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Journal articles on the topic 'Administrative agencies'
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1
Noll, David. "Administrative Sabotage." Michigan Law Review, no. 120.5 (2022): 753. http://dx.doi.org/10.36644/mlr.120.5.administrative.
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Government can sabotage itself. From the president’s choice of agency heads to agency budgets, regulations, and litigating positions, presidents and their appointees have undermined the very programs they administer. But why would an agency try to put itself out of business? And how can agencies that are subject to an array of political and legal checks sabotage statutory programs? This Article offers an account of the “what, why, and how” of administrative sabotage that answers those questions. It contends that sabotage reflects a distinct mode of agency action that is more permanent, more destructive, and more democratically illegitimate than more-studied forms of maladministration. In contrast to an agency that shirks its statutory duties or drifts away from Congress’s policy goals, one engaged in sabotage aims deliberately to kill or nullify a program it administers. Agencies sabotage because presidents ask them to. Facing pressure to dismantle statutory programs in an environment where securing legislation from Congress is difficult and politically costly, presidents pursue retrenchment through the administrative state. Building on this positive theory of administrative sabotage, this Article considers legal responses. The best response, this Article contends, is not reforms to the cross-cutting body of administrative law that structures most agency action. Rather, the risk of sabotage is better managed through changes to how statutory programs are designed. Congress’s choices about agency leadership, the concentration or dispersal of authority to implement statutory programs, the breadth of statutory delegations, and other matters influence the likelihood that sabotage will succeed or fail. When lawmakers create or modify federal programs, they should design them to be less vulnerable to sabotage by the very agencies that administer them.
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Noll, David. "Administrative Sabotage." Michigan Law Review, no. 120.5 (2022): 753. http://dx.doi.org/10.36644/mlr.120.5.administrative.
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Government can sabotage itself. From the president’s choice of agency heads to agency budgets, regulations, and litigating positions, presidents and their appointees have undermined the very programs they administer. But why would an agency try to put itself out of business? And how can agencies that are subject to an array of political and legal checks sabotage statutory programs? This Article offers an account of the “what, why, and how” of administrative sabotage that answers those questions. It contends that sabotage reflects a distinct mode of agency action that is more permanent, more destructive, and more democratically illegitimate than more-studied forms of maladministration. In contrast to an agency that shirks its statutory duties or drifts away from Congress’s policy goals, one engaged in sabotage aims deliberately to kill or nullify a program it administers. Agencies sabotage because presidents ask them to. Facing pressure to dismantle statutory programs in an environment where securing legislation from Congress is difficult and politically costly, presidents pursue retrenchment through the administrative state. Building on this positive theory of administrative sabotage, this Article considers legal responses. The best response, this Article contends, is not reforms to the cross-cutting body of administrative law that structures most agency action. Rather, the risk of sabotage is better managed through changes to how statutory programs are designed. Congress’s choices about agency leadership, the concentration or dispersal of authority to implement statutory programs, the breadth of statutory delegations, and other matters influence the likelihood that sabotage will succeed or fail. When lawmakers create or modify federal programs, they should design them to be less vulnerable to sabotage by the very agencies that administer them.
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Shkurska, I. S. "ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION IN THE ACTIVITIES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AGENCIES." Juridical scientific and electronic journal, no. 3 (2021): 240–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.32782/2524-0374/2021-3/61.
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Estreicher, Samuel, and Richard L. Revesz. "Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies." Yale Law Journal 98, no. 4 (February 1989): 679. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/796731.
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RHEE, Eun-sang. "A study on improvement of practical national administrative organization legal system aimed at coexistence and convergence." European Constitutional Law Association 43 (December 31, 2023): 483–509. http://dx.doi.org/10.21592/eucj.2023.43.483.
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In-depth research on administrative organization from the perspective of administrative law has not been sufficiently conducted so far. In a situation where social problems are becoming more complex and diverse, and the risks and uncertainties inherent therein are increasing, it is necessary to study from a legal perspective on the appropriate administrative organization to respond to the situation. Among the many topics that can be studied in relation to that study, legal research on administrative operations involving multiple administrative agencies is particularly necessary because it can serve as a starting point for understanding the reality of frequent interactions within public administration and preventing and resolving disputes between administrative agencies. This paper is a broad-brush study of administrative operations related to multiple administrative agencies.
This paper focuses on the relationship between multiple central administrative organizations while leaving the relationship with local administrative organizations as a future research topic. First, this paper reviews the current status of laws and systems premised on administrative operations related to multiple central administrative agencies. Next, it reviews republicanism as an administrative organization principle for realizing appropriate administrative purposes of multiple central administrative agencies, and coexistence and convergence as its central values. Finally, based on the results of such review, this paper presents practical ways to improve the central administrative organization legal system, aiming for and realizing the coexistence and convergence of multiple central administrative agencies.
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Lee, Mordecai. "The Agency Spokesperson: Connecting Public Administration and the Media." Public Administration Quarterly 25, no. 1 (March 2001): 1–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/073491490102500104.
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Spokespersons for administrative agencies are the focal point for connecting public administration and the media. However, while significant attention has been paid to spokespersons for elected officials, those for administrative agencies have received less attention. This article reviews the literature on spokespersonship, presents the results of a survey of the chief public information officers in local government agencies, and compares the results to an identical survey of their counterparts in federal agencies. It concludes that spokespersons for all government agencies are becoming increasingly important in public administration due to the rise of the role of the media in modern society.
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Givati, Y. "Strategic Statutory Interpretation by Administrative Agencies." American Law and Economics Review 12, no. 1 (November 28, 2009): 95–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahp017.
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Jeong, Hoon. "The Personal Liability of Member for Decision making of Representative Administrative Agencies." National Public Law Review 20, no. 1 (February 28, 2024): 135–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.46751/nplak.2024.20.1.135.
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Where needs arise to perform part of duties independently, an administratve agency may establish a representative administrative agency, such as administrative committee, etc., as prescribed by statutes. Such a a representative administrative agency or administrative committee makes decisions in the name of committee.
Therefore a member of committee doesn’t accept personal liability for decision making of representative administrative agencies. Nevertheless, there are a lot of cases where a member of committee is at risk of disciplinary punishment, criminal liability, civil liability for decision making of representative administrative agencies. A strict requirement for personal liability of a member should be established, even though decision making of representative administrative agencies is decided that it is illegal. It is such an example that certain member of committee manipulates, omits, overestimates, underestimates essential data for decision making by intention or gross negligence for one’s advantage or disadvantage or illegal decision making. Conclusionally, the personal liability of a member of committee can’t be accepted because that violates, independence, neutrality, fariness, autonomy of committee.
