Books: 'Agent attitude'

1

McCallen, Brian. EFL agents and their attitudes: A sample study. (Manchester): British Council, 1991.

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2

Larivière, Michel A. S. Attitudes des agents de correction fédéraux à l'égard des délinquants. [Ottawa]: Correctional Service Canada, Correctional Research and Development, 1996.

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3

Garicano, Luis. Favoritism under social pressure. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2001.

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4

Christiana, Coggins, ed. A study of women's preferences regarding the formulation of over-the-counter vaginal spermicides. New York, NY (One Dag Hammarsjold Plaza, New York 10017 USA): Population Council, Robert H. Ebert Program on Critical Issues in Reproductive Health, 1998.

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5

David, Giauque, ed. Motivations et valeurs des agents publics à l'épreuve des réformes. [Québec]: Presses de l'Université Laval, 2012.

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6

M, Farr Robert, and Marková Ivana, eds. Representations of health, illness and handicap. Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1995.

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7

Vellakkal, Sukumar. Adverse selection and private health insurance coverage in India: A rational behaviour model of insurance agents under asymmetric information. New Delhi: Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, 2009.

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Popa, Stoica Cristinel. The Republic of Moldova between East and West: Vectors and agents of change that determine political attitudes (1991-2016). Târgovişte: Cetatea de Scaun, 2020.

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9

Generazioni precarie: Formazione e lavoro nella realtà dei call center. Pisa: ETS, 2011.

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10

1944-, McInerney Peter, ed. From silent witnesses to active agents: Student voice in re-engaging with learning. New York: P. Lang, 2012.

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11

Josy, Lévy Joseph, Pierret Janine, and Trottier Germain, eds. Les traitements antirétroviraux: Expériences et défis. Sainte-Foy: Presses de l'Université du Québec, 2004.

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12

Charron, Jean. La production de l'actualité: Une analyse stratégique des relations entre la presse parlementaire et les autorités politiques au Québec. [Montréal]: Boréal, 1994.

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13

Les vendeurs sont-ils tous des prédateurs? Montréal: Béliveau éditeur, 2011.

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14

Inzirillo, Christophe. L'intelligence sportive au service du manager. Paris: Eyrolles, 2009.

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15

Chiyŏk munhwa yesul chinhŭng ŭl wihan pŏpche chŏngbi pangan. Sŏul Tʻŭkpyŏlsi: Hanʼguk Pŏpche Yŏnʼguwŏn, 2005.

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16

Owusu-Ansah, J. P. Making The Visible Invisible: The Impact of Extension Agent Attitude Towards Farmers on Extension Projects and Policy- The Case of Uganda. 1st Books Library, 2004.

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17

Owusu-Ansah, J. P. Making The Visible Invisible: The Impact Of Extension Agent Attitude Towards Farmers On Extension Projects And Policy- The Case Of Uganda. Authorhouse, 2004.

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18

Ooshima, Tomomi. 5 Minutes a Day Gratitude Journal for Travel Agent: Daily Guide to Have a Nice Attitude of Gratitude Mindfulness, Relaxation and Stress Relief. Independently Published, 2021.

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19

David, Marilyn. 5 Minutes a Day Gratitude Journal for Travel Agent: Daily Guide to Have a Nice Attitude of Gratitude Mindfulness, Relaxation and Stress Relief. Independently Published, 2021.

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20

Mason, Melanie. 5 Minutes a Day Gratitude Journal for Travel Agent: Daily Guide to Have a Nice Attitude of Gratitude Mindfulness, Relaxation and Stress Relief. Independently Published, 2021.

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21

Coppock, Elizabeth, and Stephen Wechsler. The proper treatment of egophoricity in Kathmandu Newari. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198786658.003.0003.

