Dissertations / Theses on the topic '1889-1976 Sein und Zeit'
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Tremblay, Michel. "L'interprétation du temps dans Sein und Zeit." Master's thesis, Université Laval, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11794/45695.
Full textLapidot, Elad. "Être sans mot dire : la logique de Sein und Zeit." Paris 1, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008PA010571.
Full textMacAvoy, Leslie A. "The dialogicality of Dasein : conversation and encounter within Heidegger's Being and time." Thesis, McGill University, 1997. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=34754.
Full textPart I offers an interpretation of Heidegger's concept of subjectivity with emphasis on the movement from inauthenticity to authenticity. In order to mediate the more traditionally existentialist reading of Dasein's authenticity, I situate Being and Time within Heidegger's larger phenomenological project. This opens up the possibility of thinking about Being-in-the-world and Being-towards-death in terms of a lived intentionality in which Dasein has its own Being as its object. Although Dasein in its everydayness generally only comports toward its own Being in the manner characteristic of empty intentionality, this intention can be fulfilled. This fulfillment constitutes Dasein's authenticity.
Part II poses the question: What is dialogue? I illustrate that there are two figures of dialogue---conversation and encounter. Conversation is an exchange between participants which maintains a particular flow and thematic unity, and is based on the structure of question and response. Its possibility rests in the otherness of the participants with respect to one another and in their ability to mediate this difference through some shared basis of meaning. Encounter, on the other hand, is an event of meeting between participants in which the alterity of the other is thrown into high relief by the challenge which it poses to the self, thereby throwing into question both the self and the meaning in which it dwells. Nevertheless, both conversation and encounter can be shown to be dialogical relative to a constellation of concepts. Dialogue is an engagement with alterity marked by a simultaneous continuity and discontinuity with the other. This engagement bears a relation to meaning and is the ground of responsibility and questionability .
In Part III, this notion of dialogue is used to interpret Dasein's subjectivity and its becoming authentic. I argue that Dasein's everydayness can be understood as a conversationality in the third person which is transformed into the first-person conversationality of authentic historizing through an encounter with radical alterity in anxious Being-towards-death.
Bowden, Peta Lyn. "Relationships with others : insights from the work of Martin Heidegger for feminism, ethics and care." Thesis, McGill University, 1987. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=63779.
Full textDe, Sousa Rui. "Martin Heidegger's interpretation of ancient Greek aletheia and the philological response to it." Thesis, McGill University, 2000. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=36760.
Full textLévêque, Gilles. "L'apparence de l'être : la phénoménologie d'Être et temps de Heidegger en question." Paris 4, 2001. http://www.theses.fr/2001PA040104.
Full textThe aim of this work is to determine the reasons why the opening of being, taken on in Being and Time by the Dasein, is not in a position to lead to the objective targeted by Heidegger in 1927, i. E. The making out of the meaning of being. To reach that aim, we undertake a strictly phenomenological examination of the phenomena that are described in Being and Time, determining the way in which they are led to show themselves. We examine in particular the dissimulation belonging to the opening of the Dasein, along with its privative nature, that essentially characterizes, as we mean to demonstrate, the opening, even authentic. Finally we attempt to establish that a phenomenological reduction which is radicalised with regard to Husserl's is constantly exercised in Being and Time, and that it is this reduction which generates both the question of being and the aporia of that work
Flores, Cienfuegos Gerardo. "Acerca de la idea de muerte en Heidegger." Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 1997. http://www.repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/129921.
Full textJullien, Philippe. "Je suis déjà là : structure de la relation entre Dasein et Être chez Heidegger." Paris 4, 2003. http://www.theses.fr/2003PA040029.
Full textAs Heidegger's remarks about the relationship between Dasein and Being are scattered in a variety of texts, and as they are never thematically dealt with, the reconstructing of this relationship, made from a selection of texts covering a period long enough to be significant, is the purpose of this study : first Being and Time, as a recapitulation of an earlier thinking ; then the 1927-1932 period, where Heidegger goes beyond Being and Time towards a metaphysic of the Dasein ; then his political commitment, interpreted as a step rather than an interlude ; and finally the years immediatly after the political commitment, when the posterity of the thinking of Being beginns. This way a structure of the relationship between Dasein and Being appears, that the comparison of the texts allows to reconstruct. The thinking of this relationship proves to be well unified before 1933, then commited in a problematical context where it does not totally disappear for all that, lastly altered from 1934, the point being now that the immediate relation to Being is no longer anymore attributed to the Dasein but to poetry, the Dasein being " brought down " below this position. The structure of the relationship is not changed, unlike the estimation of the modes of its bringing into play. What is emphasized is now the habitation of the earth, in accordance with the fundamental tonality of the poetry
McIntyre, Sarah Anne. "Heideggerian historicity 1927-1976 : three examples of casuistry from Sein und Zeit." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.615213.
