Journal articles on the topic 'Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant'
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КУДИНОВ, Владимир Владимирович. "CYBERTERRORISM: MAIN THREATS AND LEGAL REGULATION ISSUES." Расследование преступлений: проблемы и пути их решения, no. 3(33) (September 30, 2021): 50–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.54217/2411-1627.2021.33.3.006.
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В статье рассматриваются особенности правового регулирования противодействия кибертерроризму, исследовано понятие «кибертерроризм», показаны основные угрозы, исходящие от террористических организаций «Исламское государство Ирака и Леванта» (ИГИЛ) и «Аль-Каида» (запрещены в РФ), предложены основные направления по противодействию угрозам кибертерроризма. The article examines the features of the legal regulation of countering cyberterrorism, explores the concept of “cyberterrorism”, shows the main threats emanating from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Al-Qaeda (terrorist organizations banned in the Russian Federation), suggests the main directions of countering the threats of cyberterrorism.
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Siebert, Johannes Ulrich, and Detlof von Winterfeldt. "Comparative Analysis of Terrorists’ Objectives Hierarchies." Decision Analysis 17, no. 2 (June 2020): 97–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/deca.2019.0400.
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To develop effective counterterrorism strategies, it is important to understand the capabilities and objectives of terrorist groups. Much of the understanding of these groups comes from intelligence collection and analysis of their capabilities. In contrast, the objectives of terrorists are less well understood. In this article, we describe a decision analysis methodology to identify and structure the objectives of terrorists based on the statements and writings of their leaders. This methodology was applied in three case studies, resulting in the three objectives hierarchies of al-Qaeda, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and Hezbollah. In this article, we propose a method to compare the three objectives hierarchies, highlight their key differences, and draw conclusions about effective counterterrorism strategies. We find that all three terrorist groups have a wide range of objectives going far beyond the objective of killing and terrorizing people in the non-Muslim world. Among the shared objectives are destroying Israel and expelling Western powers from the Middle East. All three groups share the ambition to become a leader in the Islamic world. Key distinctions are the territorial ambitions of ISIL and Hezbollah versus the large-scale attack objectives of al-Qaeda. Objectives specific to ISIL are the establishment of a caliphate in Iraq and Syria and the re-creation of the power of Sunni Islam. Hezbollah has unique objectives related to the establishment of a Palestine State and to maintain the relationship with and support of Iran and Syria. Al-Qaeda’s objectives remain focused on large-scale attacks in the West. We also note a recent shift to provide support for small-scale attacks in the West by both al-Qaeda and ISIL. Our method can be used for comparing objectives hierarchies of different organizations as well as for comparing objectives hierarchies over time of one organization.
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Wardin, Katarzyna. "Security of passenger transport in the Baltic Sea in the context of foreign terrorist fighters." Journal of Transportation Security 13, no. 3-4 (July 8, 2020): 215–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12198-020-00213-3.
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AbstractThe Baltic Sea basin is one of the busiest areas in Europe in terms of the passenger transport and is considered as a domestic sea of the European Union, very important for the development and prosperity of all citizens. A high number of ferries connections along with exclusive cruise ships, visiting the Baltic countries, make the sea very busy. At the same time the security of lines of communications has become the highest priority, especially that a possibility of terrorist attacks still poses a serious threat. Although terrorism has been being fought intensively since 11th September, terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda or Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, are still able to attack. The article considers the threat of organizing a terrorist attack posed by Foreign Terrorist Fighters returning home to the Baltic countries. Due to the fairly high number of Foreign Terrorist Fighters in some countries around the Baltic Sea, very intense passenger traffic in the area, and the appeals which have been proclaimed by Al-Qaeda and Islamic State leaders, there is a possibility of a terrorist attack occurrence in the near future. Cited facts lead to the conclusion that some precautions should be taken both in terms of technical and organizational measures to make passenger traffic secure.
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Chwiej, Edyta. "The relations between Latin America and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant." Anuario Latinoamericano – Ciencias Políticas y Relaciones Internacionales 3 (November 28, 2016): 183. http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/al.2016.3.183.
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Oluwaseun Samuel Osadola and Godwin Stephen Emah. "Terrorism in Nigeria and Her Neighbours." Konfrontasi: Jurnal Kultural, Ekonomi dan Perubahan Sosial 9, no. 3 (September 9, 2022): 439–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.33258/konfrontasi2.v9i3.237.
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Good neighbourliness is no doubt a key policy in managing inter-state relations in the international relations. It developed out of the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty of states in international law. In recent years, terrorism has become a game of domestic and international politics with implications for peace, security and good governance. Nigeria lies between five francophone countries with geo strategic, identity and security implications. This ipso facto connotes the idea of a split of ethno religious groups originally bounded in historical empires but now exist within the borders of colonially separated states. The recent link and cooperation between the Boko Haram sect and other notorious terrorist groups like Isis (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), al Qaeda, and ISWA (Islamic State of West Africa), have internationalized their activities and spread their tentacles into the shores of Nigeria’s neighbouring states like Niger, Cameroon and Chad. This paper argues that terrorism has become a significant setback for global relations and development, considering the good neighbourliness policy which is meant to foster good relationships among states in the international community. This work relies on secondary materials and employs descriptive and analytic methods in analyzing the data for the study.
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Klik, Jan. "Hijrah of Our Time: Islamic Concept of Religious Emigration in Contemporary Salafism." Acta FF 14, no. 1 (2022): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.24132/actaff.2022.14.1.1.
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This study presents a comparison of the religious-legal concept of the hijrah in the approach of schools of Salafism, which are the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and the Muhammad al-Albani’s and his disciples’ teachings. The first, theoretical section of the submitted material, intends to provide a contextual ground on which the analytical chapter of this article is built up. The subsequent analytical section focuses on the breakdown of Salafist’s take on the hijrah through a qualitative content analysis of several texts that include, on one hand, the production of Muhammad al-Albani and his students, and on the other hand, the magazines Dabiq and Rumiyah, which were published on behalf of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. The reason for choosing these particular authors and their conception of hijrah as the main research intention of the presented study is that on one hand the Islamic State represents the latest entity that conceptually grasped the topic and, above all, made it one of the pillars of its general ideology and on the other hand teachings of al-Albani are extremely influential in mainstream Salafism. The analysis showed that in general, both scrutinized Salafist schools are similar in the main principles, ie. both consider the hijrah to be an ongoing religious duty. However, they differ in details and also in the emphasis on violence, with the Islamic State emphasizing that hijrah and jihad are two stages of a single process, with the only possible destination for the hijrah being Islamic State territory.
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Werfelli, Wissal. "Trump’s Peace Plan." RUDN Journal of World History 14, no. 2 (April 29, 2022): 223–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2312-8127-2022-14-2-223-234.
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Since the 1960s, the US foreign policy has been characterized by relative stability in interaction with the dynamics of the Palestinian conflict. Well-established American institutions, legal, constitutional and political restrictions, and various groups of interests and pressure, especially the Jewish lobby, research centers, media, and American public opinion, which mostly support the Israeli point of view, are the important factors in developing and defining the foreign policy of the United States. One more factor relates to international and regional shifts. As the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was going on, and since the signing of the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s, the first issue among the priorities of successive US administrations in the Middle East until regional developments imposed other priorities as a result of the events of September 2001, and the subsequent occupation of Iraq in 2003. The emergence of Al Qaeda, the turmoil of the Middle East region and the disturbance of its political, social and religious structure coincided with the emergence of the so-called Arab revolutions of 2011 and extremist jihadist organizations such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Therefore, the role of Trump administration was determined by developments within the US on the one hand, and by the interaction of events in the Middle East region on the other hand.
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RASHEED, ASMAA. "Gender relations within the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)." Journal Ishraqat Tanmawya 27 (June 2021): 234–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.51424/ishq.27.9.
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In June 2014, fighters belonging to an extremist group calling itself (ISIS) and nicknamed (ISIS) invaded the city of Mosul, the second largest Iraqi governorate, and announced the establishment of the Islamic Islamic Caliphate, which lasted until 2017. ISIS's control spread values related to the isolation of women and a hierarchical vision of the relationship between the sexes that works to reinforce and consecrate male domination and places women in a lower position. Several mechanisms have been adopted with the aim of returning women to the private sphere and keeping them at home, including the imposition of legal dress and preventing women from going out except with a mahram, and the rule of hisbah and penalties. The current study aims to provide an understanding of the laws and ideology governing gender relations within societies that ISIS has controlled for more than two years. It addresses three main issues, including the harassment of women, the attempt to control their bodies, and the monitoring and punishment mechanisms that were practiced on women. And the roles of women in societies dominated by the organization, and the issue of marriage. The study relied on testimonies and interviews conducted with a number of women who lived through ISIS rule in Mosul, Salah al-Din and Fallujah. In addition to reports issued by international organizations and documents published on the Internet and news circulated, which gave the information obtained more reliability. Key words: Iraq, ISIS, women, isolation, punishment, roles, marriage
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TRUEVTSEV, K. M. "MIDDLE EAST: MORPHOLOGY OF AND POST-CONFLICT DESIGN." Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law 10, no. 2 (November 2, 2017): 143–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2017-10-2-2.
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This article looks at the structure and the dynamics of the Middle Eastern crisis set in motion by the events of the Arab Spring. At the heart of the crisis was Syria, where antigovernment protests broke out in early 2011, almost in parallel with other countries also affected by the Arab Spring. Starting from late March 2011, the unrest morphed into a civil war, leading to a large-scale crisis engulfing the country by the end of the year. At first, the opposition to the Syrian regime consisted of numerous groups with varying political affiliations – from liberals to Islamists – however, by early 2012, radical Islamism came to dominate the opposition forces. And by the end of the same year, the opposition was spearheaded by an openly terrorist organization – the al-Nusra Front, an outgrowth of the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda. Over the same period, regional and international forces were becoming more and more involved in the Syrian crisis. Since 2012, in parallel with the Syrian crisis, there has been another internal conflict raging in the Middle East, namely in Iraq, with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) taking the foreground and combining groups of Iraqi al-Qaeda militants with Baathist underground forces. In 2014–2015, ISIL took hold of large swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq, effectively turning the Syrian civil war into a regional conflict. In addition to Syria and Iraq, the ongoing crisis has involved – either directly or indirectly – such actors as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and a number of other regional powers. Turkey has been indirectly involved in the Syrian crisis since its very beginning, but starting from 2016 its engagement in the conflict has become much more active – not only in Syria, but also in Iraq. In 2013, Iran started to interfere in the Syrian crisis directly, using its Shia allies, and expanded its presence onto Iraq in 2014. Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s participation in the Syrian conflict has been indirect, mainly through military and financial assistance provided to their clients inside the country. However, Saudi Arabia’s activities in Syria have started to decline in 2015, due to its military involvement in Yemen, which – in a broader context – can be perceived as a peripheral component of the large regional conflict. In addition to the above mentioned components, one could also name a number of other equally important factors to the crisis. One of them is that the ranks of al- Nusra and ISIL militants have been reinforced not only by people coming from the Arab countries, but also from the citizens of Western Europe, North America and the former USSR. Another factor has been the growing role of Kurdish groups in the confrontation with the terrorists, especially with ISIL. This has led to the creation of a Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. At the same time, an armed confrontation began in Turkish Kurdistan, which Turkey views as a threat to its territorial integrity. The Syrian crisis has also been marked by involvement of global powers, such as the US and Russia. The US-led international coalition has not succeeded in changing the course of the conflict – on the other hand, Russia’s involvement since the second half of 2015 has made a significant difference. With the end of the campaign against ISIL already in view, and with the prospects for a successful intra- Syrian settlement, it would seem reasonable to raise the question of the post-conflict configuration of the region, which is discussed at the end of the article.
