Academic literature on the topic 'Andijan massacre'

On August 14, 1985, during the armed conflict between the Communist Party of Peru, known as Shining Path, and the Peruvian state, an army patrol entered the town of Accomarca, in the Andean region of Ayacucho, and assassinated 69 peasants, presumed sympathizers of the insurgents. The majority of the survivors were displaced to the city of Lima, where they created an organization of victims and joined the Asociación de Hijos del Distrito Accomarca. Since 2011, the survivors and relatives of the victims have been remembering the massacre and transmitting their memories to their children through a Carnival performance of music and dance. Carnival is a constructive space for the production of other forms of memory and for the pursuit of justice and reparations through participatory choreography and musical performance. El 14 de agosto de 1985—-durante el conflicto armado entre el Partido Comunista de Perú, conocido como Sendero Luminoso, y el Estado peruano—una patrulla del ejército entró en el pueblo de Accomarca, en la región andina de Ayacucho, y asesinó a 69 campesinos, presuntos simpatizantes de los insurgentes. La mayoría de los sobrevivientes fueron desplazados a la ciudad de Lima, en donde crearon una organización de víctimas y se unieron a la Asociación de Hijos del Distrito Accomarca. Desde 2011, los sobrevivientes y los familiares de las víctimas han estado recordando la masacre y transmitiendo sus memorias a sus hijos a través de un espectáculo carnavalesco de música y baile. El carnaval es un espacio constructivo para la producción de otras formas de la memoria y para la búsqueda de la justicia y la reparación por medio de una coreografía participativa y una representación musical.

This thesis is a study of interethnic relationships between the ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley, the cross-border zone between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, from independence to 2005. It argues that strong ethnic tension between the ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz was present during 'the Yellow Revolution' and the Andijan massacre in that year. The economically dominant ethnic Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan played a role in initiating the opposition due to ongoing political marginalization by the government, while the opposition appealed to Kyrgyz ethno-nationalism and failed to draw wider political support from the Uzbeks or other minorities. As a result, there the ethnic minorities' lines were divided into pro-Akaev and pro-Revolution group. In the case of the Andijan massacre, the Uzbek government, after the arrival of the Uzbek asylum seekers into Kyrgyzstan territory on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley, had stirred latent fears amongst local Kyrgyz through their propaganda broadcasting. The economically marginalized ethnic Kyrgyz on the Kyrgyzstan side of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley had subsequently turned against the refugees and the tension was not alleviated until the refugees were moved to Romania by UNHCR. Both cases exhibit that the ethnic tension between these titular ethnic groups has deeper roots, which could be taken back to the pre-1991 Soviet era. A range of dynamics affect interethnic relations: (1) the potential for harmonious relations between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz has been reduced by the rise of 'pure Uzbek' and 'pure Kyrgyz' ethnic-nationalism among these two ethnic communities in their newly created states; (2) a new economic aspect of the ethnic tension has arisen since 1991 in both eastern Uzbekistan and southern Kyrgyzstan as a result of the ethnic Uzbeks dominating the local economy in southern Kyrgyzstan; and (3) clan networks have strongly influenced the flow of post-independence politics. The revival of Islam and fundamentalist and radical ideologies, before and after independence had added complexity to the ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz relationships in the Ferghana Valley. Initially democratic nationalists and Islamic nationalists shared some goals, but this commonality faded as Islamic groups became to be seen as a critic and a threat to the Uzbek government and were subsequently banned. The ethnic Uzbeks express more religiosity than the ethnic Kyrgyz, while the majority of the supporters of Islamic fundamentalism and radicalism are the Uzbeks and a smaller number of ethnic Kyrgyz supporters. The failure of post-independence economic transitions of both countries have deepened rural poverty in eastern Uzbekistan and southern Kyrgyzstan, and gradually created collective poverty on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border zone on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley. The ethnic Kyrgyz have been victimized by the deepening rural poverty on both sides of the border. As a result, creation of 'poorer Kyrgyz' vs. 'richer Uzbeks' dynamic has sharpened the conflict between these two ethnicities.