, centrando su opinión en aquellos temas de combate de prácticas anticompetitivas y control de regulaciones anticompetitivas.
4
Koffi, Kouassi Emmanuel. "L’affirmation d’un droit de la concurrence ouest-africain : Unifier les règles de l’UEMOA et de la CEDEAO." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Paris 8, 2022. http://www.theses.fr/2022PA080040.
Abstract:
Le droit de la concurrence joue un rôle fondamental dans le bon fonctionnement des marchés soumis aux principes de liberté de circulation des marchandises, des services et des capitaux. Il était donc pertinent pour les organisations d’intégration économique ouest-africaines, l’UEMOA et la CEDEAO, qui avaient toutes deux mis en place de tels marchés dans les années 1990, de se doter de règles concurrentielles. Cependant, ces nouvelles règles ont été caractérisées par la dualité des systèmes concurrentiels choisis. Complètement opposés, les cadres institutionnels se sont souvent révélés être contradictoires : alors que les Etats membres l’UEMOA avaient opté pour une architecture institutionnelle centralisée, ceux de la CEDEAO avaient préféré un système décentralisé. Pourtant, tous les Etats membres de l’UEMOA sont également membres de la CEDEAO. L'Afrique de l'Ouest connaît ainsi une dualité de systèmes concurrentiels à l'origine d'une insécurité juridique. Cette étude prospective est dès lors un plaidoyer pour l’unification des droits régionaux de la concurrence, l'abandon du bicéphalisme au profit du monocéphalisme concurrentiel s'avérant une étape nécessaire pour assurer l’efficacité et la sécurité juridique du marché commun ouest-africainCompetition law plays a fundamental role in the proper functioning of markets subject to the principles of free movement of goods, services and capital. It was therefore relevant for the West African economic integration organizations, WAEMU and ECOWAS, which had both set up such markets in the 1990s, to adopt competition rules. However, these new rules were characterized by the duality of the competitive systems chosen. The institutional frameworks often turned out to be contradictory: while WAEMU member states opted for a centralized institutional architecture, ECOWAS member states preferred a decentralized system. However, all WAEMU member states are also members of ECOWAS. West Africa is thus experiencing a duality of competitive systems that is the source of legal insecurity. This prospective study is therefore a plea for the unification of regional competition laws, with the abandonment of bicephalism in favor of competitive monocephalism proving to be a necessary step to ensure the efficiency and legal security of the West African common market
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Loze, Julien. "Les stratégies juridiques de l'entreprise à l'épreuve du contentieux privé des pratiques anticoncurrentielles." Thesis, Toulouse 1, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019TOU10037/document.
Abstract:
Il s'agira de démontrer dans quelle mesure les réformes récentes relatives à l'action en réparation du dommage résultant de pratiques anticoncurrentielles influencent la stratégie de l'entreprise. Outre les stratégies destinées à contenir ce risque nouveau, cette dernière pourrait également tirer parti du contentieux privé afin d'améliorer ses performances sur le marchéFollowing the recent reforms regarding anticompetitive practices private enforcement, my research aims at studying the influence of these new rules on companies' legal strategies. If companies will have to adapt their strategy to avoid legal exposure, they can also use those very same rules as a tool to improve their performance
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De, Fontenelle Louis. "Les personnes publiques, prestataires de service marchand." Thesis, Pau, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015PAUU2006/document.
Abstract:
S’il est désormais clairement établi que les personnes publiques peuvent, d’une part, prendre en charge des activités sur le marché, d’autre part, candidater à des contrats de la commande publique, les conditions dans lesquelles s’exerce la concurrence des personnes publiques sont souvent l’objet de contestations dans la mesure où on leur fait reproche d’être avantagées par leur statut de droit public. L’objet de cette thèse est de démontrer que les personnes publiques ne sont ni avantagées, ni défavorisées par leur statut mais simplement inadaptées et inadaptables au milieu concurrentiel car le statut de droit public implique structurellement une distorsion concurrentielle et donc une atteinte à l’exigence d’égale concurrence. Cette difficulté pourrait toutefois être surmontée en consolidant les sociétés publiquesIt is now established that a public law person can take over activities on the market, and apply for public procurement contracts. But the terms under which these public law persons are present on the competitive market are disputed, as their statute under public law is often criticized as an unfair advantage. This thesis aims to demonstrate that public law persons are neither advantaged nor disadvantaged by their statute, but are simply not suited – and can't be adapted – to the competitive market, as their public law statute structurally implies a competitive distortion and an infringement to the legal requirements for fair competition. That difficulty may however be overcome by consolidating state-owned enterprises
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Ndiaye, Djibril. "OMC et droit de la concurrence : le droit de l'OMC face au défi de la mondialisation des pratiques anticoncurrentielles et des opérations de concentration." Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015AIXM1072/document.
