Academic literature on the topic 'A.(Herbert Lionel Adolphus)'
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Journal articles on the topic "A.(Herbert Lionel Adolphus)"
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Tardeli, Rodrigo Martiniano. "DIREITO E MORAL EM HERBERT HART/RIGHT AND MORAL IN HERBERT HART." Revista Diorito 1, no. 1 (August 1, 2017): 21. http://dx.doi.org/10.26702/rd.v1i1.7.
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RESUMOEste artigo tem o escopo de apresentar o pensamento do jusfilósofo inglês Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart (1907-1992), no que tange à conceituação do Direito e sua relação com a Moral. Palavras-chave: Direito. Moral. Pensamento Jusfilosófico. ABSTRACTThis article has the scope to present the thinking of the English philosopher Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart (1907-1992), regarding the conceptualization of Law and its relation to Morals. Keywords: Law. Moral. Jusfilosófico Thought.
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KORZHENYAK, ANASTASIA, and ANTON MIKHAILOV. "THE LEGAL DOCTRINE OF JOHN WILLIAM SALMOND AS THE EVOLUTION OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL POSITIVIST TRADITION." Sociopolitical Sciences 11, no. 5 (October 28, 2021): 73–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.33693/2223-0092-2021-11-5-73-78.
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The purpose of the research. This article examines the key ideas underlying the legal teachings of the New Zealand lawyer, civil servant and judge John William Salmond (1862-1924), who, as the authors of this study demonstrate, was one of the first critics of the “command theory of law” of the founder of the school of analytical jurisprudence John Austin (1790-1859). By analyzing and interpreting Salmond’s legal doctrine the authors refute the view, entrenched in Russian jurisprudence, that the central representative of the 20th century neo-positivism Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart (1907-1992) is considered a pioneer in this field who initiated the criticism of Austin’s legal understanding. The authors advocate the position that Hart’s critique of the command conception and understanding of law in his teachings is largely based on Salmond’s ideas. As a result of this study the authors conclude that there are certain similarities between J.W. Salmond’s idea of “ultimate legal principles” and H.L.A. Hart’s legal doctrine on the “rule of recognition”.
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Derussi, Fabiano. "O Conceito De Sistema Jurídico: Um Olhar Sobre a CISG." Teorias do Direito e Realismo Jurídico 1, no. 1 (December 7, 2015): 242. http://dx.doi.org/10.26668/indexlawjournals/2525-9601/2015.v1i1.312.
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O presente artigo elaborou uma descrição de duas grandes teorias que sustentam a sistematização do direito e como elas podem ser aplicadas no estudo do sistema jurídico brasileiro. Uma delas composta por conceitos de normas primárias e secundárias, outra, com sua divisão entre sistema e subsistema. As teorias adotadas foram aquelas desenvolvidas por Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart e Niklas Luhmman. Também, para não deixar a discussão na mais pura abstração, fez-se uma comparação sobre os pontos centrais das duas teorias em relação a incorporação da CISG no direito brasileiro, especialmente foi demonstrado de que tipo de normas ela é composta e como se relaciona com o sistema brasileiro enquanto sendo um subsistema, à semelhança daquilo que fora teorizado por Niklas Luman. Após o desenvolvimento, ficou evidenciado que há elementos convincentes que as teorias trabalhadas são ainda atuais, dado que tem especial relevância aos cientistas que trabalham com a teoria do direito, e, porque não, aos juristas que manuseiam a CISG.
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Simioni, Rafael Lazzarotto, and Rodrigo Barbosa. "Regras de reconhecimento e a legitimidade da decisão jurídica em Hart." Revista Debates 10, no. 3 (December 22, 2016): 153. http://dx.doi.org/10.22456/1982-5269.69360.
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A proposta do trabalho reside em explorar o conceito da legitimidade no marco teórico de Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart. A questão da legitimidade está na base do Estado Democrático de Direito e do convívio social, sendo ao mesmo tempo questão complexa e de suma importância, abordada em diversas hipóteses e teorias, mas sem nunca uma resposta definitiva. Observa-se inicialmente a própria necessidade de fundamentação da legitimidade e sua relação com o conceito de justiça. Prossegue-se analisando a visão de Hart sobre regras primárias e secundárias, e o papel das regras de reconhecimento como fator de legitimidade do ordenamento jurídico. Por último, estuda-se a questão da derrotabilidade das regras jurídicas, fenômeno em que regras retiram a efetividade de outras, como é o caso do instituto da legítima defesa. Conclui-se que, apesar de não ser possível, ao menos no momento, encontrar uma resposta definitiva para a pergunta da legitimidade, Hart nos oferece uma visão sofisticada, baseada em fatos sociais, sem necessidade de construções hipotéticas, tornando possível identificar, através de regras de reconhecimento, a legitimidade embutida no sistema.