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In egophoric (or conjunct/disjunct) verb-marking systems, a conjunct verb form co-occurs with first-person subjects in declaratives and second-person subjects in interrogatives, and also appears in de se attitude and speech reports; a disjunct verb form appears elsewhere. Conjunct marking also interacts with evidentiality: a speaker who abdicates responsibility for the content of an utterance by means of an evidential marker uses the disjunct verb form despite co-occurence with a first-person subject. Focussing on the case of Kathmandu Newari, Coppock and Wechsler propose that conjunct morphology marks the contents of attitudes de se. They develop a formal treatment of egophoricity, including a dynamic discourse model of the way attitudes de se are communicated. The propositional content of an attitude de se, modelled as a set of centered worlds, is effectively uncentered by its agent, to produce an ordinary proposition that is eligible to enter the common ground.

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22

Di Paolo, Ezequiel A., Thomas Buhrmann, and Xabier E. Barandiaran. Virtual actions and abstract attitudes. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198786849.003.0008.

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This chapter discusses the claim that enactivism cannot account for “representation-hungry” cognitive performance. Clusters of sensorimotor schemes suggest a way in which the virtual sensitivities inherent in every act of sense-making can be extended beyond the immediate situation by means of virtual actions. These are regulations performed by the agent that alter the functional relations between potential acts in a given activity. The chapter also reconsiders the question of object perception. Evidence suggests that adopting an abstract perceptual attitude toward an object (seeing it beyond its instrumental use) is a social skill, both in terms of how it develops and in terms of what this attitude entails, particularly as a form of decentering. Both of these analyses sketch viable routes through which enactivism can claim to address complex cognitive phenomena that previously only seemed explainable via the use of internal representations.

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23

Publishing, Ela. F*uck This Sh*it Show a Gratitude Journal for the Working Class Travel Agent: Gratitude Journal to Encourage Positive Attitude Daily / Llama / Alpaca / Llama Ya / Llama Me / Alpaca Llama / Working Class / Gag Gift / Llama Drama. Independently Published, 2019.

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24

Maloney, J. Christopher. Dual Aspect Theory. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190854751.003.0006.

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Carruthers proposes a subtle dispositionalist rendition of higher order theory regarding phenomenal character. The theory would distinguish unconscious movement management from conscious attitude management as perceptual processes. Each process takes perceptual representations as inputs. A representation subject to attitude management is apt to induce a higher order representation of itself that secures a self-referential aspect of its content supposedly determinative of phenomenal character. Unfortunately, the account requires a problematic cognitive ambiguity while failing to explain why attitude, but not movement, management, determines character. Moreover, normal variation in attitudinal management conflicts with the constancy typical of phenomenal character. And although an agent denied perceptual access to a scene about which she is otherwise well informed would suffer no phenomenal character, dispositionalist theory entails otherwise. Such problems, together with the results of the previous chapters, suggest that, whether cloaked under intentionalism or higher order theory, representationalism mistakes content for character.

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25

West, Patricia M. Predicting preferences: An examination of agent learning. 1993.

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26

Proust, Joëlle. Consensus as an Epistemic Norm for Group Acceptance. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801764.003.0008.

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What are the propositional attitude(s) involved in collective epistemic agency? There are two opposing camps on this question: the ascribers have defended an extended notion of belief, while the rejectionists have claimed that groups form goal-sensitive acceptances. Addressing this question, however, requires providing responses to four preliminary queries. (1) Are group attitudes reducible to the participants’ attitudes? (2) Is epistemic evaluation sensitive to instrumental considerations? (3) Does accepting that p entail believing that p? (4) Is there a unity of epistemic rationality across levels? Both “believing” and “accepting as true”, as applied to plural subjects, fail to provide satisfactory answers to these four queries. An alternative analysis for epistemic group attitude called “accepting under consensus” is proposed. This attitude is shown to reflect actual group agency, and to offer consistent and independently justified answers to the queries. On this analysis, an individualist epistemology cannot simply be transferred to collective agents.

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27

Brownstein, Michael. Caring, Implicit Attitudes, and the Self. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190633721.003.0004.

