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Gilbert, James Burkhart. "Animals and morality." Thesis, McGill University, 1992. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=56924.
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This thesis examines questions concerning the place of animals within our moral thought. In particular it is an investigation of the rationale behind extending our ethical systems to encompass the inclusion of animals. The thesis begins with a presentation of a general framework defining rights and their relationship to obligations. It then includes an assessment of whether or not animals, according to the general framework, can properly be called rights bearers. In order to do this, the questions of whether or not animals have value independent of their value to human beings and whether or not animals have interests are examined.Though the thesis concerns itself with animals it is not merely an examination of animal rights. In order to investigate fully the place of animals within our moral thought, many concepts which are central to ethics such as "rights", "equality", "value", and "affinity" are examined. The thesis concludes with the implications its findings have on human actions.
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Adamson, H. M. "Knowledge and morality." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2011. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.595360.
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This dissertation explores how we know moral truths, and argues for three principal conclusions. The first is that Edward Craig’s hypothesis about what the concept of knowledge does for us explains why knowledge—both of moral and non-moral truths—typically must be reached in certain ways. Second, that experience of the world is an important route to moral knowledge. Third, that someone can have moral knowledge even when they cannot articulate a reason to defend it. Chapter I examines recent work by Quassim Cassam on ‘ways of knowing’. I propose some emendations to Cassam’s account and raise questions: what is the relationship between ways of knowing and the concept of knowledge? Are there tests for sorting good from bad ways of knowing? Chapter II gives a ‘normative’ definition of justification, and it is explained how that coheres with the account of ways of knowing. In Chapter III, I discuss the relationship between ways of knowing and the concept of knowledge, using Edward Craig’s work Knowledge and the State of Nature. I believe we can give a genealogical rationale for being interested in ways of knowing. Chapter IV is concerned exclusively with moral epistemology. I give a brief summary of four central positions in the history of the subject, couched in ways of knowing terminology: intuitionism, rationalism, sentimentalism and an Aristotelian perceptualism. I then attempt to arbitrate between the theories, giving three examples I argue that none of the four theories individually capture the complexity of the examples. In Chapter V I ask what must be true of moral experience if it is to be justificatory. I discuss John McDowell’s Mind and World, which says if experience is to be justificatory of any beliefs it must have articulable conceptual content. I argue against conceptualism, mainly on the grounds that experience can be justificatory despite failing to provide a subject with an articulable reason, and give two more examples.
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Hoyos, Luis Eduardo. "Morality and Sociability." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2013. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/112773.
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The starting-point of this paper is the central idea of the moral meaning of human existence. It could be said that this idea is part of another one from Schopenhauer (he speaks about existence in general andnot only about human existence). and it tries to come to light in the philosophical project of the so-called discursive ethics, although in a very different form. Itis referred critically to this form in the last section of the paper. The artícle is mainly concerned with a defense of the constitutive value which moral consciousness represents for the life of society, far from an ethical rationalist point of view.El artículo toma su punto de partida de la idea básica del significado moral de la existencia humana. Una idea que, podría decirse, es parte de otra de Schopenhauer (él habla de la existencia en general y no sólo de la humana). y que intenta salir a la luz, aunque de muy diferente manera, en el proyecto filosófico de la llamada ética discursiva. A esa manera se hace referencia críticamente en la última parte del artículo. Se trata, principalmente, de una defensa del valor constitutivo que la conciencia moral individual representa para la vida de la sociedad, tomando distancia respecto de un punto de vista ético racionalista.
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Bloom, Dorian L. "Morality by Consensus." Ohio University / OhioLINK, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1426927930.
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Weber, Elijah. "Resentment and Morality." Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1427798481.
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Wilson, James George Scott. "Morality, dignity and pragmatism : an essay on the future of morality." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2002. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1344114/.
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This thesis is an examination and reconstruction of morality. It divides into three parts. Part one argues that morality is best considered as the tradition of ethical thinking that begins with the Stoics, develops in Christian thought and reaches its apotheosis in Kant. This tradition structures ethical thinking around three basic concepts: cosmopolitanism, or universal applicability to human beings as such, the dignity of human beings and reciprocity. It is this tradition of morality that Nietzsche sets out to destroy. Part one criticises pre-Nietzschean theories of morality, such as Kant’s, that take universal and exceptionless rules to form the core of morality. It critiques both the possibility of putting forward an adequate set of such rules and the proposed relationship between morality and human life that is implicit in these theories. Part two begins with Nietzsche’s challenge: that morality is a system of values rooted in nihilistic resentment at the vitality of other, stronger modes of living. It argues that this challenge must be taken seriously, and that the best way to do this is to make it clear that morality has as its fundamental basis a responsiveness to the value of human life; hence it is Nietzsche’s ethics that should be called nihilistic. The rest of part two examines the possibility of answering Nietzsche’s challenge by demonstrating a necessary connection between human selfhood and the acknowledgement of the dignity of human beings. Here I criticise Christine Korsgaard’s arguments and consider Charles Taylor’s more promising approach to the self. Part three turns towards pragmatism, and in so doing gives up on the attempt to show that morality is somehow necessary for all human beings. Nietzsche’s challenge is answered more subtly: an empirically backed theory of human selfhood explains the point of morality in terms of our basic need for recognition. I complete the reconstruction of morality by reinterpreting the dignity of human beings in a naturalistic way and adopting a conception of moral rules that is informed by Jürgen Habermas’ discourse ethics.