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Chunlin, Liu, and Rohan Gunaratna. "Global threat landscape 2022." UNISCI Journal 20, no. 58 (January 15, 2022): 141–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.31439/unisci-137.
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Three trends will characterise the evolving global terror threat landscape in 2022. First, the cascading implications of the return of the Taliban-al Qaeda alliance to Afghanistan on August 15, 2021. Second, the diffusion of the Islamic State threat from the Levant, notably from Iraqi-Syrian theatre. Third, the online surge of extremist and violent content especially of Islamist and Far Right entities on servers in North America and Europe mobilising and radicalizing especially youth. With lockdowns, partial lockdowns and other pandemic restrictions, the challenges facing government security forces - military, law enforcement and intelligence surged and both in resource allocation for training and mobility for operations hampered their performance and efficacy. The focus on humanitarian challenges by governments during the pandemic was ably exploited by threat groups to expand their support bases or capture territory. On the other hand, a range of ideological and material threats manifested in 2021. Some will institutionalise both in the physical and digital spaces in 2022. With radicalisation and reciprocal radicalisation of Islamists and Far Right threat groups, their networks, cells and personalities will stage attacks.
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Yashlavskii, A. "Extremist Groups in the Syrian Civil War: New Actors & New Threats." World Economy and International Relations, no. 10 (2014): 93–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2014-10-93-104.
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Since 2012 one can speak about a real civil war in Syria with participation of different political forces. Extremist Islamist jihadist groups like “Front al-Nusra” and “Islamic State of Iraq and Levant” (ISIL) play very active role among them. Relations between ruling elites and Islamists have been very complex in Syria during the past decades. On the one hand, Syrian Alawite regime is secular and nationalist. On the other hand, official Damascus used to be one of the sponsors of the militant Islamist anti-Israeli and anti-Western groups in the Middle East. Besides, Syria is a close ally of Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanese Shi'ite Hizbullah. From our point of view, the union between Assad's Syria and Islamist groups was rather tactical than strategic one. Syria always played very important role for Sunni Islam, e.g., “the Land of Sham” had a big importance in eschatological beliefs of Sunni Muslims as a place of the final battle between Believers and Dajjal (Anti-Christ). Many foreign Islamist militant involved in Syrian War are inspired by this belief. Additionally, although a big majority of Syrians are Sunni, a dominance of Alawite sect in the political and social and economic life of the country disaffects of many Syrians with an escalation of Syrian conflict. Islamization of “Syrian revolution” is connected with cruel oppression of opposition by Assad's forces and powerless position of the West. At the same time, islamisation is a common feature of the Arab Spring. Arab Spring extremist Islamists have appeared along with relatively moderate Islamist and secular pro-Western groups. Foreign militant Jihadists play an important role in radicalisation of Islamist factor in the conflict. While Shi'ite groups (like pro-Iranian Hizbullah) regards Syria as a crucial part of Shi'ite belt from Mediterranean to Iran, Sunni extremists are not going to lose ground in the face of Shiite 'heretics'. The involvement of Arab Wahhabi monarchies (Saudi Arabia and Qatar) in the current turbulence must be also noted. ISIL is now the key actor of Syrian civil war. It is active not only in Syria but also in Iraq, the homeland of the organization. Initially, this Sunni militant group was closely connected to Al Qaeda. Now the relationships between them are rather tense because of ISIL’s efforts to overmaster another Jihadist group, “Front al Nusra”. The strategic aim of the ISIL is an establishment of an Islamic State (in Iraq and later in Syria) and the restoration of Caliphate. The tactics of the ISIL include guerrilla warfare and cruel terrorist attacks against military and civil people. In Syria ISIL fights against Assad's forces as armed opposition (both secular and Islamist) for control over territories and power. “Front al Nusra” (Front of Support of the Land of Sham People, FN) is genetically connected to ISIL. In terms of ideology there are no divergences between two groups, but they are rivals when it concerns the issues of popular support and political influence. Some Syrian people consider FN as a local group in contrast to foreign militants dominated ISIL. Activities of Jihadist groups is a real danger not only for Syria, but for the whole region and even worldwide.
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Gurulé, Jimmy. "United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2199 & 2253." International Legal Materials 56, no. 6 (December 2017): 1144–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ilm.2017.41.
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In June 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) emerged on the world stage when its fighters seized Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city, after moving into Iraq from its original base in Syria. Led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-appointed caliph, ISIL's goal is to establish an Islamic caliphate in the Middle East. At its peak, ISIL was considered the wealthiest international terrorist organization in the world, estimated to have an annual budget of over $2 billion. ISIL controlled large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria, seizing control of Ramadi, the capital of Iraq's Anbar province, and the historic city of Palmyra in central Syria. In Iraq and Syria, ISIL also seized towns along important supply routes, and controlled critical infrastructure and border crossings. In 2015, the Central Intelligence Agency estimated that ISIL had between twenty thousand and thirty-one thousand fighters in Iraq and Syria, and approximately fifteen thousand of its members were foreign recruits. The acts of brutality committed by ISIL include beheading American journalists; the torture and ruthless slaughter of civilians; the persecution of ethnic minorities and Christians; and gross violations of international human rights that constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.
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Urs, Priya. "The Role of the Security Council in the Use of Force against the ‘Islamic State’." Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online 19, no. 1 (May 30, 2016): 65–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18757413-00190004.
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The destabilization of Iraq and Syria by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Al Nusrah Front has ignited extensive global debate about how to quell the group’s territorial gains in the region, and, preferably, to do so in a manner that is compliant with international law. In June 2014, the isil proclaimed the formation of an Islamic caliphate, boasting swathes of territory straddling the border between Iraq and Syria. A growing number of States have joined forces in a United States-led coalition against the isil, with varying contributions including airstrikes, military aid and humanitarian assistance. The on-going crisis in the Middle East presents international lawyers with an opportunity to re-evaluate the system of collective security envisaged in the 1945 Charter of the United Nations. This article evaluates the Security Council’s approach in addressing the situation in the Middle East as an ongoing threat to international peace and security, focusing on three areas in which it may play significant roles: 1. its participation, if any, in the exercise of self-defence under Art. 51; 2. its authorization of forcible and non-forcible measures under Chapter vii; and 3. the enduring obligation of multilateral cooperation it imposes upon States in the context of terrorism.
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Cole, Juan. "Caliphates and Juntas: Ottoman Legacies in Today's Controversies over Religion and State in the Arab World." Social Science History 42, no. 4 (2018): 797–810. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ssh.2018.2.
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Egypt and Iraq display contrasting policies in the relationship between state and religion. Egypt's nationalist officer corps has subordinated political Islam, stigmatized the Muslim Brotherhood, and bended clerics to its will. While Arab Iraq presents two models, both hold a similar stance on religion: one an elected, parliamentary government dominated by political Islam and Shiite clerics; the other a theocratic Sunni caliphate of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Egypt and Iraq are heirs to two differing Ottoman solutions to the problem of religion-state relations, the legacy of which is often overlooked. The most prevalent model subordinates clergy and religion to the state in the tradition of Mehmet I. This model is characteristic of the empire in its glory years and would have been recognized by Suleyman the Magnificent. In the other model, the late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Hamidian caliphate, the head of state claimed temporal and religious authority to combat colonial penetration. Neither Ottoman nor colonial norms of governance, nor nationalist states succeeding them, developed methods to deal with multiethnic states or avoid a tyranny of the majority. Unlike the modernizing Ottoman caliphate, however, the caliphates of Mulla Omar and Ibrahim al-Samarra'i display a literalist reading of sharia and a ruthless disregard of humane prohibitions in mainstream Islamic law against killing innocents. Of the two models, the likely victor is the state-centric subordination of religion because latter-day caliphates have flourished only briefly as radical and sectarian movements in rugged territories where power vacuums existed.
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Schindler, Hans-Jakob, and Frederique Gautier. "Looting and Smuggling of Artifacts as a Strategy to Finance Terrorism Global Sanctions as a Disruptive and Preventive Tool." International Journal of Cultural Property 26, no. 3 (August 2019): 331–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0940739119000225.
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Abstract:In recent years, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)1 as well as several Al-Qaida affiliates have used the systematic and large-scale looting of antiquities as one of their income streams. Due to the large-scale and organized looting activities of these groups, in particular, in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), following various reports and recommendations by the ISIL, Al-Qaida and Taliban Monitoring Team has adopted a range of measures, chiefly among them the landmark UNSC Resolution 2347 (2017) to counter this threat. These measures demand that both member states’ regulators as well as private sector stakeholders take specific action to ensure that the art and antiquity trading industry is capable of defending itself against the misuse of their services to finance terrorism. This article outlines the various challenges member states and private industry are facing in this regard and explains how the various new UNSC provisions, including the measures outlined in UNSC Resolution 2347 (2017), could be employed effectively to counter this threat.
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Ben Alaya, Dorra. "The Jihadi Current and the Lay Thinking: A “Re-Anchorage” Process Hypothesis." RUDN Journal of Psychology and Pedagogics 18, no. 2 (December 15, 2021): 363–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-1683-2021-18-2-363-374.
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The Jihadi-salafist doctrine which is at the Islamist terrorism origin that affects several countries since the emergence of Al Qaeda in the late 80's, gave birth to the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham/Levant (ISIS/ISIL) established as a Caliphate in 2014. Despite the ISIS official military defeat in 2019, the Jihadi-Salafist current - whose history goes back a long way, is currently behind a number of attacks whether collective or individual, claimed by known organizations or committed in isolation. In our perspective, we try to apprehend the attraction power of the Jihadi narrative issue taking the Theory of Social Representations as a paradigmatic framework. This implies that we dont consider the Jihadi current membership as the manifestation of a deviation from normality or optimal rationality, but as the expression of a certain common sense resonance. More precisely, and taking the case of the Tunisian context, the success of the Jihadi narrative is explained by its effectiveness as an interpretive grid and as a guide for action, making it possible to re-anchor a reality lacking in meaning. This hypothesis of a re-anchoring implies that anchoring as described by Moscovici as one of the two processes at the origin of the social representations formation (with the objectification process), could be not only as a familiarization of the strange by inserting it in an already known pre-existing frame, but by substituting to the frame itself, a new one, in order to be able to insert familiar objects which would have lost their sense precisely because of the old frame itself. This hypothesis could offer a theoretical and heuristic perspective allowing the anchoring process to be conceived as a circular and non-definitive process.
