Journal articles on the topic 'Aircraft accidents - Human factors - Australia'

The phenomenon of encountering instrument meteorological conditions (IMCs) while operating an aircraft under visual flight rules (VFRs) remains a primary area of concern. Studies have established that pilots operating under VFRs that continue to operate under IMCs remains a significant cause of accidents in general aviation (GA), resulting in hundreds of fatalities. This research used the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) database, which contained a total of 196 VFR to IMC occurrences, from 2003 to 2019, with 26 having formal reports. An explanatory design was adopted, commencing with a qualitative study of the 26 occurrences with reports followed by a quantitative study of all 196 occurrences. Factors investigated included the locations and date of the occurrences, involved aircraft (manufacturer, model, type), pilot details (licenses, ratings, h, and medical), number of fatalities, and causal factors. Fisher’s exact tests were used to highlight significant relationships. Results showed occurrences were more likely to end fatally if (1) they involved private operations, (2) pilots only had a night VFR rating, (3) the pilot chose to push on into IMCs, (4) the pilot did not undertake proper preflight planning consulting aviation weather services, and (5) the pilot had more than 500 h of flight experience. Further results showed occurrences were less likely to end fatally if the meteorological condition was clouds without precipitation, if the pilot held a full instrument rating, or the pilot was assisted via radio. Analysis of the data using the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) framework revealed that errors and violations occur with slightly greater frequency for fatal occurrences than non-fatal occurrences. Quantitative analyses demonstrated that the number of VFR to IMC occurrences have not decreased even though initiatives have been implemented in an attempt to address the issue.

INTRODUCTION: Aerobatic flight operations involve a higher level of risk than standard flight operations. Aerobatics imposes considerable stresses on both the aircraft and the pilot. The purpose of this study was to analyze civilian aerobatic aircraft accidents in Australia, with particular emphasis on the underlying accident causes and survival outcomes.METHODS: The accident and incident database of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau was searched for all events involving aerobatic flight for the period 19802010.RESULTS: A total of 51 accidents involving aircraft undertaking aerobatic operations were identified, with 71 aircraft occupants. Of the accidents, 27 (52.9) were fatal, resulting in a total of 36 fatalities. There were 24 nonfatal accidents. In terms of injury outcomes, there were 4 serious and 9 minor injuries, and 22 accidents in which no injuries were recorded. Fatal accidents were mainly due to loss of control by the pilot (44.4), in-flight structural failure of the airframe (25.9), and terrain impact (25.9). G-LOC was considered a possible cause in 11.1 of fatal accidents. Nonfatal accidents were mainly due to powerplant failure (41.7) and noncatastrophic airframe damage (25). Accidents involving aerobatic maneuvering have a significantly increased risk of a fatal outcome (odds ratio 26).DISCUSSION: The results of this study highlight the risks involved in aerobatic flight. Exceeding the operational limits of the maneuver and the design limits of the aircraft are major factors contributing to a fatal aerobatic aircraft accident. Improved awareness of G physiology and better operational decision-making while undertaking aerobatic flight may help prevent further accidents.Newman DG. Factors contributing to accidents during aerobatic flight operations. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2021; 92(8):612618.

To help prevent maintenance-related aircraft accidents the complex factors behind previous accidents must be understood. Maintenance-related aircraft accidents were studied to determine the effects of maintenance human factors. A taxonomy of causal factors was developed and used to classify the causes of 101 military and civilian accidents and to determine the frequency of occurrence for each factor. The taxonomy identifies elements, such as people and hardware, interfaces between elements (i.e., human factors), and maintenance processes comprised of elements and interfaces. Human factors were found to have a significant effect in the 86 military and 15 civilian maintenance-related accidents studied. Whereas investigation boards were found to focus most heavily on element failures, a majority of the failures were found to occur at the process level. Maintenance instructions and their interfaces with the maintainers and inspectors who use them were the most frequently failed elements and interfaces, respectively. Recommendations are made to guide further research, and ideas are provided for improving process analysis by maintenance units and investigation boards.

Human error has been implicated in almost 70–80% of civil and military aviation accidents. It appears that attempts to understand human factors in aircraft accidents and apply remedial strategies have been made in isolation in addressing a particular link in the whole process of aircraft accident prevention. The suggested holistic approach to minimize aircraft accidents, aims to provide a composite and macroscopic view of the activities within the aviation environment that can be targeted to produce the desired results. It also provides a microscopic look at possible domains within each link. Targeting one particular aspect or link in the entire process may or may not influence the other components in the loop. Such an approach would address the experience and certainty of safety investigators with regards to contribution of human factors in aircraft accidents and the understanding of temporal relation between various human factors at one end to issues of intervention strategies based on sound human factors principles and a follow up evaluation of the impact of these intervention strategies on the other end. The influence of safety culture in integrating the diverse components of the accident prevention program is highlighted.

Investigating accidents is an important method to enhance safety in aviation. Nevertheless, it is equally important to examine trends and factors across different accidents to adapt accordingly. Therefore, in the first study, 48 accidents and incidents occurring to manned military aircraft of the German Armed Forces between the years 2004 and 2014 were analyzed using the HFACS framework. Results show that preconditions for unsafe acts (37.7%) was observed most often, followed by unsafe acts (36.2%) and organizational influences (17.9%). Unsafe supervision was observed least often (8.2%). Thus, operators on the front line contribute the major part to manned aircraft incurrences in the German Armed Forces while higher levels of HFACS seem to play a smaller part. In the second study, 33 accidents and incidents occurring to unmanned military aircraft of the German Armed Forces between 2004 and 2014 were analyzed, also using the HFACS framework. Results show that technical issues were mentioned most often and human factors were identified considerably less than in manned aircraft.

The present study reports and compares causes of, and factors contributing to, 2,118 documented accidents of sport aviation represented by diverse aircraft types including balloons and blimps, gliders, gyroplanes, and ultralights. For the 26-year period, accidents were aircraft-specific regarding damage, injury severity, and human errors. The likelihood of fatal injuries in sport aviation accidents differs per aircraft category and is related to the phase of flight in which the accident originates and the involvement of aircraft-specific human errors. Results show that amateur-built aircraft are a specific subgroup.

Human factor is one of the safety barriers which is used in order to prevent accidents or incidents of aircraft. Therefore, the question is to which extent the error caused by human factor is included into the share of errors that are madeduring aircraft maintenance. In the EASA approved aircraft maintenance organisation, which includes in its working system the human factor as well, the tendency is to apply the approach by continuous monitoring and analysis of errors in aircraft maintenance. Such approach achieves advance prevention or reduction of the occurrence of harmful events, such as accidents, incidents, injuries and in a wider sense damages related to aircraft operation and maintenance. The research presented in this paper is a result of gathering and systematization of errors caused by human factors over the last five years in one organisation for aircraft maintenance certified according to the European standards. The study encompasses an analysis of 28 (twenty-eight) investigations of individual cases and provides insight into the main factors of errors. The results of analyses on the cause of occurrence of human error show similar results like the Boeing study which was carried out for the world fleet.

INTRODUCTION: Air taxis conduct nonscheduled transport and employ aircraft in various performance categories hereafter referred to as low, medium, and high performance, respectively. No study has yet addressed fixed-wing air taxi safety by performance category. Herein, we compared accident rates/occupant injury across air taxi airplane fleets grouped by performance category and identified human factors contributing to fatal accidents for airplanes in that category with the highest mishap rate.METHODS: Accidents (20042018) in the United States were identified from the National Transportation Safety Board database. General Aviation/Part 135 Activity Surveys provided annual fleet times. Fatal accident contributing factors were per the Human Factors Classification System (HFACS). Statistics utilized Poisson distributions, Chi-Square/Fisher, and Mann-Whitney tests.RESULTS: There were 269 air taxi mishaps (53 fatal) identified. Over the 15 yr, the accident rate (1.10/million flight hours-all categories) declined 50%, largely due to a reduction in medium/high performance category airplane crashes. However, little temporal change was observed for low performance airplanes (1.5/million flight hours) and injury severity trended higher. At the aircrew/physical environment levels, HFACS revealed decision (improper choices), skill-based (stick and rudder) and perceptual (night, instrument conditions) errors contributing to > 60% of fatal accidents involving low performance airplanes. At the organizational level, failing to correct problems, time pressures, and incentive systems contributed to 16% of fatal mishaps.CONCLUSION: Safety deficits remain for the low performance category air taxi fleet warranting increased pilot instrument flight training/utilization of the mandatory 3-axis autopilot in degraded visibility. Safety culture improvements to address issues of personnel/equipment/training deficiencies, failing to correct problems, and time pressures/a safety-compromising incentive system all need to be addressed.Budde D, Hinkelbein J, Boyd DD. Analysis of air taxi accidents (20042018) and associated human factors by aircraft performance class. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2021; 92(5):294302.

In consideration of the situation that civil aviation accidents involve many human-error factors and show the features of typical grey systems, an index system of civil aviation accident human-error factors is built using human factor analysis and classification system model. With the data of accidents happened worldwide between 2008 and 2011, the correlation between human-error factors can be analyzed quantitatively using the method of grey relational analysis. Research results show that the order of main factors affecting pilot human-error factors is preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, organization and unsafe acts. The factor related most closely with second-level indexes and pilot human-error factors is the physical/mental limitations of pilots, followed by supervisory violations. The relevancy between the first-level indexes and the corresponding second-level indexes and the relevancy between second-level indexes can also be analyzed quantitatively.

Aviation can be described as the birth place of human factors. A quick glance at the funding sources and the publications in the discipline shows that we are still quite tightly tied to aviation. Cockpit automation, mode errors, ATC workload are among topics that are currently well represented in the human factors literature. However, the place where human factors could make it biggest impact in terms of safety and error prevention, general aviation (GA), is still basically a human factors waste land. If one looks at the current statistics of light aircraft accidents, it reads like a list of errors and design problems described in any introductory human factors text.

Analyzing accidents clearly is an important method for maintaining and improving safety in aviation. Nevertheless, evaluating these accident reports is equally important. Still, such evaluations seem to be generally neglected, especially in the military domain. The aim of the current study was to shed light on this fact by analyzing investigated human factors in military aircraft accident reports of aviation psychologists. Therefore, the authors conducted a content analysis of 42 reports of the German Armed Forces from the years 1994-2014. Confidence intervals and effect sizes indicated various differences in human factors throughout the psychological aircraft accident reports. Further, confidence intervals and effect sizes indicated differences in the corresponding areas. Thus, differences concerning human factors exist in the investigated accident reports.

In recent years cognitive error models have provided insights into the unsafe acts that lead to many accidents in safety-critical environments. Most models of accident causation are based on the notion that human errors occur in the context of contributing factors. However, there is a lack of published information on possible links between specific errors and contributing factors. A total of 619 safety occurrences involving aircraft maintenance were reported using a self-completed questionnaire. Of these occurrences, 96% were related to the actions of maintenance personnel. The types of errors that were involved, and the contributing factors associated with those actions, were determined. Each type of error was associated with a particular set of contributing factors and with specific occurrence outcomes. Among the associations were links between memory lapses and fatigue and between rule violations and time pressure. Potential applications of this research include assisting with the design of accident prevention strategies, the estimation of human error probabilities, and the monitoring of organizational safety performance.

Defects in an aircraft can be caused by design flaw, manufacturer flaw or wear and tear from use. Although inspections are performed on the airplane before and after flights, accidents still result from faulty equipment and malfunctioning components. Determining the causes of an aircraft accident is an outcome of a very laborious and often very long investigation process. According to the statistics, currently the human factor has the biggest share within the causal groups. Along with the development of aviation technology came a decline in the number of accidents caused by failures or malfunctions, though such still happen, especially considering aging aircraft. Discovering causes and factors behind an aircraft accident is of crucial significance from the perspective of improving aircraft operational safety. Effective prevention is the basic measure of raising the aircraft reliability level, and the safety-related guidelines must be developed based on verified facts, reliable analysis and logical conclusions. This article presents simulation tests carried out by finite element method and constitutive laboratory tests leading to the explanation of the direct cause of a military aircraft accident. Computer-based simulation methods are particularly useful when it comes to analysing the kinematics of mechanisms and potential stress concentration points. Using computer models enables analysing an individual element failure process, identifying their sequence and locating their primary failure source.

Statistics show that the majority of aircraft accidents occurs in the vicinity of airfield areas. Yet the main factors leading to fatalities in these accidents are the forces encountered by human occupants in collision with obstacles and the presence of fire. It is possible to single out a group of “technically survivable” accidents from the total number of accidents, in which a crew member or passengers could have survived, if the evacuation took place in a timely manner. The share of such accidents is about 85–90%. However, up to 40% of passengers die in technically survivable accidents. Applicable protection systems are only adequate, if the passengers manage to exit the airplane and get to a safe distance within a limited timeframe. Although these systems have been sufficiently developed; this is one of the most significant problems in modern aviation. This means, that the study of possibilities and the development of the methods and means of passenger evacuation in aircraft accidents, specifically in and around airport areas, are relevant to be addressed.

Automation does not mean humans are replaced; quite the opposite. Increasingly, humans are asked to interact with automation in complex and typically large-scale systems, including aircraft and air traffic control, nuclear power, manufacturing plants, military systems, homes, and hospitals. This is not an easy or error-free task for either the system designer or the human operator/automation supervisor, especially as computer technology becomes ever more sophisticated. This review outlines recent research and challenges in the area, including taxonomies and qualitative models of human-automation interaction; descriptions of automation-related accidents and studies of adaptive automation; and social, political, and ethical issues.

