Academic literature on the topic '1912-1990 Philosophy'

This paper provides the historical, cultural, and clinical context for the relationship between Bruno Bettelheim (1903–1990) and Rudolf Ekstein (1912–2005). Both were Viennese-born and trained intellectuals who received doctorates in the human sciences from the University of Vienna in 1937. Both were deeply identified with lay analysis, emphasizing that for psychoanalysis to perpetuate itself it needed to promote serious and rigorous forms of research. Because Bettelheim was the better known of the two, this introduction focuses on Ekstein's family history, with special emphasis on his experience of loss and trauma and his capacity to recover from personal and educational obstacles. It argues that Ekstein was a representative product of Austro-Marxism in the period between the wars, embracing the ethical brand of democratic socialism and group solidarity that was integral to the theory and practice of Austrian Social Democracy. It discusses Ekstein's training with Moritz Schlick in philosophy and his immersion in the Vienna Circle of logical positivism. From Schlick, Ekstein evolved into a philosophical thinker who learned how to think his own thoughts. Ekstein joined the circle of psychoanalytic pedagogues who clustered around the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, under the tutelage of Willi Hoffer,August Aichhorn and, above all, Anna Freud. The clinical component of psychoanalysis emanated from his commitment to understanding the inner world of the child. Bettelheim and Ekstein first became aware of each other from reading the analytic literature and finally met in America in the 1950s. They shared a professional interest in conducting research and doing clinical work on severely disturbed children and adolescents, including those with psychotic, borderline and autistic diagnoses. They debated the value of milieu therapy versus psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy on such children. As their relationship evolved, the two collaborated and began a fascinating correspondence that gradually evolved into an intimate friendship. They both engaged in a polemic with Bernard Rimland, who was massively critical of their clinical work and a hostile critic of psychoanalytic approaches to the treatment of disturbed children. Rimland was an advocate of a neurological approach to mental illness, with an emphasis on biology and psychopharmacology. The 22 letters that constitute the Bettelheim-Ekstein exchange began with clinical concerns, including the varieties of solitude, isolation and countertransference disruptions that may trouble the psychoanalytic researcher and clinician in dealing with primitively disordered children. It moves to other issues, including mutual support during the Rimland Affair. As the two became more friendly, a pattern of good-natured competition and envy appeared. The two engaged in a heated exchange on the question of whether contemporary Vienna remained as anti-Semitic as it had been in their respective youths: Bettelheim, the concentration camp survivor, argued that nothing had changed and that most Austrians remained viscerally anti-Semitic; Ekstein, the Austro-Marxist, contended that one could not blame a generation born after World War II, holding that in his experience many Austrians had examined their consciences and held distinctly different opinions from their parents or grandparents. Toward the end of their correspondence, we encounter Ekstein's tender sensitivity to Bettelheim's descent into depression as a result of the death of his wife, Trude, leading eventually to recurrent episodes of suicidal ideation and plans for his own suicide. The letters testify to a unique friendship with a somewhat old-world quality.

ZusammenfassungDie Idee, Poesie maschinell zu generieren, ist so alt wie die Maschinen selbst. Sie lässt sich seit dem Mittelalter beobachten und setzt sich fort bis in die Gegenwart, in der Storytelling-Experimente Algorithmen zur natürlichsprachigen Textgenerierung (NLG) nutzen. Die weltweit ersten Versuche, Poesie digital herzustellen, gelangen in den 1950er Jahren den Mathematikern Christopher Strachey (1916–1975) in Manchester und Theo Lutz (1932–2010) in Stuttgart. Durch zufallsmäßige Auswahl passfähiger Wörter und Sätze erzeugte Strachey 1952 auf einer Ferranti Mark I kurze Liebesbriefe. Dazu verwendete er das Programmierhandbuch von Alan Turing (1912–1954). Daneben schrieb Strachey Programme für das Dame-Spiel und zur computationellen Erzeugung von Musik. Lutz stellte 1959 mithilfe eines Programms im Freiburger Code auf einer Zuse Z 22 seine Stochastischen Texte her, wofür er Wortmaterial aus Franz Kafkas Roman Das Schloss (1926) verwendete und wobei er mit dem Philosophen Max Bense (1910–1990) und dem späteren Informatik-Pionier Rul Gunzenhäuser (1933–2018) kooperierte. Weil Lutz’ Arbeitsunterlagen nahezu vollständig erhalten und im Deutschen Literaturarchiv Marbach für die Forschung zugänglich sind, gilt Lutz als ein literatur- und informatikgeschichtlich bedeutsamer Vertreter früher digitaler Poesie, die lange Zeit fast nur in avantgardistischen Zirkeln diskutiert wurde und kaum den Weg in eine breitere Öffentlichkeit fand. Erst aktuelle Debatten um sogenannte Künstliche Intelligenz (KI) lenken wieder die Aufmerksamkeit auf diese frühen Experimente, die ein faszinierender Mosaikstein der Technik‑, Kultur- und Literaturgeschichte sind.

