Academic literature on the topic '1772-1834 Knowledge and learning'

Background:The prevention of joint destruction is an important goal in the management of rheumatoid arthritis (RA) and a key endpoint in drug trials. To quantify structural damage in radiographs, standardized scoring systems1, such as the Sharp/van der Heijde (SvdH) score2, which separately assesses joint space narrowing (JSN) and erosions, have been developed. However, application of these scores is time-consuming, requires specially trained staff, and results are subject to considerable intra- and inter-reader variability1. This makes their application poorly feasible in clinical practice and limits their reliability in clinical trials.Objectives:We aim to develop a fully automated deep learning-based scoring system of radiographic progression in RA to facilitate the introduction of quantitative joint damage assessment into daily clinical practice and circumvent inter-reader variability in clinical trials.Methods:5191 hand radiographs and their corresponding SvdH JSN scores from 640 adult patients with RA without visible joint surgery were extracted from the picture archive of a large tertiary hospital. The dataset was split, on a patient level, into training (2207 images/270 patients), validation (1150/133), and test (1834/237) sets. Joints were automatically localized using a particular deep learning model3which utilizes the local appearance of joints combined with information on the spatial relationship between joints. Small regions of interest (ROI) were automatically extracted around each joint. Finally, different deep learning architectures were trained on the extracted ROIs using the manually assigned SvdH JSN scores as ground truth (Fig. 1). The best models were chosen based on their performance on the validation set. Their ability to assign the correct SvdH JSN scores to ROIs was assessed using the unseen data of the test set.Fig. 1.3-step approach to automated scoring: joint localization, ROI extraction, JSN scoring.Results:ROI extraction was successful in 96% of joints, meaning that all structures were visible and joints were not malrotated by more than 30 degrees. For JSN scoring, modifications of the VGG164architecture seemed to outperform adaptations of DenseNet5. The mean obtained accuracy (i.e., the percentage of joints to which the human reader and our system assigned the same score) for MCP joints was 80.5 %, that for PIP joints was 72.3 %. In only 1.8 % (MCPs) and 1.7 % (PIPs) of cases did the predicted score differ by more than one point from the ground truth (Fig. 2).Fig. 2.Confusion matrices of automatically assigned scores (‘predicted score’) vs. the human reader ground truth (‘true score’).Conclusion:Although a number of previous efforts have been published, none have succeeded in replacing manual scoring systems at scale. To our knowledge, this is the first work that utilizes a dataset of adequate size to apply deep learning to automate JSN scoring. Our results are, even in this early version, in good agreement with human reader ground truth scores. In future versions, this system can be expanded to the detection of erosions and to all joints contained in the SvdH score.References:[1]Boini, S. & Guillemin, F. Radiographic scoring methods as outcome measures in rheumatoid arthritis: properties and advantages.Ann. Rheum. Dis.60, 817–827 (2001).[2]van der Heijde, D. How to read radiographs according to the Sharp/van der Heijde method.J. Rheumatol.27, 261–263 (2000).[3]Payer, C., Štern, D., Bischof, H. & Urschler, M. Regressing Heatmaps for Multiple Landmark Localization Using CNNs. inMedical Image Computing and Computer-Assisted Intervention – MICCAI 2016230–238 (Springer, Cham, 2016). doi:10.1007/978-3-319-46723-8_27.[4]Simonyan, K. & Zisserman, A. Very Deep Convolutional Networks for Large-Scale Image Recognition.arXiv:1409.1556 [cs](2015).[5]Huang, G., Liu, Z., van der Maaten, L. & Weinberger, K. Q. Densely Connected Convolutional Networks.arXiv:1608.06993 [cs](2016).Disclosure of Interests:Thomas Deimel: None declared, Daniel Aletaha Grant/research support from: AbbVie, Novartis, Roche, Consultant of: AbbVie, Amgen, Celgene, Lilly, Medac, Merck, Novartis, Pfizer, Roche, Sandoz, Sanofi Genzyme, Speakers bureau: AbbVie, Celgene, Lilly, Merck, Novartis, Pfizer, Sanofi Genzyme, UCB, Georg Langs Shareholder of: Co-Founder/Shareholder contextflow GmbH, Grant/research support from: Grants by Novartis, Siemens Healthineers, NVIDIA