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Koval, Sofya V. "The History and Foundations of Criticism of H.L.A. Hart’s Legal Positivism in R. Dworkin’s Philosophy of Law." Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences 62, no. 7 (October 10, 2019): 124–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.30727/0235-1188-2019-62-7-124-142.
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The paper discusses the Anglo-American philosophy of law of the 20th century, more specifically the philosophy of law of Ronald Myles Dworkin and his criticism of the legal positivism of Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart. The author presents the history of the criticism of legal positivism in Ronald Dworkin’s philosophy of law and distinguishes historical stages. The subject of the study is the critique of legal positivism but not the Hart-Dworkin debate itself, well known in Western philosophy of law. The reason is that the discussion was conducted between Dworkin and Hart’s supporters but not between Dworkin and Hart by himself. The latter responded to the criticism only after twenty seven years. The article explains why Dworkin chose for his criticism Herbert Hart’s version of legal positivism. This is due to the fact that Dworkin highly appreciated Hart’s positivist theory of law and characterized it as the “most clear.” The article presents the methodological foundations of criticism of Hart’s legal positivism in Dworkin’s philosophy of law. It reveals a methodological divergence between the two legal theories, which directly affects the understanding of the concept of law and its content. Therefore, we can assume that the legal theories of Hart and Dworkin are two competing models of law: Dworkin’s model considers law as a set of rules and principles and Hart’s model acknowledges only rules and court decisions as a source of law. The article also presents the key principles of positivism criticized by Dworkin. These principles, firstly, interpret law as a set of legal rules determined through a special legal criterion, secondly, provide the judge with an opportunity to make a decision “at his own discretion” in a situation not regulated by law, and, thirdly, recognize only legal rights and obligations enshrined in legal regulations. It is important to note that in this article the author describes criticism as an independent phenomenon of legal philosophy with a particular focus on the history and foundations of this phenomenon.
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Strikaitė-Latušinskaja, Goda. "Can We Make All Legal Norms into Legal Syllogisms and Why is That Important in Times of Artificial Intelligence?" Access to Justice in Eastern Europe 5, no. 1 (December 15, 2021): 8–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.33327/ajee-18-5.1-a000095.
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Background: The term ‘hard cases’ trace back to Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart who was one of the first legal philosophers who directly used it in his works and Ronald Myles Dworkin to whom the development and establishment of this concept in legal language is linked. Even though these two legal philosophers in one of the most famous - The Hart–Dworkin – legal debate couldn’t agree on certain things, they both agreed that when dealing with hard cases, there is a need to act creatively in order to resolve such a case properly. The division of cases into easy ones and hard ones gradually lost its popularity, even in legal theory, but perhaps it can be resurrected and used these challenging times to help meet the challenges prompted by technology? Methods: This paper analyses the dichotomy of hard and easy cases as well as circumstances relating to the courts’ decision-making processes in such cases. The essay examines whether the solutions proposed by legal positivism (such as applying syllogisms and precedents) are sufficient to deal with easy cases. The paper also examines what factors analysed by legal realists have an impact on judges while making decisions in hard cases (for example, psychological factors, such as hindsight bias, intuition, hunches, the anchor effect, laziness, unwillingness to take responsibility, or the gambler’s fallacy, as well as social factors, like upbringing, life experience, social relations, gender, age, education, etc.). Given that the article is theoretical in nature, logical, systemic, teleological methods dominate. Both descriptive method and scientific research method were used as well. Results and Conclusions: The author concludes that easy cases should eventually be delegated to artificial intelligence to resolve, whereas hard cases will remain in the competence of human judges, at least until technological development reaches a certain level.
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Diaz Romero, Ubaldina. "Una aproximación a las fuentes: La regla de reconocimiento en la teoría de Herbert L. A. Hart." Estudios de Filosofía, November 9, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.348545.
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El artículo se ubica en el escenario iusfilosófico de mitad del siglo XX. Tiene como objetivo rastrear fuentes de la Regla de Reconocimiento de Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart tomando como partida la tesis que hace de dicha regla una respuesta ponderada al debate entre el formalismo kelseniano y la teoría utilitarista de Bentham y Austin en primera instancia. Esto se explora en las fuentes reconocidas y no reconocidas por el propio autor, por cuanto el artículo sostiene la presencia decisiva en lo metodológico de ascendientes directos en dicho trabajo como Hobbes, Hume, Malinowski, entre otros, los que otorgan a dicha regla de reconocimiento no un mero afán conciliador de las tradiciones anteriores, sino que definen su naturaleza propia y la necesidad de abordarla desde ámbitos interdisciplinarios, porque es desde la exploración del habla en contexto como ella puede rendir frutos para el análisis de los principios subyacentes en la práctica judicial.
