Academic literature on the topic '1712-1778 Political and social views'

The focus of this article is The Rape of the Lock, written by Alexander Pope (1688–1744). The poem was first published in 1712 but was further revised and expanded by Pope, prior to its publication in the first edition of Pope’s collected works in 1717. The opening lines of the poem What dire offence from am’rous causes springs, What mighty contests rise from trivial things (Canto I.1–2) point to its ostensible purpose as an instrument of reconciliation; its epic treatment of a matter so trivial as the stealing of a lock of hair being designed to “laugh together” the once friendly but now hostile families of the offender and the offended. Although the conciliatory intent of the poem remains a popular assumption, scholars have strongly disputed this view, arguing instead that the anecdotal reporting of a family feud provided Pope with a most welcome and timely poetic opportunity. Pope was a Roman Catholic and because of the recusancy laws that existed throughout his lifetime all the conventional means by which he could hope to influence society were closed to him. However, this article argues that it was through the establishment of his reputation as a poet that Pope was able to gain authority and respect far beyond the confines of the Catholic community. Further, and via an alignment with views that dispute the traditional, positivist approach to the definition of legal judgment, the article suggests a reading of The Rape of the Lock as an instrument of judgment. The epic treatment of an insignificant dispute both operates to ridicule the trivial concerns of Pope’s immediate society, and allows for a wider questioning of the social and political issues of the period.

XVII-XVIII centuries determined by further European inclination into the Eastern countries affair`s. Due to old custom and to enlarge European understanding of the East, a lot of travelers made their own accounts about nearly everything the saw. But usually they didn`t understand the language, didn’t realize peculiarities of social order and receive information from only one source and moreover analyzed issues they had through the prism of European-based consciousness, that had created specific and inaccurate image of the East. During the Enlightenment such descriptions were used to create a civilization theory which stated about principal distinction between East and West. In popular form this theory is known as «oriental despotism», and had been postulated by one of the most popular French philosopher – Charles Louis de Montesquieu in his works «The Spirit of Laws» and «Persian letters». This concept consists of three elements: absolute monarchy, which is not restrained by any means, law or society, ability of state to confiscate property of its own citizen and therefore absence of private property at all, and absence of codified law. In not so distant future such an ideas were implicitly rooted in the theoretical background of full-scale political and military expansion of European countries, that ruined Asian states or limited their sovereignty made them almost a colonies. Nevertheless there was one man who stood against such theories – Abraham Anquetile-Duperron (1734-1805), profound French scholar, linguist, adventurer and due to his time – participant of French-Britain rivalry in India, who is now remarkably known for efforts to translate and edit Avesta, and thereafter being totally obstructed by his fellow-scholars, and now widely recognized as one of the finding father of French oriental studies and oriental studies generally. In his not so acclaimed work «Eastern legislation» (1778) he argued that so called «oriental despotism» has never existed, its element were based on false, incomplete assumptions, mechanistic extrapolation of European realities on the improper civil situation, banal exaggerations which had been made by previous travelers. Taking Ottoman empire, Persia and India (Moghul Empire) Duperron offer his own interpretation of the same facts, which were described by others. He stated, that in each of this countries have codified laws, which regulate all kinds of social activities, there is private property, that could be bought and sold and inherited by both male and female, and could be confiscated only as a penal punishment. All economical interactions are based on written agreements and religion is not as sufficient as his predecessors described. Monarch and other officials are being restrained by the system of rules which control each their step or decision, moreover their power depends on public recognition and charisma, which means in case they lose it, they lose their position as well and society have divine right to overthrow such leaders as infidels or tyrants. In spite of this Duperron makes his conclusion of invalidity of «oriental despotism» as an immanent and established type of ruling in the East. He emphasized that so called «oriental despotism» occurs only in time of collapsing of normal social life which were described. So force Duperron insists on principal equivalency of the Eastern and Western civilization types, which have the same core elements but differs only in its realization, determinate by geography, history and society.