Abstract:
En tant qu’organisation qui a vocation à réguler les échanges commerciaux mondiaux et qui promeut le libre-échange, l’OMC désigne naturellement l’une des principales, voire l’unique, structure internationale capable d’incarner l’approche multilatérale qui s’impose devant la mondialisation des pratiques anticoncurrentielles et des opérations de concentration. Les règles de concurrence présentes dans son corpus juridique, ainsi que la jurisprudence issue de leur mise en œuvre, grâce notamment à l’existence d’un mécanisme contraignant de règlement des différends, forment un droit primaire de la concurrence. Toutefois, un tel droit ne régit que les comportements des acteurs étatiques et n’appréhende les agissements des particuliers que de manière indirecte. Par conséquent, il nécessite d’être complété et adapté aux nouvelles réalités procédant de la mondialisation des économies, ce par le biais d’une adoption d’un accord multilatéral portant sur la concurrence. Le système de règlement des litiges devrait aussi subir une mutation, en renforçant ses techniques de sanction et en s’ouvrant aux personnes privéesAs an organization which goal is to regulate international trade exchanges and to promote free trade, the World Trade Organization refers naturally to one of the main international structures or even the only one which can embody the multilateral approach needed to face the globalization of anti-competitive practices and concentration operations. The competition rules mentioned in its legal corpus as well as the case law from their implementation, are a primary competition law thanks to the existence of a coercing mechanism to solve problems in particular. However, a such rule only governs the states actors’ behaviours and is not directly apprehensive of the acting of the individuals. Therefore, it needs to be completed and adapted to the new realities of the situation by proceeding the globalization of the economies by means of the adoption of an multilateral agreement over the competition. The settlement of dispute system would need some change, by strengthening its technical punishments and by opening its gates to the private individuals
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Vivanco, Carla Alejandra Ochoa. "Concentração de mercado no Equador : uma análise da intervenção por parte da entidade de regulação superintendência de controlo do poder de mercado, a partir da sua criação." Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15960.
Abstract:
Mestrado em Gestão e Estratégia IndustrialO funcionamento dos mercados não produz resultados eficientes por si só, essas condições são conhecidas como falhas de mercado e justificam a intervenção do Estado. Os possíveis efeitos de uma operação de concentração de mercado, variam entre melhorar a eficiência para as empresas, bem como possíveis prejuízos à livre concorrência ou à sociedade. O presente estudo realiza uma análise sobre a concentração por atividade económica das empresas ativas no Equador, para os anos 2011 e 2016, destacando os resultados da intervenção por parte da entidade de regulação Superintendência de Controlo e Poder de Mercado, SCPM, que entrou em vigor no ano 2012. A partir desta informação, determina-se a alteração na concentração em cada uma das atividades económicas, no país, juntamente com a influência das políticas de regulação que contribuíram na tentativa de combater as práticas anti concorrenciais. Para isto, analisam-se os resultados no quadro geral de concentração económica do país, antes e durante a existência do SCPM, através do índice Herfindahl-Hirschman. Por outro lado, identificam-se as contribuições da intervenção da SCPM na concentração de mercado e práticas de abuso de poder, juntamente com a perspetiva dos atores da instituição que foram parte do processo de regulação. Os resultados permitem concluir que, no período observado, a economia, na análise geral por atividade económica, não apresenta resultados de concentração. Em relação às contribuições do SCPM, na análise por subactividade ou mercado relevante que a entidade realiza, existiram práticas anticoncorrenciais potencialmente prejudiciais à economia, que foram avaliadas e corrigidas no momento pela entidade.