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Chan, Shaun Y. W. "Williams, ethics, and morality." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp05/nq22448.pdf.
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Van, Schoelandt Chad. "Justification and Social Morality." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/556823.
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A common conceptual framework depicts morality as an alien force commanding us from on high; in contrast, this dissertation presents a picture of morality that is deeply social. It is not an abstract morality that commands us, but we who place demands on each other. On this picture, we are equal participants in morality, rather than mere subjects of morality. This participation has fundamentally important implications for the shape and structure of morality; or so this dissertation argues. By way of introducing the work as a whole, I will here note some of the key facets of the social nature of morality that the dissertation develops. Our participation is primarily as enforcers, rather than followers, of morality. We hold people accountable to moral requirements through emotional responses like resentment, as well as actions and relations that follow from that attitude. As I argue, these emotions carry an important representational content, displaying the other person as having shown ill will. This ill will can be best understood as a disregard for relevant moral considerations that are available to the resented agent. Despite the negative tone of resentment, it is an aspect of being in community with each other. Someone who can be resented is a co-member of a community with us upon whom we can make demands and who can make demands upon us. We may not share community with some people regarding some issues, such as across religious divides, while still seeing them as people with whom we share at least some form of community, as within the system of basic liberal rights. There are people, as I discuss, who fail to be eligible for responsibility to even basic demands. With such people we have no community; they are to us like forces of nature, and the most dangerous of them are for us monsters. Though many endorse conceptions of community focused on shared experiences or values, I argue that such a notion of community is not appropriate for modern, diverse societies. In modern, particularly liberal, societies, we cannot expect to share religion, occupation, views of the good life, or the like, so these cannot constitute community among the members of society. A shared moral framework, however, provides a promising conception of community for diverse societies like our own. Our shared morality may thus be among the most important forms of community we can have on the large scale of modern society. That same diversity, however, raises problems for a shared morality. As I argue, our interpersonal moral demands will have to be justified to each other, given our different perspectives, and such justification may be difficult. I address both the nature of this interpersonal justification, as well as the difficulties of achieving it, within this dissertation. This dissertation shows that morality is social in yet another way. Focusing on justice, as a central part of the morality, I argue that the content of the principles to which we hold each other accountable itself emerges from our social institutions as those develop over time through our interactions. The diverse members of society must be able to share an understanding of their mutual expectations, but such members tend to disagree about how to interpret and apply moral values and principles. Social institutions, such as legal systems with courts to interpret law, can provide a common interpretation of expectations. If the rules that emerge from these institutions are justified to the members, then those rules may constitute justice within that society. This dissertation, then, presents a picture of morality that is social through and through. Morality is constructed within our social institutions, enforced interpersonally, restricted to what is mutually justified to society’s members, and ultimately constitutes one of our primary forms of community.
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Diehl, Christiane. "Kant's justification of morality." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.433389.
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Farrelly-Jackson, Steven. "Universalism, morality, and art." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.333323.
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Vallance, Grant Douglas. "Science, evaluation and morality." Thesis, Open University, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.500608.
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There is considerable dispute over the nature of the relationship between ethics and the natural sciences. This thesis argues that ethics is substantially independent of the natural sciences because the appeals to the natural sciences fail to adequately justify moral judgements about human beings. Specifically, I argue that if appeals to the natural sciences are not adequate to justify the normative assessment of living organisms, then they are not adequate to justify moral judgements about human beings. I consider the following appeals to justify the normative assessment of living organisms. These include the appeals to: (1) typicality; (2) history; (3) what is natural; (4) natural selection; (5) functions; (6) development; (7) species; and (8) the experience of pleasure and pain. I claim that these appeals are inadequate for one or more of the following reasons. One, some versions of the appeals are incompatible with the natural sciences. Two, the appeals justify implausible and counterintuitive moral judgements. Three, the appeals fail to adequately determine what should occur in contrast to what occurs. Four, there are many different appeals which justify contrary moral judgements and no objective means within the natural sciences to privilege one appeal over another. Finally, five, for some appeals there are various parameters which determine what is justified, but there are no objective means within the atural sciences to justify any particular set ot parameters over and against alternatives.
