Academic literature on the topic 'Anti-blasphemy'

This study examines the constitutionality of Indonesia’s Anti-Blasphemy Law, which has been challenged unsuccessfully at the Constitutional Court on three occasions, in 2009, 2012, and 2018. While the Court has acknowledged the law’s provisions are open to multiple interpretations, it insists on maintaining the law as it is, on the grounds that the right to religious expression is not absolute, as freedom and rights are restricted under Article 28J of the 1945 Constitution. The Court believes that canceling the law would create a dangerous legal vacuum. The ambiguity of the Court’s decisions on the constitutionality of the Anti-Blasphemy Law is illustrated in recent blasphemy cases that have not been explored in previous studies. This study uses a doctrinal legal approach to examine why the Anti-Blasphemy Law is flawed and to analyze to what extent the ‘particular constitutionalism’ approach influenced the Court’s decisions when declaring the constitutionality of the law. As such, the Court’s misinterpretation of the core principles of the competing rights – the right to religious freedom and the right to freedom of expression – and its standard limitation, have been ignored. The findings of this study show that in dealing with the Anti-Blasphemy Law, the Court has a narrow and limited recognition of human rights law. The Court’s fear of revoking the Anti-Blasphemy Law is based only on assumptions and is less supported by facts. The Court has failed to realize that the implementation of the flawed Anti-Blasphemy Law in various cases has triggered public disorder, with people taking justice into their own hands.

In this essay I develop a blasphemy counter-discourse arguing that it was ecclesial and state authorities who committed blasphemies, which were condemned by Pussy Riot’s Punk Prayer. Thus, the performance in this respect may be interpreted as an anti-blasphemy protest. The blasphemy list includes the collaboration of the church with the authoritarian state, known as heresy of Sergianism; Caesar and Temple idolatry, blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, Virgin Mary and Folly for Christ’s sake. The Punk Prayer may be interpreted as a feminine version of the Lord’s Prayer – Mater Nostra. Several corporeal narratives in the background – women’s dress code and rape debates, Virgin Mary’s belt, and its alleged miraculous ability to help women to deliver a baby – may be seen as allegories of feminist versus patriarchal opposition in Russian religious and political culture.

As the largest Muslim country, Indonesia is on the way to balancing the order of its people, their religious practice, and how these two are influencing the public sphere. There is an existing regulation called Anti-Blasphemy Law which contains any rule to guarantee that religion and the public sphere do not contradict from one to another. Related to it, this research found that in this digital era with an advanced development on technology, some factors potentially create any form of manipulation on religion which comprises religion itself, social dynamic, and legal instrument. This form of manipulation has also triggered the advancement of the interdependency discourse on religion and the public sphere. In the context of Indonesia, by its characteristic, to separate religion and the public sphere will only create other problems among religious people. Using normative legal research, this paper aims to look at the relevance of the Anti-Blasphemy Law to the socio-structural conditions of Indonesian society. In this research, it is argued that religion and the public sphere (state) should be placed through a form of functional differentiation concept, and found that there is an interdependent relationship between religion and the public sphere, nevertheless, Anti-Blasphemy Law failed to create and maintain this relation. Hence, legal reform on the Anti-Blasphemy Law has become a necessity in ensuring a balanced and harmonious (state) religious life.

Focused on Nikolai Gogol’s absurdist tale, “The Nose” (1835), this article is an investigation into the concealed representation of suppressed and marginalized libertine and anti-religious discourses in nineteenth-century Russian literature. The author identifies overlooked idiomatic phraseology, forgotten specificities of the Imperial hierarchy (the Table of Ranks), and allusions to religious customs and Christian rituals that would have been apparent to Gogol’s readers and shows how some were camouflaged to escape censorship in successive drafts of the work. The research builds on the approaches to Gogol’s language, imagery and plot developed earlier by the Russian Formalists, Tartu-Moscow semioticians, and a few other scholars, who revealed the latent obscenity of Gogol’s “rhinology” and the sacrilegious meaning of the tale’s very specific chronotope. The previous scholars’ observations are substantially supplemented by original findings. An integrated analysis of these aspects in their mutual relationship is required to understand what the telling details of the story reveal about Gogol’s religious and psychological crisis of the mid-1830s and to demonstrate how he aggregated indecent Shandyism, social satire, and religious blasphemy into a single quasi-oneiric narrative.