The functioning of the markets does not produce efficient results by itself, these conditions are known as market failures and justify the intervention of the State. The possible effects of market concentration can vary between improving the efficiency and competitiveness of firms, as well as possible harm to free competition or to society. The present study analyzes the concentration by economic activity of the active companies in Ecuador, for the years 2011 and 2016, highlighting the results of the intervention by the Superintendence of Control and Market Power (SCPM), which came into force in 2012. Based on this information, the change in concentration in each of the economic activities, in the economic sphere is determined, with the influence of the regulatory policies that contributed in the attempt to combat anti-competitive practices in the Ecuadorian economic sector. For this, were analyzed the results in the general economic concentration of the country, through the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which, determines the level of concentration. On the other hand, were identified the contributions by the regulatory intervention of the SCPM, along with the perspective of the actors were involved in the regulation process. The results allow to conclude that, in the observed period, the economy, in the analysis by economic activity, does not present concentration results between 2011 and 2016. Regarding SCPM contributions, in the sub-activity or relevant market analysis carried out by the regulator entity, there were anticompetitive practices potentially damaging to the economy, which were evaluated and corrected at the time.
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
9
Basséne, Yannick Boniface. "La protection du consommateur par l'action de groupe en droit de la concurrence." Thesis, Sorbonne Paris Cité, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018USPCB147.
Abstract:
Le 19ème siècle est marqué par la mécanisation des activités humaines issues de la révolution industrielle et accentuée par l'essor du progrès technique. Cette révolution est à l'origine de la prolifération des préjudices subis par les consommateurs du fait de la défaillance des machines. De plus, d'autres dommages sont venus se greffer aux dommages corporels. Il en est par exemple les scandales de l'amiante, des cigarettes ou encore des produits médicamenteux, tels que les antidépresseurs ou le vaccin contre l'hépatite B. Ces dommages corporels qui touchaient jadis à la santé, sont de nature économique aujourd'hui. Aussi, la particularité du contexte économique participe-t-elle à accentuer cette complexité du fait notamment de la consommation de masse, de la concentration croissante des opérations économiques et de la globalisation des échanges marchands. Un tel contexte rend ainsi l'expression et le traitement des recours à caractère individuel tantôt inopérants, tantôt insuffisants, pour répondre adéquatement, sur la scène judiciaire, aux besoins légitimes de défense des intérêts individuels. En effet, la conception traditionnelle de notre système de responsabilité civile, dont la réforme est amorcée et qui est marquée par un individualisme ancestral, se révèle souvent inadaptée voire inefficace lorsqu'un même préjudice, subi par des consommateurs victimes, est d'une valeur pécuniaire relativement faible sur le plan individuel, alors même que des profits illicites importants peuvent avoir été engrangés par les contrevenants. Parallèlement à ces évolutions, un constat est fait. Les consommateurs ont changé de comportement, ils sont devenus plus soucieux de leur protection et de plus en plus revendicatifs parce qu'ils considèrent que la réparation des dommages subis est un droit. Aussi, imposèrent-ils des débats politique, judiciaire et économique de la question de la réparation des dommages qu'ils ont subis du fait des pratiques anticoncurrentielles. Face à cette situation les systèmes juridiques s'efforcent de trouver des solutions afin d'améliorer la protection de l'individu. La consommation des ménages étant un enjeu fondamental, des règles notamment l'action en représentation conjointe, furent adoptées, sans succès, avec pour finalité de rééquilibrer les relations professionnels/consommateurs et assurer la protection des consommateurs. L'action de groupe apparait dans ces cas de figure comme l'instrument juridique devant permettre aux victimes de pratiques anticoncurrentielles d'obtenir la réparation des préjudices subis. L'objectif principal de cette thèse était donc d'étudier l'effectivité de la protection du consommateur par l'action de groupe en droit de la concurrence. Pour ce faire, la démarche que nous avons adoptée nous a amené à répondre dans la première partie à deux questions importantes. La première question est relative à l'adaptation des règles de la responsabilité civile à la réparation effective des consommateurs victimes de pratiques anticoncurrentielles, qui constitue notre titre premier. L'étude de cette question nous a conduit à analyser les dispositions permettant la recevabilité de l'action en dommages et intérêts des consommateurs. Cette analyse a permis non seulement de mettre en évidence la particularité de la faute concurrentielle ainsi que le préjudice qui en découle mais également de voir à quel point il était nécessaire de procéder à un aménagement des règles qui gouvernent la responsabilité civile pour les adapter au contentieux concurrentiel. Le second titre de notre première partie a été consacré à l'aspect transnational des pratiques anticoncurrentielles. Le caractère transnational de l'action de groupe a été délibérément omis par le législateur. En effet, la DG concurrence renvoie pour l'action de groupe internationale à l'application des règles de DIP européen. (...)After several decades of doctrinal and legislative debates, the procedure of group action was introduced in French law. The excesses of the American class action has always aroused in French legislators and some specialists in the field a certain mistrust of class actions. As a result, the repression of anti-competitive practices was essentially the responsibility