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Brito, Simone Magalhaes. "Negative Morality : Adorn's Sociology." Thesis, Lancaster University, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.507083.
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Franken, Lizelle. "Evil, morality and modernity." Thesis, Stellenbosch : Stellenbosch University, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/20262.
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Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012.ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis takes Zygmunt Bauman’s book Modernity and the Holocaust as a point of departure in an attempt to show that genocides of the twentieth century are by-products of modernity, and not aberrations, as previously thought. Bauman’s work focuses on the distinctly modern nature of the Holocaust. Using the theory he develops in Modernity and the Holocaust, this thesis attempts to show, first and foremost, that the Holocaust is not the only example of modern genocide. By comparing and contrasting the Holocaust to another, more recent, genocide, namely the Rwandan genocide of 1994, it becomes clear that despite superficial differences between the two genocides, the Rwandan genocide is also a by-product of modernity. This conclusion has important implications, not only for the way in which we remember the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide, but also for our understanding of evil and perpetrators of evil. Drawing on the work of Bauman and Hannah Arendt, especially with regard to the Eichmann case, chapter three investigates our traditional assumptions and expectations with regard to evil and perpetrators of evil and notes the unsettling differences between our assumptions and the modern reality. In order to truly understand the nature of perpetrators of modern genocide, it is important to look at the influence of morality on such perpetrators and the reasons why morality seems incompatible with modernity. In this regard, Haas’ book Morality after Auschwitz is of critical importance. Given the various failures and unexpected by-products of modernity, one has to wonder whether postmodernity would offer a better moral alternative to modernity. Chapter five investigates this supposition, and finds it wanting. Drawing yet again on Bauman, the notion of an ethics of responsibility is put forth as the only safeguard against modern evil.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis neem Zygmunt Bauman se boek Modernity and the Holocaust as ‘n beginpunt en probeer om te wys dat die volksmoorde van die twintigste eeu byprodukte, en nie afwykings, van moderniteit is nie. Bauman se werk fokus op die moderne eienskappe van die Holocaust. Deur gebruik te maak van die teorie wat hy in Modernity and the Holocaust ontwikkel, probeer hierdie tesis om, eerstens, te wys dat die Holocaust nie die enigste voorbeeld van ‘n moderne volksmoord is nie. Deur die Holocaust met ‘n ander, meer onlangse volksmoord, die Rwandese volksmoord van 1994, te vergelyk en te kontrasteer word dit duidelik dat ten spyte van die oppervlakkige verskille tussen die twee volksmoorde, die Rwandese volksmoord ook ‘n byproduk van moderniteit is. Hierdie gevolgtrekking het belangrike implikasies nie net vir die manier waarop ons die Holocaust en die Rwandese volksmoord onthou nie, maar ook vir die wyse waarop ons die kwaad (evil) en perpetrators of evil1 verstaan. Deur verder gebruik te maak van Bauman se werk sowel as die werk van Hannah Arendt, veral met betrekking tot die Eichmann saak, ondersoek hoofstuk drie ons tradisionele aannames en verwagtinge met betrekking tot die kwaad (evil) en perpetrators of evil en wys die onaangename verskille tussen ons aannames en die moderne realiteit uit. Ten einde werklik die aard van perpetrators van moderne volksmoord te verstaan, is dit belangirk om na die invloed van moraliteit op hierdie perpetrators of evil te kyk, asook die redes waarom moraliteit blykbaar teenstrydig is met moderniteit. Haas se belangrike boek, Morality after Auschwitz, word hier geraadpleeg. Gegewe die verskeie tekortkominge van moderniteit, moet ons wonder of postmoderniteit nie dalk ‘n beter morele alternatief bied nie. Hoofstuk vyf ondersoek hierdie stelling en vind dat postmoderniteit ook nie voldoende is nie. Laastens word Bauman weereens geraadpleeg en sy seining van ‘n etiek van verantwoordelikheid word voorgestel as die enigste beskerming teen moderne kwaad.
Harry Crossley Foundation
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Blair, Robert James Richard. "The development of morality." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 1992. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1318028/.
