Dissertations / Theses: '1889-1951 Philosophy'

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Cunningham, Thomas Robert. "The continuity of Wittgenstein's critical meta-philosophy." Thesis, University of Stirling, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1893/1055.

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This thesis investigates the continuity of Wittgenstein’s approach to, and conception of, philosophy. Part One examines the rule-following passages of the Philosophical Investigations. I argue that Wittgenstein’s remarks can only be read as interesting and coherent if we see him, as urged by prominent commentators, resisting the possibility of a certain ‘sideways-on’ perspective. There is real difficulty, however, in ascertaining what the resulting Wittgensteinian position is: whether it is position structurally analogous with Kant’s distinction between empirical realism and transcendental idealism, or whether philosophical ‘therapy’ is meant to dissolve any drive towards such idealism. I argue that both of these readings of Wittgenstein are found in the work of McDowell. Part Two argues that related issues arise in respect to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the question of realism. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of a certain ‘sideways-on’ perspective. Again, I argue, it is unclear whether Wittgenstein embraces a form of transcendental idealism or, on the contrary, ultimately reveals the idealist position to be empty. Part Three connects ‘sideways-on’ glances with the threat of idealism by introducing a philosophical ‘measure’. I argue that the measure is a useful tool in assessment of the Tractatus, and shows that Wittgenstein was no idealist, but is less useful as an assessment of the Investigations. It yields the result that Wittgenstein succumbed to idealism, but in doing so may overlook the ‘therapeutic’ nature of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy.

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2

Fronda, Earl Stanley. "Wittgenstein from a theological point of view." Thesis, University of Wales Trinity Saint David, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.683343.

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3

李鐵. "論維特根斯坦的遵守規則思想 = Wittgenstein on following a rule." HKBU Institutional Repository, 2006. http://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_ra/692.

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4

Last, Nana D. "Images of entanglement : Wittgensteinian spatial practices between architecture and philosophy." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/9673.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Architecture and Planning, February 1999.
Includes bibliographical references (p. 217-218).
This thesis explores the deep spatio-linguistic relationship between the Austrian born philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein's practices of philosophy and of architecture. Wittgenstein's philosophy of language is notable for its sharply distinguished early and late work: with the early work most strongly associated with his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) and the later frequently designated by his posthumously published Philosophical Investigations (1953). Following the completion of the early work Wittgenstein abandoned philosophy for a period of ten years, spending the years from 1926 to 1929 engaged in the design and construction of a house in Vienna for his sister Margarethe Stonborough. The thesis considers the ways in which the intervening practice of architecture infiltrated, altered, influenced and manifested itself in the later philosophy by focusing on the spatial. temporal. conceptual and cognitive gaps in the philosophy. The importance and the prevalence of the practice of architecture for Wittgenstein's later philosophy are exhibited in a variety of ways that together broaden, reconceive and resituate the functioning of language and philosophy. The thesis considers these developments in the philosophy as they are revealed in the visual and spatial language, thinking and construction of the philosophical texts. This analysis reveals a shift from the removed, idealized and flattened picture theory of the Tractatus to the production of the spatially complex and ambiguous images of entanglement in the Investigations. The Stonborough house, itself, is analyzed through its production of cognitive and spatial practices and problematics. Wittgenstein's practice of architecture is shown to utilize. develop, challenge and reveal related spatial concepts found in the philosophy. These include the ideas of limits, boundaries, inner/outer dichotomies, the relationship between showing and saying, the idea of correspondence and the practices of representation, assembly. resemblance, construction, building and rearrangement.
by Nana D. Last.
Ph.D.

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5

Prucka, Leslie J. "Linguistic, strategies for architectural activities : Wittgenstein, philosophy, and language." Thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology, 1987. http://hdl.handle.net/1853/21705.

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6

Wong, Ka Ling. "The later Wittgenstein on grammar, necessity and normativity." HKBU Institutional Repository, 2011. https://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_ra/1271.

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7

Temelini, Michael. "Seeing things differently : Wittgenstein and social and political philosophy." Thesis, McGill University, 1999. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=35950.

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This thesis calls into question a currently orthodox view of Ludwig Wittgenstein's post-Tractarian philosophy. This view is that the social and political implications of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations are conservative and relativist. That is, Wittgenstein's concepts such as 'forms of life', 'language-games' and 'rule-following' defend and promote: a rule-determined and context-determined rationality; or an incomparable community-determined human understanding; or a neutralist, nonrevisionary, private or uncritical social and political philosophy.
In order to challenge and correct this conventional understanding the thesis sets up as 'objects of comparison' a variety of very different examples of the use of Wittgenstein in social and political philosophy. These uses are neither relativist nor conservative and they situate understanding and critical reflection in the practices of comparison and dialogue. The examples of this 'comparative-dialogical' Wittgensteinian approach are found in the works of three contemporary philosophers: Thomas L. Kuhn, Quentin Skinner and Charles Taylor.
This study employs the technique of a survey rather than undertaking a uniquely textual analysis because it is less convincing to suggest that Wittgenstein's concepts might be used in these unfamiliar ways than to show that they have been put to these unfamiliar uses. Therefore I turn not to a Wittgensteinian ideal but to examples of the 'comparative-dialogical' uses of Wittgenstein. In so doing I am following Wittgenstein's insight in section 208 of the Philosophical Investigations: "I shall teach him to use the words by means of examples and by practice. And when I do this, I do not communicate less to him than I know myself." Thus it will be in a survey of various uses and applications of Wittgenstein's concepts and techniques that I will show that I and others understand them.

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8

Tavares, Francisco Renato 1981. "Metafísica e Misticismo no Tractatus de Wittgenstein." [s.n.], 2013. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/281686.

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Orientador: Arley Ramos Moreno
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: Este trabalho mostra que o misticismo do Tractatus é de fundamental importância para a compreensão da atitude de Wittgenstein perante o mundo e a vida. O místico que se mostra na estrutura do mundo e da linguagem é inefável e, é a única solução para a metafísica. O Tractatus não pretende ser uma negação positivista da metafísica, como sugerido pela interpretação dos membros do Círculo de Viena. Wittgenstein, nesta obra, inaugura uma nova postura diante da metafísica. Quando se atinge a perspectiva de contemplação do mundo sub specie aeterni, é possível perceber porque a metafísica é incapaz de expressar o que há de mais sublime. O silêncio é a única atitude lógico-filosófica de quem compreende que a linguagem esbarra em seus limites, nos limites do mundo, toda vez que queira dizer algo sublime
Abstract: This work shows that the mysticism of the Tractatus is of fundamental importance for the understanding Wittgenstein's attitude towards the world and life. The mystic which is showed in the structure of the world and language is ineffable, and is the only solution for the metaphysics. The Tractatus is not intended to be a positivist denial of metaphysics, as suggested by the interpretation of the members of the Vienna Circle. Wittgenstein, in this work, inaugurates a new attitude toward metaphysics. When one achieves the perspective of contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni, it is possible to see why the metaphysics is unable to express what is most sublime. Silence is the only logical and philosophical attitude of one who understands that language comes up against its limits, within the limits of the world, every time one wants to say something sublime
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia

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9

Heyes, Cressida J. "'Back to the rough ground!' : Wittgenstein, essentialism, and feminist methods." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp02/NQ36981.pdf.

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10

Magalhães, Tiago de Oliveira. "Os papéis do psicológico na filosofia de Wittgenstein: do tractatus às investigações." www.teses.ufc.br, 2010. http://www.repositorio.ufc.br/handle/riufc/6528.

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MAGALHÃES, Tiago de Oliveira. Os papéis do psicológico na filosofia de Wittgenstein: do tractatus às investigações. 2010. 120f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2010.
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The present study intends to enlighten the role that the reflection on psychological issues performs in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, embracing the most remarkable moments of the period that goes from his first philosophical book until his main mature work. In order to do it, the capital features of his thought are presented, so that it becomes possible to identify the function displayed by his awareness on that subject field. Thus, the development of the wittgensteinian philosophy itself is a highlighted topic. What can be noticed throughout this process is the philosopher permanent and explicit concern in making clear the structural distinction between the philosophical task and any form of scientific research on mental world, going along with a progressive enhancement of his interest on the psychological as matter of the philosophical activity. The conclusion is that both aspects are fundamental traits of Wittgentein’s thought.
O presente trabalho tem como objetivo evidenciar o papel desempenhado pela reflexão sobre o psicológico na filosofia de Ludwig Wittgenstein, abrangendo os momentos mais relevantes do período que vai de seu primeiro livro filosófico até a principal obra de sua maturidade. Com esse intuito, as principais características do pensamento do autor são expostas, de maneira que aí se possa identificar o lugar ocupado pela reflexão sobre aquele campo temático. Dessa forma, o próprio desenvolvimento da filosofia wittgensteiniana em si mesmo é um tópico em destaque. O que se observa ao longo desse processo é um permanente e explícito cuidado em tornar clara a distinção entre o trabalho filosófico e qualquer forma de pesquisa científica sobre o mundo mental, acompanhado por um progressivo aumento do interesse pelo psicológico enquanto tema da atividade filosófica. Conclui-se que ambos esses aspectos são fatores fundamentais da própria caracterização do pensamento wittgensteiniano.

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11

Wright, James K. "Schoenberg, Wittgenstein, and the Vienna circle : epistemological meta-themes in harmonic theory, aesthetics, and logical positivism." Thesis, McGill University, 2001. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=38438.

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This study examines the relativistic aspects of Arnold Schoenberg's harmonic and aesthetic theories in the light of a framework of ideas presented in the early writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the logician, philosopher of language, and Schoenberg's contemporary and Austrian compatriot. The author has identified correspondences between the writings of Schoenberg, the early Wittgenstein (the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, in particular), and the Vienna Circle of philosophers, on a wide range of topics and themes. Issues discussed include the nature and limits of language, musical universals, theoretical conventionalism, word-to-world correspondence in language, the need for a fact- and comparison-based approach to art criticism, and the nature of music-theoretical formalism and mathematical modeling. Schoenberg and Wittgenstein are shown to have shared a vision that is remarkable for its uniformity and balance, one that points toward the reconciliation of the positivist-relativist dualism that has dominated recent discourse in music theory. Contrary to earlier accounts of Schoenberg's harmonic and aesthetic relativism, this study identifies a solid epistemological core underlying his thought, a view that was very much in step with Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, and thereby with the most vigorous and forward-looking stream in early twentieth century intellectual history.