Entre 1950 et 1972, Henri Thomas s’engage dans une recherche singulière qui fait l’objet de notre étude et dont il est utile de distinguer deux mouvements.L’énigme qui passionne alors Thomas est celle de l’accès au territoire de l’impossible, entendu comme ce qui outrepasse les limites du possible — irrationnel, illimité, inexpliqué, autres noms du poétique ou du sacré — et seul espace authentique de la poésie.Textuellement, il s’enquiert d’une forme nouvelle capable de dire la recherche de l’impossible, et d’intégrer une dimension épique et poétique. Tous ses récits entre Les Déserteurs (1951) et La Relique (1969) façonnent et affinent une écriture à même de rendre compte de l’aventure à la fois héroïque et poétique des personnages.La forme nouvelle imaginée par Thomas se détourne du récit poétique et des procédés stylistiques qui lui sont liés pour développer une dimension épique portée par la présence d’un héros, qui vient nourrir les questionnements poétiques.D’autre part, il s’agit, grâce à ce récit que Thomas perfectionne pendant vingt ans, de trouver une forme de résolution à la recherche de l’impossible. Durant cette période, l’auteur assume progressivement l’assimilation de l’impossible à une immédiateté qui est aussi la déchirure du sacré. Les références au mythe de Diane, au texte de Klossowski, à la lumière de Hölderlin et à sa quête poétique, et enfin à la présence de la relique, dans les trois derniers récits du cycle étudié, orientent définitivement sa quête vers cette conclusion. Chaque roman l’amène à éclaircir un aspect de sa quête de l’impossible. La quête d’une totalité impensable inscrit résolument Thomas dans une tradition littéraire, de Hölderlin à Mallarmé et à Rimbaud, jusqu’aux poètes du Grand Jeu, et des mystiques à Léon Chestov. Elle l’inclut aussi dans une modernité, une « communauté de l’impossible » qui réunit Artaud, Blanchot, Bataille et Klossowski dans un projet commun, bien que les moyens utilisés pour le mener à bien diffèrent selon les écrivains.Le projet de Thomas mêle donc intimement poétique et narratif, se distinguant de certains mouvements d’avant-garde par sa conservation des éléments traditionnels du roman (personnages, héros, quête…), mais aussi d’une littérature à idées, philosophiques ou politiques, qui l’enfermerait dans le langage du possible.La recherche de l’impossible évolue de pair, chez Thomas, avec la prise de conscience de la nécessité d’un héroïsme qui soit à sa hauteur. Dans ses récits, le dépassement héroïque s’inscrit dans une construction propre à l’épopée, telle que nous l’avons dégagée : un véritable héros, qui répond aux critères du héros romanesque selon Philippe Hamon ou Vincent Jouve.La quête de l’impossible, se résout donc dans la lumière hölderlinienne, lumière philosophique et poétique d’une joie subversive. Ainsi doit se comprendre la quête de réalité parfaite d’Henri Thomas, recherche d’une libération et d’une joie poétique impossibles, qui n’est atteinte que par l’acceptation de son absence
Between 1950 and 1972, Henri Thomas is engaged in a singular research which is the subject of our study and of which it is useful to distinguish two movements.The enigma that then fascinates Thomas is that of access to the territory of the impossible, understood as what goes beyond the limits of the possible - irrational, unlimited, unexplained, other names of the poetic or the sacred - and the only authentic space of the poetry.Textually, he inquires of a new form capable of saying the search for the impossible, and of integrating an epic and poetic dimension. All his narratives between Les Déserteurs (1951) and La Relique (1969) shape and refine a writing that can account for the heroic and poetic adventure of the characters.The new form imagined by Thomas turns away from the poetic narrative and the stylistic processes connected with it in order to develop an epic dimension borne by the presence of a hero who nourishes poetic questions.On the other hand, it is a question, thanks to this narrative that Thomas perfects during twenty years, to find a form of resolution in search of the impossible. During this period, the author assumes progressively the assimilation of the impossible to an immediacy which is also the tearing of the sacred. References to Diane's myth, to Klossowski's text, to the light of Hölderlin and his poetic quest, and finally to the presence of the relic in the last three narratives of the cycle studied, definitely orientate his quest towards this conclusion. Each novel leads him to clarify an aspect of his quest for the impossible.The quest for an unthinkable total resolutely inscribes Thomas in a literary tradition, from Hölderlin to Mallarmé and Rimbaud, to the poets of the Grand Jeu, and from the mystics to Leon Chestov. It also includes it in a modernity, a "community of the impossible" that unites Artaud, Blanchot, Bataille and Klossowski in a common project, although the means used to carry it out differ according to the writers.Thomas's project is therefore intimately poetic and