Academic literature on the topic 'Agricultural collective bargaining'

Most recent studies investigating pattern bargaining have sought to establish its presence or absence by statistically comparing summary measures of wage levels or growth rates across and within industries. The author of this study argues that a better measure of the existence of pattern bargaining over wages is the degree of similarity of collective bargaining contract clauses—the usual focus of negotiators when they engage in pattern-following. Using that criterion, he analyzes UAW and IAM collective bargaining agreements in the automobile, aerospace, and agricultural implement industries for the years 1970–95. He finds evidence that a strong wage pattern existed at both the inter- and intra-industry levels in the 1970s, but that this pattern weakened in the 1980s. Among the major automobile industry bargaining pairs, however, a strong intra-industry pattern returned in the late 1980s.

This article analyses the evolution and geographic distribution of the rural unrest that prevailed during the years of the Second Spanish Republic (1931–1936), a period characterised by political instability and social conflict. The number of provincial strikes recorded in the forestry and agricultural industries and complied by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare constitute the primary source of the study. Based on this information, maps of the regional and provincial distribution of the agricultural unrest have been created for the republican period. The results reveal that, contrary to the traditional belief which confines the rural unrest of this period to the geographic areas of the latifundios (large estates), Spanish agriculture, in all its diversity, was hit by collective disputes. Although the areas of the latifundios were most affected by the agricultural reform of 1932, the data show that the extension of the unrest in the Spanish countryside was also the result of the refusal of the landowners to accept and apply the new republican collective bargaining agreement. The number of strikes increased during the period 1931–1933, fell between 1934 and 1935, and increased again during the months of the Popular Front (February to July 1936).

Marketing cooperatives are gaining popularity in the supply chain management of fruits and vegetables (F&V) due to consumers’ increasing desire to purchase cooperative products as well as producers’ willingness to reinforce their bargaining power in the market. The main purpose of this empirical study is to investigate the most important factors that motivate Greek producers to participate in marketing cooperatives, as well as those motives that discourage them. The prefecture of Imathia, in the northern part of Greece, was chosen because it is characterized by a high involvement of cooperatives, wholesalers and retailers in F&V trading. A structured questionnaire was answered by 61 producers of Imathia in 2020. The results indicate that producers recognize that they ensure safer financial transactions and direct distribution of their fresh agricultural produce via marketing cooperatives. Moreover, the study showed that there is a statistically significant difference in the motives of participation in a marketing cooperative that has bargaining power and direct distribution of fresh agricultural produce between the three categories of education level. However, producers appeared to agree that (1) the great divergence in members’ reasons for participation in a marketing cooperative and (2) the inability to take collective decisions by the general assembly are the most important disincentives for participation in marketing cooperatives.

Agricultural cooperatives are seen as an efficient way for smallholder farmers to create bargaining power in order to achieve poverty reduction and food security. However, the success of these cooperatives depends on their ability to maintain their social capital, which is at the core of collective action. Using unique data collected from 511 agricultural cooperatives in 12 districts of Tigray region in northern Ethiopia, this paper examines the effects of cooperative size on conflict, fraud, and distrust. We used instrumental variables (IV) probit estimation techniques, accounting for endogeneity of membership size, to confirm that cooperative size does affect the occurrence of conflict, fraud, and trust. The results also indicate that other influencing factors include: cooperative age, number of employees, payment of dividends based on transaction volume, and heterogeneity of member goals.

This article explores how model temporary migrant worker programs (TMWPs) that permit seasonal return can institutionalize deportability or the possibility of removal among participants with legal status. It draws on the cases of two groups of workers who participated in the British Columbia–Mexico Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP) and who managed to unionize and secure collective agreements (CAs). The author argues that the design and operation of SAWP constrains workers’ capacity to see out fixed-term contracts and to realize the promise of seasonal return. These inherent constraints lead to a form of institutionalized deportability, even among participants covered by CAs crafted to mitigate the possibility of unjust termination and premature repatriation and to address workers’ precarious transnational situation. Focusing on how deportability operates, the article analyzes immigration and labor laws and policies, CAs, key informant interviews, and testimony before British Columbia’s labor relations tribunal along with the decisions of that tribunal.