The period of the first half of the nineteenth century is characterized by a significant number of the pedagogical education projects development, which can be divided into two main groups: the author’s (M. Demkov, V. Ivanovsky, G. Kollontay, M. Pirogov, М. Troitsky, K. Ushinsky, T.Chacky, etc.) and official (authorized by the Ministry of Public Education). Among them are the projects of Pedagogical Institute in the "Prior Rules of Public Education" (1803), the General Regulations of the Russian Imperial Universities in 1804 and 1835, the Pedagogical Courses Principles (1860, 1865); the draft of the Teaching Institute Regulations (1862) and a number of others. It`s considered that author's approaches significantly influenced the content of the official group and even served as their basis.The analysis of the projects content is allowed to group them into two divisions. The first is the projects of educational institutions for the primary school teachers training (teachers' seminary, teacher's institutes), and the second one is educational institutions for the secondary school teachers training (pedagogical faculties, pedagogical institutes, pedagogical courses, pedagogical seminaries). At the same time, the first projects were planned as an independent, exclusively closed educational institutions of the residential type. Their curricula had to provide the detailed learning of the primary schools disciplines and the teaching methods. A compulsory condition for the existence of the second group was their opening on the basis of universities, which according to the authors of the projects had to provide a broad compulsory education and special training for advanced teaching. The dominant for university teaching institutions was the viewpoint of their open type, which is slightly allowed to reduce the cost of teacher training, providing teacher applicants with scholarships rather than complete public funds.The common requirement for both types of projects was the requirement for compulsory in-depth pedagogical training, which, as a rule, reflected the need to follow the principle of theoretical pedagogical courses unity (pedagogy, didactics, knowledge about upbringing, history of pedagogical currents, etc.) and pedagogical training.Thereby the pedagogical institute on this basis was opened in the structure of the University of St. Volodymyr in Kyiv in 1834. Having passed the difficult historical path, today is known in the world educational space by a large-scale innovative activity as National Pedagogical Dragomanov University, it is still the custodian of the university pedagogical institute idea of the 1830s, traditions of teacher training.

In 1861 Friedrich Max Müller (1823–1900) delivered his famous Lectures On the Science Of Language at the Royal Institution in London. Published the following year, this popular and influential volume provided a classical exposition for a widely accepted and comforting account of the role played by language in the creation and subsequent preservation of new knowledge. This view, based largely on German comparative philology, was embraced by George Eliot and G.H. Lewes even though it bore stiking resemblances to the lexical ideas and practise of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772–1834) and William Whewell (1794–1866), representative figures of an earlier generation of philosophical Idealists – Kantians, admiring commentators on Plato, and both of them powerful defenders of the Anglican Church and Tory traditionalism. There was something about Müller's “great and delightful book” (as George Eliot called it) which appealed to distinguished Victorians of every intellectual stripe. Among the auditors at the Royal Institution were “Germano-Coleridgian” clergymen (Bishop Thirlwall, Dean Stanley F.D. Maurice), poets and philosophers (Tennyson, John Stuart Mill, the Duke of Argyle), and a distinguished group of scientists, headed by Michael Faraday. All were excited and enthusiastic, despite their very different intellectual positions. Linda Dowling suggests why:Muller's lectures on language … were deeply reassuring. They managed to suggest that even though the new philology had reconstituted language in wholly new terms as a phonetic totality independent of representation and of human control, language somehow remained unchanged in its power to guarantee human identity and value. (“Victorian Oxford” 161)

In a dynamic society, digital technologies are a major priority of the modern education system. Digital technologies have now penetrated into all spheres of public life, creating an urgent need for their use. In this regard, high school graduates are subject to much more requirements, such as mastering the skills of collecting and analyzing, transmitting, using data in the information and digital space. The aim of our study is a theoretical and practical assessment of the impact of professional digital competencies on the careers of managers, as well as the development of recommendations for improving the curriculum for managers by studying the discipline "Digital Economics" and developing additional methodological support. For the formation of digital competencies of managers, an informational educational space is created, which includes electronic library systems formed in educational organizations. There are some questions when conducting practical classes in some areas of training managers. The level of preparation of students decreases due to the impossibility of face-to-face communication with distance learning. Proper control of students' knowledge is carried out in test form due to various subjective or objective reasons. Of particular importance in the formation of professional competencies of managers is the methodological work. Methodical work is a complex system