narrative, distinguished from certain avant-garde movements by its preservation of the traditional elements of the novel (characters, heroes, quest ...), but also from a literature with ideas, philosophical or political , Which would enclose him in the language of the possible.The search for the impossible evolves in tandem, in Thomas, with the realization of the need for heroism that is at his height. In her narratives, the heroic surpassing is part of a construction peculiar to the epic, as we have seen it: a true hero, who meets the criteria of the romantic hero according to Philippe Hamon or Vincent Jouve.The quest for the impossible is resolved in the Hölderlin light, a philosophical and poetic light of subversive joy. Thus must be understood the quest for the perfect reality of Henry Thomas, the search for an impossible liberation and poetic joy, which is attained only by the acceptance of his absence

Nous nous intéressons dans cette thèse à la relation originale et problématique qui s’est établie, dans la période qui va de l’après-guerre jusqu’à la fin des années 1970, entre, d’une part, la temporalité de l’écriture telle que vécue par l’écrivain et, d’autre part, la temporalité produite par le texte. Le schème paradoxal qui préside à cette relation pourrait se résumer ainsi : écrire pour savoir pourquoi écrire. Si la formule semble consonner avec la vulgate d’une écriture autotélique, elle nous semble plus profondément poser la question complexe du désir du scripteur, quand toute relation univoque entre le dedans et le dehors est mise en cause. Pour mener à bien cette étude, nous procédons en deux grands moments. Le premier aborde cette configuration par un bord théorique : nous suivons le fil du syntagme de « point aveugle », en ses acceptions métaphoriques et conceptuelles, dans un corpus essayistique extrait du grand moment théorique français. La seconde propose deux parcours de lecture dans les œuvres littéraires narratives fictionnelles de Bernard Pingaud et d’Henri Thomas – écrivains qui, selon des modalités distinctes, montrent deux voies d’articulation originale des registres temporels considérés. Aussi différents soient-ils, ils partagent ce principe : écrire pour savoir ce que, sans cette traversée, on ne pourrait savoir, en s’affrontant à cet irréductible point aveugle qui se donne comme condition de possibilité et d’impossibilité du sens
The focus of this thesis is the relationship - in the period between the end of World War Two and the late 1970s - between the temporality of writing as experienced by the writer, and the temporality produced by the text itself. The paradoxical structure of this relationship can be captured by the following formula: writing in order to know why one writes. Though this formula may seem to invoke the modernist received wisdom concerning autotelitic writing, this thesis takes it as the starting point in order to understand the desires of the “scriptor” (to use Roland Barthes’s term) when all unambiguous relations between the internal and the external are called into doubt. This study will proceed in two major parts. The first will apply a theoretical lens to the notion of the “blind spot” as it appears in its various metaphorical and conceptual senses in the essayistic corpus of so-called “French theory”. The second will consist of a literary analysis of the fictional narratives of Bernard Pingaud and Henri Thomas: writers who, each in their own distinct modalities, reveal an original way of articulating the forms of temporality at the center of this study. As different as they are, Pingaud and Thomas each share the aim of writing in order to understand that which, without writing, one could never understand. In pursuit of this aim, both writers come face-to-face with a blind spot that poses itself as the condition of both the possibility and the impossibility of meaning

Attention to safety and health are of ever-increasing priority to industrial organizations. Good Safety is demanded by stockholders, employees, and the community while increasing injury costs provide additional motivation for safety and health excellence. Safety has always been a strong corporate value of DuPont and a vital part of its culture. As a result, DuPont has become a benchmark in safety and health performance. Since 1990, DuPont has re-engineered itself to meet global competition and address future vision. In the new re-engineered organizational structures, DuPont has also had to re-engineer its safety management systems. A special Discovery Team was chartered by DuPont senior management to determine the “best practices’ for safety and health being used in DuPont best-performing sites. A summary of the findings is presented, and five of the practices are discussed. Excellence in safety and health management is more important today than ever. Public awareness, federal and state regulations, and enlightened management have resulted in a widespread conviction that all employees have the right to work in an environment that will not adversely affect