Early in 1944 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) certified Local 22 of the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing, and Allied Workers of America (UCAPAWA) as the bargaining agent for manufacturing workers at the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (RJR) in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. The local was built and largely sustained by the collective actions of African Americans, especially women, who quickly made it the primary institutional locus advancing the racial aspirations of Winston-Salem's black working class. Operating the largest tobacco manufacturing facility in the world and employing a workforce of 12,000, none unionized (Tilley 1948, 1985), RJR vigorously fought the local from its inception.

In economic literature, agricultural policy instruments for market and price stabilisation are classified in two broad categories: direct instruments and indirect instruments. Having the direct instruments failed, the cap proposals for years 2014-2020 are focusing on the indirect instruments: producer organisations, collective bargaining, interbranch agreements, transparency of the food supply chain, market risk management. Such themes emerged in the recent debate on agricultural policy because of two facts: strong volatility of agricultural prices and a growing disparity between basic prices and consumer prices. Objective of the present work is the evaluation of eight instruments of agricultural policy for improving the food supply chain functioning, with an analysis of potential economical consequences of the various options. The evaluation takes into account both efficiency (expenditure level, simplicity of use of the instruments, compatibility with Wto rules) and effectiveness (market and prices stabilisation, strengthening of producers position in the food supply chain, market transparency). Analysis was conduct referring to economic literature, to empirical evidences coming from sectors that use indirect instruments, and to results of studies produced by public or private organisations.

The evolution and persistence of biological cooperation have been an important puzzle in evolutionary theory. Here, we suggest a new approach based on bargaining theory to tackle the question. We present a mechanistic model for negotiation of benefits between a nitrogen-fixing nodule and a legume plant. To that end, we first derive growth rates for the nodule and plant from metabolic models of each as a function of material fluxes between them. We use these growth rates as pay-off functions in the negotiation process, which is analogous to collective bargaining between a firm and a workers' union. Our model predicts that negotiations lead to the Nash bargaining solution, maximizing the product of players' pay-offs. This work introduces elements of cooperative game theory into the field of mutualistic interactions. In the discussion of the paper, we argue for the benefits of such an approach in studying the question of biological cooperation.

This paper analyzes rural conflict in one of the most volatile areas of interwar Europe, the latifundia regions of the South of Spain. The historical and economics literature argues that rural conflict is a bottom-up response of landless peasants to unemployment, bad harvests, landownership inequality, changes in property rights, and poor enforcement of proworker legislation. A second generation of historical studies has focused on democratization and concomitant changes in collective bargaining and labor market institutions. Was conflict caused by structural factors like poverty, inequality, or unemployment or was conflict an endogenous response to political change? This paper uses municipal-level time series and cross-sectional variation in rural conflict in three Andalusian provinces (Córdoba, Jaén, and Seville) in the early 1930s to argue that, although collective misery certainly shaped the main issues of contention, inequality or deteriorating living standards did not explain the explosive intensification of conflict during the Second Republic. Geographic variation in conflict would be consistent with unobserved locational advantages and higher agricultural incomes, thicker labor markets, facility of communication, and market access and information, irrespective of the intensity of inequality or the degree of local Socialist political power. Poor harvests can only explain a small part of the time-series evolution of conflict from April 1931 to June 1934, while good harvests probably intensified the competition of temporary migrants and local workers for well-paid harvest jobs. Large gains in rural laborers’ bargaining power, organizational buildup, and reactions to policy changes and state intervention are more promising explanatory factors of the temporal evolution of conflicts in the period.

Historically, in the context of Kerala, through mobilisation, electoral and mass struggles and a broad-based alliance of poor peasants, agricultural labour and workers were forged into a political constituency. This paper locates new forms of women workers’ struggles in the post-1990 context which saw a shift in the politics of labour and in the language of class and since the People’s Planning Campaign for democratic decentralisation in Kerala, when agency moved away from trade unions to a plurality of organisations serving a range of objectives but linked with local governance. There was a shift away from exclusive collective bargaining by workers to collective social activity, for example, Kudumbashree, Ayalkootam (neighbourhood groups), public works, MNREGA forums and other forms of associational activities. Identities shifted beyond that of workers to citizens, involving a range of rights with the neighbourhood and the local as an axis. This paper focusses on women labour particularly in the context of the trajectory of development and labour in Kerala and the wider canvas in which labour movements developed post the 1980s in India.

