Dissertations / Theses: '220312 Philosophy of Cognition'

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Devitt, Susannah Kate. "Homeostatic epistemology : reliability, coherence and coordination in a Bayesian virtue epistemology." Thesis, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 2013. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/62553/1/62553c.pdf.

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How do agents with limited cognitive capacities flourish in informationally impoverished or unexpected circumstances? Aristotle argued that human flourishing emerged from knowing about the world and our place within it. If he is right, then the virtuous processes that produce knowledge, best explain flourishing. Influenced by Aristotle, virtue epistemology defends an analysis of knowledge where beliefs are evaluated for their truth and the intellectual virtue or competences relied on in their creation. However, human flourishing may emerge from how degrees of ignorance are managed in an uncertain world. Perhaps decision-making in the shadow of knowledge best explains human wellbeing—a Bayesian approach? In this dissertation I argue that a hybrid of virtue and Bayesian epistemologies explains human flourishing—what I term homeostatic epistemology. Homeostatic epistemology supposes that an agent has a rational credence p when p is the product of reliable processes aligned with the norms of probability theory; whereas an agent knows that p when a rational credence p is the product of reliable processes such that: 1) p meets some relevant threshold for belief (such that the agent acts as though p were true and indeed p is true), 2) p coheres with a satisficing set of relevant beliefs and, 3) the relevant set of beliefs is coordinated appropriately to meet the integrated aims of the agent. Homeostatic epistemology recognizes that justificatory relationships between beliefs are constantly changing to combat uncertainties and to take advantage of predictable circumstances. Contrary to holism, justification is built up and broken down across limited sets like the anabolic and catabolic processes that maintain homeostasis in the cells, organs and systems of the body. It is the coordination of choristic sets of reliably produced beliefs that create the greatest flourishing given the limitations inherent in the situated agent.

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Vakarelov, Orlin. "GENERAL SITUATED COGNITION." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/202751.

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The dissertation is based on four papers that together offer a theory of General Situated Cognition. The project has two overarching goals: (1) to unify existing foundational approaches to cognition by investigating cognition within the framework of the philosophy of information; (2) to characterize the function of cognition and suggest a general (meta-)framework for cognitive architecture. Two of the papers, "Pre-cognitive Semantic Information" and "The Information Medium", deal primarily with the concept of information. They offer a pragmatic and structural account of information, as well as a novel and more general theory of meaning appropriate for simple, non-linguistic organisms - the interface theory of meaning. The papers lay the theoretical and conceptual machinery needed for the other two papers, "The Cognitive Agent: Overcoming Informational Limitations" and "Information Networks: A Meta-architecture for Situated Cognition", which investigate cognition as a general natural phenomenon. They specify the function of cognition as the mechanism in an organism that overcomes informational deficits. They also offer a broad architecture of cognitive systems based on networks of information media, which encompasses, and thus unifies existing approaches to cognition, such as the computational/symbolic approach, the connectionist approach, the dynamicist approach and the ecological embodied approach.

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Grönroos, Gösta. "Plato on perceptual cognition." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2001. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-120001.

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The aim of the study is to spell out and consider Plato' s views on perceptual cognition. It is argued that Plato is cornrnitted to the view that perceptual cognition can be rational, and that beliefs about the sensible world need not be confused or ill-founded. Plato' s interest in the matter arises from worries over the way in which his forerunners and contemporaries conceived of perceptual cognition. They conceived of cognitive processes in terms of corporeal changes and attempted to explain perceptual cognition in causal terms. The problem with such accounts, according to Plato, is that they make perceptual cognition an entirely passive process, and seem incapable of accommodating the freedom of reason. Plato's main target is Protagoras' view on cognition and he accuses him of conflating different cognitive phenomena that ought to be kept apart. More particularly, he suggests that Protagoras' 'man the measure' thesis is based on the conflation of sen se perception (aisthesis), belief (doxa) and appearing (phantasia), and that Protagoras is cornmitted to the view that beliefs are arrived at in a non-rational way. It is shown how Plato takes issue with Protagoras by disentangling these three cognitive phenomena. It is argued that Plato' s way of understanding these notions leaves room for the possibility that reason plays apart in perceptual cognition and that we arrive at beliefs in a rational way. In the course of spelling out the argument, Plato' s views on a number of topics are scrutinised: the perceptual mechanism; the objects of sense perception; perceptual content; the nature of belief; the eon trast between belief and appearing; the nation of reason.
aisthesis, doxa, phantasia, being, reason, Plato, Protegoras

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Van, Wagner Tracy P. "An Integrated Account of Social Cognition in ASD: Bringing Together Situated Cognition and Theory Theory." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2017. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1505203102196309.

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Jarvie, A. Max. "Acceptance, belief and cognition." Thesis, McGill University, 2005. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=85170.