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Across both virtue and vice cases, spontaneity has the potential to give rise to actions that seem “unowned.” Agents may lack self-awareness, control, and reasons-responsiveness in paradigmatic cases. But these are actions nevertheless, in the sense that they are not mere happenings. While agents may be passive in an important sense when acting spontaneously, they are not thereby necessarily victims of forces acting upon them (from either “outside” or “inside” their own bodies and minds). The central claim of this chapter is that spontaneous actions can be, in central cases, “attributable” to agents, by which I mean that they reflect upon the character of those agents. This claim is made on the basis of a care-based theory of attributability. Attributability licenses (in principle) what some theorists call “aretaic” appraisals. These are evaluations of an action in light of an agent’s character or morally significant traits.

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28

van Kleef, Gerben. Emotions as Agents of Social Influence. Edited by Stephen G. Harkins, Kipling D. Williams, and Jerry Burger. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199859870.013.19.

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Emotion is part and parcel of social influence. The emotions people feel shape the ways in which they respond to persuasion attempts, and the emotions people express influence other individuals who observe those expressions. This chapter is concerned with the latter type of emotional influence. Such interpersonal effects of emotional expressions are quite different from the traditionally studied intrapersonal effects of emotional experience. This calls for a new theoretical approach that is dedicated specifically to understanding the interpersonal effects of emotional expressions. I summarize emotions as social information (EASI) theory, which posits that emotional expressions shape social influence by triggering affective reactions and/or inferential processes in observers, depending on the observer’s information processing and the perceived appropriateness of the emotional expression. I review supportive evidence from various domains of social influence, including negotiation, leadership, attitude change, compliance, and conformity in groups. Differences and commonalities with traditional intrapersonal frameworks are discussed.

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29

Brink, David O. Fair Opportunity and Responsibility. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198859468.001.0001.

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Fair Opportunity and Responsibility lies at the intersection of moral psychology and criminal jurisprudence and analyzes responsibility and its relations to desert, culpability, excuse, blame, and punishment. It links responsibility with the reactive attitudes but makes the justification of the reactive attitudes depend on a response-independent conception of responsibility. Responsibility and excuse are inversely related; an agent is responsible for misconduct if and only if it is not excused. Consequently, we can study responsibility by understanding excuses. We excuse misconduct when an agent’s capacities or opportunities are significantly impaired, because these capacities and opportunities are essential if agents are to have a fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. This conception of excuse tells us that responsibility itself consists in agents having suitable cognitive and volitional capacities—normative competence—and a fair opportunity to exercise these capacities free from undue interference—situational control. Because our reactive attitudes and practices presuppose the fair opportunity conception of responsibility, this supports a predominantly retributive conception of blame and punishment that treats culpable wrongdoing as the desert basis of blame and punishment. We can then apply the fair opportunity framework to assessing responsibility and excuse in circumstances of structural injustice, situational influences in ordinary circumstances and in wartime, insanity and psychopathy, immaturity, addiction, and crimes of passion. Though fair opportunity has important implications for each issue, treating them together allows us to explore common themes and appreciate the need to take partial responsibility and excuse seriously in our practices of blame and punishment.

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30

Family as an agent in the education process: A test theory of underachievement of African-American adolescents. [Philadelphia, PA]: National Center on Education in the Inner Cities, 1996.

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31

Tsur, Reuven. Elusive Qualities in Poetry, Receptivity, and Neural Correlates. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190457747.003.0013.

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Arnheim’s terms “actively organizing mind” and “passively receiving mind” can usefully be applied in practical criticism to suggest the significance of poetic structures as described by more concrete terms. But it is not quite clear what exactly they refer to. This chapter explores how the latter term can be illuminating in close readings of poems by Verlaine. Neuropsychological findings proposed in the last section fill those terms with more solid meaning. When you experience sensory stimuli, certain areas in the secondary somatosensory cortex light up. When you perceive yourself as the voluntary agent causing the sensations, this activity is suppressed. This may account for the observation that the actively organizing mind is less sensitive to elusive sensations in poetry than a passive attitude. This chapter explores the linguistic means—syntactic, semantic, and phonetic—by which Verlaine’s texts manipulate the fictional speaker and/or the flesh-and-blood reader into a passive stance.

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32

L' Assureur-vie au Québec: Monographie de recherches. Montréal, Qué: Agence d'ARC, 1985.