of the enforcement public led by the relevant competition authorities. However, the 19th century is marked by the mechanization of human activities resulting from the industrial revolution and accentuated by the rise of technical progress. This revolution is at the origin of the proliferation of the damages suffered by the consumers because of the failure of the machines. In addition, other damages were added to the bodily injury. Examples include asbestos scandals, cigarettes and drug products, such as anti-depressants or hepatitis B vaccine. These bodily injuries that once affected health are of an economic nature today. In parallel with these evolutions, a report is made. Consumers have changed their behavior, they have become more protective and more and more demanding because they consider that compensation for damages is a right. Thus, they imposed political, judicial and economic debates on the question of compensation for the damage they suffered as a result of anti-competitive practices. Faced with this situation, the legal systems try to find solutions to improve the protection of the individual. Since household consumption is a fundamental issue, rules, including joint representation, were adopted with the aim of rebalancing professional / consumer relations and ensuring consumer protection. However, in the contemporary context of mass consumption, the increasing concentration of economic operations and the globalization of market exchanges, the expression and the treatment of individual remedies prove sometimes ineffective, sometimes insufficient, to respond adequately, on the judicial scene, the legitimate needs of defense of collective interests. Indeed, the traditional conception of civil liability, marked by ancestral individualism, proves to be inadequate when the harm suffered by the victim is of a relatively low pecuniary value at the individual level compared to the illicit global profits collected by the offenders. In order to remedy the ineffectiveness of the right to compensation for damages suffered, the French legislator, through the Hamon law, has offered the consumer a degree of autonomy in the implementation of legal remedies aimed at the repression of anticompetitive practices by the exercise of a right to easy compensation, which has the effect of reinforcing its capacity as a player in the field of competition law. In fact, the provisions specific to group action seem, at first glance, to give weight and influence to the consumer from whom he was previously supposed to be without. The legislator, under the recommendations of the European Commission, wanted to give consumers the necessary weapons to no longer be condemned to suffer the impact of the additional costs imposed between professionals involved upstream. Also, since this is a matter of effectiveness in terms of private remedies due to anticompetitive practices, will this issue be used to examine the means by which the victims of anticompetitive practices may be compensated. This thesis is essentially an analysis of the mechanism of group action to answer the question of whether this procedure effectively protects consumers. Thus, the author has sought to understand how the private enforcement mechanism works to assess whether this model contributes to consumer protection
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Šimek, David. "Ochrana hospodářské soutěže - dohody narušující soutěž." Master's thesis, 2015. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-337192.
Abstract:
The purpose of my thesis is to analyse two issues arising out of the European and Czech competition law provisions prohibiting agreements which restrict competition. First, I shall examine the issue of distinction between prohibited agreements and allowed unilateral conduct. Furthermore, I shall explore the definition of the concerted practice as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union and Czech administrative courts focusing again on the distinction between such practice and unilateral conduct. Second, I shall elaborate on the structure of Article 101 TFEU. As a consequence of the "more economic approach" taken by the Commission and the repeal of the individual exemption system under Article 101(3) TFEU, the distinction between the concept of object offences and the concept of effect offences is slowly disappearing while having detrimental implications for legal certainty. Moreover, the conceptual distinction between considerations of ancillary restraints under Article 101(1) TFEU and consideration of pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects under Article 101(3) TFEU is slowly disappearing as well. The economics take their role in the assessment, and that is also the reason why I chose this topic because I am interested in the overlap between law and economics. My thesis is...
Books on the topic "Anti-competitive practice":
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Adhikari, Ratnakar. Anti-competitive practices in Nepal. Kathmandu, Nepal: South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics & Environment, 2001.
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Sharma, Milan Mani. Anti-competitive practices in Nepal's petroleum sector. Kathmandu: South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics & Environment, 2007.
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CUTS Centre for Competition, Investment & Economic Regulation (Jaipur, India) and Consumer Association of Malawi, eds. Spine chilling experiences of anti-competitive practices in Malawi. Jaipur, India: CUTS Centre for Competition, Investment, and Economic Regulation, 2003.
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D, Barrington, and Institute of International Business Law and Practice., eds. Due process and anti-competitive practices =: Les garanties procédurales et les pratiques anti-concurrentielles. Paris: International Chamber of Commerce, 1994.
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Great Britain. Office of Fair Trading. Anti-competitive practices: A guide to the provisions of the Competition Act 1980. [London]: Office of Fair Trading, 1986.