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Pops, Gerald M. "Administrative Law as Public Policy: The First Fifty Years." Journal of Policy History 2, no. 1 (January 1990): 98–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0898030600006862.
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Administrative law in the United States during the last half century has been dominated by three major themes: (1) the extent to which legislative authority may be delegated to administrative agencies, (2) judicial review of legislative action, and (3) analysis of the formal aspects of agency procedures. At the core of this traditional approach to administrative law—defining its purpose—is the problem of the legitimacy of public administration. Specifically, the issue, to traditionalists, is how far administrative agencies can go before they impinge on the rights of private citizens.
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Ruslin, Ruslin. "An Existence of State Administration Court in Establishing Good Governance." Aloha International Journal of Multidisciplinary Advancement (AIJMU) 1, no. 1 (January 31, 2019): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.33846/aijmu10101.
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Administration officials have broad authority in carrying out the affair of government. With this broad authority tends to be misused to cause harm and injustice in the society, therefore there must be other institutions that control it. Based on the theory of Trigs Politico executive agencies are politically controlled by the legislative and juridical institutions controlled by the judiciary, because the officials running the state administration executive functions that control the judiciary is legally the state administrative court. Judicial control of administrative functions of the state administrative court in addition aims to provide legal protection for the public and state administration officials themselves, as well as state administrative law enforcement agencies who aspire to realize a good and authoritative government.
Keywords: Good government, State administration court
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Savranchuk, L. L. "The essence of administrative discretion in the activities of public administration agencies." Analytical and Comparative Jurisprudence, no. 1 (July 2, 2022): 199–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.24144/2788-6018.2022.01.37.
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The article examines the essence of administrative discretion in the activities of public administration bodies. The author proposes his own definition of administrative discretion as intellectual, creative activity of public authorities, local governments and their officials, established by legislation on self-assessment and decision-making and a certain choice of behavior, which has a legally significant result.
The selected properties that are inherent in administrative discretion: 1) are the right of public authorities, local governments and their officials to make decisions, carry out activities (inaction); 2) is implemented by the relevant circle of persons authorized by law; 3) the limits of discretion are limited by the law, it complies with the law and does not contradict them; 4) the process of applying administrative discretion is an intellectual and creative activity; 5) has a legally significant result.
It is emphasized that the functioning of public authorities in the exercise of administrative discretion should be subject to regulation and proper control, as often there is a problem of abuse of administrative discretion, the reasons for which are: ambiguity of laws, which creates the illusion of great authority; lack of proper level of training and knowledge of the official; exceeding the limits of discretionary powers.
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de Lucia, Luca. "A Microphysics of European Administrative Law: Administrative Remedies in the EU after Lisbon." European Public Law 20, Issue 2 (June 1, 2014): 277–307. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/euro2014020.
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This article aims to offer a view of the principal administrative remedies toward the European administration and to illustrate the effect that the Lisbon Treaty has on these. In particular, three types of administrative remedies governed by secondary laws are presented: those relating to internal review, those decided by independent commissions instituted within European agencies and those involving the European Commission against acts of European agencies. Following this the relationship between administrative appeals and the regulation of certain executive acts of the European Union will be looked at in order to formulate some considerations on the role of such tools inside the 'European administrative justice' system.
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Ilo, Babajide Olatoye. "Functions, Theories And Practice Of Administrative Law In Contemporary Governance." Administrative and Environmental Law Review 3, no. 1 (June 29, 2022): 49–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.25041/aelr.v3i1.2492.
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The vast development in the socio, economic and political spheres of the contemporary society makes governance more demanding and cumbersome. This necessitates the rational for a system of administration where governmental powers and functions can legally be delegated to individuals and or corporate bodies otherwise known as administrative bodies to carry out the functions and powers of Government in modern society. Governmental powers and functions are traceable to the Constitution which provides the limits of such powers. Administrative agencies saddled with the responsibility of performing the functions of Government must be properly created and must at all times act within the scope of power created by the enabling law. Abuse by the administrative agencies in the exercise of their functions is inevitable, and hence this research through doctrinal methodology examines the system of law that oversees the internal operations of Government agencies through developments of administrative law principles. Although various theories in administrative law like red, green and amber light have emerged over the years with conflicting arguments, the court are nonetheless always ready to grant remedies to an aggrieved citizen whenever the administrative agencies exceed or abuse its powers.
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Khair, Abdul, Sunarjo Edy Siswanto, Sarkawi -, and Muhammad Saleh. "Penyelesaian Sengketa Keputusan Tata Usaha Negara Melalui Upaya Banding Administratif." JATISWARA 31, no. 3 (October 13, 2017): 416–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.29303/jtsw.v31i3.59.
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The purpose of this study was to determine and analyze the dispute resolution process KTUN through appeals of administration according to Law Number 51 Year 2009 regarding the Second Amendment to Law Number 05 Year 1986 concerning State Administrative Court and to know and analyze the strengths and weaknesses in the process dispute resolution through an administrative appeal case in Indonesia. This research is a normative empirical research, the method of approach to legislation, analytical approach. The results of the study are as follows: (1) The process of dispute resolution KTUN through the efforts of Appeals Administration according to Law Number 51 Year 2009 regarding the Second Amendment to Law Number 05 Year 1986 regarding Administrative Court Negaraialah dispute resolution TUN administratively conducted by agencies supervisor or other agencies from issuing the decision in question. Administrative appeals procedure is done by filing an administrative appeal letter addressed to the head of an official or other agencies and bodies / administrative official of the State which issued a decision that the authority to examine the disputed KTUN (SEMA 2 of 1991 dated July 9, 1991). Judging from the elucidation of Article 48 of Law Administrative Court, there are two categories of institutions / agencies authorized to deal with the Administrative Appeal, namely: (a) Agencies supervisor of officials who issued KTUN and; (B) any other authorized. While Strengths and Weaknesses in the Settlement of Disputes through the Administrative Appeals Efforts in Indonesia is; (1) Ratings administrative effort carried out fully against an administrative decision both in terms of legality (rechtmatigheid) as well as aspects Opportunitas (doelmatigheid) (2) the Parties are not faced with the decision win or lose (Winor Loose) as well as in the judiciary; (3) approach to dispute resolution is done with deliberation; (4) The trial is simple and quick no such formality in the Administrative Court; (5) There is no need to pay money matters; (6) Completed at internal concerned agencies; (7) An appeal is not bound to wear procedural administrative proceedings such as in the Administrative Court; (8) Do not need a lawyer; (9) The decision according to desire of the applicant; (10) Direct executable (strong eksekutorial). Weakness Settlement through the Administrative Appeals Efforts are; (1) At the level of objectivity of the assessment for the Agency / State Officials system that issued the Decree is sometimes associated interests, directly or indirectly, thereby reducing the maximum assessment that should be pursued; (2) There are no definite rules specifically time expired ratings or siding; (3) There is a chance of ignoring the report or appeal an administrative person.