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This is a study of a problem in the logic of belief revision. On the assumption of a number of fairly traditional views concerning the relationship between mind and world, the mechanics of perception, and the nature of belief, an argument is made to the effect that revision of extant beliefs is impossible even in the light of new perceptual experience. The argument turns on the ability of a cognitive system to recognize conflict among its thoughts and perceptions. A number of models of the mechanics of perceptual interpretation are explored, all of which are revealed to share a susceptibility to the problem as posed. Certain objections are taken up, the responses to which modify the scope of the original argument; although the problem may yet be said to arise in a number of crucial contexts where its presence is undesirable, some situations are found in which the problem can be dissolved. The problem is then reexamined in light of the epistemological position called fallibilism, with an eye to demonstrating that it arises notwithstanding the highly cautious perspective embodied in that position. A solution to the problem is then offered in the form of a family of model cognitive systems with certain properties. Because the problem is a feature of belief-based cognitive systems, the family of systems offered in arguing for a resolution of the problem is constructed on the notion that cognition, construed as information processing, normally proceeds without any epistemic evaluations being attached either to perceptions in particular or thoughts in general. The non-evaluative propositional attitude employed in normal cognition should, I argue, be what I call acceptance. The propositional attitude of belief, traditionally conceived of as occupying the role now given to acceptance, is accorded an extremely limited scope of application. Epistemic evaluation in general is itself restricted to contexts of decision only, its application arising only

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Lormand, Eric Paul. "Classical and connectionist models of cognition." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/14140.

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7

Sommerlatte, Curtis. "The central role of cognition in Kant's transcendental deduction." Thesis, Indiana University, 2016. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10111945.

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I argue that Kant’s primary epistemological concern in the Critique of Pure Reason’s transcendental deduction is empirical cognition. I show how empirical cognition is best understood as “rational sensory discrimination”: the capacity to discriminate sensory objects through the use of concepts and with a sensitivity to the normativity of reasons. My dissertation focuses on Kant’s starting assumption of the transcendental deduction, which I argue to be the thesis that we have empirical cognition. I then show how Kant’s own subjective deduction fleshes out his conception of empirical cognition and is intertwined with key steps in the transcendental deduction’s arguments that the categories have objective validity and that we have synthetic a priori cognition.

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Akagi, Mikio Shaun Mikuriya. "Cognition in practice| Conceptual development and disagreement in cognitive science." Thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 2016. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=10183682.

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Cognitive science has been beset for thirty years by foundational disputes about the nature and extension of cognition—e.g. whether cognition is necessarily representational, whether cognitive processes extend outside the brain or body, and whether plants or microbes have them. Whereas previous philosophical work aimed to settle these disputes, I aim to understand what conception of cognition scientists could share given that they disagree so fundamentally. To this end, I develop a number of variations on traditional conceptual explication, and defend a novel explication of cognition called the sensitive management hypothesis.

Since expert judgments about the extension of “cognition” vary so much, I argue that there is value in explication that accurately models the variance in judgments rather than taking sides or treating that variance as noise. I say of explications that accomplish this that they are ecumenically extensionally adequate. Thus, rather than adjudicating whether, say, plants can have cognitive processes like humans, an ecumenically adequate explication should classify these cases differently: human cognitive processes as paradigmatically cognitive, and plant processes as controversially cognitive.

I achieve ecumenical adequacy by articulating conceptual explications with parameters, or terms that can be assigned a number of distinct interpretations based on the background commitments of participants in a discourse. For example, an explication might require that cognition cause “behavior,” and imply that plant processes are cognitive or not depending on whether anything plants do can be considered “behavior.” Parameterization provides a unified treatment of embattled concepts by isolating topics of disagreement in a small number of parameters.

I incorporate these innovations into an account on which cognition is the “sensitive management of organismal behavior.” The sensitive management hypothesis is ecumenically extensionally adequate, accurately classifying a broad variety of cases as paradigmatically or controversially cognitive phenomena. I also describe an extremely permissive version of the sensitive management hypothesis, arguing that it has the potential to explain several features of cognitive scientific discourse, including various facts about the way cognitive scientists ascribe representations to cognitive systems.

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Cassidy, Joseph P. "Extending Bernard Lonergan's ethics: Parallel between the structures of cognition and evaluation." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1996. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/10039.

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This dissertation is concerned with the foundations of ethical decision-making. It argues that a study of Bernard Lonergan's works on the human good can lead to a heightened awareness of what it means to take responsibility for our being responsible. Just as Lonergan suggested that we turn to the subject and pay attention to how we know in order to understand what we know, so this dissertation attends to how we make decisions. In so doing, responsible decision-making is understood not as one discrete act, but as a process that includes a series of evaluative operations. The dissertation explains Lonergan's levels of the good, and on that basis identifies and explains a structure of three evaluative operations--desiring, deliberating on possibilities, and evaluating/judging the preferability of possibilities for action--which are parallel to Lonergan's three cognitional operations of experiencing, understanding and judging. From there, the study asks whether the three evaluative operations ought to be distinguished from their cognitional counterparts. The question is addressed by noting how Lonergan distinguished levels of operations and/or levels of consciousness. The conclusion is that the same arguments that Lonergan used to identify cognitional operations and cognitional structure can be used to identify evaluative operations and evaluative structure. From there, one of the hallmarks of Lonergan's approach to ethics is considered: namely his claim that values are apprehended in feelings. Lonergan's treatment of value judgements is discussed. A similarity to Kantian ethics is adduced by claiming that the rationality that Kantian ethics grasps is the need for sustainable systems. This same emphasis can be found in the works of Kenneth Melchin. Given that this approach is conspicuously at odds with the positivist position on the irreducibility of the good, the differences between that position and a Lonerganian approach are discussed, the conclusion being that a Lonerganian approach has stronger empirical grounding that the positivist approach. A clarification is then made concerning the supposed virtual unconditionality of value judgements. In contrast to the claims of many Lonerganian scholars, it is argued that this is not an apt way of characterizing value judgements, nor was it favoured by Lonergan. Lonergan's work on self-transcendence as the criterion of the good is then studied. Self-transcendence is explained precisely in the ways that each level of operations sublates previous levels of operations. Two topics of special concern to Lonergan are then reviewed in the light of evaluative structure: bias is explained in terms of getting the order of sublations "wrong"; and conversion is explained in terms of getting the order of sublations "right." The dissertation concludes with an exploration of Lonergan's and Frederick Crowe's explanation of an above downwards dynamism operating in human development. The conclusion applies the dissertation's findings to debates between deontologists and teleologists, arguing for the complementarity of the approaches as well as their inadequacy. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