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Hristozova, Mariya. "Human rights in the fight against terrorism: Sanctions regimes of the United Nations Security Council." Law Journal of New Bulgarian University 15, no. 1-3 (April 10, 2020): 35–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.33919/ljnbu.19.1-3.2.
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In the last decade, the growing number of acts of terrorism that threaten world peace and security, as well as the fundamental values in every democratic society, in particular respect for fundamental human rights, have called for more active action by the international community in the struggle with terrorism. In this regard, the United Nations Security Council adopted a number of resolutions establishing sanctions regimes against the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (IDES), Al-Qaida and the Taliban, and other individuals, groups, and related entities and suspected terrorist suspects. Despite the social purpose of these regimes, they created serious preconditions for violations of the human rights of the affected subjects, in particular the right to a fair trial, the right to an effective remedy, the right to property, the right of the persons concerned to be informed of the charges against them, the right to be heard and other procedural rights. This circumstance calls for reforms to be made to the arrangements in place to ensure fundamental human rights in the fight against terrorism.
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Priscilla Suri, Jessica. "THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON SANCTIONS TOWARDS INDIVIDUAL FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW." Padjadjaran Journal of International Law 3, no. 2 (June 28, 2019): 202–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.23920/pjil.v3i2.316.
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AbstractThe United Nations Security Council (SC) holds the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security as stipulated in Article 24 of the United Nations Charter (UN Charter). The emergence of international terrorism as a threat to international peace and security encourages the SC to impose sanctions in the form of assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo towards targeted individuals through the SC Resolutions on Taliban, Al-Qaida and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). However, the implementation of UN targeted sanctions towards individuals has been violating the targeted individual’s human rights to property, rights of movement, rights to privacy, honor and reputation, and also the rights to a fair trial. This article will explain about the legitimation of the SC Resolutions in imposing sanction towards an individual, and the obligation of UN member states towards the SC resolution that imposes sanctions against its citizen. The violations of human rights stemming from the implementation of SC Resolutions on sanction towards individuals indicate that the resolutions have been adopted beyond the limits of international law. Therefore this condition makes the resolutions lost its legitimacy under international law. In accordance with Article 25 and 103 of the UN Charter, all member states have an obligation to accept, carry on and give priority to the obligation originating from the SC Resolution including to implement the sanction measures towards individuals. Nevertheless, member states must accommodate and harmonize its obligations in respecting, protecting and fulfilling all the individuals’ rights who are targeted by the SC along with its obligation to the SC Resolutions.
Keywords: Human Rights, Sanction towards Individuals, United Nations Security Council.AbstrakDewan Keamanan Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa (DK) memiliki tanggungjawab utama untuk menjaga perdamaian dan keamanan internasional berdasarkan Pasal 24 Piagam PBB. Munculnya terorisme internasional sebagai ancaman terhadap perdamaian dan keamanan internasional mendorong DK untuk menjatuhkan sanksi berupa pembekuan aset, pelarangan perjalanan serta embargo senjata kepada individu yang ditargetkan melalui rezim Resolusi Taliban, Al-Qaida dan Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Dalam penerapannya penjatuhan sanksi tersebut menimbulkan pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia (HAM) yaitu hak terhadap properti, hak kebebasan berpindah, hak atas privasi, kehormatan dan reputasi serta hak atas proses pengadilan yang adil. Pelanggaran HAM tersebut memunculkan tujuan dilakukannya penulisan artikel ini yaitu untuk menunjukan mengenai legitimasi resolusi DK yang menjatuhkan sanksi kepada individu, serta memaparkan mengenai kewajiban negara anggota PBB terhadap resolusi DK yang menjatuhkan sanksi kepada warga negaranya. Pelanggaran HAM yang disebabkan oleh penerapan penjatuhan sanksi terhadap individu mengindikasikan bahwa resolusi yang mendasari penjatuhan sanksi tersebut diadopsi dengan melampaui batasan-batasan penjatuhan sanksi DK dan telah kehilangan legitimasinya menurut hukum internasional. Sehingga meskipun negara memiliki kewajiban berdasarkan Pasal 25 dan 103 Piagam PBB untuk tetap menerima, melaksanakan dan mengutamakan kewajibannya berdasarkan Resolusi DK yang menjatuhkan sanksi terhadap individu, negara tetap harus mengakomodir dan mengharmonisasikan kewajibannya dalam menghormati, melindungi dan memenuhi HAM individu yang dijatuhkan sanksi saat melaksanakan kewajibannya yang berasal dari Resolusi DK.
Kata Kunci: Dewan Keamanan Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa, Hak Asasi Manusia, Sanksi terhadap Individu
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Giumelli, Francesco, and Filippo Costa Buranelli. "When states and individuals meet: The UN Ombudsperson as a ‘contact point’ between international and world society." International Relations 34, no. 1 (July 11, 2019): 46–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0047117819856402.
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Interaction between individuals and states is considered a distinctive character of domestic politics, while international politics is the ‘realm of states’. However, it is becoming more common to encounter loci where both states and individuals interact at the international level, such as in the cases of the Special Tribunals for Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Former Yugoslavia as well as the International Criminal Court (ICC). Within the International Relations (IR) theory panorama, one would expect the English School of International Relations (ES) to have the theoretical and analytical tools to conceptualize synergies between states and individuals, but this is not evident. This article asks, how does the interaction between individuals and states take place in the ES? We argue that this interaction takes place via ‘contact points’, defined as those international bodies that bring together states and non-state actors, be they individuals or groups, interacting on equal grounds in terms of rights and responsibilities towards each other. The notion of ‘contact point’ is developed inductively by focusing on the Office of the Ombudsperson to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL; Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. This research has theoretical implications. We aim to refine, sharpen and advance both the ES’s theoretical and analytical architecture. The contribution we seek to make is one that will better equip ES scholars to conceptualize and analyse those secondary institutions that allow states and individuals to enjoy rights and duties equally. By so doing, we will make possible for the ES to provide a more fine-grained account for these synergies than other IR theories. The notion of ‘contact point’ does set a new agenda for the ES, since interactions between individuals and states are likely to become a constitutive essence of world politics.
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Bradley, Curtis A., and Jack L. Goldsmith. "Obama’s AUMF Legacy." American Journal of International Law 110, no. 4 (October 2016): 628–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0002930000763147.
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In the fifteen years since the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) was enacted on September 18, 2001, the Taliban has been removed from power but not eliminated; Osama Bin Laden has been killed and the senior leaders of Al Qaeda as of 9/11 have been captured, killed, or driven underground, although Al Qaeda remains a threat; numerous Al Qaeda affiliates have sprung up around the globe, most notably in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Somalia; and most ominously, the Islamic State has arisen from the ashes of Al Qaeda in Iraq to become what the Director of National Intelligence has described as “the preeminent terrorist threat” against the United States “because of its self-described caliphate in Syria and Iraq, its branches and emerging branches in other countries, and its increasing ability to direct and inspire attacks against a wide range of targets around the world.”Despite massive changes in the geographical scope of the conflict that began on 9/11, the strategy and tactics employed, and the identity of the enemy, the AUMF remains the principal legal foundation under U.S. domestic law for the president to use force against and detain members of terrorist organizations. The AUMF is already the longest operative congressional authorization of military force in U.S. history, and, as of fall 2016, there was no immediate prospect that Congress would move to repeal or update it. With the continued vibrancy of Al Qaeda, its associates, and the Taliban, and with the 2014 presidential extension of the AUMF to cover military operations against the Islamic State, the AUMF is likely to be the primary legal basis for American uses of force for the foreseeable future.
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Fatimah, Siti, and Yanuardi Syukur. "Al-Qaeda’s New Orientation After the Death of Osama bin Laden." Jurnal Studi Sosial dan Politik 3, no. 2 (December 31, 2019): 130–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.19109/jssp.v3i2.4390.
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After the death of Osama Bin Laden and the declaration of the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Al-Qaeda movement changed from being aggressive to being passive. The aggressiveness of the Al-Qaeda movement, for instance, was seen during the spectacular terror of 9/11, which was then followed by various actions carried out by followers in various parts of the world. However, Bin Laden's death and the rise of the ISIS group made Al-Qaeda look passive. This paper seeks to see the history of the Al-Qaeda movement to the dynamics that influence the movement’s choices. The author found that changing Al-Qaeda's orientation from aggressive to passive did not deny the existence of a consolidated movement that deliberately distanced itself from the anti-terrorism campaign carried out by the United States.
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Vergani, Matteo, and Ana-Maria Bliuc. "The Language of New Terrorism: Differences in Psychological Dimensions of Communication in Dabiq and Inspire." Journal of Language and Social Psychology 37, no. 5 (January 10, 2018): 523–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0261927x17751011.
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We investigate differences in the psychological aspects underpinning Western mobilisation of two terrorist groups by analysing their English-language propaganda. Based on a computerised analysis of the language used in two English-language online magazines circulated by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and al-Qaeda (i.e., Dabiq and Inspire), we found significant differences in their language—the ISIS’ language being higher in authoritarianism and its level of religiousness. In a follow-up experimental study, we found that being high in religiousness and authoritarianism predicts more positive attitudes towards the language used by ISIS, but not towards the language used by al-Qaeda. The results suggest that ISIS’ propaganda may be more effective in mobilising individuals who are more authoritarian and more focused on religion than that of al-Qaeda. These findings are consistent with the behaviour observed in recent homegrown terrorist attacks in the United States and Europe.
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Mirskii, G. "Drama of the Arab East." World Economy and International Relations, no. 11 (2014): 77–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2014-11-77-87.
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New upheavals have shaken the Middle East this summer. A small but determined army of Sunni jihadists that had operated in the war-torn Syria suddenly crossed the border into Iraq and launched a large-scale military campaign. In a matter of days the invaders captured the second largest city of Iraq, Mosul, and although heavily outnumbered by the Iraqi army, put it to flight. The militants, known as ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham, the latter word meaning Syria and Lebanon) and led by an exceedingly tough and ruthless commander Abubaqr al-Baghdadi, are descendants of the infamous terrorist international network Al-Qaeda. Actually, the ISIS members represent the third generation of Al-Qaeda militants who waged the war against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan back in 1989-s and later fought the Americans in Iraq in the wake of the U.S. invasion. Lately they joined the Syrian armed opposition that has been trying to overthrow the regime of Bashar al-Assad for about three years. Now that the military situation in Syria appears to favor the embattled president, ISIS has probably come to the conclusion that its priority is not necessarily the ousting of Assad; rather it is the creation of an Islamic state according to the name of their organization. Exactly this seems to be the rationale for their comeback into Iraq. The Sunni jihadists whose ultimate aim is to resurrect the medieval Islamic Caliphate have to confront both the Iraqi Kurds who live in a virtually semi-independent state formation and the Shia Arabs who mostly inhabit the southern part of Iraq. Yet, both communities, although probably capable of protecting North, South and the capital city, are hardly likely to reassert the government authority in the central part of the country. What is necessary is the assistance from abroad. The Shia-dominated Iraqi government of Nouri al-Maliki, in deep trouble, is looking to both Iran and the U.S. for military aid. Both Washington and Tehran, however, appear reluctant to be seen as wholeheartedly backing the Shia side if only for fear of alienating the mainstream Arab States who are of course Sunni. This is a pretty delicate situation indeed.