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12

Yokoyama, Fernando Sposito 1989. "A noção de 'realidade' no Tractatus de Wittgenstein." [s.n.], 2014. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/279658.

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Orientador: José Oscar de Almeida Marques
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: Em seu Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein procura explicar o modo pelo qual as proposições da linguagem adquirem o sentido que expressam. A abordagem desse tema, no plano da obra, ganha a forma de uma investigação acerca da natureza essencial da representação, pois, segundo o Tractatus, uma proposição expressa um sentido na medida em que ela representa uma situação na realidade. Ao oferecer uma teoria acerca da essência da representação, Wittgenstein acaba por enunciar teses acerca das propriedades essenciais da realidade representada. Nesse ponto, existe um conflito na literatura secundária da obra entre as leituras denominadas realista e antirrealista, que divergem acerca do modo de conceber essas teses. O objetivo deste trabalho é examinar esse conflito, explicando as diferentes interpretações apresentadas por essas leituras opostas. De acordo com a leitura denominada realista, essas teses dizem respeito a uma realidade concebida como um domínio independente de sua representação linguística. Poder-se dizer então que essa linha interpretativa atribui ao Tractatus teses que podem ser tomadas como ontológicas ou metafísicas, no sentido de que elas enunciariam as propriedades últimas de um domínio real independente. Já os proponentes da leitura denominada antirrealista sustentam que essas teses dizem respeito exclusivamente à ordem lógica essencial dos nossos sistemas de representação. Por conseguinte, eles recusam que o Tractatus contenha teses que possam ser consideradas ontológicas, uma vez que a ordem lógica da linguagem teria sido o começo e o fim de todas as investigações de Wittgenstein nesta obra. Procuraremos delinear os aspectos centrais dessas duas leituras, tentando mostrar, se possível, as vantagens e desvantagens de cada uma delas no que diz respeito à sua adequação à teoria semântica desenvolvida por Wittgenstein no Tractatus
Abstract: In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein seeks to explain the way in which the propositions of language acquire the meaning they express. The approach to this subject, in the framework of the book, assumes the form of an inquiry into the essential nature of representation, since, according to the Tractatus, a proposition expresses a sense insofar as it represents a situation in reality. By offering a theory of the essence of representation, Wittgenstein ultimately states theses about the essential properties of the reality that is represented. At this point, there is a conflict in the secondary literature between the so-called realist and anti-realist readings, which differ on how to conceive such theses. The aim of the present work is to examine this conflict, by explaining the different interpretations put forward by these opposite readings. According to the so-called realist reading, these theses relate to a reality conceived as a domain that is independent of its linguistic representation. One can say that this reading attributes to the Tractatus theses that can be taken as ontological or metaphysical, in the sense that they would state the ultimate properties of an independent reality. On the other hand, the proponents of the so-called anti-realist reading maintain that these thesis relate only to the essential logical order of our systems of representation. Therefore, they refuse that the Tractatus contains theses that could be considered as ontological, since the logical order of language would be the beginning and the end of all Wittgenstein¿s investigations in this work. We will try to outline the main aspects of these two readings, trying to show, if possible, the advantages and disadvantages of each one with regard to their adequacy to the semantic theory developed by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia

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13

Azize, Rafael Lopes. "Paradigmas de analise conceitual em Wittgenstein." [s.n.], 2008. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/280188.

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Orientador: Arley Ramos Moreno
Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias
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Resumo: Este trabalho investiga a atividade filosófica de análise conceitual segundo a concebe o Wittgenstein tardio, do ponto de vista da maneira como tal análise contribui para exibir os limites casuísticos do sentido após o Tractatus. A análise conceitual é então considerada sobretudo do ponto de vista do seu escopo, i.e., do seu terminus. Três momentos são pontuados, correspondentes aos três capítulos: 1. o momento de introdução das regras como objeto de análise, no contexto dos respectivos sistemas de regras; 2. o momento de pluralização dos sistemas de regras, isto é, quando o âmbito de esclarecimento duma regra extrapola para sistemas encadeados, quando então se introduz o conceito de jogo de linguagem para dar conta do modo desse encadeamento; e por fim, 3. o momento em que a análise conceitual encontra os seus limites últimos no contexto amplíssimo e vago (die Umgebung) da forma de vida. Paralelamente a essa tripla pontuação, ressaltam-se alguns aspectos mais específicos, relativos às diferenças entre os três paradigmas de análise: 1. os diferentes procedimentos de análise, ou esclarecimento, solicitados por cada paradigma; 2. aquilo que, em cada paradigma, conta como conceito; e, por fim, 3. um movimento amplo, que se mostra numa consideração retrospectiva dos três paradigmas, de ampliação do âmbito analítico em direção ao ambiente pragmático.
Abstract: This work investigates the philosophical activity of conceptual analysis as conceived by the latter Wittgenstein, from the point of view of the way in which it contributes to exhibit the casuistic limits of sense after the Tractatus. Conceptual analysis is thus considered particularly from the point of view of its scope, of its terminus. Three moments are pinpointed, corresponding to the three chapters: 1. the moment when rules are introduced as objects of analysis, in the context of the corresponding systems of rules; 2. the moment of pluralization of the systems of rules, i.e., when the field of a rule's clarification extrapolates to chained systems, and the concept of language game is introduced to account for the mode of such continuity; and finally, 3. the moment in which conceptual analysis finds its outer boundaries in the very broad and vague context (die Umgebung) of the form of life. Parallel to this, more specific aspects are outlined, relative to the differences between the three paradigms of analysis: 1. the different procedures of analysis, or clarification, required by each paradigm; 2. what counts as a concept in each paradigm; and finally, 3. a wider movement, which is revealed in a retrospective consideration of the three paradigms, of broadening of the analytical scope, toward the pragmatic environment
Doutorado
Doutor em Filosofia

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14

Lugtig, Joan F. (Joan Frances). "Philosophy, history, language and education : the hermeneutic epistemology underlying scientific linguistics." Thesis, McGill University, 1995. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=23854.

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This thesis attempts to clarify a particular epistemological problem which surfaces in Chomsky's attempt to attain an objective psychological distance from the language used in his scientific theorizing, in taking language as an epistemological object. This is accomplished by examining the presumed objectivity underlying the theoretical basis of Chomskyan linguistics in its hermeneutical relation to the theories of language advocated by Quine, Wittgenstein, and other philosophers.
The thesis begins by situating the "metalanguage" in which the argumentation between Chomsky and Quine takes place in the Western philosophical tradition. It continues by outlining an historic-hermeneutic link between classical philosophy, early modernism and some twentieth century philosophies of language, most particularly those articulated by Wittgenstein in his two major works. Finally, the thesis concludes by identifying the hermeneutical nature of the philosophical discourse from which Chomsky's linguistics gains its epistemological force.

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Vilela, Denise Silva. "Matematicas nos usos e jogos de linguagem : ampliando concepções na educação matematica." [s.n.], 2007. http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/251793.

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Orientador: Antonio Miguel
Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Faculdade de Educação
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Resumo: Como o termo matemática vem sendo usado na literatura acadêmica da Educação Matemática? Esta é a questão inicial que orienta este estudo investigativo realizado com base em publicações e pesquisas acadêmicas recentes em Educação Matemática. Com base nesses documentos, verificou-se a ocorrência, em freqüência significativa, de diversas adjetivações do termo matemática tais como: matemática escolar, matemática da rua, matemática acadêmica, matemática popular, matemática do cotidiano, etc. A partir da análise de alguns desses textos, constatou-se que as adjetivações, que ocorrem geralmente aos pares, apontam especificidades das matemáticas, tais como, diferenças em resultados, processos, valores, significados, conceitos, etc. A partir de uma visão de conjunto das especificidades apontadas nos textos pesquisados, as diversas adjetivações são interpretadas como jogos de linguagem que não possuiriam uma essência, mas apresentariam semelhanças de famílias, no sentido dado por Wittgenstein a este conceito. Para formular a questão acima, inspiramo-nos nos conceitos desse filósofo, bem como em sua concepção de filosofia, que possui uma perspectiva de ampliação dos significados alcançada mediante as descrições dos usos de um conceito, a qual possibilita dissolver a noção essencialista e referencial de significado A partir disso, para alcançar um sentido sociológico dessas adjetivações à interpretação filosófica é ampliada com conceitos da sociologia de Bourdieu, notadamente com o conceito de campo científico. As adjetivações expressariam uma tensão no campo das matemáticas: o reconhecimento da produção de conhecimentos matemáticos em diversas práticas que não só a dos matemáticos profissionais, mas também as dos professores, as de grupos profissionais, etc., e também o questionamento do monopólio da definição e atribuições do campo por matemáticos profissionais. Ou seja, as adjetivações são entendidas como objetivações de novos termos da gramática do campo das matemáticas. Além disso, são indicados elementos para uma compreensão das matemáticas como práticas sociais, não simplesmente como determinadas por estratégias racionais intencionais, e sim como práticas condicionadas pela própria estrutura da linguagem, que implica em regularidades as quais limitam e regulam as possibilidades de inteligibilidade e de desenvolvimento das matemáticas nas práticas especificas, mas que não constituem regulamentos que impediriam novos usos
Abstract: How used the term Mathematic in Mathematics Education literature has been? This is the main question that guides this investigation, supported by recent academic researches and publications in the field of Mathematics Education. Based on these writings, we have noticed the existence of several ways of adjetivizing the term mathematics such as: school mathematics, street mathematics, academic mathematics, popular mathematics, everyday mathematics, and so on. After analyzing some of these works, it can be seen that these adjectives, that often show up in pairs, point to mathematics specificities, such as difference in results, processes, values, meanings, concepts etc. From a global view of the specificities pointed in all researched texts, adjectives are understood as language-games that do not have an essence, but would present family resemblances, in the sense given by Wittgenstein to these concepts. To answer the question stated above, we were inspired by these Wittgenstein¿s concepts, as well as by his conception of philosophy, which has a tendency to broaden meanings through the use descriptions of a concept. This allows dissolving na essentialist notion of meaning as a last and universal reference. In order to search for a sociological sense for these adjectivize, our goal is to historically rescue this tendency to adjective in the current context of cultural studies in which modernity values are questioned. Thus, a philosophical explanation is broadened by concepts of Bourdieu's sociology, specially the concept of scientific field. The adjectives would express a struggle within the mathematics field, and the recognition that there is mathematical knowledge production in many practices beyond the professional mathematicians¿, like teachers¿, professional groups¿ etc. That is, adjectives are understood as objectivations for new terms of a grammar of mathematics fields. Besides, this work indicates elements for a understanding of mathematics as social practices, not merely determined by rational and intended strategies, but also as practices conditioned by language structures, which implies regularities that limit and adjust the possibilities of understanding and developmenting of mathematics within specific practices, but not representing regulations that could hinder new uses
Doutorado
Educação Matematica
Doutor em Educação

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Crawley, Karen. "Limited ink : interpreting and misinterpreting GÜdel's incompleteness theorem in legal theory." Thesis, McGill University, 2006. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=101814.