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33

Russell, Paul. Responsibility and the Condition of Moral Sense. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190627607.003.0004.

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This chapter presents a thesis about necessary conditions of responsible agency that arise at the interface between (compatibilist) reason-responsive theories and Strawsonian naturalistic approaches. A number of contemporary compatibilists who accept broadly Strawsonian accounts of holding responsible, as understood in terms of moral sentiments or reactive attitudes, have also advanced accounts of moral capacity and moral agency in terms of powers of rational self-control or reasons responsiveness. These accounts do not, however, involve any reference to moral sentiments and our ability to hold agents responsible. The central thesis of this chapter is that the responsible agent (i.e. one who is capable of being responsible) must also be one who is capable of holding herself responsible. Where moral sense is lacking, rational self-control is seriously impaired or compromised.

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34

James, David. Practical Necessity, Freedom, and History. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198847885.001.0001.

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By means of careful analysis of relevant writings by Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and Marx, the author argues that the concept of practical necessity is key to understanding the nature and the extent of human freedom. Practical necessity here means being, or believing oneself to be, constrained to act in certain ways in the absence (whether real or imagined) of other, more attractive options, or by the high costs attached to pursuing other options. Agents become subject to practical necessity because of economic, social, and historical forces over which they have, or appear to have, no effective control, while the extent to which they are subject to this form of necessity varies according to the amount of economic and social power that one agent possesses relative to other agents. The concept of practical necessity is also shown to acknowledge how the beliefs and attitudes of social agents are, in large part, determined by social and historical processes in which they are caught up, and how the type of motivation that we attribute to such agents should recognize this fact. Another key theme is how Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and Marx, in contrast to Hobbes, explain the emergence of the conditions of a free society in terms of a historical process that is initially governed by practical necessity. The role that this form of necessity plays in explaining historical necessity invites thefollowing question: to what extent arehistorical agents genuinely subject to practical and historical necessity?

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35

Refugee Women, Representation and Education: Creating a Discourse of Self-Authorship and Potential. Taylor & Francis Group, 2017.

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36

Giambrone, Antonino. Environmental educators as agents of change in elementary schools. 2003.

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37

Okasha, Samir. Agents and Goals in Evolution. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198815082.001.0001.

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In evolutionary biology, there is a mode of thinking which is quite common, and philosophically significant. This is ‘agential thinking’. In its paradigm case, agential thinking involves treating an evolved organism as if it were an agent pursuing a goal, such as survival and reproduction, and treating its phenotypic traits, including its behaviours, as strategies for achieving this goal. Less commonly, the entities that are treated as agent-like are genes or groups, rather than individual organisms. Agential thinking is related to the familiar Darwinian point that organisms’ evolved traits are often adaptive, but it goes beyond this. For it involves deliberately transposing a set of concepts—goals, interests, strategies—whose original application is to rational human agents, to the biological world at large. There are two possible attitudes towards agential thinking in biology. The first sees it as mere anthropomorphism, an instance of the psychological bias which leads humans to see intention and purpose in places where they do not exist. The second sees agential thinking as a natural and justifiable way of describing or reasoning about Darwinian evolution and its products. The truth turns out to lie in between these extremes, for agential thinking is not a monolithic whole. Some forms of agential thinking are problematic, but others admit of a solid justification, and when used carefully, can be a source of insight.

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38

Newton, Hannah. ‘Nature Concocts and Expels’. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779025.003.0002.

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This chapter investigates the first stage of recovery in early modern perceptions, the removal of disease. It shows that three agents were responsible for ousting illness: God, Nature, and the physician. While scholars are familiar with the first and last of these forces, the vital agency of ‘Nature’, the divinely endowed ‘intrinsic agent’ of the body, has been largely overlooked. Personified both as a hardworking housewife and a warrior queen, Nature removed disease through processes that resembled cooking/cleaning and fighting, the ‘concoction’ and ‘expulsion’ of the humours. Particular attention is paid to the complex power–gender dynamic between female Nature and the male doctor: in theory, the physician was ‘Nature’s servant’, but in practice, he often became her commander, a situation which illuminates wider cultural attitudes to womankind. To demonstrate the prevalence of belief in Nature’s healing role, Galenic ideas are compared with those of the Flemish physician J. B. van Helmont.