of measures aimed at improving the quality of training, generalization and development of creative potential, as well as achieving optimal results in the digitization of education. The development of digitalization of the educational process requires special ways of organizing the modern educational process. Improvement occurs through the introduction of innovative technologies and methods of working with large databases. The main task of methodical work is to create conditions for the formation of motivation to study this course, to provide a conceptual apparatus for further education. As a result, there is a need to strengthen the training and professional development of the teacher, the development of modern creative thinking in the field of digital technology. These measures will contribute to the formation of professional competencies of digitalization of managers, increase the level of readiness to solve professional problems set by modern business models, as well as to the easiest and most active adaptation in the new digital system.

As a specialist in culture and communication studies, teaching in a school of business, I realised that the notion of interdisciplinarity is usually explored in the comfort of one's own discipline. Meanwhile, the practice of interdisciplinarity is something else. The very notion of disciplinarity implies a regime of discursive practices, but in the zone between disciplines, there is often no adequate language. This piece of writing is a brief analysis of an example of the language of business studies when business studies thinks about culture. It looks at how business studies approaches cultural difference in context of intercultural contact. Geert Hofstede's Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind (1991) This article is a brief and very selective critique of Geert Hofstede's notion of culture in Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. Hofstede has been publishing his work on cross-cultural management since the 1960s. His work is routinely used in reference to cross/multi/intercultural issues in business studies (a term I use to include commerce, finance, management, and marketing). Before I begin, I must insist that Hofstede's Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind is a very useful text for business studies students, as it introduces them to useful concepts in relation to culture, like culture shock, acculturation (not enculturation -- I suppose managers are repatriated before that happens), and training for successful cross-cultural communication. It is worth including here a brief note on the subtitle of Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. This "software of the mind" is clearly analogous to computer programming. However, Hofstede disavows the analogy, which is central to his thesis, saying that people are not programmed the way computers are. So they are, but not really. Hofstede claims that in order to learn something different, one "must unlearn ... (the) ... patterns of thinking, feeling, and potential acting which were learned throughout (one's) lifetime". And it is this thinking/feeling/acting function he calls the "software of the mind" (4). So, is the body the hardware? Thinking and feeling are abstract and could, with a flight of fancy, be seen as "software". However, acting is visible, tangible, and often visceral. I am suggesting that "acting" either represents or is just about all we have as culture. Acting (in the fullest sense, including speech, gesture, manners, textual production, etc.) is not evidence of culture, it is culture. Also, computer technology, like every other technology, is part of culture, as evident in this journal. Culture I share Clifford Geertz's concept of culture as a semiotic one, where interpretation is a search for meaning, and where meaning lies in social relations. Geertz writes that to claim that culture consists in brute patterns of behaviour in some identifiable community is to reduce it (the community and the notion of culture). Human behaviour is symbolic action. Culture is not just patterned conduct, a frame of mind which points to some sort of ontological status. Culture is public, social, relational, and contextual. To quote Geertz: "culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviours, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed; it is a context" (14). Culture is not an ontological essence or set of behaviours. Culture is made up of webs of relationships. That Hofstede locates culture in the mind is probably the most problematic aspect of his writing. Culture is difficult for any discipline to describe because different disciplines have their own view of social reality. They operate in their own paradigms. Hofstede uses a behaviourist psychological approach to culture, which looks at what he calls national character and typical behaviours. Even though Hofstede is aware of being, as an observer of human behaviour, an integral part of his object of analysis (other cultures), he nevertheless continuously equates the observed behaviour to particular kinds of national thinking and feeling where national