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This thesis explores the significance of Godel's Theorem for an understanding of law as rules, and of legal adjudication as rule-following. It argues that Godel's Theorem, read through Wittgenstein's understanding of rules and language as a contextual activity, and through Derrida's account of 'undecidability,' offers an alternative account of the relationship of judging to justice. Instead of providing support for the 'indeterminacy' claim, Godel's Theorem illuminates the predicament of undecidability that structures any interpretation and every legal decision, and which constitutes the opening to justice. The first argument in this thesis examines Godel's proof, Wittgenstein's views on rules, and Derrida's undecidability, as manifestations of a common concern with the limits of what can be formalized. The meta-argument examines their misinterpretation and misappropriation within legal theory as a case study of just what they mean about meaning, context, and justice as necessarily co-implicated.

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17

Panjvani, Cyrus. "Rule-following : conventionalism, scepticism and rationality." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/12950.

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The thesis argues, in lie main, for both a negative and positive agenda to Wittgenstein's rule-following remarks in both his Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the foundations of Mathematics. The negative agenda is a sceptical agenda, different than as conceived by Kripke, that is destructive of a realist account of rules and contends that the correct application of a rule is not fully determined in an understanding of the rule. In addition to these consequences, this negative agenda opens Wittgenstein to Dummett's charge of radical conventionalism (a charge that also, but differently, applies to certain mid-period views and this is addressed in the first chapter). These negative consequences are left unresolved by Kripke's sceptical solution and, notably, are wrongly assessed by those that dissent from a sceptical reading (e.g., McDowell). The positive agenda builds on these negative considerations arguing that although there is no determination in the understanding of a rule of what will count as a correct application in so far unconsidered situations, we are still able to follow a rule correctly. This seems to involve an epistemic leap, from an underdetermined understanding to a determinate application, and, in respect of this appearance, involves what Wittgenstein calls following a rule "blindly" in an epistemic sense. Developing this view, of following a rule blindly, involves developing an account of an alternative rational response to rule instruction, one that need not involve a role for interpreting or inferring, but all the same allows for correctness in rule application in virtue of enabling agreement in rule application.

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Fultner, Barbara. "Rules in context : a critique of Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein." Thesis, McGill University, 1989. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=59391.

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The rule-following problem can be condensed into the paradox that a rule cannot determine any course of action because every course of action can be made to accord with that rule. In his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke sees this paradox as potentially leading to a radical semantic scepticism that renders meaning itself meaningless, and attributes a sceptical solution of the problem to Wittgenstein. After a critical examination of Kripke's work, I conclude that this solution fails on account of allowing neither for a normativity beyond the subjection of the individual to correction by others in her community, nor for a non-interpretive conception of the understanding. Finally, I propose an alternative solution that incorporates the notion of communal background understanding into that of a form of life and thus preserves the normativity of rule-following and of language.

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Brambatti, Laina Jéssica de Almeida. "Universalidade e contexto : os usos da linguagem e a pretensão de validade de juízos na ética." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UCS, 2016. https://repositorio.ucs.br/handle/11338/1352.

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Este estudo pretende entender sob que aspectos a crítica que Wittgenstein realiza nas Investigações Filosóficas aponta problemas relevantes na determinação de definições unívocas em ética. A questão norteadora desta pesquisa se põe da seguinte forma: é possível encontrar sentido no discurso ético rejeitando a pretensão de universalidade que foi fundamento das investigações filosóficas clássicas da ética? Ocupa papel de destaque nesta pesquisa a temática em torno da ética em sua relação com a linguagem e, assim sendo, procura-se analisar a relação entre estas dimensões do conhecimento do humano. Visamos compreender, de modo geral, que pressupostos, nesse contexto, sustentam a noção de universalidade e como estes estão relacionados com os conceitos fundamentais da ética. Neste contexto, uma análise da linguagem é tomada como fundamental na consideração dos problemas filosóficos, visto que tais problemas são indicados por Wittgenstein como resultantes de um uso inadequado da linguagem. Para tanto, é realizada uma análise breve do Tratado Lógico-Filosófico de modo auxiliar na compreensão do conteúdo presente nas Investigações Filosóficas. Diante dos paradoxos contemporâneos a respeito da necessidade da reflexão ética, dos impasses filosóficos gerados com o desenvolvimento da filosofia da linguagem e dos constantes questionamentos a respeito dos limites da filosofia, se mostra relevante compreender quais argumentos embasam um ou outro ponto. Assim, pode-se esclarecer se tais críticas indicam um relativismo contextual inevitável, uma confusão na apreensão de conceitos ou ainda uma mera rebeldia para romper com a tradição.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior, CAPES
This study aims to understand in what ways the criticism that Wittgenstein held in Philosophical Investigations points relevant problems in determining unambiguous definitions in ethics. The main question of this research is put as follows: is it possible to find meaning in ethical discourse rejecting the claim of universality which was the basis of the classical philosophical investigations of ethics? It occupies a prominent role in this research theme around ethics in its relationship to language and, therefore, seeks to analyze the relationship between these dimensions of human knowledge. We aim to understand, in general, that assumptions in this context, support the notion of universality and how these are related to the basic concepts of ethics. Therefore, it is held a brief analysis of Tractatus Logico-Philosophical so assist in the understanding of this content in Philosophical Investigations. In the face of contemporary paradoxes about the need for ethical reflection , philosophical impasses generated with the development of philosophy of language and the constant questioning about the philosophy of limits , shown important to understand what arguments underlie one or another point. Thus, one can say whether such criticisms indicate an inevitable contextual relativism, confusion in the apprehension of concepts or merely a rebellion to break with traditional.

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Decauwert, Guillaume. "L'articulation des aspects logique et "mystique" du Tractatus de Wittgenstein : forme et origines de la distinction entre dire et montrer." Thesis, Grenoble, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013GRENP003.

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La présente thèse de doctorat propose une interprétation du Tractatus logico-philosophicus qui prend pour fil directeur l'analyse de la distinction opérée par Ludwig Wittgenstein entre « ce qui peut être dit » et « ce qui se montre ». Il s'agit, à partir d'une étude de la relation entre les développements logiques du Traité et son aspect « mystique » (c'est-à-dire ses considérations concernant la notion de valeur absolue), de poser le problème de son unité structurelle. L'unité du premier ouvrage de Wittgenstein s'avère étroitement liée à la distinction entre dire et montrer en laquelle résident selon l'auteur l'« argument principal » de son livre et le « problème cardinal de la philosophie ». Afin d'expliquer l'unité du Tractatus, ce travail de recherche s'efforce d'élucider la nature de la distinction dire/montrer, d'abord par une analyse de ses applications dans les remarques dont le Traité est composé, puis par une enquête sur ses origines dans les œuvres de Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Arthur Schopenhauer, Otto Weininger, William James et Léon Tolstoï. Selon la lecture du texte ici présentée, tous les emplois de cette distinction participent d'une forme commune qui est liée à la notion de réflexivité (ou d'autoréférence)
This PhD thesis deals with Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-philosophicus and intends to construct an interpretation of the book by using the distinction between ‘what can be said' and ‘what shows itself' as a central thread. Starting from a study of the relationship between the logical developments of the treatise and its ‘mystical' aspect (i.e. its remarks on the idea of an absolute value), the thesis raises the problem of the structural unity of Wittgenstein's early work. It appears that this unity is intimately related to the distinction between saying and showing, which is, according to Wittgenstein, the ‘main point' of his book and ‘the cardinal problem of philosophy'. To explain the unity of the Tractatus, the present work tries to elucidate the nature of the say/show distinction—first, through an analysis of its use in the book, and second, through an investigation into its origins in the works of Frege, Russell, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Weininger, James, and Tolstoy. According to the reading presented here, all the uses of this distinction pertain to a common form, which is linked to the concept of reflexiveness (or self-reference)

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Bozatski, Maurício Fernando [UNESP]. "Entre o humano e a linguagem: um estudo sobre a filosofia de Wittgenstein." Universidade Estadual Paulista (UNESP), 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/11449/91797.

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Procuramos delimitar o âmbito de interação do humano com a realidade a partir da teoria lingüística expressa no Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus e nas Investigações Filosóficas. A partir da identificação deste âmbito ontológico-lingüístico da ação humana, representadas pela tríade agir/sentir/pensar, demonstraremos como a linguagem representa a realidade a partir da afiguração. Através de contextualizações e aproximações das teorias wittgensteinianas com noções filosóficas tradicionais busca-se demonstrar a inovação do método wittgensteiniano e suas possibilidades de aplicação ao exercício filosófico contemporâneo.
We have tried to delimit the ambit of the human's interaction with the reality starting from the linguistic theory expresses in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and in the Philosophical Investigations. Starting from the identification of this ontological-linguistic ambit of the human action, represented by the triad to act/to feel/to think, we will demonstrate as the language it represents the reality starting from the representation. Through contextualize and approaches of the Wittgenstein’s theories with the traditional philosophical notions, we aim for to demonstrate the innovation of the Wittgenstein’s method and your application possibilities to the contemporary philosophical exercise.

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Erson, Eva. ""Det är månen att nå- " : en studie i några datorintresserade pojkars språk och föreställningsvärld." Doctoral thesis, Umeå universitet, Litteraturvetenskap och nordiska språk, 1992. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-65819.