BACKGROUND: Spatial disorientation, poor situational awareness, and aerodynamic stalls are often causal/contributory to general aviation accidents. To mitigate against the occurrence of these mishaps Cirrus Aircraft has, since 2002, introduced advanced avionics into their piston airplanes (Cirrus SR20/22). These airplanes are also certificated to more rigorous crashworthiness tests than legacy aircraft approved prior to these standards being codified. Herein, using for comparison two legacy aircraft fleets manufactured prior to 2002, we determined whether a reduced mishap rate for all accidents or relating to the aforementioned causes/contributing factors and/or diminished injury severity for survivable accidents were evident for Cirrus SR20/22 airplanes.METHODS: Accidents (2008–2017) involving Cirrus SR20/22 airplanes (manufactured 2002 or later) and Beechcraft 35/36 (Bonanza) and Mooney 20 models (both manufactured no later than 2001) (14CFR Part 91 rules) were identified (N = 136, 259, 164, respectively) from the NTSB database. Statistical analyses used Poisson distribution/contingency tables/ t- and Mann-Whitney tests.RESULTS: For each year within the 2013–2017 timespan the Cirrus SR20/22 all-accident rate was diminished 39–75% relative to both legacy fleets. Temporally, the fraction of fatal Cirrus SR20/22 accidents, initially higher, declined 50% achieving a lower, or comparable, proportion to the two legacy airframes. Fatal accident rates involving spatial disorientation/situational awareness/aerodynamic stalls were > 80% lower for Cirrus SR20/22 airplanes. For survivable mishaps, Cirrus SR20/22 aircraft showed a lower proportion (0.13 compared with 0.20–0.35) of fatal/serious injuries.CONCLUSION: Toward improving legacy aircraft safety, owners should be encouraged to upgrade their avionics for mitigating against the occurrence of such human-factor-related mishaps and install airbags to minimize injury severity.Boyd DD, Howell C. Accident rates, causes, and occupant injury involving high-performance general aviation aircraft. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2020; 91(5):387–393.

The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS, Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003) was developed as an analytical framework for the investigation of the role of human factors in aviation accidents. HFACS is based upon Reason's model (1990) of human error in which active failures are associated with the performance of front -line operators in complex systems and latent failures are characterized as inadequacies which lie dormant within a system for a long time, and are only trigge red when combined with other factors to breach the system's defenses. In this research HFACS was used to analyze accidents occurring in civil aviation aircraft in the Republic of China (ROC). Forty-one accident reports from the Aviation Safety Council (A SC) were analyzed. Relationships in the HFACS framework were identified linking fallible decisions at higher (organizational) levels with supervisory practices, thereby creating the preconditions for unsafe acts and hence indirectly impairing the performance of pilots.

The F-16 Falcon jet fighter is a marvel of engineering. Having been in operational United States Air Force service since approximately 1980, this fly-by-wire aircraft can climb vertically, sustain a 9-G turn without the loss of airspeed, and fly greater than the speed of sound. With such capabilities, this aircraft was originally designed and conceived of as a daylight air-to-air “dog-fighting” pilot's dream. As time has passed, the F-16 aircraft has been tasked with carrying out much more diverse missions than only day air-to-air combat. The aircraft and highly-trained pilots that fly it now accomplish additional missions such as day and night ground attack. An examination of ten years of USAF Safety Center accident data revealed that the F-16 aircraft had 59 Class A operational mishaps during this period. This was the highest number for any single-seat fighter-attack aircraft, and second only to the Aggressor's “Red Flag” F-5 per 100,000 hours of flight time (Class A Accident Rates: F-16 2.86 v. F-5 4.76). Incidentally, about 73% of the Royal Netherlands Air Force pilots reported that they were more susceptible to spatial disorientation and loss of situation awareness in the F-16 compared to other fighter aircraft that they had flown. After 11 years of operational experience, 21 of 210 of the Netherlands' F-16 aircraft were destroyed. A detailed examination of the USAF database revealed that a host of human factors issues are pertinent to the F-16 such as the loss of situation awareness, spatial disorientation, G-induced loss of consciousness, etc.; all of which contributed heavily to the accident rates cited for this aircraft. Additionally, cockpit design issues relatable to man-machine interfacing present human factors challenges to the pilot as well depending upon the mission scenario. The majority (53%) of F-16 accidents occurred during low-level or maneuvering flight. About 20% of the F-16 mishaps happened during the takeoff or landing phase of operations. Over 60% of the accidents were deemed by investigating officers to have “channelized attention” as a definite contributor to the mishap rate. Other human factors issues such as task oversaturation, distraction, and a variety of spatial disorientation problems contributed to many of the accidents also. Cockpit improvements, research, better training/awareness programs and Ground Collision Avoidance Devices (GCAS/PARS) are all suggested as methods to reduce future F-16 Falcon accident rates.

Introduction. The most dangerous emergency situation at the airport is an aviation accident with human victims – a plane crash. It can occur on the territory of the airport, in its vicinity, as a result of takeoff or landing of an aircraft. About 80 % of accidents occur at the stages of takeoff, altitude, and approach. A complex situation can develop as a result of mixed types of emergency situations, such as: a collision of several aircrafts while moving along the runway, a collision in the air; a collision of an aircraft with an object of the airport infrastructure or fuel-filling complex. Due to large amount of aviation fuel in the wings of aircraft during destruction and shock loads, a fire, for example, begins outside the aircraft, but spreads inside after 1-2 minutes. Survival of people after 5 minutes of being in these conditions is unlikely. The impact factors associated with the destruction of the object of the collision are added to the damage to the aircraft. The airport emergency rescue forces are not enough to save people in these conditions. Therefore, on the basis of the study of the characteristics and consequences of aviation events and the tasks of emergency and rescue units, scenarios of the development of the situation in emergency situations and other factors influencing the organization of rescue operations have been established. The purpose of the study is to improve the efficiency of planning, organizing and conducting emergency rescue operations at the airport by identifying and eliminating negative factors that affect their organization, as well as shortcomings in the management system of forces and means when responding to emergency events on the territory of the airport. Research methods. General scientific and special methods of scientific knowledge were used To obtain the results – analysis, synthesis, generalization, which were based on the general principles of systems theory, operations research, information theory. The results of the study. Scenarios for the development of the situation in emergency situations at the airport, features of the organization of emergency and fire protection of the airport, shortcomings in the system of management of forces and means in response to emergency events are established; the initial data that are the basis for improving measures to protect people and objects of the airport complex are substantiated. Conclusion. Taking into account the provisions considered will allow managers to effectively solve problems of saving peoples’ lives and protecting objects on the territory of the airport. The obtained conclusions are the basis for the development of a methodology for justifying the forces and means to perform emergency rescue operations in an emergency situation at the airport. Key words: airport, emergency, aviation event, consequences, tasks of rescue units, organization, management.

The article outlines some human factors affecting the operation and safety of passenger air transport given the massive increase in the use of the VLA. Decrease of the impact of the CO2 world emissions is one of the key goals for the new aircraft design. The main wave is going to reduce the burned fuel. Therefore, the eco-efficiency engines combined with reasonable economic operation of the aircraft are very important from an aviation perspective. The prediction for the year 2030 says that about 90% of people, which will use long-haul flights to fly between big cities. So, the A380 was designed exactly for this time period, with a focus on the right capacity, right operating cost and right fuel burn per seat. There is no aircraft today with better fuel burn combined with eco-efficiency per seat, than the A380. The very large aircrafts (VLAs) are the future of the commercial passenger aviation. Operating cost versus safety or CO2 emissions versus increasing automation inside the new generation aircraft. Almost 80% of the world aircraft accidents are caused by human error based on wrong action, reaction or final decision of pilots, the catastrophic failures of aircraft systems, or air traffic control errors are not so frequent. So, we are at the beginning of a new age in passenger aviation and the role of the human factor is more important than ever.

Aircraft approaching is the most dangerous phase in every complete flight. To solve the pressure of air traffic controllers and the landings delayed problems caused by the huge air traffic flow in Terminal Control Area (TCA), an automatic Air Traffic Control (ATC) instructions system is initially designed in this paper. It applies the fuzzy theory to make instant and appropriate decisions which can be transmitted via Controller-Pilot Datalink Communications (CPDLC). By means of the designed system, the decision-making time can be saved and the human factors can be reduced to avoid the flight accidents and further delays in aircraft approaching.

ABSTRACT Aircraft maintenance activities are one of the most important criteria for the safe and effective execution of aviation operations. In aircraft accidents and incidents, maintenance factor is vital for the development of safety for organizations, authorities and countries in the aviation field. Effective maintenance activities will also contribute to the costs of organizations by ensuring the safe operations of aircraft with people. Maintenance activities are carried out by maintenance technicians in areas such as hangars or aprons. Aircraft maintenance technicians' performance in performing maintenance activities directly impacts flight safety and technician safety, which in turn has a positive or negative impact on organizations. Improving technician competency assessment processes can reduce maintenance errors, improve technician performance, create positive impacts on safe and efficient flight operations, reduce maintenance costs and benefit of entire aviation industry. Technician competency should be considered in performance evaluations and assignments by assessing in all levels with the compatibility of videly used human resources management methods. In this study, technician competence assessment processes are mentioned, the effects of these processes on aviation safety are explained and solutions are proposed to develop and apply the assessment processes. Keywords: Aircraft maintenance, aircraft maintenance technician competency, competency assessment, human factors in aviation.

Although the aircraft checklist has long been regarded as a foundation of pilot standardization and cockpit safety, it has escaped the scrutiny of the human factors profession. The improper use, or nonuse, of the normal checklist by flight crews is often cited as a major contributing factor to aircraft accidents. This paper reports the results of a field study of flight deck checklists and examines this seemingly mundane yet critical device from several perspectives: its functions, format, design, length, and usage, and the limitations of the humans who must interact with it. Certain sociotechnical factors, such as the airline "culture," cockpit resource management, and production pressures that influence the design and use of this device, are also discussed. Finally, a list of design guidelines for normal checklists is provided. Although the focus of this paper is on the air transport industry, most of the principles discussed apply equally well to other high-risk industries, such as maritime transportation, power production, weapons systems, space flight, and medical care.

National Transportation Safety Board accident data for 1983-1991 were used to compare those general aviation accident cases that involved spatial disorientation (SD) with all others. About 2.1% of general aviation airplane accidents involved SD. Those accidents were associated with low ceilings, restricted visibility, precipitation, darkness and instrument flight conditions. Pilots in certain professions, particularly those in business, were more involved in SD accidents. Pilots in SD accidents were more often under pressure, fatigue, anxiety, physical impairment and alcohol or drugs. The pilots' total and night flying experience were inversely related to involvement in SD accidents. Spatial disorientation accidents accounted for a small number of crashes, but they were very severe-fatalities occurred in 92%, they accounted for 9.9% of the fatal accidents, 11% of the fatalities and in 95% the aircraft were destroyed. The results suggest that the pilots in SD accidents lacked the flight experience necessary to recognize or cope with the stimuli that induce SD, which was compounded by fatigue, alcohol/drugs or pressure and other psychological and physical impairments. Specific exposure to conditions leading to SD in training of general aviation and all pilots should be evaluated to help them to recognize it, and the techniques used by experienced pilots to combat its onset and effects should be studied and used in training. Improved human factors engineering of the cockpit instrumentation is also needed.

Purpose Aviation has multi-cultural business environment in all aspects as operational and management. Managing aviation requires high awareness on human factor risk which includes organizational behavior-related topics. The greatest risk to an enterprise’s ability to achieve its strategic goals and objectives is the human factor. Both organizational behavior and corporate culture behavior with social psychology are the most vital aspects of management and strategy in terms of human resources. Related risks, including organizational behavior and culture, have the potential to directly impact on both business performance and corporate sustainability. Therefore, in this paper, the most prominent risks were determined in accordance with social psychology, and after identification of human factor-based risks, these have prioritized and prepared risk mapping with fresh approach. For this reason, this study aims to develop risk mapping model for human factors that takes into account interrelations among risk factors three dimensional based new approach. This approach includes both identification of human factor based risks, prioritization them and setting risk mapping according to corporate based qualifications via tailoring risk list. Developed risk map in this paper will help to manage corporate risks to achieve improved performance and sustainability. Design/methodology/approach This new organizational behavior- and culture-focused risk mapping model developed in this study has the potential to make significant contribution to the management of the human factor for modern management and strategy. In enterprise risk management system, risk mapping is both strong and effective strategic methodology to manage ergonomics issue with strategic approach. Human factor is both determinative and also strategic element to both continuity and performance of business operations with safely and sound. In view of management and strategy, vitally, the human factor determines the outcome in both every business and every decision-making. Findings It is assumed that, if managers manage human risk you may get advantages to achieving corporate strategies in timely manner. Aviation is sensitive sector for its ingredients: airports, airlines, air traffic management, aircraft maintenance, pilotage and ground handling. Aim of this paper is to present risk management approach to optimize human performance while minimizing both failures and errors by aircraft maintenance technician (AMT). This model may apply all human factors in other departments of aviation such as pilots and traffic controllers. AMT is key component of aircraft maintenance. Thus, errors made by AMTs will cause aircraft accidents or incidents or near miss incidents. In this study, new taxonomy model for human risk factors in aircraft maintenance organizations has been designed, and also new qualitative risk assessment as three dimensions is carried out by considering the factors affecting the AMT’s error obtained from extensive literature review and expert opinions in the field of aviation. Human error risks are first categorized into two main groups and sub three groups and then prioritized using the risk matrix via triple dimension as probability, severity and interrelations ratio between risks. Practical implications Risk mapping is established to decide which risk management option they will apply for managers when they will look at this map. Managers may use risk map to both identify their managerial priorities and share sources to managing risks, and make decisions on risk handling options. This new model may be a useful new tool to manage ergonomic human factor-based risks in developing strategy in aviation business management. In addition, this paper will contribute to department of management and strategy and related literature. Originality/value This study has originality via new modeling of risk matrix. In this study, dimension of risk analysis has been improved as three dimensions. This study has new approach and new assessment of risk with likelihood (probability), impact (severity) and interrelations ratio. This new model may be a useful new tool to both assess and prioritize mapping of ergonomic-based risks in business management. In addition, this research will contribute to aviation management and strategy literature and also enterprise risk management literature.

