Academic literature on the topic '1588-1679 Leviathan'

The article is devoted to the concept of the political in the philosophy of English thinker Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). The author points out the key concepts for understanding the concept of the political in Hobbes’s philosophy, such as the method of his philosophy, anthropological views, and the idea of the state of nature. The author describes the philosopher’s thought path toward the concept of the political, beginning from his attempt to overcome the shortcomings of contemporary philosophy and the desire to create a science of politics, based on rational deliberation. Hobbes contrasts elocution with his method of searching for political truth based on reason because there is more harm than good done to the state by elocution. In the hands of selfish and vain individuals, elocution turns into an instrument for achieving personal goals rather than the common good. Hobbes’s anthropological views allow him to describe all the horror and injustice in the state of nature, in which any selfish, but reasonable person, using the right method will come to the idea of the need to establish a state. The author notes that the concepts of vanity and fear occupied a particularly important place in Hobbes’s philosophy, since they are the reasons for the collapse and creation of states. Thus, the concept of the political in Hobbes’s philosophy is inseparable from deliberation based on reason, since without it selfish individuals cannot hear the voice of reason, establish the Leviathan, and proceed to the political condition. The social con- tract, obtained as a result of rational deliberation of egoistic individuals, represents the pinnacle of the political because neither the political condition nor citizens existed before it.

Contemporary sport is a complex phenomenon with a rich multicultural historical tradition, its universal principles, such as peaceful and institutionalised competition included in the rules of individual fi tness professions, as well as ethos, ceremonial and ideology, are the work of many epochs and nations. The particular contribution of English culture to sport is well-known, from the promotion of its fi nal name (from the Old French desporte, which came to England in the 11th century with the Normans), through the promotion of physical education by eminent educators and philosophers such as John Locke, Herbert Spencer and Thomas Arnold, to the creation and dissemination of many sports, including football, rugby, tennis, cricket and golf. In the article, I refer to the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, signifi cantly infl uencing the shape of modern concepts regarding natural rights, articulating, inter alia, the inalienable right of every human being to freely use his/her body to maintain health through physical activity. Hobbes based his anthropology on the mechanistic philosophy of motion, which he used to explain not only physical activity and functional fi tness of the body, but it also became a premise for the development of the psychology of human aff ects and desires, the culmination of which was the image of the sports race as a metaphor of human life. Hobbes did not limit himself to discussing in-offi ce deliberati, he was very active throughout his life, implementing the movement directive he proposed by performing sports, recreation, practicing preventive health treatments and taking numerous trips. The article is part of the history of ideas - it is a presentation of the concept of movement by the English modern philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), supplemented with a new element in doxographic studies linking the mechanicism of the Leviathan author with the existential motif regarding the idea of the life as a sport competition.

It is customary in any commentary on Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and his best-known work, Leviathan, to emphasise the influence on him of the pre-eminent thinkers of his time, men with whom he had personal dealings (such as Bacon, Descartes and Galileo), forerunners of the Age of Enlightenment. It is also well recognised that Hobbes was much influenced by the civil disorders in England during his own time. However, the influence on him of the great writers and thinkers of ancient Greece has been less well recognised.

AbstractThis paper critically supports the modern evolutionary explanation of religion popularised by David Sloan Wilson, by comparing it with those of his predecessors, namely Emile Durkheim and Thomas Hobbes, and to some biological examples which seem analogous to religions as kinds of superorganisms in their own right. The aim of the paper is to draw out a theoretical pedigree in philosophy and sociology that is reflected down the lines of various other evolutionarily minded contributors on the subject of religion. The general theme is of evolved large-scale cooperative structures. A scholarly concern is as follows: Wilson (Darwin’s Cathedral: Evolution, Religion, And The Nature Of Society, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2002) draws on Durkheim, (The elementary forms of religious life. Free Press, New york, 1912) using Calvinism as an example without mentioning Hobbes (Leviathan, Edited by E. Curley, Cambridge, Hackett, 1651), but it was Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) who used Calvinism as an example of a leviathanesque religious structure—which is not acknowledged by either Wilson or Durkheim. If there are even any similarities between these authors, there appears to be an omission somewhere which should rightly be accounted for by giving credit to Hobbes where it is due. I issue on conclusion, what it is that makes Wilson’s approach radically different to that it skates on. I also issue it with a cautionary word.