Cette thèse propose une lecture juridique, politique et sociale de l’application de la loi anti-blasphème de 1965 dans le plus grand pays musulman du monde, l’Indonésie. Plusieurs controverses sont apparues ces dernières années concernant la nature de la loi sur le blasphème dans la vie religieuse de la société démocratique indonésienne ; cette loi correspond-elle à la prévention des abus en matière de religion et/ou de blasphème, comme il est mentionné explicitement dans son titre, ou bien concernerait-elle plutôt la restriction de la liberté de religion et d’expression en matière religieuse ? En avril 2010, après le procès contrôlant la constitutionnalité de cette loi, une décision de la Cour constitutionnelle indonésienne a établi que la loi examinée ne correspondait pas à cette seconde lecture. Si cette loi a bien pour objectif de restreindre la liberté de religion ou d’expression en matière religieuse, selon la Cour, cela ne signifie pas que cette forme de restriction est inconstitutionnelle dès lors que la Constitution de 1945 en vigueur s’accompagne d’une restriction légale au respect ou à la sauvegarde des valeurs religieuses en particulier, à côté de la moralité, de la sécurité et de l’ordre public. Toutefois, les débats et les tensions au sein de la société concernant l’application de cette loi perdurent sans relâche. Les défenseurs des droits de l’homme maintiennent que l’existence d’une telle loi anti-blasphème est contraire à l’esprit de la démocratie. En revanche, les défenseurs de la censure religieuse s’obstinent à affirmer que cette loi est nécessaire pour éviter les conflits religieux. À travers une analyse de son contenu juridique et de sa mise en application, nous considérons que la loi anti-blasphème de 1965 a visé en premier lieu à entraver le déploiement des courants de croyance spirituelle locale ou des courants mystiques javanais qui, dans une certaine mesure, sont considérés par les musulmans en particulier comme une menace pour les religions existantes et pour la désintégration du pays. Dans un second temps, nous verrons que l’existence de ladite loi est davantage destinée à restreindre le nombre des religions reconnues par l’État d’une part, et à réprimer les courants religieux « dissidents » ou « hétérodoxes » d’autre part. Si les actes jugés comme blasphématoires, parmi lesquels figure la diffusion d’interprétation religieuse « déviantes » de l’orthodoxie, sont des infractions sanctionnées, ce n’est pas la loi anti-blasphème de 1965 qui sert de référence, mais l’article 156a du Code pénal qui trouve son origine dans ladite loi. Ainsi, la loi anti-blasphème de 1965 est plutôt utilisée pour restreindre la liberté de religion et de conviction au sens large, alors que l’article 156a du Code pénal est chargé de limiter la liberté d’expression en matière religieuse. En Indonésie comme ailleurs, le renforcement de l’application de la loi anti-blasphème va de pair avec l’émergence des groupes religieux radicaux qui veulent voir triompher leur conception totalitaire d’une liberté d’expression bridée par le respect de la foi religieuse. Ces derniers utilisent de cette loi non seulement à des fins religieuses, mais également à des fins politiques, notamment celle déstabiliser un régime « laïque » ou bien d’étendre leur influence. L’objectif de cette thèse est non seulement d’analyser la nature de la loi anti-blasphème de 1965, mais aussi de proposer une perspective alternative pour aborder les conflits juridiques en Indonésie concernant les deux droits fondamentaux, à savoir le droit à la liberté de religion et le droit d’expression. La thèse vise alors la prévention des conflits juridiques en la matière et ainsi qu’à trouver un équilibre entre les libertés concernées
This thesis proposes a legal, political and social reading of the application of the blasphemy law in the largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia. Several controversies have emerged in recent years regarding the nature of the blasphemy law in the religious life of the Indonesian democratic society. For instance, disagreement remains with regards to the intent of this law, i.e., whether it really aims at preventing misuse of religion and/or acts of blasphemy, as explicitly mentioned in its title, or whether it intends to restrict the freedom of religion and religious expression. In April 2010, after the examination of the constitutionality of this law, the Indonesian Constitutional Court ruled out the second possibility. The court further argues that even if the law has an unintended effect of restricting the freedom of religion or religious expression, it is not against the constitution since the 1945 Constitution is accompanied by a legal restriction to respect or preserve religious values in particular, as well as morality, security and public order. However, the debates and tensions within society regarding the implementation of this law continue unabated. On the one hand, human rights defenders persist in saying that the existing anti-blasphemy law is contrary to the spirit of democracy. On the other, defenders of religious censorship persist in resisting that this law is necessary to avoid religious conflicts. Through an analysis of legal content and its implementation, I argue that the blasphemy law of 1965 initially aims to hinder the development of the local spiritual belief stream or Javanese mystical groups, which to some extent are considered by Muslims in particular as a threat to existing religions and a source of disintegration of the country. Further, I maintain that the existence of the above-mentioned law has the tendency to restrict the number of religions officially acknowledged by the State and to repress “dissident” or “heterodox” religious movements. If acts considered blasphemous, including the "deviant" religious interpretation of orthodoxy, are punishable offenses, it is not the anti-blasphemy law of 1965 that serves as a reference, but the article 156a of the Penal Code, which has its origin in that blasphemy law does. As a consequence, the blasphemy law of the 1965 is rather used to restrict the freedom of religion and belief in the broad sense, while article 156a of the Penal Code is applied to limit the freedom of religious expression. In Indonesia, as elsewhere, the strengthening of the application of the blasphemy law goes hand in hand with the emergence of radical religious groups intend to promote their totalitarian concept of freedom of expression restrained by respect for the religious faith. The latter make use of this law not only for religious reasons, but also for political reasons, including destabilizing a secular regime or extending their influence. The thesis does not only aim to analyze the nature of the blasphemy law of 1965, but also to propose an alternative perspective in understanding and solving the problem of the legal conflicts in Indonesia pertaining to the two fundamental rights, namely the right to freedom of religion and expression. The thesis also seeks to find a balance between two freedoms and to propose preventive measures that can be adopted in the aforementioned legal conflicts

