Thematische Bibliographien / Xi (Chinese people)

Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „Xi (Chinese people)“

Autor: Grafiati

Veröffentlicht am 27. Juli 2024

Zuletzt aktualisiert am 29. Juli 2024

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Zeitschriftenartikel zum Thema "Xi (Chinese people)"

Tian, Robert Guang, und Li Yangkuo. „From Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping: China towards a New Era“. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal 8, Nr. 12 (27.12.2021): 232–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.812.11424.

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China is a large socialist developing country, and the CPC is the core force chosen by the Chinese people to lead it. Mao Zedong was the creator of the Communist Party of China and the People's Republic of China. He led the Chinese people to complete the cause of liberation, carried out socialist construction and began to march toward modernization, forming the great Mao Zedong Thought. Xi Jinping inherited Mao Zedong Thought. He put forward the strategic vision of realizing the Chinese Dream, the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. In the new international environment and under the new historical conditions, Xi Jinping has formed a series of highly relevant and continuous theoretical thoughts. His theoretical thoughts have become the guiding ideology for China to become prosperous and strong and make greater global contributions. This paper Outlines the historical process of China from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping and discusses Xi Jinping's main theoretical ideas.

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Babar, Summar Iqbal, und Abdul Moiz Khan. „CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION UNDER XI: HARBINGER OF A NEW GREAT POWERS RIVALRY“. Asia-Pacific - Annual Research Journal of Far East & South East Asia 40 (26.12.2022): 43–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.47781/asia-pacific.vol40.iss0.5863.

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Chinese rapid growth in the economy is compelling its investment in enhancing and expanding military modernization. Defensive compulsions amplify Chinese gradual tilt towards complementing technological advancements in the military sphere. For this purpose, China is undergoing a process of robust military modernization. This paper aims to dissect China’s military modernization under the leadership of President Xi. It comprises of three portions. The first part theorizes the process of Chinese Military Modernization. Structural Anarchy in International Politics and Security Dilemma helps us in understanding the process of Chinese Military Modernization. The second part of this study explains the process of military modernization of China under the leadership of President Xi. This part explains three dimensions of Chinese military modernization under President Xi; Evolution of Chinese Military Doctrine, Reorganization of People Liberation Army (PLA), and technological advancements in Chinese weaponry. The final part of this study explains the rising challenges to the existing international order in face of the Chinese rise.

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Quan, Jiayue. „Five Dimensions on Xi Jinping's New Age of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics“. Public Administration Research 7, Nr. 2 (30.10.2018): 58. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/par.v7n2p58.

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Xi Jinping's New Age of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics systematically answers this basic question: “In the new era what kind of upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics, how to adhere to and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics". It fully reflects the unity of The Times and people's wishes; Reflects the unity of theory innovation and practice innovation; Embodies the stick to comprehensively deepen reform and comprehensively promote the political determination and confidence of the construction of the Communist Party of China. It is guide action that leads the Chinese people of all ethnic groups to obtain a new great victory with an unyielding and overcome difficult under new historical conditions. Xi Jinping's New Age of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics highlight four characteristics: The theory of character of inheritance and innovation, Centering on people's value concept, rock-solid political concentration, the essence of realistic and practical, the concept of Community of human destiny.

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Xinwu, Zhou. „«Network» imagery in Chinese political discourse (based on speeches of Chinese President Xi Jinping)“. World of Russian-speaking countries 1, Nr. 7 (2021): 5–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.20323/2658-7866-2021-1-7-5-16.