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Rio, Laura Souza Pires do. "A religião como fundamento ético para os direitos humanos segundo o pensamento de John Finnis." HORIZONTE - Revista de Estudos de Teologia e Ciências da Religião, December 31, 2019, 1651. http://dx.doi.org/10.5752/p.2175-5841.2019v17n54p1651.
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A presente pesquisa propõe apresentar, pela primeira vez na área de conhecimento das Ciências da Religião, a análise do pensamento jusnaturalista de John Finnis acerca do aspecto humano da religião. Nas obras de sua autoria, Finnis apresenta uma reconstrução inovadora da teoria do direito natural de Aristóteles e Tomás de Aquino. Tal inovação foi publicada em 1980, sob a orientação de Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, que foi seu mentor quando na conclusão de seu doutorado, sendo que este último lhe propôs o título da obra Natural Law and Natural Rights - Lei Natural e Direitos Naturais (LNDN) (2011a), o qual foi acolhido. A primeira publicação desta obra no Brasil ocorreu somente em 2007, pela editora Unisinos. Finnis enfatiza em suas obras a possibilidade de, por meio da razão prática, ser possível a identificação de sete bens humanos que ele mesmo os caracteriza como fundamentais básicos, dentre eles a Religião. Tais bens, segundo a sua compreensão acerca da teoria da lei natural de Aristóteles e Tomás de Aquino, consistem em valores inerentes ao ser humano, e, por assim o serem, são essenciais para o florescimento humano de cada indivíduo. Dessa forma, essa dissertação propõe-se a analisar como a teoria do direito natural de John Finnis colabora para pensar o lugar da religião no espaço público, no que condiz a sua ressignificação como fundamento ético para a formação dos direitos humanos. A análise será realizada mediante a leitura das obras do autor acerca deste tema, principalmente Natural Law & Natural Rights e Religion & Public Reasons. Como resultado geral, indica-se a necessidade de se fundamentar eticamente os direitos humanos sob a base dos bens humanos fundamentais básicos da teoria do direito natural de John Finnis. Sendo assim, fundamentando-se os Direitos Humanos na Religião, considerando-a de tal maneira, como bem fundamental básico, será possível pensar a importância do seu lugar na esfera pública. Como bem humano fundamental básico, a religião passa a ser entendida, segundo o autor determina, como essencial bem para o florescimento humano, assim como, para o bem comum da sociedade como um todo.
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Balon, Jan, and John Holmwood. "Race, nation and empire; the forgotten sociology of Herbert Adolphus Miller." Journal of Classical Sociology, October 3, 2022, 1468795X2211263. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1468795x221126330.
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Herbert Adolphus Miller (1875–1951) is a neglected figure within North American sociology, yet he made a distinctive contribution to the sociology and politics of race relations. He was one of the first sociological critics of eugenics and developed a distinctive approach to race relations and the position of subject minorities derived from a critical analysis of European empires. His approach was complementary to that of Du Bois with whom he had a close relationship. In this article, we trace Miller’s critique of eugenics and the idea of ‘Americanisation’ as a policy of immigrant assimilation, showing the distinctiveness of his approach within North American sociology, including the milieu of Chicago sociology with which he was associated. We also examine the connection between his sociology of race and Park’s position on race relations as being a process of gradual assimilation. We conclude with discussion of the Chicago school influence over Gunnar Myrdal’s The American Dilemma and the alternative approach to race relations that both Du Bois and Miller had already outlined in the 1920s.
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Balon, Jan, and John Holmwood. "Immigration, Domination, and ‘Proportional Patriotism’: Recovering the Sociology of Herbert Adolphus Miller." American Sociologist, March 19, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12108-022-09530-7.
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AbstractThis article addresses the sociological approach and political engagements of the early twentieth century sociologist, Herbert Adolphus Miller (1875–1951). He is now largely forgotten, but he had deep connections within the Chicago milieu of pragmatist sociology and social reform activities through both the Settlement movement and the Survey movement. In 1914 he wrote a volume in the Cleveland Survey on Immigrant children in the school system and in 1918 was appointed to head the division on Immigrant Contributions in the Carnegie Corporation’s project on ‘Methods of Americanization’, in which Robert E. Park was head of the division on Immigrant Press and Theater (Park in The Immigrant Press, 1922). If Miller’s name is recognized at all it is as author with Park of Old World Traits Transplanted (1921), a work subsequently attributed to W. I. Thomas. We examine the nature of Miller’s research on immigrant populations from subject nationalities in Europe, undertaken in Cleveland and as part of the Carnegie project. He left the latter project mid-way through to become part of a small group that drafted the Czechoslovakian Declaration of Independence in November 1918. We show how Miller developed a distinctive approach to ‘Americanization’ through his idea of ‘proportional patriotism’ that challenged the dominant discourse of assimilation that became entrenched in the years after the end of the first world war and which was largely accepted by Park and by Thomas. He was dismissed in 1932 from Ohio State University because of his views on race mixing and his criticisms of the British and Japanese empires.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "A.(Herbert Lionel Adolphus)"
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López, Pérez Nicolás. "H. L. A. Hart y las sirenas cientificistas. Una genealogía de la tradición analítica de la filosofía del derecho de los siglos XX y XXI." Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2016. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/136654.
