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Books on the topic 'Adversarial games'

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Author: Grafiati

Published: 10 December 2022

Last updated: 28 January 2023

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1

Horowitz, Andrew W. Beyond indifferent players: On the existence of prisoners dilemmas in games with amicable and adversarial preferences. Antwerp, Belgium: Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of Antwerp, 2005.

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2

Miller, Steve, Michael Mikaelian, Owen K. C. Stephens, Eric Cagle, Michelle Lyons, and Wil Upchurch. Ultimate Adversaries. Renton, Washington, United States of America: Wizards of the Coast, 2004.

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3

author, Rios Jesus, and Ríos Insua, David, 1964- author, eds. Adversarial risk analysis. Boca Raton: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2016.

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4

Axelrod, Alan. Risk: Adversaries and allies : mastering strategic relationships. New York: Sterling Pub., 2009.

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5

Jajodia, Sushil. Moving Target Defense II: Application of Game Theory and Adversarial Modeling. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2013.

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6

Adversarial Reasoning. London: Taylor and Francis, 2006.

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7

Banks, David L., David Rios Insua, and Jesus M. Rios Aliaga. Adversarial Risk Analysis. Taylor & Francis Group, 2015.

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8

Banks, David L., David Rios Insua, and Jesus M. Rios Aliaga. Adversarial Risk Analysis. Taylor & Francis Group, 2015.

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9

McEneaney, William M., and Alexander Kott. Adversarial Reasoning: Computational Approaches to Reading the Opponent's Mind. Taylor & Francis Group, 2006.

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10

(Editor), Alexander Kott, and William M. McEneaney (Editor), eds. Adversarial Reasoning: Computational Approaches to Reading the Opponent's Mind. Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2006.

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11

Jajodia, Sushil, Anup K. Ghosh, Cliff Wang, V. S. Subrahmanian, Vipin Swarup, and X. Sean Wang. Moving Target Defense II: Application of Game Theory and Adversarial Modeling. Springer, 2012.

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12

Jajodia, Sushil, Anup K. Ghosh, and V. S. Subrahmanian. Moving Target Defense II: Application of Game Theory and Adversarial Modeling. Springer, 2012.

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13

Jajodia, Sushil, Anup K. Ghosh, Cliff Wang, V. S. Subrahmanian, Vipin Swarup, and X. Sean Wang. Moving Target Defense II: Application of Game Theory and Adversarial Modeling. Springer, 2014.

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14

Wheeler, Nicholas J. The Priority of Trust in Signal Interpretation. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199696475.003.0005.

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This chapter considers two theories that develop an alternative basis to trust for accurate signal interpretation. The two theories, both of which rely on the proposition that, if a signal can be made costly enough, this will communicate peaceful intent, are Charles Osgood’s GRIT policy and Andrew Kydd’s Reassurance Game. The former is a social-psychological approach, while the latter is a formal modelling approach. The chapter argues that neither has a convincing theory of how trust develops in adversarial contexts, and, as such, neither can explain how signals are interpreted accurately when these are sincerely aimed at communicating peaceful intent. For this, it is necessary to develop relationships of bonded trust and the mental state of trust as suspension that this makes possible.

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15

Doshi, Rush. The Long Game. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197527917.001.0001.

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For more than a century, no US adversary or coalition of adversaries—not Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, or even the Soviet Union—has ever reached 60 percent of US GDP. China is the sole exception, and it is fast emerging into a global superpower that could rival, if not eclipse, the United States. What does China want, does it have a grand strategy to achieve it, and what should the United States do about it? The Long Game draws from a rich base of Chinese primary sources, including decades’ worth of party documents, leaked materials, memoirs by party leaders, as well as careful analysis of China's conduct, to provide a history of China’s grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. Taking readers behind the Party’s closed doors, this book uncovers Beijing’s long, methodical game to displace America from the regional and global order through three sequential “strategies of displacement.” The book shows how China’s strategy is profoundly shaped by key events that change its perception of American power—the end of the Cold War, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the populist elections of 2016, and the coronavirus pandemic of 2020. Finally, the book offers a comprehensive yet “asymmetric” plan for an effective US response to the China challenge. Ironically, the proposed approach takes a page from Beijing’s own strategic playbook to undermine China’s ambitions and strengthen American order without competing dollar-for-dollar, ship-for-ship, or loan-for-loan.

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