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39

Persson, Ingmar. Reasons in Action. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198845034.001.0001.

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The principal aim of this book is to analyse what it is to act for a reason in such a way that we intentionally do what we have a reason for doing and intentionally attain the end for which we perform this action, as specified by the reason. The analysis is mainly developed to suit physical actions, but it is considered how it needs to be modified to cover mental acts. It is also adapted to fit the notion of letting something be the case by refraining from acting. The analysis of intentional action presented is reductionist in the sense that it does not appeal to any concepts that are distinctive of the domain of action theory, such as a unique type of agent-causation, or irreducible mental acts, like acts of will, volitions, decisions, or tryings. Nor does it appeal to any unanalysed attitudes or states essentially related to intentional action, like intentions and desires to act. Instead, the intentionality of actions is construed as springing from desires conceived as physical states of agents which cause facts because of the way these agents think of them. A sense of our having responsibility that is sufficent for our acting for reasons is also sketched.

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40

Svavarsdóttir, Sigrún. The Rationality of Ends. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823841.003.0013.

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This chapter defends the thesis that an agent can display more or less rationality in selecting ends, even final ends, against the background of a conception of practical rationality as an excellence in the exercise of cognitive capacities in one’s practical endeavors. It moreover argues that Humeans and anti-Humeans alike should accept this conclusion, while refocusing their disagreement on the question of whether excellence in the exercise of cognitive capacities in one’s practical endeavors invariably yields a configuration of attitudes which precludes that some specific kinds of ends make good sense to the agent, so that having these kinds of ends is a sure sign of irrationality. By way of preliminaries, the chapter also offers a new (partial) account of ends and motivates the cognitive excellence conception of practical rationality in preference to conceptions of practical rationality as responsiveness to normative reasons or as coherence of attitudes and actions.

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41

McPherson, Melinda. Refugee Women, Representation and Education: Creating a Discourse of Self-Authorship and Potential. Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.

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42

McPherson, Melinda. Refugee Women, Representation and Education: Creating a Discourse of Self-Authorship and Potential. Taylor & Francis Group, 2014.

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43

Chinese Migrants And African Development New Imperialists Of Agents Of Change. Zed Books Ltd, 2013.

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44

Worsnip, Alex. What is (In)coherence? Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198823841.003.0009.

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Philosophers have recently been increasingly attentive to “coherence requirements,” with heated debates about both the content of such requirements and their “normativity” (i.e., whether there is necessarily reason to obey them). Yet there is little work on the metanormative status of coherence requirements. Metaphysically: what is it for two or more mental states to be jointly incoherent, such that they are banned by a coherence requirement? In virtue of what are some putative requirements genuine and others not? Epistemologically: how are we to know which requirements are genuine and which are not? This chapter offers an account that tries to answer these questions. On this account, the incoherence of a set of attitudes is a matter of its being constitutive of the attitudes in question that any agent who holds these attitudes jointly is disposed, when conditions of full transparency are met, to give at least one of them up.

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45

Weirich, Paul. Rational Responses to Risks. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190089412.001.0001.

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A philosophical account of risk, such as this book provides, states what risk is, which attitudes to it are rational, and which acts affecting risks are rational. Attention to the nature of risk reveals two types of risk, first, a chance of a bad event, and, second, an act’s risk in the sense of the volatility of its possible outcomes. The distinction is normatively significant because different general principles of rationality govern attitudes to these two types of risk. Rationality strictly regulates attitudes to the chance of a bad event and is more permissive about attitudes to an act’s risk. Principles of rationality governing attitudes to risk also justify evaluating an act according to its expected utility given that the act’s risk, if any, belongs to every possible outcome of the act. For a rational ideal agent, the expected utilities of the acts available in a decision problem explain the agent’s preferences among the acts. Maximizing expected utility is just following preferences among the acts. This view takes an act’s expected utility, not just as a feature of a representation of preferences among acts, but also as a factor in the explanation of preferences among acts. It takes account of an agent’s attitudes to an act’s risk without weakening the standard of expected-utility maximization. The view extends to evaluations of combination of acts, either simultaneous or in a sequence. Applications cover hedging, return-risk evaluation, professional advice, and government regulation.