Did you wake up this morning wondering: "What really is my true identity?" Or have you ever seen your favorite television news program do a spot on cultural identity? "Today we ask you the viewer about your cultural identity." Not likely. It is certainly not vital for each of us to be able to expound upon our personal identity issues and definitions (you don't necessarily have to talk about identity to know yourself and to be happy and well-rounded). And yet, with this said, a casual visit to the local "mall" for a dose of people/culture-watching is all that it might take to be reminded of the multitude of social, economic and political institutions that vie every day for a piece of your identity, and the identity of everyone else we share this society with. Some of these identity-mongers can be considered beneficial and welcome influences on our understandings of who we are and how we see the world and life itself. These groups may include your family, friends, religious community and the cultural knowledge or background within which you were raised. Other groups that seek strong identification with themselves or their products include nation states, corporations, entertainment products, political parties and some civic institutions as well. From our observations in the mall, you can see how many aspects of identity have to do with collective identifications common to members of groups, such as those mentioned above. Indeed, much of the recent work in academia on identity analyses how social systems in the current era of late modernity affect identity construction. Yet, if we are to try to glue together a total picture or concept of what identity is, we must also consider the elements of an individual's identity which can be better understood within the unique experiences and feelings of each person. To be sure, it would be a sad reality if the identifications that influence my behavior in the mall encompassed the totality of "my identity". To get at what identity is, or might be made of, we can first venture into a tragically brief history lesson on the evolution of the concept of identity. This evolution has been rather drastic over the past few centuries. Chapter One -- Identity before Hegel: in Western society, before the beginning stages of the industrial revolution, you were considered to be born with your identity. It was a mixture, perhaps, of your soul and your situation/position in society and family (i.e. depending on your father's occupation, your gender, ethnic group, etc.). This view varies greatly from the modern, "constructionist" conceptualisation of identity. Chapter Two -- Modern Identity: in intellectual and academic circles much of the constructionist work on identity was begun by Existentialist philosophers such as Nietzsche and Sartre. The most recent inquiries on the issue of identity have been within Cultural Studies and Postmodernist thought. The constructionist view sees identity as "constructed on the back of a recognition of some common origin or shared characteristic with another person or group, or with an idea" (Hall 2). Thus, identity is formed through experiences of, and identification with, certain events, rituals, social institutions and symbols of culture(s) in which an individual was raised and lives. In short, identity is not a given or static; it is an evolving construction within each of us. Now that history class is over, perhaps we should highlight three principal concepts from the constructionist's viewpoint on identity. First, cultural environment is of utmost importance to personal and collective identity construction. "Cultural environment" must be seen as encompassing, (1) the plethora of entertainment and information technologies -- cultural spaces that corporations fill with new and reconstructed cultural products --, and (2) more temporal symbolic spaces such as oral and written languages. So, the Power Rangers will have their say in the identities of their young minions, but family heritages will as well, provided that such spaces are available and experienced. Secondly, the amount of cultural/social power that different groups and interests have to influence identity at the individual and collective (group) levels is also a vital element in the identity continuum. The last point is that identity itself is inherently a social phenomenon; it is a product of society, rather than a preexistent element of a being human. Identity is here seen as a way in which people make sense of and understand the self through affiliation and bonds with other people and the signs (i.e., the culture) that societies have created. Manuel Castells, a prolific writer and social observer, offers some compelling ideas about how social structures in modern societies are instrumental in collective identity construction. Castells's hypothesis is that identity construction can be separated into three categories: (1) legitimising identity, which is introduced by the dominant (hegemonic) institutions of society to further reproduce and rationalise their privileges, power and domination vis-à-vis social actors; (2) resistance identity, emerging from actors within cultures that are marginalised by dominant discourses and power relations, and who therefore build "trenches of resistance and survival" against these forces; and (3) project identity, "where social actors, on the basis of whichever cultural materials are available to them, build a new identity that redefines their position in society and, by doing so, seek the transformation of overall social structure" (Castells 8). While Castells's theories deserve more in-depth consideration than can be offered here, for our purposes nevertheless they help to distinguish some of the boundaries and anomalies within identity. Resistance identity, for example, is for me a useful concept for explaining the impact of ethnicity and nationality on how people use various cultural products to build and maintain their identities. In the USA, there are many groups who share common histories, experiences of persecution and discrimination, and culture with other members of the group. African-Americans are the best known and most studied sub-cultural (i.e., not the dominant) cultural/social groups in the USA. Being African-American, or "Black", is experienced by the individual and the group in the home, at school and work, and through the mass media and literature. For Castells, being Black in the USA is a resistance identity which is constructed through negative experiences of bigotry, discrimination and, for some, a lower economic status, and also through positive experiences of Black culture, history and family. Returning briefly to the international scene, resistance identity may also be a reaction to the proliferation of US and English-language cultural products in local settings. With "American" mass media and political-economic dominance (at present in the form of neo-liberal policies), nationalism, regional cultural pride and preservation may involve some resistance to this increasingly intrusive order. We must remember that Castells's typology here deals with collective identity only. This is important to keep in mind, particularly because common stereotypes of people's identities often play on the ethnic and social-economic groups which people may or may not be a part of. An endemic assumption