is often collapsed into cultural. Hofstede uses an empirical behaviourist paradigm which measures certain behaviours, as if the observer is outside the cultural significance attributed to behaviours, and attributes them to culture. Hofstede's Notion of Culture Hofstede's work is based on quantitative data gathered from questionnaires administered to IBM corporation employees in various countries. He looked at 72 national subsidiaries, 38 occupations, 20 languages, and at two points in time (1968 and 1972), and continued his commentary on that data into the 1990s. He claims that because the entire sample has a common corporate culture, the only thing that can account for systematic and consistent differences between national groups within a homogeneous multinational organisation is nationality itself. It is as if corporate culture is outside, has nothing to do with, national culture (itself a complex and dynamic concept). Hofstede's work does not account for the fact that IBM is an American multinational corporation and, as such, whatever attributes are used to measure cultural difference, those found in American corporate culture will set the benchmark for whatever other cultures are measured. This view is supported in business studies in general where American management practices are seen as universal and normal, even when they are described as 'Western'. The areas Hofstede's IBM survey looked at are: 1. Social inequality, including the relationship with authority (also described as power distance); 2. The relationship between the individual and the group (also described as individualism versus collectivism); 3. Concepts of masculinity and femininity: the social implications of having been born as a boy or a girl (also described as masculinity versus femininity); 4. Ways of dealing with uncertainty, relating to the control of aggression and the expression of emotions (also described as uncertainty avoidance). These concepts are in themselves culturally specific and have become structurally embedded in organisational theory. Hofstede writes that these four dimensions of culture are aspects of culture that can be measured relative to other cultures. What these four dimensions actually do is not to combine to give us a four-dimensional (complex?) appreciation of culture. Rather, they map onto each other and reinforce a politically conservative, Eurocentric view of culture. Hofstede does admit to having had "a 'Western' way of thinking", but he inevitably goes back to "the mind" as a place or goal. He refers to a questionnaire composted by "Eastern', in this case Chinese minds ... [which] ... are programmed according to their own particular cultural framework" (171). So there is this constant reference to culturally programmed minds that determine certain behaviours. In his justification of using typologies to categorise people and their behaviour (minds?) Hofstede also admits that most people / cultures are hybrids. And he admits that rules are made arbitrarily in order to classify people / cultures (minds?). However, he insists that the statistical clusters he ends up with are an empirical typology. Such a reduction of "culture" to this kind of radical realism is absolutely anatomical and enumerative. And, the more Hofstede is quoted as an authority on doing business across cultures, the more truth value his work accrues. The sort of language Hofstede uses to describe culture attributes intrinsic meanings and, as a result, points to difference rather than diversity. Languages of difference are based on binaristic notions of masculine/feminine, East/West, active/passive, collective/individual, and so on. In this opposition of activity and passivity, the East (feminine, collectivist) is the weaker partner of the West (masculine, individualist). There is a nexus of knowledge and power that constructs cultural difference along such binaristic lines. While a language of diversity take multiplicity as a starting point, or the norm, Hofstede's hegemonic and instrumentalist language of difference sees multiplicity as problematic. This problem is flagged at the very start of Cultures and Organizations. 12 Angry Men: Hofstede Interprets Culture and Ignores Gender In the opening page of Cultures and Organizations there is a brief passage from Reginald Rose's play 12 Angry Men (1955). (For a good review of the film see http://www.film.u- net.com/Movies/Reviews/Twelve_Angry.html. The film was recently remade.) Hofstede uses it as an example of how twelve different people with different cultural backgrounds "think, feel and act differently". The passage describes a confrontation between what Hofstede refers as "a garage owner" and "a European-born, probably Austrian, watchmaker". Such a comparison flags, right from the start, a particular way of categorising and distinguishing between two people, in terms of visible and audible signs and symbols. Both parties are described in terms of their occupation. But then the added qualification of one of the parties as being "European-born, probably Austrian" clearly indicates that the unqualified party places him in the broad category "American". In