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Полянський, А. О. "THE PLACE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STANDARDS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM PRINCIPLES OF INTERACTION OF JUDICIAL EXPERT INSTITUTIONS WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES." Juridical science, no. 3(105) (March 30, 2020): 258–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.32844/2222-5374-2020-105-3.33.
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The relevance of the article is that the effectiveness and efficiency of interaction between forensic agencies and law enforcement agencies depends on many factors, one of which is a properly "constructed" system of legal acts. At the same time, the special nature of the interaction of these entities, the attraction of its content to the administrative and legal sphere, as well as the specifics of forensic institutions and law enforcement agencies in general necessitates a detailed review of legal principles in this area and determining the place of administrative and legal regulation. The purpose of the article is to establish a system of legal bases for the interaction of forensic institutions with law enforcement agencies, as well as to determine the place of administrative and legal regulation among them. It is established that the legal basis of interaction of forensic institutions with law enforcement agencies is a system of regulations and their provisions governing the legal status of forensic institutions and law enforcement agencies, as well as the content and procedure of interaction of these entities. It is proved that administrative-legal regulation is a type of branch of the general-legal category of legal regulation, which occurs with the help of administrative law and determines the impact of law on public relations of a special nature arising from the activities of public administration. That is, we are talking about the relationship of power and management influence that prevails in the work of public authorities, local governments and so on. This is a purposeful, comprehensive, streamlining impact of law on public relations in the sphere of government, which occurs through the rules of administrative law, which are part of the system of legal principles outlined above. It is emphasized that the legal basis for the interaction of forensic institutions and law enforcement agencies have an administrative and legal basis, which is expressed in a large number of rules of administrative law, enshrined in regulations of various legal force. This situation is due to the fact that the norms of this branch of law determine: the administrative and legal status of forensic institutions and law enforcement agencies; functions, powers and tasks assigned to law enforcement agencies and forensic institutions; mechanisms of interaction of forensic institutions and law enforcement agencies in performing their functions defined by law; organizational and practical goals of this interaction; etc.
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Chand, Daniel E. "Protecting Agency Judges in an Age of Politicization: Evaluating Judicial Independence and Decisional Confidence in Administrative Adjudications." American Review of Public Administration 49, no. 4 (February 24, 2019): 395–410. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0275074019829608.
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Administrative judges, who serve in state and federal agencies, as opposed to a separate branch of government, are an understudied, and occasionally controversial, type of public administrator. Many who find themselves in administrative courts protest the agency judge’s lack of independence. According to critics, because agency judges are members of—and often evaluated by—the very agency with a vested interest in the case, they are subject to political influence and cannot possibly be an impartial arbitrator. In the United States, various approaches to addressing this concern have been employed. At the federal level, Congress grants some administrative judges statutory protections from agency evaluation. Most states have utilized an organizational independence approach by placing administrative judges in separate agencies dedicated to administrative adjudications. Via a national survey returned by 250 agency judges, this study compares perceptions of judicial independence and decisional confidence. It finds that administrative judges serving in independent agencies (known as central panels) report higher levels of judicial independence and more confidence their rulings will not be overturned. The theoretical implications are significant for public administration and administrative law scholars, especially those concerned about the politicization of administrative duties.
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Nguyen, Son. "Ensuring citizenship in the operations of State administrative agencies in Vietnam." Ministry of Science and Technology, Vietnam 63, no. 4 (April 30, 2021): 23–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.31276/vjst.63(4).23-28.
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The activities of State administrative agencies have the strongest and fastest impact on society. All decisions from the State’s administrative agencies have a direct and immediate impact on social life, however, in the operation of the State’s administrative agencies, there are always potential risks of infringing upon citizenship. In recent years, the implementation of Vietnam still has many problems that have not been studied and resolved, both in terms of mechanism and law to the practical activities of State agencies in general and of the State’s administrative agencies in particular. This study assesses the current situation and proposes a solution to ensure citizenship in the operation of the State’s administrative agencies in Vietnam today.
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Arana García, Estanislao. "ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: TOWARDS A COMMON MODEL OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE." Administrative law and process, no. 2(25) (2019): 87–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2227-796x.2019.2.06.
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Purpose. The aim of this paper is to analyse the activity of the European agencies as a mechanism of control prior to the judicial review. This procedure is carried out by independent and impartial administrative tribunals. This model supposes to create specialized administrative organs that solve conflicts previous to the judicial procedure. The “agencies model” is mainly used in western countries with legal Anglo-Saxon reminiscences. In this paper we analyze the importance of these agencies and its possibilities for improvement in the near future. Method. To achieve this goal it is necessary to: 1) analysis the creative solutions of the agencies courts; 2) verify the performance of agencies through the information provided by themselves; 3) discuss the judicial decisions from a scientific perspective. This process has been implemented through direct contact with experts and professional actively involved at these European administrative courts. Results. EU law is haphazardly creating a system of administrative review that is in many cases a pre-condition to judicial review. This system is most evidently manifesting itself in the application of EU law by administrative agencies. For this purpose, some of the EU’s most important agencies have created specialised bodies known as boards of appeal. These objective and independent bodies have the power to review the decisions of the agency they form part on based on both questions of law and fact. The paper aims to establish a critical vision of the role that new judicial forms are developing and the importance of to reach a specialized criterion for solving technically increasingly complex issues. Conclusions. The board-of-appeal model has proven a successful one as it offers parties a low-cost and effective way of having their complaints resolved without having to go to the European Union Court of Justice. Lastly, there appears to be a need for the European Union to, as it is currently doing with administrative procedure, establish a common set of rules for this emerging remedy for reviewing European administrative acts.
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Krenik, Vale. "“No One Can Serve Two Masters”: A Separation of Powers Solution for Conflicts of Interest Within the Department of Health and Human Services." Texas Wesleyan Law Review 12, no. 2 (March 2006): 585–630. http://dx.doi.org/10.37419/twlr.v12.i2.6.