is that an "American", "Black", "Latino", or even a "yuppie" will possess an identity and personality common to their stereotyped groupings. One problem with concepts of identity is that it is easy to generalise or overdetermine them. A face-value understanding of legitimising identity, for example, may posit that it is the embodied association and identification with the dominant institutions of society. Yet, if you think about it, most members of society, including members of marginalised groups, possess aspects of a legitimised identification with mainstream society. Most people do identify with capitalist dreams of being important, wealthy and living a specific lifestyle. Furthermore, many people, regardless of ethnicity or other groupings, do participate in the capitalist society, political systems and parties, Western ideologies, religious institutions and values. My point here is not to generalise, but rather to suggest that most people who have or feel some resistance to the dominant society also identify with certain legitimised and accepted aspects of that same society or culture. One way to think about the difference between resistance identity and legitimised identity is to consider how members of marginalised groups have access to specialised social and cultural spaces which other groups do not. Blacks have access to the black community, Latinos to Latino communities, homosexuals to homosexual communities. Specific processes of socialisation, identity-building and reaffirmation go on within these groups that non-group members miss out on for a variety of reasons. What members of the dominant society have are opportunities for membership in other specialised spaces that they seek membership in due to interests, unique personalities, physical traits or situational experiences. These cultural phenomena include musical tastes, gangs or civil groups, sports and other school activities, and the list goes on and on. Depending on the level of marginalisation, many members of "resistance" groups may or may not participate in a variety of other identity groups such as these. Furthermore, the type of identification involved may be collective or largely unique to the individual. Even with identities that we may call collective, as with my example of African-American identity, the actual types of identifications, feelings and interpretations that an individual feels with reference to her or his group(s) certainly can vary greatly. Another place we might look for a better understanding of identity groups is the wide gamut of communities of interest thriving in cyberspace. The development of online communities-of-interest, which are seen by some writers as allowing breaks from some of the traditional social constraints of modern society, has led to theories and excitement about the postmodern nature of cyberspace. These communities have developed because they allow individuals to express parts of themselves which do not have many outlets in real-world lives. The ability to play with gender and other personal characteristics in chat rooms or MUDs also offers identity variations that are refreshing, exciting and at times empowering for some people (see Bradlee, Lillie). Yet these considerations, like many others that accompany discussions of "post-modern" identity, dwell on the positive. Identity developments can also lead to harmful behaviors and thought processes. The Internet has also grown to offer a plethora of spaces for many people, particularly middle and upper-class men, to engage sexual fetishes, via the use of pornographic Web sites, that certainly can have long-term effects on their identities and perhaps on intimate relations with real people. The Internet offers a vast number of cultural spaces that those who have the chance to be online can tap into and identify with. Many of these spaces have been colonised by corporate interests, and more importantly, these capitalist forces are the primary drivers of new software and hardware production that will shape the look and feel, if not the content, of the Net of tomorrow (Schiller). As dangerous and unfortunate as this may be, identity is not yet in danger of being the proxy and total creation of mega-multinationals. Collective identification often has its roots in temporal cultures, tradition, and, for some, resistance identity. The audio-visual and Internet industries might have installed themselves as cultural gatekeepers and producers (a dangerous development in itself), but they cannot create cultural identities so easily. Drawing on the ideas laid out above, we can posit that the individual (whether they know it or not) and the cultural background and family/community influences in which he or she grows up most likely have the largest role. Concepts of identity, particularly newer work in the constructionist legacy (the example here being Castells), can serve us well by helping to forge understandings of the role of (1) the individual and (2) group influences in our day-to-day integration of cultural spaces, products and genres into our identities, behaviors and belief systems. Although constructionist ideas are implicitly represented in how much of the popular culture and society articulates "identity", it is all too easy to get caught up in concepts of identity based on bigotry, religious fanaticism or over-generalisation. As you stroll through the mall this week you might then pause to consider, not so much the extent to which our collective selves are casualties of a vapid consumer culture, but rather, I suggest, how to productively conceptualise the complexities of modern identities. References Berland, Jodi. "Angels Dancing: Cultural Technologies and the Production of Space." Cultural Studies. Eds. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler. London: Routledge, 1992. Braddlee. "Virtual Communities: Computer-Mediated Communication and Communities of Association." Master's Thesis. U of Indiana, 1993. Castells, Manuel. The Power of Identity. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. Hall, Stuart. "Introduction: Who Needs Identity?" Questions of Cultural Identity. Eds. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay. London: Sage, 1996. Lillie, Jonathan. "The Empowerment Potential of Internet Use." Homepage of Jonathan Lillie. 3 Apr. 1998. 14 Oct. 1998 <http://www.unc.edu/~jlillie/340.php>. Schiller, H.I. "The Global Information Highway: Project for an Ungovernable World." Resisting the Virtual Life: The Culture and Politics of Information. Eds. James Brook and Iain A. Boal. San Francisco: City Lights, 1995. Citation reference for this article MLA style: Jonathan Lillie. "Tackling Identity with Constructionist Concepts." M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 1.3 (1998). [your date of access] <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/9810/const.php>. Chicago style: Jonathan Lillie, "Tackling Identity with Constructionist Concepts," M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 1, no. 3 (1998), <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/9810/const.php> ([your date of access]). APA style: Jonathan Lillie. (1998) Tackling identity with constructionist concepts. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 1(3). <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/9810/const.php> ([your date of access]).