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Political discourse is a multidimensional linguistic phenomenon. With the constant expansion of political communication, it is becoming more and more important to analyse it. As China's international position is strengthening, political scientists and linguists pay more attention to the speeches of Chinese leaders, especially President Xi Jinping. Accurate and expressive language ensures the effectiveness of a political initiative. An interesting resource of verbal eloquence in a politician's speeches is the use of images popular in the networks communication practices. Alongside the development of Internet technologies, politicians often use certain words and images from Internet discourse, as the scope of using such expressions is constantly expanding, entering economy, diplomacy and culture. This article attempts to analyse the use of the most frequent 'network' words in President Xi Jinping's speeches and to identify the underlying social and political connotations associated with these words. The conclusion is that Xi Jinping makes skilful use of various types of 'network' imagery, adjusting it to the expression of political ideas. This article presents a typology of «network phraseology» in Xi Jinping's speeches, based on the subject matter of the speeches and outlines political, economic, diplomatic and everyday types of «network discourse». The target group for the Chinese President's speeches is extremely numerous and diverse (in terms of ethnic-cultural, age and intellectual characteristics), but it is the «network» imagery resources that help convey important social and political information to a wide variety of people.

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Tian, Robert Guang. „The World Needs to Better Understand China“. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal 9, Nr. 12 (05.01.2023): 536–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.14738/assrj.912.13650.

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Chinese people are working together to build the Chinese path to modernization in the new era. In their book China in Xi Jinping Era, some Chinese scholars convey the lessons learned from China’s peaceful development to the world. To build a human community with a shared future, Chinese scholars must continue introducing China to the world by shaping a reliable, admirable and respectable image of China. Thus, the world can better understand China.

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Hu, Wenjing. „Adhering to the People-centered Approach Is the Value Pursuit of Marxism“. International Journal of Education and Humanities 9, Nr. 1 (15.06.2023): 17–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/ijeh.v9i1.9029.

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Adhering to the people-centered development thought is an important part and one of the important strategies of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. Adhering to the people-centered approach reflects the distinct political stance of Marxism, the values of the CPC putting the people first, the concept of governing for the people, and the concept of free and all-round development.

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Guan, Pinxiao, Yingqin Pan, Yuanrong Li, Yutian Zhang, Dongzhe Jiang und Ziao Wang. „Research on the Current Situation and Optimization Strategies of Youth Volunteers Engaging in Law-Popularization Activities under the Construction of the Rule of Law in China“. Journal of Education, Humanities and Social Sciences 1 (06.07.2022): 77–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.54097/ehss.v1i.641.

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Under the guidance of Xi Jinping's thought on the rule of law, this paper takes the "Youth Law Popularization Volunteers' Grassroots Tour of Rule of Law Culture" as a carrier to promote Xi Jinping's thought on the rule of law in youth volunteer law popularization activities. Thus, the theory and practice of socialist rule of law with Chinese characteristics has gained much popularity among Chinese residents, as seen in the improvement of the authority of the Constitution and law, more people respecting, learning, observing, and using the law in social governance. All of these play an important role in comprehensively promoting the rule of law in China and building a law-based China.

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Lomanov, A. V. „Human rights in modern ideology of the Communist Party of China“. Orientalistica 5, Nr. 4 (20.12.2022): 882–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.31696/2618-7043-2022-5-4-882-897.

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Over the decade of Xi Jinping’s leadership the Chinese interpretation of human rights emphasized practical and legal aspects of the issue. At the same time, the elevation to normative status of “Xi Jinping’s ideas of a new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics” stimulated the process of theoretical systematization of the views of the party leader on the development of human rights. The notion that “happy life of the people is the greatest human right” gained key prominence. Chinese researchers underline the change of “generations” in the understanding of human rights, according to which the primary Western commitment to civil and political rights has been replaced by the priority of social and economic rights. China claims the authorship of modern comprehensive interpretation of human rights that facilitates better life for all population and all-embracing human development. Official interpretation of “China’s path of developing human rights” insists on connecting together the Marxist concept of human rights, Chinese reality, traditional Chinese culture and the achievements of human civilization. The key modern Chinese foreign policy concept of the “community of destiny of mankind” acts as a rationale for China’s human rights actions in the outside world.

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Xing, Guotong. „Three-dimensional Reflection on Xi Jinping Thought on Culture: The Theoretical Origin, Historical Vein and Realistic Basis“. Yixin Publisher 2, Nr. 3 (30.03.2024): 15–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.59825/jcs.2024.2.3.15.