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This Comment examines the financial conflicts of interests within the DHHS that results in private influence, the consequential impact of the private influence on the agency's constitutionality under the nondelegation and separation of powers doctrines, and offers a solution that better conforms to the principles and structure of the United States Constitution. Part II examines the penetration of conflicts of interests within the DHHS and impact on drug safety and human lives. Part III discusses the separation of powers doctrine and the development of the nondelegation doctrine with respect to delegations to private groups. Part IV analyzes the constitutionality of administrative agencies under the influence of private interests. Part V analyzes the constitutionality of administrative agencies with respect to the separation of powers doctrine. Part VI proposes a solution to the problems of private interests with administrative agencies. This Comment concludes in advocating a long term solution of repairing the structural flaws that violate the separation of powers by advocating the reformation of Executive Branch agencies into constituent legislative, executive and adjudicatory functions and altering their reporting structure to corresponding branches. In practical terms, the agencies must be disassembled and rebuilt to separate the powers.
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Paul, Paul. "What the Return of the Administrative Conference of the United States Means for Administrative Law." Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law, no. 1.1 (2012): 17. http://dx.doi.org/10.36640/mjeal.1.1.what.
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Administrative law, writ large, is about the way agencies behave, and how other institutions and the public react to that behavior. By promulgating rules, adjudicating cases and claims, enforcing statutes, providing guidance, collaborating with interest groups, exercising discretion, and so forth, agencies manage and implement the business of government.1 They do this under the auspices of the Executive Branch, but the other branches assert authority over the agencies as well. Congress does so by legislating, budgeting, and overseeing, while the courts do so by interpreting statutes and requiring rational behavior from agencies. These important and essential activities fill many law school publications with statutes, cases, and rules. But the branches that produce this body of law are institutionally constrained—they have difficulty testing hypotheses or experimenting with alternatives before statutes are enacted, cases are decided, or rules are promulgated.
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Grisinger, Joanna. "Law in Action: The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure." Journal of Policy History 20, no. 3 (July 2008): 379–418. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jph.0.0020.
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The story of American political development in the twentieth century is in no small part the story of administration. Administrative agencies, bureaus, and departments tasked with handling the work of the federal government had been a feature of governance since the early republic. With the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887, however, administrative agencies and independent regulatory commissions began to proliferate across the federal landscape. By the end of the massive expansion of federal power that characterized the New Deal, Americans very much experienced government through their interactions with bureaucrats and with administrative boards. Individuals and businesses claimed benefits from the Railroad Retirement Board and Veterans Administration, defended themselves against claims of unfair competition before the Federal Trade Commission, requested permits from the Federal Alcohol Administration and the Federal Communications Commission, and sought to resolve labor disputes before the National Labor Relations Board.
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LOWANDE, KENNETH. "Who Polices the Administrative State?" American Political Science Review 112, no. 4 (September 17, 2018): 874–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055418000497.
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Scholarship on oversight of the bureaucracy typically conceives of legislatures as unitary actors. But most oversight is conducted by individual legislators who contact agencies directly. I acquire the correspondence logs of 16 bureaucratic agencies and re-evaluate the conventional proposition that ideological disagreement drives oversight. I identify the effect of this disagreement by exploiting the transition from George Bush to Barack Obama, which shifted the ideological orientation of agencies through turnover in agency personnel. Contrary to existing research, I find ideological conflict has a negligible effect on oversight, whereas committee roles and narrow district interests are primary drivers. The findings may indicate that absent incentives induced by public auditing, legislator behavior is driven by policy valence concerns rather than ideology. The results further suggest collective action in Congress may pose greater obstacles to bureaucratic oversight than previously thought.
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Smith, Brian C. "Access to administrative agencies: a problem of administrative law or social structure?" International Review of Administrative Sciences 52, no. 1 (March 1986): 17–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002085238605200104.
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Jaworski, Bogdan. "Regional and local branch agencies of the central government." Acta Iuridica Resoviensia 38, no. 3 (September 2022): 106–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.15584/actaires.2022.3.7.
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Contemporary public administration is divided according to the adopted criteria. The most clear and legible division indicates the functioning in its structures of the government administration, which undertakes the activities of the state assigned to it. The bodies of this administration function on different levels of organization and have different powers and competences. The study presents the organization of local government administration divided into two basic forms: combined and non-combined. The deliberations were based on the theory of administrative law and practical organizational solutions. An attempt was also made to assess the form of governmental administration organization functioning in the field. Research attention has also focused on its functioning during a pandemic.
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Rahman, Prof Abd. "Performance accountability of public agencies in the act government." Indonesia Prime 2, no. 1 (July 27, 2018): 40–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.29209/id.v2i1.23.
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Performance accountability of public bodies meaning widespread not only limited liability in law but also in the field of non-law. Special accountability law, imaged through the performance creation of the law (legal creating), as well as in the implementation of the law (legal applying) as the embodiment of government action (Bestuurhandeling). In the concept of the law of State administration and administrative law, Government action in question is the Act or acts committed by State administration in carrying out the task of Government.
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Egeberg, Morten, Åse Gornitzka, and Jarle Trondal. "Merit-based recruitment boosts good governance: how do European Union agencies recruit their personnel?" International Review of Administrative Sciences 85, no. 2 (June 21, 2017): 247–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020852317691342.
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Studies show that public administrations that practise merit-based recruitment of their personnel are significantly less marked by corruption than administrations that do not recruit in this manner. While we know a lot about how EU member states score with regard to the degree of merit-based recruitment within their administrations, and also how the European Commission administration performs in this respect, recruitment practices within the increasing number of European Union regulatory (decentralized) agencies seem to remain a white spot in the literature so far. In this article, we make a first step in mapping recruitment practices within the secretariats of such agencies. We also investigate if it matters whether a European Union agency is located in a country marked by a non-meritocratic administrative culture or not. The article shows that European Union agencies seem to overwhelmingly apply meritocratic instruments when hiring people, regardless of their location. Points for practitioners This article argues and shows that recruitment based on merit enhances good and non-corrupt governance. The case in point is European Union agencies. The data presented illuminate that these agencies generally apply meritocratic instruments when hiring administrative staff. The study also shows that recruitment practices are not affected by the geographical location of European Union agencies. These agencies tend to practise the common merit-based European Union standards regardless of their location since agencies are components of the European Union administration.
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Juarez-Garcia, Mario I., and David Schmidtz. "THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE." Social Philosophy and Policy 38, no. 1 (2021): 1–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052521000194.
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AbstractThere has always been a tension, in theory, between the public accountability and the professional efficiency of the agencies of the administrative state. How has that tension been handled? What would it be like for it to be well handled?
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Sopilko, Iryna, and Kseniia Tokarieva. "EPISTEMOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE-LEGAL PRINCIPLES IN RESEARCH ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES." Journal of International Legal Communication 11, no. 4 (December 30, 2023): 33–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.32612/uw.27201643.2023.11.4.pp.33-43.