Mexican migrant workers have been coming to Canada since 1974 to work in agriculture as participants of the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP). Presently, Mexicans constitute the majority of SAWP workers. As well, Ontario is the main receiver of these workers followed by British Columbia and Quebec. Accordingly, the scope of this thesis mainly encompasses Mexican workers in Ontario. However, the thesis also includes Mexican SAWP workers in Quebec and British Columbia. This thesis reveals two main issues: (1) that all SAWP workers, particularly Mexican workers, lack key legal rights and protections relating to labour relations, employment, health and safety standards at the structural level of the SAWP; and at the federal, provincial, and international levels. (2) Even when they have rights under legislation relating to the above-mentioned subject matters, Mexicans, especially, lack the capacity to access them. Thus, they become ‘unfree labourers’ who are placed in a perpetual state of disadvantage, vulnerable to abuse and exploitation once in Canada. To describe the issues above, the thesis is divided into five chapters addressing the following: Chapter 1 presents the historical context behind the SAWP as well as the Mexican workers’ circumstances that attract them to participate in the Program. Chapter 2 examines the applicable constitutional and federal framework for SAWP workers. In addition, it highlights key federal exclusions placed on them, which originate in the federal immigration and employment insurance legislation. Chapter 3 concludes that Ontario does not protect its agricultural workers from unfair treatment and exploitation in the workplace; rather, it perpetuates such practices. This reality is intensified for SAWP Mexican workers. Particularly, chapter 3 analyses a constitutional challenge to the Ontario legislation excluding agricultural worker from its labour relations regime; said challenge is based on ss. 2(d) and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Chapter 4 maintains that similarly to workers in Ontario, SAWP workers in Quebec and British Columbia also face extreme disadvantages due in great part to the lack of or limited legal protections. Finally, chapter 5 asserts that due to its implementation in the Canadian framework, international law is inadequate to protect domestic and SAWP workers’ rights. While each chapter identifies tangible drawbacks or anomalies, which affect SAWP workers negatively, the thesis also provides recommendations to alleviate said weaknesses.