their safety and health. In DuPont, we believe that excellence in safety and health is necessary to achieve global competitiveness, maintain employee loyalty, and be an accepted member of the communities in which we make, handle, use, and transport products. Safety can also be the “catalyst” to achieving excellence in other important business parameters. The organizational and communication skills developed by management, individuals, and teams in safety can be directly applied to other company initiatives. As we look into the 21st Century, we must also recognize that new organizational structures (flatter with empowered teams) will require new safety management techniques and systems in order to maintain continuous improvement in safety performance. Injury costs, which have risen dramatically in the past twenty years, provide another incentive for safety and health excellence. Shown in the Figure 1, injury costs have increased even after correcting for inflation. Many companies have found these costs to be an “invisible drain” on earnings and profitability. In some organizations, significant initiatives have been launched to better manage the workers’ compensation systems. We have found that the ultimate solution is to prevent injuries and incidents before they occur. A globally-respected company, DuPont is regarded as a well-managed, extremely ethical firm that is the benchmark in industrial safety performance. Like many other companies, DuPont has re-engineered itself and downsized its operations since 1985. Through these changes, we have maintained dedication to our principles and developed new techniques to manage in these organizational environments. As a diversified company, our operations involve chemical process facilities, production line operations, field activities, and sales and distribution of materials. Our customer base is almost entirely industrial and yet we still maintain a high level of consumer awareness and positive perception. The DuPont concern for safety dates back to the early 1800s and the first days of the company. In 1802 E.I. DuPont, a Frenchman, began manufacturing quality grade explosives to fill America’s growing need to build roads, clear fields, increase mining output, and protect its recently won independence. Because explosives production is such a hazardous industry, DuPont recognized and accepted the need for an effective safety effort. The building walls of the first powder mill near Wilmington, Delaware, were built three stones thick on three sides. The back remained open to the Brandywine River to direct any explosive forces away from other buildings and employees. To set the safety example, DuPont also built his home and the homes of his managers next to the powder yard. An effective safety program was a necessity. It represented the first defense against instant corporate liquidation. Safety needs more than a well-designed plant, however. In 1811, work rules were posted in the mill to guide employee work habits. Though not nearly as sophisticated as the safety standards of today, they did introduce an important basic concept — that safety must be a line management responsibility. Later, DuPont introduced an employee health program and hired a company doctor. An early step taken in 1912 was the keeping of safety statistics, approximately 60 years before the federal requirement to do so. We had a visible measure of our safety performance and were determined that we were going to improve it. When the nation entered World War I, the DuPont Company supplied 40 percent of the explosives used by the Allied Forces, more than 1.5 billion pounds. To accomplish this task, over 30,000 new employees were hired and trained to build and operate many plants. Among these facilities was the largest smokeless powder plant the world had ever seen. The new plant was producing granulated powder in a record 116 days after ground breaking. The trends on the safety performance chart reflect the problems that a large new work force can pose until the employees fully accept the company’s safety philosophy. The first arrow reflects the World War I scale-up, and the second arrow represents rapid diversification into new businesses during the 1920s. These instances of significant deterioration in safety performance reinforced DuPont’s commitment to reduce the unsafe acts that were causing 96 percent of our injuries. Only 4 percent of injuries result from unsafe conditions or equipment — the remainder result from the unsafe acts of people. This is an important concept if we are to focus our attention on reducing injuries and incidents within the work environment. World War II brought on a similar set of demands. The story was similar to World War I but the numbers were even more astonishing: one billion dollars in capital expenditures, 54 new plants, 75,000 additional employees, and 4.5 billion pounds of explosives produced — 20 percent of the volume used by the Allied Forces. Yet, the performance during the war years showed no significant deviation from