The task to provide flight safety is solved both at the stage of design and manufacture of aircraft and during its operation. Flight safety is influenced by three groups of factors: a human factor, a technical factor and marginal ambient conditions. In spite of the fact that only about 3% of aviation accidents are caused by marginal ambient conditions, in many cases there was a combination of the human factor as the main one with the availability of the accompanying unfavorable external conditions, especially marginal weather conditions. The article provides a comparative analysis of a flight safety factor in commercial civil aviation in the Russian Federation and the United States and analyzes accident statistics caused by adverse meteorological conditions. Since the greatest number of accidents related to marginal weather conditions occurred with helicopters, the article has highlighted the possibility of increasing helicopter flight safety by creating a methodology for risk assessment associated with the influence of adverse weather conditions before the flight operation. Risk assessment techniques, such as the ICAO Risk Assessment Matrix, the CFIT checklist, FRAT, have been analyzed and the feasibility of using the FRAT methodology has been demonstrated. On the basis of the FRAT methodology after updating the section "Operating conditions of the aircraft", a risk assessment methodology for the forthcoming flight of helicopters was obtained. A risk level admissibility scale for the forthcoming flight was proposed to interpret the obtained values of the risk level.

The entire activity involving human factors, machinery, chemicals, and through some work processes had the potential hazard that increased the risk of accidents and health problems. Aircraft paint removal job was a high risk of an accident. The purpose of this research was to identify hazards, assess pure risks, identify risk control, and assess risks after risk control were conducted on aircraft paint removal job in PT. X. Type of this research was descriptive research. Primary data retrieval techniques in the study was observational and interview. The subject of research were 1 PDCA HSE and 4 aircraft paint removal workers. Variable in this study is the hazards, likelihood, severity, risk levels, and risk control. The results of hazard identification obtained 14 risk in Aircraft Paint Removal such as 1 low risk, 2 middle risks and 13 high risks. Risk control by the company showed that there are 13 high risk decrease to 7, 2 middle risks increased to 6 risk, and 1 low risk increased to 3 risks. In conclusion, PTX. has 14 risks, 13 of them included in the high risk category. There was a decrease in risk due to the control carriedd out by the company into 13 risks and 7 of them included in high risk.Keywords: aircraft paint removal, hazard identification, risk assessment, risk control

Workload and fatigue of aircraft pilots represent an argument of great interest in the framework of human factors and a pivotal point to be considered in aviation safety. 75% of aircraft accidents are related to human errors that, in most cases, are due to high level of mental workload and fatigue. There exist several subjective or objective metrics to quantify the pilots’ workload level, with both linear and nonlinear relationships reported in the literature. The main research objective of the present work is to analyze the relationships between objective and subjective workload measurements by looking for a correlation between metrics belonging to the subjective and biometric rating methods. More particularly, the Heart Rate Variability (HRV) is used for the objective analysis, whereas the NASA-TLX questionnaire is the tool chosen for the subjective evaluation of the workload. Two different flight scenarios were considered for the studies: the take-off phase with the initial climb and the final approach phase with the landing. A Maneuver Error Index (MEI) is also introduced to evaluate the pilot flight performance according to mission requirements. Both qualitative and quantitative correlation analyses were performed among the MEI, subjective and objective measurements. Monotonic relationships were found within the HRV indexes, and a nonlinear relationship is proposed among NASA-TLX and HRV indexes. These findings suggest that the relationship between workload, biometric data, and performance indexes are characterized by intricate patterns of nonlinear relationships.

Unlike door crash accidents predominantly involving bicycles in Australia, the UK, and other Western countries, cases in Taiwan are far more fatal as they usually involve motorcycles. This is due to the unique anthropogeography and transportation patterns of Taiwan, particularly the numbers of motorcycles being twice that of cars. Both path analysis and multivariate logistic regression methods were adopted in this study. The multivariate logistic regression analysis results have shown that the main risk factors causing serious injuries in door crashes include winter, morning, male motorcyclists, heavy motorcycles, and the left sides of cars. Regarding the gender differences in motorcyclists, it appears that female motorcyclists have higher door crash accident rates, while the odds of severe injury and fatality in male motorcyclists are 1.658 times greater than that of female motorcyclists. The risk factors derived from the multivariate logistic regression analysis were further discussed and analysed. It was found that the causes of serious injuries and deaths stemming from door crashes were related to the risk perception ability, reaction ability, visibility, and riding speed of the motorcyclists. Therefore, suggestions on risk management and accident prevention were proposed using advocacy through the 3E strategies of human factors engineering design.

Accidents continue to create an unacceptable personal, social, and economic burden in many domains. Various accident analysis methods exist; however, key limitations have been identified. This paper describes a new accident analysis method, the Accident Network (AcciNet), that was recently developed as part of an ongoing collaboration between Human Factors and Ergonomics research groups from Australia and the United Kingdom. The method is demonstrated via an analysis of the Uber-Volvo fatal pedestrian collision. The analysis demonstrates how AcciNet goes beyond current state-of-the-art accident analysis methods to consider the role of normal performance in accident causation and identify the interrelations between failures, normal performance, and both human and non-human actors in the system. We describe the implications for accident analysis in practice and outline the next steps of the research program, including formal reliability and validity testing of AcciNet and the development of practical training materials.

Early aeromedical risk i was based on aeromedical standards designed to eliminate individuals ii from air operations with any identifiable medical risk, and led to frequent medical disqualification. The concept of considering aeromedical risk as part of the spectrum of risks that could lead to aircraft accidents (including mechanical risks and human factors) was first proposed in the 1980s and led to the development of the 1% rule which defines the maximum acceptable risk for an incapacitating medical event as 1% per year (or 1 in 100 person-years) to align with acceptable overall risk in aviation operations. Risk management has subsequently evolved as a formal discipline, incorporating risk assessment as an integral part of the process. Risk assessment is often visualised as a risk matrix, with the level of risk, urgency or action required defined for each cell, and colour-coded as red, amber or green depending on the overall combination of risk and consequence. This manuscript describes an approach to aeromedical risk management which incorporates risk matrices and how they can be used in aeromedical decision-making, while highlighting some of their shortcomings.

The article describes a new class of organizational and technical systems - intelligent aviation systems, whose operational principles provide the increased safety of an aircraft flight. The development of systems of this class is primarily explained by the need to record statistical data on the main causes of aviation accidents (human factor - up to 87%, failure of aviation equipment - up to 15%, external factors - 2% of all cases). A scientific problem is formulated related to the importance of creating methods for assessing and predicting the threat of an accident based on direct control of changes in the values of characteristics that affect flight safety. For this, it is proposed to use the methods and means of the scientific and technical direction of artificial intelligence, which will reveal the immediate causes of an aviation accident and prevent them using the flight safety management system. The technical characteristics are considered, the properties of the system under study are presented, which determine the principles of its functioning: intelligence, information content, speed, controllability, interdependence of subsystems, flight safety, including identification of the threat of an accident, its prediction and parry. The above principles of the functioning of the system under study, which are part of the methodology for managing the safety of an aircraft in flight, are implemented in a set of methods and algorithms. Among them should be noted the intelligent method for assessing the threat of an aviation accident, the method for predicting the threat of an accident, the method for supporting decision-making by the crew in the event of the threat of an accident, as well as the method for synthesizing the control law for countering the threat

Ensuring the safety of the civil aviation system is the main goal of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) activities and the "human factor" was define as a priority in the field of flight safety. Given the variety of factors potentially affecting human performance, it is not surprising, that human error has been recognized as a major causative factor in virtually all air crashes and accidents since the inception of aviation. The reliability and safety of flights are influenced by: the quality of preparation of aviation equipment for flight, the quality of manufacture, assembly, acceptance, and pre-flight tests, the quality of design of aircraft and engines. The quality of workmanship is confirmed by the execution of control at each stage of manufacture. In any activity, the "human factor" is manifested by mistakes, oversights, and omissions, or miscalculations that a person makes when doing his job under certain conditions. The theory of the occurrence and prevention of errors associated with human physiology and the environment were described by H. Heinrich's "domino theory". Human errors form sequences in which the first error causes a chain of subsequent ones, keeping one of the dominoes standing behind each other, it is possible to prevent the consequences of an accident in the form of material damage or an accident. Human physiological features such as vision can be one of the dominoes and lead to erroneous actions. In the modern world, non-destructive testing methods are relevant and the role of a defectoscopistꞌs in determining the nature of a defect is quite large. Regular monitoring of vision (prophylactic examination) allows you to identify potential vision problems with a specialist, which can lead to erroneous actions. Human factors research is fundamental to understanding the context in which normal, healthy, skilled, well-equipped and reasonably motivated personnel make mistakes, some of which are fatal and, if the causes of human error are correctly understood, it will be possible to develop more effective prevention strategies errors, their control, and safe elimination.

Purpose Real flight is cognitively demanding; accordingly, both indicators and display panel layout should be user-friendly to improve pilot-aircraft interaction. Poor pilot-interface interactions in aircrafts could result in accidents. Although a general reason of accidents is improper displays, relatively few studies were conducted on interfaces. This study aims to present an optimization model to create intuitively integrated user-friendly cockpit interfaces. Design/methodology/approach Subjectivity within most usability evaluation techniques could bring about interface design problems. A priori information about indicator’s possible locations may be available or unavailable. Thus different analytical approaches must be applied for modifications and new interface designs. Relative layout design (RLD) model was developed and used in new interface designs to optimize locations of indicators. This model was based on layout optimization and constructed in accordance with design requirements, ergonomic considerations with the pilot preferences. RLD model optimizes interface design by deploying indicators to the best locations to improve usability of display panel, pilot-aircraft interaction and flight safety. Findings Optimum interfaces for two problem instances were gathered by RLD model in 15.77 CPU(s) with 10 indicators and 542.51 CPU(s) with 19 indicators. A comparison between relative and existing cockpit interfaces reveals that locations of six navigation and four mechanical system indicators are different. The differences may stem from pilots’ preferences and relativity constraints. Both interfaces are more similar for the central part of the display panel. The objective function value of relative interface design (Opt: 527938) is far better than existing interface (737100). The RLD model improved usability of existing interface (28.61 per cent considering decrease in the objective function values from 737100 to 527938. Practical implications Future cockpit and new helicopter interface designs may involve RLD model as an alternative interface design tool. Furthermore, other layout optimization problems, e.g. circuit boards, microchips and engines, etc. could be handled in a more realistic manner by RLD model. Originality/value Originality and impact of this study related to development and employment of a new optimization model (RLD) on cockpit interface design for the first time. Engineering requirements, human factors, ergonomics and pilots’ preferences are simultaneously considered in the RLD model. The subjectivity within usability evaluation techniques could be diminished in this way. The contributions of RLD model to classical facility layout models are relativity constraints with the physical constrictions and ergonomic objective function weights. Novelty of this paper is the development and employment of a new optimization model (RLD) to locate indicators.

Last (1983) defines public health as: the efforts organised by society to protect, promote and restore the public's health. It is the combination of sciences, skills and beliefs that are directed to the maintenance and improvement of the health of all people through collective or social actions. The programs, services and institutions involved emphasise the prevention of disease and the health needs of the population as a whole. Public health activities change with changing technology and values, but the goals remain the same: to reduce the amount of disease, premature death and disability in the population. (p.45)Recommended goals and targets for addressing national public health problems and directed at reducing the amount of death and premature death have been proposed in many countries over the past 10 years, including the United States of America (United States Department of Health and Human Services, 1990), the United Kingdom (Department of Health, 1992), Canada (Ontario Premiers' Council on Health, 1987) and Australia (Nutbeam, Wise, Bauman, Harris, & Leeder, 1993). In Australia for example, over the past 2 years, much attention has been directed at health outcomes related to cardiovascular disease, cancers, accidents and injuries and mental health. All of these reports have emphasised the importance of changing those lifestyle and related risk factors associated with preventable causes of death. Priority lifestyle areas that have been identified include physical inactivity, diet and nutrition, smoking, alcohol and other drug use, safety behaviours, sun protective behaviours, appropriate use of medicines, immunisation, sexuality and reproductive health, oral hygiene, and mental health. Priority populations and appropriate settings for intervening in these areas have also been identified.

The article presents the results of the "risk pyramids" analysis of commercial aviation for their adequacy to the current state of the aviation transport system of Russia. The necessity of annual updating of "risk pyramids" is shown, as the aviation transport system (ATS) of Russia is dynamic and the ATS state changes faster than the accident rate statistical indicators characterizing this state. The method of linear weighted moving average for the synthesis and annual correction of the "risk pyramids" parameters with an optimized averaging coefficient – 7 years is substantiated and proposed. The optimization of the averaging coefficient is performed by the criterion of the minimum mismatch between the averaged values of the "risk pyramids" parameters and the current (annual) values determined by the statistical data of an aviation events. The general and private "risk pyramids" of commercial aviation of Russia synthesized by results of the statistical factorial analysis of aviation events for 2009–2016 are presented. The synthesis of "risk pyramids" is made in accordance with the classification of aviation events in the civil aviation of Russia, separately by causative factors: "Human", "Aircraft", "Environment". The parameters of the "risk pyramids" reflect the conditional probability of an aviation event of great severity (for example, a catastrophe), if there were aviation events of less severity (for example, incidents). The parameters of the presented pyramids are intended for inclusion into the algorithms of indirect estimation of probability of aviation accidents for any airline and any period of flight work (from a month or more).