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Great Britain. Office of Fair Trading., ed. Anti-competitive practices: A guide to the provisions of the Competition Act 1980. London: Office of Fair Trading, 1986.
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Network, Economic Freedom. Protection from anti-competitive practices: Competition Commission of Pakistan creating a level playing field. Islamabad: Economic Freedom Network, 2010.
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Great Britain. Office of Fair Trading., ed. Monopolies & anti-competitive practices: A guide to the provisions of the Fair Trading Act 1973 & the Competition Act 1980. London: Office of Fair Trading, 1995.
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Orehov, Vladimir, Tat'yana Orehova, and Konstantin Baldin. Anti-crisis management. ru: INFRA-M Academic Publishing LLC., 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/1093041.
Abstract:
The anti-crisis management of the economy and national security of the Russian Federation in modern conditions (pandemics, hybrid wars, competitive restrictions and anti-Russian propaganda from the West), approaches to Western sanctions as new opportunities for the development of the Russian Federation are considered. The ways of developing an innovative economy and increasing the productivity of aggregate labor as the main sources that ensure the accelerated development of the country are outlined. Attention is paid to the peculiarities of social partnership, economic and financial crises in the trends of macro - and micro-development, the role of investment as a financial source of anti-crisis management. The theoretical and practical foundations of the insolvency (bankruptcy) of enterprises and individual entrepreneurs, the methodology of the enterprise's recovery from the crisis, forecasting the results of anti-crisis management are described.
Meets the requirements of the federal state educational standards of higher education of the latest generation.
For undergraduate, graduate, postgraduate students and teachers of higher educational institutions of economic specialties, as well as researchers, managers and managers of firms.
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Combating Anti-Competitive Practices. United Nations, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.18356/0218fc34-en.
Book chapters on the topic "Anti-competitive practice":
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Mondez, Thomas Elliot A., and Jocelyn P. Cruz. "Corruption and Illegality in Asian Investment Arbitration: The Philippines." In Corruption and Illegality in Asian Investment Arbitration, 343–67. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9303-1_13.
Abstract:
AbstractCorruption is deeply rooted in Philippine culture. Much legislation was passed to strengthen the country’s legal frameworks to prosecute corruption cases. However, the abundant local anti-corruption laws have yet to produce the desired results. For most of the latter half of the twentieth century, the Philippines relied on protectionist policies conducive to corruption to shelter its domestic economy from the burgeoning highly competitive international markets. The succeeding adoption of trade liberalization policies enabled the country to attract foreign investments to bolster its economy. Unfortunately, it also exposed investors to the pitfalls of local corruption. The country’s first major investment dispute involving its main international airport was not a pleasant experience. The Philippines is no longer in a bubble. As an active member of the international community, it must adjust its law enforcement efforts, legal systems, treaty practice and business culture to match global anti-corruption standards.
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Ong, Burton. "Compulsory Licences of Pharmaceutical Patents to Remedy Anti-Competitive Practices Under Article 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement: Can Competition Law Facilitate Access to Essential Medicines?" In MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 235–65. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54704-1_13.
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Burke, T., A. Genn-Bash, and B. Haines. "A Practical Guide to Anti-competitive Practices." In Competition in Theory and Practice, 151–69. Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203702536-7.
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Schütze, Robert. "11. Competition Law: Cartels." In An Introduction to European Law, 266–89. Oxford University Press, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780192885944.003.0011.
Abstract:
This chapter provides an overview of EU competition law through the lens of Article 101 TFEU. Article 101 outlaws anti-competitive collusions between undertakings; that is, ‘cartels’. Historically, this form of illegal behaviour has been the most dangerous anti-competitive practice. The European Union has thus given a wide jurisdictional scope to Article 101, and EU competition law generally. Article 101 thereby prohibits anti-competitive agreements, concerted practices, and cartels specifically. Yet it also tries to find an appropriate balance between pro- and anti-competitive considerations for every agreement. Due to the EU’s historic task of creating an internal market, vertical agreements have been of particular importance to EU.
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Tóth, András. "Central European Countries’ Competition Law Practice Contribution to the Development of EU Competition Law." In The Policies of the European Union from a Central European Perspective, 103–18. Central European Academic Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.54171/2022.aojb.poeucep_5.