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The aim of this thesis is to describe some central conceptual ideas expressed in the language of six computer interested boys. The starting-point is the philosophy of language of Ludwig Wittgenstein, where language is seen as something deeply integrated in our practices, traditions and culture. The use of our language shows its meaning. The material consists of 18 months of observations in the computer room of a secondary school and a series of three deep-interviews with each one of the boys over a period of three years. The computer has a central function in their identity work. Within our culture, this object - with its structure and its ways of operating - has become a metaphor for human thinking. It offers freedom and control. The discussions involved in this work and its form of representation problemize some of the fundamental assumptions of linguistics and the humanities. The three portraits (chapters 3-5) are to be understood as meaningful examples, while the persons portrayed are to be seen as symbols, inviting the reader to reflect over our culture and our practices. The fostering into the computer world and the ways of looking at the world are shown through the "personal voice", each followed by an interpretation linked to the theories and results of other researchers. In the boys' ways of using language there are differences and similarities. Learning, growing, creating, signifying 'freedom', can be seen as central notions in the identity work of one of them. With another of the boys there is a strong resemblance in his talking of computers and of his personal God; he "fixes" the world through dividing-lines, strong recommendations, further emphasized through the frequent use of the verb ska (shall, should). In the third portrait it is evident that the boy's abundance of words and narrative-making is a strategy of preventing nearness and to be able both to control the interview situation and to intensify the here and now. "Going deep" into computers make certain assumptions about the world more essential than others. Central concepts explicit in their common language game are logic, power and control (chapter 7). There is a common tendency to hierarchize and dichotomize the world; upper/under world, outer/inner world, logic/feeling, we/they, right/wrong. Stability can be seen as a summarizing notion. The deeper significance of their feeling of safety and control in the computer world is a fostering both into male dominance and into a dominant way of thinking about knowledge as something primarily logical, controllable and possible to account for. This masculinist language game is confirmed in different ways: individually, in the group and at a more subtle and symbolic level.

Diss. Umeå : Univ., 1992

digitalisering@umu

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Sousa, Cássio Vinícius Steiner de. "O meta-compositor na batalha da figuração : o caso do roubo do baralho e o jogo das voltas estranhas." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/156320.

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A presente dissertação tem dois objetivos. Em primeiro lugar, pretendemos armar um debate entre Russell e Wittgenstein tendo como questão mestra a relação entre lógica e linguagem. Em especial, procuramos encontrar elementos em The Philosophy of Logical Atomism e no Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus para reconstruir a resposta que consta em cada uma das obras para as questões: qual o estatuto lógico da linguagem corrente? Qual a função do lógico enquanto tal? Em segundo lugar, pretendemos apresentar um jogo de cartas – o jogo da Figuração – que desenvolvemos ao longo da pesquisa e funciona como uma ilustração do Tractatus. Em função do jogo será possível compreender algumas das principais teses da obra. Em especial, o papel da teoria da figuração e a distinção entre dizer e mostrar como pilares da explicação tractariana para a questão sobre o funcionamento lógico da linguagem. Além disso, com base na semelhança entre o nosso jogo da figuração e a explicação de Wittgenstein para o funcionamento lógico da linguagem, apresentaremos uma série de razões que justificam o fracasso do projeto de Wittgenstein. Por fim, defenderemos a tese segundo a qual o nosso pensamento funciona com base em uma série de padrões lógicos distintos e não apenas um único padrão lógico (tal qual defendido no Tractatus).
The present dissertation has two goals. In the first place, we intend to construct a debate between Russell and Wittgenstein having the relation between logic and language as our master question. In particular, we seek to find elements in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to reconstruct the answer in each of the works for the questions: what is the logical status of the current language? What is the role of the logician as such? Secondly, we intend to present a card game – the Picture game- that we developed throughout the research and functions as an illustration of the Tractatus. Based on the game we will be able to understand some of the main theses of the work. In particular, the role of picture theory and the distinction between saying and showing as pillars of the tractarian explanation for the question about the logical functioning of language. Moreover, on the basis of the similarity between our picture game and Wittgenstein's explanation for the logical functioning of language, we will present a number of reasons for the failure of Wittgenstein's project. Finally, we will defend the thesis that our thinking operates on the basis of a series of distinct logical patterns and not just a single logical pattern (as defended in the Tractatus).

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Di, Rocco Valdecantos Florencia. "La métaphysique comme branche de la littérature fantastique : une lecture wittgensteinienne de Borges." Thesis, Paris 1, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PA01H230/document.

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La métaphysique comme branche de la littérature fantastique : une lecture wittgensteinienne de Borges. L'une des formules de Borges tient que la "métaphysique" n'est qu'une branche de la littérature fantastique. Caractérisant la logique borgésienne d'une "ludique" herméneutique - celle de lire les textes philosophiques à partir des narrativités qu'ils autorisent- cette remarque semble pourtant soulever une question proprement philosophique : celle du statut de notre concept ordinaire d'objet. D'après la proposition wittgensteinienne, notre concept d'objet physique n'est qu'un concept "logique". La question demeure ainsi de savoir si nos jeux de langage ordinaire épuisent sa grammaire, et dans quelle mesure les fictions et les essais de Borges, qui jouent avec celle-ci, devraient être considérés comme un élargissement, ou bien comme une distorsion de la grammaire ordinaire de l'objet. Il s'agira ainsi d'interroger, d'un côté, si les textes borgésiens tolèrent une lecture analytique ; d'un autre, de démontrer comment la fiction, en recadrant à chaque fois le partage entre dire et montrer, permet d'en détourner, ou bien d'en dépasser la "logique"
Metaphysics as a branch of fantastic literature: a Wittgensteinian reading of Borges. One of Borges' slogans holds that "metaphysics" is only a branch of fantastic literature. Characterizing the Borgesian logic behind a playful hermeneutics -i.e., the possibility to read philosophy througout the narrativities it authorizes- this remark seems to raise a strictly philosophical question, namely that of the status of our ordinary concept of object. According to Wittgenstein, our concept of physical object is just a "logical" concept. The question thus remains whether our ordinary language games exhaust its grammar, and to what extent Borges' fictions and essays, as an attemp to play with it, should be regarded as an extension, or rather as a distortion of the ordinary grammar of the object. It will thus be necessary to inquiry, on the one hand, whether the Borgean texts tolerate an analytic reading; on the other, to show how each fiction, by reframing all over again the split between saying and showing, makes it possible to divert or rather to go beyond its "logic"

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Tomm, Davi Alexandre. "Paradoxos ficcionais : literatura, solipsismo e esquizofrenia em Wittegenstein's mistress." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/140283.

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Esta dissertação apresenta um estudo do livro Wittgenstein‟s mistress (1988), do escritor estadunidense David Markson (1927 – 2010), cujo texto é narrado em primeira pessoa por uma mulher que se autodenomina Kate e que se apresenta como sendo o último ser humano sobrevivente no mundo. Habitando uma casa em alguma praia, ela senta-se diante da máquina de escrever e divaga sobre suas lembranças e viagens, misturando memória e imaginação, de forma a deixar-nos, nós, os leitores, sem um lastro firme para identificar o que é realidade e o que é ilusão. A análise aqui realizada aborda a estrutura paradoxal desse texto, que não consegue estabelecer de modo concreto um mundo ficcional no qual a personagem narradora habita, ou seja, não podemos saber o que realmente acontece ou não com ela. Esse efeito se dá principalmente por um estilo esquizofrênico que será relacionado com as reflexões e observações que o filósofo Ludwig Wittgenstein denomina ―doenças do intelecto‖, as quais, segundo o professor de psicologia clínica e escritor Louis A. Sass, aproximam-se da esquizofrenia. O objetivo desta pesquisa é examinar a maneira como se imbricam as relações entre a linguagem ficcional do livro de Markson e a realidade extratextual, através de uma visão wittgensteiniana que coloca a linguagem imersa na nossa forma de vida, ancorada sempre nas práticas e costumes compartilhados pela sociedade. A análise mostrará que mesmo em um texto onde predomina esse estilo esquizofrênico que faz a linguagem se fechar no mundo interior da personagem, e também no mundo intratextual, ainda há a possibilidade de rompimento deste solipsismo textual, conectando essa linguagem à esfera intersubjetiva e comunitária. Esse rompimento só é possível através da apresentação (ou exteriorização) de vivências, que depende de uma confiança na linguagem como prática social e imersa na nossa forma de vida, assim como de uma confiança na prática de contar histórias.
This M.A. thesis analyses Wittgenstein‟s Mistress (1988), a book written by the American author David Markson (1927-2010), whose text is narrated, in the first person, by a woman who calls herself Kate. Declaring that she is the last remaining person alive in the world, Kate sits in front of her typewriter, in a house on a beach somewhere, revisiting her recollections and her travels. Memory and imagination are mixed in such a way that Kate leaves us, the readers, without a solid basis to separate reality from delusion. The focus of my research is the analysis of the paradoxal structure of this text that cannot sets up a fictional world in a concrete way. We cannot find a fictional world in which the narrator lives and so we cannot really know what happens or not happens to her. This effect exists mainly in a schizophrenic style which will be related to the reflections and observations made by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein about the ―sicknesses of the understanding‖ – which according to professor of clinical psychology and writer Louis A. Sass, come close to the realm of schizophrenia. The aim of this research is to examine the imbrications respecting the fictional language of Markson‘s book and the extratextual reality. This will be done through a Wittgensteinian perspective of language as something absorbed in our form of life, and grounded in practices and mores shared by society. The analysis will show that even in a text in which that schizophrenic style prevails, which makes language close itself in the internal world of the character and the text, there is still the possibility to break with this textual solipsism and connect language to the intersubjective and communal sphere. This break can only occur through the presentation (or exteriorization) of experiences that depend on a trust in language as a social practice immersed in our form of life, and on the trust in the practice of telling stories.

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Silva-Romero, Eduardo. "Philosophes du langage et droit : les jeux du langage juridique." Paris 2, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000PA020039.

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Le but de la these est d'appliquer les principes de la philosophie du langage, et notamment de celle proposee par le philosophe autrichien ludwig wittgenstein, lors d'une tentative de resolution des problemes traditionnels de la philosophie du droit. Dans une premiere partie, il est question de ce qui peut etre dit clairement en philosophie du droit, c'est-a-dire de la recherche des confusions etdes limites du langage juridique. Dans une deuxieme partie, on traite de ce qui ne peut pas etre dit en philosophie du droit mais qui, neanmoins, pourrait etre montre.

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Plaud, Sabine. "Penser et parler en images dans la philosophie de Ludwig Wittgenstein : modèle, shéma, type." Paris 1, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009PA010629.

