Academic literature on the topic '1724-1804 Contributions in philosophy of language'

This study is an attempt to establish that 20th century’s canonized Taiwanese philosopher Mou Zongsan (1909–1995) has contributed significantly to the innovative burgeoning of modern Confucianism (or New Confucianism) with the revision of Western philosophy. This is based on the hypothesis that if ideas travel through the past to the present, and vice versa, and if intellectual thinking never knows any national, cultural and social boundaries, then there is an obvious intersection and communication of philosophical thoughts of East and West. This article also contemplates the fact that Western philosophies are widely known as they are widely published, read and circulated. Conversely, due to the language barriers philosophy and philosophers from the East are less widely known. Therefore, this research critically introduces and connects the early 20th century Confucian philosopher Shili Xiong (1885–1968), his disciple the contemporary Taiwanese Confucian intellectual Mou Zongsan, along with the Western philosophers Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), and Herman Bavinck (1854–1921), through ideas like moral autonomy, ethics, ontology, and imago Dei. In so doing, the article delineates the path to study 20th century Taiwanese philosophy, or broadly Chinese Confucian philosophy which makes a bridge between the East and the West through Modern Confucianism prevalently called New Confucianism.

InNight ThoughtsHenry Harris made plain that Hegel imbibed naturalism deeply in Jena. Harris states:The balance of social influence has shifted so drastically between Hegel's time and ours … from the religious to the scientific establishment, that Hegel's own contribution to this shift has itself become an obstacle to the right understanding of what he said.Hewanted to swing religious consciousness into full support of a scientific interpretation of human life …. His own choice of language was conditioned by the Christian teaching, but also by the knowledge that the Christian doctrine of spirit was derived from Stoic sources. (Harris 1983, 302)The Stoics were uncompromising materialists and naturalists. Harris (1998, 492) admitted, however, thatNight Thoughtsis less successful thanTowards the Sunlightbecause he didn't have detailed knowledge of contemporaneous natural science and so could not explicate Hegel's philosophy of nature effectively. Similarly, Hegel's 1804–05 philosophy of nature is omitted from the collective translation of Hegel's Jena system edited by Burbidge and di Giovanni becauseits translation would require specialized knowledge that none of the […. translating collective] has and also because it is removed from the interests of all of them. (Hegel 1986,vii–viii.)This lack of interest leaves two members of Hegel's philosophical system – his logic and metaphysics – precariously imbalanced because they lack their third supporting member, the philosophy of nature. This can only result in serious distortion of our understanding of Hegel's system.

Nikolai Ivanovich Nadezhdin (1804–1856), a Russian philologist, literary and theater critic, philosopher, journalist, editor, historian, archaeologist, ethnographer, art critic, and educator, was the son of a poor village priest. The surname Nadezhdin was given to him by the Ryazan archbishop Theophilact (Rusanov), who pinned great hopes on the boy. N.I. Nadezhdin made a significant contribution to the development of science in Russia. Back in 1834, he spoke of the need to study the Russian language in various fields, in addition to belles-lettres and theological literature. He defended the idea of using philology as a supporting discipline in history. Nadezhdin was one of the founders of historical geography and played a significant role in the formation of ethnography in Russia. In his works, N.I. Nadezhdin focused on the history of Carpathian Rus. His first materials on Rusins appeared when he lived in Odessa. The earliest articles explored the history of Rusins in Bessarabia, the north of which is thought to belong to Carpathian Rus (A Walk in Bessarabia (1839), On the location of the ancient city of Peresechen, belonging to the Uglich people (1844)). In 1840–1841, on behalf of the Odessa educational district trustee D.M. Knyazhevich, Nadezhdin traveled through the southern and West Slavic lands. In his Note on the Journey Through the South Slavic Countries (1842) and in The Report on the Journey Made in 1840 and 1841 in the South Slavic Lands (1844), he mentions the Russian population of Hungary and Transylvania. Unfortunately, according to Nadezhdin, “South-West Russia, whose purest and most unique part was leaving the Russian Empire” was hardly studied by Russian scholars. N.I. Nadezhdin reported about the surviving Russian settlements in Transylvania, whose inhabitants had spoken the “Little Russian language”. He drew attention to the need for further development of the diplomacy of the Danube principalities, especially Moldova, which was initiated by Yu.I. Venelin. Nadezhdin noted that the geographical nomenclature not only in the Moldavian and Wallachian principalities, which were adjacent to Russia, but in Transylvania and Hungary, almost up to the Danube, hides its Slavic and actually Russian nature “under a thick layer of Romanian and Magyar sediment.” In his article On the ethnographic study of the Russian nationality (Notes of the Russian Geographical Society. Book. 2. SPb., 1847), N.I. Nadezhdin once again raised the question of studying the “population of the Russian outside Russia.” He pointed to the “Russian element” in the Austrian Empire, to the Rusins (Rusnaks) living in Galicia and Hungary. The scholar recalled that the remnants of the Russian population could still be found in Transylvania, “At present, in most of the local Russian villages, only women still speak Russian; men, however, refused from their native language for the dominant languages around: Madyar or Volosh. In Moldavia and Wallachia, the presence of the Russian element was even more obvious. Especially in Moldova, where it shines everywhere through the ruling stratum of the Romanian population; and most of all – in the so-called Upper Moldavia (Țara de Sus).”