other words, the garage owner's apparently neutral ethnicity implies a normative "American", against which all markers of cultural difference are measured. Hofstede is aware of this problem. He writes that "cultural relativism does not imply normlessness for oneself, nor for one's society" (7). However, he still uses the syntax of binaristic classification which repeats and perpetuates the very problems he is apparently addressing. One of the main factors that makes 12 Angry Men such a powerful drama is that each man carries / inscribes different aspects of American culture. And American culture is idealised in the justice system, where rationality and consensus overcomes prejudice and social pressure. Each man has a unique make-up, which includes class, occupation, ethnicity, personality, intelligence, style and experience. But 12 Angry Men is also an interesting exploration of masculinity. Because Hofstede has included a category of "masculine/feminine" in his study of national culture, it is an interesting oversight that he does not comment on this powerful element of the drama. People identify along various lines, in terms of ethnicities, languages, histories, sexuality, politics and nationalism. Most people do have multiple and varied aspects to their identity. However, Hofstede sees multiple lines of identification as causing "conflicting mental programs". Hofstede claims that identification on the gender level of his hierarchy is determined "according to whether a person was born as a girl or as a boy" (10). Hofstede misses the crucial point that whilst whether one is born female or male determines one's sex, whether one is enculturated as and identifies as feminine or masculine indicates one's gender. Sex and gender are not the same thing. Sex is biological (natural) and gender is ideological (socially constructed and naturalised). This sort of blindness to the ideological component of identity is a fundamental flaw in Hofstede's thesis. Hofstede takes ideological constructions as given, as natural. For example, in endnote 1 of Chapter 4, "He, she, and (s)he", he writes "My choice of the terms (soft feminine and hard masculine) is based on what is in virtually all societies, not on what anybody thinks should be (107, his italics). He reinforces the notion of gendered essences, or essences which constitute national identity. Indeed, the world is not made up of entities or essences that are masculine or feminine, Western or Eastern, active or passive. And the question is not so much about empirical accuracy along such lines, but rather what are the effects of always reinscribing cultures as Western or Eastern, masculine or feminine, collectivist or individualist. In an era of globalism and mass, interconnected communication, identities are multiple, and terms like East and West, masculine and feminine, active and passive, should be used as undecidable codes that, at the most, flag fragments of histories and ideologies. Identity East and West are concepts that did not come out of a political or cultural vacuum. They are categories, or concepts, that originated and flourished with European expansionism from the 17th century. They underwrote imperialism and colonisation. They are not inert labels that merely point to something "out there". East and West, like masculine and feminine or any other binary pair, indicate an imaginary relationship that prioritises one of the pair over the other. People and cultures cannot be separated into static Western and Eastern essences. Culture itself is always diverse and dynamic. It is marked by migration, diaspora, and exile, not to mention historical change. There are no "original" cultures. The sort of discourse Hofstede uses to describe cultures is based on an ontological and epistemological distinction made between East and West. Culture is not something invisible or intangible. Culture is not something obscure that is in the mind (whatever or wherever that is) which manifests itself in peculiar behaviours. Culture is what and how we communicate, whether that takes the form of speech, gestures, novels, plays, architecture, style, or art. And, as such, communication includes the objects we produce and exchange and the symbols to which we give meaning. So, when Hofstede writes that the Austrian watchmaker acts the way he does because he cannot behave otherwise. After many years in his new home country, he still behaves the way he was raised. He carries within himself an indelible pattern of behaviour he is attributing a whole range of qualities which are frequently given by dominant cultures to their cultural "others" (1). Hofstede attributes politeness, tradition, and, above all, stasis, to the European-Austrian watchmaker. The phrase "after many years in his new home country" is contradictory. If so many years have passed, why is "home" still "new"? And, indeed, the watchmaker might still behave the way he was raised, but it would be safe to assume that the garage owner also behaves the way he was raised. One of the main points made in 12 Angry Men is that twelve American men are all very different to each other in terms