L'importance centrale du concept de souverainete absolue dans la pensee politique de thomas hobbes (1588-1679) a souvent fait considerer ce dernier comme un theoricien de l'absolutisme classique. Pourtant, a examiner la nature rationnelle et les implications pratiques du contrat social sur lequel il fonde sa doctrine de la souverainete, du gouvernement et des lois, notamment dans le leviathan, il y a lieu de se demander si cette oeuvre ne propose pas, avant tout, une theorie du pouvoir legitime parce que conforme a la raison. Des lors, l'absolutisme que semble exprimer le mythe de leviathan pourrait etre une anticipation paradoxale de l'etat democratique moderne de forme liberale, oriente vers la promotion de la securite et du bienetre de tous.

L'objet de cette these est l'inscription du leviathan dans une theorie philosophique. Psychologique et esthetique du baroque par des principes politiques et juridiques. Ainsi le passage de l'etat de nature a l'etat civil traduit la necessaire reconnaissance de l'ordre social par la representation. Mais l'obtention du salut eternel par le respect des regles civiles fait de la republique chretienne le triste compromis entre une illusion naturaliste fondatrice et une illusion civile redemptrice. Des lors le leviathan apparait comme une utopie. Expression d'un temps mythique qui se veut le reflet d'un temps chretien en quete de lui-meme
The objet of this thesis is to place the leviathan in the context of a philo sophical, psychological and esthetic theory of baroque, using political and juri dical principals. The passage from the state of nature to the civil state translates the recognition of a necessary social into representation. But the achievement of eternal salvation through the observance of civil legislation makes the christian republic a sorry compromose betwwen a founding naturalist illusion and a redeeming civil iollusion. From this point, the leviathan appears to be an utopia, expression of a mythical time which would be the reflection of a christian time in search of it self.

Hobbes' argument in Leviathan can be viewed as a response to the question of why rational human beings should choose to organize themselves into a state. In Hobbes' words, the argument, in large part, attempts to establish the 'causes' of a 'commonwealth'. However, the fact of the matter is that human beings do not organize themselves into a. state; rather, they organize themselves into a plurality of states. The question then becomes one of determining — again in Hobbes' words — the 'causes' of a plurality of 'commonwealths'. In other words, why do rational human beings choose to organize themselves into separate states? It is not clear to me that Hobbes' answered this question; nor is it clear to me that Hobbes' arguments can be extended in order to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. Since international theory is concerned with the plurality of states, it seems reasonable to suppose that an 'Hobbesian' tradition in international thought would have provided at least some insight into the question of the 'causes' of such a plurality. In other words, an 'Hobbesian' tradition in international thought must have at least considered why it is that several Leviathans would emerge from the state of nature. However, having examined the current conception of the 'Hobbesian' tradition, I found that it was simply the 'realist' tradition under a different label; a tradition to which Hobbes' name had been appropriated. Furthermore, I found that the appropriation of Hobbes' name was justified on the basis of his chapter 13 analogy which compared— albeit in a limited way — his theoretical inference of the state of nature with his observations of relations among sovereigns. I argue that the analogy, being neither a definition nor an inference, has no theoretical relationship with Hobbes' main argument; in which case it cannot form the basis of a genuine Hobbesian tradition. Having established that the current Hobbesian tradition is not a genuine one, I propose that a genuine tradition should a least render an account of the emergence of several Levaithans from the state of nature and conclude that this cannot be done without compromising Hobbes' account of the state.
Arts, Faculty of
Political Science, Department of
Graduate