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Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales)Esta tesis presenta una reflexión metateórica de la historia de la filosofía del derecho de los siglos XX y XXI al interior de la tradición analítica. Para dicho propósito se divide en tres ejes argumentativos. El primero presenta la elucidación de la noción de tradición analítica en filosofía, a partir de la distinción entre “tradiciones y concepciones filosóficas” propuesta por M. E. Orellana Benado, con el fin de dar cuenta de sus orígenes, rasgos distintivos y discusiones más relevantes. El segundo ofrece una comprensión iusfilosófica de la tradición analítica en el siglo XX. Sobre la base de: la Teoría Pura del Derecho (1934) de Hans Kelsen y El Concepto de Derecho (1961) de H. L. A. Hart. Analizando las dos aproximaciones metodológicas de este último (al derecho como sociología descriptiva y como teoría jurídica analítica) y sus puntos centrales. Finalmente, revisa las consecuencias que trajo la publicación de la segunda edición de El Concepto de Derecho (1994) con el Postscript, añadido por sus editores, texto en el que Hart responde a sus críticos. El tercer eje argumentativo muestra en dos partes el desarrollo de la filosofía jurídica analítica de los tres primeros lustros del siglo XXI. Una de ellas considera la importancia y actualidad de los proyectos de Kelsen y Hart, mientras que la otra indagará en el surgimiento de nuevas concepciones iusfilosóficas como el naturalismo jurídico, el pragmatismo jurídico, el Law & Economics y los estudios críticos del derecho
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Delatorre, Rogério. "A interpretação/aplicação judicial do direito e a discricionariedade judicial: um diálogo com pensamento de Ronald Dworkin e Herbert Hart." Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10923/2438.
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Previous issue date: 2008This work addresses some of the most important issues about judicial discretionary powers. Positivist perspectives are reviewed and it is suggested methods to surpass its doctrine, whose teachings have not been adequate enough to explain a plausible interpretation of Law. It is defended that the act of enforcing the law is unique and demands interpretation, comprehension and application of Law. Therefore, it is argued in this research that hermeneutical philosophy approach (GADAMER) is essential because the linguistic turning point has ceased traditional separation of subject and object, and it is understood that well-founded interpretation shall be present when both elements are put together. These issues have been framed from the debates between the law philosophers Herbert Hart and Ronald Dworkin. According to Herbert Hart, a soft positivist, it is allowed, in hard cases (based on problems of uncertainty about rights), to enforce rules in different manners, and the judge may use his creative power when facing the open texture of the rules. On the other hand, Ronald Dworkin denies discretionary powers to judges because they must give “the right answer” in all cases grounded on pre-existing moral principals. It is sustained in this research that the “right answer approach” (DWORKIN) is not compatible with democratic values in a constitutionally pluralistic community, and in every case the adjudicator must reach the “best answer” (JUAREZ FREITAS) among all possibilities.
Nesta dissertação questionamos alguns dos aspectos mais importantes da teoria da discricionariedade judicial. Criticamos e propomos a superação das posturas positivistas, as quais não se mostram adequadas para bem explicar o fenômeno da interpretação do direito. A idéia central é a defesa de que o ato aplicativo do direito é único e implica a interpretação, a compreensão e a aplicação do direito. Propomos, assim, que a abordagem da hermenêutica filosófica (GADAMER) é fundamental, pois a viragem lingüística rompeu com a tradicional separação entre o sujeito e o objeto, e se passou a entender que a boa interpretação somente ocorre na devida união entre ambos. A partir das discussões travadas pelos jusfilósofos Herbert Hart e Ronald Dworkin traçamos os contornos desta questão. Para Hart, um positivista brando, frente aos casos difíceis (baseados nos problemas da incerteza do direito), permite-se que as regras sejam aplicadas de diversas maneiras, e frente à textura aberta das regras o juiz irá dispor de seu poder de criação do direito. Por outro lado, Ronald Dworkin nega que o juiz tenha poder discricionário, pois em todo e qualquer caso tem a responsabilidade de encontrar a “resposta correta”, baseado nos princípios morais pré-existentes à decisão judicial. Defende-se, ao final, que a “única resposta correta” (DWORKIN) não corresponde aos ideais democráticos de uma sociedade constitucionalmente pluralista, e em todo caso o juiz deve procurar a “melhor resposta” (JUAREZ FREITAS) entre as possibilidades que estão à sua disposição.