Literature New capabilities to modernize the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS) include support of real-time information streams derived from many data sources across the NAS. As an emergent property, safety of the NAS arises from interactions between many elements at different levels, ranging from those attributable to humans, technology, and the environment. Each component in the NAS needs to interact with other components, exchange resources and information, and operate under broad regulations to achieve overall system objectives (Harris & Stanton, 2010). Sometimes, incidents and accidents result from insufficient interaction (communication and coordination) between humans (e.g., pilot-controller). The content of communication provides value and supports understanding with a multitude of individual, group, team, and data sets within air traffic research. In addition, another dimension to communication with a potentially rich source of understanding is everything outside of its explicit meaning. Cooke and Gorman (2009) describe methods of communication flow between teams (considered to be a system) that have proven insightful. The first is a ratio of team members speech quantity, which can indicate the degree of influence one member has over others. Another is the communication required and passed score, or how much variation there is in actual team communication from expectations. Flow quantity represents how much speech each member of the team produces. Gorman et al.’s (2012) study applied discrete Recurrence Quantification Analysis (RQA) to team communication flow data in order to visualize and measure coordination dynamics of Unnamed Aircraft Vehicle (UAV) teams, both mixed teams (i.e., team members changed) and intact teams (i.e., team members stayed the same over successive experimental sessions). Interestingly, mixed teams were better able to adjust to unexpected perturbations; this ability was linked to team level coordination dynamics. That is, mixed teams adopted a globally stable pattern of communication while exhibiting strong temporal dependence (Gorman, Cooke, Amazeen, & Fouse, 2012). Similarly, Demir, Cooke, & Amazeen (2018) applied discrete RQA on human-robot interaction in an Urban Search and Rescue task and multivariate extension of RQA on human-synthetic team in a UAV task. They underline that metastable team coordination (not too stable nor too flexible) between team members is associated with the ability to successfully overcome novel events (i.e., team situation awareness) in a dynamic task environment. The current project addresses the question of how human factors related to air traffic control (ATC), specifically situation awareness and cognitive load, interact with other factors in the NAS to affect ATC performance and a result in a safe and effective NAS? One way to answer this question is focusing on ATC-pilot communication as a chief performance indicator. In the current study, we investigate the potential of dynamical systems perspectives to capture the differential dynamics of three cases between controller-pilot communication flow during incidents and accidents. Method One of the approaches for investigating interaction patterns between system components (in the controller-pilot case) and their change over time involves looking at communication flow using discrete Recurrence Plot (RP) and corresponding Recurrence Quantification Analysis (RQA), which quantifies how many recurrences with a certain length are present by multidimensional space (phase space) trajectory in a dynamical system (Marwan, Carmen Romano, Thiel, & Kurths, 2007). RP is the basis of discrete RQA (Eckmann, Kamphorst, & Ruelle, 1987), which is a visual tool for demonstrating a system’s recurrent structure in the phase space when a system revisits specific states or sequences of states within a region of phase space over a period of time. In the case of two or more systems, discrete RP displays the times when two or more separate dynamical systems show a recurrence simultaneously (Marwan et al., 2007). Three cases of controller-pilot audio transmissions with their communication time stamps were obtained from “Cockpit Voice Recorder Transcripts” (2019), visualized using RP, and analyzed via discrete RQA. The cases represent situations of particular interest, communication, and coordination. Discrete RQA quantifies not only the effect of interventions (such as unexpected events) on instability, but also the dyad interaction processes and the dynamics that contribute to that process. The RQA was used to produce several measures, including percent recurrence rate, percent determinism (DET), longest diagonal line, longest vertical line, entropy, and laminarity. Of these, the focal variable was determinism (Marwan et al., 2007), which indicates the amount of organization in the communication of a system. DET is derived from the recurrence plot by examining how the recurrent points are distributed. Dyads with high determinism tend to repeat sequences of states many times, while a controller-pilot with low determinism rarely repeats a sequence of states, producing few diagonal lines. Results and discussion One of the objectives of this study is to monitor human performance indicators in real-time in the NAS to make predictions about risk. The current exploratory paper presents an idea about how to model human interaction between two or more roles with the larger purpose of developing NAS risk prognostics. We have presented three controller-pilot communication flows via discrete RP and RQA methods that differentiate three real cases based on discrete interaction sequences. The measures extracted from the RQA and visualizations of the interaction patterns show that effective communication and coordination is needed for effective situation awareness, i.e., overcoming the failures. Based on previous studies (Demir et al., 2018), we expected that the rigidity of the coordination dynamics between controller and pilot in one of the cases would associated with a fatal accident as well as lack of communication (confusion during the landing), resulting in a lack of situation awareness. On the other hand, two other incidents demonstrated more flexible behavior across the roles (controller-pilot) to adapt to the dynamic environment. In this case, the key lies in the dynamic transition between interaction and the environment. The controller and pilot are compelled to adjust their interaction patterns (flexibility) to adapt to changes in the environment and maintain a stable trajectory toward meeting their goals, such as landing safely. Thus, there are three crucial states for effective interaction in both temporal and spatial states: what needs to be communicated, when it needs to be coordinated, and how it needs to be communicated and coordinated”.

From its beginning, mankind suffered injuries through falling, fire, drowning and human aggression [1]. Although the frequency and the kinetics modifiy over millennia, trauma continues to represent an important cause of morbidity and mortality even in the modern society [1]. Significant progresses in the trauma surgery were due to military conflicts, which next to social sufferance came with important steps in injuries’ management, further applied in civilian hospitals. The foundation of modern trauma systems was started by Dominique Jean Larrey (1766-1842) during the Napoleonic Rin military campaign from 1792. The wounded who remained on the battlefield till the end of the battle to receive medical care, usually more than 24 hours, from that moment were transported during the conflict with flying ambulances to mobile hospitals. Starting with the First World War, through the usage of antiseptics, blood transfusions, and fracture management, the mortality decreased from 39% in the Crimean War (1853–1856) to 10%. One of the most preeminent figures of the Second World War was Michael DeBakey, who created the Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH), concept very similar to the Larrey’s unit. In 1941, in England, Birmingham Accident Hospital was opened, specially designed for injured people, this being the first trauma center worldwide. During the Golf War (1990–1991) the MASH were used for the last time, being replaced by Forward Surgical Teams, very mobile units satisfying the necessities of the nowadays infantry [1]. Nowadays, trauma meets the pandemic criteria, everyday 16,000 people worldwide are dying, injuries representing one of the first five causes of mortality for all the age groups below 60 [2]. A recent 12-month analysis of trauma pattern in the Emergency Hospital of Bucharest revealed 141 patients, 72.3% males, with a mean age of 43.52 ± 19 years, and a mean New Injury Severity Score (NISS) of 27.58 ± 11.32 [3]. The etiology was traffic related in 101 (71.6%), falls in 28 (19.9%) and crushing in 7 (5%) cases. The overall mortality was as high as 30%, for patients with a mean NISS of 37.63 [3]. At the scene, early recognition of severe injuries and a high index of suspicion according to trauma kinetics may allow a correct triage of patients [4]. A functional trauma system should continuously evaluate the rate of over- and under-triage [5]. The over-triage represents the transfer to a very severe patient to a center without necessary resources, while under-triage means a low injured patient referred to a highly specialized center. If under-triage generates preventable deaths, the over-triage comes with a high financial and personal burden for the already overloaded tertiary centers [5]. To maximize the chance for survival, the major trauma patients should be transported as rapid as possible to a trauma center [6]. The initial resuscitation of trauma patients was divided into two time intervals: ten platinum minutes and golden hour [6]. During the ten platinum minutes the airways should be managed, the exsanguinating bleeding should be stopped, and the critical patients should be transported from the scene. During the golden hour all the life-threatening lesions should be addressed, but unfortunately many patients spend this time in the prehospital setting [6]. These time intervals came from Trunkey’s concept of trimodal distribution of mortality secondary to trauma, proposed in 1983 [7]. This trimodal distribution of mortality remains a milestone in the trauma education and research, and is still actual for development but inconsistent for efficient trauma systems [8]. The concept of patients’ management in the prehospital setting covered a continuous interval, with two extremities: stay and play/treat then transfer or scoop and run/ load and go. Stay and play, usually used in Europe, implies airways securing and endotracheal intubation, pleurostomy tube insertion, and intravenous lines with volemic replacement therapy. During scoop and run, used in the Unites States, the patient is immediately transported to a trauma center, addressing the immediate life-threating injuries during transportation. In the emergency department of the corresponding trauma center, the resuscitation of the injured patients should be done by a trauma team, after an orchestrated protocol based on Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS). The modern trauma teams include five to ten specialists: general surgeons trained in trauma care, emergency medicine physicians, intensive care physicians, orthopedic surgeons, neurosurgeons, radiologists, interventional radiologists, and nurses. In the specially designed trauma centers, the leader of the trauma team should be the general surgeon, while in the lower level centers this role may be taken over by the emergency physicians. The implementation of a trauma system is a very difficult task, and should be tailored to the needs of the local population. For example, in Europe the majority of injuries are by blunt trauma, while in the United States or South Africa they are secondary to penetrating injuries. In an effort to analyse at a national level the performance of trauma care, we have proposed a national registry of major trauma patients [9]. For this registry we have defined major trauma as a New Injury Severity Score higher than 15. The maintenance of such registry requires significant human and financial resources, while only a permanent audit may decrease the rate of preventable deaths in the Romanian trauma care (Figure 1) [10]. Figure 1 - The website of Romanian Major Trauma Registry (http://www.registrutraume.ro). USA - In the United States of America there are 203 level I centers, 265 level II centers, 205 level III or II centers and only 32 level I or II pediatric centers, according to the 2014 report of National Trauma Databank [11]. USA were the first which recognized trauma as a public health problem, and proceeded to a national strategy for injury prevention, emergency medical care and trauma research. In 1966, the US National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council noted that ‘’public apathy to the mounting toll from accidents must be transformed into an action program under strong leadership’’ [12]. Considerable national efforts were made in 1970s, when standards of trauma care were released and in 1990s when ‘’The model trauma care system plan’’[13] was generated. The American College of Surgeons introduced the concept of a national trauma registry in 1989. The National Trauma Databank became functional seven years later, in 2006 being registered over 1 million patients from 600 trauma centers [14]. Mortality from unintentional injury in the United States decreased from 55 to 37.7 per 100,000 population, in 1965 and 2004, respectively [15]. Due to this national efforts, 84.1% of all Americans have access within one hour from injury to a dedicated trauma care [16]. Canada - A survey from 2010 revealed that 32 trauma centers across Canada, 16 Level I and 16 Level II, provide definitive trauma care [18]. All these centers have provincial designation, and funding to serve as definitive or referral hospital. Only 18 (56%) centers were accredited by an external agency, such as the Trauma Association of Canada. The three busiest centers in Canada had between 798–1103 admissions with an Injury Severity Score over 12 in 2008 [18]. Australia - Australia is an island continent, the fifth largest country in the world, with over 23 million people distributed on this large area, a little less than the United States. With the majority of these citizens concentrated in large urban areas, access to the medical care for the minority of inhabitants distributed through the territory is quite difficult. The widespread citizens cannot be reached by helicopter, restricted to near-urban regions, but with the fixed wing aircraft of the Royal Flying Doctor Service, within two hours [13]. In urban centers, the trauma care is similar to the most developed countries, while for people sparse on large territories the trauma care is far from being managed in the ‘’golden hour’’, often extending to the ‘’Golden day’’ [19]. Germany - One of the most efficient European trauma system is in Germany. Created in 1975 on the basis of the Austrian trauma care, this system allowed an over 50% decreasing of mortality, despite the increased number of injuries. According to the 2014 annual report of the Trauma Register of German Trauma Society (DGU), there are 614 hospitals submitting data, with 34.878 patients registered in 2013 [20]. The total number of cases documented in the Trauma Register DGU is now 159.449, of which 93% were collected since 2002. In the 2014 report, from 26.444 patients with a mean age of 49.5% and a mean ISS of 16.9, the observed mortality was 10% [20]. The United Kingdom - In 1988, a report of the Royal College of Surgeons of England, analyzing major injuries concluded that one third of deaths were preventable [21]. In 2000, a joint report from the Royal College of Surgeons of England and of the British Orthopedic Association was very suggestive entitled "Better Care for the Severely Injured" [22]. Nowadays the Trauma Audit Research network (TARN) is an independent monitor of trauma care in England and Wales [23]. TARN collects data from hospitals for all major trauma patients, defined as those with a hospital stay longer than 72 hours, those who require intensive care, or in-hospital death. A recent analysis of TARN data, looking at the cost of major trauma patients revealed that the total cost of initial hospital inpatient care was £19.770 per patient, of which 62% was attributable to ventilation, intensive care and wards stays, 16% to surgery, and 12% to blood transfusions [24]. Global health care models Countries where is applied Functioning concept Total healthcare costs from GDP Bismarck model Germany Privatized insurance companies (approx. 180 nonprofit sickness funds). Half of the national trauma beds are publicly funded trauma centers; the remaining are non-profit and for-profit private centers. 11.1% Beveridge model United Kingdom Insurance companies are non-existent. All hospitals are nationalized. 9.3% National health insurance Canada, Australia, Taiwan Fusion of Bismarck and Beveridge models. Hospitals are privatized, but the insurance program is single and government-run. 11.2% for Canada The out-of-pocket model India, Pakistan, Cambodia The poorest countries, with undeveloped health care payment systems. Patients are paying for more than 75% of medical costs. 3.9% for India GDP – gross domestic product Table 1 - Global health care models with major consequences on trauma care [17]. Traumas continue to be a major healthcare problem, and no less important than cancer and cardiovascular diseases, and access to dedicated and timely intervention maximizes the patients’ chance for survival and minimizes the long-term morbidities. We should remember that one size does not fit in all trauma care. The Romanian National Trauma Program should tailor its resources to the matched demands of the specific Romanian urban and rural areas.

Abstract Amateur and sports flight is an activity with growing numbers worldwide. However, the main cause of flight incidents and accidents is increasingly pilot error, for a number of reasons. Fatigue, sleep issues and hypoxia, among many others, are some that can be avoided, or, at least, mitigated. This article describes the analysis of psychological and physiological parameters during flight in unpressurized aircraft cabins. It relates cerebral oximetry and heart rate with altitude, as well as with flight phase. The study of those parameters might give clues on which variations represent a warning sign to the pilot, thus preventing incidents and accidents due to human factors. Results show that both cerebral oximetry and heart rate change along the flight and altitude in the alert pilot. The impaired pilot might not reveal these variations and, if this is detected, he can be warned in time.

Abstract Human error is one of the primary reasons for accidents in complex industries like aviation, nuclear power plant management, and health care. Physical and cognitive workload, flawed information processing, and poor decision making are some of the reasons that make humans vulnerable to error and lead to failures and accidents. In many accidents and failures, oftentimes, vulnerabilities that are embedded in the system, in the form of design deficiencies and poor human factors, lead to latent or catastrophic failures, but the last link is a human operator who gets blamed or worse, injured. This paper introduces an early design human performance assessment framework to identify what type of digital prototyping methodologies are appropriate to detect the deviation of the operator's performance due to an emergency condition. Fire in a civilian aircraft cockpit was introduced as a performance shaping factor (PSF). Ergonomics performance was evaluated using two prototyping strategies: (1) a computational prototyping framework includes digital human modeling (DHM) and computer-aided design; and (2) a novel mixed prototyping framework includes motion capture, DHM, and virtual reality. Results showed that the mixed prototyping framework can simulate emergency scenarios with increased realism and also has the potential to incorporate subjective aspects of ergonomics outcomes, overcoming the underlying lack of design knowledge in conventional early design methodologies.