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10

Lorenz, Hendrik. "Non-rational practical cognition in Plato and Aristotle." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2000. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.365631.

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Lebed, Jay Aaron. "On some issues concerning symbols and the study of cognition." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/14406.

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Fraser, Christopher J. "Similarity and standards : language, cognition, and action in Chinese and western thought /." Thesis, Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong, 1999. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B20933964.

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13

Crowley, Stephen J. "A complex story about simple inquirers micro-epistemology and animal cognition /." [Bloomington, Ind.] : Indiana University, 2006. http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:3229575.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Philosophy, 2006.
"Title from dissertation home page (viewed July 3, 2007)." Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-08, Section: A, page: 3007. Advisers: Colin Allen; Mark Kaplan.

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14

Dahl, S. Gregg. "On the interpretation of neural network activity in parallel distributed processing models of cognition." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1994. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/11047.

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De, Villiers Tanya. "Mind and language : evolution in contemporary theories of cognition." Thesis, Link to the online version, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/1092.

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Branquinho, João Miguel Biscaia Valadas. "Direct reference, cognitive significance and Fregean sense." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1992. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:9d87a630-2d56-4e0a-a437-ab8f3ad82ad8.

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This essay deals with certain problems in the theory of singular reference. The following question is taken as central: What role is to be assigned to nonempty and syntactically simple singular terms in fixing the semantic contents of utterances of declarative sentences in which they may occur? I focus on those aspects of the current dispute between Millian and neo-Fregean approaches to singular reference which are related to issues about the cognitive significance of language use; the following two issues are singled out as crucial: the issue about (alleged) potential differences in informativeness between sentences constructed out of co-referential singular terms; and the issue about (alleged) failures of substitutivity salva veritate of co-referential singular terms in propositional-attitude contexts. The general direction of my arguments is as follows. On the one hand, I argue that "notational variance" claims recently advanced on both sides of the dispute should be deemed unsound; and hence that one is really confronted with separate accounts of singular content. On the other, I argue that Milllanism does not provide us with a satisfactory solution to the problems about cognitive significance; and hence that a framework of singular senses is Indispensable to deal with such problems in an adequate way. I also discuss the problem of Cognitive Dynamics, i.e. the issue of attitude-retention and persistence of mental content, in connection with the individuation of indexical thought. I argue that the standard Intuitive Criterion of Difference for thoughts might be reasonably extended to the diachronic case, allowing thus the possibility of discriminating between thoughts entertained by a thinker at different times.

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17

Favela, Luis H. Jr. "Understanding Cognition via Complexity Science." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2015. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1427981743.

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Cuffari, Elena Clare. "Co-Speech Gesture in Communication and Cognition." Thesis, University of Oregon, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/12145.

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xv, 256 p. : ill.
This dissertation stages a reciprocal critique between traditional and marginal philosophical approaches to language on the one hand and interdisciplinary studies of speech-accompanying hand gestures on the other. Gesturing with the hands while speaking is a ubiquitous, cross-cultural human practice. Yet this practice is complex, varied, conventional, nonconventional, and above all under-theorized. In light of the theoretical and empirical treatments of language and gesture that I engage in, I argue that the hand gestures that spontaneously accompany speech are a part of language; more specifically, they are enactments of linguistic meaning. They are simultaneously (acts of) cognition and communication. Human communication and cognition are what they are in part because of this practice of gesturing. This argument has profound implications for philosophy, for gesture studies, and for interdisciplinary work to come. As further, strong proof of the pervasively embodied way that humans make meaning in language, reflection on gestural phenomena calls for a complete re-orientation in traditional analytic philosophy of language. Yet philosophical awareness of intersubjectivity and normativity as conditions of meaning achievement is well-deployed in elaborating and refining the minimal theoretical apparatus of present-day gesture studies. Triangulating between the most social, communicative philosophies of meaning and the most nuanced, reflective treatments of co-speech hand gesture, I articulate a new construal of language as embodied, world-embedded, intersubjectively normative, dynamic, multi-modal enacting of appropriative disclosure. Spontaneous co-speech gestures, while being indeed spontaneous, are nonetheless informed in various ways by conventions that they appropriate and deploy. Through this appropriation and deployment speakers enact, rather than represent, meaning, and they do so in various linguistic modalities. Seen thusly, gestures provide philosophers with a unique new perspective on the paradoxical determined-yet-free nature of all human meaning.
Committee in charge: Mark Johnson, Chairperson; Ted Toadvine, Member; Naomi Zack, Member; Eric Pederson, Outside Member

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Stepanenko, Walter Scott. "Passionate Cognition: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion and the Role of the Emotions inCognition." University of Toledo / OhioLINK, 2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=toledo1396533522.