Full textSève, Henry. "Ecriture scénaristique-écriture du temps le temps du scénario par la lecture de Sein und zeit de Heidegger." Paris 8, 1999. http://www.theses.fr/1999PA081624.
Full textArrien, Sophie-Jan. "L'herméneutique comme pensée de l'être dans "Être et temps"." Thesis, Université Laval, 1995. http://www.theses.ulaval.ca/1995/14439/14439.pdf.
Full textCôté, Gabriel. "L'évolution du concept de vérité et l'interprétation critique de Platon chez Heidegger de 1927 à 1943." Master's thesis, Université Laval, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11794/31450.
Full textEble, Margareta. "Zukunft : die Zeitdimension des Handelns." Paris 1, 2005. http://www.theses.fr/2005PA010501.
Full textVélez, López Germán Darío. "Heidegger : genèse d'une vie philosophique." Paris 1, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009PA010717.
Full textVillevieille, Laurent. "Détermination et indétermination dans la pensée de Martin Heidegger. Essai d’une relecture du traité Sein und Zeit." Thesis, Paris 4, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012PA040107.
Full text“Sein und Zeit” is a Abhandlung, a “treatise”. Even though it never gives an express definition of this status, which it claims yet explicitly, “Sein und Zeit” founds it nevertheless on its own mereological structure, in other words on the articulation of a whole and its parts. This structure isn’t limited to a textual division of the work into parts, sections, chapters and paragraphs. At a deeper level, it implies the concordance of these textual divisions and those of the thing itself, that is to say those of the Dasein, whose structure: being-in-the-world, is itself the object of a tripartition. As a result, there’s a risk of fragmentation, both textual and ontological, which turns out to be inherent in the very act of determination. Thus, it would be the problematic act of determining the Dasein, which, by going deeper into the mereological problem, would give to “Sein und Zeit” its treatise structure. Consequently, our purpose is to show that the treatise of 1927 allows to interpret its incompletion precisely on the basis of its treatise structure – that is to say on the basis of a merelogical project of determination which doesn’t authorize an articulation of a whole and of its parts because it reaches its highest point with the discovery of a constituent indetermination, and which nevertheless can’t or doesn’t want to abandon the treatise structure it had initially adopted
Castellanos, Rafael. "Déconstruction de l'auto-affection pure : étude sur les notions de répétition et d'auto-affection pure à l'époque de Sein und Zeit." Thesis, Paris 4, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011PA040022.
Full textIf deconstruction begins somewhere, if its starting point is not already the original multiplication ofprinciple and origin, then it is necessary to say that it begins first as the deconstruction of pure selfaffection.The interrogation of the concept of pure self-affection is the interrogation of probably the lastattempt to think about subjectivity in the terms of a principle (which are of course the terms of“subjectivity”). The pure self-affection concept widely refers to the 1929 book by Heidegger on Kanttitled Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. In this context, the concept of pure self-affection refersalready to repetition as the essential “device” for its production. The question of repetition is in factinseparable from pure self-affection deconstruction. If pure self-affection can work as another name fortemporality, then we have to show the reason for a well established fact : it is just through repetitionthat temporality can be disclosed. In this sense, repetition is already the repetition of the question onbeing (Sein und Zeit), but also the repetition of Kant (Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics). Now, thedetermination of temporality as pure self-affection, through Heidegger's repetition of Kant, supposesthe essential understanding of phenomenological temporality on the basis of Husserl's concept oforiginary impression. In this sense, as leading pure self-affection deconstruction, repetition – before theconstitution of identity – is to be found on the grounds of the originary impression itself
Croce, Camilla. "Stimmung et Ereignis. Sur le caractère d’événement des dispositions émotives dans la pensée de Heidegger." Thesis, Paris 4, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011PA040003.