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Kaválek, Tomáš. "From al-Qaeda in Iraq to Islamic State: The Story of Insurgency in Iraq and Syria in 2003-2015." Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 14, no. 1 (December 26, 2015): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.21599/atjir.29299.
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Gac, Miłosz. "The evolution of the strategy of the Islamic State in the years 2014-2017." Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces 195, no. 1 (March 17, 2020): 12–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.0254.
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In the last three years, the Islamic State (ISIS – Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) had to redefine its strategy as a result of air raids conducted by the antiterrorist coalition. The tactic is no longer concentrated on the territorial expansion and the creation of their own statehood, but on the attacks carried out by the so-called “lone wolves”, just like in the case of their rival Al-Qaeda. The idea of a solitary attack is accompanied by a new method used by the terrorists – crashing into people or places with the help of cars. Since the events in Nice in 2016, this phenomenon, known as “ramming”, has taken a death toll in Europe.
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Brzuszkiewicz, Sara. "Radicalisation in Europe after the fall of Islamic State: Trends and risks." European View 17, no. 2 (October 2018): 145–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1781685818805677.
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The so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has experienced repeated defeats since 2017. To develop more effective counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation strategies, the counterterrorism community has started to focus on the possible consequences in Europe of these defeats. The goal of this article is twofold. First, it aims to address the resilience of jihadism and the major challenges that Europe has to face in dealing with it. Second, it gives an overview of the best practices that should be adopted to face the persistent risks that will have to be addressed in the short and medium terms. Moreover, it argues that understanding the concepts of re-Qaedisation—the process that might cause ISIS-affiliated cells to bear a greater resemblance to the al-Qaeda model—and old-style recruitment—a set of recruitment patterns based on face-to-face interaction, pre-existing bonds and a shared radical milieu—will be crucial to reaching the above-mentioned objectives.
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Mohsen, Fatema, Yousef Latifa, and Bisher Sawaf. "War-related trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder prevalence among Syrian university students." BJPsych Open 7, S1 (June 2021): S43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/bjo.2021.163.
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AimsPTSD is one of the most prevalent mental disorders in war-affected regions. Syria has endured 10 years of war and yet little is known about the impact of the conflict on the well-being of Syrians who remain. This study aimed to provide an estimated prevalence of PTSD among trauma-exposed university students in Deir-ez-Zor, Syria, a war-ridden region, that was under siege by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) for over 3 years. Moreover, we aimed to study the different types of trauma to which the students were exposed and studied the association between PTSD and multiple covariates including, socio-demographic characteristics, smoking habits, academic performance, and stress levels, and identify factors that influence the development of PTSD symptoms.MethodA descriptive cross-sectional study design was used on a sample of Al-Furat university students in Deir-ez-Zor. We collected data on socio-demographics, trauma exposure, and stress levels. PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 was used to carry out PTSD diagnosis and to determine the severity of the disorder.ResultA total of 833 Syrian students were recruited into the study, the mean was 22.4 ± 3.2 years. Of those, (22.2%) have been displaced 3 times, while (18.8%) were displaced over 5 times. (86.4%) reported experiencing at least one traumatic event, (33.8%) of the participants were exposed to one traumatic event, and (44.7%) experienced four or more traumatic events. PTSD prevalence was (28.2%), and the highest PTSD rates were found among students who were forced into sexual acts (46.3%), followed by those who witnessed childhood trauma or violence and those who witnessed violence as adults (42.6%). Sample distribution over stress levels was as follows: normal (39.5%), mild (16.0%), moderate (17.8%), severe (17.3%), and extremely severe (9.8%). A statistically significant association was found between PTSD prevalence and stress severity (p = 0.000). A significant association was found between PTSD and internal displacement (p = 0.032), academic year (p = 0.002), and social-economic status (p = 0.000). Binary logistic regression revealed that smokers (vs non-smokers, OR = 0.259, p = .034) and third-year students (vs fifth year, OR = 0.44, p = .019) were significantly associated with PTSD.ConclusionThe results presented in this research revealed a high prevalence of trauma exposure and PTSD among a sample of university students in Deir-ez-Zor. These findings call for immediate actions to help the affected population in restoring their mental health, so they can be prepared to face the challenges and demands of the post-conflict period.
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Kahan, Jerome H. "Living with Terrorism: Unimaginable Nightmare or Prospective Reality." Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 13, no. 2 (July 1, 2016): 231–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jhsem-2016-0003.
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Abstract Nine days after the transformational 9/11 attacks, President G.W. Bush proclaimed that the nation is fighting a Global War on Terror (GWOT), an attention-grabbing phrase designed as a rallying cry for America to win the battle against al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations threatening our homeland as well as our allies and interests abroad. Eight years later, President Obama inherited what had become an even more dangerous situation, which led to the unexpected and courage attack that felled bin Laden and splintered al Qaeda. However, this success was short-lived when the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) suddenly emerged as our primary terrorist adversary – a new and brutal threat that President Obama vowed to “degrade and ultimately destroy” by doing what it takes to win the war against this and other terrorist organizations. While there has been some progress in halting and reversing ISIS territorial gains with the US providing support to newly trained Iraqi forces, this terrorist organization is not fully contained and far from being destroyed.
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Chuang, Yao-Li, Noam Ben-Asher, and Maria R. D’Orsogna. "Local alliances and rivalries shape near-repeat terror activity of al-Qaeda, ISIS, and insurgents." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 116, no. 42 (September 30, 2019): 20898–903. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1904418116.
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We study the spatiotemporal correlation of terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and local insurgents, in six geographical areas identified via k-means clustering applied to the Global Terrorism Database. All surveyed organizations exhibit near-repeat activity whereby a prior attack increases the likelihood of a subsequent one by the same group within 20 km and on average 4 (al-Qaeda) to 10 (ISIS) weeks. Near-response activity, whereby an attack by a given organization elicits further attacks from a different one, is found to depend on the adversarial, neutral, or collaborative relationship between the two. When in conflict, local insurgents respond quickly to attacks by global terror groups while global terror groups delay their responses to local insurgents, leading to an asymmetric dynamic. When neutral or allied, attacks by one group enhance the response likelihood of the other, regardless of hierarchy. These trends arise consistently in all clusters for which data are available. Government intervention and spillover effects are also discussed; we find no evidence of outbidding. Understanding the regional dynamics of terrorism may be greatly beneficial in policy making and intervention design.
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Lantsov, Sergey A. "Terrorism in the Middle East: Main stages of evolution." Political Expertise: POLITEX 16, no. 2 (2020): 182–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu23.2020.206.
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The article discusses the main stages of the evolution of terrorism in the Middle East from the 40s of the 20th century to the beginning of the 21st century. It is noted that terrorism as a political technology of using violence to achieve its goals was introduced to the Middle East from Europe after World War II. Ideological origins of terrorism in the 60–70s of the 20th century are analyzed. It is emphasized that during this period left-wing ideas had great popularity all over the world and in the Middle East. On the basis of ideological proximity, there was cooperation between some Palestinian organizations and left-wing extremist groups operating in other regions of the world. It is stated that at the end of the 20th century, in connection with the decline of the influence of radical leftist ideas, Islamic terrorism became the main type of terrorism in the Middle East. A comparative analysis of the characteristics of the activities of such terrorist organizations as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State is given. It is noted that with a common ideological platform, there were structural and organizational differences between them. It is pointed out that Al-Qaeda is characterized by an internal contradiction between the ultimate goal — the creation of a world caliphate and the network principle of activity. The “Islamic State” overcame this contradiction by “territorialization” in Iraq and Syria. As a “quasi-state” entity, ISIS has become vulnerable to counter-terrorism. The final part of the article discusses the main ways of countering terrorism in the Middle East in modern conditions.
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Gul, Imtiaz. "Women’s Role in Recruitment for ISIS/Islamist Networks in Pakistan." International Annals of Criminology 56, no. 1-2 (November 2018): 79–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cri.2018.15.
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AbstractHistorically, women in Pakistan’s northwestern territories bordering Afghanistan have played a critical role in providing money and men to jihadist organizations such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” (ISIS). Lack of education, too little exposure and a male-dominated conservative milieu constitute some of the ingredients of support for these outfits. This was true for over three decades and the phenomenon remained restricted to the rural, backward northwestern regions. But since the early 1990s, outfits such as the Al-Hudda Foundation – an exclusively women-focused organization – began serving as the initial hooks for middle- and upper-class women whom the Foundation targets. It brainwashes women into using hijab, and also into believing that they need to forge an alliance against the West and work for an Islamic, Sharia-based state. This advocacy turns many affluent women into religious radicals who can potentially work as the first line of recruits for extremist outfits like Daesh/IS. However small their numbers, these women represent a big threat to the global liberal values of society.
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Abdul Chalim, Fadholi, Sri Hudiarini, Ahmad Baha'uddin, Koesmarijanto, and Ane fany Novitasari. "Penyuluhan Deradikalisasi Pemahaman Ajaran Islam Di Desa Sitirejo Kecamatan Wagir Kabupaten Malang." Jurnal Pengabdian Polinema Kepada Masyarakat 9, no. 2 (December 10, 2022): 211–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.33795/jppkm.v9i2.164.
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Dewasa ini paham radikalisme menjadi ancaman serius bagi kehidupan berbangsa dan beragama. Ruh Islam sebagai penebar rahmat bagi seluruh alam menjadi pudar karena dampak dari tindakan intoleran yang dialkukan oleh sebagian umat Islam. Pemahaman Islam yang radikal menjadikan praktik-praktik yang sebenarnya semakin jauh dari makna Islam yang hakiki. Misi Islam yang menyebarkan kedamaian rahmatan lil alamin berubah menjadi penebar terror. Setelah dilakukan penyuluhan Deradikalisasi Pemahaman Ajaran Agama Islam, Masyarakat menyadari bahwa pelu adanya filter dari berbagai informasi yang masuk baik informasi melalui ceramah-ceramah Agama secara langsung maupun ceramah Agama yang bisa diakses melalui media online seiring merebaknya organisasi[1]organisasi tertentu yang mengatasnamakan Islam dan menggunakan kekerasan dalam setiap gerakannya misalnya al-Qaeda, Jama’ah Islamiyah, Ikhwan al-Muslimin dan yang paling fenomenal saat ini adalah ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), NII Negara Islam Indonesia
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Akhmetova, Elmira, and Muhammad Izzuddin Jaafar. "RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION OF MUSLIMS IN MALAYSIA:." Journal of Nusantara Studies (JONUS) 5, no. 1 (January 30, 2020): 104–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.24200/jonus.vol5iss1pp104-123.