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Abstract: Xi Jinping Thought on Culture is the latest achievement of the development of Marxism in the cultural field and the action guide of China's cultural construction in the new era. In order to deeply study Xi Jinping Thought on Culture, we must correctly understand the theoretical source, historical vein and realistic foundation of Xi Jinping Thought on Culture. As far as the source of its theory is concerned, Xi Jinping Thought on Culture takes Marxist cultural theory as the “soul”, Chinese excellent traditional culture as the “root”, and the excellent achievements of human civilization as the mirror. In terms of its historical vein, Xi Jinping Thought on Culture comes down in a continuous line from the CPC’s cultural thought in the period of the new-democratic revolution, inherits and develops the CPC’s cultural thought in the period of socialist revolution and construction, continues to extend the CPC’s cultural thought in the new period of reform, opening up, and socialist modernization, and succinctly sublimates the CPC’s cultural thought since the new era. As far as the basis of its reality is concerned, the formation of Xi Jinping Thought on Culture is inseparable from the significant improvement of the comprehensive quality of Chinese people, the continuous improvement of social civilization and the steady growth of national cultural soft power.

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Cummings Neville, Robert. „Wisdom in Chinese Confucian Philosophy“. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 112, Nr. 3 (01.08.2020): 341–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/antw2020.3.007.cumm.

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Abstract This article introduces the Chinese conception of wisdom by a focus mainly on the famous discussion in Mencius. It emphasizes that everything is a change, that changes toward wisdom are natural (or in the case of Xunzi, humane), and that people are always changing toward or away from what is wise. In contrast to much Western thought, wisdom is a response to external things, not to an internal marker. Moreover, it is nearly always a commentary on conjoint actions as in a game, or ritual. The essay continues some strands of Chinese thinking about wisdom through Xunzi and up to Zhu Xi. My position as a Westerner is commented on at the end.

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Dissertationen zum Thema "Xi (Chinese people)"

Huang, Zhih-Yu, und 黃智郁. „The Study of Chinese People''s Liberation Army Military Reform During the period of Xi Jinping“. Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/822fcs.

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碩士
國立中山大學
中國與亞太區域研究所
107
After Xi Jinping took office the chairperson of Central Military Commission in 2012, he began planning to promote military reform and announced a reform plan in 2015. Furthermore, He planed to make the goals of theaters are responsible operations, and the services are responsible for construction by establishing the Army Headquarters and the Theater Commands, reducting and merger with the group army, the formation of synthetic brigades and battalions. The military reform is an unprecedented change for the Army and represents the end of the "Big Army" era. Therefore, this article takes the Army as the object of "military reform" and uses "historical research" as a research approach to discuss the background of Xi Jinping''s military reform. What changes will the Army''s forces face after the military reform? Finally, we will explore the challenges and problems that the Army may face after the military reform. This study finds that the "active defense" strategy still affects Xi Jinping''s military reform. Although Xi Jinping''s reform of the Army has reduced the status of the army, it also enables the Army to have the capability of joint operations and then move toward global operations. Although the CCP officials have repeatedly declared that the military reform has achieved results, the Army still has problems and challenges to face. Therefore, only through actual combat methods can we truly test the effectiveness of the reform.

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CHEN, CHIH-MIN, und 陳志明. „A Study on the Reform of Chinese Peoples Armed Police Force under Xi Jinping Presidency“. Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/tps2ts.