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46

Sullivan, Meghan. Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198812845.003.0012.

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This introduction states key concepts used in the book. First, it defines time biases as systematic preferences about when events happen. Next, it describes the kind of rationality at issue in the book: prudential approbative rationality. This kind of rationality governs what we should approve of or prefer given our self‐interest. On this approach to rationality, preferences are the sorts of attitudes that we can and should support with reasons. Finally, the introduction discusses three principles for rational planning needed for the book’s arguments: (1) Consistency: a prudentially rational agent doesn’t prefer logically inconsistent states of affairs; (2) Success: at any given time, a prudentially rational agent prefers her life going forward to go as well as possible; and (3) Non‐Arbitrariness: at any given time, a prudentially rational agent’s preferences are insensitive to arbitrary differences.

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47

Brownstein, Michael. Reflection, Responsibility, and Fractured Selves. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190633721.003.0005.

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The preceding chapter established that paradigmatic spontaneous actions can be “ours” in the sense that they reflect upon us as agents. But a number of questions remain about the relationship between the implicit mind and the self. First, what exactly is the relationship between cares and action, such that actions can “reflect upon” cares? Second, when an action reflects upon what one cares about, is one thereby responsible for that action? In other words, are we responsible for the spontaneous actions in which our implicit attitudes are implicated? Third, do implicit attitudes reflect who we are, really truly deep down? This chapter attempts to answer these questions and to answer concerns about the roles of intentions to act, self-awareness, and rational judgments in assessing attributability for implicit attitudes.

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48

Bacon, Andrew. Vagueness and Decision. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198712060.003.0009.

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If linguistic vagueness is more fundamental than propositional vagueness, it is natural to think that vague propositions won’t play a substantive role in decision theory. On a linguistic picture, what it is rational for an agent to do is completely determined by their attitudes towards precise propositions. This is vacuously true if all propositions are precise, but it also seems like a natural idea if, like the expressivist discussed in Chapter 8, a distinction is drawn between metaphysically ‘first-rate’ precise propositions and metaphysically ‘second-rate’ vague propositions. This chapter considers how to formulate decision theory in a setting where there are vague propositions, and discusses ways in which vague beliefs, desires, and actions can have concrete impacts on practical deliberation and action.

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49

Deigh, John. Psychopathic Resentment. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190878597.003.0005.

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Recent philosophical accounts of resentment make being a moral agent, that is, being someone who has a conscience, a condition for being liable to resentment. The argument of this essay opposes these accounts. The essay describes characters from two Hitchcock films, Shadow of a Doubt and Strangers on a Train, to illustrate the problem of taking moral agency or having a conscience as a condition for being liable to resentment. Both are psychopathic killers who are resentful of people they perceive as having mistreated them. The essay then uses the account of reactive attitudes and their role in interpersonal relations that P. F. Strawson offered in his “Freedom and Resentment” to explain the liability to resentment of psychopaths despite their lacking a conscience.

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50

Bischof, Christopher. Teaching Britain. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198833352.001.0001.

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Teaching Britain examines teachers as key agents in the production of social knowledge. Teachers claimed intimate knowledge of everyday life among the poor and working class at home and non-white subjects abroad. They mobilized their knowledge in a wide range of mediums, from accounts of local happenings in their schools’ official log books to travel narratives based on summer trips around Britain and the wider world. Teachers also obsessively narrated and reflected on their own careers. Through these stories and the work they did every day, teachers imagined and helped to enact new models of professionalism, attitudes towards poverty and social mobility, ways of thinking about race and empire, and roles for the state. As highly visible agents of the state and beneficiaries of new state-funded opportunities, teachers also represented the largesse and the reach of the liberal state—but also the limits of both.

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Books on the topic 'Agent attitude'

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