In this paper I attempt to give an historically accurate statement of the fundamentals of Henry Peter Brougham, First Baron Brougham and Vaux's (1778-1867) political philosophy and to show how he seeks guidance in his development of this philosophy from the materials of history in general and Italian history in particular. The article seeks to explain Brougham's view that history should be written in a "non-historicist," "objective," "absolutist" and "judgmental" manner and that this position is linked to his belief that there are rationally demonstrable supreme objects of legitimate government which can be shown to be obligatory on all governments at all times however much the prevailing historical conditions may limit or condition actual practical choices. Brougham will be shown to be a proponent of representative, popular government over an extended territory as the best means to attaining the legitimate objects of government in the form of domestic order and external security. Brougham comes to this conclusion while being aware of the great advantages to be had from the absolute rule of one wise and virtuous monarch and the necessity for a purely democratic constitution when the conditions of public enlightenment and social advancement have reached their apogee. In outlining this portrait the article indicates some of the connecting links between Brougham's thought and that of both ancient and modern political philosophers as it was known to him. We find in Brougham a certain blend or melding of various strands within the tradition of liberal thought which as a central figure in the politics of the British Empire during the first third of the nineteenth century he was able to advance on the practical level. It is the hope of this article to contribute in some small way to the re-discovery of a heretofore undeservedly neglected or at least underestimated historical figure.