Full textIn Time and being Heidegger describes the emotional character of the ontological structure of existence as a Befindlichkeit. The state of mind occurs on the ontical experience of everyday as a Stimmung, which in its phenomenological function as formal indication defers to the ontological structure of Dasein. The relation between them seems to be that of simple accompaniment. Within the turn this relation undergoes a reversal, so that the term Befindlichkeit itself disappears to leave only the Stimmung. While in 1926 the onticity of Stimmung was considered inauthentic, within the Kehre, however, this ontical layer always emotionally disposed, reveals the access to the original in the Daseins facticity. The ontic-ontological structure unfolds the ambiguity of truths as duplicity of the emotional openness of Dasein, so that it would have definitely been perceived in the early 1930’s as ontical Stimmung. In this way Heidegger strengthens its function, so far as to make it indispensable for the preparation of the other beginning of thinking. If the representational thinking depends on the Grundstimmung of the first beginning, as well as on the fact that metaphysics do not question ask about the truth of being, but rather pursue the question of the entity until the calculating thought of the technological epoch, then the thought of the other beginning must not only forbid the representation, but also, at the same time, rediscover the disclosing essence of the image. Once poetry is understood as original language, poetry’s use of image offers the possibility to bring the appropriative event to the language without objectifying it. The ability to safeguard the being into a word that does not represent it but just states it, indicating its happening, depends on the correct understanding of the event’s character of Stimmungen
Kasowski, Gregor Bartolomeus. "Conscience et attestation : le rôle méthodologique de « l’appel de la conscience » (Gewissensruf) dans Être et temps de Heidegger." Thesis, Paris 4, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012PA040061.
Full textThis study aims to exhibit the methodological role that Martin Heidegger assigns toconscience (Gewissen) in Being and Time and to reveal the implications of hisinterpretation of the “call of conscience” as the means of producing the attestation(Bezeugung) of authentic existence as a possibility of Being-in-the-world (or Dasein). Webegin by seeking to understand how Heidegger’s notion of conscience evolved prior to the1927 publication of Being and Time and to identify the sources which contributed to hisinterpretation of conscience as the “call of care.” Our historical analysis notably revealsthat Heidegger never once describes conscience as a “call” before reading Das Gewissen(1925) by Hendrik G. Stoker, a young South African philosopher who studied under MaxScheler’s direction at the University of Cologne. We specifically examine how Stoker’sphenomenological study—which describes conscience as the “call-of-duty” issued to eachhuman being by the divine “spark” (synteresis) placed in his or her soul by God—contributed to shaping Heidegger’s account of the “existential call.” Focusing on themethodological role of conscience in Being and Time, we analyze Heidegger’s major workin light of his early lectures on phenomenology at Freiburg and Marburg. This approachconfirms the relation between conscience in Being and Time and the concept of “formalindication” that Heidegger placed at the heart of his evolving “method” ofphenomenological investigation. While many commentators have argued that Heidegger’s“call of conscience” is solipsistic and impossible to experience, we propose a way ofreconsidering this apparent impasse by examining what Being and Time itself “formallyindicates” with regard to conscience. We show that Heidegger’s conscience points to aphenomenon of existential “testimony” which is radically different from the traditionalnotion of conscientia. Guided by Heidegger’s “formal indication” of conscience, we“destructively” review the history of the German word Gewissen and reveal its originalmeaning to be “testimonium” not “conscientia.” In recognizing that Gewissen originally meant “attestation,” we show how Heidegger’s existential phenomenon of conscience canbe understood as Dasein’s experience of hearing the “silent testimony” of the martyr
Leal, Hânder Costa. "A temporalização da temporalidade política compreendida por meio da analítica existencial de Heidegger em Ser e tempo." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/148981.
Full textThis work is a journey into the fabric of political time. What is political time and why does it lack a sense of urgency? Explaining political time is retrieving the being of political time: the temporalization of political temporality. We look for an answer to the origin of political time in the existential analytic developed by Martin Heidegger in Being and Time. We suggest that political temporality is derived from the individual’s temporality: the everyday Dasein is the subject of the temporalization of political temporality. Approaching philosophy of time and political theory into an ontology of political time allows us to reveal two political temporalities: existential microtime and institutional macrotime. Existential microtime is the political implication of the temporality of the authentic individual: authentic Dasein, who is being-toward-death as existential urgency of present time and who temporalizes political temporality as urgency. Institutional macrotime is the political implication of the temporality of the everyday Dasein. Inauthentic as he/she is, he/she is a being-toward-death as fleeing from death, and so temporalizes political temporality as waiting and delay. The time efficiency of politics depends on the demand for the achievement in the present time of a political will either conceived or expressed in the present time. Urgency is associated with high time efficiency of politics, while waiting leads to politics with low time efficiency. Urgency and waiting, the two modes of being of political time, are mediated by two structures of temporalization: modernization and transcendentalism. In the dimension modernization of political temporality, the demand for the achievement in the present time of a political will either conceived or expressed in the present time relies on the individual’s capability as perceived in the present time. In the dimension transcendentalism of political temporality, the demand for the achievement in the present time of a political will either conceived or expressed in the present time relies on the sense of urgency triggered by the objectification of death as the impossibility of any possibility. If, as Heidegger claims, the individual is a being-toward-the-end (Sein-zum-Ende), and death is the ontological impossibility of any possibility, then existence is the totality of political time. This means that finiteness (Endlichkeit) imposes on the individual the need for totalizing politics in the present time. However, it turns out that the average citizen takes as his/her own the temporality of the political system, the temporality of the “they” (Dasman), which is ontologically incompatible with existential urgency, since the “they”, for it is both anyone and no one, never dies. A comprehensive understanding of political temporality and the establishment of a methodology of political science aimed at retrieving the sense of urgency – the latter is a must unveiled by the study of the political temporality from the perspective of the being – will only be possible if we take account of the ontological incompatibility between finiteness and political delay.