of values and behaviour. All this is represented in the dialogue and behaviour of twelve men in a closed room. If we are concerned with different kinds of social behaviour, and we are not concerned with pathological behaviour, then how can we know what anyone carries within themselves? Why do we want to know what anyone carries within themselves? From a cultural studies perspective, the last question is political. However, from a business studies perspective, that question is naïve. The radical economic rationalist would want to know as much as possible about cultural differences so that we can better target consumer groups and be more successful in cross-cultural negotiations. In colonial days, foreigners often wielded absolute power in other societies and they could impose their rules on it [sic]. In these postcolonial days, foreigners who want to change something in another society will have to negotiate their interventions. (7) Those who wielded absolute power in the colonies were the non-indigenous colonisers. It was precisely the self-legitimating step of making a place a colony that ensured an ongoing presence of the colonising power. The impetus behind learning about the Other in the colonial times was a combination of spiritual salvation (as in the "mission civilisatrice") and economic exploitation (colonies were seen as resources for the benefit of the European and later American centres). And now, the impetus behind learning about cultural difference is that "negotiation is more likely to succeed when the parties concerned understand the reasons for the differences in viewpoints" (7). Culture as Commerce What, in fact, happens, is that business studies simultaneously wants to "do" components of cross-cultural studies, as it is clearly profitable, while shunning the theoretical discipline of cultural studies. A fundamental flaw in a business studies perspective, which is based on Hofstede's work, is a blindness to the ideological and historical component of identity. Business studies has picked up just enough orientalism, feminism, marxism, deconstruction and postcolonialism to thinly disavow any complicity with dominant (and dominating) discourses, while getting on with business-as-usual. Multiculturalism and gender are seen as modern categories to which one must pay lip service, only to be able to get on with business-as-usual. Negotiation, compromise and consensus are desired not for the sake of success in civil processes, but for the material value of global market presence, acceptance and share. However, civil process and commercial interests are not easily separable. To refer to a cultural economy is not just to use a metaphor. The materiality of business, in the various forms of commercial transactions, is itself part of one's culture. That is, culture is the production, consumption and circulation of objects (including less easily definable objects, like performance, language, style and manners). Also, culture is produced and consumed socially (in the realm of the civil) and circulates through official and unofficial social and commercial mechanisms. Culture is a material and social phenomenon. It's not something hidden from view that only reveals itself in behaviours. Hofstede rightly asserts that culture is learned and not inherited. Human nature is inherited. However, it is very difficult to determine exactly what human nature is. Most of what we consider to be human nature turns out to be, upon close inspection, ideological, naturalised. Hofstede writes that what one does with one's human nature is "modified by culture" (5). I would argue that whatever one does is cultural. And this includes taking part in commercial transactions. Even though commercial transactions (including the buying and selling of services) are material, they are also highly ritualistic and highly symbolic, involving complex forms of communication (verbal and nonverbal language). Culture as Mental Programming Hofstede's insistent ontological reference to 'the sources of one's mental programs' is problematic for many reasons. There is the constant ontological as well as epistemological distinction being made between cultures, as if there is a static core to each culture and that we can identify it, know what it is, and deal with it. It is as if culture itself is a knowable essence. Even though Hofstede pays lip service to culture as a social phenomenon, saying that "the sources of one's mental programs lie within the social environments in which one grew up and collected one's life experiences" (4), and that past theories of race have been largely responsible for massive genocides, he nevertheless implies a kind of biologism simply by turning the mind (a radical abstraction) into something as crude as computer software, where data can be stored, erased or reconfigured. In explaining how culture is socially constructed and not biologically determined, Hofstede says that one's mental programming starts with the family and goes on through the neighbourhood, school, social groups, the work place, and the community. He says that "mental programs vary as much as the social environments