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碩士
中央警察大學
公共安全研究所
107
The People’s Armed Police Force of the People’s Republic of China has always been one of the armed forces responsible for the political and social security tasks of the mainland. Since the founding of the Communist Party of China, the troops of different names have been set up to take charge of the security and security tasks. They are responsible for defending the security agencies, eliminating hostile secret agents, watching criminals and maintaining public order. Since Xi Jinping took office in 2012, he launched a series of anti-corruption campaigns and took the opportunity to rectify the army. In 2017, vigorously promoted the reform of the Armed Police Force and implemented the decision of the Party Central Committee on adjusting the leadership and command system of the Armed Police Force. In accordance with the principle of “army is the army, the police are the police, the people are the people”, all the active forces listed in the armed police force sequence and the leadership of the State Council are all withdrawn from the armed police. Xi Jin-Ping’s reform of the armed police force is extremely rare in the 40 years since the reform and opening up of the Chinese Communist Party. Under the “stable stability” thinking and governance of regime with “stability overwhelming”, the role and problems of the armed police are worthy of further investigation. This study found that the reformed armed police, it is combat command or management, by the highest decision-making body. Xi Jin-Ping has full control then key lies in “concentrating unified command”, “establishing the position and role of the armed police” and “adjusting the size of the armed police organization.” Keywords: Chinese Peoples Armed Police Force(PAP), Stability, Cross-military reform.

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Bücher zum Thema "Xi (Chinese people)"

Bijie Diqu min zu shi wu wei yuan hui. und Bijie Diqu Yi wen fan yi zu., Hrsg. Xi nan Yi zhi. Guiyang Shi: Guizhou min zu chu ban she, 1994.

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Liming, Luo, Hrsg. Feng xi Mulao: Mulao zu juan : Feng xi Mulao. Nanning Shi: Guangxi min zu chu ban she, 2010.

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Xie, Yongmao. Lanfang Gongheguo shi: Xi yuan 1777 nian-1884 nian. Taibei shi: Shi jie ke shu zong hui, 2021.

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Guizhou Sheng Qian xi nan zi zhi zhou shi zhi zheng ji bian zuan wei yuan hui. Qian xi nan Buyizu Miaozu Zizhizhou zhi. [Guiyang shi]: Guizhou min zu chu ban she, 1987.

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Chongguang, Xie. She zu yu Kejia fu lao guan xi shi lue. Fuzhou: Fujian ren min chu ban she, 2002.

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Dielan. Yadegen: Wo de mu xi wo de zu. Beijing Shi: Ren min wen xue chu ban she, 2017.

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Lin, Renfang. Ke jia yan jiu: Min xi jin dai ke jia. 2. Aufl. Beijing Shi: Beijing Yanshan chu ban she, 2009.

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Ming, Xian. Dong nan xi bei Zhongguo ren =: Chinese people working and living status. Xinbei Shi: Yi yan tang chu ban, 2012.

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An, Guoqiang. Kejia da qian xi: Kejia daqianxi. Beijing Shi: Beijing shi fan da xue chu ban she, 2015.

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Yajian, Liu, und Li Zhaolun, Hrsg. Xi Xia yi zhen. Beijing Shi: Wen wu chu ban she, 2013.

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Buchteile zum Thema "Xi (Chinese people)"

Ranade, Jayadeva. „Xi Jinping Launches Campaigns to Entrench the Chinese Communist Party Among the People“. In Xi Jinping: China's Third New Era, 260–64. London: Routledge, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003349549-40.

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Tsang, Steve, und Olivia Cheung. „Creating a Patriotic Chinese People“. In The Political Thought of Xi Jinping, 145–67. Oxford University PressNew York, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197689363.003.0007.

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Abstract Xi Thought’s goal for promoting “patriotism”—in reality party-centric nationalism—is to forge a single united people out of the Chinese population. The centerpiece that anchors party-centric nationalism under Xi Thought is “the China Dream,” the calling that all Chinese, including ethnic minorities and the people of Hong Kong, are required to respond. The education sector and the media, social media, and entertainment industries are being rectified to become effective conduits for indoctrination or “education.” This includes priming the people to live out “core socialist values” by rejecting materialism and individualism. Xi Thought distorts history to create the myth that the Party is invincible and makes China great, China is only ever peace-loving, and US aggression is a constant challenge that must be confronted. Any Chinese citizen who fails to reach Xi’s mark for a “patriot” are offered “help” to succeed.