the pre-war years. In 1941, the DuPont Company was 10 times safer than all industry and 9 times safer than the Chemical Industry. Management and the line organization were finally working as they should to control the real causes of injuries. Today, DuPont is about 50 times safer than US industrial safety performance averages. Comparing performance to other industries, it is interesting to note that seemingly “hazard-free” industries seem to have extraordinarily high injury rates. This is because, as DuPont has found out, performance is a function of injury prevention and safety management systems, not hazard exposure. Our success in safety results from a sound safety management philosophy. Each of the 125 DuPont facilities is responsible for its own safety program, progress, and performance. However, management at each of these facilities approaches safety from the same fundamental and sound philosophy. This philosophy can be expressed in eleven straightforward principles. The first principle is that all injuries can be prevented. That statement may seem a bit optimistic. In fact, we believe that this is a realistic goal and not just a theoretical objective. Our safety performance proves that the objective is achievable. We have plants with over 2,000 employees that have operated for over 10 years without a lost time injury. As injuries and incidents are investigated, we can always identify actions that could have prevented that incident. If we manage safety in a proactive — rather than reactive — manner, we will eliminate injuries by reducing the acts and conditions that cause them. The second principle is that management, which includes all levels through first-line supervisors, is responsible and accountable for preventing injuries. Only when senior management exerts sustained and consistent leadership in establishing safety goals, demanding accountability for safety performance and providing the necessary resources, can a safety program be effective in an industrial environment. The third principle states that, while recognizing management responsibility, it takes the combined energy of the entire organization to reach sustained, continuous improvement in safety and health performance. Creating an environment in which employees feel ownership for the safety effort and make significant contributions is an essential task for management, and one that needs deliberate and ongoing attention. The fourth principle is a corollary to the first principle that all injuries are preventable. It holds that all operating exposures that may result in injuries or illnesses can be controlled. No matter what the exposure, an effective safeguard can be provided. It is preferable, of course, to eliminate sources of danger, but when this is not reasonable or practical, supervision must specify measures such as special training, safety devices, and protective clothing. Our fifth safety principle states that safety is a condition of employment. Conscientious assumption of safety responsibility is required from all employees from their first day on the job. Each employee must be convinced that he or she has a responsibility for working safely. The sixth safety principle: Employees must be trained to work safely. We have found that an awareness for safety does not come naturally and that people have to be trained to work safely. With effective training programs to teach, motivate, and sustain safety knowledge, all injuries and illnesses can be eliminated. Our seventh principle holds that management must audit performance on the workplace to assess safety program success. Comprehensive inspections of both facilities and programs not only confirm their effectiveness in achieving the desired performance, but also detect specific problems and help to identify weaknesses in the safety effort. The Company’s eighth principle states that all deficiencies must be corrected promptly. Without prompt action, risk of injuries will increase and, even more important, the credibility of management’s safety efforts will suffer. Our ninth principle is a statement that off-the-job safety is an important part of the overall safety effort. We do not expect nor want employees to “turn safety on” as they come to work and “turn it off” when they go home. The company safety culture truly becomes of the individual employee’s way of thinking. The tenth principle recognizes that it’s good business to prevent injuries. Injuries cost money. However, hidden or indirect costs usually exceed the direct cost. Our last principle is the most important. Safety must be integrated as core business and personal value. There are two reasons for this. First, we’ve learned from almost 200 years of experience that 96 percent of safety incidents are directly caused by the action of people, not by faulty equipment or inadequate safety standards. But conversely, it is our people who provide the solutions to our safety problems. They are the one essential ingredient in the recipe for a safe workplace. Intelligent, trained, and motivated