This dissertation deals with the transcendental philosophy of Immanuel Kant. I provide the background of transcendental philosophy before Kant, beginning from Aristotle. Kant transformed Aristotelian transcendental philosophy by using the method of the sciences in the Modern period. This method was initiated by Francis Bacon, in his method of induction. Isaac Newton transformed the method so that it could deal with verification and falsification. This Newtonian method was taken up into chemistry, serving as a guide for the analysis and synthesis of elements. Kant used this method in his transcendental philosophy, with a view to putting metaphysics onto the path of a science. Kant was first awakened to transcendental idealism in 1769, though he did not put forth a full transcendental philosophy until 1781. In his mature transcendental philosophy, he not only uses the scientific method, but he also illustrates the categories using biological imagery. After looking at the broad contours of Kant's transcendental philosophy, I deal with the first criticism of his transcendental philosophy. In replying to his critic, Kant made explicit his scientific method, while drawing from the thought of David Hume and Thomas Reid. With Kant's explanations of his transcendental philosophy in hand, I turn to an element of his non-transcendental philosophy, namely moral philosophy, in order to provide a contrast that serves to illuminate the precise nature of his transcendental philosophy.

Kant believed that the moral law is a law that the rational will legislates. This thesis examines this claim and its broader implications for Kant’s moral theory. Many are drawn to Kantian ethics because of its emphasis on the dignity and legislative authority of the rational being. The attractiveness of this emphasis on the special standing and capacities of the self grounds a recent tendency to interpret Kantian autonomy as a doctrine according to which individual agents create binding moral norms. Where this line is taken, however, its advocates face deep questions concerning the compatibility of autonomy and the conception of moral requirement to which Kant is also certainly committed – one which conceives of the moral law as a strictly universal and necessary imperative. This thesis has two main aims. In the first half, I offer an interpretation of Kantian autonomy that both accommodates the universality and necessity of moral constraint and takes seriously the notion that the rational will is a legislator of moral law. As a means of developing and securing my preferred view, I argue that recent popular interpretations of Kantian autonomy fail to resolve the tensions that seem at first glance to plague the concept of self-legislation, where what is at stake is the legislation of a categorical imperative. In the second half of this thesis, I examine the connections between my preferred interpretation of self-legislation and Kant’s dichotomisation of reason and our sensuous nature. I argue that some of the more harsh and seemingly unreasonable aspects of Kant’s moral philosophy can be defended by bringing to light the ways in which they are connected to his commitment both to the autonomy of the will and to developing a genuinely normative ethics.

This chapter examines the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). Kant made the study of the German language, in which he wrote all his important works, almost obligatory for philosophers in every country for a century and a half. He remained connected with the university almost his whole adult life, with the exception of the six years he spent as a private tutor; and the university, in consequence, acquired national and international prestige as a place in which not only guild interests but also intellectual innovations had their place. Kant published his first epoch-making philosophical work, the Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason) in 1781, when he was fifty-seven; up to that point, the greatest recognition for his work in philosophy came for the Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral (Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality, 1764), which received a (second) prize from the Berlin Academy of Sciences.