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Evidence that individuals distinguish between moral and conventional rules is reviewed. Moral rules prohibit actions that result in victims (e.g., violence, stealing, etc.). Conventional rules prohibit actions that do not result in victims (e.g., not saying please, dressing in opposite sex clothes). Previous theoretical accounts of the development of the moral/conventional distinction are discussed. These theories are contrasted with an approach that is developed here. It is proposed that there is a mechanism, a Violence Inhibition Mechanism (VIM), that is responsible for the previously observed aversive arousal response to the distress of others. It is proposed that this aversive arousal response is a prerequisite for the development of the moral/ conventional distinction, the moral emotions and the inhibition of violent behaviour. Previous accounts have stressed role taking as a prerequisite for the moral/ conventional distinction. However, this was found not to be the case. Autistics, already known to be lacking a 'Theory of Mind' and therefore unable to role take, were found to make the moral/ conventional distinction. It was hypothesized that Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD) might be a consequence of a lack of VIM; the clinical description of APD stresses their lack of the moral emotions and their inability to inhibit their violent actions. In line with this, APD subjects were not found to make a moral/conventional distinction. Two rival explanations of APD were investigated: that APD is due to an inability to role take and; that APD is due to frontal lobe damage. APD subjects were not found to be impaired in either of these respects in comparison to criminal controls. A final investigation focused on the emotion attributions of APD subjects. It was hypothesized, given the contention that VIM is a prerequisite for the development of the moral emotions, that APD subjects might make anomalous attributions in victim situations though their attributions of other situations should prove normal. This study observed that while the attributions of APD subjects and criminal controls did not differ if the emotions attributed were happiness, sadness or embarrassment there was significant difference in victim situations where APD subjects were less likely to attribute guilt and more likely to attribute indifference than criminal controls. This finding was taken as indirect support of the VIM position. Additional tests, and implications of the VIM model are then discussed.
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Curry, Oliver. "Morality as natural history." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2005. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2/.
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What are moral values and where do they come from? David Hume argued that moral values were the product of a range of passions, inherent to human nature, that aim at the common good of society. Recent developments in game theory, evolutionary biology, animal behaviour, psychology and neuroscience suggest that Hume was right to suppose that humans have such passions. This dissertation reviews these developments, and considers their implications for moral philosophy. I first explain what Darwinian adaptations are, and how they generate behaviour. I then explain that, contrary to the Hobbesian caricature of life in the state of nature, evolutionary theory leads us to expect that organisms will be social, cooperative and even altruistic under certain circumstances. I introduce four main types of cooperation: kin altruism, coordination to mutual advantage, reciprocity and conflict resolution and provide examples of "adaptations for cooperation" from nonhuman species. I then review the evidence for equivalent adaptations for cooperation in humans. Next, I show how this Humean-Darwinian account of the moral sentiments can be used to make sense of traditional positions in meta-ethics; how it provides a rich deductive framework in which to locate and make sense of a wide variety of apparently contradictory positions in traditional normative ethics; and how it clearly demarcates the problems of applied ethics. I defend this version of ethical naturalism against the charge that it commits "the naturalistic fallacy". I conclude that evolutionary theory provides the best account yet of the origins and status of moral values, and that moral philosophy should be thought of as a branch of natural history.
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Franklin, Donald Edwin. "The morality of groups." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.396008.
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Towse, Marcus John. "Intentionality, morality and humanity." Thesis, University of York, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.258731.
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Walker, Mark Thomas. "The inescapability of morality." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1989. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.333339.
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Howard, Rachelle Erika. "Acknowledging Morality in Methodology." Diss., CLICK HERE for online access, 2008. http://contentdm.lib.byu.edu/ETD/image/etd2694.pdf.
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Holst, Cathrine. "Feminism, epistemology & morality." Bergen : University of Bergen, 2005. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/77564206.html.
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Gronholz, Shane. "Reasons, morality and God." Connect to online resource, 2008. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:1456698.
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Tiffany, Evan C. "The normativity of morality /." Diss., Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC IP addresses, 2000. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p9988314.
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Horgan, Jane Elizabeth. "Religion, morality, and crime." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2015. https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.709223.
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Kampakoglou, Kyriaki. "Neuromarketing : Validity and Morality." Thesis, Högskolan i Borås, Institutionen Textilhögskolan, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hb:diva-16794.
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The new way of doing marketing the so -called neuromarketing, which is a combination of neuroscience findings collected for and used in the marketing domain, has raised a lot of support but a lot of critic as well. The research question is focusing on whether the neuromarketing has been an approach of explaining and defining the human behavior, or whether it has transformed to an unethical manipulation of consumers in order to discover the much wanted “buy button” in consumers’ brains. Additionally issues of validity of neuromarketing researches is to be examined as well their purpose of conduction and the use of their findings.Program: Master in Fashion Management with specialisation in Fashion Marketing and Retailing
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Baltzly, Vaughn Bryan. "Contractarianism and Moderate Morality." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/33999.
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In his book The Limits of Morality, Shelly Kagan claims that contractarian approaches to ethics are incompatible with our common, everyday, "moderate" morality. In this thesis I defend a version of contractarianism that I believe leads to both deontological constraints and options; i.e., to a genuinely moderate morality. On my account, the parties to the agreement are conceived of as being motivated not only to promote self-interest, but also to formulate a code of ethics that gives proper respect to their moral status as persons. If such a picture of the bargainers' motivations is defensible, as I believe it is, then the 'moderate' may in fact have recourse to contractarianism in her defense of everyday morality, for - as my thesis argues - bargainers that are thus motivated will arrive at a moderate morality.Master of Arts
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Milliken, John Robert. "The Authority of Morality." Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2007. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1181165177.