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This study discusses the reasons behind the rise of religious extremism in Malaysia within the framework of international politics and the world order by highlighting the ties of Malay Muslims with the Mujahidin, Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) over the last four decades. For that purpose, a qualitative analytical approach is used, referencing secondary sources such as academic journal articles and scholarly books. In understanding the situation, online newspaper articles were also considered as secondary sources to extract the data to understand the destructive situation in Malaysia, which has gradually become a fertile ground for the sowing of radical ideas. The paper highlights that since the 1970s, religious extremism and radicalism have intensified due to the Cold War politics, the conflict between Palestine and Israel, and, later, foreign invasions of Muslim nation-states, giving rise to many local religious extremist groups with their relations to international extremist groups. Analysis of the secondary sources reveals the existence of a radical understanding of Islam by a substantial portion of the population, thus suggesting that the authorities should pay attention to extremist influences on the moderate nature of social relations in multi-ethnic and multi-religious Malaysia. At the same time, the paper argues that this negative transformation cannot be explained by external factors alone, as the internal factors have played an important role in the radicalisation of Malay society. The paper concludes with several practical recommendations such as improvisation of religious education that emphasises on peaceful cohesion, and discontinuation of foreign intervention policies and overgeneralisations. These recommendations are to regulate the escalation of extremism and radical understanding of Islam in Malaysia, which considerably threatens national security and citizens’ wellbeing.
Keywords: Al Qaeda, ISIS, Islamic radicalism in Malaysia, mujahidin, religious extremism.
Cite as: Jaafar, M. I., & Akhmetova, E. (2020). Religious extremism and radicalisation of Muslims in Malaysia: The Malay ties with the Mujahidin, Al Qaeda and ISIS. Journal of Nusantara Studies, 5(1), 104-123. http://dx.doi.org/10.24200/jonus.vol5iss1pp104-123
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Rath, Saroj Kumar. "Searching a Political Solution for Syria." India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 73, no. 2 (June 2017): 180–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0974928416683058.
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Syria’s sudden plunge into civil struggle is directly linked with United States’ Middle East policy. The 2011 pull-out of American troops from the smouldering provinces of Iraq and the subsequent refusal of the US to take sides in the ‘Arab Spring’ have weakened the incumbent governments and produced too many unsuitable civil claimants to rule ‘Arab Spring’-affected countries. The so-called US neutrality left a vacuum, which was filled by a swarm of Islamist extremists. The resultant internecine wars sparked by contending parties in Iraq, Syria and Yemen had taken these countries to the very verge of chaos. The outcome among other things included a revival of al-Qaeda, which was soon eclipsed by Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and an unending spiral of civil war in Syria, the major result of the anti-Western blowback. This article argues that the fight against extremist forces in Syria is doomed if there is absence of a strong, functional and acceptable government. Lasting peace under President Bashar al-Assad looks impossible but it is essential to have the core of Ba’athist regime in place in any transitional or post-transition mechanism. A new interpretation of political solution is required. Else, the state will collapse, which will only help the jihadists. Despite its limitations and challenges, federalisation of Syria and the establishment of a federal structure of the government, it seems, is the only viable solution.
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Anshori, Muhammad Fikry. "Hacktivist pada Pergerakan Sosial Transnasional: Kampanye Anonymous melawan Jaringan Teroris Transnasional 2015-2016." Andalas Journal of International Studies (AJIS) 8, no. 2 (November 30, 2019): 167. http://dx.doi.org/10.25077/ajis.8.2.165-185.2019.
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Latar belakang artikel ini adalah aktivitas kampanye Anonymous melawan jaringan teroris transnasional. Kampanye tersebut perlu dibahas karena dilakukan oleh jaringan transnasional terhadap jaringan transnasional lainnya. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk mendeskripsikan karakteristik pergerakan sosial transnasional dalam kampanye Anonymous melawan jaringan teroris transnasional. Konsep yang digunakan dalam artikel ini adalah pergerakan sosial transnasional dari S. Tarrow yang berfokus pada empat karakteristik yaitu kesempatan politik, struktur mobilisasi, kerangka tindakan kolektif, serta repertoar perlawanan. Dari hasil penelusuran artikel ini, diketahui kampanye Anonymous melawan jaringan teroris transnasional terdiri dari enam operasi yang dilakukan selama periode 2015-2016. Operasi tersebut dilakukan oleh enam kelompok peretas sebagai bagian dari Anonymous terhadap Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) dan Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) sebagai targetnya. Artikel ini menemukan Anonymous melakukan empat karakteristik pergerakan sosial transnasional dari S. Tarrow dalam enam kampanye terhadap jaringan teroris transnasional. Lebih lanjut, terdapat ciri khas tersendiri dari Anonymous sebagai aktor pergerakan sosial transnasional.
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Acharya, Arabinda. "Easter Sunday Bombings and Jihad in Sri Lanka." Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal 8, no. 10 (November 7, 2021): 457–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.810.10942.
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2019 Easter Sunday bombings in Sri Lanka by Islamist radicals poses a level of complexity that could challenge conventional thinking about radicalization and the spread of influence of groups like Al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and the Muslim Brotherhood, in many fundamental respects. At a very basic level, it defies common understanding of the emergence of Islamist radicalism in Sri Lanka – a country ravaged by extremist violence in other forms perpetrated by groups like JVP and the LTTE for example, which are mostly secular in character. In this context, jihadism in Sri Lanka introduces a new dynamic - utilitarian and pragmatic - where groups, cutting across their ideological and political divides, come together to achieve common goals.
Ability of the groups like ISIS and Muslim Brotherhood to recruit and deploy local Muslims in Sri Lanka to attack Western targets and attract global attention testify to the potency and resiliency of the ideology. [1]
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Brownlee, Jason. "Cognitive Shortcuts and Public Support for Intervention." Journal of Conflict Resolution 64, no. 2-3 (June 21, 2019): 261–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002719854210.
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Scholars of public opinion on military intervention agree that survey respondents make judgments from limited information. Yet researchers still question whether ordinary Americans reflect elite attitudes or instead reach their own “pretty prudent” conclusions from the stated principal policy objective (PPO). This article adjudicates the debate while incorporating lessons from the study of bounded rationality. Evidence comes from an original data set of aggregate US public opinion, covering 1,080 nationally representative survey items about launching operations, across thirty-five countries, during 1981 to 2016. Tests show that PPO matters: pursuing “internal policy change” is less popular than restraining international aggression. However, language reflecting White House cues and one prominent cognitive shortcut (the “availability heuristic”) statistically and substantively outperforms PPO at predicting intervention support. The results indicate that when ordinary Americans are polled about using force against salient foes (Saddam Hussein, al-Qaeda, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), elements of bounded rationality can overtake the prudence expressed toward less vivid problems.
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Istadiyantha. "The Ideology of Islamic State of Iraq and the Syria and Al-Qaeda After the Arab Spring and Its Impacts in Southeast Asia." Advanced Science Letters 22, no. 12 (December 1, 2016): 4418–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1166/asl.2016.8172.
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Abumelhim, Mohammad Husni, Ramzy Mahmoud Radaideh, and Esra’a Omar Abu-Alkeshek. "Sociology of Terrorism: A Brief History and Overview of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) Propaganda Wing from a Socio-Educational Perspective." Journal of Educational and Social Research 12, no. 2 (March 5, 2022): 399. http://dx.doi.org/10.36941/jesr-2022-0061.
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This study aimed at providing a brief overview of ISIS’s ideology and origins as starting points for an analysis of its propaganda strategy. How did ISIS utilize its ideological propaganda wing to achieve its socio-educational goals? An intrinsic case study is used to provide an overview of ISIS’s key multi-lingual propaganda documents and media modes. It is these documents and modes of media that ISIS uses as primary sources for its propaganda strategy, which is employed through vocabulary reinforcement, in addition to piece-meal usage of Qur’an and Hadith. Through the intrinsic case study, this study illustrates precisely how ISIS’s ideology is reflected through both content and form. Since ISIS’s inception as an offshoot of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), ISIS has learned to constantly reposition and remarket itself as a needed response to the needs of the umma. It is only by understanding the periodicals that ISIS has developed over time that one can do justice in delving into ISIS’s strategy of sociolinguistic terrorism.
Received: 11 November 2021 / Accepted: 29 December 2021 / Published: 5 March 2022
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Viano, Emilio C. "Unholy Alliances and their Threat: The Convergence of Terrorism, Organized Crime and Corruption." International Annals of Criminology 58, no. 1 (May 2020): 91–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cri.2020.18.
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AbstractSince the tragedy of September 11, 2001 (9/11) there have been a growing awareness and recognition of the expanding threat presented by the transmutation and convergence of international organized crime and terrorist groups. There is a semantic debate on whether these organizations are “converging” or “transforming.” Regardless, this worrisome development is complicated and progressively difficult to combat and calls for law enforcement, intelligence and military interventions. While the United States and other countries have been dealing with the post-9/11 world of persistent problems like Iraq, Afghanistan, al Qaeda, “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” (ISIS), Syria, and more, the links between organized crime and terrorism could prolong these challenges and generate further disruptions and menace to global security and development. There are strong operational needs and requirements that bring organized crime and terrorists together for collaboration and even seamless transitions within the same general operation. However, there are substantial hurdles that make a total teamwork between the two groups not so easily achievable. For example, organized crime normally avoids the publicity and the indiscriminate killings often used by terrorists. However, it is clear that the merging of international organized crime and terrorist groups is growing and presents unique challenges and opportunities. This paper examines this ongoing transmutation, convergence and cooperation between transnational organized crime and terrorism, and offers examples and recommendations on how to prevent it and defeat it.
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Marsaulina, Roce. "Radicalism in Political Perspective and Peace Education." International Journal of Science and Society 3, no. 2 (June 11, 2021): 269–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.54783/ijsoc.v3i2.338.