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20

Krieger, Gordon S. F. "Connectionism, naturalized epistemology, and eliminative materialism." Thesis, McGill University, 1993. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=68112.

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The aim of this essay is to explore the potential for an epistemology consistent with eliminative materialism based on work in connectionist modeling.
I present a review of the connectionist approach to psychological models that contrasts it with the classical symbolic approach, focusing on the nature of their respective representations. While defending the legitimacy of the connectionist approach, I find that its most useful application is as a basis for neuroscientific investigation.
Discussing connectionist psychology, I find it inconsistent with folk psychology and therefore consistent with eliminative materialism. I argue also for the naturalization of epistemology and thus for the relevance of psychology for epistemology. The conclusion of the essay is an outline of connectionist epistemology, which centres around two mathematical analyses of the global activity of connectionist networks; I argue that connectionist psychology leads to a version of epistemic pragmatism.

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21

Turner, Sudan A. "Intrinsically semantic concepts and the intentionality of propositional attitudes /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/5721.

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Vidlund, Elin. "Moral cognition and its neural correlates : Possibilites for enhancement of moral cognition and behavior." Thesis, Högskolan i Skövde, Institutionen för biovetenskap, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:his:diva-15726.

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This essay aims to provide an overview of some key theories and frameworks regarding moral cognition and its neural correlates, in order to examine the possibilities of enhancement of moral cognition. Moral cognition arises from the functional integration of several distinct brain regions and networks. These neural systems correspond to different socioaffective abilities, such as empathy and compassion, as well as sociocognitive abilities, such as theory of mind. Due to this neural distinction, these moral abilities, behaviors, and emotions can be targeted and trained separately. Recent research suggests that training sociocognitive and socioaffective abilities increases cortical thickness in corresponding brain regions and networks, hence providing support for adult neural plasticity in relation to moral cognition. Increased cortical thickness also corresponds to enhanced performance in socioaffective and sociocognitive abilities. Training compassion and empathy induce enhanced abilities to pick up emotional cues, as well as strengthen the motivation to alleviate others’ distress. Practicing theory of mind allows for a better understanding of the perspective of others, which has been indicated to reduce biases between individuals or societal groups. Thus, enhanced moral cognition can contribute to an increase in consideration for those affected by our choices and behavior, which may yield more compassionate, just, and safe societies.

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Wells, Marnix St John. "ShiÌ€ : dynamics of cognition and causation in the axial period of Chinese philosophy." Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 2001. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.251733.

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Kurak, Michael D. "The foundations of cognition : variations on the theme of an a priori structure of awareness." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1999. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/113446/.

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In the search for the foundations of cognition philosophers often encounter a familiar problem - the problem of content. The problem of content is essentially the problem of how content, whether experiential or intentional, is possible. In practice providing a response to this problem involves providing an account of how an active self-consciousness is able to conceive/perceive, or in some way be consciousness ofx. The unique nature of this problem imposes significant constraints on the field of explanatory possibilities. Since the x which is to be accounted for is essentially the possibility of absolutely any x there is no y which is not also an x. Hence, nothing remains outside of the explanandum which can be appealed to in order to account for it without, to some extent, presupposing that which needs to be explained. In many of the theories we will examine overcoming this problem involves appealing to a transcendental "structure of awareness" which more often than not is composed of "universal-like" transcendental "entities" of indeterminate nature and ontological status. A major appeal of transcendental entities (e.g., forms, species, essences, pure categories, and dharmas) is that they can at least appear to provide a way of supplying the power of objective "determinateness" necessary to account for the possibility of determination without themselves being determinates (i.e., without presupposing content). The general strategy of appealing to such transcendental "entities" has, however, for some time been suspiciously regarded as it is unclear how such an appeal is able to avoid the aforementioned presupposition of content. But if the appeal to transcendental cognizing intermediates is to be ' dismissed we may be left to face up to the fact that content simply "happens"- that the process of determination, of "judgment", is a mysterious talent that can neither be taught nor understood. Through a critical examination of both Western and Eastern philosophical approaches to the problem of content this dissertation identifies and describes, insofar as is possible, "that" through which content is rendered possible. In so doing it draws attention to previously neglected points of contact between major philosophical traditions and clarifies the central issues surrounding the problem. The dissertation supports the conclusion that, although there is a need to acknowledge a particular role for a transcendental "self- consciousness" in providing a coherent response to the problem of content, the attempt to articulate a mechanism through which this role is fulfilled most likely misguided. Although it appears to be possible both to know something about this "self-consciousness", and even to know it more directly, it cannot be understood in the usual sense.

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Simonis, Fabien. "A Chinese model of cognition : the Neiye, fourth century B.C.E." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape11/PQDD_0004/MQ43950.pdf.

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Hibbert, Ruth. "Are there any situated cognition concepts of memory functioning as investigative kinds in the sciences of memory?" Thesis, University of Kent, 2015. https://kar.kent.ac.uk/49118/.