Abstract:
The case law of the Central European EU Member States has made important contributions to the development of EU competition law through preliminary rulings. First, restriction of competition ‘by object’ is an open category since the European Court of Justice’s judgment in the Hungarian insurance cartel: the competition authority or the court may also declare market conduct as anti-competitive by object if it is not yet characterized as having an anti-competitive object. Second, preliminary ruling questions referred from Central European countries have given the EU Court of Justice an opportunity to clarify the relationship between national and EU competition law.
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Schütze, Robert. "12. Competition Law: Cartels." In An Introduction to European Law, 282–306. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198858942.003.0012.
Abstract:
This chapter provides an overview of EU competition law through the lens of Article 101 TFEU. Article 101 outlaws anti-competitive collusions between undertakings; that is, ‘cartels’. Historically, this form of illegal behaviour has been the most dangerous anti-competitive practice. The prohibition on any collusion between undertakings to restrict competition in the internal market is thereby set out in Article 101. The European Union has given a wide jurisdictional scope to the provision, and EU competition law generally. Yet it tries to find an appropriate balance between pro- and anti-competitive considerations for every agreement. Due to the EU's historic task to create an internal market, vertical agreements have been of particular importance to EU; and distribution agreements indeed continue to occupy a prominent place within the case law of the European Courts.
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Craig, Paul, and Gráinne de Búrca. "27. Competition Law: Article 101." In EU Law, 1034–86. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198856641.003.0027.
Abstract:
All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. EU competition law covers anti-competitive agreements between firms, abuse of a dominant position, and mergers. Article 101 TFEU is the principal vehicle for the control of anti-competitive agreements. This chapter examines its key features. These include: the meaning given to the terms agreement and concerted practice; the relationship between Article 101(1) and (3); the extent to which economic analysis does and should take place within Article 101(1); and the interpretation accorded to Article 101(3), including whether non-economic factors can be taken into account. The discussion then shifts to more detailed examination of vertical agreements, followed by an outline of the reform of the enforcement regime for Articles 101 and 102. The UK version contains a further section analysing issues concerning EU competition law and the UK post-Brexit.
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Craig, Paul, and Gráinne de Búrca. "27. Competition Law: Article 101." In EU Law, 1072–125. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198859840.003.0027.
Abstract:
All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing students with a stand-alone resource. EU competition law covers anti-competitive agreements between firms, abuse of a dominant position, and mergers. Article 101 TFEU is the principal vehicle for the control of anti-competitive agreements. This chapter examines its key features. These include: the meaning given to the terms agreement and concerted practice; the relationship between Article 101(1) and (3); the extent to which economic analysis does and should take place within Article 101(1); and the interpretation accorded to Article 101(3), including whether non-economic factors can be taken into account. The discussion then shifts to more detailed examination of vertical agreements, followed by an outline of the reform of the enforcement regime for Articles 101 and 102. The UK version contains a further section analysing issues concerning EU competition law and the UK post-Brexit.
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Fahad, Mohammad Quadeer, Mohd Tauseef Khan, and Anwar Shahzad Siddiqui. "Market Power in Deregulated Power System." In Handbook of Research on Power and Energy System Optimization, 480–510. IGI Global, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-5225-3935-3.ch014.
Abstract:
In today's competitive market, deregulation of power industry is inevitable. The aim of deregulating the power markets is to bring competition into them and thereby make them more economically efficient. In an economically efficient market, no consumer or producer has the ability to impact on prices by itself or by collaborating with any other participant. However, the electricity wholesale market is not a perfect market and the potential for market power exploitation is an issue. Sometimes private companies collaborate with each other to get more profit, driving the prices to a higher level and thus acquiring a market power which is an anti-competitive practice. Thus, market power is the capability of a seller or a group of sellers to profitably maintain the prices above a competitive level and control the total output for a noteworthy period of time.
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Marco Colino, Sandra. "16. An analysis of the principal abusive practices." In Competition Law of the EU and UK, 352–404. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198725053.003.0016.
Abstract:
This chapter focuses on the most important pricing and non-pricing practices, which together constitute the larger part of the anti-competitive and exploitative abuses of dominant firms. The types of conduct considered abusive of market power are similar under most competition regimes, and include both pricing and non-pricing practices. The ‘form-based’ analysis of abusive practices is progressively shifting to an ‘effects-based approach’. In the EU and the UK, both exclusionary and exploitative abuses may fall foul of the relevant competition law provisions. Exclusionary practices are usually considered abusive when they are likely to lead to ‘anticompetitive foreclosure’. The EU and UK law and practice in relation to all these potential abuses is and will remain aligned until the UK has formally left the EU.