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The international community is facing the same global situation and conditions for crimes against humanity that have occurred in decades, namely the radicalism movement and international terrorism. Indonesia, as the largest country in Southeast Asia, has experienced toughening of the radicalism movement based on religion as its basic reference. Moreover, the international terrorism movement Al Qaeda and the ISIS Group (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) have become the mecca for the radicalism movement in Indonesia. How can Indonesia face the radicalism movement, what should Indonesia do and what is the solution so that Indonesia can be minimized from the crimes of radicalism and the global terrorism movement? This is what is discussed in this article. In Indonesia, the radicalism movement not only begins from thoughts based on religious teachings but also the political, ideological and enthusiastic elements of certain groups with different views and directions. In this article, the discussion begins with how religion responds to views about radicalism and radicalism movements, especially those that occur in Indonesia, a pluralistic country with various ethnic groups, various languages, cultural and religious traditions. Indonesia is a country with Pancasila as its state ideology. Apart from Religious Education which teaches how to live amongst fellow Indonesian citizens, to respect each other and respect differences, Indonesia also has the Bhineka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) as its national motto which reinforces the Pancasila philosophy, with life’s view and freedom to embrace the religion one believes in.
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Senzai, Farid. "Making Sense of Radicalization." American Journal of Islam and Society 32, no. 2 (April 1, 2015): 139–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v32i2.984.
Full textAbstract:
The self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s (ISIS) burning to deathof Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kasasba and beheading of twenty-one Egyptiansin Libya are just the latest incidents in a series of escalating acts of violencethat epitomize the seemingly senseless carnage that so often results from thepolitical radicalization of individual Muslims. As the international media zeroesin on such instances, one often struggles to make sense of the perpetrators’true motives. But understanding the circumstances that lead up to such viciousnessis key if governments are to minimize such acts in the future.What motivates an individual to join a terrorist organization? Is it ideology,politics, poverty, or something else? What might be done to de-radicalize anindividual who has joined a terrorist group? The reality is that there is no singlepathway toward radicalization. In a May 2010 report entitled “Why Youth Joinal-Qaeda,”1 U.S. Army Colonel Matt Venhaus suggested that those seeking tojoin jihadist networks can be divided into revenge seekers needing an outletfor their frustration, status seekers needing recognition, identity seekers in needof a group to join, and thrill seekers looking for adventure.2 Clearly the motivesfor terrorism are differentiated and complex, as opposed to uniform and simple.Thus identifying an overarching pattern to understanding how individualsmight become susceptible to terrorist recruiters and what intervention strategiescan be employed to stop it becomes a very difficult task ...
43
Gaggioli, Gloria, and Pavle Kilibarda. "Counterterrorism and the risk of over-classification of situations of violence." International Review of the Red Cross 103, no. 916-917 (April 2021): 203–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1816383121000424.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractRichard Baxter famously stated that “the first line of defence against international humanitarian law is to deny that it applies at all”. While “under-classification” remains an issue today, a parallel trend needs to be acknowledged. This is the tendency to over-classify situations of violence, especially in relation to transnational terrorist organizations such as the so-called Islamic State group or Al-Qaeda. This tendency stems from practical difficulties inherent in the changing operational environment. The last few years have witnessed a proliferation of armed non-State actors that are labelled or designated as terrorists (e.g., in Iraq, Syria, Mali, Nigeria and Yemen). Terrorist groups are characterized by opaque, often volatile organizational structures and tend to operate in decentralized networks rather than clear hierarchies. The formation of splinter groups, changing alliances, temporary reunification and even open hostility among former allies are common phenomena. This complex factual situation has led to the proliferation of theories of conflict classification, many of them arguing in favour of more flexible classification via the loosening of existing standards. Because international humanitarian law is in many respects less protective than international human rights law, particularly regarding the rules on the use of force and detention, classifying a situation of violence as an armed conflict when the threshold has not been met is a problem that should not be underestimated. In this article, we revisit the criteria of intensity and organization, as well as the related matter of the role of motives in conflict classification, considering conflicts involving armed groups described as terrorists. Our goal is to identify minimum requirements that could diminish the risk of over-classification by various stakeholders.
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Mohd Khambali@Hambali, Khadijah, Mustaffa Abdullah, and Abdul Karim Ali. "Idealism of Jihad and War from the Qurʾanic Perspective." Al-Bayān – Journal of Qurʾān and Ḥadīth Studies 15, no. 2 (November 21, 2017): 240–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22321969-12340053.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract There are various verses in the Qurʾan which apparently lead to the meaning of war. With regard to its intepretation of its related verses, there are mainly two different views. The first view argues that war in Islam will not happen but in a defensive manner. In other words, a war among Muslims would not happen unless they have been attacked and their reaction is in the form of counter attack in order to protect their dignity and life. The second view sees war in offensive manner. It is considered as a holy war (jihād) which is under the category of striving in the cause of Allah, and recommended to gain the status of martyrdom (syahīd). These different views create variant intepretations of the word jihād and war. The existance of certain groups related to terrorism such as Islamic State of Iraq and al-Syam (isis), al-Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf, Jemaah Islamiyyah and others, abusing the name of Islam and using hostile approaches in order to achieve their aims, have clearly a negative impact on Islam. This article reviews the meaning of jihād and war in accordance to the Qurʾanic perspective in order to address this issue fairly. Relevant data have been taken from selected authoritative Qurʾanic exegesis pertaining to verses of jihād and war. It uses content analysis to analyse those related data.The article concludes that jihad in Islam is subject to sincere intention and a clear objective: it does not simply mean fighting. A war should be viewed from different aspects whether defensive or offensive because different backgounds will lead to the both. Both jihad and war are clearly different from terrorism, and both of them are associated with the meaning of fī sabīllah as commonly understood.
45
Khidhir, Zainaddin M. "US Foreign Policy Goals in the Middle East between 2011 and 2021." Foreign Policy Review 14, no. 3 (2021): 164–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.47706/kkifpr.2021.3.164-182.
Full textAbstract:
Since the end of World War II, the United States’ interests in the Middle East have intensified rapidly, and this presence continues today in response to a variety of economic and security concerns. Following the 2011 Arab uprisings and the Iraqi regime change, US foreign policy has pursued several transformative agendas against some of its traditional allies, apparently contradicting Washington’s longstanding defence of the regional status quo. This has caused levels of uncertainty among regional players about what to expect from the United States. The present study highlights the US foreign policy goals in the Middle East between 2011 and 2021, which includes upholding US military bases in the Gulf countries, supporting client-states and other friendly states, providing support and protection to Israel’s sovereignty, maintaining strategic access to oil in the Gulf countries, and battling Islamic movements and terrorist groups (such as Hamas, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)). In addition, the study also focuses on other crucial aspects that might affect the United States and their regional allies’ interests in the regime. To explore US foreign policy decisions and actions between the years 2011 and 2021, data was collected through structured interviews and online secondary data sources. The data was reviewed and analysed to look at the sociopolitical, historical, and economic factors at work in the Middle East. The theoretical analysis uses a descriptive approach as to how the changes in the period after 2011 have influenced American foreign policy in the Middle East. The findings illustrate that terrorism, civil wars, and instability in the Middle East have had significant influence on the United States’ economic, national security, and diplomatic interests in the region. Maintaining strong ties with allies and comprehending the nature of conflicts is critical to attaining the US foreign policy objectives in the Middle East. This research study serves as a reference guide for scholars, policy analysts, and practitioners by examining to what extent the relationship between the US and the Middle East has changed.
46
ملكاوي, أسماء حسين. "عروض مختصرة." الفكر الإسلامي المعاصر (إسلامية المعرفة سابقا) 14, no. 55 (January 1, 2009): 218–01. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/citj.v14i55.2661.
Full textAbstract:
التراث والمنهج بين أركون والجابري، نايلة أبي نادر، بيروت: الشبكة العربية للأبحاث والنشر، 2008م، 590 صفحة.
ما بعد الاستشراق: الغزو الأمريكي للعراق وعودة الكولونياليات البيضاء، فاضل الربيعي، بيروت: مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، 2007م، 293 صفحة.
الإسلام والإصلاح الثقافي، زكي الميلاد، القطيف: دار أطياف للنشر والتوزيع، 2007م، 175 صفحة.
تحليل النظريات الاقتصادية، بول كروغمان، ترجمة: رانيا محمد عبد اللطيف، القاهرة: الدار الدولية للاستثمارات الثقافية، 2007م، 270 صفحة.
الانتماء الحضاري والهوية الثقافية في ضوء عروبة القرآن - الإسلام العربي .. معالم في طريق الوحدة والتعايش والاعتدال لتدبّر القرآن وفهمه بلسانٍ عربيٍ مبين، علاء الدين المدرس، العراق: دار الرقيم، 2008م، 191 صفحة.
الماضوية - الخلل الحضاري في علاقة المسلمين بالإسلام، سامر خير أحمد، عمان: دار البيروني للنشر والتوزيع، 2008م، 166 صفحة.
القرآن الكريم في دراسات المستشرقين (دراسة في تاريخ القرآن: نزوله وتدوينه وجمعه)، مشتاق بشير الغزالي، بيروت: دار النفائس، 2008م، 200 صفحة.
النظم الإسلامية، عبد العزيز الدوري، بيروت: مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، سلسلة الأعمال الكاملة للدكتور عبد العزيز الدوري، العدد 6، 2008م، 223 صفحة.
تطور الفكر السياسي السُّني: نحو خلافة ديمقراطية، أحمد الكاتب، بيروت: مؤسسة الانتشار العربي، 2008م، 307 صفحة.
ما بين دولة الطوائف والدولة الديمقراطية: إشكاليات وتوجهات- تراثنا الفكري: بين الرؤية السّلفية والتّنوير المعرفي، مجموعة مؤلفين، بيروت: دار الفارابي، 2008م، 269 صفحة.
الرحمانية ديمقراطية القرآن، محمد سلمان غانم، بيروت: دار الفارابي، 2008م، 245 صفحة.
الأصول الاجتماعية للدكتاتورية والديمقراطية: اللورد والفلاح في صنع العالم الحديث، بارينجتون مور، ترجمة أحمد محمود، بيروت: المنظمة العربية للترجمة، 2008م، 639 صفحة.
Islam and the Orientalist World-System (Political Econo-my of the World-System Annuals), Khaldoun Samman (Editor), Mazhar Al-Zo'by (Editor), Paradigm Publishers (September 30, 2008), 248 pages.
Challenging the New Orientalism: Dissenting Essays on the "War Against Islam", M.Shahid Alam, Islamic Publications In-ternational (January 1, 2007), 272 pages.
Defending the West: A Critique of Edward Said's Orien-talism, Ibn Warraq, Prometheus Books (October 23, 2007), 500 pages.
Islam in the British Broadsheets: The Impact of Oriental-ism on Representations of Islam in the British Press, Elzain El-gamri, Ithaca Press (15 Sep 2008), 240 pages.
American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945, Douglas Little, The University of North Carolina Press (March 3, 2008), 464 pages.
German Orientalism: The Study of the Middle East and Is-lam from 1800 to 1945 (Culture and Civilization in the Middle East), Ursula Wokoec, Routledge; 1 edition (May 31, 2009), 320pages.