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This research delves into the evolving epistemological foundations of administrative-legal principles within the domain of law enforcement agencies. A meticulous analysis of over 200 scholarly works, with a specific focus on more than ten dissertations, has been conducted to illuminate the essence and content of activities undertaken by law enforcement agencies. The study offers a comprehensive un-derstanding of administrative-legal principles, encompassing their functions, forms, methods of opera-tion, and their legal underpinnings as reflected in sectoral legislative acts. The investigation explores the concept of „administrativelegal principles” and establishes its intricate interrelations with key cate-gories in administrative law, such as „principles of administrative law,” „legal regulation,” and „admin-istrative-legal norms.” Findings reveal that administrative-legal principles form a cohesive system in-fluencing the functions, forms, and methods of operation employed by law enforcement agencies. Key outcomes of the study emphasize the paramount importance of delving into administrative-legal principles within the specific context of law enforcement agencies. A nuanced examination of their functions, forms, and methods of operation underscores their critical role. This research advocates for understanding administrative-legal principles as foundational elements of administrative law, shedding light on their pivotal function in regulating the multifaceted activities of law enforcement agencies.
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Markey, Edward J. "Congress to Administrative Agencies: Creator, Overseer, and Partner." Duke Law Journal 1990, no. 5 (November 1990): 967. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1372737.
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Ring, Peter Smith, and Howard Ball. "Federal Administrative Agencies: Essays on Power and Politics." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 4, no. 3 (1985): 469. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3324242.
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Polman, Daniel. "Participation of Implementing Agencies in European Administrative Networks." JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 58, no. 4 (January 29, 2020): 818–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12990.
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Fallon, Richard H. "Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III." Harvard Law Review 101, no. 5 (March 1988): 915. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1341424.
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Johnson, Gbemende. "Judicial Deference and Executive Control Over Administrative Agencies." State Politics & Policy Quarterly 14, no. 2 (April 9, 2014): 142–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532440013520243.
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Hall, Lavinia. "BENDING THE RULES: NEGOTIATING RULES IN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES." Policy Studies Journal 16, no. 3 (March 1988): 533–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.1988.tb01866.x.
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Grishin, Dmitry A., and Alexander S. Dugenets. "Dugenets A.S. Administrative liability: features of legal relations involving correctional agencies." Law Enforcement Review 4, no. 4 (December 28, 2020): 115–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.24147/2542-1514.2020.4(4).115-123.
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The subject of the research is the modern administrative law and administrative procedural doctrine shaping the view of the contents and nature of the legal relationship of administrative liability involving correctional agencies. The purpose of the article is to confirm or disprove the hypothesis about significant features of legal relations of administrative liability arising, developing and terminating in the field of execution of criminal penalties. The methodology includes systematic analysis of legal academic literature, interpretation of Russian legislation on administrative offences. The main results. The static (universal for all law enforcement agencies) structure of the institution of administrative liability acquires its qualitative originality in the process of its practical implementation in the law enforcement activities of the relevant bodies and officials authorized by the state to bring to administrative responsibility through appropriate legal relations. The main part of the legal relations of administrative responsibility that develop in the activities of correctional institutions and pre-trial detention centers are of a security nature. These relations are primarily aimed not at implementing the main tasks of the legislation on administrative responsibility, but at achieving the basic goal of the func- tioning of penitentiary institutions, i.e. ensuring the public safety of objects of the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia. Identification and proper procedural registration of the fact of an administrative offense will be the basis for the emergence of the corresponding protective legal relationship. The authors make proposals aimed at improvement of normative regulation and practice of application of administrative coercive measures, enforced by employees of the Federal Penitentiary Service of Russia. It is necessary to radically change the approach to the administrative and jurisdictional practice of correctional agencies by expanding the application of administrative responsibility to convicted persons and persons held in pre-trial detention centers. Conclusions. Administrative liability relations involving correctional agencies have specific features. The application of such liability is aimed at maintaining the normal legal regime and ensuring the public safety of the relevant penitentiary facility. Administrative responsibility should be applied by correctional agencies to citizens who are located on the territory of the penitentiary institution and pre-trial detention center, civil personnel of the penitentiary system and special agents. A doctrinal definition of the legal relationship of administrative liability involving correctional agencies is formulated by authors.
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Iglin, Aleksei Vladimirovich. "Administrative mechanisms for resolving individual labour disputes in foreign countries." SHS Web of Conferences 118 (2021): 03011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/shsconf/202111803011.
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According to international labor standards, the labor-management system covers all public administration bodies responsible for and/or involved in labor-management, whether they are ministerial departments or government agencies, including semipublic, regional, or local agencies, or any other form of decentralized administration, and any institutional framework for coordinating the activities of such bodies and for consultation and participation of employers and employees and their organization. In this regard, dispute resolution mechanisms through administrative departments and agencies, labor inspections, and voluntary compliance are most pronounced. The purpose of the study was to conduct a comprehensive analysis of administrative mechanisms for resolving individual labor disputes in foreign countries; to draw conclusions about the effectiveness, prospects, and legal clarity of coordination of labor disputes. When conducting research the author relies on foreign doctrine, the practice of the subjects involved in labor relations, acts of foreign legislation. Research methods: a dialectical approach to the knowledge of administrative mechanisms, allowing analyzing them in their practical development and functioning in the context of coordination of labor legal relations. The comparative legal method and dialectics determined the choice of specific research methods: comparative and formal-legal. The functions, jurisdiction, and procedures of individual labor dispute resolution mechanisms and labor inspectorates are the subject of comprehensive research because of their effectiveness in protecting workers’ rights. The article provides a detailed comparative legal analysis of the specifics of dispute resolution through administrative departments and agencies, the role of labor inspections/law enforcement, and access to justice for workers in unclear or hidden employment relationships. On the basis of a large array of regulative sources, the author concludes about the importance of administrative mechanisms in the proper enforcement of labor laws abroad.
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Rao, Neomi. "The Hedgehog & the Fox in Administrative Law." Daedalus 150, no. 3 (2021): 220–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_01869.
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Abstract This essay examines the constitutional muddle of the administrative state with reference to how agencies operate–it looks at a hedgehog's problem from the fox's perspective. Not only does the structure and delegated authority of administrative agencies often exist in substantial tension with the Constitution, but agencies regularly fail to act in a manner that promotes “constitutional values.” Drawing from my experience as regulatory czar, I explain that regulatory policy is frequently developed with little regard for separation of powers, political accountability, due process, or other values drawn from the Constitution. Proponents of the status quo thus cannot rely on such values to legitimize the ever-expanding activity of administrative agencies.