¿Por qué el tiempo político carece de un sentido de urgencia? Explicar el tiempo político es recobrar el ser del tiempo político: la temporalización de la temporalidad política. Buscamos, en la analítica existencial desarrollada por Martin Heidegger en Ser y Tiempo, una respuesta para la cuestión del origen del tiempo político. Sugerimos que la temporalidad política se deriva de la temporalidad de la persona: el ser-ahí cotidiano es el sujeto de la temporalización de la temporalidad política. Emplear filosofía del tiempo y teoría política en una ontología del tiempo político nos permite revelar dos temporalidades políticas: microtiempo existencial y macrotiempo institucional. El microtiempo existencial es la manifestación política de la temporalidad del indivíduo auténtico: el ser-ahí auténtico, que es ser-para-la-muerte como urgência existencial del tiempo presente y que temporaliza la temporalidad política como urgencia. El macrotiempo institucional es el despliegue político de la temporalidad del ser-ahí cotidiano. Inauténtico, él/ella es un ser-para-la-muerte como fuga de la muerte y temporaliza la temporalidad política como espera. La eficiencia temporal de la acción política depende de la demanda por realización en el tiempo presente de la voluntad política concebida o expresada en el tiempo presente. La urgencia se asocia con una alta eficiencia temporal de la acción política. La espera se asocia con una baja eficiencia temporal de la acción política. Urgencia y espera, los dos modos de ser del tiempo político, son mediados por las dos estructuras de temporalización: modernización y trascendentalismo. En la dimensión modernización de la temporalidad política, la demanda por realización en el tiempo presente de la voluntad política concebida o expresada en el tiempo presente depende de la capacidad del individuo percibida en el tiempo presente. En la dimensión trascendentalismo de la temporalidade política, la demanda por realización en el tiempo presente de la voluntad política concebida o expresada en el tiempo presente depende de la sensación de urgencia provocada por la objetivación de la muerte como la imposibilidad de cualquier posibilidad. Si, como afirma Heidegger, el individuo es ser-para-el-fin (Sein-zum- Ende), y la muerte es la imposibilidad ontológica de toda y cualquiera posibilidad, entonces la existencia es la totalidad del tiempo político. Esto significa que la finitud (Endlichkeit) impone al hombre la necesidad de totalizar la política en el tiempo presente. Sin embargo, resulta que el ciudadano medio considera como sendo suya la temporalidad del sistema político, la temporalidad del “ellos” (Dasman), que es ontológicamente incompatible con la urgencia existencial, porque por ser a la vez todos y ninguno, el “ellos” nunca muere. Una comprensión profunda de la temporalidad política y la construcción de una metodología de ciencia política centrada en el recobro del sentido de urgencia, necesidad imperativa desvelada en el estudio de la temporalidad política desde la perspectiva del ser, sólo serán posibles si se tiene en cuenta la incompatibilidad ontológica entre la finitud y los retrasos políticos.
deRose, Barbara Sue. "The lived experience of obtaining required childhood vaccinations from Latino immigrants’ perspective." Thesis, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1805/4605.
Full textVaccinations are an important step in preventing childhood illnesses and disease outbreaks in the community. Complete immunizations before school assure eligibility for enrollment and protect children against severe illness. The fact that foreign-born children of Latino immigrants face health disparities in receiving vaccinations is well documented. However, there is little information in the literature about the actual experience of immigrants facing the complexities of the health system, and through their eyes, which factors ultimately affect vaccination rates of immigrant Latino children. The purpose of this study is to give voice to Latino immigrant families who have recently immigrated to the United States, in terms of the issues they encountered when engaging the health care system for vaccinations.