employees are any company’s greatest resource. Our success in safety depends upon the men and women in our plants following procedures, participating actively in training, and identifying and alerting each other and management to potential hazards. By demonstrating a real concern for each employee, management helps establish a mutual respect, and the foundation is laid for a solid safety program. This, of course, is also the foundation for good employee relations. An important lesson learned in DuPont is that the majority of injuries are caused by unsafe acts and at-risk behaviors rather than unsafe equipment or conditions. In fact, in several DuPont studies it was estimated that 96 percent of injuries are caused by unsafe acts. This was particularly revealing when considering safety audits — if audits were only focused on conditions, at best we could only prevent four percent of our injuries. By establishing management systems for safety auditing that focus on people, including audit training, techniques, and plans, all incidents are preventable. Of course, employee contribution and involvement in auditing leads to sustainability through stakeholdership in the system. Management safety audits help to make manage the “behavioral balance.” Every job and task performed at a site can do be done at-risk or safely. The essence of a good safety system ensures that safe behavior is the accepted norm amongst employees, and that it is the expected and respected way of doing things. Shifting employees norms contributes mightily to changing culture. The management safety audit provides a way to quantify these norms. DuPont safety performance has continued to improve since we began keeping records in 1911 until about 1990. In the 1990–1994 time frame, performance deteriorated as shown in the chart that follows: This increase in injuries caused great concern to senior DuPont management as well as employees. It occurred while the corporation was undergoing changes in organization. In order to sustain our technological, competitive, and business leadership positions, DuPont began re-engineering itself beginning in about 1990. New streamlined organizational structures and collaborative work processes eliminated many positions and levels of management and supervision. The total employment of the company was reduced about 25 percent during these four years. In our traditional hierarchical organization structures, every level of supervision and management knew exactly what they were expected to do with safety, and all had important roles. As many of these levels were eliminated, new systems needed to be identified for these new organizations. In early 1995, Edgar S. Woolard, DuPont Chairman, chartered a Corporate Discovery Team to look for processes that will put DuPont on a consistent path toward a goal of zero injuries and occupational illnesses. The cross-functional team used a mode of “discovery through learning” from as many DuPont employees and sites around the world. The Discovery Team fostered the rapid sharing and leveraging of “best practices” and innovative approaches being pursued at DuPont’s plants, field sites, laboratories, and office locations. In short, the team examined the company’s current state, described the future state, identified barriers between the two, and recommended key ways to overcome these barriers. After reporting back to executive management in April, 1995, the Discovery Team was realigned to help organizations implement their recommendations. The Discovery Team reconfirmed key values in DuPont — in short, that all injuries, incidents, and occupational illnesses are preventable and that safety is a source of competitive advantage. As such, the steps taken to improve safety performance also improve overall competitiveness. Senior management made this belief clear: “We will strengthen our business by making safety excellence an integral part of all business activities.” One of the key findings of the Discovery Team was the identification of the best practices used within the company, which are listed below: ▪ Felt Leadership – Management Commitment ▪ Business Integration ▪ Responsibility and Accountability ▪ Individual/Team Involvement and Influence ▪ Contractor Safety ▪ Metrics and Measurements ▪ Communications ▪ Rewards and Recognition ▪ Caring Interdependent Culture; Team-Based Work Process and Systems ▪ Performance Standards and Operating Discipline ▪ Training/Capability ▪ Technology ▪ Safety and Health Resources ▪ Management and Team Audits ▪ Deviation Investigation ▪ Risk Management and Emergency Response ▪ Process Safety ▪ Off-the-Job Safety and Health Education Attention to each of these best practices is essential to achieve sustained improvements in safety and health. The Discovery Implementation in conjunction with DuPont Safety and Environmental Management Services has developed a Safety Self-Assessment around these systems. In this presentation, we will discuss a few of these practices and learn what they mean. Paper published with permission.