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Johnson, Ann M. "Legislation induced organizational inefficiency: The case of the federal reserve and the dodd-frank." International Journal of Organization Theory & Behavior 18, no. 4 (March 1, 2015): 434–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijotb-18-04-2015-b004.
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In 2010 the Dodd-Frank Law was passed in response to the 2008 recession. However, questions arose regarding the federal agenciesʼ ability to regulate the economy in general and the utility of financial regulations in particular. This work examines and discusses the challenges associated with the uncertainty of the administrative environment in which agencies have been drafting regulations in response to Dodd-Frank. A lack of administrative clarity as a result of Congressional politics led to regulatory capture and operational paralysis on the part of federal agencies tasked with implementing the Act. In this type of environment it becomes very difficult for regulatory agencies to be effective and competent when regulations have not all been drafted yet and legislation is continuously changing. This article critically examines the recent proposed changes to the Dodd-Frank Law. Specifically, it delineates the manner in which the legislative instability has impacted the Federal Reserve Bankʼs capacity to effectively implement the necessary rules for mitigating economic risks.
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Fobih, Nick. "Administrative and Ethical Issues in Ghana’s Public Administration." Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal 8, no. 10 (November 10, 2021): 573–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.810.11105.
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This study examines some of the major administrative and ethical challenges facing Ghana’s public administration, with regard to the issues associated with the country’s governance processes and public sector service delivery. The methodology used is based on the qualitative approach with combined sources from primary and secondary data and the case study method. The findings in the study show that whereas Ghana’s democracy has made significant inroads over the years since the 1992 democratic transition, a number of administrative and ethical issues hinder the country’s public administration processes and procedures, which require immediate government attention to address them more appropriately. The study recommends that the government (executive branch) and the bureaucracy (Ministries, Departments and Agencies) should make frantic efforts towards promoting effective and efficient service delivery system and government accountability for accelerated national development. The study’s implication for theory is that it will inform its readers about the different perspectives on the topic discussed. Given the service delivery and corruption challenges in Ghana’s public sector, the recommendations will go a long way to help address some of the problems facing Ghana’s MDAs and the government in general. The significance of the study is that it provides key insights into important issues in Ghana’s public administration, which can serve as useful lessons for the government, public institutions and the bureaucracy. The outlined challenges and recommendations will inform the government, MDAs and other government agencies of the need to improve governance and administration in order to accelerate the country’s political and socio-economic development. This study further contributes towards academic discussions on the administrative and ethical issues hampering the effective delivery of services and public and administration in Ghana and Africa in general.
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Bakurova, N. N. "Features of management decisions in enforcement agencies." Courier of Kutafin Moscow State Law University (MSAL)), no. 5 (July 15, 2024): 54–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.17803/2311-5998.2024.117.5.054-063.
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The article examines the features of managerial decision-making in such public authorities as enforcement agencies. The author considers management decisions in enforcement agencies from the point of view of the phonomena of their legal status, in particular, as a tool for ensuring the enforcement of an authoritative decision of a judge, judicial authority, other public authority, official in relation to a single legal entity: a citizen, an organization, a public authority. This proves the importance of the role of management decisions in ensuring human and civil rights as the highest value, authoritative publicly significant decisions on the scale of the entire state. Adhering to a broad interpretation of the definitions of the concepts of “public administration”, “act”, the author comes to the conclusion that the management decision — this is a process that requires formalization, and which permeates the entire activity of the enforcement authority, in particular and mainly, illustrating the process of enforcement proceedings, asserts that a management decision accompanies it from the moment of receipt of the enforcement document to its completion, says that as long as the state exists, it will need tools for the enforcement of authority decisions, and therefore in a management decision. According to the author, a legally significant managerial decision of the enforcement body, its official, is based on a triad of conditions on the basis of which it is made: legislative, jurisdictional, competent; it takes the form of a legal act of management, the main of which is a resolution. In addition to resolutions, the author names such forms of management decisions as a request, a bilateral act and others, arguing his position from the point of view of a broad understanding of the term “act”. The author comes to the conclusion that the adoption of a managerial decision in enforcement proceedings is a vivid example of a combination of administrative procedure and specific administrative and jurisdictional proceedings, characteristic only of a bailiff conducting enforcement proceedings, in the unity of conditionally allocated types of administrative procedural activities.
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Candeub, D. A. "Tyranny and administrative law." Revista de Direito Administrativo 277, no. 1 (May 11, 2018): 15. http://dx.doi.org/10.12660/rda.v277.2018.74801.
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<p>Tirania e o direito administrativo</p><p> </p><p><em>The Federalist Papers </em>define “tyranny” as “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many.” This definition would seem to include the modern administrative agency, which exercises all three powers. To avoid tyrannical agencies and their illegitimate exercise of power, judges and academics look to administrative law. Its procedures and requirements, such as public comment, judicial review, agency reason-giving and deliberation, and executive oversight, saddle agencies with checks and balances and, therefore, legitimacy. Yet unease with the administrative state continues; indeed, it seems to be in a constant crisis of legitimacy, suggesting that administrative law’s quest for legitimacy has not succeeded. This Article argues that this crisis of legitimacy stems from the inherent conflict between the assumptions underlying those of administrative law and the Constitution. These sets of assumptions differ profoundly over political actors’ motivations and human nature, rationality in political and administrative decision-making, and the role of executive lawmaking in a democracy. This Article compares <em>The Federalist Papers </em>and administrative law and scholarship to uncover those differences. But this Article does not engage in an “originalist” critique of administrative law. Instead, it shows that administrative law’s crisis of legitimacy inevitably proceeds from its jarring discontinuity with deep assumptions underlying our constitutional structure.</p><p> </p><p>A obra <em>O federalista </em>define “tirania” como “a acumulação de todos os poderes, legislativo, executivo e judiciário, nas mesmas mãos, seja na de um, alguns ou vários”. Essa definição pareceria incluir a agência administrativa moderna, que exerce todos os três poderes. Para evitar agências tiranas e seu exercício ilegítimo do poder, juízes e acadêmicos procuram o direito administrativo. Seus procedimentos e requerimentos, como comentários públicos, revisão judicial, agência de razão e deliberação e supervisão executiva, selam agências com verificações e balanços e, portanto, legitimação. Ainda assim, o desconforto com o Estado administrativo continua; inclusive, parece ser uma constante crise de legitimidade, sugerindo que a busca do direito administrativo por legitimidade não prosperou. Este artigo argumenta que essa crise de legitimidade se origina do conflito inerente entre hipóteses subjacentes às do direito administrativo e a Constituição. Esse conjunto de hipóteses difere profundamente das motivações de atores políticos e da natureza humana, da racionalidade na tomada de decisões políticas e administrativas, e em toda a legislação executiva na democracia. Este artigo compara a obra <em>O federalista</em>, as leis administrativas e a escolaridade para revelar aquelas diferenças. Mas este artigo não se engaja em uma crítica “original” do direito administrativo. Pelo contrário, mostra que a crise de legitimidade do direito administrativo inevitavelmente provém de chocante descontinuidade com premissas subjacentes à estrutura constitucional.</p>
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Steblianko, A. V. "Administrative and Legal Status of Law Enforcement Agencies as Subjects of Interaction with Financial Institutions in the Sphere of Combating the Legalization of Criminal Proceeds." Law and Safety 75, no. 4 (December 20, 2019): 59–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.32631/pb.2019.4.08.