The Ezemvelo Farmers’ Organisation (EFO) is a certified organic smallholder group in KwaZulu-Natal province (South Africa) that exists as an institution to improve smallholder access to niche markets by reducing unit production and transaction costs. The study is motivated by the need to understand drivers of collective action, prevalence of internal group free-riding, and the impact of contract terms on contract performance. These three theoretical concepts are pertinent in understanding organisational and institutional issues affecting the performance of smallholder organic farming groups and in formulating policies to promote the performance of such groups. The study relies on the theoretical foundations of collective action, free-riding and contracts found within the realm of New Institutional Economics (NIE). These theories, though separate, are in fact related in certain respects. Collective action in smallholder groups, apart from being a function of a plethora of socio-economic factors, including transaction costs, could be constrained by free-riding within the group, which in turn could be influenced by flawed contractual arrangements. This study of collective action focuses on 200 farmers drawn from a sample survey of 49 non-EFO members, and a census survey of 103 partially certified and 48 fully certified EFO members. A ‘collective action’ model investigates the impact of perceived benefits and savings on production and transaction costs attributed to collective action by drawing comparisons between EFO members and non-members using a multinomial logit model. The study of free-riding uses data from 151 members of the EFO to construct an index of free-riding within the group using principal components analysis (PCA). A ‘contract model’, which also focuses on EFO members only, attempts to measure the impact of verbal contract provisions on contract performance in addition to evaluating the determinants of preferred contract terms using a combination of PCA, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, and logit models. Results indicate that continued participation in EFO is not influenced by the age or gender of the farmer, but positively influenced by growth in the net benefits of participation, and negatively by an increase in the size of the household’s cropland or on-farm earnings. With respect to production and transaction costs, the results suggest that EFO has reduced fully certified members’ concerns that crops would be damaged by livestock or constrained by inadequate technical information. However, this is not the case for other problems such as price uncertainty in conventional markets, a lack of affordable operating inputs, a lack of affordable transport, and a lack of communications infrastructure. The index of free-riding behaviour constructed using principal components analysis suggests that free-riding poses a serious threat to EFO’s collective marketing efforts. Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis of the index scores shows that members who are male, poorly educated, partially certified, aware of loopholes in the grading system, and who do not trust the buyer are more likely to free-ride. Benefits accruing to EFO members are limited and there is substantial confusion among members about the terms of EFO’s verbal contract with the pack house that purchases their organic produce. Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis of the impact that perceived contractual terms have on quantities delivered to the pack house yielded interesting findings. Perceptions that delivery calls are made by the buyer, that grading procedures are flawed and that prices are not jointly established were found to reduce quantities delivered to the pack house, after controlling for differences in farm and farmer characteristics. Logit models estimated to identify the determinants of preferred contract clauses indicate that farmers with higher levels of formal education and farm income, and lower levels of experience, favour a written contract over a verbal contract. Similarly, farmers with higher levels of formal education and lower levels of family farm labour favour a contract denominated by area rather than weight. It is concluded that EFO should recruit households that rely on farming for income and which are land constrained. EFO is more likely to survive if it continues to secure fully subsidised information, transport, fencing, and certification services for its members, and if it improves the benefits of participating by synchronising harvest and delivery dates, negotiating price discounts for organic inputs, and by maintaining an office with telephone, fax and postal services. In the longer-term, EFO should address institutionalised free-riding by issuing tradable ownership rights. In the short-term, EFO must engage with the pack house (buyer) to remove flaws in the grading process that conceal the origin of low quality produce. Transparent and mediated negotiations leading to an incentive compliant contract with the buyer may also help to build trust and reduce free-riding within EFO. It is also recommended that the terms of EFO’s contract with the pack house should be revised so that; (a) delivery calls can be made by either the pack house or by EFO during specified periods and with reasonable notice, and (b) grading procedures are fully transparent and ensure traceability so that losses caused by poor quality can be internalised to members who deliver inferior produce. In addition, it is important that prices be negotiated at the beginning of each season and that the contractual parties have recourse to pre-agreed facilitators and an arbitrator to resolve disputes on price and quality. A written contract is recommended to support these more complex terms, with the proviso that the contract is explained to current and prospective members, and that growers are fully informed of their rights and obligations.
Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2008.

Cette étude traite des difficultés que rencontrent les travailleurs agricoles salariés dans l’exercice de leur droit à la liberté d’association et à la négociation collective. Ils sont souvent exclus des régimes législatifs nationaux de protection des droits syndicaux ou restreints dans leur capacité de les exercer en dépit du fait qu’ils sont parmi les plus pauvres et mal nourris de la planète et donc requerraient une protection accrue. Quelles sont les causes historiques de ce traitement discriminatoire (première partie) ? Comment le droit international du travail contribue-t-il à remédier à cette situation (deuxième partie) ? En quoi est-ce que le droit international du travail a-t-il influencé le droit interne canadien pour la protection des travailleurs agricoles salariés (troisième partie) ? Les causes du traitement singulier accordé à ces travailleurs remontent aux origines mêmes de l’agriculture. Consciente des caractéristiques particulières de cette activité, l’Organisation internationale du travail affirmera dès le début du 20e siècle qu’il est injustifié d’empêcher les travailleurs agricoles salariés de se syndiquer. Elle insiste sur la valeur fondamentale des droits syndicaux devant différents forums onusiens et favorise leur promotion à travers l’élaboration de normes du travail mais également d’instruments de soft law, considérés mieux adaptés dans un contexte contemporain de mondialisation. Ce droit international du travail influencera ensuite l’interprétation de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés par les tribunaux canadiens dans leur analyse de la constitutionnalité de l’exclusion totale ou partielle des travailleurs agricoles salariés des régimes législatifs de protection des droits syndicaux.
This study analyses the difficulties faced by agricultural workers exercising their rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining. These workers often find themselves excluded from national legislation providing for the protection of union rights, and when these rights are provided to them, their ability to exercise them is limited. Being amongst the poorest human beings on earth, agricultural workers would instead require stronger protection. What are the historical causes of this discriminatory treatment (part one) ? How has international labour law helped to correct this situation (part two) ? In what way did international labour law influence canadian domestic law in regard of the protection of wage earning agricultural workers (part three) ? The reasons for the singular treatment of this class of workers go back to agriculture’s very roots. Conscious of the particular characteristics of this activity, the International Labour Organisation asserted, at the very beginning of the 20th century, that no justification stood to limit the rights of agricultural workers to unionize. It later insisted on the fundamental value of union rights in front of diverse UN forums and favoured their promotion for agricultural workers through the elaboration of labour standards as well as extensive use of soft law tools, considered more suited to the globalised world. International labour law also contributed to the interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom by Canadian courts in their analysis of the constitutionality of total or partial exclusion of agricultural workers from legislation protecting union rights.