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Bilhalva, Gabriel Vieira. "A construção do método em O conceito de direito." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/131755.
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Com publicação de O Conceito de Direito, de Herbert Hart, introduziuse na teoria do direito toda uma gama de novos problemas que, a partir da segunda metade do século XX, tornaram-se o centro dos debates da filosofia jurídica, marcadamente para o positivismo jurídico. A questão do método aparece como particularmente especial nesse conjunto de problemas. As teses centrais de O Conceito de Direito dependem diretamente de teses correlatas sobre a possibilidade de uma teoria descritiva do direito que leve em consideração a perspectiva interna dos participantes de um sistema jurídico. A forma como Hart estrutura essa teoria apresenta certa peculiaridade. Diferentemente dos autores da tradição positivista, Hart não se vale de uma concepção de ciência ou métodos científicos para o desenvolvimento da teoria. Não se trata de importar métodos para obter avanços. Pelo contrário, Hart vai defender a ideia de que para se obter uma melhor compreensão teórica do direito precisamos, ao desenvolver a teoria, atender às características do objeto. Significa dizer que, para sabermos o tipo de método que vamos utilizar na teoria do direito, precisamos saber antes exatamente quais características o objeto tem, para então moldarmos um método adequado a estas características.With the publication of Herbert Hart’s “The Concept of Law”, a whole new range of problems were introduced in legal theory and they became the core of debates in legal philosophy from the second half of the 20th century, especially for legal positivism. The issue of method is relevant within this set of problems. The central theses of “The concept of Law” rely directly on corresponding theses about the possibility of a descriptive legal theory that takes into account the internal perspective of the participants of a legal system. The way Hart structures this theory is unique because, differently from other authors within a positivist tradition, he does not use a concept of science or scientific methods in order to develop the theory. The question is not about importing methods so as to obtain advances. In contrast, Hart advocates that, to obtain a better theoretical comprehension of the law, we need to meet the specifications of the object while developing the theory. In other words, in order to know which type of method will be used in law theory, it is necessary to know in advance the exact features of the object, so as to format a method that is adequate for those characteristics.
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Campos, Fernando Rosa. "Filosofia da linguagem do século XX no conceito de direito de Herbert Hart." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/185972.
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A presente dissertação de mestrado tenta estabelecer como e em qual medida o Conceito de Direito de Herbert Hart é influenciado por teorias da linguagem do século XX. Com este objetivo, são primeiro analisadas as passagens do livro e as considerações do autor que indicam uma influência de teses próprias da filosofia da linguagem em sua obra. Após, são expostas algumas intepretações do tema, tanto no sentido de concordar que existe esta relação entre as teses de Hart e a filosofia da linguagem do século 20, quanto no sentido de negar este vínculo. Especial atenção é atribuída a interpretação de Ronald Dworkin do tema, tendo em vista a sua relevância histórica e o fato do autor reconhecer a vinculação referida e a utilizá-la como base para críticas das teses do Conceito de direito. Estabelecidas estas interpretações divergentes, são então expostas as principais ideias e propostas dos filósofos da linguagem do ambiente acadêmico de Oxford, tendo em vista a relação e proximidade de Hart a estes autores. Expostas estas teses, diferentes pontos da carreira bibliográfica de Hart são analisados, com o objetivo de traçar a relação dos escritos do autor com as teorias recém vistas e de tentar estabelecer a evolução da linha argumentativa que culminou no Conceito de Direito. Uma vez que os argumentos dessa obra forem analisados e um entendimento específico dessas teses for defendido, as críticas de Dworkin e de outros autores são revistas. Este exercício, por fim, mostra como o entendimento defendido neste trabalho serve também como defesa contra algumas caracterizações da obra de Hart que considero equivocadas.The main goal of this paper is to establish to what extent the work “The Concept of Law” was influenced by philosophical theories of language from the 20th century. First are considered some passages of this work, together with some pronouncements of its author Herbert Hart that appear to confirm that his theses were so influenced. Then are shown some interpretations that recognize the influence between the author and theses from the philosophy of language, together with other interpretations that deny this relationship. Special attention is given to the perception of Ronald Dworkin of the subject given its historical relevance and the fact that it recognize a relationship between these theses and uses it as basis for criticism of the arguments expressed in The Concept of Law. Once these distinctive interpretations are stablished, the main ideas and goals of the Oxford language philosophers, given their relationship and proximity to Hart, are exposed. Once these theses are dealt with, varied moments of the bibliography of Herbert Hart are considered in order to show the connection between his works and the language theses here exposed. After these point are considered and a distinct understanding of the subject is developed the criticism of Dworkin and other authors are retaken. This last point aims to show how the understanding developed in this paper also develops a defense of Hart’s theory from some mischaracterizations of his work.