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Au cours des différentes périodes de sa production philosophique, Ludwig Wittgenstein a cherche à approfondir Ia nature du lien existant entre pensée ou discours d'une part, et représentation picturale d'autre part. Le Tractatus logico-philosophicus, premier ouvrage du philosophe autrichien, introduit ainsi une théorie de la « proposition-image» selon laquelle les propositions élémentaires du langage sont autant d'images ou de modèles des faits qu'elles représentent. Dans sa philosophie ultérieure, Wittgenstein renonce à la théorie de Ia proposition-image au sens strict, mais maintient Ia légitimité du paradigme pictural lorsqu'il s’agit de caractériser la nature de Ia pensée ou du discours. La pensée philosophique, en particulier, doit selon lui s'efforcer de produire des images-types ou schématiques de nos systèmes de règles. Ainsi, la méthode des jeux de Iangage mise en oeuvre par Ie Viennois peut être interprétée comme une recherche d'« images primitives », dans l'esprit de la méthode morphologique développe par Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Cette recherche doit, a son tour, aboutir à la production de «représentations synoptiques» (c'est à dire d'images intuitivement claires) de notre grammaire. La philosophie de Wittgenstein, en ce sens, est et reste tout a la fois une pensée de l'image, et une pensée qui se fait elle-même par I'image.

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PASSERIEU, DIT JEAN MARC. "Wittgenstein et l'idee de culture." Paris 1, 1996. http://www.theses.fr/1996PA010563.

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1) visees problematiques : ce travail repond a une double exigence philo sophique a) demontrer la fonction interne de l'idee de culture dans la conceptualite de wittgenstein ("w") - en chacune de ses "epoques" presu mees -, son incidence regulatrice dans l'usage des concepts de sprache, grammatik, sprachspiel, lbensform. . . B) clarifier plus generalement les conditions d'une hermeneutique culturelle et d'une axiologie possibles a partir de l'examen par w des notions de kultur et zivilisation. 2) methodologie : apres une etude critique de la figure de w dans notre pay sage culturel, la 1ere partie etablit ce qui distingue w des conceptions theoriques de la kultur et des "visions du monde". Une genealogie du jeu de langage philosophique (cultura, civilta, kultur, zivilisation) situe w dans l'histoire de la philosophie et de l'anthropologie. La 2eme par tie suit la formation de cette pensee multiple de la culture. 3) conclusions entre la problematique "logique" et celle des jeux de langage existe une consequence. La visee "pragmatique" de w differe aussi bien de l'em pirisme que de l'eidetique transcendantale, de l'ontologie fondamentale et de la lebensphilosophie. Les fins dernieres de la culture n'induisent pas le nihilisme ou le relativisme en matiere d'anthropologie et d'esthetique. La decision ethique et l'acte de la foi fondent la logique de la gewissheit et decident de la possibilite d'un ordre culturel
1) conceptual views : this work fulfils two philosophical requirements. A) to describe how the concept of culture is internally connected with the fundamental conceptuality of w's philosophy (in each one of his socalled "periods"); to show the normative relevance of culture in the philosophical use of "sprache", "grammatik", "sprachspiel", "lebensform"; b) from a more general point of view, the second requirement consists of the clarification of all possible hermeneutics and theory of values. Following the w's insight of culture and civilization. 2) methodology : after a critical investigation of the w's legend in our cultural landscape, our first part shows the way w rejects the theoretical conceptions of culture and the world views; a grammatical study of the philosophical language games of culture replaces w inside the historical development of philosophy and anthropology. The second part describes the complex evolution of his inquiry and the role of culture. 3) conclusions a specific continuity links the "logical" problematics to the "language game's one. W's "pragmatic" point of view is as far as from empiricism as from transcendental philosophy or "lebensphilosophie". Against nihilism and relativism, the logic of certainty is founded on acts and faith

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Friedland, Julian. "Esthétique, signification et valeur : développements de la seconde philosophie de Ludwig Wittgenstein." Paris 1, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000PA010594.

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Notre étude se concentre principalement sur la "seconde philosophie" de Wittgenstein pour développer d'avantage le thème déjà central depuis sa "première philosophie", selon lequel l'éthique et l'esthétique sont transcendantales. Nous étudions ainsi les relations entre l'esthétique, la signification et la valeur en réempruntant la méthode de l'analyse linguistique par expériences de pensée, dont Wittgenstein se servait pour dévoiler les erreurs fatales du projet positiviste. Nous montrons que cette critique est particulièrement propice aujourd'hui ou la majorité des philosophes analytiques importants partagent de nouveau une métaphysique matérialiste d'un esprit tout à fait positiviste. Les thèses fondatrices de cette nouvelle vision se réunissent généralement autour de la question de l'origine du langage (traitée en première partie) et entrainent certaines conséquences (traitées en deuxième partie) notamment, concernant l'intelligence artificielle, la propriété intellectuelle, et la valeur éthique

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Jemmali, Badreddine. "L'éthique dans la philosophie analytique : Wittgenstein et ses contemporains : limites, significations et controverses." Paris 1, 2010. http://www.theses.fr/2010PA010515.

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Si à un certain moment de sa vie, Wittgenstein s'est rendu disponible à une dimension mystique, son scepticisme à I'égard des questions éthiques conduit à nous demander si la philosophie n'est pas passée par des phases successives. Wittgenstein vide la question de fondement de l'éthique , de son fondement même. Dans Ie Tractatus, Ie Je métaphysique devient une éthique transcendantale , individualiste, conduisant Wittgenstein à la conclusion que la métaphysique relève de I'indicible. Ainsi quand dans son ouvrage De la certitude il prend nettement position contre toute « vision du monde », il n'est pas contraint de se contredire, car il n'a jamais prétendu construire une vision du monde. En passant du Tractatus au traité De la certitude, Wittgenstein n'a que modifié son approche spéculative en approche pratique. Les membres du cercle de Vienne ont bien assimilé les enjeux de cette approche, notamment Schlick, Waismann, Kraft et Carnap. Ils ont même limité à la manière de Wittgenstein leur discussion à l'éthique pour les mêmes raisons que lui : délimiter ce qui'peut être dit et pense, mais faire de cette délimitation même le seul enjeu éthique. Comprendre Wittgenstein, ce ne serait pas aborder une philosophie proprement dite, mais une méthode de résolution-dissolution des problèmes philosophiques qui prend la forme d'une enquête sur les fins de I'existence. . .

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Monnoyer, Jean-Maurice. "Wittgenstein et l'image logique de la proposition visuelle : le cas particulier de l'application aux couleurs." Paris 1, 1995. http://www.theses.fr/1995PA010603.

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L'objet de ce travail est de montrer que l'intérêt porte par L. Wittgenstein au monde des couleurs revêt un caractère déterminant dans le développement de sa pensée. Depuis le tractatus logico-philosophicus jusqu'aux remarques sur les couleurs, il n'aura de cesse de se demander si nous "voyons" ce que nous disons, ce qu'elles sont si nos phrases permettent en effet de "proposer" une nouvelle expérience du voir, au lieu de dire simplement que nous les voyons, et de considérer que nos "perceptual reports" suffisent a constater leur présence. On examine successivement l'identification des couleurs aux "entités", aux désignations fonctionnelles, et aux échantillons. Mais cette identification échoué devant la résolution réelle de l'énigme, qui consiste a déterminer quels concepts nous utilisons pour les "voir" autrement, et qu'elles règles sont nécessaires a l'emploi de ces concepts
The sense of this work is to shown how the world of colors is concerned in the whole process of the L. Wittgenstein's philosophy. Since the tractatus logico-philosophicus untill his remarks on colour, his very claim is to ask if we see what we say "what they are" - if our statements give us a new experience of seeing - instead of simply assert that we see them, and to admit that our perceptual reports ascribe their only matter of fact. The logical assomption of colours as (ontological) entities, as functional symbols, and as samples, will be successively examined, and finally falls short before the resolution of the enigma. Which is : use of concepts, an rules for seeing them in another look

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Perrin, Denis. "Temps et langage chez Ludwig Wittgenstein." Grenoble 2, 2003. http://www.theses.fr/2003GRE29027.

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Cette étude a un objectif exégétique et un objectif de philosophie générale. Le premier est de mettre à jour l'existence d'une méditation continue (de 1929 à 1951) du temps chez L. Wittgenstein par une étude systématique de son Nachlass et de mesurer l'importance de cette méditation au sein de sa pensée. De cette façon, une lecture nouvelle de thèmes majeurs de cet auteur est élaborée ( cf. Les thèmes de la signification, de la règle, du critère de la mémoire et de l'attente). Le second objectif est de montrer que Wittgenstein conduit à bien (au moins en partie) un chantier majeur de la philosophie du langage ordinaire : celui du retour au langage ordinaire du temps. Il le fait dans le cadre de sa philosophie thérapeutique et déjoue au premier chef, toutes les manifestations du mythe du présent qui se sont insinuées dans notre philosophie (cf. Augustin, James et Russell). La radicalité de son propos est ici de nous faire renoncer à toute conception philosophique du temps.

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Ponsonnet, Maïa. "Jeux de langage comparés : manières de voir le monde des Aborigènes Dalabon d'Australie du nord." Paris 8, 2005. http://www.theses.fr/2005PA082699.

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Ce travail croise philosophie et anthropologie : une expérience de « terrain » chez les Aborigènes Dalabon, alliée à une formation wittgensteinienne, nous ont conduite vers une démarche interdisciplinaire. L’observation des jeux de langage Dalabon montre qu’ils sont exempts de certaines confusions philosophiques dénoncées par Wittgenstein ou Austin : doute hyperbolique, conceptions égarantes de la connaissance ou de la « signification »… Il semblerait donc judicieux, à première vue, de s’inspirer des jeux de langage Dalabon pour éliminer ces confusions. Cependant, la comparaison entre ces jeux et les nôtres révèle que notre forme de vie ne s’accommode pas des jeux des Dalabon. En fait, nos confusions philosophiques sont partie prenante de nos jeux de langage, leur sont indispensables, et sont facteurs de production d’un discours « efficace ». Dans cette perspective, l’inspiration d’une certaine philosophie contemporaine par la figure des sociétés traditionnelles soulève des questions
This work stands at the cross-roads of philosophy and anthropology. “Field” experience with Dalabon Aborigines, influenced by Wittgensteinian ideas, lead us towards this mixed approach. Observing Dalabon language games, we find them free of some of the philosophical confusions which Wittgenstein, or Austin, for instance, have underlined: radical doubt, misleading conceptions of knowledge, of “signification”… At first sight, drawing inspirations from Dalabon language games so as to free ourselves from these confusions might seem helpful. However, comparing our games to theirs, we also find that their games do not suit our form of life. In fact, our philosophical confusions are part of our daily language games, to the point that they have become indispensable. They are also a means to produce “effective” theory and speech. In this perspective, the inspirations drawn by some contemporary philosophers from the figure of traditional societies may be problematic

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Narboux, Jean-Philippe. "Dimensions et paradigmes : Wittgenstein et le problème de l'exemplarité." Amiens, 2003. http://www.theses.fr/2003AMIE0002.