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This thesis will address the question of whether there are any situated cognition concepts of memory functioning as investigative kinds in the sciences of memory. Situated cognition is an umbrella term, subsuming extended, embedded, embodied, enacted and distributed cognition. I will be looking closely at case studies of investigations into memory where such concepts seem prima facie most likely to be found in order to establish a) whether the researchers in question are in fact employing such concepts, and b) whether the concepts are functioning well – functioning as investigative kinds – and should therefore continue to be employed, or whether something has gone wrong in the practice of the science and they should employ a different kind of concept. An historically situated approach to the case studies will allow me to answer part b) here. Along the way, I will argue for a way of construing scientific research that I call the dynamic framework account, an account of (im)maturity for science, a variety of conceptual role semantics with respect to scientific concepts, and the historically situated case study-based method I will employ in answering the central question. My conclusions, and the way I reach them, constitute contributions to debates about situated cognition particularly, and to philosophy of science more generally, as well as recommendations for scientific practice.

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Frazier, Alexis Dian. "Effect of story presentation condition on syntactic and semantic recall for 7 and 9-year old good and poor readers /." Access Digital Full Text version, 1986. http://pocketknowledge.tc.columbia.edu/home.php/bybib/10599538.

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Tremblay, Françoise. "Aline et Pauline : "le discours : acte de perception et de cognition" /." Thèse, Chicoutimi : Université du Québec à Chicoutimi, 1994. http://theses.uqac.ca.

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Martin, Jonathan. "Finding Useful Concepts of Representation in Cognitive Neuroscience: A new tactic for addressing dynamical critiques of representational models of cognition, action, and perception." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1571833717613181.

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Higgins, Joe. "Being and thinking in the social world : phenomenological illuminations of social cognition and human selfhood." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/10640.

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At least since the time of Aristotle, it has been widely accepted that “man is by nature a social animal”. We eat, sleep, talk, laugh, cry, love, fight and create in ways that integrally depend on others and the social norms that we collectively generate and maintain. Yet in spite of the widely accepted importance of human sociality in underlying our daily activities, its exact manifestation and function is consistently overlooked by many academic disciplines. Cognitive science, for example, regularly neglects the manner in which social interactions and interactively generated norms canalise and constitute our cognitive processes. Without the inescapable ubiquity of dynamic social norms, any given agent simply could not cognise as a human. In this thesis, I aim to use a range of insights – from phenomenology, social psychology, neuroscience, cultural anthropology and gender studies – to clarify the role of sociality for human life. More specifically, the thesis can be broadly separated into three parts. I begin (chapters 1 and 2) with a broad explanation of how human agents are fundamentally tied to worldly entities and other agents in a way that characterises their ontological existence. In chapters 3 and 4, I criticise two recent and much-discussed theories of social cognition – namely, we-mode cognition and participatory sense-making – for failing to make intelligible the social constitution of human existence. In the later chapters (5-7), I then propose foundations for a more satisfactory theory of social cognition, as well as explicating a view of human selfhood as ‘biosocial', such that even the autonomy of biological bodies is socially codified from a human perspective. Taken together, the aforementioned chapters should contribute to calls for a new direction in social cognitive science, whilst also yielding novel insights into the nature of human selfhood.

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Littlefield, William Joseph II. "Abductive Humanism: Comparative Advantages of Artificial Intelligence and Human Cognition According to Logical Inference." Case Western Reserve University School of Graduate Studies / OhioLINK, 2019. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=case1554480107736449.

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32

Kaag, John Jacob. "Thinking through the imagination : the centrality of aesthetic creativity in human cognition /." view abstract or download file of text, 2007. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1421606011&sid=2&Fmt=2&clientId=11238&RQT=309&VName=PQD.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2007.
Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 258-272). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.

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Bamford, Desmond Nicholas. "Person, deification and re-cognition : a comparative study of person in the Byzantine and Pratyabhijna traditions." Thesis, University of Chichester, 2010. http://eprints.chi.ac.uk/810/.

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This thesis will construct a model of person through a comparison of ideas relating to a concept of person in the Byzantine and Pratyabhijnii traditions. Questions will be asked, such as, whether a concept of person can be constructed within these two traditions, and how can ideas developed from these traditions be utilised to construct a model of person? This thesis will provide an in depth examination of terms and concepts that will be related to a concept of person within the two traditions, examining the ontological and existential implications of those terms. This work will also develop, from a subsequent convergence of the theologies of the two traditions, a model of person that is inter-religious and dialogical. Though this work is analytical in nature, in its deconstructing philosophical and theological models relating to person, it is also constructive, taking what is useful from the Byzantine and Pratyabhijnii traditions so as to construct a new model of person through the development of the term, Atman-hypostasis which looks to understanding human personhood in the fullest mystical state (deification) within the human condition. A comparison of the two traditions has not been attempted before in relation to the theological discourse of person; neither has such an extensive examination and deconstruction of the concept person in Byzantine and Pratyabhijnii traditions been undertaken in relation to contemporary studies; neither has a construction of this type of model of person been undertaken. This work, in constructing a new term Atmanhypostasis, which emerged from this research as an outcome of the comparison of terms and ideas relating to a concept of person in both traditions, will contribute to the academic theological field of personhood and this thesis will also contribute to the field of inter-religious dialogue in developing an anthropological model that aims to overcome the barriers that separate and divide.