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A figura do Legislador na obra Do Contrato Social de Jean-Jacques Rousseau surge em meio a uma forma de legislação popular, sendo o povo o próprio Soberano e encarregado, por meio da vontade geral, de legislar para o próprio povo. Para tanto, este trabalho tem por objetivo analisar a definição que o autor dá ao Legislador, seus exemplos e a necessidade real para a existência deste Legislador. Posteriormente, analisaremos a utilidade para esta função recorrente na filosofia rousseauniana.
The figure of the Legislator in The Social Contract work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau comes amid a popular form of legislation, being the Sovereign own people and charge through the general will, to legislate for the people themselves. Therefore, this paper aims to examine the definition that the author gives to the legislator, his examples and the real need for the existence of this Legislator. Later, we will examine the usefulness for this recurring role in Rousseau's philosophy.

C’est en 1758 que Rousseau constate qu’il ne peut achever rapidement les Institutions Politiques, et décide d’en séparer le Contrat social et Lettre à d’Alembert sur les spectacles. En 1761, Il finit de travailler sur une partie des textes de l’Abbé de Saint-Pierre qui lui permis d’avoir une approche claire avec les relations internationales. Ce texte dit extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle de l’abbé de Saint-Pierre se veut une solution de sortie de crise politique dans laquelle les États européens s’étaient engouffrés. Les premières notions telles l’idée d’une citoyenneté européenne ou d’une confédération voyaient le jour
It is in 1758 that Rousseau finds that he can quickly complete the Political Institutions, and decided to separate the Social Contract and Letter to d'Alembert on the shows. In 1761 he finished work on a part of the texts of the Abbot of St. Peter which allowed him to have a clear approach to international relations. This text says excerpt of perpetual peace project of the Abbot of Saint-Pierre wants a political crisis solution in which European states were engulfed. The first such concepts the ideas of European citizenship or a confederation were emerging

Notion irréductible de notre univers politique, la souveraineté semble aujourd’hui dépassée, et appelée à céder sa place à d’autres modes de représentation de l’État et de la collectivité. Pourtant, les difficultés liées à son dépassement recèlent le fait que ce concept n’a rien en réalité rien d’évident :abstraite et mystérieuse, la souveraineté l’est par nécessité. Le cœur de cette abstraction, fossile théologico-politique, fonde sa légitimité. Ainsi, la souveraineté est surtout le produit d’un refoulement des sources et de la nature violente de l’autorité vers le Tiers autoritaire, notion médiane caractérisant la nécessaire conceptualisation de l’autorité légitime comme troisième terme institutionnalisé de la relation entre celui qui exerce l’autorité et celui qui la subit.

Ce Tiers, au sortir de la théologie médiévale, s’est d’abord incarné dans le concept de Corps ;le corps de l’État dérive en droite ligne du corps du Christ d’abord, de celui de l’Église ensuite, et a offert à l’autorité, alors pensée sur un registre hétéronome, divin et naturel, un écrin la liant à une légitimité et une nécessité naturelles. Le mythe du Corps, pourtant, va petit à petit devenir celui du Père au fur et à mesure de la constitution de l’État, et singulièrement de la monarchie absolue. Le Père campe alors le caractère nécessaire de l’autorité devant être exercée par le créateur sur sa chose créée, mais permet de continuer dans le même temps à faire bénéficier les structures existantes de l’empreinte théologique représentée sur terre par des mandataires héréditaire – les princes. L’institutionnalisation de l’État, et la relative stabilité qui va en découler, va toutefois fournir le cadre apte à permettre à une pensée du sujet d’émerger, faisant naître des concepts qui, tels la multitude et le peuple, posent de plus en plus directement la question de la légitimité par la prise en compte de la volonté de ceux sur lesquels elle s’exerce. C’est ainsi que naîtront les théories du pacte social, qui tentent chacune à leur manière de concevoir un moment méthodologique où l’octroi du pouvoir soit a été cédé dans le passé, soit est toujours exercé par le peuple à chaque instant. Le mythe du contrat, ainsi, est celui par lequel la légitimité de l’autorité est conciliée avec l’origine du pouvoir. Cette liaison est rendue possible par le meurtre du Père, c’est-à-dire la suppression de l’autorité naturelle et nécessaire au profit d’une autorité conventionnelle et contingente. Or, le mythe du contrat est fragile ;il nécessite, pour juguler le flux de contingence qui émerge dès lors que la question de la légitimité se pose, que la question de la nature du pouvoir soit dûment maîtrisée. Cela demande que l’autorité ne prenne pas sa source dans le repli sur le présent permanent, c’est-à-dire sur le peuple, mais sur un critère de représentativité. Cela nécessite surtout un refoulement conscient de la nature et de l’origine de l’autorité vers un sur-moi qui constituera, à l’apogée de la modernité, le cœur abstrait de la notion de souveraineté.