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Prado, Junior Plinio Walder. "De l'art de juger : aspect, affect, écriture." Paris 8, 1998. http://www.theses.fr/1998PA081469.

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Contexte du present ouvrage : celui de l'effondrement des assurances metaphysiques, religieuses, politiques; et de l'essor du << tournant langagier >> de la pensee (technologies du langage comprises). L'enjeu : repenser a nouveaux frais la puissance de juger (sans garantie, desormais); la reelaborer comme operation a l'oeuvre par et dans le langage. D'ou la presente relecture de wittgenstein, et enparticulier de ses derniers manuscrits (publies sous le titre posthume de << philosophie de la psychologie >>), menee a la lumiere du kant de la critique du jugement. Premiere tache : reconsiderer le champ langagier lui-meme a partir d'une dimension qui excede ses articulations semantiques et pragmatiques (a rebours donc des pragmatiques actuelles de la communication, anglo-americaines ou allemandes), a savoir: la dimension du travail << poetique >> de l'aspect (au sens wittgensteinien). Y apparaitra alors que la conception wittgensteinienne de l'aspect contient deja, in nuce, une philosophie de l'imagination et du jugement (ce meme jugement que kant nommait << reflechissant >>, et qui n'est pas sans rappeler l'eustochia, le genie analogique que les grecs, l'opposant a vepisteme, posaient commeessentiel aussi bien a la poesie qu'a la philosophie). Se profile ainsi un art dejuger, qu'on surprendra deja a l'oeuvre dans l'exercice ordinaire de la parole (la conversation, le mot d'esprit, le parler amoureux. . . ), mais aussi dans les modes langagiers << complexes >> ou se joue le sort d'un art, d'une litterature, d'une pensee. Cela induit une pensee de l'ecriture, esquissee ici, pour finir, a partir de trois motifs majeurs: celui de l'art de l'interpretation (la deutungskunst freudienne); celui de l'art du jugement esthetique (la urteilskraft kantienne); celui enfin de l'art de la presentation ou du style philosophique (la darstellungskunst, du schematisme kantien a l'analogique wittgensteinienne et au-dela)
The context of the present work: that of the collapse of the metaphysical, religious, political certainties and the expansion of the + linguistic turn ; of thought (technologies of language included). What is at stake : to rethink again the power of judgment (from now on without guarantee); reelaborate it again as operation at work by and in the language. Hence the present rereading of wittgenstein, and in particular of his last manuscripts (published under the posthumous title : + philosophy of psychology ;), conducted in the light of the kant of critique of judgement. First task : reconsider the linguistic field itself from a dimension which exceeds its semantic and pragmatic articulations (thus contrary to the anglo-american or german present pragmatics of communication), that is : the dimension of +poetical; work of aspect (in the wittgensteinian sense). It will then be shown that wittgensteinian conception of aspect already contains, in nuce, a philosophy of imagination and judgement (this same judgement that kant calls + reflective ;, and which is not unrelated to the eustochia, the analogical genius that the greeks, opposing it to the episteme, posed as essential as well to poetry as to philosophy). An art of judgement thus emerges, which one already finds at work in the everyday practice of speech (conversation, witticism, lovers' language. . . ), but also in the + complex ; linguistic moods where the fate of an art, a literature, a thought is decided. This implies a thought of writing, sketched here, lastly, from three major motifs : that of the art of interpretation (the freudian deutungskunst), that of the art of aesthetic judgement (the kantian urteilskraft); that of the art of presentation or philosophical style (the darstellungskunst, from the kantian schematism to the wittgensteinian analogic and beyond). (translated by cyd rogers. )

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Pastorini, Chiara. "Concettualismo e non concettualismo in Ludwig Wittgenstein." Paris 1, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008PA010520.

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Cette thèse analyse l'antithèse conceptualisme/non conceptualisme a l'intérieur de la pensée wittgensteinienne. La question renvoie au débat contemporain sur le contenu non conceptuel et n'est pas présente en ces termes chez Wittgenstein. Toutefois, les observations du philosophe fournissent plusieurs indications pour résoudre (ou mieux, "dissoudre") des difficultés conceptuelles a la base de ce débat. La question du contenu non conceptuel peut être synthétisée de la manière suivante: est-ce que le contenu de la perception est de nature conceptuelle ou bien de nature non conceptuelle? Wittgenstein nous conduit a un déplacement du problème: plutôt que d'enquêter sur la détermination de la nature du contenu perceptif, nous nous interrogeons sur le si et sur le quand il est possible de parler de "contenu". Et l' enseignement de Wittgenstein est celui-ci: la seule notion de 'contenu' qui peut être employée positivement est une notion expérientielle, inséparable de la dimension du vécu.

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Rapczyk, Nicolas. "Les variations infinies de la vie : relativisme culturel et rationalité des normes et des valeurs." Paris 8, 2010. http://octaviana.fr/document/157354938#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=0.

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Cette thèse a pour sujet le relativisme culturel. La question est posée dans la perspective ouverte par la philosophie de Wittgenstein et dans le cadre des controverses récentes qu’elle a suscitées dans les sciences sociales et politiques. Les idées directrices de l’auteur (l’autonomie du grammatical, la relation interne entre la règle et son application, le donné des formes de vie, la normativité de la pratique…) sont confrontées aux conceptions relativistes qui tirent argument de la diversité empirique des cultures pour en conclure à une relativité axiologique généralisée. Je défends l’idée que la philosophie de Wittgenstein n’est pas relativiste, en quelque sens que ce soit (conceptuel, linguistique, épistémique…) et qu’elle permet d’opérer une dissolution (au sens d’une thérapie philosophique) du problème posé par le relativiste. Dans une première partie, je m’intéresse au statut de l’éthique et à la sémantique des propositions normatives dans les premiers écrits de Wittgenstein. La seconde partie est consacrée au ‘paradoxe de la règle’ et à la réfutation de ses interprétations sociologiques. Je me demande notamment quel est ce ‘nous’ auquel renvoie Wittgenstein lorsqu’il parle d’un accord dans nos formes de vie et dans nos jugements. Dans une troisième partie, j’examine plusieurs versions contemporaines du relativisme culturel. Puis je défends la thèse qu’une philosophie sociale inspirée par Wittgenstein et sa méthode d’une ethnographie imaginaire permet un dépassement de l’opposition entre relativisme et universalisme, mais qu’elle n’implique pas l’abandon de toute idée de l’universel si l’on conçoit celui-ci dans les termes d’une épistémologie comparative
This thesis is about cultural relativism. The question is raised in the perspective opened by the philosophy of Wittgenstein and in the context of recent controversies it has aroused in the social and political sciences. The main ideas of the author (the autonomy of grammar, the internal relation of a rule to acts, the given of forms of life, the intrinsic normativity of the practice. . . ) are confronted with relativist views which appeal to the empirical diversity of cultures to conclude in favor of a generalized axiological relativity. I argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is not relativistic, in any sense whatsoever (conceptual, linguistic, epistemic, and so on) and that, on the contrary, it allows for a dissolution (in the sense of a philosophical therapy) of the problem raised by the relativist. In a first section, I concern with the status of ethics and the semantics of the normative statements in Wittgenstein’s early writings. The second section is devoted to the ‘rule-following paradox’ and to refute its sociological interpretations. I wonder especially what is that ‘we’ to which Wittgenstein refers when he speaks of an agreement in our forms of life and in our judgments. In the third section, I survey several contemporary versions of cultural relativism. Then I argue that a social philosophy inspired by Wittgenstein and his method of imaginary ethnography allows overtaking the opposition between relativism and universalism but doesn’t imply a dismissal of any idea of the universal if we conceive it in terms of an epistemology of radical comparison

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Ulive, Schnell Vicente. "Les performatifs mimétiques : enjeux et limitations." Paris 8, 2007. http://octaviana.fr/document/133382133#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=0.

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Notre recherche tente de cerner la polémique autour des modèles des Actes de parole (Austin, Searle, Grice) en reprenant et re-évaluant les notions avancées par Wittgenstein sur le langage. Nous pouvons identifier un fil conducteur entre les deux livres centraux du penseur viennois, le Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus et les Investigations Philosophiques, qui permet d'ouvrir la porte aux découvertes en Philosophie Anthropologique proposées par Arnold Gehlen (et aussi Max Scheller et Johann G. Herder). De cette façon, nous pouvons relever l'aspect "mimétique" relatif à la production d'une locution, inhérent à la relation de '’être humain avec son environnement. Ceci permet de rafraîchir notre compréhension du fonctionnement du langage et notamment de sortir de la logique binaire proposée par les penseurs anglo-saxons, selon laquelle toute question de langage n'est plus qu'une question d'imitation / application d'un modèle dans une situation appropriée. Nous tacherons ensuite de montrer comment une lecture "mimétique", qui essaie de trouver les liens de production / reproduction d'une façon de penser, peut s'avérer intéressante pour la compréhension de la façon dont se propagent certains regards ou "formes de vie" (Wittgenstein) dans plusieurs domaines. Puisque les modèles des Actes de parole s'érigent en tant que philosophie "totale", avec une justification logique et pragmatique, politique, éthique et sociale, il est important de déceler toutes leurs implications et d'analyser la façon dont ils s'érigent en tant que philosophie d'explication et justification de notre monde contemporain. C'est pourquoi une lecture alternative, qui prend comme point de départ les propositions de Wittgenstein sur la relation entre l'homme et son langage, peut nous conduire à élargir notre regard sur cette relation et à ouvrir la porte vers une approximation où le principe finaliste d'un langage "performatif" serait écarté à faveur d'un langage "mimétique" où les instances d'appropriation, de compréhension, de production et de création de la locution prendraient une place d'envergure
Our research approaches the debate surrounding the "Speech acts" models (Austin, Searle, Grice) by reevaluating the ideas advanced by Ludwig Wittgenstein concerning language. We can find a line of thought connecting his two major works: The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Philosophical Investigations that leads us to the Philosophical Anthropology proposed by Arnold Gehlen (as well as Max Scheler and Johann G. Herder). This thread takes us to the "mimetic" aspect inherent in the production of a locution, characteristic of man's interaction with his environment. This approach can help us refresh our understanding of language, noticeably by opening up the binary logic proposed by Anglo-Saxon thinkers who reduce all linguistic interaction to a question of imitation / application of a model in a given situation. In our research, we try to show how a "mimetic" approach to language, this is, an approach that tries to uncover the path of production / reproduction of a way of thinking, can be interesting in the understanding of how certain "views" or "forms of life" (Wittgenstein) are transmitted between different domains and fields. Also, since the "Speech act" models present a "total" philosophy that includes a logic and a pragmatic characteristic as well as a political, an ethic and a social approach, it is important to study these models and understand how they have become an explanation and a justification for the world we live in. This is why a different perspective, that takes into account Wittgenstein's concerns about man and his relation to language, can enlarge our understanding about how language works and help us escape the teleological "performative" language approach in favor of a "mimetic" language where variables such as appropriation, comprehension production and creation of a locution are what is essentially important

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Cambrelin, Jean-Jacques. "Le concept de volonté dans la philosophie de L. Wittgenstein." Thesis, Reims, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011REIML014/document.