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Kvaran, Trevor. "Dual-process theories and the rationality debate contributions from cognitive neuroscience /." unrestricted, 2007. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-08032007-161242/.

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Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2007.
Title from file title page. Andrea Scarantino, Eddy Nahmias, committee co-chairs; Erin McClure, committee member. Electronic text (68 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Jan. 7, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-68).

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Starkweather, Jonathan David Hayslip Bert. "Bidirectional effects between engaged lifestyle and cognition in later life exploring the moderation hypothesis for personality variables /." [Denton, Tex.] : University of North Texas, 2009. http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc12202.

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Starkweather, Jonathan. "Bidirectional Effects Between Engaged Lifestyle and Cognition in Later Life: Exploring the Moderation Hypothesis for Personality Variables." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2009. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc12202/.

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Longitudinal data (N = 263) was used to investigate the bidirectional relationship between engagement (engaged lifestyle activities) and cognition (crystallized & fluid intelligence). Extroversion and openness to experience were also tested as moderators of the relationship between engagement and cognition. Results showed that the relationship between engagement at Wave 1 and cognition at Wave 2 did not differ from the relationship between cognition at Wave 1 and engagement at Wave 2. Testing for moderation with regression indicated that neither extroversion nor openness was moderating the relationship between engagement and cognition in either direction. Structural equation models provided further summary evidence that the relationships among engagement at Wave 1, extroversion, openness, and cognition at Wave 2 were not strong. However, a strong limitation to these results was the measurement error associated with a new measure of engagement.

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Viger, Christopher David. "Mental content in a physical world : an alternative to mentalese." Thesis, McGill University, 1998. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=35953.

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In an attempt to show how rational explanation of human and animal behaviour has a place in the scientific explanation of our physical world, Fodor advances the language of thought hypothesis. The purpose of this dissertation is to argue that, contrary to the language of thought hypothesis, we need not possess a linguistic internal representational system distinct from any natural language to serve as the medium of thinking. I accept that we have an internal representational system, but by analyzing Fodor's theory of content, I show Fodor's argument that the internal system must be as expressive as any natural language, which he uses in arguing that the internal system is the linguistic medium of thought, is unsound. Distinguishing an informational theory of content from a causal theory of content, which Fodor conflates, I argue that internal representations, whose content is determined by information they carry, cannot be related in a way that corresponds to semantic associations between terms in natural languages, reflecting actual associations of items in the world. Furthermore, provided certain animal cognition, which is homogeneous with human cognition, can be explained without requiring that the internal system possess anything corresponding to the logical connectives, the internal system need not possess anything corresponding to the logical connectives. I give such an explanation of animal cognition by developing an approach to content in the Rylean/Dennettian tradition, based on the notion of embodied cognition, in which animals embody the hypotheses they entertain in virtue of their total dispositional state, rather than explicitly representing them. It follows that there are two features of natural languages, semantic associations of terms and possessing logical connectives, that the internal system need not have. Hence a rational interpretation of linguistic behaviour need not be derived from an intentional interpretation of the transformations on int

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Trapp, Michael Vann. "Thomas Aquinas on the Nature of Singular Thought." Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/52901.

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In his account of the intellectual cognition of singulars, Aquinas claims that the intellect cognizes singulars by way of mental images. Some recent commentators have claimed that Aquinas' appeal to mental images is inadequate to account for the intellectual cognition of singulars because mental images considered in terms of their qualitative character alone have content that is general and are, therefore, insufficient to determine reference to a singular. That is, if Aquinas takes mental images to refer to singulars because those singulars perfectly resemble the mental images, then his account is deficient. In my paper, I argue that the critical interpretation above is predicated on a misunderstanding of Aquinas regarding the intentionality of images. I investigate Aquinas' account of the intentionality of images in order to show that Aquinas understands the reference of mental images to be determined not by their qualitative character alone but also by the causal relation that obtains between the cognizer and a singular.
Master of Arts

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SMITH, JOHN-CHRISTIAN. "COMMONSENSE FACULTY PSYCHOLOGY: REIDIAN FOUNDATIONS FOR COMPUTATIONAL COGNITIVE SCIENCE (FUNCTIONALISM, INTENTIONALITY, MODULARITY, MIND, REPRESENTATION)." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1985. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/188133.

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This work locates the historical and conceptual foundations of cognitive science in the "commonsense" psychology of the philosopher Thomas Reid. I begin with Reid's attack on his rationalist and empiricist competitors of the 17th and 18th centuries. I then present his positive theory as a sophisticated faculty psychology appealing to innateness of mental structure. Reidian psychological faculties are equally trustworthy, causally independent mental powers, and I argue that they share nine distinct properties. This distinguishes Reidian 'intentionalism' from idealist 'representationalism,' which derive cognitive content either from the inherited structure of faculties of from the occurrent structure of sensory activity. Next, I turn to consciousness and reflection for a contemporary Reidian response to traditional phenomenology. Unlike reflection, faculties of reason and remembrance are not causally mediated by consciousness. My interpretation of Reid is that 'Humean causation' of individual faculty structure accounts only for 'natural intentionality,' while 'efficient causation' of faculty interrelations accounts for cognitive 'personal intentionality.' I then proceed by adopting a form of computational description for reconstructing this view as a computational theory of mind. I contrast functional analyses in explanations of some capacities with computational and componential analyses in explanations of other, intentional capacities, in which some processes must be taken to semantically encode and govern the roles of others. This step reconstructs the Reidian notion of intentional operations as requiring an explanation of component faculties and their representation-governed interactions. I argue that properties of faculties delimiting these interactions under Reid's theory parallel those in Fodor's (1983) essay on the "modularity of mind," although the reasons given for individual criteria are often very different. Fodor also proposes a trichotomous mental structure, but I find that a third level of "central systems" is a myth engendered by causal information theory. Such an analysis cannot capture generalizations over the internal representation of semantic roles that determines the character of faculty relations. This requirement for any computational account of cognition is precisely the motivation for the reconstructed Reidian theory. Thus, it comports more favorably with the explanatory program constitutive of a computational cognitive science.