This chapter analyzes how threats and acts of blacklisting impeded the fair application of the collective agreement between UFCW Local 1518 and Sidhu & Sons. The detection and analysis of the blacklisting of bargaining unit members at Sidhu uncover important “truths” about the management of migration among temporary migrant workers with the prospect of return. Broadly, it demonstrates that institutionalized programs' mechanisms, promoted in the global policy discourse embracing migration management as a means of stemming the flow of “irregular migration,” can impede access to and the exercise of labor rights. More narrowly, it shows that SAWP's “best practices” are by no means neutral, but are instead consistent with the dynamics of global capitalism, producing a race to the bottom in conditions of work and employment. This model temporary migrant work program (TMWP) permits state officials to behave in unprincipled ways that can involve, among other things, defying collective agreement provisions by delegating key responsibilities related to readmission—such as recruitment, selection, and aspects of documentation—to those in the interior and posted abroad. It also illustrates vividly how a labor relations tribunal compelled to prioritize national, and thereby sending-state, sovereignty, can be inhibited in—and even prevented from—implementing and enforcing host-state labor laws under its oversight.

This chapter details the attempts of the union representing Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP) employees at Sidhu & Sons to organize, gain certification, and secure a first collective agreement for a bargaining unit encompassing participants in a temporary migrant work program (TMWP) permitting circularity. Through an analysis of the legal proceedings surrounding United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW) Local 1518's bid for certification, it explores SAWP employees' two important motivations for organizing: namely, to preempt termination without just cause prompting premature repatriation and to secure mechanisms for recall suitable to workers laboring transnationally. Local 1518, in seeking to represent SAWP employees, came up against tensions arising both from the Labour Relations Board's (LRB) understanding of its role of facilitating access to collective bargaining under the Labour Relations Code (LRC) and from limits posed by the parameters of the TMWP in play. Consequently, the unit obtained certification, but only on a restricted basis. At the same time, it introduced mechanisms aiming to limit termination without just cause prompting premature repatriation and offered novel provisions on recall and seniority.

This introductory chapter provides an overview of temporary migrant work. In the age of migration management, temporary migrant work is a significant phenomenon in many countries where relative labor shortages fuel demands for temporary migrant work programs (TMWPs) that provide comparatively low labor standards and wage levels. In this context, workers laboring transnationally in such programs are turning to unions for assistance in attempt to realize and retain access to rights. Yet even those engaged in highly regulated TMWPs permitting circularity—or repeated migration experiences involving one or more instances of emigration and return—confront significant obstacles tied to their deportability. This book tells the story of Mexican nationals participating in a subnational variant of Canada's model of migration management program, the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP). It explores how these workers organized to circumvent deportability, but despite achieving union certification, securing a collective agreement, and sustaining a bargaining unit, ultimately remained vulnerable to threats and acts of removal.

This chapter develops the argument that deportability, as it applies to participants in a temporary migrant work program (TMWP) permitting circularity, is an essential condition of possibility for migration management. Under this paradigm, TMWPs—such as the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP)—which are perceived to represent “best practices” by, for example, offering participants the prospect of return, simultaneously sustain this approach to governing migration and represent its limit, including in contexts in which unionization is permissible. The legal struggle of SAWP employees of Sidhu & Sons to unionize, secure a first collective agreement, and maintain bargaining unit strength gives substance to these claims. It reveals how deportability is lived among temporary migrant workers and the central modalities through which it functions. As such, these SAWP employees' experience provides rich empirical evidence for a grounded critique of migration management revealing that, despite its call for “regulated openness,” this global policy paradigm introduces new modes of control.