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Traitant de la volonté dans la philosophie de Wittgenstein, nous devons constater que ce concept acquiert une importance que nous ne soupçonnions pas initialement. Les écrits aphoristiques et la singularité des écrits de notre philosophe nous refusent un accès facile à cette volonté qui doit nous permettre un effort de libération vis-à-vis de nos concepts figés. Aussi, si la volonté prend une telle ampleur dans cette philosophie thérapeutique, elle le doit à la révolution cathartique qu’elle suscite en nous, amorçant la conversion du regard que notre auteur espère inspirer. Oubliant la voix lancinante de la convention, Wittgenstein nous engage à nous délivrer de la servitude linguistique et à envisager le concept de « volonté » sous un jour plus pragmatique. Pour autant, Wittgenstein a-t-il réussi à éradiquer l’attrait méphitique des abysses métaphysiques ? Rien n’est moins sûr ! Reste que cette philosophie incomparable appréhendée sous l’angle de la volonté ne peut laisser insensible le lecteur enclin à changer sa vie et à se libérer des entraves conceptuelles
Dealing with will in Wittgenstein's philosophy, we can but conclude that this conceptis far more important than we imagined. The aphoristic writings and the originality of thephilosopher deny the reader an easy access to this will which should enable us to get rid ofour narrow concepts. Thus, if will takes on such a dimension in this therapeutic philosophy, itis due to the cathartic revolution it triggers, causing a change in the way we think of it.Forgetting the traditional definition, Wittgenstein urges us to free ourselves from ourlinguistic slavery and to study the concept of will in a more pragmatic way. Yet, we maywonder whether Wittgenstein has managed to eradicate the sulphurous side of the mostobscure metaphysics. The point is, this unrivalled philosophy seen from the point of view ofwill cannot leave the reader unaffected and will encourage him to change his lifestyle and toget rid of his conceptual fetters

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Halais, Emmanuel. "Éthique et expression : langage, métaphysique et individualité chez Wittgenstein et dans la philosophie morale anglaise." Amiens, 2005. http://www.theses.fr/2005AMIE0013.

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Lévêque, Christian. "Pratiquer la philosophie à l'école : pour une éthique wittgensteinienne du savoir." Caen, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009CAEN1564.

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Enseignant en classes élémentaires, je propose depuis quatre ans à des élèves de 8 à 11 ans une activité péri-éducative de discussion à visée philosophique. Je me propose de mettre en évidence les implications de cette expérience sur un plan pédagogique, faisant de la philosophie, avec Montaigne, "celle qui nous instruit à vivre", parce qu'elle ouvre le chantier d'un autre rapport au savoir. L'oeuvre de Wittgenstein inaugure une pratique nouvelle de la philosophie centrée sur l'éthique, elle vient innerver le dispositif que je mets en place et m'oriente dans la compréhension de la pensée des enfants. Les expériences menées en France depuis l'exemple de Matthew Lipman assument plus ou moins explicitement une fonction de régulation et d'évaluation du système éducatif par ses acteurs. Ma pratique s'inscrit d'autant plus résolument dans cette logique qu'elle réaffirme l'importance de la pédagogie, en la requalifiant. La pédagogie, que l'on peut redéfinir en la distinguant de la didactique comme de l'éducation, a pour fin l'évaluation (donc la valorisation) des compétences ou des savoirs. Le déploiement raisonné de problématiques philosophiques classiques comme celles de la justice ou du temps permet aux participants de faire évoluer leurs conceptions anthropologiques spontanées, ce qui est l'essentiel du projet wittgensteinien. Ce que je définirai comme leur "intelligence sensible" trouve, dans le dispositif d'écriture et d'échange qui s'institue progressivement, matière à composer des expériences de pensée, qui, en retour, déstabilisent nos réflexions d'adultes

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Raïd, Layla. "Wittgenstein, le réalisme et la nature de la signification." Paris 1, 2000. http://www.theses.fr/2000PA010521.

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Nous étudions le problème du réalisme (questions métaphysiques d'existence indépendante et de connaissance adéquate) à travers la philosophie du second Wittgenstein. A partir d'une critique des oppositions métaphysiques traditionelles, renvoyées au non-sens, nous déterminons un <>, conçu comme le respect des formes normales d'expression du langage ordinaire. En contrepoint, nous proposons une comparaison avec le réalisme naturaliste de Quine, en particulier sur ses fondements dans la thèse d'indétermination de la signification.

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Marrou, Élise. "Solipsisme(s) : la résistance d'un problème dans la pensée de Wittgenstein." Paris 1, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009PA010712.

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L'enjeu de cette étude est double: la première partie de ce travail est consacrée à une clarification du sens du solipsisme. Elle montre comment ce spectre s'est diffracté en plusieurs figures dont on propose une typologie a partir d'une relecture des "Méditations": cinq figures sont ainsi dégagées (les trois premières - berkeleyenne, lockienne et leibnizienne - s'inscrivent dans un cadre cartésien, les deux suivantes -fichtéenne et schopenhauerienne - dans un cadre kantien). On envisage ensuite la spécificité des traitements analytiques du problème du solipsisme (ses différentes versions méthodologiques). Les limites des réponses constructionnistes conduisent a dégager l'angle depuis lequel Wittgenstein aborde ce problème en le replaçant dans Ie contexte d'une réponse aux "Grundgesetze der Arithmetik" de Frege. La seconde partie de ce travail, dont la démarche est évolutive, montre comment Wittgenstein déjoue chacune des figures traditionnelles du solipsisme pour mieux mettre en évidence la résistance d'une dernière figure inventée par Wittgenstein, celle du solipsisme logique. Dans le "Tractatus", Wittgenstein répond aux figures idéalistes du solipsisme et corrige les traitements russellien et frégéen de ce problème. L'universalisme logique étouffe en revanche la menace du solipsisme logique, qui rejaillit durant la période intermédiaire. Alors que Wittgenstein récuse les versions empiristes du solipsisme la figure machienne et le solipsisme méthodologique de l'Aujbau - la rupture avec I'intentionalisme du "Tractatus" débouche sur le fond sceptique du solipsisme logique qui n'est pas tant réfute dans les "Recherches philosophiques" que révélé pour lui-même.

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Schmezer, Gerhard. "Entre le non-sens et l'exhortation : le religieux dans la recherche de Ludwig Wittgenstein." Paris 8, 2006. http://www.theses.fr/2006PA082626.

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Ce travail porte sur la dimension religieuse de l’œuvre de Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 1951). Premièrement, nous démontrons que la notion du religieux chez Wittgenstein ne peut pas être comprise sans tenir compte de sa biographie. Deuxièmement, nous montrons le rapport étroit entre l’histoire de la publication de ses manuscrits et les diverses interprétations de son « point de vue religieux ». Troisièmement, nous esquissons l’itinéraire religieux de Wittgenstein en remettant les textes désormais disponibles dans leur contexte historique, afin de reconstruire son « imagination religieuse ». Nous montrons comment il abordait ses propres difficultés spirituelles, dialoguait avec des auteurs religieux et souvent élucidait des problèmes philosophiques par des exemples religieux. Finalement, nous abordons la notion de l’« âme » telle que Wittgenstein la décrit dans sa dernière philosophie ainsi que le rôle de ce concept dans la philosophie de la religion post-wittgensteinienne
This dissertation addresses the religious dimension of the life and work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 1951). First of all, we demonstrate that this religious element in Wittgenstein’s thought cannot be understood in isolation from his life. Secondly, we show that their exists a close relationship between the traditional interpretations of his “religious point of view” and the history of the publication of his manuscripts. Thirdly, we sketch Wittgenstein’s religious biography, placing the various texts now available in their historical context, with the intention of reconstructing his “religious imagination”. We show how he addresses his own spiritual difficulties, dialogues with religious authors and often elucidates philosophical problems with religious examples. Finally, we examine the notion of “soul” as Wittgenstein’s describes it in his last philosophy as well as its role in post-Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion

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Pris, François-Igor. "Le fossé explicatif dans la philosophie de l’esprit du point de vue de la deuxième philosophie de Wittgenstein vue comme un naturalisme normatif." Paris 4, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008PA040046.