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The author has studied administrative and legal status of law enforcement agencies, which are the subjects of interaction with financial institutions in the field of combating the legalization of criminal proceeds. The contents of such categories as status, legal status, administrative and legal status have been clarified. Based on the analysis of the scientific literature, the author has determined that the rights and responsibilities are integral structural elements of the administrative and legal status. It has been noted that two main approaches to determining the structural elements of the administrative and legal status of law enforcement agencies were formed in administrative law science.
The author has provided the list of law enforcement agencies that are empowered to counter the legalization of criminal proceeds and are subjects of interaction with financial institutions. Such agencies are the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, the agencies of the Security Service, the National Police and Prosecutor’s Office, the State Bureau of Investigation, the tax police units of the State Fiscal Service of Ukraine. The necessity to distinguish only such elements of the administrative and legal status of law enforcement agencies as the purpose, tasks, functions, competence, powers, legal responsibility, as well as organizational structure has been proved.
The purpose of the activity of law enforcement agencies in this field has been formulated. Only those tasks and functions of law enforcement agencies that contribute to the achievement of the stated purpose have been considered. It has been emphasized that the competence is the sphere of activity of a certain law enforcement agency, and the authority is the totality of the rights and duties of that agency, granted by the legislation to perform the assigned functions within the competence. It has been established that the employees of the designated law enforcement agencies have disciplinary, civil, administrative and criminal liability. It has been stated that structural units facilitate the implementation of the tasks and functions of a specific law enforcement agency. The author has provided the definition of the administrative and legal status of the subjects that cooperate in the sphere of combating the legalization of criminal proceeds. The place and role of the indicated subjects in the sphere of combating the legalization of criminal proceeds have been determined.
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Kharaberiush, Ivan. "Special equipment in administrative activities of law enforcement bodies." Vìsnik Marìupolʹsʹkogo deržavnogo unìversitetu. Serìâ: Pravo 10, no. 19 (2020): 42–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.34079/2226-3047-2020-10-19-42-51.
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The article considers special equipment used in the administrative activities of law enforcement agencies, which is defined as organizational equipment. It is emphasized that the scientific and technical means, which we generally define as organizational equipment, play a significant role in the process of democratic formation of the state and effective administrative activity of law enforcement agencies. Factors emphasizing the need to use organizational equipment in the administrative activities of law enforcement agencies are presented. Organizational technology is seen as a means of law enforcement in general. The definition of the concept of "organizational technique" is given. The method of criterion selection is used to determine the scope of the concept of "organizational technique". According to the selected criteria the system-structural structure of organizational equipment of law enforcement agencies is investigated. To determine the system-structural structure of the organizational equipment of law enforcement agencies as a scientific category, the classical theory of organization was chosen. The basis for the system atization of organizational equipment is the hierarchical structure of law enforcement agencies engaged in administrative activities. It is proved that the defining requirement of the current legislation to the means of organizational equipment is the need for their certification and periodic verification.
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Hutler, Brian, and Anne Barnhill. "SNAP EXCLUSIONS AND THE ROLE OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN POLICY-MAKING." Social Philosophy and Policy 38, no. 1 (2021): 266–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052521000315.
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AbstractThis essay uses a specific example—proposals to exclude sugary drinks from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)—to explore some features of the contemporary U.S. administrative state. Dating back to the Wilsonian origins of the U.S. administrative state there has been uncertainty about whether we can and should separate politics and administration. On the traditional view, the agencies are to be kept separate from politics—technocratic and value-neutral—although they are indirectly accountable to the president and Congress. The SNAP exclusions example shows, however, that agencies often must make complex and controversial decisions on their own, decisions that go beyond value-neutral technocratic administration. When authorizing legislation has multiple goals, as we’ll argue is the case in the SNAP example, an agency will have to choose between conflicting statutory mandates. Moreover, as the SNAP example shows, agencies often face complex normative questions of ethics and justice that go beyond the question of how to balance competing aims. The appropriate response to the SNAP exclusions example is not to keep politics out of administrative decision-making, but to develop procedures that allow ethical and political questions to be addressed in agency policy-making, consistent with overarching commitments to fairness and democracy.
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Bernstein, David E. "“ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM”: CONSIDERING THE ROLE OF AGENCY DECISION-MAKING IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT." Social Philosophy and Policy 38, no. 1 (2021): 109–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052521000248.
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AbstractThe last decade or so has seen an explosion of scholarship by American law professors on what has become known as administrative constitutionalism. Administrative constitutionalism is a catchphrase for the role of administrative agencies in influencing, creating, and establishing constitutional rules and norms, and governing based on those rules and norms. Though courts traditionally get far more attention in the scholarly literature and the popular imagination, administrative constitutionalism scholars show that administrative agencies have been extremely important participants in American constitutional development. Section I of this essay identifies three different versions of administrative constitutionalism—(1) Engagement with Existing Constitutional Doctrine; (2) Resolving Questions of Statutory Meaning that Implicate Constitutional Questions; and (3) Shadow Administrative Constitutionalism—and provides examples from the scholarly literature to illustrate these distinct manifestations of administrative constitutionalism. Section II of this essay discusses the normative turn in administrative constitutionalism scholarship. Much of this normative literature is implicitly or explicitly premised on the notion that agencies are more likely to pursue progressive goals than are other government actors. Section III of this essay disputes the notion that agency constitutional decision-making is “democratic” and that agencies are naturally inclined to serve progressive goals. Finally, Section IV of this essay notes that scholars who support broad agency autonomy to work out and enforce their own constitutional visions have failed to consider how their work fits in with the economic and political science literature on agency behavior. One can predict, based on that literature, that agencies given broad autonomy under the guise of administrative constitutionalism will primarily be inclined to expand their scope and authority at the expense of countervailing considerations.