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Jaggard, Dylan William Yeandle. "Nietzsche, morality and modernity." Thesis, Birkbeck (University of London), 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.419710.
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In recent years, Nietzsche's moral philosophy has been receiving more and more attention in the English speaking moral philosophical community. This study is a contribution to the ongoing debate in this area. Its central aim is to understand Nietzsche's critique of Christian morality in relation to his own particular understanding of modernity. For Nietzsche modernity is a condition in which the individual is committed to the antithetical moral value schemes of master and slave moralities, whilst failing to recognise that this is so. These value schemes are antithetical in regard to the stance they take towards existence. A master morality is one that affirms life, whereas a slave morality is one that denies life. The thesis begins by looking at Nietzsche's characterisation of the problem of morality. For Nietzsche, Christian morality has become a problem because, in the light of the death of God, it has lost its foundations. He argues that we should attempt to assess the value of these Christian values. His method of doing so is a psychological-historical one, which he calls genealogy. This thesis examines Nietzsche's genealogy of Christianity in detail and treats it as a serious historical account rather than as illustrative fiction as some scholars have done in the past. I argue that some of the problems that one encounters when treating genealogy as history stem from the fact that commentators have placed too much emphasis on Nietzsche's work, On the Genealogy of Morality, and that his other genealogical texts deserve equal attention. I then show how this genealogy supplies the modem human being with the necessary self-knowledge in order that it can recognise its commitment to antithetical value schemes. Finally, this thesis examines some of the issues that surround Nietzsche's attempt to aid the modem human being in overcoming its commitment to Christian values.
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Stroud, Ian Cecil. "Morality's Alpha: A Case Study Determining Whether Morality Must Be the Basis of Capitalism." Walsh University Honors Theses / OhioLINK, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=walshhonors1588161944422878.
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Neog, Bhaskarjit. "An Understanding of Common Morality." Thesis, Linköping University, Centre for Applied Ethics, 2007. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-9478.
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The idea of common morality is not a new idea. Philosophers have been engaged with it from the very early days. Many modern philosophers intend to perceive it when they compare or contrast it with the implications of ethical theories for genuine understanding of moral facts. They believe that without having any reference to what common people think, believe and practice, it is preposterous to construct a complete set of abstract norms and postulate them as relevant to practical life. In this work, proceeding with a motive of understanding the characteristic strength of common morality and to see how meaningfully we can designate the relevance of common moral beliefs in our applied ethical discussion, I am basically exploring two different accounts common morality view. The first one is the universalistic account which emerges from the works or Bernard Gert and Tom Beauchamp (including their colleagues), and the other one, I believe, sets its journey from the wombs of the critics of the first one. In this work, in order to properly designate the relevance of common morality, I am intending to develop the second account.
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Mellow, David Rodger. "Self-defense, agency, and morality." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape15/PQDD_0003/MQ34900.pdf.
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Nine, Birk Cara. "The Morality of State Borders." Tucson, Ariz. : University of Arizona, 2006. http://etd.library.arizona.edu/etd/GetFileServlet?file=file:///data1/pdf/etd/azu%5Fetd%5F1371%5F1%5Fm.pdf&type=application/pdf.
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Nine, Birk Cara. "The Morality of State Borders." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194195.
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Traditional theories of domestic distributive justice take two claims for granted. (1) State territorial borders place legitimate limits on the scope of obligations of distributive justice, i.e., there is an obligation to distribute goods within our territory but not beyond our territory. (2) States have a need for and a legitimate claim to exclusive territorial jurisdiction. Given increasing globalization and the recent prominence of international theories of distributive justice, it is now obvious that these two claims cannot be taken for granted. Theories of distributive justice must explain how and why state borders affect distributive obligations.In this dissertation I argue that state borders serve fundamental values in a liberal theory of justice. As such, state borders are morally relevant to a theory of justice. I argue for a Lockean theory of territory; state territory is justified because it serves four fundamental Lockean values of need, efficiency, the labor theory of desert, and self-determination. State borders mark the boundaries of a state's autonomous territory. State territory, and the borders that mark the boundaries of that territory, are valuable in a liberal theory of justice. This conclusion has implications for the answer to the question: what is owed to foreigners? The fundamental values served by the state's right to territory also support the state's right to control the natural resources within its territory and the state's right to control benefits that flow from the resources within the territory. This means that the state has a right to distribute the benefits from the resources within its territory and (to some degree) to exclude foreigners from these benefits.
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Gay, R. "Morality : Emotion, perception and belief." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1985. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.371649.