Reading Orientalism: Said and the Unsaid, Daniel Martin Varisco, Daniel Martin Varisco, University of Washington Press, November 2007, 501 pages.
Muslim American Youth: Understanding Hyphenated Identities through Multiple Methods (Qualitative Studies in Psy-chology), Selcuk Sirin, Michelle Fine, NYU Press (July 12, 2008), 304 pages.
Marching Toward Hell: America and Islam After Iraq, Michael Scheuer, Free Press (February 10, 2009), 384 pages.
European Perceptions of Islam and America from Saladin to George W. Bush: Europe's Fragile Ego Uncovered, Peter O'Bri-en, Palgrave Macmillan (December 23, 2008), 240 pages.
Islam: To Reform or to Subvert?, Mohammed Arkoun, Saqi Books (January 1, 2007), 326 pages.
Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari`a, Abd Allah Naim, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim, Triliteral, March 2008, 336 pages.
The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State, Noah Feldman, Princeton University Press, March 2008, 189 pages.
A Deadly Misunderstanding: A Congressman's Quest to Bridge the Muslim-Christian Divide, Mark D. Siljander, Harper-Collins Publishers, October 2008, 260pp.
Islamism in the Shadow of al-Qaeda, François Burgat (Author), Patrick Hutchinson (Translator), University of Texas Press (November 1, 2008), 212 pages.
Islam, the People and the State: Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East, Sami Zubaida, I. B. Tauris; Revised and Updated edition (March 17, 2009), 224 pages.
للحصول على كامل المقالة مجانا يرجى النّقر على ملف ال PDF في اعلى يمين الصفحة.
47
Zaman, Maheen. "Jihad & Co.: Black Markets and Islamist Power." American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 35, no. 3 (July 1, 2018): 104–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v35i3.490.
Full textAbstract:
In this critically insightful and highly readable book of political ethnogra- phy, Aisha Ahmad, a political scientist at University of Toronto, seeks to explain how and why Islamist movements continue to militarily prevail and politically succeed in forming proto-states, over clan, ethnic, and/or tribal based competitions, amidst the chaos and disorder of civil wars across the contemporary Muslim world, from Mali to Mindanao. To this end, Ahmad seeks to go beyond the usual expositions that center the explanatory power of Islamist ideologies and identities, which dominate the scholarly fields of political science, international relations, security studies as well as the global public discourse shaped by journalists, politicians, and the punditry of shouting heads everywhere. Through a deep, immersive study of power in Afghanistan and Soma- lia, Ahmad demonstrates the profoundly symbiotic relationship between Islamists and the local business class. While recognizing the interconnec- tions between violent conflict and illicit trade is nothing new, Ahmad’s explication of the economic logics of Islamist proto-states furnishes a nov- el two-stage dynamic to explain the indispensability and ubiquity of this Islamist-business alliance in conflict zones. The first is the gradual social process of conversion of the business class’ worldview and practice to align them with Islamist identity formations, which is “aimed at mitigating un- certainty and improving access to markets” (xvii). Alongside this long-term socialization is a second, short-term political-economic dynamic of rapid shift in the business class’s collective patronage of a new Islamist faction, based on the assumption that it will lower the cost of business. The for- midable alliance between business class interests and Islamist institutions brings forth the new Islamist proto-state. Chapter one of the book adum- brates this two-stage argument and offers justifications for the two case studies, namely the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia. The second chapter unpacks the two-stage dynamic in detail. We learn that in modern civil wars across the Muslim world, business communi- ties intentionally adopt ardent Islamist identities as a practical means to- ward building trust and lowering cost. Islamist factions, aspiring toward hegemony, offer the possibility of economic relationships that transcend the ethnic boundaries which limit rival factions rooted in clan, tribal, or ethno-linguistic social formations. This leads to the second, faster conver- gence of business-Islamist interests, wherein the Islamist groups leverage their broader social identity and economic market to offer stronger secu- rity at a lower cost. This development of an economy of scale leads the local business elites to throw their financial support behind the Islamists at a critical juncture of militant competition. Once this threshold is met, Islamist factions rapidly conquer and consolidate territories from their rel- atively socially constrained rivals to form a new proto-state, like the Taliban regime and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). When we look at the timeline of their development (the Taliban in 1994 and the ICU in 2006), we notice a similar length of gestation, about 15 years of war. This similarity may be coincidental, but the political-military threshold is the same. Both societ- ies, ravaged by civil war, reached a stalemate. At this critical juncture the positional properties of Islamist formations in the field of civil war factions gives the Islamists a decided economic (cost analysis) and social (trust building across clan/tribal identities) advantage. Chapters three to six examine each of the two processes for the se- lected sites of inquiry. Thus chapters three and five, respectively, explore the long-term Islamist identity construction within the smuggling industry in the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderland, and the Somali business elites’ gradual convergence with Islamists. In chapter four, Ahmad explores the second dynamic in the context of rising security costs during the Afghan civil war. Mullah Omar’s Taliban provided the order and security across the borderland that had previously eluded the variety of industries. This allowed the Taliban to expand on the backs of voluntary donations, rather than extortions like their rival tribal warlords, which in turn allowed them to recruit and retain more disciplined fighters (81). The source of these donations was the business class, especially those involved in the highly lucrative transit trade, which, before the rise of Taliban, paid immense op- portunity cost at the hands of rapacious local and tribal warlord fiefdoms and bandits. Instead of the multitude of checkpoints crisscrossing south- ern Afghanistan and the borderlands, the Taliban presented a simplified administration. While the rest of the world took notice of their repressive measures against women’s mobility, education, and cultural expression, the men of the bazaar appreciated the newly acquired public safety to ply their trade and the lowered cost of doing business. Chapter six, “The Price of Protection: The Rise of the Islamic Courts Union,” demonstrates a similar mutually beneficial Islamist-business relationship emerging out of the incessant clan-based militia conflicts that had especially plagued southern Somalia since the fall of the last national government in 1991. Businesspeople, whether they were tycoons or small business owners, had to pay two types of tax. First was what was owed to the local racket or warlord, and the second was to the ever-fragmenting sub-clan militias and their checkpoints on the intercity highways. Unlike their rival, the Transitional Federal Government (TGF), ICU forged their supra-clan institutional identity through a universalist legal discourse and practice rooted in Islamic law and ethics. They united the courts and their associated clan-based militias, including al-Shabaab. Ahmad demonstrates, through a synthesis of secondary literature and original political ethnogra- phy, the economic logics of ICU’s ability to overcome the threshold of ma- terial and social support needed to establish the rule of law and a far-reach- ing functioning government. If the Taliban and the ICU had solved the riddle of creating order and security to create hegemonic proto-states, then what was their downfall? Chapter seven gives us an account of the international interventions that caused the collapse of the two proto-states. In the aftermath of their de- struction, the internationally supported regimes that replaced them, de- spite immense monetary and military aid, have failed to gain the same level of legitimacy across Afghanistan and Somalia. In chapter eight, Ahmad expands the scope of analysis to North/Western Africa (Al-Qaeda in the Is- lamic Maghrib: AQIM), Middle East (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria: ISIS), and South Asia (Tahrik-i Taliban-i Pakistan: TTP). At the time of this book’s publication, these movements were not yet, as Ahmad posits, closed cases like the Taliban and the ICU. Thus, the data from this chapter’s comparative survey furnishes suggestive arguments for Ahmad’s larger thesis, namely that Islamist proto-states emerge out of a confluence of economic and security interests rather than mere ideological and identity politics. The epistemic humility of this chapter signals to this reader two lines of constructive criticism of some aspects of Ahmad’s sub- stantiation of this thesis. First, the juxtaposing of Islamist success against their clan-/tribal iden- tity-based rivals may be underestimating the element of ethnic solidarity in those very Islamists’ political success. The most glaring case is the Taliban, which in its original formation and in its post-American invasion frag- mentations, across the Durand Line, was more or less founded on a pan- or-tribal Pashtun social identity and economic compulsions relative to the other Afghan ethno-linguistic communities. How does one disaggregate the force of ethnic solidarity (even if it is only a necessary condition, rather than a cause) from economic calculus in explaining the rise of the Taliban proto-state? The second issue in this juxtaposition is that when we compare a suc- cessful Islamist movement against socially limited ethnocentric rivals, we discount the other Islamist movements that failed. Explanations for those Islamists that failed to create a proto-state along the lines of the ICU or the Taliban, such as al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya (Somalia) or Gulbuddin Hekmat- yar’s Hezb-e Islami (Afghanistan), needed to be more robustly taken into account and integrated into the substantiation of Ahmad’s thesis. Even in the section on ISIS, it would have been helpful to integrate the case of Jabhat al-Nusra’s (an al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria) inability to create a proto-state to rival ISIS. We must ask, why do some Jihadi Islamist movements prevail against each other and why do others fail? Perhaps some of these Islamist movements appear too early to scale up their operation (i.e., they precede Ahmad’s ‘critical juncture’), or they were too embroiled and too partisan in the illicit trade network to fully leverage their Islamist universalism to create the trust and bonds that are the first part of Ahmad’s two-stage dy- namic. Possible answers would need to complement Ahmad’s excellent po- litical ethnography with deeper quantitative dives to identify the statistical variations of these critical junctures: when does the cost of warlords and mafias’ domination outweigh the cost of Islamist-Jihadi movements’ social- ly repressive but economically liberating regimes? At which point in the social evolution of society during an unending civil war do identities forged by the bonds of blood give way to those imagined through bonds of faith? These two critical suggestions do not diminish Ahmad’s highly teach- able work. This book should be read by all concerned policy makers, schol- ars in the social sciences and humanities, and anyone who wants to go be- yond ‘culture talk’ historical causation by ideas and identity and uncover structuralist explanations for the rise of Jihadi Islamist success in civil wars across the Muslim world. It is especially recommended for adoption in cog- nate courses at the undergraduate level, for its combination of erudition and readability.
Maheen ZamanAssistant ProfessorDepartment of HistoryAugsburg University
48
Zaman, Maheen. "Jihad & Co.: Black Markets and Islamist Power." American Journal of Islam and Society 35, no. 3 (July 1, 2018): 104–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.35632/ajis.v35i3.490.