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Japola, Justyna Marta. "Fodor and Aquinas the architecture of the mind and the nature of concept acquisition /." Connect to Electronic Thesis (CONTENTdm), 2009. http://worldcat.org/oclc/642200251/viewonline.

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Fuller, Timothy. "Science and Mind: How theory change illuminates ordinary thought." The Ohio State University, 2012. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1343840173.

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Stellings, Alan. "Music cognition as musical culture, a philosophical investigation of cognitivist theory of music." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape16/PQDD_0005/NQ28131.pdf.

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Skorburg, Joshua. "Extended Virtues." Thesis, University of Oregon, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/23177.

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The central argument of this dissertation is that virtue ethics is overly individualistic. In response, I develop and defend a more relational, ecological account - what I call extended virtues. First, following Andy Clark, Kim Sterelny, and others, I argue that cognition and emotion can be embedded in, scaffolded by, or even extended to include various environmental resources. These arguments undermine default internalism about cognitive and affective processes. Next, I show how recent work in social and personality psychology similarly undermines individualism about the bearers of these cognitive and affective processes. Taken together, these arguments have significant but heretofore underappreciated implications for virtue ethics. After reviewing the literature which attempts to spell out the ethical implications of embedded, scaffolded, and extended cognition, I conclude that a more substantive engagement with virtue ethics is needed. I then show how plausible, mainstream theories of virtue assume default internalism and individualism, and are thus subject to charges of empirical inadequacy. Finally, I formulate my account of extended virtues in response to these shortcomings. I begin by making three explicit arguments for why an account of extended virtues is needed. I then develop two further arguments - the process argument and the bearer argument - which yield the conclusion that the processes relevant to, and the bearers of, moral and intellectual virtues can be embedded, scaffolded, or extended. After providing examples and filling in details about the hypotheses of embedded, scaffolded, and extended virtue, I propose that virtues are less like dispositions and more like relations. I conclude by suggesting that ecological metaphors such as stewardship are more fitting than traditional views of morality as inner strength.

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BLAHNIK, GARY A. "EXPERIMENTALISM: INTEGRATING MIND & BODY, SPIRIT & MATTER, THE ONE & THE MANY." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2007. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1185550468.

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Forrest, Peter V. "Can phenomenology determine the content of thought?" Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:83967922-db20-4f05-bdc9-0ac4b361ba07.

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This thesis is about consciousness and representation. More specifically, the big picture issue in the background throughout is the relationship between consciousness (or "phenomenology") and representation (or "intentionality") in the life of the mind. Phenomenology and intentionality are inarguably the two central topics in philosophy of mind of the last half-century. The question of phenomenology is, "how can there be something it feels like, from a subjective viewpoint, for a physical being to experience the world?" The question of intentionality is, "how can something physical, such as a brain state, be about, or represent, some other thing out in the world?" Not too long ago, the majority opinion was that these two questions addressed two essentially independent domains. However, in recent years the views of many philosophers have swung dramatically in the opposite direction. An important theme of analytic philosophy of mind in the last decade or two has been the exploration of the groundbreaking idea that these two domains might be fundamentally linked in previously unrecognized ways. Perhaps phenomenal properties are reducible to certain kinds of intentional properties. Perhaps the mind's non-derivative intentionality is grounded in phenomenology. Perhaps we should think of phenomenology and intentionality as "intertwined, all the way down to the ground" (Chalmers 2004, 32). This thesis addresses one crucial question within this larger framework: whether, and how, thoughts are phenomenally conscious. Thoughts are an important test case for theories about the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality, because they have long been considered paradigmatic intentional states, in contrast to perceptual and sensory experiences, which are paradigmatic phenomenal states. While there is something it is like, from the inside, for an individual to undergo a perceptual experience such as an olfactory experience of roasted coffee beans, by contrast entertaining a thought might seem to lack such a distinctive qualitative "feel". The thought is clearly intentional: it involves carrying informational content about objects and properties in the world. But is there also something it is like for a subject to experience thinking itself? To answer this question in the affirmative is to accept the existence of a phenomenology of thought, so-called "cognitive phenomenology" (CP). The literature on this topic so far has focused primarily on the question of whether CP exists. Here I will focus on the subtly different, and largely neglected, question of whether a kind of CP exists that is able to determine thought's intentional content. Many proponents of CP seem to be motivated by the hope that it can, since they believe that in the case of other conscious states, the phenomenology accounts for the intentionality. However, in what follows I argue that this ambitious project is doomed to fail, because CP is not suited to determine the intentional content of thought.