Objective We extend the theory of conceptual categories to flight safety events, to understand variations in pilot event knowledge. Background Experienced, highly trained pilots sometimes fail to recognize events, resulting in procedures not being followed, damaging safety. Recognition is supported by typical, representative members of a concept. Variations in typicality (“gradients”) could explain variations in pilot knowledge, and hence recognition. The role of simulations and everyday flight operations in the acquisition of useful, flexible concepts is poorly understood. We illustrate uses of the theory in understanding the industry-wide problem of nontypical events. Method One hundred and eighteen airline pilots responded to scenario descriptions, rating them for typicality and indicating the source of their knowledge about each scenario. Results Significant variations in typicality in flight safety event concepts were found, along with key gradients that may influence pilot behavior. Some concepts were linked to knowledge gained in simulator encounters, while others were linked to real flight experience. Conclusion Explicit training of safety event concepts may be an important adjunct to what pilots may variably glean from simulator or operational flying experiences, and may result in more flexible recognition and improved response. Application Regulators, manufacturers, and training providers can apply these principles to develop new approaches to pilot training that better prepare pilots for event diversity.

IntroductionBushfires have taken numerous lives and destroyed communities throughout Australia over many years. Catastrophic fire weather alerts have occurred during the Australian summer of 2012–13, and long-term forecasts predict increased bushfire events throughout several areas of Australia. This article highlights how organisational and individual responses to bushfire in Australia often entail creative responses—either improvised responses at the time of bushfire emergencies or innovative (organisational, strategic, or technological) changes which help protect the community from, or mitigate against, future bushfire catastrophes. These improvised or innovative responses include emergency communications systems, practices, and devices. This article reports on findings from a research project funded by the Australian Research Council titled Using Community Engagement and Enhanced Visual Information to Promote FireWatch Satellite Communications as a Support for Collaborative Decision-making. FireWatch is a Web-based public information product based on near real time satellite data produced by the West Australian (WA) Government entity, Landgate. The project researches ways in which remote and regional publics can be engaged and mobilised through the development of a more user-friendly FireWatch site to make fire information accessible and usable, allowing a community-focused response to risk.The significance of the research project is evident both in how it addresses the important and life-threatening challenge of bushfires; and also in how Australia’s increasingly hot, dry, long summers are adding to historically-established risks. This innovative project uses an iterative, participatory design process incorporating action-research practices. This will ensure that the new Firewatch interface is redesigned, tested, observed, and reflected upon multiple times—and will incorporate the collective creativity of users, designers, and researchers.The qualitative findings reported on in this article are based on 19 interviews with community members in the town of Kununurra in the remote Kimberley region of WA. The findings are positioned within a reconceptualised framework in which creativity is viewed as an essential component of successful emergency responses. This includes, we argue, two critical aspects of creativity: improvisation during a catastrophic event; and ongoing innovation to improve future responses to catastrophes—including communication practices and technologies. This shifts the discourse within the literature in relation to the effective management and community responses to the changing phenomenon of fire catastrophes. Findings from the first round of interviews, and results of enquiries into previous bushfires in Australia, are used to highlight how these elements of creativity often entail a collective creativity on the part of emergency responders or the community in general. An additional focus is on the importance of the critical use of communication during a bushfire event.ImprovisationThe notion of "improvisation" is often associated with artistic performance. Nonetheless, improvisation is also integral to making effectual responses during natural catastrophes. “Extreme events present unforeseen conditions and problems, requiring a need for adaptation, creativity, and improvisation while demanding efficient and rapid delivery of services under extreme conditions” (Harrald 257).Catastrophes present us with unexpected scenarios and require rapid, on the spot problem solving and “even if you plan for a bushfire it is not going to go to plan. When the wind changes direction there has to be a new plan” (Jeff. Personal Interview. 2012). Jazz musicians or improvisational actors “work to build their knowledge across a range of fields, and this knowledge provides the elements for each improvisational outcome” (Kendra and Wachendorf 2). Similarly, emergency responders’ knowledge and preparation can be drawn “upon in the ambiguous and dynamic conditions of a disaster where not every need has been anticipated or accounted for” (Kendra and Wachtendorf 2). Individuals and community organisations not associated with emergency services also improvise in a creative and intuitive manner in the way they respond to catastrophes (Webb and Chevreau). For example, during the 9/11 terrorism catastrophe in the USA an assorted group of boat owners rapidly self-organised to evacuate Lower Manhattan. On their return trips, they carried emergency personnel and supplies to the area (Kendra and Wachendorf 5). An interviewee in our study also recalls bush fire incidents where creative problem solving and intuitive decision-making are called for. “It’s like in a fire, you have to be thinking fast. You need to be semi self-sufficient until help arrives. But without doing anything stupid and creating a worse situation” (Kelly. Personal Interview. 2012). Kelly then describes the rapid community response she witnessed during a recent fire on the outskirts of Kununurra, WA.Everyone had to be accounted for, moving cars, getting the tractors out, protecting the bores because you need the water. It happens really fast and it is a matter of rustling everyone up with the machinery. (2012)In this sense, the strength of communities in responding to catastrophes or disasters “results largely from the abilities of [both] individuals and organisations to adapt and improvise under conditions of uncertainty” (Webb and Chevreau 67). These improvised responses frequently involve a collective creativity—where groups of neighbours or emergency workers act in response to the unforseen, often in a unified and self-organising manner. InnovationCatastrophes also stimulate change and innovation for the future. Disasters create a new environment that must be explored, assessed, and comprehended. Disasters change the physical and social landscape, and thereby require a period of exploration, learning, and the development of new approaches. (Kendra and Wachtendorf 6)These new approaches can include organisational change, new response strategies, and technologies and communication improvements. Celebrated inventor Benjamin Franklin, for instance, facilitated the formation of the first Volunteer Fire department in the 1850s as a response to previous urban fire catastrophes in the USA (Mumford 258). This organisational innovation continues to play an instrumental part in modern fire fighting practices. Indeed, people living in rural and remote areas of Australia are heavily reliant on volunteer groups, due to the sparse population and vast distances that need to be covered.As with most inventions and innovations, new endeavours aimed at improving responses to catastrophes do not occur in a vacuum. They “are not just accidents, nor the inscrutable products of sporadic genius, but have abundant and clear causes in prior scientific and technological development” (Gifillian 61). Likewise, the development of our user-friendly and publically available FireWatch site relies on the accumulation of preceding inventions and innovations. This includes the many years spent developing the existing FireWatch site, a site dense in information of significant value to scientists, foresters, land managers, and fire experts.CommunicationsOften overlooked in discussions regarding emergency communications is the microgeographical exchanges that occur in response to the threat of natural disasters. This is where neighbours fill the critical period before emergency service responders can appear on site. In this situation, it is often local knowledge that underpins improvised grassroots communication networks that inform and organise the neighbourhood. During a recent bushfire on peri-rural blocks on the outskirts of Kununurra, neighbours went into action before emergency services volunteers could respond.We phoned around and someone would phone and call in. Instead of 000 being rung ten times, make sure that one person rang it in. 40 channel [CB Radio] was handy – two-way communication, four wheelers – knocking on doors making sure everyone is out of the house, just in case. (Jane. Personal Interview. 2012) Similarly, individuals and community groups have been able to inform and assist each other on a larger scale via social network technologies (SNTs). This creative application of SNTs began after the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001 when individuals created wikis in order to find missing persons (Palen and Lui). Twitter has experienced considerable growth and was used freely during the 2009 Black Saturday fires in Australia. Studies of tweeting activity during these fires indicate that “tweets made during Black Saturday are laden with actionable factual information which contrasts with earlier claims that tweets are of no value made of mere random personal notes” (Sinnappan et al. n.p.).Traditionally, official alerts and warnings have been provided to the public via television and radio. However, several inquiries into the recent bushfires within Australia show concern “with the way in which fire agencies deliver information to community members during a bushfire...[and in order to] improve community safety from bushfire, systems need to be implemented that enable community members to communicate information to fire agencies, making use of local knowledge” (Elsworth et al. 8).Technological and social developments over the last decade mean the public no longer relies on a single source of official information (Sorensen and Sorensen). Therefore, SNTs such as Twitter and Facebook are being used by the media and emergency authorities to make information available to the public. These SNTs are dynamic, in that there can be a two-way flow of information between the public and emergency organisations. Nonetheless, there has been limited use of SNTs by emergency agencies to source information posted by in situ residents, in order to help in decision-making (Freeman). Organisational use of multiple communication channels and platforms to inform citizens about bushfire emergencies ensures a greater degree of coverage—in case of communication systems breakdowns or difficulties—as in the telephone alert system breakdown in Kelmscott-Roleystone, WA or a recent fire in Warrnambool, Victoria which took out the regional telephone exchange making telephone calls, mobiles, landlines, and the Internet non-operational (Johnson). The new FireWatch site will provide an additional information option for rural and remote Australians who, often rely on visual sightings and on word-of-mouth to be informed about fires in their region. “The neighbour came over and said - there is a fire, we’d better get our act together because it is going to hit us. No sooner than I turned around, I thought shit, here it comes” (Richard. Personal Interview. 2012). The FireWatch ProjectThe FireWatch project involves the redevelopment of an existing FireWatch website to extend the usability of the product from experts to ordinary users in order to facilitate community-based decision-making and action both before and during bushfire emergencies. To this purpose, the project has been broken down to two distinct, yet interdependent, strands. The community strand involves collaboration within a community (in this case the Kununurra community) in order to carry out a community-centred approach to further development of the site. The design strand involves the development of an intuitive and accessible Web presentation of complex information in clear, unambiguous ways to inform action in stressful circumstances. At this stage, a first round of 19 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders has been conducted in Kununurra to determine fire-related information-seeking behaviours, attitudes to mediated information services in the region, as well as user feedback on a prototype website developed in the design strand of the project. Stakeholders included emergency services personnel (payed and volunteer), shire representatives, tourism operators, small business operators (including tourism operators), a forest manager, a mango farmer, an Indigenous ranger team manager as well as general community members. Interviewees reported dissatisfaction with current information systems. They gave positive feedback about the website prototype. “It’s very much, very easy to follow” (David. Personal Interview. 2012). “It looks so much better than [the old site]. You couldn’t get in that close on [the other site]. It is fantastic” (Lance. Personal Interview. 2012). They also added thought-provoking contributions to the design of the website (to be discussed later).Residents of Kununurra who were interviewed for this research project found bushfire warning communications unsatisfactory, especially during a recent fire on the outskirts of town. People who called 000 had difficulties passing the information on, having to explain exactly where Kununurra was and the location of fires to operators not familiar with the area. When asked how the Kununurra community gets their fire information a Shire representative explained: That is not very good at the moment. The only other way we can think about it is perhaps more updates on things like Facebook, perhaps on a website, but with this current fire there really wasn’t a lot of information and a lot of people didn’t know what was going on. We [the shire] knew because we were talking to the [fire] brigades and to FESA [Fire and Emergency Services Authority] but most residents didn’t have any idea and it looks pretty bad. (Ginny. Personal Interview. 2012) All being well, the new user-friendly FireWatch site will add another platform through which fire information messages are transmitted. Community members will be offered continuously streamed bushfire location information, which is independent of any emergency services communication systems. In particular, rural and remote areas of Australia will have fire information at the ready.The participatory methodology used in the design of the new FireWatch website makes use of collaborative creativity, whereby users’ vision of the website and context are incorporated. This iterative process “creates an equal evolving participatory process between user and designer towards sharing values and knowledge and creating new domains of collective creativity” (Park 2012). The rich and sometimes contradictory suggestions made by interviewees in this project often reflected individual visions of the tasks and information required, and individual preferences regarding the delivery of this information. “I have been thinking about how could this really work for me? I can give you feedback on what has happened in the past but how could it work for me in the future?” (Keith. Personal Interview. 2012). Keith and other community members interviewed in Kununurra indicated a variety of extra functions on the site not expected by the product designers. Some of these unexpected functions were common to most interviewees such as the great importance placed on the inclusion of a satellite view option on the site map (example shown in Figure 1). Jeremy, a member of an Indigenous ranger unit in the Kununurra area, was very keen to incorporate the satellite view options on the site. He explained that some of the older rangers:can’t use GPSs and don’t know time zones or what zones to put in, so they’ll use a satellite-style view. We’ll have Google Earth up on one [screen], and also our [own] imagery up on another [screen] and go that way. Be scrolling in and see – we’ve got a huge fire scar for 2011 around here; another guy will be on another computer zoning in and say, I think it is here. It’s quite simplistic but it works. (Personal Interview. 2012) In the case above, where rangers are already switching between computer screens to incorporate a satellite view into their planning, the importance of a satellite view layer on the FireWatch website makes user context an essential part of the design process. Incorporating many layers on one screen, as recommended by participants also ensures a more elegant solution to an existing problem.Figure 1: Satellite view in the Kununurra area showing features such as gorges, rivers, escarpments and dry riverbedsThis research project will involve further consultation with participants (both online and offline) regarding bushfire safety communications in their region, as well as the further design of the site. The website will be available over multiple devices (for example desktops, smart phones, and hand held tablet devices) and will be launched late this year. Further work will also be carried out to determine if social media is appropriate for this community of users in order to build awareness and share information regarding the site.Conclusion Community members improvise and self-organise when communicating fire information and organising help for each other. This can happen at a microgeographical (neighbourhood) level or on a wider level via social networking sites. Organisations also develop innovative communication systems or devices as a response to the threat of bushfires. Communication innovations, such as the use of Twitter and Facebook by fire emergency services, have been appropriated and fine-tuned by these organisations. Other innovations such as the user-friendly Firewatch site rely on previous technological developments in satellite-delivered imagery—as well as community input regarding the design and use of the site.Our early research into community members’ fire-related information-seeking behaviours and attitudes to mediated information services in the region of Kununurra has found unexpectedly creative responses, which range from collective creativity on the part of emergency responders or the community in general during events to creative use of existing information and communication networks. We intend to utilise this creativity in re-purposing FireWatch alongside the creative work of the designers in the project.Although it is commonplace to think of graphic design and new technology as incorporating creativity, it is rarely acknowledged how frequently these innovations harness everyday perspectives from non-professionals. In the case of the FireWatch developments, the creativity of designers and technologists has been informed by the creative responses of members of the public who are best placed to understand the challenges posed by restricted information flows on the ground in times of crisis. In these situations, people respond not only with new ideas for the future but with innovative responses in the present as they communicate with each other to deal with the challenge of a fast-moving and unpredictable situation. Such improvisation, honed through close awareness of the contours and parameters of both community and communication, are one of the ways through which people help keep themselves and each other safe in the face of dramatic developments.ReferencesElsworth, G., and K. Stevens, J. Gilbert, H. Goodman, A Rhodes. "Evaluating the Community Safety Approach to Bushfires in Australia: Towards an Assessment of What Works and How." Biennial Conference of the Eupopean Evaluation Society, Lisbon, Oct. 2008. Freeman, Mark. "Fire, Wind and Water: Social Networks in Natural Disasters." Journal of Cases on Information Technology (JCIT) 13.2 (2011): 69–79.Gilfillan, S. Colum. The Sociology of Invention. Chicago: Follett Publishing, 1935.Harrald, John R. "Agility and Discipline: Critical Success Factors for Disaster Response." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 604.1 (2006): 256–72.Johnson, Peter. "Australia Unprepared for Bushfire”. Australian Broadcasting Corporation 17 Dec. 2012. 3 Jan. 2013 ‹http://www.abc.net.au/environment/articles/2012/12/17/3654075.htm›.Keelty, Mick J. "A Shared Responsibility: the Report of the Perth Hills Bushfires February 2011". Department of Premier and Cabinet, Government of Western Australia, Perth.Kendra, James, and Tricia Wachtendorf. "Improvisation, Creativity, and the Art of Emergency Management." NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Understanding and Responding to Terrorism: A Multi-Dimensional Approach. Washington, DC, 8-9 Sep. 2006.———. "Creativity in Emergency Response after the World Trade Centre Attack". Amud Conference of the International Emergency Management Society. University of Delaware. 14-17 May 2002. Mumford, Michael D. "Social Innovation: Ten Cases from Benjamin Franklin." Creativity Research Journal 14.2 (2002): 253–66.Palen, Leysia, and Sophia.B. Liu. "Citizen Communications in Crisis: Anticipating a Future of ICT-Supported Public Participation." Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. San Jose, 28 Apr. - 3 May 2007.Park, Ji Yong. "Design Process Excludes Users: The Co-Creation Activities between User and Designer." Digital Creativity 23.1 (2012): 79–92. Sinnappan, Suku, Cathy Farrell, and Elizabeth Stewart. "Priceless Tweets! A Study on Twitter Messages Posted During Crisis: Black Saturday." Proceedings of 21st Australasian Conference on Information Systems (ACIS 2010). Brisbane, Australia, 1-3 Dec 2010.Sorensen, John H., and Barbara Vogt Sorensen. "Community Processes: Warning and Evacuation." Handbook of Disaster Research. Eds. Havidán Rodríguez, Enrico Louis Quarantelli, and Russell Rowe Dynes. New York: Springer, 2007. 183–99.Webb, Gary R., and Francois-Regis Chevreau. "Planning to Improvise: The Importance of Creativity and Flexibility in Crisis Response." International Journal of Emergency Management 3.1 (2006): 66–72.