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Dans la thèse nous argumentons que chaque propriété mentale, Q, est identique à (est) une certaine propriété physique, P, (1) Q est P, ainsi qu’il n’existe aucun fossé ontologique entre Q et P. Nous argumentons que l’identité (1) peut être expliquée. Donc ce qu’on appelle le « fossé explicatif » est également absent (au niveau épistémique). En outre, de notre point de vue, la distinction entre le niveau ontologique et le niveau épistémique est relative. Le physicalisme/naturalisme, nous argumentons, est vrai, mais si et seulement si il est ce que nous appelons un "physicalisme/naturalisme normatif". L’identité (1) est vraie au sens du physicalisme/naturalisme normatif seulement si elle a une justification. Nous trouvons ce genre du naturalisme/physicalism dans la deuxième philosophie de Wittgenstein. Le physicalisme/naturalisme normatif permet notamment de résoudre le problème de l’identité pour le cas compliqué qui est celui de l’identité entre la conscience phénoménale et un état physique (le « problème difficile »). Nous défendons une version du réalisme phénoménal naturaliste
We argue that every mental property, Q, is identical to (is) a certain physical property, P, (1) Q is P, so that an ontological “gap” between Q and P doesn’t exist. We argue that the identity (1) can be explained. Hence the so-called “explanatory gap” (EG) (an epistemic gap) is also absent. Moreover, from our point of view, the difference between the ontological and epistemic levels is relative. The naturalism/physicalism is true, but if and only if it is what we call a “normative naturalism/physicalism”. We find this kind of naturalism/physicalism in the second philosophy of Wittgenstein (W). The language games are natural (physical) and at the same time spontaneous (normative). In particular, the normative physicalism allows resolving the Hard Problem - the problem of identity between a state of phenomenal consciousness and a physical state. We defend a version of phenomenal realism

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46

Spadola, Joseph. "La pensée contextuelle : situation, environnement, et circonstance dans la philodophie de Ludwig Wittgenstein." Paris 1, 2010. http://www.theses.fr/2010PA010523.

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La philosophie de Wittgenstein est une philosophie du contexte: elle met en lumière les liens conceptuels qui relient nos actes symboliques aux conditions intersubjectives qui les « entourent ». Cette approche, désormais familière, est cependant loin d'être comprise en toute sa profondeur dans la philosophie du langage contemporaine. Il ne s'agit pas de dire que le contexte « enrichisse» un contenu sémantique préalable (minimal ou non minimal, propositionnel ou sous-propositionnel, conscient ou infra-conscient) mais que le contexte intervient dès le niveau le plus profond d'analyse, en clair des qu'il est question, sous quelle que forme que ce soit, du sens. Pour comprendre la contribution sémantique du contexte, il ne suffit pas de se reporter à la « situation d' énonciation » ou à l'« occasion» qui préside à un acte symbolique : nos mots et nos gestes s'inscrivent dans un réseau de contextes interconnectés (dans une « mosaïque » composée de « motifs récurrents ») qui ne peuvent être compris que les uns en rapport avec autres. II s'agit donc moins de comprendre comment nous adaptons nos actes symboliques aux divers contextes qui composent notre vie que de comprendre comment les divers contextes qui composent notre vie sont adaptés, par leur structure même, à nos actes symboliques, au sens ou « la régularité de notre langage imbibe notre vie ».

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47

Mansour, Goufrane. "Le réalisme en question : Bolzano, Wittgenstein et le réalisme perceptuel." Paris 1, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009PA010502.

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Balaska, Maria. "Groundlessness and possibilities of meaning : young Wittgenstein and Jacques Lacan respond to experiences of limitation." Paris 8, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014PA084107.

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Notre thèse requiert une réflexion sur ce que l'on appelle « expérience de la limite » (experience of limitation). Il s'agit de ce que Wittgenstein approche en termes du « paradoxe » dans sa Conférence sur l' éthique[1] ainsi que de ce que Cora Diamond appelle « la difficulté de la réalité » dans son article « La difficulté de la réalité et la difficulté de la philosophie »[2]. Lacan appellerait cette expérience une « expérience du réel ». Ce que je soutiens est qu’une telle expérience est une expérience de ce que Wittgenstein appelle la valeur absolue (dans sa « conférence sur l 'Ethique ») qui ne peut pas être exprimée sans que cela conduise nécessairement à l' engendrement du non-sens; Si (comme je le propose) quand on reste exposé à une telle expérience et à l’engendrement de non-sens qui l'accompagne, l’on se trouve contraint de faire face à un problème concernant le niveau du sens (meaning), ma question est quelle approche du sens (meaning) peut s' accorder avec une position qui exclut une attitude d'esquive tout en restant exposée à cette expérience. En examinant la notion du sens dans le Tractatus ainsi que la relation entre le réel et la signification, j' essaye de montrer comment Wittgenstein et Lacan par leurs voies différentes répondraient à une telle expérience et à l' aporie qu' une telle expérience fait émerger
The thesis focuses on what is called an experience of limitation. This could be also called a “running up against the limit experience” in Wittgensteinian terms, or “an experience of the real” in Lacanian terms. In any of those cases, it is of course a paradoxical kind of experience. The description of this experience is also articulated in relation to Diamond's notion of “difficulty of reality”. Such experiences necessarily generate nonsense and therefore pose a question on meaning. What such experiences concern and what cannot be put into words without the generation of nonsense is according to the thesis the ethical or aesthetical dimension of language. For the thesis, the task which arises in staying exposed at such experiences is the task of accepting that meaning cannot be grounded in some metaphysical anchorage but it emerges as recoverable possibilities attached to our use of language in the different contexts of our forms of life. The aim of the thesis is to explore a different notion of meaning (which involves this ethical dimension of language) and to show how an experience of limitation can make us attentive to it. What I try to argue is that both Wittgenstein and Lacan can offer us a third way of treating such experiences, a way which allows us to see language as a locus of value (through meaning) without seeking to ground meaning on metaphysics (or on a realm beyond language)

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Aly, Laurence. "Wittgenstein : l'envers de l’œuvre." Paris 8, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011PA083808.

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Dans L'envers de la psychanalyse, Lacan déclare que la philosophie de Wittgenstein est une extraordinaire parade à la vérité du maître que cache le désir de savoir dans le discours universitaire. Nous montrons qu'à la différence des philosophes qui veulent capter le désir de l'autre en occupant la place du Grand Autre, Wittgenstein ne veut pas sauver la vérité, ce qui ne va pas sans une position subjective psychotique pour autant que la vérité chez lui, n'est pas un roc mais bien plutôt ce dont il ne veut rien savoir. Aussi philosophe-t-il sans la vérité, déjouant ainsi ce qui s'impose de la vérité du symptôme et s'opposant à tout mi-dire. Rien ne peut se dire d'elle car il faudrait pour ce faire occuper une position d'extériorité par rapport au langage : la vérité est identifiée à l'indicible de telle sorte qu'elle se trouve être neutralisée. Nous faisons ainsi apparaître que l'opération wittgensteinienne force la vérité à se taire: elle procède du rejet de l'inconscient. Sur son pommier, nous dit Lacan, il n'y a pas de fruit : son œuvre n'est pas faite pour plus-de-jouir et tue le désir de savoir en débusquant le croire dans le savoir. Aussi, philosopher sans la vérité est aussi bien un nom de sinthome pour autant que s'y découvre une jouissance opaque qui exclut le sens-joui dans la mesure où celui-ci se trouve court-circuité par les butées logiques que Wittgenstein découvre dans le langage comme limite artificielle du sens: il y a de l'inexprimable. Notre discussion finale porte sur la question de savoir si Wittgenstein incarne le sinthome: peut-il l'incarner dès lors qu'il bride sa parole par le féroce impératif: « Sur ce dont on ne peut parler, il faut se taire »?
In his Seminar XVII, Lacan says that Wittgenstein's philosophy is a special reply to the truth of the master hidden by the desire for knowledge within the university discourse. We wish to show that, contrary to the philosophers’ tendency to capture the other’s desire by occupying the place of the Big Other, Wittgenstein does not want to save the truth, which does not go without a psychotic subjective position in as much as the truth, from his standpoint, is not a rock but much rather what he does not want to know anything about. In that light, he philosophizes without the truth, thus thwarting that which, about the truth of the symptom, cannot be escaped, and opposing any half-saying. Nothing about it can be said, because to do so one should place oneself outside of language : the truth is identified with the unspeakable in such a way that it gets neutralized. We thus reveal that Wittgenstein’s operation forces the truth to silence : it proceeds from the rejection of the unconscious. On Wittgenstein’s tree, says Lacan, there are no fruits : his work is not done for more-of-to enjoy and kills the knowledge by hunting out the belief contained in it. Thus, to philosophize without the truth is tantamount to a name of sinthome in so far as, in it, clears up an opaque enjoyment which excludes the enjoyed-sense since it is short-circuited by the logic stops that Wittgenstein finds out in the language as an artificial limit of meaning : there is inexprimable. Our final discussion concerns the question of whether Wittgenstein embodies the sinthome : can he embody it since he bridles his word by the fierce imperative : "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent"

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Lemaire, Eric. "Wittgenstein et la métaphysique." Paris 7, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009PA070081.

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Le second Wittgenstein fut l'un des penseurs les plus importants dans l'histoire de la philosophie analytique. Il est connu, notamment, pour sa conception provocante de la philosophie au coeur de la laquelle se trouve l'idée que les propositions métaphysiques - et plus généralement philosophiques - sont dépourvues de sens. Ainsi comprise, la philosophie a pour principal objectif d'éliminer les propositions métaphysiques, en montrant que les problèmes auxquels elles tentent de répondre ne sont que des pseudo problèmes. De nombreux commentateurs de Wittgenstein estiment non seulement que cette conception de la philosophie concerne toute forme de métaphysique mais qu'elle est vraie. Dans le même temps, au sein de la tradition analytique, nous assistons à un renouveau de la métaphysique. Ce contexte historique soulève une question : Le second Wittgenstein a-t-il réellement montré que la métaphysique est illégitime ? Notre principal objectif est de montrer que ce n'est pas le cas. Au contraire, le second Wittgenstein peut être compris comme un métaphysicien du sens commun, comme un philosophe qui nous donne des outils, des idées et une méthode pour repenser l'entreprise métaphysique et défendre sa légitimité
The second Wittgenstein was one of the most important thinkers in the history of analytic philosophy. He is known for his provocative conception of philosophy according to which metaphysical propositions - and more generally philosophical propositions - are nonsensical. Thus understood, the main task of philosophy is to eliminate these propositions and to show that metaphysical problems are pseudo-problems. Many commentators of the second Wittgenstein's works assume that this conception affects any form of metaphysics and that he showed the illegitimacy of any metaphysics. In the meanwhile metaphysics renewed in the analytic tradition. In such a context a question raises: Did the second Wittgenstein really undermine the legitimacy of metaphysics? Our main aim here is to show that he did not. On the contrary, the second Wittgenstein can be understood as a common sense metaphysician, that is as a philosopher who gives us tools, ideas, and a method to rethink the metaphysical enterprise. Hence, he does offer us means to defend the legitimacy of metaphysics

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic '1889-1951 Philosophy'

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