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Hornbeck, Ryan. "A pure world : moral cognition and spiritual experiences in Chinese World of Warcraft." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:da29fb13-3133-47c3-a0dd-87e41d670e0f.

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This dissertation is about moral cognition and the production of spiritual experiences in the Chinese version of the massively multiplayer online game, World of Warcraft (CWoW). Chapter 1 introduces the game, field sites, data collection methods, and the questions and paradigms that structure the dissertation's narrative. This chapter explains that during fieldwork CWoW players frequently described gameplay as yielding positive moral and spiritual experiences. Chapter 2 outlines the cognitive mechanisms – Haidt and Joseph's 'moral foundations' (2004; 2007) – that are hypothesised to inform the in-game experiences to which players attributed moral significance. Chapter 3 argues that some aspects of the WoW gameworld are high in cognitive 'relevance' (following Sperber & Wilson, 1986) for Haidt and Joseph's moral foundations. This relevance yields the game a capacity for cross-cultural appeal. Chapter 4 argues that social agencies operant in the lives of CWoW players motivated players to utilise these morally relevant aspects of gameplay as a 'religion-like tool for group cohesion' (following Sosis & Alcorta, 2008). These extra-game agencies help explain why these aspects of gameplay were cultivated in lieu of, or as superordinate to, aspects that may be 'relevant' to other cognitive mechanisms. Chapter 5 argues that reports of soul merger experiences obtained in CWoW resemble Durkheim’s 'collective effervescence' (Durkheim, 1995 [1912]) and may be understood at the cognitive level as 'flow' (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) experiences conjoined with affective outputs from Haidt and Joseph's moral foundations. Chapter 6 summarises the key points made in the preceding chapters and concludes that in the contexts sampled here, high-contingency aspects of CWoW gameplay may be viewed as Durkheimian religious rituals.

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Russell, Michael L. "The Phenomenology of Harmonic Progression." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2020. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1703408/.

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This dissertation explores a method of music analysis that is designed to reflect the phenomenology of the listening experience, specifically in regards to harmony. It is primarily inspired by the theoretical approaches of the music theorist Moritz Hauptmann and by the writings of philosopher Edmund Husserl.

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Wallin-Ruschman, Jennifer. "A Girl Power Study: Looking and Listening to the Role of Emotions and Relationality in Developing Critical Consciousness." PDXScholar, 2014. https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds/1837.

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The concept of critical consciousness centers on the capacity for involvement in social change efforts. Its development has been the aim of many recent social movements (e.g., the consciousness raising groups of the women's movement). In this work, critical consciousness is defined as the highest level of socio-political-cultural (SPC) consciousness development. SPC consciousness is characterized by the linking of the personal and the political so that structures and discourses of oppression are not only understood but also lead to critical action and transforming relations of domination. Additionally, critical consciousness includes the ability to tolerate ambivalence and conflict as well as the capacity to form group identifications that support critical reflection. While critical consciousness can develop in a variety of settings, it has a historical affinity with liberation education projects, particularly education projects that combine Critical Pedagogy and community engaged learning. Empirical inquiry on critical consciousness development is extremely limited. This dissertation addresses that gap, focusing specifically on the role of emotion and relationality in critical consciousness development. Further, the study offers a feminist critique of the literature, addressing as well the contribution of Community Psychology to conceptualizing critical consciousness. This dissertation analyzes data gathered through the Girl Power Senior Capstone, a course routinely taught at an urban Pacific Northwest public university. The six-hour course lasts for one quarter-term and integrates classroom time with community engagement. A central aim of the course is the development of critical consciousness. Specifically, the research was designed to address the following questions: 1) How are emotionally and relationally significant Girl Power experiences related to SPC consciousness development? 2) What tensions arise between the dominant culture and/or significant others' values and the values of the Girl Power capstone and how do these tensions move individuals toward or away from critical consciousness? The theoretical framework and interview schedule were guided by participant observation of the Girl Power course conducted over an academic term. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with all consenting and available capstone participants (N=10) in the course where participant-observations were carried out. The interviews were transcribed and analyzed based on a modified version of Carol Gilligan's Listening Guide. Two primary themes emerged from the data analysis-- the processes of awakening and sources of dissonance. The first theme relates to the processes of transformation that participants undergo during and following the course. Participants discuss this process as coming to see the world in a new way though their emotional experiences and relations developed in the course. The second theme, sources of dissonance, addresses sources of conflict that emerge as participants undergo this process of awakening. Areas of tension that were particularly salient centered on relationships and experiences in the course. Participants identified experiences in the course that they perceived as contributing in key respects to SPC consciousness. Yet some aspects of change in the course seemed to reflect limiting capacities, including magical thinking, a limited range of critical action strategies, and lack of critical community post Girl Power. The findings from the dissertation can be used to inform the creation and implementation of future projects of critical consciousness development and social justice work more broadly.

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VAN, CLEAVE MATTHEW JAMES. "THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT." University of Cincinnati / OhioLINK, 2007. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ucin1186060901.

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Gers, Matt. "Human culture and cognition : a thesis submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Philosophy /." ResearchArchive@Victoria e-Thesis, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10063/320.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic '220312 Philosophy of Cognition'

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