In recent years, Pakistan has witnessed incidents such as lynching of a student on a university campus, torching of a Christian couple alive, attacks on entire neighbourhoods by angry mobs, and assassination of a governor upon allegations of blasphemy. This thesis begins with the premise that the anti-blasphemy violence is meaningful political action and locates it within the wider socio-cultural and historical context of Pakistan. I argue in this thesis that blasphemy accusations and the violence that often follows them are an outcome of the wider concern for maintaining purity at the national, communal, and individual levels. The creation and the consolidation of the state of Pakistan has popularised certain ideas of national identity based on an imagined homogenous community defined by its purity. At the local level, the national identity is interpreted within specifically local cultural notions of sexual, ancestral, communal and religious purity. At an individual level, the concern for the purity of the self and the society has led to widespread moral and existential anxieties. It is within the context of these anxieties concerning the purity of the nation, the community, and the self that the blasphemy accusations gain traction. By focusing on the inter-personal relationships between the accused and the accusers, this thesis contends that the accusations are triggered by perceived transgressions of social hierarchies and religio-cultural notions of purity among people known to each other. Through ethnographic examples, I demonstrate that most accusations are simultaneously motivated by religio-cultural ideals, emotions, and personal rivalries. However, once the blasphemy accusations have been made, regardless of the initial motives of the accusers, they quickly escalate into a shared religious concern inciting passionate responses from a much wider audience of believers living with anxieties concerning their faith, their religio-national identity, and the purity of their society. To the mobilised crowds, the accused becomes a symbolic figure, 'the impure other' who threatens the national, communal, and individual purity. The violent punishment of 'the impure other' that follows is however not inevitable; rather it is orchestrated and enabled by various actors motivated by both reason and passion. Some of these actors are key proponents of ideas of popular justice. By promoting non-state punishments of alleged blasphemers, the agents of popular justice contest the state's sole authority over legitimate violence and its sovereignty in representing Islamic ideals. The thesis analyses blasphemy-related violence as political contestation through which the state's interpretation and implementation of justice is challenged by those competing with the state in the shared religio-political sphere. The state and non-state proponents of justice draw upon the same sources of legitimacy and sovereignty in claiming to represent Islamic principles of justice. Consequently, the assertions by proponents of non-state violence become enshrined in the state's foundations and its laws. This thesis thus reworks accepted analytical dichotomies of reason/emotion, culture/religion, traditional/Western, state/non-state and legal/extra-legal to extend our understanding of the upsurge of blasphemy related violence in Pakistan.