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Delatorre, Rog?rio. "A interpreta??o/aplica??o judicial do direito e a discricionariedade judicial : um di?logo com pensamento de Ronald Dworkin e Herbert Hart." Pontif?cia Universidade Cat?lica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2009. http://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/handle/tede/4046.
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Previous issue date: 2009-01-12Nesta disserta??o questionamos alguns dos aspectos mais importantes da teoria da discricionariedade judicial. Criticamos e propomos a supera??o das posturas positivistas, as quais n?o se mostram adequadas para bem explicar o fen?meno da interpreta??o do direito. A id?ia central ? a defesa de que o ato aplicativo do direito ? ?nico e implica a interpreta??o, a compreens?o e a aplica??o do direito. Propomos, assim, que a abordagem da hermen?utica filos?fica (GADAMER) ? fundamental, pois a viragem ling??stica rompeu com a tradicional separa??o entre o sujeito e o objeto, e se passou a entender que a boa interpreta??o somente ocorre na devida uni?o entre ambos. A partir das discuss?es travadas pelos jusfil?sofos Herbert Hart e Ronald Dworkin tra?amos os contornos desta quest?o. Para Hart, um positivista brando, frente aos casos dif?ceis (baseados nos problemas da incerteza do direito), permite-se que as regras sejam aplicadas de diversas maneiras, e frente ? textura aberta das regras o juiz ir? dispor de seu poder de cria??o do direito. Por outro lado, Ronald Dworkin nega que o juiz tenha poder discricion?rio, pois em todo e qualquer caso tem a responsabilidade de encontrar a resposta correta, baseado nos princ?pios morais pr?-existentes ? decis?o judicial. Defende-se, ao final, que a ?nica resposta correta (DWORKIN) n?o corresponde aos ideais democr?ticos de uma sociedade constitucionalmente pluralista, e em todo caso o juiz deve procurar a melhor resposta (JUAREZ FREITAS) entre as possibilidades que est?o ? sua disposi??o.
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Lacroix, Sébastien. "Étude philosophique du renversement juridique canadien concernant l'aide médicale à mourir, à la lumière du débat Hart-Dworkin." Master's thesis, Université Laval, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11794/27253.
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Le 6 février 2015, la Cour suprême du Canada a rendu un jugement historique, unanime et anonyme. Dans l'arrêt Carter c. Canada (Procureur général), la Cour reconnaît que l'interdiction mur à mur de l'aide médicale à mourir porte atteinte aux droits constitutionnels de certaines personnes. En effet, les adultes capables devraient pouvoir demander l'aide d'un médecin pour mettre fin à leur vie s'ils respectent deux critères : consentir clairement et de façon éclairée à quitter ce monde et être affecté de problèmes de santé graves et irrémédiables leur causant des souffrances persistantes et intolérables. Or, cette décision constitue un renversement juridique, car un jugement inverse avait été rendu en 1993. En effet, vingt-deux ans auparavant, la Cour suprême avait jugé à cinq contre quatre que l'interdiction du suicide assisté était constitutionnelle. Dans l'arrêt Rodriguez c. Colombie-Britannique, la majorité avait statué que la protection du caractère sacré de la vie dans toute circonstance, tant pour les personnes vulnérables que pour les adultes capables, était une raison suffisante pour ne pas accorder de dérogation aux articles du Code criminel qui concernent le suicide assisté. Les juges majoritaires craignent alors que toute ouverture à l’aide au suicide entraine un élargissement progressif des critères d’admissibilité, ce que plusieurs appellent l’argument du « doigt dans l’engrenage ». Dans le cadre de ce mémoire, le renversement juridique Rodriguez-Carter sera analysé à la lumière du débat entre H. L. A. Hart et Ronald Dworkin. Alors que le premier défend une nouvelle version du positivisme modéré, le second offre une théorie nouvelle et innovatrice, nommée l’interprétativisme. L’objectif est simple : déterminer laquelle de ces deux théories explique le mieux le renversement juridique canadien concernant l’aide médicale à mourir. L’hypothèse initiale soutient que les deux théories pourront expliquer ledit renversement, mais que l’une le fera mieux que l’autre.On February 6th 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada issued an anonymous, unanimous landmark judgment. In Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), the Court recognized that a blanket prohibition of physician-assisted dying violates the constitutional rights of certain individuals. Indeed, a competent adult person should be allowed to seek help from a doctor to end her life if she meets two criteria: clearly consent to the termination of life and have a grievous and irremediable medical condition causing enduring suffering that is intolerable to the said individual. This legal decision constitutes an judicial overrule, because a reverse judgment was made in 1993. In fact, twenty-two years ago, the Supreme Court ruled five to four in favour of the ban on assisted suicide. In Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), the majority ruled that the protection of the sanctity of life in all circumstances, both for vulnerable people for capable adults, was reason enough not to invalidate the sections of the Criminal Code concerned with assisted suicide. The majority then feared that any opening to assisted suicide would cause a gradual widening of the eligibility criteria, what many have called the argument of the “slippery slope”. As part of this thesis, the Rodriguez-Carter judicial overrule will be analyzed in light of the debate between H. L. A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin. While the former is known for his defence of a new version of soft positivism, the latter offers a new and innovative theory, named interpretivism. The goal is simple: to establish which of these two theories best explains the Canadian legal overrule regarding physician-assisted dying. The initial hypothesis is that both theories may explain said reversal, but one will do so better than the other.