L’objectif principal de la thèse consiste à déterminer si l’obligation d’obéir dans un Etat hobbesien est fondée sur un calcul prudentiel ou si elle procède d’une autre forme de rationalité pratique. En cherchant à donner une réponse à cette question, nous serons en mesure d’identifier les limites de l’interprétation contractualiste de la théorie hobbesienne de la loi et de l’obligation politique. L’interprétation contractualiste a été développée dans les années 1980 par des interprètes issus de la tradition analytique, et elle reste, encore aujourd’hui, l’interprétation dominante dans le champ des études hobbesiennes. Cette lecture soutient que, pour Hobbes, la principale vocation de la loi est de punir les actes de désobéissance et de fournir, ce faisant, des raisons d’obéir d’ordre essentiellement prudentiel. Dans cette perspective, le trait saillant de l’approche de Hobbes consisterait dans l’idée suivant laquelle si les agents sont enclins à obéir à la loi, c’est parce qu’il est plus coûteux d’agir autrement. Dans ce travail, nous aurons recours au concept d’autorité élaboré par Joseph Raz et proposerons sur cette base une lecture alternative de la théorie politique de Hobbes. Selon notre interprétation, les ordres de l’Etat ne se réduisent pas à leur association avec une sanction en cas de non-respect ; ils constituent plus fondamentalement des commandements autorisés qui fournissent aux agents des raisons spécifiques d’agir ou de ne pas agir qui sont susceptibles de prévaloir dans la délibération pratique moins en tant qu’incitation à agir que par leur statut. Notre thèse est que tout raisonnement qui considère les menaces de sanction comme principal fondement de l’obéissance politique échoue à expliquer la rationalité de cette dernière. Si de telles menaces peuvent être des causes de la désobéissance, elles ne peuvent constituer, en revanche, de véritables raisons d’obéir à la loi
The dissertation’s main objective is to determine whether the obligation to obey the law in a Hobbesian commonwealth is grounded in prudential, i. E. , self-interested reasons, or in reasons of a different kind. Answering this question allows us to identify the limits of the contractarian reading of Hobbes’s account of law and political obligation. The contractarian interpretation was developed by analytical philosophers in the 1980s and is still the dominant interpretation of Hobbes’s work. In a nutshell, the contractarian reading argues that the characteristic feature of law is that it sanctions non-compliance with penalties and thus provides strong prudential considerations to act according to the law. Therefore, Hobbes’s distinctive claim would be that agents would have reason to obey the law because acting otherwise is more costly than complying with state commands. Instead of rational-choice theory, I use Joseph Raz’s analysis of authority to develop an alternative reading of Hobbes’s political theory. On my interpretation, state orders are not merely threats of punishment for non-compliance; instead, they are authoritative commands that provide agents with genuine reasons to justify action or restraint that pre-empt other reasons by kind instead of weight. In turn, my reading introduces the following thesis: the reasoning that takes threats of punishment for non-compliance as grounding political obedience does not really explain the rationale for political obedience. Threats may be causes of actions, but they are not genuine reasons to comply with the law

La filosofía política de Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) tiene como fundamento último una teología política que deduce del cristianismo el fundamento del poder absoluto del soberano. A esta altura del estado del arte, esto no resulta nada nuevo, y la importante literatura al respecto, que mencionaremos más adelante, así lo demuestra, lo que no deja de sorprender en un pensador que fue considerado por mucho tiempo como un ateo. Sin embargo, nos parece que el uso que hace Hobbes de las Escrituras es muchas veces incorrecto, inadecuado, reductor y acomodaticio, dejando fuera aspectos esenciales del cristianismo y, destacando sólo aquellos que les sirven para sus propósitos. De forma tal, que, por un lado, su teología política es discutible, y, por otro, su interpretación de las Escrituras acrecienta, en vez de disminuir, su fama de ateo. En consecuencia, pensamos, que es necesario realizar un análisis crítico del lugar que ocupa la religión, y el cristianismo, en su sistema de ideas para apreciar lo bien o mal fundada que resulta su filosofía política cuando a los argumentos filosóficos se agregan los teológicos. Éste será nuestro aporte al tema, la crítica a los fundamentos de su teología política. Creemos que Hobbes hace un uso abusivo de las Escrituras para darle un fundamento religioso a su política, de esta forma, pretende darle una mayor fuerza persuasiva a sus escritos, y un fundamento superior a su filosofía política. Ésta es nuestra tesis. Nuestra estudio, en consecuencia, tiene como propósito analizar la relación entre religión y política en la filosofía de Thomas Hobbes con el fin de evaluar el lugar que la religión ocupa en su filosofía política, al punto de que se pueda hablar de la existencia de una teología política en su filosofía. Entendemos por teología política, una política cuyos fundamentos son religiosos o teológicos.

This thesis examines the question of how primitive states form. The first part of the thesis defines a state. I then analyse Hobbes�s Theory of the Commonwealth by Acquisition (TCA), expounded in Leviathan. I conclude that this theory fails as an answer to the question of how primitive states form as it suffers from at least five major flaws. I go on to explain, modify and correct Hobbes�s TCA through techniques that have been used in modern critiques of Hobbes�s Theory of the Commonwealth by Institution. The result is the strongest possible answer that Hobbes can give to the question of how primitive states form. I conclude that his attempt fails as even if the technical aspects of his theory can be fixed, the overall problem of empirical falsification occurs. I then put forward my own theory, based on the modified Hobbesian theory. The major innovation is the replacement of individuals with groups in the Hobbesian State of Nature. This move answers the problem of empirical falsification, at least initially. The theory also helps to explain several of the more technical problems with Hobbes�s theory. The resulting theory is a Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation. The next step in the thesis is to match the Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation to the empirical evidence of primitive state formation, represented by anthropology. I analyse the anthropological literature and put forward that at least one recent research program in anthropology matches my Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation. I conclude that Hobbesian theory, based on the TCA can be successfully modernised into a plausible answer to the question of how primitive states formed.