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全倩怡 and Sin-yee Cindy Chuen. "The libertines and anti-morality." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2002. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B42576325.
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Moehler, Michael. "A theory of minimal morality." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.502421.
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The idea of the theory of minimal morality is simple. The two-level contractarian theory aims to justify a system of morality that can secure mutually beneficial and globally stable cooperation between individuals living in a pluralistic world. The theory entails three components: local rules of cooperation, a global rule of conflict resolution, and the principle of subsidiarity. The principle of subsidiarity, applied to the theory of minimal morality, dictates the priority of the rules of cooperation and has no further function. The rules of cooperation define the local moralities of different groups of cooperation and are exogenously given. That is, as long as the members of different groups agree with their local rules of cooperation, and the rules do not negatively affect other individuals' interests within or outside the group, the group members can establish any rules that advance their interests. The individuals' agreement with these lower-level rules of cooperation represents the first contract that they enter into, assuming that each individual is at least a member of one such group of cooperation. In order to secure stability of cooperation globally, however, there needs to be, in situations of dispute that cannot be settled by the local moralities, a further rule that is agreed upon by all individuals independently of which group they belong to, to resolve the remaining conflicts. To determine this rule of conflict resolution, the individuals will be hypothetically placed within a rational choice framework, in which they decide un-veiled about a possible mediation rule. I will argue that as a result of this procedure, each individual endowed with a minimal form of reasoning, the rationality of homo prudens, will agree with the weak principle of universalisation as the unique rule of conflict resolution. The individuals' agreement with this higher-level rule of mediation represents the second contract that they enter into. Once the rule of conflict resolution is derived, the regulating institutions of the local groups of cooperation and a specifically established supra-group institution will apply and enforce the rule in order to settle any otherwise un-resolvable intra-and inter-group conflicts. A rational individual will follow the solutions specified, because she can expect that such rule-compliant behaviour is likely to be beneficial for her, or so I will argue.
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Peterson, Michael A. "Homosexuality, morality, and military policy." Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/8477.
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In December 1993, the Department of Defense issued directives that revised the military's exclusionary policy toward homosexuals. These directives marked the culmination of an intense period of public debate that placed little emphasis on the moral dimension of homosexuality. The objective of this thesis is to determine if personal religious beliefs of military members influence their responses to policies that they perceive to involve morality, specifically with regard to the 1993 proposal to integrate homosexuals into the military. The research approach involves two phases: a review of the religious heritage of the United States, the First Amendment to the Constitution, and the history of military policies toward homosexuals; and an analysis of the religious demographics of the active-duty military, the doctrines on homosexuality of the largest denominations represented in the military, and the expressed moral beliefs of active-duty members regarding homosexuality. The results indicate that the United States has a strong Christian heritage, and that the First Amendment to the Constitution was not written to exclude Christian moral influence from the public-decision making process. Demographic data shows that a majority of military personnel classify themselves as Christian. Also, various studies suggest that a majority of military personnel oppose homosexual integration into the military. The author concludes that opposition to homosexual integration from military personnel is likely influenced by Christian teaching. It is recommended that future research explore the implications of opposition based on religious belief
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Hotte, Alan M. (Alan Mark) Carleton University Dissertation Psychology. "Morality and value-attitude correspondence." Ottawa, 1992.
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Chuen, Sin-yee Cindy. "The libertines and anti-morality." Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 2002. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B42576325.
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Harrosh, Shlomit. "Evildoing : an attack on morality." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2010. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:c2ef133f-800f-460b-bf8d-8396b7f48070.
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This thesis presents a comprehensive theory of evildoing as an attack on morality, grounded in objective morality. It introduces evildoing as a distinct category of immorality, arguing that it is the relationship of evil acts to the core of morality that distinguishes them from ordinary wrongdoing. Two projects are undertaken: to provide an account of morality that can ground a theory of evildoing that is both objective and capable of systematically accommodating the diverse phenomena and definitions of evil acts, and to articulate and defend the attack on morality theory of evildoing. The challenge of the first project is met by a minimalist account of morality, structured by what I call the fundamentals of morality. The thesis defends a particular substantive account of these fundamentals, underpinned by the idea of conatus as the end of morality. Ultimately, it is conatus as the striving to persist in existence and prosper inherent in human beings that justifies the objectivity of the fundamentals of morality and with it the objectivity of the theory of evildoing, for it is these fundamentals that are attacked when we speak of an ‘attack on morality.’ Specifying and defending the conditions necessary for such an attack is the task of the second part of the thesis. An act constitutes evildoing, or an attack on morality, when it is wrong, results in serious harm to others, originates in an intention based on the correct belief that the act will cause or risk such harm, and where the perpetrator’s mental states and/or the act’s consequences are antagonistic to the realization of morality via one or more of its fundamentals.