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Abarzúa, Navarrete Sebastián Andrés, and Vargas Marcelo Hernán Valenzuela. "El derecho como forma de alcanzar la justicia." Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2014. http://www.repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/116688.
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Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales)Nuestra memoria intenta mostrar que es posible pensar un más allá del derecho positivo en la conexión que creemos necesaria con la moral y que el ideal de justicia es posible si se parte desde esta perspectiva. Para llegar hasta allí comenzaremos por esbozar lo que entenderemos por Positivismo Jurídico, mostrando sus cimientos y analizando a sus principales exponentes para posteriormente explicar la existencia de una moral interna en el derecho y como puede ser ésta el camino para conectarse con la justicia apreciando la relación de alteridad que debe haber entre ambos conceptos si se quiere hacer frente a la urgente amenaza que significa la irrupción del estado de excepción.
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Bligh, Grégory. "Les bases philosophiques du positivisme juridique de H.L.A. Hart." Thesis, Paris 2, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016PA020076.
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Cette thèse cherche à reconstituer les bases philosophiques de la pensée juridique de H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992), figure majeure du positivisme juridique anglo-saxon au XXe siècle, et professeur de jurisprudence à l'université d'Oxford de 1952 à 1968. Ses travaux demeurent largement méconnus en France.Dégager les sources philosophiques du « positivisme analytique » de Hart permettra, premièrement, de reconstruire le dialogue entre le juriste d'Oxford et certaines figures importantes de la théorie du droit continentale. Hart oppose d’importantes critiques à certaines formes continentales de positivisme juridique, comme le normativisme de Hans Kelsen ou le réalisme scandinave d'Alf Ross. Cependant, cette thèse montrera également qu'il est possible d'établir des rapprochements étroits entre la pensée de Hart et celle du juriste francophone Chaïm Perelman. L'étude des bases philosophiques de la pensée juridique de Hart offre ainsi des points de contact intéressants entre ces différentes cultures juridiques.Deuxièmement, cette thèse cherche à faire ressortir l'influence déterminante de la philosophie du langage ordinaire qui se développa à Oxford au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Notre propos s'appuiera notamment sur un « premier corpus » de textes philosophiques publiés avant son accession à la chaire de jurisprudence en 1952, ainsi que sur les travaux préparatoires à son ouvrage The Concept of Law (1961). Nous défendons l'idée que ses prises de position philosophiques se retrouvent dans sa réflexion juridique et permettent de comprendre la cohérence de son œuvre, ainsi que la forme d'empirisme juridique qui sous-tend sa conception de la notion de ConstitutionThis thesis bears on the implicit epistemology and methodological considerations underlying the legal philosophy of H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992), the major representative of XXth century legal positivism in the English speaking world, and Oxford chair of jurisprudence (1952-1968). His work remains little known in France.We will seek to answer the view that Hart might not really have been durably influenced by ordinary language philosophy. We will address these questions by examining a corpus of earlier (overlooked) articles which he published as a young Oxford linguistic philosopher. This “early work” consists of the articles which Hart published before he in was elected to the Oxford chair of jurisprudence. Our view is that the work in general philosophy which he did in this early period is crucial to understand some of the positions which he defends in his legal writings. This thesis will thus show that Hart was active in the epistemological debate opposing the Oxford philosophers and the British representatives of logical atomism and logical empiricism. It will also show that these early positions are carried over into his later jurisprudence, including his major work The Concept of Law (1961).Shedding light on these philosophical foundations of Hart’s legal theory will ultimately allow us to reconstruct the debate opposing his own “analytical positivism” and Continental forms of positivism, such as Hans Kelsen’s normativism or Alf Ross Scandinavian legal realism. It will also allow us to draw important parallels between Hartian legal theory and that of the francophone philosopher Chaïm Perelman
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Chechik, Grigorina. "The Hart-Dworkin debate and the separation thesis of legal positivism." Thesis, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2010-08-1957.