Pourquoi Hobbes écrivit le Léviathan ? Afin de répondre à cette question cruciale, l'étude suggère que Hobbes entreprit son œuvre politique majeure pour réaliser une réforme radicale des consciences et de la conscience comme catégorie théologico-politique décisive au succès de son programme philosophique. Au cours de celle qu'on a rebaptisée « the age of conscience », le for interne était invoqué comme la garantie dernière du salut individuel et de l'ordre collectif. Chaque devoir, qu'il fût religieux ou politique, se basait sur la conscience ; toutefois, la règle du vivre traversait une crise profonde. Source de « all seditions concerning religion and ecclesiastical government », la conscience s'était révélé un dispositif de contrôle des masses et une maladie létale pour le corps politique et, donc, un obstacle majeur à la constitution de l'État bien-fondé hobbesien. L'étude montre comment Hobbes, après avoir soumis la catégorie-clé de la théologie morale chrétienne à une critique radicale, lui donna un fondement scientifique, qui fit de la cum-scientia le pivot immuable de l'unité de l'état, tout en mettant la sphère publique à l'abri des convictions privées sur le juste et l'injuste. Combinant des méthodologies différentes, comme l'analyse lexicographique et l'histoire conceptuelle, l'étude examine d'abord le caractère problématique de la conscience hobbésienne par rapport aux conceptions contemporaines. Ensuite, elle illustre l'argument étymologique du Léviathan comme point culminant de la réflexion de Hobbes sur la conscience, pour enfin en analyser les implications éthiques et politiques dans le milieu de la casuistique et de la réforme cartésienne du probabilisme
Why did Hobbes write the Leviathan ? In pursuit of an answer to this crucial question, this study suggests that Hobbes began his major political work in order to radically reform both consciences and the very notion of conscience, as it was decisive to the success of his politico-theological programme. During what was called “the age of conscience”, the internal forum was invoked as the last guarantee of individual salvation and collective order. Religious and political duties were based on conscience; yet, the authentic “rule of conduct” was going through a profound crisis. By triggering “all seditions concerning religion and ecclesiastical government”, conscience turned out to be a device for the subjection of the masses and a deadly disease for the political body, and therefore a major obstacle to the constitution of Hobbes’s well-grounded state. The study shows how Hobbes, after criticizing the key category of Christian moral theology, gave it a scientific foundation, which made the cum-scientia the pivot of political unity, while securing the public sphere from private convictions on right and wrong. Through the combination of different methods, like lexicographic analysis and intellectual history, the study examines at first the problematic character of the hobbesian conscience against the backdrop of contemporary conceptions. Then, it illustrates the etymological argument of the seventh chapter of Leviathan, by depicting it as the turning point of Hobbes’s reflection on the idea of conscience. Finally, the ethical and political implications of the etymology are analyzed in the context of both casuistry and the cartesian reform of probabilism

The question this essay sets out to answer is what role God plays in Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan, in the book “Of a Christian Common-wealth”, in relationship to humans as moral beings. The question is relevant as the religious aspects of Hobbes’s thinking cannot be ignored, although Hobbes most likely had rather secular and sceptical philosophical views. In order to answer the research question Leviathan’s “Of a Christian Common-wealth” will be compared and contrasted with two contextual works: the canonical theological document of the Anglican Church, the Thirty-Nine Articles (1571), and Presbyterian-Anglican document the Westminster Confession (1648). Also, recent scholarly works on Hobbes and more general reference works will be employed and discussed. Hobbes’s views provide a seemingly unsolvable paradox. On the one hand, God is either portrayed, or becomes by consequence of his sceptical and secular state thinking, a distant God in relationship to moral humans in “Of a Christian Common-wealth”. Also, the freedom humans seem to have in making their own moral decisions, whether based on natural and divine, or positive laws, appears to obscure God’s almightiness. On the other hand, when placing Hobbes in context, Hobbes appears to have espoused Calvinist views, with beliefs in predestination and that God is the cause of everything. Rather paradoxically it not unlikely that Hobbes espoused both the views that appear to obscure the role of God, and his more Calvinistic views.

La clásica argumentación hobbesiana a favor de la necesidad de establecer un Estado soberano, dotado de plenas atribuciones para disponer de la suerte, los recursos e incluso la vida de sus ciudadanos, caracterizados como súbditos, tiene, aunque resulte paradójico, un núcleo originariamente liberal. En efecto, el punto de partida del razonamiento filosófico-político hobbesiano es la libertad de los individuos, concebidos capaces de decidir en términos propios, al margen de cualquier predeterminación exterior del sentido de su querer y su acción. Este punto de partida, sin embargo, termina completamente ensombrecido por la ulterior legitimación de la autoridad socialmente irrestricta de la instancia soberana de gobierno bajo el ordenamiento dado en el Estado civil.
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