Or cette conception de l’autorité se fissure elle-même sous le poids d’une contingence qui, comme flux permanent, tend par nature à excéder son cadre. A terme, ainsi, l’étiolement de la souveraineté coïncide-t-il avec l’avènement du dogme des droits de l’homme, appelés sur un registre immanent à compenser la perte de sens induite par l’insuffisance de verticalité assumée par la modernité.

Doctorat en Philosophie
info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Cette recherche a pour objet le lien conceptuel entre participation politique et lien social dans la théorie politique de Rousseau. Elle présente une réinterprétation de la volonté générale, considérée comme un concept descriptif avant d’être normatif, affectif avant d’être rationnel,attribuée aux membres du collectif avant de l’être à celui-ci. L’activité de la volonté générale mesure l’attachement des citoyens aux lois, dans la mesure où ils y voient le moyen de promouvoir leur propre intérêt, compte tenu du fait de la socialisation. La volonté générale des citoyens ne saurait toutefois se maintenir sans que ces derniers soient régulièrement amenés à contrôler les termes de leur association et à vérifier leur effectivité dans le cadre d’institutions spécifiques. L’exigence exorbitante de souveraineté populaire, identifiée à l’exercice direct du pouvoir législatif, est manifestement attenante à l’idéal de socialité juridique que Rousseau place au coeur de sa théorie politique. Cet idéal trouve une incarnation contrefactuelle dans les pratiques et demandes de la bourgeoisie de Genève, en particulier durant le premier tiers du XVIIIe siècle, auxquelles le Contrat Social donne un fondement théorique ex post facto. Plutôt que d’abstraire le Contrat Social de son contexte, croyant ainsi en étendre la portée, c’est de l’intérieur de celui-ci que s’éclaire son universalité. Nous montrons, en dialogue critique avec les philosophies de Rawls et de Habermas, qu’il soutient l’exigence d’une démocratie délibérative radicale
This research focuses on the link between political participation and social bonds in Rousseau's political theory. We present a new interpretation of the concept of general will as relevant to individuals rather than the collective, focusing on its descriptive and emotionalrather than normative and rational dimensions. General will measures citizens' attachment to laws in so far as they see them as a means of promoting their own best interests as social beings.However, the general will of citizens could not be maintained if they did not regularly reassess the terms of their association and verify their effectiveness within specific institutions. The exorbitant demand for popular sovereignty, which is the direct exercise of legislative power, is rooted in the ideal of legal sociality at the heart of Rousseau’s political theory. This ideal finds counterfactual embodiment in the practices and demands of the Geneva bourgeoisie, to which the Social Contract gives a theoretical foundation ex post facto, especially during the first third of the eighteenth century. Rather than abstracting the Social Contract from its context in the hope of extending its scope, we argue that, paradoxically, its universality lies in this particular context. Through a dialogue with the theories of Rawls and Habermas, we show that the Social Contract supports the demand for a radical deliberative democracy

Text in Afrikaans
This study investigates postcolonial aspects of the prose oeuvre of André P. Brink, with specific reference to his historiographical texts `n Oomblik in die wind, Houd-den-Bek, Die eerste lewe van Adamastor, Inteendeel, Sandkastele and Donkermaan. The texts can be described as links in a textual history of South Africa: a history corresponding to the official version, revisioning it in an imaginative way. The texts also criticize political (mal)practices, and the pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial social contexts of the country are critically scrutinized. The texts offer suggestions for a new political dispensation. Since the seventies the Brink oeuvre has developed a multi-dimensional postcolonial approach. Aspects of post-colonialism, post-structuralism, magical realism and feminism as articulated in the texts, are analyzed and interpreted. Brink's investigation of problems concerning historiography, and the relation between history and fiction, comprised an important aspect of the research leading to this report.
Afrikaans & Theory of Literature
D.Litt. et Phil