In the contemporary urban environment of mass transit, it falls to a small group of public officers to keep large number of travellers safe. The small size of their force and the often limited powers they exert mean that these public safety ‘transit officers’ must project more authority and control than they really have. It is this ambience of authority and control which, in most situations they encounter and seek to influence, is enough to keep the public safe. This paper examines the ambience of a group of transit officers working on the railway lines of an Australian capital city. We seek to show how transit officers are both influenced by, and seek to influence, the ambience of their workplace and the public spaces they inhabit whilst on duty, and here we take ambience to apply to the surrounding atmosphere, the aura, and the emotional environment of a place or situation: the setting, tone, or mood. For these transit officers to keep the public safe, they must themselves remain safe. A transit officer who is disabled in a confrontation with a violent offender is unable to provide protection to his or her passengers. Thus, in the culture of the transit officers, their own workplace safety takes on a higher significance. It affects not just themselves. The ambience exuded by transit officers, and how transit officers see their relationship with the travelling public, their management and other organisational work groups, is an important determinant of their work group’s safety culture. Researching the Working Lives of Transit Officers in Perth Our discussion draws on an ethnographic study of the working lives and communication cultures of transit officers (TOs) employed by the Public Transport Authority (PTA) of Western Australia (WA). Transit officers have argued that to understand fully the challenges of their work it is necessary to spend time with them as they undertake their daily duties: roster in, roster out. To this end, the research team and the employer organisation secured an ARC Linkage Grant in partnership with the PTA to fund doctoral candidate and ethnographer Christine Teague to research the workers’ point of view, and the workers’ experiences within the organisation. The two-hundred TOs are unique in the PTA. Neither of the other groups who ride with them on the trains, the drivers and revenue protection staff (whose sole job is to sell and check tickets), experiences the combination of intense contact with passengers, danger of physical injury or group morale. The TOs of the PTA in Perth operate from a central location at the main train station and the end stations on each line. Here there are change lockers where they can lock up their uniforms and equipment such as handcuffs and batons when not on duty, an equipment room where they sign out their radios, and ticket-checking machines. At the main train station there is also a gym, a canteen and holding cells for offenders they detain. From these end stations and central location, the TOs fan out across the network to all suburbs where they either operate from stations or onboard the trains. The TOs also do ‘delta van’ duty providing rapid, mobile back-up support for their colleagues on stations or trains, and providing transport for arrested persons to the holding cell or police lock up. TOs are on duty whenever the trains are running–but the evenings and nights are when they are mainly rostered on. This is when trouble mostly occurs. The TOs’ work ends only after the final train has completed its run and all offenders who may require detaining and charging have been transferred into police custody. While the public perceive that security is the TOs’ most frequent role, much of the work involves non-confrontational activity such as assisting passengers, checking tickets and providing a reassuring presence. One way to deal with an ambiguous role is to claim an ambience of power and authority regardless. Various aspects of the TO role permit and hinder this, and the paper goes on to consider aspects of ambience in terms of fear and force, order and safety, and role confusion. An Ambience of Fear and Force The TOs are responsible for front-line security in WA’s urban railway network. Their role is to offer a feeling of security for passengers using the rail network after the bustle of the work day finishes, and is replaced by the mainly recreational travels of the after hours public. This is the time when some passengers find the prospect of evening travel on the public transport rail network unsettling–so unsettling that it was a 2001 WA government election promise (WA Legislative Council) that every train leaving the city centre after 7pm would have two TOs riding on it. Interestingly, recruitment levels have never been high enough for this promise to be fully kept. The working conditions of the TOs reflect the perception, and to an extent, the reality that some late night travel on public transport involves negotiating an edgy ambience with an element of risk, rubbing shoulders with people who may be loud, rowdy, travelling in a group, and or drug and alcohol affected. As Fred (all TO names are pseudonyms) comments: You’re not dealing with rational people, you’re not dealing with ‘people’: most of the people you’re dealing with are either drunk or under the influence of drugs, so they’re not rational, they don’t hear you, they don’t understand what you’re saying, they just have no sense of what’s right or wrong, you know? Especially being under the influence, so I mean, you can talk till you’re blue in the face with somebody who’s drunk or on drugs, I mean, all you have to say is one thing. ‘Oh, can I see your ticket please’, ‘oh, why do I need a fucking ticket’, you know? They just don’t get simple everyday messages. Dealing with violence and making arrest is a normal part of this job. Jo described an early experience in her working life as a TO:Within the first week of coming out of course I got smacked on the side of the head, but this lady had actually been certified, like, she was nuts. She was completely mental and we were just standing on the train talking and I’ve turned around to say something to my partner and she was fine, she was as calm as, and I turned around and talked to my partner and the next thing I know I ended up with her fist to the side of my head. And I went ‘what the hell was that’? And she went off, she went absolutely ballistic. I ended up arresting her because it was assault on an officer whether she was mental or not so I ended up arresting her.Although Jo here is describing how she experienced an unprovoked assault in the early days of her career as a TO, one of the most frequent precursors to a TO injury occurs when the TO is required to make an arrest. The injury may occur when the passenger to be arrested resists or flees, and the TO gives chase in dark or treacherous circumstances such as railway reserves and tunnels, or when other passengers, maybe friends or family of the original person of concern, involve themselves in an affray around the precipitating action of the arrest. In circumstances where capsicum spray is the primary way of enforcing compliance, with batons used as a defence tool, group members may feel that they can take on the two TOs with impunity, certainly in the first instance. Even though there are security cameras on trains and in stations, and these can be cued to cover the threatening or difficult situations confronting TOs, the conflict is located in the here-and-now of the exchanges between TOs and the travelling public. This means the longer term consequence of trouble in the future may hold less sway with unruly travellers than the temptation to try to escape from trouble in the present. In discussing the impact of remote communications, Rubert Murdoch commented that these technologies are “a powerful influence for civilised behaviour. If you are arranging a massacre, it will be useless to shoot the cameraman who has so inconveniently appeared on the scene. His picture will already be safe in the studio five thousand miles away and his final image may hang you” (Shawcross 242). Unfortunately, whether public aggression in these circumstances is useless or not, the daily experience of TOs is that the presence of closed circuit television (CCTV) does not prevent attacks upon them: nor is it a guarantee of ‘civilised behaviour’. This is possibly because many of the more argumentative and angry members of the public are dis-inhibited by alcohol or other drugs. Police officers can employ the threat or actual application of stun guns to control situations in which they are outnumbered, but in the case of TOs they can remain outnumbered and vulnerable until reinforcements arrive. Such reinforcements are available, but the situation has to be managed through the communication of authority until the point where the train arrives at a ‘manned’ station, or the staff on the delta vehicle are able to support their colleagues. An Ambience of Order and Safety Some public transport organisations take this responsibility to sustain an ambience of order more seriously than others. The TO ethnographer, Christine Teague, visited public transport organisations in the UK, USA and Canada which are recognised as setting world-class standards for injury rates of their staff. In the USA particularly, there is a commitment to what is called ‘the broken windows’ theory, where a train is withdrawn from service promptly if it is damaged or defaced (Kelling and Coles; Maple and Mitchell). According to Henry (117): The ‘Broken Windows’ theory suggests that there is both a high correlation and a causal link between community disorder and more serious crime: when community disorder is permitted to flourish or when disorderly conditions or problems are left untended, they actually cause more serious crime. ‘Broken windows’ are a metaphor for community disorder which, as Wilson and Kelling (1982) use the term, includes the violation of informal social norms for public behaviour as well as quality of life offenses such as littering, graffiti, playing loud radios, aggressive panhandling, and vandalism.This theory implies that the physical ambience of the train, and by extension the station, may be highly influential in terms of creating a safe working environment. In this case of ‘no broken window’ organisations, the TO role is to maintain a high ‘quality of life’ rather than being a role predominantly about restraining and bringing to justice those whose behaviour is offensive, dangerous or illegal. The TOs in Perth achieve this through personal means such as taking pride in their uniforms, presenting a good-natured demeanour to passengers and assisting in maintaining the high standard of train interiors. Such a priority, and its link to reduced workforce injury, suggests that a perception of order impacts upon safety. It has long been argued that the safety culture of an organisation affects the safety performance of that organisation (Pidgeon; Leplat); but it has been more recently established that different cultural groupings in an organisation conceive and construct their safety culture differently (Leith). The research on ‘safety culture’ raises a problematic which is rarely addressed in practice. That problematic is this: managers frequently engage with safety at the level of instituting systems, while workers engage with safety in terms of behaviour. When Glendon and Litherland comment that, contrary to expectations, they could find no relationship between safety culture and safety performance, they were drawing attention to the fact that much managerial safety culture is premised upon systems involving tick boxes and the filling in of report forms. The broken window approach combines the managerial tick box with managerial behaviour: a dis-ordered train is removed from service. To some extent a general lack of fit between safety culture and safety performance endorses Everett’s view that it is conceptually inadequate to conceive organisations as cultures: “the conceptual inadequacy stems from the failure to distinguish between culture and behavioural features of organizational life” (238). The general focus upon safety culture as a way of promoting improvements in safety performance assumes that compliance with a range of safety systems will guarantee a safe workplace. Such an assumption, however, risks positioning the injured worker as responsible for his or her own predicament and sets up an environment in which some management officials are wont to seek ways in which that injured worker’s behaviour failed to conform with safety rules or safety processes. Yet there are roles which place workers in harm’s way, including military duties, law enforcement and some emergency services. Here, the work becomes dangerous as it becomes disorderly. An Ambience of Roles and Confusion As the research reported here progressed, it became clear that the ambience around the presentation of the self in the role of a TO (Goffman) was an important part of how ‘safety’ was promoted and enacted in their work upon the PTA (WA) trains, face to face with the travelling public. Goffman’s view of all people, not specifically TOs, is that: Regardless of the particular objective which the individual has in mind and of his motive for having this objective, it will be in his interests to control the conduct of the others, especially their responsive treatment of him. This will largely be through influencing the perception and definition that others will come to formulate of him. He will influence them by expressing himself in such a way that the kind of impression given off will lead them to act voluntarily in accordance with his own plan. (3)This ‘influencing of perception’ is an important element of performing the role of a TO. This task of the TOs is made all the more difficult because of confusions about their role in relation to two other officers: police (who have more power to act in situations of public safety) and revenue project officers (who have less), as we now discuss. The aura of the TO role borrows somewhat from those quintessential law and order officers: the police. TOs work in pairs, like many police, to support each other. They have a range of legal powers including the power of arrest, and they carry handcuffs, a baton and capsicum spray as a means of helping ensure their safety and effectiveness in circumstances where they might be outnumbered. The tools of their trade are accessibly displayed on heavy leather belts around their waists and their uniforms have similarities with police uniforms. However, in some ways these similarities are problematic, because TOs are not afforded the same respect as police. This situation underlines of the ambiguities negotiated within the ambience of what it is to be a TO, and how it is to conduct oneself in that role. Notwithstanding the TOs’ law and order responsibilities, public perceptions of the role and some of the public’s responses to the officers can position these workers as “plastic cops” (Teague and Leith). The penultimate deterrent of police officers, the stun gun (Taser), is not available to TOs who are expected to control all incidents arising on duty through the fact that they operate in pairs, with capsicum spray available and, as a last resort, are authorised to use their batons in self defence. Furthermore, although TOs are the key security and enforcement staff in the PTA workforce, and are managed separately from related staff roles, they believe that the clarity of this distinction is compromised because of similarities in the look of Revenue Protection Officers (RPOs). RPOs work on the trains to check that passengers have tickets and have paid the correct fares, and obtain names and addresses to issue infringement notices when required. They are not PTA employees, but contracted staff from an outside company. They also work in pairs. Significantly, the RPO uniform is in many respects identical to that of the TO, and this appears to be a deliberate management choice to make the number of TOs seem greater than it is: extending the TO ambience through to the activities of the RPOs. However, in the event of a disturbance, TOs are required and trained to act, while RPOs are instructed not to get involved; even though the RPOs appear to the travelling public to be operating in the role of a law-and-order-keeper, RPOs are specifically instructed not to get involved in breaches of the peace or disruptive passenger behaviour. From the point of view of the travelling public, who observe the RPO waiting for TOs to arrive, it may seems as if a TO is passively standing by while a chaotic situation unravels. As Angus commented: I’ve spoken to quite a few members of public and received complaints from them about transit officers and talking more about the incident have found out that it was actually [RPOs] that are dealing with it. So it’s creating a bad image for us …. It’s Transits that are copping all the flak for it … It is dangerous for us and it’s a lot of bad publicity for us. It’s hard enough, the job that we do and the lack of respect that we do get from people, we don’t need other people adding to it and making it harder. Indeed, it is not only the travelling public who can mistake the two uniforms. Mike tells of an “incident where an officer [TO] has called for backup on a train and the guys have got off [the train at the next station] and just stood there, and he didn’t realise that they are actually [revenue protection] officers, so he effectively had no backup. He thought he did, but he didn’t.” The RPO uniform may confer an ambience of power borrowed from TOs and communicated visually, but the impact is to compromise the authority of the TO role. Unfortunately, what could be a complementary role to the TOs becomes one which, in the minds of the TO workforce, serves to undermine their presence. This effect of this role confusion is to dilute the aura of authority of the TOs. At one end of a power continuum the TO role is minimised by those who see it as a second-rate ‘Wannabe cop’ (Teague and Leith 2008), while its impact is diluted at the other end by an apparently deliberate confusion between the TO broader ‘law and order’ role, and the more limited RPO revenue collection activities. Postlude To the passengers of the PTA in Perth, the presence and actions of transit officers appear as unremarkable as the daily commute. In this ethnographic study of their workplace culture, however, the transit officers have revealed ways in which they influence the ambience of the workplace and the public spaces they inhabit whilst on duty, and how they are influenced by it. While this ambient inter-relationship is not documented in the organisation’s occupational safety and health management system, the TOs are aware that it is a factor in their level at safety at work, both positively and negatively. Clearly, an ethnography study is conducted at a certain point in time and place, and culture is a living and changing expression of human interaction. The Public Transport Authority of Western Australia is committed to continuous improvement in safety and to the investigation of all ways and means in which to support TOs in their daily activities. This is evident not only in their support of the research and their welcoming of the ethnographer into the workforce and onto the tracks, but also in their robust commitment to change as the findings of the research have progressed. In particular, changes in the ambient TO culture and in the training and daily practices of TOs have already resulted from this research or are under active consideration. Nonetheless, this project is a cogent indicator of the fact that a safety culture is critically dependent upon intangible but nonetheless important factors such as the ambience of the workplace and the way in which officers are able to communicate their authority to others. References Everett, James. “Organizational Culture and Ethnoecology in Public Relations Theory and Practice.” Public Relations Research Annual. Vol. 2. Eds. Larissa Grunig and James Grunig. Hillsdale, NJ, 1990. 235-251. Glendon, Ian, and Debbie Litherland. “Safety Climate Factors, Group Differences and Safety Behaviour in Road Construction.” Safety Science 39.3 (2001): 157-188. Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life. London: Penguin, 1959. Henry, Vincent. The Comstat Paradigm: Management Accountability in Policing, Business and the Public Sector. New York: Looseleaf Law Publications, 2003. Kelling, George, and Catherine Coles. Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities. New York: Touchstone, 1996. Leith, David. Workplace Culture and Accidents: How Management Can Communicate to Prevent Injuries. Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag, 2008. Leplat, Jacques. “About Implementation of Safety Rules.” Safety Science 29.3 (1998): 189-204. Maple, Jack, and Chris Mitchell. The Crime Fighter: How You Can Make Your Community Crime-Free. New York: Broadway Books, 1999. Pidgeon, Nick. “Safety Culture and Risk Management in Organizations.” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 22.1 (1991): 129-140. Shawcross, William. Rupert Murdoch. London: Chatto & Windus, 1992. Teague, Christine, and David Leith. “Men of Steel or Plastic Cops? The Use of Ethnography as a Transformative Agent.” Transforming Information and Learning Conference Transformers: People, Technologies and Spaces, Edith Cowan University, Perth, WA, 2008. ‹http://conferences.scis.ecu.edu.au/TILC2008/documents/2008/teague_and_leith-men_of_steel_or_plastic_cops.pdf›. Wilson, James, and George Kelling. “Broken Windows.” The Atlantic Monthly (Mar. 1982): 29-38. WA Legislative Council. “Metropolitan Railway – Transit Guards 273 [Hon Ed Dermer to Minister of Transport Hon. Simon O’Brien].” Hansard 19 Mar. 2009: 2145b.