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Heydari, Fard Sahar. "The Morality of Social Movements." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2021. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1623240271431722.
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Serfontein, Bernice. "Morality : an evolutionary biological perspective." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/61095.
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This study explores how human beings became moral beings. Are we the only creatures that engage in this way of thinking, doing and discerning? The ultimate focus of this study is to present an integrated perspective on the origin of morality, taking its lead from evolutionary biology. It further stresses the notion that a firmer grip on the origin of morality can provide us with a clearer understanding of what it means to be human. In the discussion of important ethical issues, it is of utmost importance to have a clear understanding of embodied existence. The study commences by gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the origin of morality, which is achieved by exploring the modern discourse on the origin thereof. It consists of an exposition of three perspectives on the origin of morality – theological, philosophical and evolutionary biological – in which the contribution of influential representatives of each perspective are in focus. The study continues with a more in-depth study of the evolutionary biological perspective on the origin of morality. This is accomplished through an in-depth study of primatologist Frans de Waal’s perspective on the origin of morality. De Waal posits that morality is built into our species. Rather than coming to us top-down from God, or any other external source, morality for De Waal arises bottom-up from our emotions and our day-to-day social interactions, which themselves evolved from foundations in animal societies. De Waal’s opinion on the origin of morality is assessed by means of a discussion of contemporary responses on his particular view. This research is undertaken from the basic conviction that an exclusive theological perspective on the origin of morality does not represent a comprehensive genesis of morality. Theology engaging with the evolutionary biology will, therefore, result in a more comprehensive understanding of the origin of morality.Dissertation (MTh)--University of Pretoria, 2016.
Dogmatics and Christian Ethics
MTh
Unrestricted
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Mccormack, Jessica L. "Morality in the Meat Machine." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/23181.
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This thesis examines the excusing and exempting conditions in Strawsonian accounts of moral responsibility. More specifically, it notes some concerns for Strawsonian accounts with regards to exempting individuals on the basis of psychological abnormalities, namely that the excusing/exempting distinction is unclear, and more importantly that treating a person's brain as an entity distinct from the person suggests a dualistic picture of the self that is not consistent with neuroscientific accounts of the brain. If we redraw the distinction to be between external/internal features, and focus on brain processes as the responsible entities for any given action, we can avoid these worries and have a more empirically accurate account of responsibility.Master of Arts
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Minjarez, Jennifer Marie, and Jennifer Marie Minjarez. "On Morality and Self-Interest." Thesis, The University of Arizona, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/625104.
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One of the oldest questions in the philosophical tradition regards the relationship between morality and self-interest. As human beings, we have prudential ends and motivations to which we are committed. However, we are also subject to moral norms and expectations, which often conflict with our prudential ends. It seems we face a contradiction: why should we be moral if it is not in our self-interest? Countless thinkers have tried to answer this question. I refer to their general endeavor as the "Reconciliation Project," which is a term borrowed from Gregory Kavka. Broadly, the goal of the Reconciliation Project is to reconcile the seemingly paradoxical concepts of morality and self-interest. The purpose of this paper is to explore and synthesize three unique approaches to the Project, so as to better understand them, and the human faculties of morality, self-interest, and rationality. The paper focuses namely on Kavka, Gauthier, and Schmidtz's approaches to the Project.
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MacMahon, Paul. "Reliance in morality and law." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2013. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.669886.
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Chehtman, Alejandro Eduardo. "The morality of extraterritorial punishment." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2009. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2344/.
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This thesis provides a philosophical account of the morality of extraterritorial punishment. The introduction clarifies the methodology by putting forward an analytical account of moral rights and endorsing the interest-based theory of rights, and presents a normative appraisal of the moral significance of political boundaries. Chapter 1 presents an innovative interest-based justification for the right to punish. Chapter 2 examines the extraterritorial scope of this right to punish with regards to domestic offences. It argues that the justification here advocated is the best suited to account for the strong intuition that the right to punish should be primarily territorial in scope, and provides a critique of the principles for states' power to punish offences committed extraterritorially currently in force under international law. The next part of the thesis focuses on extraterritoriality in the context of international criminal law. Chapter 3 argues that the defining feature of the concept of an international crime is that it warrants conferring upon some extraterritorial body the power to punish their perpetrators regardless of the nationality of both offender and victim. Chapter 4 provides a fresh look at universal and international jurisdiction, i.e., at the theoretical explanation for the proposition that every state should have the right to punish international crimes and the scope of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Chapter 5 provides a theory of legitimate authority to punish offenders. It relies on an innovative application of the influential service conception of authority to this specific question and permits a philosophical examination of issues such as show trials, victor's justice, tu quoque, and trials in absentia or against defendants who have been abducted abroad. A conclusion summarizes the central findings of the thesis and suggests possible avenues for future research.