‘Blasphemy and religion’ evaluates the concept of blasphemy in religion, looking at the common theme emerging across the world religions. In Islam, ‘blasphemy’ is about protecting the community from fitnah (civil unrest). In Hinduism and Buddhism, it is about preventing adharma (non-dharma or anti-dharma). In the Bible, blasphemy is a crime of lèse-majesté, concerned with protecting the dignity of socially revered gods and men. In each case, blasphemy is social, political, and religious, and prohibiting blasphemy is about protecting community cohesion. The relationship between blasphemy and religious violence and the concept of inner-religious blasphemy is an interesting point of discussion here.

Black metal, one of the most extreme subgenres of metal music, is famous for its brutal, multimodal expression in lyrics, imagery and music. The genre’s metanarrative is centred around a disdainful and provocative stance towards religion, one infused with an anti-establishment and anti-authoritarian rhetoric. Blasphemy commonly lies at the heart of this metanarrative. This chapter investigates the use of Islamic semiotics in Turkish black metal. The author argues that the use of anti-Islamic references is closely related to a dialectical relationship with international as well as national expectations of subcultural concepts such as authenticity and identity. Blasphemy in black metal must be further recognised as a subcultural response and resistance to the dominance of pious conservatism in Turkey.

Abstract This chapter pieces together the trail of violence that led up to the Second Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan in 1974, where Ahmadis were constitutionally excluded from claiming Muslim citizenship. It examines several anti-Ahmadiyya riots that occurred in the early years of Pakistan's formation. This chapter ultimately finds that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's transformation of blasphemy from a criminal offence punishable under the penal code into a constitutional provision had severe legal and political consequences for Pakistan.

This second chapter on The Satanic Verses considers the collision between the novel’s anti-statist energies and Rushdie’s increasing dependency on the Thatcher government after the fatwa, an unlikely custodian of literary freedom at the end of the Cold War. It then turns to the precise ways the state offered Rushdie protection, focusing on the anachronistic stipulations in English common law restricting the crime of blasphemy to the Church of England debated in the legal cases against the novel in the UK and in Europe. The second half revisits the secular foundations of the British legal system, considering the alternative stance on free expression in diverse societies adopted in British India and Bhikhu Parekh’s communitarian alternative to the individualism of British liberalism.

The iconic case of book-burning in the late twentieth century is Salman Rushdie. The chapter begins by examining in detail the events of early 1989, and their ramifications for the history of censorship, blasphemy and ‘hate crime’. The case of Rushdie is then juxtaposed with the sixteenth-century persecution of the anti-Trinitarian Michael Servetus, which had profound meaning in the Enlightenment arguments of Voltaire and Rousseau. What is at stake in the argument between Servetus and Calvin, and what does it tell us about the power of the idea of the written book in the emergence of modernity? The chapter argues against a simple model of secularization to posit instead a deeper meaning in the concept of heresy, still alive today. The chapter ends with a discussion of Stefan Zweig and Paul Celan, and the idea of the ‘shibboleth’ in language.

This chapter addresses two related subjects, the reception of De Hooghe’s satires and the role of the satirist. The focus of this discussion is the so-called Pamphlet War of 1690, the primary vehicle for much of the criticism of De Hooghe’s satires. In twelve scathing pamphlets published against Romeyn de Hooghe in the first several months of 1690, witnesses alleged his blasphemy, atheism, and sexual perversion, and embroiled him in a fevered exchange of pamphlets with representatives of Amsterdam. While such rhetoric employed against the printmaker in pamphlet literature vividly described his manifold immorality, Hollands hollende koe (Holland’s running cow), an anti-Williamite satire produced by the printmaker’s enemies in his distinctive etching style, provided material ‘evidence’ of his lack of integrity. With this print, De Hooghe was accused of working for both sides of the political divide—producing Orangist satires for William III and anti-Williamite satires for the Amsterdam regents. The potency of Hollands hollende koe depends fundamentally upon the assumption of integrity between satirist and satire, the notion that he or she believes in the positions and ideologies espoused in his or her satires. It will be argued that the conflation of satirist and satire and the attendant expectation of moral conviction on the part of the satirist are not only associated with the genre of political satire, they are engendered by it and feature prominently throughout its history.