By the time you read this, it will be wrong. Things seemed to be moving so fast in these first days after airplanes crashed into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the Pennsylvania earth. Each certainty is as carelessly dropped as it was once carelessly assumed. The sounds of lower Manhattan that used to serve as white noise for residents—sirens, screeches, screams—are no longer signs without a referent. Instead, they make folks stare and stop, hurry and hustle, wondering whether the noises we know so well are in fact, this time, coefficients of a new reality. At the time of writing, the events themselves are also signs without referents—there has been no direct claim of responsibility, and little proof offered by accusers since the 11th. But it has been assumed that there is a link to US foreign policy, its military and economic presence in the Arab world, and opposition to it that seeks revenge. In the intervening weeks the US media and the war planners have supplied their own narrow frameworks, making New York’s “ground zero” into the starting point for a new escalation of global violence. We want to write here about the combination of sources and sensations that came that day, and the jumble of knowledges and emotions that filled our minds. Working late the night before, Toby was awoken in the morning by one of the planes right overhead. That happens sometimes. I have long expected a crash when I’ve heard the roar of jet engines so close—but I didn’t this time. Often when that sound hits me, I get up and go for a run down by the water, just near Wall Street. Something kept me back that day. Instead, I headed for my laptop. Because I cannot rely on local media to tell me very much about the role of the US in world affairs, I was reading the British newspaper The Guardian on-line when it flashed a two-line report about the planes. I looked up at the calendar above my desk to see whether it was April 1st. Truly. Then I got off-line and turned on the TV to watch CNN. That second, the phone rang. My quasi-ex-girlfriend I’m still in love with called from the mid-West. She was due to leave that day for the Bay Area. Was I alright? We spoke for a bit. She said my cell phone was out, and indeed it was for the remainder of the day. As I hung up from her, my friend Ana rang, tearful and concerned. Her husband, Patrick, had left an hour before for work in New Jersey, and it seemed like a dangerous separation. All separations were potentially fatal that day. You wanted to know where everyone was, every minute. She told me she had been trying to contact Palestinian friends who worked and attended school near the event—their ethnic, religious, and national backgrounds made for real poignancy, as we both thought of the prejudice they would (probably) face, regardless of the eventual who/what/when/where/how of these events. We agreed to meet at Bruno’s, a bakery on La Guardia Place. For some reason I really took my time, though, before getting to Ana. I shampooed and shaved under the shower. This was a horror, and I needed to look my best, even as men and women were losing and risking their lives. I can only interpret what I did as an attempt to impose normalcy and control on the situation, on my environment. When I finally made it down there, she’d located our friends. They were safe. We stood in the street and watched the Towers. Horrified by the sight of human beings tumbling to their deaths, we turned to buy a tea/coffee—again some ludicrous normalization—but were drawn back by chilling screams from the street. Racing outside, we saw the second Tower collapse, and clutched at each other. People were streaming towards us from further downtown. We decided to be with our Palestinian friends in their apartment. When we arrived, we learnt that Mark had been four minutes away from the WTC when the first plane hit. I tried to call my daughter in London and my father in Canberra, but to no avail. I rang the mid-West, and asked my maybe-former novia to call England and Australia to report in on me. Our friend Jenine got through to relatives on the West Bank. Israeli tanks had commenced a bombardment there, right after the planes had struck New York. Family members spoke to her from under the kitchen table, where they were taking refuge from the shelling of their house. Then we gave ourselves over to television, like so many others around the world, even though these events were happening only a mile away. We wanted to hear official word, but there was just a huge absence—Bush was busy learning to read in Florida, then leading from the front in Louisiana and Nebraska. As the day wore on, we split up and regrouped, meeting folks. One guy was in the subway when smoke filled the car. Noone could breathe properly, people were screaming, and his only thought was for his dog DeNiro back in Brooklyn. From the panic of the train, he managed to call his mom on a cell to ask her to feed “DeNiro” that night, because it looked like he wouldn’t get home. A pregnant woman feared for her unborn as she fled the blasts, pushing the stroller with her baby in it as she did so. Away from these heart-rending tales from strangers, there was the fear: good grief, what horrible price would the US Government extract for this, and who would be the overt and covert agents and targets of that suffering? What blood-lust would this generate? What would be the pattern of retaliation and counter-retaliation? What would become of civil rights and cultural inclusiveness? So a jumble of emotions came forward, I assume in all of us. Anger was not there for me, just intense sorrow, shock, and fear, and the desire for intimacy. Network television appeared to offer me that, but in an ultimately unsatisfactory way. For I think I saw the end-result of reality TV that day. I have since decided to call this ‘emotionalization’—network TV’s tendency to substitute analysis of US politics and economics with a stress on feelings. Of course, powerful emotions have been engaged by this horror, and there is value in addressing that fact and letting out the pain. I certainly needed to do so. But on that day and subsequent ones, I looked to the networks, traditional sources of current-affairs knowledge, for just that—informed, multi-perspectival journalism that would allow me to make sense of my feelings, and come to a just and reasoned decision about how the US should respond. I waited in vain. No such commentary came forward. Just a lot of asinine inquiries from reporters that were identical to those they pose to basketballers after a game: Question—‘How do you feel now?’ Answer—‘God was with me today.’ For the networks were insistent on asking everyone in sight how they felt about the end of las torres gemelas. In this case, we heard the feelings of survivors, firefighters, viewers, media mavens, Republican and Democrat hacks, and vacuous Beltway state-of-the-nation pundits. But learning of the military-political economy, global inequality, and ideologies and organizations that made for our grief and loss—for that, there was no space. TV had forgotten how to do it. My principal feeling soon became one of frustration. So I headed back to where I began the day—The Guardian web site, where I was given insightful analysis of the messy factors of history, religion, economics, and politics that had created this situation. As I dealt with the tragedy of folks whose lives had been so cruelly lost, I pondered what it would take for this to stop. Or whether this was just the beginning. I knew one thing—the answers wouldn’t come from mainstream US television, no matter how full of feelings it was. And that made Toby anxious. And afraid. He still is. And so the dreams come. In one, I am suddenly furloughed from my job with an orchestra, as audience numbers tumble. I make my evening-wear way to my locker along with the other players, emptying it of bubble gum and instrument. The next night, I see a gigantic, fifty-feet high wave heading for the city beach where I’ve come to swim. Somehow I am sheltered behind a huge wall, as all the people around me die. Dripping, I turn to find myself in a media-stereotype “crack house” of the early ’90s—desperate-looking black men, endless doorways, sudden police arrival, and my earnest search for a passport that will explain away my presence. I awake in horror, to the realization that the passport was already open and stamped—racialization at work for Toby, every day and in every way, as a white man in New York City. Ana’s husband, Patrick, was at work ten miles from Manhattan when “it” happened. In the hallway, I overheard some talk about two planes crashing, but went to teach anyway in my usual morning stupor. This was just the usual chatter of disaster junkies. I didn’t hear the words, “World Trade Center” until ten thirty, at the end of the class at the college I teach at in New Jersey, across the Hudson river. A friend and colleague walked in and told me the news of the attack, to which I replied “You must be fucking joking.” He was a little offended. Students were milling haphazardly on the campus in the late summer weather, some looking panicked like me. My first thought was of some general failure of the air-traffic control system. There must be planes falling out of the sky all over the country. Then the height of the towers: how far towards our apartment in Greenwich Village would the towers fall? Neither of us worked in the financial district a mile downtown, but was Ana safe? Where on the college campus could I see what was happening? I recognized the same physical sensation I had felt the morning after Hurricane Andrew in Miami seeing at a distance the wreckage of our shattered apartment across a suburban golf course strewn with debris and flattened power lines. Now I was trapped in the suburbs again at an unbridgeable distance from my wife and friends who were witnessing the attacks first hand. Were they safe? What on earth was going on? This feeling of being cut off, my path to the familiar places of home blocked, remained for weeks my dominant experience of the disaster. In my office, phone calls to the city didn’t work. There were six voice-mail messages from my teenaged brother Alex in small-town England giving a running commentary on the attack and its aftermath that he was witnessing live on television while I dutifully taught my writing class. “Hello, Patrick, where are you? Oh my god, another plane just hit the towers. Where are you?” The web was choked: no access to newspapers online. Email worked, but no one was wasting time writing. My office window looked out over a soccer field to the still woodlands of western New Jersey: behind me to the east the disaster must be unfolding. Finally I found a website with a live stream from ABC television, which I watched flickering and stilted on the tiny screen. It had all already happened: both towers already collapsed, the Pentagon attacked, another plane shot down over Pennsylvania, unconfirmed reports said, there were other hijacked aircraft still out there unaccounted for. Manhattan was sealed off. George Washington Bridge, Lincoln and Holland tunnels, all the bridges and tunnels from New Jersey I used to mock shut down. Police actions sealed off the highways into “the city.” The city I liked to think of as the capital of the world was cut off completely from the outside, suddenly vulnerable and under siege. There was no way to get home. The phone rang abruptly and Alex, three thousand miles away, told me he had spoken to Ana earlier and she was safe. After a dozen tries, I managed to get through and spoke to her, learning that she and Toby had seen people jumping and then the second tower fall. Other friends had been even closer. Everyone was safe, we thought. I sat for another couple of hours in my office uselessly. The news was incoherent, stories contradictory, loops of the planes hitting the towers only just ready for recycling. The attacks were already being transformed into “the World Trade Center Disaster,” not yet the ahistorical singularity of the emergency “nine one one.” Stranded, I had to spend the night in New Jersey at my boss’s house, reminded again of the boundless generosity of Americans to relative strangers. In an effort to protect his young son from the as yet unfiltered images saturating cable and Internet, my friend’s TV set was turned off and we did our best to reassure. We listened surreptitiously to news bulletins on AM radio, hoping that the roads would open. Walking the dog with my friend’s wife and son we crossed a park on the ridge on which Upper Montclair sits. Ten miles away a huge column of smoke was rising from lower Manhattan, where the stunning absence of the towers was clearly visible. The summer evening was unnervingly still. We kicked a soccer ball around on the front lawn and a woman walked distracted by, shocked and pale up the tree-lined suburban street, suffering her own wordless trauma. I remembered that though most of my students were ordinary working people, Montclair is a well-off dormitory for the financial sector and high rises of Wall Street and Midtown. For the time being, this was a white-collar disaster. I slept a short night in my friend’s house, waking to hope I had dreamed it all, and took the commuter train in with shell-shocked bankers and corporate types. All men, all looking nervously across the river toward glimpses of the Manhattan skyline as the train neared Hoboken. “I can’t believe they’re making us go in,” one guy had repeated on the station platform. He had watched the attacks from his office in Midtown, “The whole thing.” Inside the train we all sat in silence. Up from the PATH train station on 9th street I came onto a carless 6th Avenue. At 14th street barricades now sealed off downtown from the rest of the world. I walked down the middle of the avenue to a newspaper stand; the Indian proprietor shrugged “No deliveries below 14th.” I had not realized that the closer to the disaster you came, the less information would be available. Except, I assumed, for the evidence of my senses. But at 8 am the Village was eerily still, few people about, nothing in the sky, including the twin towers. I walked to Houston Street, which was full of trucks and police vehicles. Tractor trailers sat carrying concrete barriers. Below Houston, each street into Soho was barricaded