Full textAbstract:
In this critically insightful and highly readable book of political ethnogra- phy, Aisha Ahmad, a political scientist at University of Toronto, seeks to explain how and why Islamist movements continue to militarily prevail and politically succeed in forming proto-states, over clan, ethnic, and/or tribal based competitions, amidst the chaos and disorder of civil wars across the contemporary Muslim world, from Mali to Mindanao. To this end, Ahmad seeks to go beyond the usual expositions that center the explanatory power of Islamist ideologies and identities, which dominate the scholarly fields of political science, international relations, security studies as well as the global public discourse shaped by journalists, politicians, and the punditry of shouting heads everywhere. Through a deep, immersive study of power in Afghanistan and Soma- lia, Ahmad demonstrates the profoundly symbiotic relationship between Islamists and the local business class. While recognizing the interconnec- tions between violent conflict and illicit trade is nothing new, Ahmad’s explication of the economic logics of Islamist proto-states furnishes a nov- el two-stage dynamic to explain the indispensability and ubiquity of this Islamist-business alliance in conflict zones. The first is the gradual social process of conversion of the business class’ worldview and practice to align them with Islamist identity formations, which is “aimed at mitigating un- certainty and improving access to markets” (xvii). Alongside this long-term socialization is a second, short-term political-economic dynamic of rapid shift in the business class’s collective patronage of a new Islamist faction, based on the assumption that it will lower the cost of business. The for- midable alliance between business class interests and Islamist institutions brings forth the new Islamist proto-state. Chapter one of the book adum- brates this two-stage argument and offers justifications for the two case studies, namely the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia. The second chapter unpacks the two-stage dynamic in detail. We learn that in modern civil wars across the Muslim world, business communi- ties intentionally adopt ardent Islamist identities as a practical means to- ward building trust and lowering cost. Islamist factions, aspiring toward hegemony, offer the possibility of economic relationships that transcend the ethnic boundaries which limit rival factions rooted in clan, tribal, or ethno-linguistic social formations. This leads to the second, faster conver- gence of business-Islamist interests, wherein the Islamist groups leverage their broader social identity and economic market to offer stronger secu- rity at a lower cost. This development of an economy of scale leads the local business elites to throw their financial support behind the Islamists at a critical juncture of militant competition. Once this threshold is met, Islamist factions rapidly conquer and consolidate territories from their rel- atively socially constrained rivals to form a new proto-state, like the Taliban regime and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). When we look at the timeline of their development (the Taliban in 1994 and the ICU in 2006), we notice a similar length of gestation, about 15 years of war. This similarity may be coincidental, but the political-military threshold is the same. Both societ- ies, ravaged by civil war, reached a stalemate. At this critical juncture the positional properties of Islamist formations in the field of civil war factions gives the Islamists a decided economic (cost analysis) and social (trust building across clan/tribal identities) advantage. Chapters three to six examine each of the two processes for the se- lected sites of inquiry. Thus chapters three and five, respectively, explore the long-term Islamist identity construction within the smuggling industry in the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderland, and the Somali business elites’ gradual convergence with Islamists. In chapter four, Ahmad explores the second dynamic in the context of rising security costs during the Afghan civil war. Mullah Omar’s Taliban provided the order and security across the borderland that had previously eluded the variety of industries. This allowed the Taliban to expand on the backs of voluntary donations, rather than extortions like their rival tribal warlords, which in turn allowed them to recruit and retain more disciplined fighters (81). The source of these donations was the business class, especially those involved in the highly lucrative transit trade, which, before the rise of Taliban, paid immense op- portunity cost at the hands of rapacious local and tribal warlord fiefdoms and bandits. Instead of the multitude of checkpoints crisscrossing south- ern Afghanistan and the borderlands, the Taliban presented a simplified administration. While the rest of the world took notice of their repressive measures against women’s mobility, education, and cultural expression, the men of the bazaar appreciated the newly acquired public safety to ply their trade and the lowered cost of doing business. Chapter six, “The Price of Protection: The Rise of the Islamic Courts Union,” demonstrates a similar mutually beneficial Islamist-business relationship emerging out of the incessant clan-based militia conflicts that had especially plagued southern Somalia since the fall of the last national government in 1991. Businesspeople, whether they were tycoons or small business owners, had to pay two types of tax. First was what was owed to the local racket or warlord, and the second was to the ever-fragmenting sub-clan militias and their checkpoints on the intercity highways. Unlike their rival, the Transitional Federal Government (TGF), ICU forged their supra-clan institutional identity through a universalist legal discourse and practice rooted in Islamic law and ethics. They united the courts and their associated clan-based militias, including al-Shabaab. Ahmad demonstrates, through a synthesis of secondary literature and original political ethnogra- phy, the economic logics of ICU’s ability to overcome the threshold of ma- terial and social support needed to establish the rule of law and a far-reach- ing functioning government. If the Taliban and the ICU had solved the riddle of creating order and security to create hegemonic proto-states, then what was their downfall? Chapter seven gives us an account of the international interventions that caused the collapse of the two proto-states. In the aftermath of their de- struction, the internationally supported regimes that replaced them, de- spite immense monetary and military aid, have failed to gain the same level of legitimacy across Afghanistan and Somalia. In chapter eight, Ahmad expands the scope of analysis to North/Western Africa (Al-Qaeda in the Is- lamic Maghrib: AQIM), Middle East (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria: ISIS), and South Asia (Tahrik-i Taliban-i Pakistan: TTP). At the time of this book’s publication, these movements were not yet, as Ahmad posits, closed cases like the Taliban and the ICU. Thus, the data from this chapter’s comparative survey furnishes suggestive arguments for Ahmad’s larger thesis, namely that Islamist proto-states emerge out of a confluence of economic and security interests rather than mere ideological and identity politics. The epistemic humility of this chapter signals to this reader two lines of constructive criticism of some aspects of Ahmad’s sub- stantiation of this thesis. First, the juxtaposing of Islamist success against their clan-/tribal iden- tity-based rivals may be underestimating the element of ethnic solidarity in those very Islamists’ political success. The most glaring case is the Taliban, which in its original formation and in its post-American invasion frag- mentations, across the Durand Line, was more or less founded on a pan- or-tribal Pashtun social identity and economic compulsions relative to the other Afghan ethno-linguistic communities. How does one disaggregate the force of ethnic solidarity (even if it is only a necessary condition, rather than a cause) from economic calculus in explaining the rise of the Taliban proto-state? The second issue in this juxtaposition is that when we compare a suc- cessful Islamist movement against socially limited ethnocentric rivals, we discount the other Islamist movements that failed. Explanations for those Islamists that failed to create a proto-state along the lines of the ICU or the Taliban, such as al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya (Somalia) or Gulbuddin Hekmat- yar’s Hezb-e Islami (Afghanistan), needed to be more robustly taken into account and integrated into the substantiation of Ahmad’s thesis. Even in the section on ISIS, it would have been helpful to integrate the case of Jabhat al-Nusra’s (an al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria) inability to create a proto-state to rival ISIS. We must ask, why do some Jihadi Islamist movements prevail against each other and why do others fail? Perhaps some of these Islamist movements appear too early to scale up their operation (i.e., they precede Ahmad’s ‘critical juncture’), or they were too embroiled and too partisan in the illicit trade network to fully leverage their Islamist universalism to create the trust and bonds that are the first part of Ahmad’s two-stage dy- namic. Possible answers would need to complement Ahmad’s excellent po- litical ethnography with deeper quantitative dives to identify the statistical variations of these critical junctures: when does the cost of warlords and mafias’ domination outweigh the cost of Islamist-Jihadi movements’ social- ly repressive but economically liberating regimes? At which point in the social evolution of society during an unending civil war do identities forged by the bonds of blood give way to those imagined through bonds of faith? These two critical suggestions do not diminish Ahmad’s highly teach- able work. This book should be read by all concerned policy makers, schol- ars in the social sciences and humanities, and anyone who wants to go be- yond ‘culture talk’ historical causation by ideas and identity and uncover structuralist explanations for the rise of Jihadi Islamist success in civil wars across the Muslim world. It is especially recommended for adoption in cog- nate courses at the undergraduate level, for its combination of erudition and readability.
Maheen ZamanAssistant ProfessorDepartment of HistoryAugsburg University
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Byttebier, Sarah. "Eigen schuld, dikke bult? Juridische analyse van de rechten van kinderen van Foreign Terrorist Fighters met de Belgische nationaliteit in het kader van hun leefomstandigheden en terugkeer." Radices 1, no. 1 (June 15, 2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.21825/radices.84835.
Full textAbstract:
In elke oorlog zijn kinderen betrokken: kinderen van burgerslachtoffers, maar eveneens kinderen van strijdende partijen. Zo ook in de humanitaire crisis die zich afspeelt in het Midden-Oosten waarbij een opmerkelijk aantal landgenoten betrokken zijn. Een oorlog die zich al enkele malen heeft gemanifesteerd onder de vorm van terroristische aanslagen in West-Europa. Dit artikel handelt over kinderen van Foreign Terrorist Fighters met de Belgische nationaliteit die zich aansloten bij de entiteit van Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, meer bepaald kinderen met een (on)rechtstreeks aanknopingspunt met België die zich nog bevinden in Syrië. In dit artikel wordt onderzocht of de Belgische Staat verzuimt aan haar (inter)nationale verplichtingen indien hij kinderen van Belgische Foreign Terrorist Fighters hun rechten in het kader van hun leefomstandigheden en hun terugkeer niet verleent.
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Dunkley, Mark. "Culture, conflict and armed non-state actors: cultural heritage protection in a changing operating environment." Journal of Cultural Heritage Management and Sustainable Development ahead-of-print, ahead-of-print (September 20, 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jchmsd-08-2020-0122.
Full textAbstract:
PurposeThis paper examines the implications, for States Parties, of the 1954 Convention safeguarding regime in the context of contemporary non-international armed conflict and ANSAs, with a general focus on the Middle East and in situ cultural property.Design/methodology/approachAs the nature of conflict changes and armed forces become further engaged in supporting peacekeeping operations and deliver training to host nation security forces, and human security becomes an increasingly important function of military operations, the protection of cultural heritage (as an expression of a people's identity) becomes a significant contribution to individual operations.FindingsInternational obligations to States Parties for the in situ protection of cultural heritage, under both International Humanitarian Law and HC54, become an ever increasing important responsibility for armed forces to help deliver.Research limitations/implicationsWhile NATO is increasingly focussed on the defence of western states parties from threats posed by the Russian Federation, and observing a commercially and military assertive China, a recent report issued by the Pentagon noted that the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is regrouping in Iraq faster than in Syria and could regain territory in six to twelve months in the absence of sustained military pressure.Practical implicationsPreservation in situ is used by heritage professionals to refer to the protection of a cultural heritage asset in its original location while the in situ protection of cultural property is a cornerstone topic of the 1954 Hague Convention Special Protection category. The Convention was drafted with international armed conflict in mind but the initial signatories to the Convention had sufficient foresight to consider non-international armed conflict and its potential effect on in situ cultural property by parties to the conflict, including Armed Non-State Actors (ANSA)Social implicationsUN Security Council Resolution 2449 (December 2018) recognized the negative impact of the presence, violent extremist ideology and actions on stability in Syria and the region of both Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Al-Nusrah Front (ANF). This includes not only the devastating humanitarian impact on civilian populations but also the unlawful destruction of cultural heritage.Originality/valueANSAs comprise individuals and groups that are wholly or partly independent of State governments and which threaten or use violence to achieve their goals, such as Islamic State. As such, the military operating environment has changed since 1954.