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In the postscript to The Concept of Law, H.L. A. Hart describes the on-going debate inspired by his book, focusing on the criticisms of Ronald Dworkin. In this essay, I will discuss Dworkin’s criticisms of Hart, as well as Hart’s responses, showing that while Hart responds adequately to some criticisms, he fails to respond adequately to others. I will also reconstruct and evaluate the arguments given for and against the separation thesis by Dworkin and Hart. Finally, I will argue that the debate about the separation thesis – the thesis that morality and law are separable – is misguided, conflating as it does two distinct questions. These are the questions of what the positive law is, that is, the law that is posited in a specific time and place, and of what the natural law is, that is, the law that (if it exists) is universal and timeless. Once we distinguish these questions, we will see that the answer to the question of whether law is separable from morality depends on which sense of ‘law’ is relevant, and that there are two different answers corresponding to the two senses of positive law and natural law. Positive law is separable from morality while natural law is not.text
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"法律與道德的關係: 論哈特與狄奧堅的爭辯." 1988. http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5895510.
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劉傑雄.手稿本及手稿本複印本.
Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學, 1988.
Shou gao ben ji shou gao ben fu yin ben.
Includes bibliographical references: leaves [13]-[16]
Liu Jiexiong.
Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1988.
引言 --- p.1
Chapter 第一部份 --- 哈特對法律道德關係的看法 --- p.14
Chapter （甲） --- 社會律則的一般分析 --- p.14
Chapter （一） --- 社會律則的意義 --- p.14
Chapter （二） --- 社會律則兩方面的陳述 --- p.16
Chapter （三） --- 義務 --- p.18
Chapter （乙） --- 道德 --- p.21
Chapter （一） --- 道德的意義 --- p.21
Chapter （二） --- 道德的基本成份 --- p.22
Chapter （三） --- 道德的特質 --- p.30
Chapter （丙） --- 法律 --- p.36
Chapter （一） --- 基始律則──義務律 --- p.36
Chapter （二） --- 從屬律則──轉變律、審裁律和認可律 --- p.37
Chapter （三） --- 法律的成份 --- p.47
Chapter （丁） --- 法律與道德的關係 --- p.48
Chapter 第二部份 --- 狄奧堅對哈特的批評 --- p.61
Chapter （甲） --- 一個基本的概念──原則 --- p.62
Chapter （一） --- 原則的意思 --- p.62
Chapter （二） --- 原則和律則 --- p.67
Chapter （三） --- 原則的來源 --- p.70
Chapter （乙） --- 對哈特法律理論的批評 --- p.72
Chapter （一） --- 哈特的兩個選擇 --- p.73
Chapter （二） --- 第一個選擇──至少有些原則具有法律的約束力 --- p.76
Chapter （三） --- 第三個選擇──任何原則不具有法律的約束力 --- p.76
Chapter （四） --- 哈特法律理論的兩難 --- p.88
Chapter （五） --- 認可律的漏洞 --- p.90
Chapter （丙） --- 法律與道德的關係 --- p.100
Chapter 第三部份 --- 哈特與狄奧堅爭辯之評估 --- p.103
Chapter （一） --- 哈特與狄奧堅爭辯之論題 --- p.103
Chapter （二） --- 爭辯的爭論點 --- p.103
Chapter （三） --- 第一個爭論點 --- p.106
Chapter （四） --- 第二個爭論點 --- p.116
Chapter （五） --- 狄奧堅理論的毛病 --- p.124
結語 --- p.131
Books on the topic "A.(Herbert Lionel Adolphus)"
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Wald, Alan M. Jewish Internationalists. University of North Carolina Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5149/northcarolina/9781469635941.003.0001.
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The role of Jewish radicalism is the theme of this chapter, especially as it was expressed in the pages of Menorah Journal. The ideas of Isaac Deutscher in regard to the “Non-Jewish Jew” and of Horace Kallen about “cultural pluralism” are treated in relation to the debate about assimilation and internationalism. Elliot Cohen, Lionel Trilling, and Herbert Solow are treated as representative figures.
Book chapters on the topic "A.(Herbert Lionel Adolphus)"
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Henkel, Thomas. "Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus." In Kindlers Literatur Lexikon (KLL), 1. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05728-0_9772-1.
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Vega-Gomez, Juan. "Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus." In Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 1–9. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_904-1.
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Atria, Fernando, and Neil MacCormick. "Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus (1907–1993)." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, 873–75. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_166.
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Henkel, Thomas. "Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus: The Concept of Law." In Kindlers Literatur Lexikon (KLL), 1–2. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05728-0_9773-1.
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Lacey, Nicola. "Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus (1907–92)." In International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 536–39. Elsevier, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-08-097086-8.61044-9.
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Lacey, N. "Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus(1907–92)." In International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 6476–79. Elsevier, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/b0-08-043076-7/00355-7.
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"MERTON, Lionel Francis Herbert (1919– 1974)." In Dictionary Of British And Irish Botantists And Horticulturalists Including plant collectors, flower painters and garden designers, 2147. CRC Press, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/b12560-1115.
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