Conference papers on the topic "Anti-competitive practice":
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Parcalab, Carolina. "Vertical agreements on digital markets." In The 3rd International Scientific Conference "Development through Research and Innovation". Academy of Economic Studies of Moldova, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.53486/dri2022.04.
Abstract:
Introduction: Moldovan competition regulations have been modernized in 2012 in the spirit of European directives. However, European entrepreneurial experience, competitive culture, and case law in the field of competition rules’ enforcement are far above. The absence of an extensive experience in this field leads often to confusion about the practical application of competition rules, and the risk exists that pro-competitive economic behaviour is wrongly blamed as an anti-competitive practice. Vertical restraints may be often identified in business contracts with vertical structures, such as supply, distribution, franchising, and agency agreements, whether such contracts are implemented in traditional or digital markets. Digitization and innovative technological solutions have substantially changed the production and distribution chain of goods and services.
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Šokinjov, Stefan. "Tržišna koordinacija preduzeta s ciljem narušavanja konkurencije." In XVI Majsko savetovanje. University of Kragujevac, Faculty of Law, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.46793/upk20.819s.
Abstract:
Restriction of competition by object is characterised with those types of business practices which reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition. These are the most serious forms of business practices such as: price fixing, market sharing, output restrictions. But, restriction of competition can not be established simply considering the form of the practice. It means that it is not enough to recognise existence of price fixing to decide that competition is distorted by object. An analysis has to be done. But analysis of what? It is absolutely not analysis of restrictive effects because no actual anticompetitive effect need to be demonstrated where the practice by its very nature is sufficiently deleterious nor competition authorities can rely on restrictive effects as a proof that competition is restricted by object. Restrictions of competition by object and by effects are alternative. At the other side, assessment of restrictive impact of the practice must not be purely hypothetical. Assessment of the content of the business practice done in the economic and legal context of relevant market is a good starting point to determine boundaries of investigation but is not a final solution since the subject of assessment must be defined. The very acceptable direction in resolving of the puzle is to answer the question regarding the objectives of the practice and ask what is a rationale of the practice i.e. more precisely: can the practice produce pro- competitive effects? If it is plausible for the practice to be objectively justified by producing pro-competitive effects, the practice can not be determined as a restrictive by object (that does not exclude the possibility that the practice is restrictive due its effects if a comparison carried out in further procedure shows that restrictive effects outweigh pro-competitive ones or that prevention of competition is not indispensable for achieving of pro-competitive effects). That is why restrictions of competition by object are not per se prohibited. There are instances where price fixing, market sharing or output limitations are not deemed as practices that are restrictive by object because determined rationale of the practice indicates that the practice undertaken can be justified. For example, it can not be considered as a restriction of competition by object where an agreed output limit is equal to a maximum of capacity and production volume of a joint venture or to the agreed amount of outsourced products (if other so called hardcore restrictions are not present). Such objective explanations and other legitimate aims of competition restriction appearing in the pending case must be considered because restriction of competition by object must be interpreted strictly. Consequently, in the situation of a sufficiently deleterous practice where is not allowed for restriction of competition by object to be proved by existence of anti- competitive effects, it can be proved by absence of pro-competitive ones. Only that practice for which from experience derives conclusion that regularly restricts competition appreciably and which does not produce and is not capable to produce any pro-competitive effect restricts the competition by object. If pro- competitive effects can justify restriction an assessment of restrictive effects and comparison of former and latter is inevitable.
Reports on the topic "Anti-competitive practice":
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Altstein, Miriam, and Ronald J. Nachman. Rational Design of Insect Control Agent Prototypes Based on Pyrokinin/PBAN Neuropeptide Antagonists. United States Department of Agriculture, August 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.32747/2013.7593398.bard.