in which they were acquired", which is nothing whatsoever like computer software (4-5). But he carries on to claim that "a customary term for such mental software is culture" (4, my italics). Before the large-scale changes which took place in the second half of the twentieth century in disciplines like anthropology, history, linguistics, and psychology, culture was seen to be a recognisable, determined, contained, consistent way of living which had deep psychic roots. Today, any link between mental processes and culture (formerly referred to as "race") cannot be sustained. We must be cautious against presuming to understand the relationship between mental process and social life and also against concluding that the content of the mind in each racial (or, if you like, ethnic or cultural) group is of a peculiar kind, because it is this kind of reductionism that feeds stereotypes. And it is the accumulation of knowledge about cultural types that implies power over the very types that are thus created. Conclusion A genuinely interdisciplinary approach to communication, commerce and culture would make business studies more theoretical and more challenging. And it would make cultural studies take commerce more seriously, beyond a mere celebration of shopping. This article has attempted to reveal some of the cracks in how business studies accounts for cultural diversity in an age of global commercial ambitions. It has also looked at how Hofstede's writings, as exemplary of the business studies perspective, papers over those cracks with a very thin layer of pluralist cultural relativism. This article is an invitation to open up a critical dialogue which dares to go beyond disciplinary traditionalisms in order to examine how meaning, communication, culture, language and commerce are embedded in each other. References Carothers, J.C. Mind of Man in Africa. London: Tom Stacey, 1972. Degabriele, Maria. Postorientalism: Orientalism since "Orientalism". Ph.D. Thesis. Perth: Murdoch University, 1997. Geertz, Clifford. The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. New York: Basic Books, 1973. Hofstede, Geert. Cultures and Organisations: Software of the Mind. Sydney: McGraw-Hill, 1991. Moore, Charles A., ed. The Japanese Mind: Essentials of Japanese Philosophy and Culture. Honolulu: East-West Centre, U of Hawaii, 1967. Patai, Raphael. The Arab Mind. New York: Scribner, 1983. Toffler, Alvin. Future Shock: A Study of Mass Bewildernment in the Face of Accelerating Change. Sydney: Bodley Head, 1970. 12 Angry Men. Dir. Sidney Lumet. Orion-Nova, USA. 1957. Citation reference for this article MLA style: Maria Degabriele. "Business as Usual: How Business Studies Thinks Culture." M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3.2 (2000). [your date of access] Chicago style: Maria Degabriele, "Business as Usual: How Business Studies Thinks Culture," M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3, no. 2 (2000), ([your date of access]). APA style: Maria Degabriele. (2000) Business as usual: how business studies thinks culture. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3(2). ([your date of access]).

Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) was a man of literature, and his cast of mind was not scientific. However, he cultivated the friendship of several leading British and German men of science, and could almost be called one of the scientific community. Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (F.R.S., 1793), renowned as satirist and aphorist, was Professor of Natural Philosophy in Göttingen, and a leading German authority in astronomy and physics, as well as in a number of newly emerging sciences, such as chemistry, geodesy, geophysics, meteorology and statistics. He was also the foremost German anglophile during the last decades of the Enlightenment, disseminating English culture and discoveries in the popular Göttingen Pocket Calendar that he edited from 1777 to 1799, and using his Commentaries (1794-99) to Hogarth’s prints as a teaching aid for English life, literature and art. Repeatedly, but without providing details, he referred to his contacts and sources of information in England, yet so far no relevant correspondence has been found, and we are left with only indirect evidence of these, such as the last letter to reach Lichtenberg, sent on 19 February 1799 by Carl Christian von Hinliber, a distinguished member of a Hanover family with close links to the English court and the University of Göttingen. It concerned Coleridge’s wish to be introduced to Lichtenberg as soon as possible after his arrival in Göttingen, and commended the young poet as remarkably well qualified for a course in natural philosophy. As Lichtenberg was terminally ill and no longer able to respond, the note has received attention mainly for the eerie significance of the sender’s name; for hinüber , meaning across or beyond, serves as euphemism for death and dying. But the short communication is also indicative of Coleridge’s scientific interests and background knowledge at the time soon after the first edition of the Lyrical Ballads (1798) had been published.