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Norra, Azza Azka. "CONFLICTING NORMS BETWEEN TACIT REFUSAL AND TACIT AUTHORIZATION AND ITS CONTEXTUALIZATION IN THE LIGHT OF GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION LAW." Jurnal Hukum Peratun 3, no. 2 (March 23, 2021): 141–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.25216/peratun.322020.141-154.
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The silence of the Government Administration has two possibilities, Tacit Refusal and Tacit Authorization. Tacit Refusal means that if the government agencies/bodies ignored requests from citizens then it is considered to have rejected the request. Tacit Authorization means if the government agencies/bodies ignored requests from citizens then it is considered to have granted the request. In Indonesia, both the Tacit Refusal and Tacit Authorization have their own places in the laws and regulations. The Law No. 5 of 1986 concerning Administrative Judiciary, rules the Tacit Refusal, meanwhile Law No. 30 of 2014 concerning Government Administration, rules the Tacit Authorization. Both cannot be implemented simultaneously because both of them are negating each other. This paper tries to explain the implementation of Tacit Refusal and Tacit Authorization after the enactment of Law No. 30 of 2014 concerning Government Administration in the administrative court.
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Bajakić, Ivana, and Veseljka Kos. "What Can We Learn About Regulatory Agencies and Regulated Parties from the Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Regulatory Agencies’ Decisions? The Case of Croatia." Central European Journal of Public Policy 10, no. 1 (May 1, 2016): 22–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/cejpp-2016-0021.
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Abstract The purpose of this paper is to examine regulatory agencies and regulated parties in an empirical study of administrative disputes initiated against the decisions of regulatory agencies in Croatia. We first aim to provide an overview of the status and trend estimates regarding these disputes; second, to answer the question how well does the system work from the perspectives of both the plaintiffs and the regulatory agencies; third, to identify the problem areas and to compare these with problem areas identified by the authors studying the broader area of administrative judiciary in Croatia, and finally to compare efficiency level of regulatory agencies to other public authorities in confirming the legality of their decisions and actions. Data on all administrative disputes against 12 Croatian regulatory agencies’ decisions in the 17-year period between 1995 and 2011 are used to identify the main characteristics and trends relating to these disputes. Data for 2012 to 2013 was also examined to identify initial changes and emerging trends in the new administrative judiciary system resulting from fundamental legal reform as part of Croatia’s process of accession to the European Union in 2013. The results show these administrative disputes to be often costly and timely with modest outcome for the plaintiff and impressive success rate for the most of regulatory agencies.
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Shin, Kwan Woo. "Review of information disclosure disposition by police agencies: Focusing on the analysis of the 2023 ruling by the Central Administrative Appeals Commission." Korean Association of Public Safety and Criminal Justice 33, no. 1 (March 30, 2024): 131–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.21181/kjpc.2024.33.1.131.
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In this study, examine information disclosure and the administrative judgment system, which are means of police control, and examine the current status of the Central Administrative Appeals Commission's citation decision that clearly recognized the illegality and unfairness of the disposition of information disclosure by police agencies in 2023. In addition, it was intended to provide suggestions for reasonable disposition of information disclosure by police agencies. When a citizen exercises the right to request information disclosure from a police agency, the police agency decides whether or not to disclose the information in accordance with the statutory procedures set forth in the Information Disclosure Act. A person requesting information disclosure may appeal a police agency's decision to disclose information by filing an administrative appeal with the Central Administrative Appeals Commission. After reviewing the decision to disclose information to police agencies, be able to confirm the following facts. First, police agencies identified cases where they did not comply with statutory procedures under the Information Disclosure Act or misjudged the application of reasons for non-disclosure. In addition, we were able to confirm cases where police agencies' information disclosure officers lacked basic knowledge of the Information Disclosure Act, adding or changing the reasons for disposition, or restricting the information disclosure claimant's right to object through a substantive refusal with formal legality. The suggestions derived from the review of citation decisions regarding information disclosure by police agencies as discussed above can be summarized as follows. There is a need to do about the First, strengthening disciplinary responsibility for those in charge who do not comply with information disclosure procedures, Second, regular education and evaluation on cases of illegal and unfair information disclosure, Third, the introduction of a training completion system for police agency-specific office workers in the fields of investigation, transportation, and life safety, Fourth, strengthening the supervisory function of the Supervisory Office, Fifth, disclosure of cases of illegal and unfair decisions
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Robbins, Donijo. "Administrative Discretion: Its Use in Budgetary Analysis." Public Administration Quarterly 29, no. 2 (June 2005): 187–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/073491490502900204.
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The foundation of this research applies the following definition of discretion: the use of individual judgment to make decisions. The literature surrounding budgetary analysis within the public budgetary process, particularly the first two stages, does not explicitly discuss discretion. Therefore, using the definition above coupled with the limited research surrounding discretion, we demonstrate how agencies, budget offices, executives, and legislative bodies use discretion when analyzing the budget. Overall, agencies and departments maintain discretion when they are assertive, politically astute, and when the budget format promotes flexibility. Effective communication and executive support are two factors that seem to result in agency and department budget growth. Agencies are more likely to witness spending decreases, however, when the legislature is dissatisfied with agency performance. In the end, the presence of politics overshadows, and hence limits, discretion.
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KRAUSE, GEORGE A., and J. KEVIN CORDER. "Explaining Bureaucratic Optimism: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Executive Agency Macroeconomic Forecasts." American Political Science Review 101, no. 1 (February 2007): 129–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055407070074.
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We offer a theory of intertemporal bureaucratic decision making which proposes that an agency's forecast optimism is related to the extent to which it discounts future reputation costs associated with bureaucratic incompetence. Agency forecasts of the distant future are more likely to be optimistic than short-term forecasts. We claim that unstable organizations will discount reputation costs at a steeper rate than stable organizations, and therefore will produce more optimistic forecasts. We test our theory using macroeconomic forecasts produced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Social Security Administration (SSA) across six forecast horizons from 1979 to 2003. The statistical results are generally consistent with our theory: OMB generates more optimistic long-term forecasts than SSA. Further, differences in forecast optimism between these executive branch agencies widen as the forecast horizon increases. Our evidence suggests that more stable agencies place a premium on minimizing reputation costs. Conversely, less stable agencies are more likely to accommodate political pressures for forecast optimism. These findings underscore the importance of institutional design for understanding how executive agencies balance the conflicting goals of political responsiveness and bureaucratic competence within the administrative state.