Abstract:
The general objective of this study was to develop rationally designed mimetic antagonists (and agonists) of the PK/PBAN Np class with enhanced bio-stability and bioavailability as prototypes for effective and environmentally friendly pest insect management agents. The PK/PBAN family is a multifunctional group of Nps that mediates key functions in insects (sex pheromone biosynthesis, cuticular melanization, myotropic activity, diapause and pupal development) and is, therefore, of high scientific and applied interest. The objectives of the current study were: (i) to identify an antagonist biophores (ii) to develop an arsenal of amphiphilic topically active PK/PBAN antagonists with an array of different time-release profiles based on the previously developed prototype analog; (iii) to develop rationally designed non-peptide SMLs based on the antagonist biophore determined in (i) and evaluate them in cloned receptor microplate binding assays and by pheromonotropic, melanotropic and pupariation in vivo assays. (iv) to clone PK/PBAN receptors (PK/PBAN-Rs) for further understanding of receptor-ligand interactions; (v) to develop microplate binding assays for screening the above SMLs. In the course of the granting period A series of amphiphilic PK/PBAN analogs based on a linear lead antagonist from the previous BARD grant was synthesized that incorporated a diverse array of hydrophobic groups (HR-Suc-A[dF]PRLa). Others were synthesized via the attachment of polyethylene glycol (PEG) polymers. A hydrophobic, biostablePK/PBAN/DH analog DH-2Abf-K prevented the onset of the protective state of diapause in H. zea pupae [EC50=7 pmol/larva] following injection into the preceding larval stage. It effectively induces the crop pest to commit a form of ‘ecological suicide’. Evaluation of a set of amphiphilic PK analogs with a diverse array of hydrophobic groups of the formula HR-Suc-FTPRLa led to the identification of analog T-63 (HR=Decyl) that increased the extent of diapause termination by a factor of 70% when applied topically to newly emerged pupae. Another biostablePK analog PK-Oic-1 featured anti-feedant and aphicidal properties that matched the potency of some commercial aphicides. Native PK showed no significant activity. The aphicidal effects were blocked by a new PEGylated PK antagonist analog PK-dF-PEG4, suggesting that the activity is mediated by a PK/PBAN receptor and therefore indicative of a novel and selective mode-of-action. Using a novel transPro mimetic motif (dihydroimidazole; ‘Jones’) developed in previous BARD-sponsored work, the first antagonist for the diapause hormone (DH), DH-Jo, was developed and shown to block over 50% of H. zea pupal diapause termination activity of native DH. This novel antagonist development strategy may be applicable to other invertebrate and vertebrate hormones that feature a transPro in the active core. The research identifies a critical component of the antagonist biophore for this PK/PBAN receptor subtype, i.e. a trans-oriented Pro. Additional work led to the molecular cloning and functional characterization of the DH receptor from H. zea, allowing for the discovery of three other DH antagonist analogs: Drosophila ETH, a β-AA analog, and a dF analog. The receptor experiments identified an agonist (DH-2Abf-dA) with a maximal response greater than native DH. ‘Deconvolution’ of a rationally-designed nonpeptide heterocyclic combinatorial library with a cyclic bis-guanidino (BG) scaffold led to discovery of several members that elicited activity in a pupariation acceleration assay, and one that also showed activity in an H. zea diapause termination assay, eliciting a maximal response of 90%. Molecular cloning and functional characterization of a CAP2b antidiuretic receptor from the kissing bug (R. prolixus) as well as the first CAP2b and PK receptors from a tick was also achieved. Notably, the PK/PBAN-like receptor from the cattle fever tick is unique among known PK/PBAN and CAP2b receptors in that it can interact with both ligand types, providing further evidence for an evolutionary relationship between these two NP families. In the course of the granting period we also managed to clone the PK/PBAN-R of H. peltigera, to express it and the S. littoralis-R Sf-9 cells and to evaluate their interaction with a variety of PK/PBAN ligands. In addition, three functional microplate assays in a HTS format have been developed: a cell-membrane competitive ligand binding assay; a Ca flux assay and a whole cell cAMP ELISA. The Ca flux assay has been used for receptor characterization due to its extremely high sensitivity. Computer homology studies were carried out to predict both receptor’s SAR and based on this analysis 8 mutants have been generated. The bioavailability of small linear antagonistic peptides has been evaluated and was found to be highly effective as sex pheromone biosynthesis inhibitors. The activity of 11 new amphiphilic analogs has also been evaluated. Unfortunately, due to a problem with the Heliothis moth colony we were unable to select those with pheromonotropic antagonistic activity and further check their bioavailability. Six peptides exhibited some melanotropic antagonistic activity but due to the low inhibitory effect the peptides were not further tested for bioavailability in S. littoralis larvae. Despite the fact that no new antagonistic peptides were discovered in the course of this granting period the results contribute to a better understanding of the interaction of the PK/PBAN family of Nps with their receptors, provided several HT assays for screening of libraries of various origin for presence of PK/PBAN-Ragonists and antagonists and provided important practical information for the further design of new, peptide-based insecticide prototypes aimed at the disruption of key neuroendocrine physiological functions in pest insects.