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O'Sullivan, Maureen. "Morality patently matters : the case for a universal suffrage for morally controversial biotechnological patents." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/31227.
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This thesis is a critique and proposed reform of the decision-making process under the European Patent Convention 1973, Article 53(a) as it relates to morality. It postulates that the manner in which the morality bar is currently managed is inappropriate as it relies on patent officials to make the initial decision as to whether the patent application is morally permissible or not. In a pluralistic world, morality is understood differently by a wide variety of people but this is not currently being acknowledged within the patent system. Whilst there is an option to bring opposition proceedings to challenge patent grants, this onus is considerable on the challenger and any debate is then played out by a very small sector of highly specialised experts, often with very differing views on morality. This thesis seeks to broaden the decision-making process to reflect society's pluralism. Officials, it will be argued, should instead of trying to decide what constitutes morality in a realm of such importance for humanity as a whole, administer a system which facilitates public participation and a vote. This will be based on existing models of widespread public deliberation and participation, albeit not ones that currently operate in (or near) the patent world. At present, criticisms in the legal literature tend to suggest more deliberation in the patent field and more participation is recommended in science literature but the logistics are unexplored and will be brought together in this work, making an original contribution to knowledge. In order to achieve its aim, the thesis employs a pluralistic methodology which includes doctrinal, socio-legal and interdisciplinary facets which will enable the construction of a model for reform of the patent system in the domain of morality. This will come from outside of traditional legal mechanisms such as legislative, judicial or patent office reform solutions, as a far-reaching paradigm is envisaged. The claim to originality lies in the extraction of principles from deliberative and participatory models of democracy and their application to the decision-making process in morally controversial biotechnological patents.
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Harvey, Charles D. "Finding morality in the diaspora ? : moral ambiguity and transformed morality in the books of Esther /." Berlin ; New York : W. De Gruyter, 2003. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb39051441k.
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Harvey, Charles D. "Finding morality in the diaspora? : moral ambiguity and transformed morality in the Books of Esther." Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/30254.
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This thesis explores issues of moral character found in the books of Esther. While the Hebrew Esther story has been the focus of much past and present readerly attention in light of such issues, the two primary Greek versions (LXX and Alpha-Text), treated as whole narratives, have not been so privileged. Part I is a single chapter which approximates and anticipates the present study as it suggests the two commonest approaches to perceived moral problems in the story of Esther: avoidance and transformation. It then proceeds to outline the contexts in which the content of the thesis is located: a delimitation and brief description of the Esther texts to be studied (MT, LXX, AT); the verification scheme followed in the study of each version; a explanation of procedure; an explanation of our approach to the Esther texts, which seeks to investigate each narrative in its entirety and in its own context; an explanation of the selection of relevant portions of text in our study; the task of describing moral character; an anticipation of the assessment of moral character in the books of Esther. Part II contains the work of elucidation and evaluation, and begins in chapter two with an exploration of moral character in the MT Esther story. We proceed exegetically through selected portions of the Hebrew narrative as we investigate issues of mortality involving major characters in the story - Vashti, Esther, Mordecai, Haman, the Jews, and the king (אחשוךוש). As in the following two chapters, the relevance and profit of each section surfaces via our exegetical labours. Chapter three continues in the exegetical mode as we approach issues of moral character in the Greek text found in the Septuagint (LXX). Selected narrative portions involving major characters in the LXX Esther story - Astin, Esther, Mardochaios, Aman, the Jews, and the king (Αρταξέρξης) - provide the specific contexts for our moral probing.
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Bianchini, Victor. "James Mill on morality and decision : a matter of calculation." Thesis, Paris 1, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA010098.
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James Mill sur la moralité et la décision : une question de calculThrough the part it played in the formation of William Stanley Jevons’s mathematical theory of economics (Nathalie Sigot 2002), Jeremy Bentham’s felicific calculus seems to have influenced recent views on individual behavior and decisional issues (William Stark 1946; Collison R. D. Black 1988). Obviously, this influence was complex, such that Bentham’s teaching remained far from being a mere pre-figuration of the standard approach (see, forinstance, Andre Lapidus & Sigot 2000). This conjunction between an influence on the standard approach and an analysis which was irreducible to it, recalls that Bentham’s own period was also a turning point: that of a passage from the moral debates of the eighteenth century, to the first formulation of the manner in which decision-making became understood from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards. It is from this point of view that James Mill was to play a crucial part, and not only as a well-known friend of Bentham and as official spokesman for classical Utilitarianism. James Mill had something to say about calculation, which had specific relevance for him through the importance he gave to associationism and, more generally, to psychological matters
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Lok, Fong Io. "Aesthetic morality in Oscar Wilde's works." Thesis, University of Macau, 2007. http://umaclib3.umac.mo/record=b1781061.
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