and manned by huddles of cops. I had walked effortlessly up into the “lockdown,” but this was the “frozen zone.” There was no going further south towards the towers. I walked the few blocks home, found my wife sleeping, and climbed into bed, still in my clothes from the day before. “Your heart is racing,” she said. I realized that I hadn’t known if I would get back, and now I never wanted to leave again; it was still only eight thirty am. Lying there, I felt the terrible wonder of a distant bystander for the first-hand witness. Ana’s face couldn’t tell me what she had seen. I felt I needed to know more, to see and understand. Even though I knew the effort was useless: I could never bridge that gap that had trapped me ten miles away, my back turned to the unfolding disaster. The television was useless: we don’t have cable, and the mast on top of the North Tower, which Ana had watched fall, had relayed all the network channels. I knew I had to go down and see the wreckage. Later I would realize how lucky I had been not to suffer from “disaster envy.” Unbelievably, in retrospect, I commuted into work the second day after the attack, dogged by the same unnerving sensation that I would not get back—to the wounded, humbled former center of the world. My students were uneasy, all talked out. I was a novelty, a New Yorker living in the Village a mile from the towers, but I was forty-eight hours late. Out of place in both places. I felt torn up, but not angry. Back in the city at night, people were eating and drinking with a vengeance, the air filled with acrid sicklysweet smoke from the burning wreckage. Eyes stang and nose ran with a bitter acrid taste. Who knows what we’re breathing in, we joked nervously. A friend’s wife had fallen out with him for refusing to wear a protective mask in the house. He shrugged a wordlessly reassuring smile. What could any of us do? I walked with Ana down to the top of West Broadway from where the towers had commanded the skyline over SoHo; downtown dense smoke blocked the view to the disaster. A crowd of onlookers pushed up against the barricades all day, some weeping, others gawping. A tall guy was filming the grieving faces with a video camera, which was somehow the worst thing of all, the first sign of the disaster tourism that was already mushrooming downtown. Across the street an Asian artist sat painting the street scene in streaky black and white; he had scrubbed out two white columns where the towers would have been. “That’s the first thing I’ve seen that’s made me feel any better,” Ana said. We thanked him, but he shrugged blankly, still in shock I supposed. On the Friday, the clampdown. I watched the Mayor and Police Chief hold a press conference in which they angrily told the stream of volunteers to “ground zero” that they weren’t needed. “We can handle this ourselves. We thank you. But we don’t need your help,” Commissioner Kerik said. After the free-for-all of the first couple of days, with its amazing spontaneities and common gestures of goodwill, the clampdown was going into effect. I decided to go down to Canal Street and see if it was true that no one was welcome anymore. So many paths through the city were blocked now. “Lock down, frozen zone, war zone, the site, combat zone, ground zero, state troopers, secured perimeter, national guard, humvees, family center”: a disturbing new vocabulary that seemed to stamp the logic of Giuliani’s sanitized and over-policed Manhattan onto the wounded hulk of the city. The Mayor had been magnificent in the heat of the crisis; Churchillian, many were saying—and indeed, Giuliani quickly appeared on the cover of Cigar Afficionado, complete with wing collar and the misquotation from Kipling, “Captain Courageous.” Churchill had not believed in peacetime politics either, and he never got over losing his empire. Now the regime of command and control over New York’s citizens and its economy was being stabilized and reimposed. The sealed-off, disfigured, and newly militarized spaces of the New York through which I have always loved to wander at all hours seemed to have been put beyond reach for the duration. And, in the new post-“9/11” post-history, the duration could last forever. The violence of the attacks seemed to have elicited a heavy-handed official reaction that sought to contain and constrict the best qualities of New York. I felt more anger at the clampdown than I did at the demolition of the towers. I knew this was unreasonable, but I feared the reaction, the spread of the racial harassment and racial profiling that I had already heard of from my students in New Jersey. This militarizing of the urban landscape seemed to negate the sprawling, freewheeling, boundless largesse and tolerance on which New York had complacently claimed a monopoly. For many the towers stood for that as well, not just as the monumental outposts of global finance that had been attacked. Could the American flag mean something different? For a few days, perhaps—on the helmets of firemen and construction workers. But not for long. On the Saturday, I found an unmanned barricade way east along Canal Street and rode my bike past throngs of Chinatown residents, by the Federal jail block where prisoners from the first World Trade Center bombing were still being held. I headed south and west towards Tribeca; below the barricades in the frozen zone, you could roam freely, the cops and soldiers assuming you belonged there. I felt uneasy, doubting my own motives for being there, feeling the blood drain from my head in the same numbing shock I’d felt every time I headed downtown towards the site. I looped towards Greenwich Avenue, passing an abandoned bank full of emergency supplies and boxes of protective masks. Crushed cars still smeared with pulverized concrete and encrusted with paperwork strewn by the blast sat on the street near the disabled telephone exchange. On one side of the avenue stood a horde of onlookers, on the other television crews, all looking two blocks south towards a colossal pile of twisted and smoking steel, seven stories high. We were told to stay off the street by long-suffering national guardsmen and women with southern accents, kids. Nothing happening, just the aftermath. The TV crews were interviewing worn-out, dust-covered volunteers and firemen who sat quietly leaning against the railings of a park filled with scraps of paper. Out on the West Side highway, a high-tech truck was offering free cellular phone calls. The six lanes by the river were full of construction machinery and military vehicles. Ambulances rolled slowly uptown, bodies inside? I locked my bike redundantly to a lamppost and crossed under the hostile gaze of plainclothes police to another media encampment. On the path by the river, two camera crews were complaining bitterly in the heat. “After five days of this I’ve had enough.” They weren’t talking about the trauma, bodies, or the wreckage, but censorship. “Any blue light special gets to roll right down there, but they see your press pass and it’s get outta here. I’ve had enough.” I fronted out the surly cops and ducked under the tape onto the path, walking onto a Pier on which we’d spent many lazy afternoons watching the river at sunset. Dust everywhere, police boats docked and waiting, a crane ominously dredging mud into a barge. I walked back past the camera operators onto the highway and walked up to an interview in process. Perfectly composed, a fire chief and his crew from some small town in upstate New York were politely declining to give details about what they’d seen at “ground zero.” The men’s faces were dust streaked, their eyes slightly dazed with the shock of a horror previously unimaginable to most Americans. They were here to help the best they could, now they’d done as much as anyone could. “It’s time for us to go home.” The chief was eloquent, almost rehearsed in his precision. It was like a Magnum press photo. But he was refusing to cooperate with the media’s obsessive emotionalism. I walked down the highway, joining construction workers, volunteers, police, and firemen in their hundreds at Chambers Street. No one paid me any attention; it was absurd. I joined several other watchers on the stairs by Stuyvesant High School, which was now the headquarters for the recovery crews. Just two or three blocks away, the huge jagged teeth of the towers’ beautiful tracery lurched out onto the highway above huge mounds of debris. The TV images of the shattered scene made sense as I placed them into what was left of a familiar Sunday afternoon geography of bike rides and walks by the river, picnics in the park lying on the grass and gazing up at the infinite solidity of the towers. Demolished. It was breathtaking. If “they” could do that, they could do anything. Across the street at tables military policeman were checking credentials of the milling volunteers and issuing the pink and orange tags that gave access to ground zero. Without warning, there was a sudden stampede running full pelt up from the disaster site, men and women in fatigues, burly construction workers, firemen in bunker gear. I ran a few yards then stopped. Other people milled around idly, ignoring the panic, smoking and talking in low voices. It was a mainly white, blue-collar scene. All these men wearing flags and carrying crowbars and flashlights. In their company, the intolerance and rage I associated with flags and construction sites was nowhere to be seen. They were dealing with a torn and twisted otherness that dwarfed machismo or bigotry. I talked to a moustachioed, pony-tailed construction worker who’d hitched a ride from the mid-west to “come and help out.” He was staying at the Y, he said, it was kind of rough. “Have you been down there?” he asked, pointing towards the wreckage. “You’re British, you weren’t in World War Two were you?” I replied in the negative. “It’s worse ’n that. I went down last night and you can’t imagine it. You don’t want to see it if you don’t have to.” Did I know any welcoming ladies? he asked. The Y was kind of tough. When I saw TV images of President Bush speaking to the recovery crews and steelworkers at “ground zero” a couple of days later, shouting through a bullhorn to chants of “USA, USA” I knew nothing had changed. New York’s suffering was subject to a second hijacking by the brokers of national unity. New York had never been America, and now its terrible human loss and its great humanity were redesignated in the name of the nation, of the coming war. The signs without a referent were being forcibly appropriated, locked into an impoverished patriotic framework, interpreted for “us” by a compliant media and an opportunistic regime eager to reign in civil liberties, to unloose its war machine and tighten its grip on the Muslim world. That day, drawn to the river again, I had watched F18 fighter jets flying patterns over Manhattan as Bush’s helicopters came in across the river. Otherwise empty of air traffic, “our” skies were being torn up by the military jets: it was somehow the worst sight yet, worse than the wreckage or the bands of disaster tourists on Canal Street, a sign of further violence yet to come. There was a carrier out there beyond New York harbor, there to protect us: the bruising, blustering city once open to all comers. That felt worst of all. In the intervening weeks, we have seen other, more unstable ways of interpreting the signs of September 11 and its aftermath. Many have circulated on the Internet, past the blockages and blockades placed on urban spaces and intellectual life. Karl-Heinz Stockhausen’s work was banished (at least temporarily) from the canon of avant-garde electronic music when he described the attack on las torres gemelas as akin to a work of art. If Jacques Derrida had described it as an act of deconstruction (turning technological modernity literally in on itself), or Jean Baudrillard had announced that the event was so thick with mediation it had not truly taken place, something similar would have happened to them (and still may). This is because, as Don DeLillo so eloquently put it in implicit reaction to the plaintive cry “Why do they hate us?”: “it is the power of American culture to penetrate every wall, home, life and mind”—whether via military action or cultural iconography. All these positions are correct, however grisly and annoying they may be. What GK Chesterton called the “flints and tiles” of nineteenth-century European urban existence were rent asunder like so many victims of high-altitude US bombing raids. As a First-World disaster, it became knowable as the first-ever US “ground zero” such precisely through the high premium immediately set on the lives of Manhattan residents and the rarefied discussion of how to commemorate the high-altitude towers. When, a few weeks later, an American Airlines plane crashed on take-off from Queens, that borough was left open to all comers. Manhattan was locked down, flown over by “friendly” bombers. In stark contrast to the open if desperate faces on the street of 11 September, people went about their business with heads bowed even lower than is customary. Contradictory deconstructions and valuations of Manhattan lives mean that September 11 will live in infamy and hyper-knowability. The vengeful United States government and population continue on their way. Local residents must ponder insurance claims, real-estate values, children’s terrors, and their own roles in something beyond their ken. New York had been forced beyond being the center of the financial world. It had become a military target, a place that was receiving as well as dispatching the slings and arrows of global fortune. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Deer, Patrick and Miller, Toby. "A Day That Will Live In … ?" M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 5.1 (2002). [your date of access] < http://www.media-culture.org.au/0203/adaythat.php>. Chicago Style Deer, Patrick and Miller, Toby, "A Day That Will Live In … ?" M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 5, no. 1 (2002), < http://www.media-culture.org.au/0203/adaythat.php> ([your date of access]). APA Style Deer, Patrick and Miller, Toby. (2002) A Day That Will Live In … ?. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 5(1). < http://www.media-culture.org.au/0203/adaythat.php> ([your date of access]).