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Karl, Rebecca E. „Serve the People“. In Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi. ANU Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.22459/acc.2019.40.

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Tsang, Steve, und Olivia Cheung. „The Party Leads Everything“. In The Political Thought of Xi Jinping, 63–90. Oxford University PressNew York, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197689363.003.0004.

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Abstract Xi Thought requires the Chinese Communist Party to strengthen its role as the vanguard of China which “leads everything.” It considers the Party’s organizational laxity and the pluralization of thinking in China as impediments. To reverse the former, Xi reinvigorates the system of central leading small groups, merges party departments, subsumes state organs under the Party, and strengthens party-building at nonparty organizations. These measures have not only bolstered the Party’s leadership authority, but also contributed to the replacement of over two decades of collective leadership by Xi’s strongman rule. This is the most significant change Xi has made to the consultative Leninist system he inherited. To standardize thinking in China, Xi cracks down on Western or liberal political ideas. He appeals to ancient Chinese history and nationalism to make the people of China believe that socialism with Chinese characteristics is rooted in Chinese civilization.

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Tsang, Steve, und Olivia Cheung. „Building a Moderately Well-Off Society Comprehensively“. In The Political Thought of Xi Jinping, 91–115. Oxford University PressNew York, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197689363.003.0005.

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Abstract Xi Thought brands “building a moderately well-off society comprehensively” to be the First Centenary Goal, a milestone for “the China Dream” of “national rejuvenation.” To achieve the goal, Xi officially “eliminated” absolute poverty in rural China in time for the centenary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021. The antipoverty campaign (2015–20), which featured dispatching upper-level cadres to poor villages, party-organized relocation and employment for the poor, reinvigoration of the Maoist dossier system, mobilization of extensive public participation, and forceful Sinicization of the Uyghurs, show how Xi “upgraded” the Party’s de facto social contract with the Chinese people. It promises to enhance the Party’s effectiveness in meeting public demands or expectations, in exchange for the people to actively defend regime security and accept more intrusive control. It also reinvigorates the mass line to reassure the public that the Party is delivering its side of the bargain.

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Blanchette, Jude. „Forgetting History Is a Betrayal“. In China's New Red Guards, 127—C5.P76. Oxford University PressNew York, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197577554.003.0007.

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Abstract This chapter addresses how China was facing a crisis of ideology, of politics, of organization, of discipline, and of confidence when Xi Jinping assumed office in November 2012. Xi’s drive to reform the Chinese political system spared few, least of all the Communist Party itself. The goal of these reforms was to arrest and reverse the CCP’s internal decay by restoring rigid political and organizational discipline in order that the Party lead the Chinese people to the “national rejuvenation” that Xi first outlined in November 2012. Far from being a relic of the 20th century, in Xi’s mind the Party was bold, capable, disciplined, and absolutely vital to China’s continuing rise. Ultimately, Xi Jinping has inherited the world his predecessors’ decisions shaped, and at the center of that world remains Mao Zedong.

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„Chapter 2. Do Modern Chinese People Have Knowledge of the First Being or God, or Are they Atheists?“ In From Confucius to Zhu Xi, 205–356. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols Publishers, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1484/m.gph-eb.5.133161.

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Mitter, Rana. „7. Brave new China?“ In Modern China: A Very Short Introduction, 131–34. Oxford University Press, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780198753704.003.0007.

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Since the ascension to power of Xi Jinping, China has become less liberal at home and more assertive overseas. It is likely it will change further. ‘Brave new China?’ questions whether China today really is a ‘brave new world’ even though a glance at the Shanghai night cityscape may make it appear to be so. China has constantly had to engage in a balancing act between the state, the party, and the people. What do the Chinese people think? Are they allowed to be unhappy? Are they allowed to openly discuss their views without being infantilized by an over-protective state and party? The Chinese journey continues.

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Kurlantzick, Joshua. „Old-Fashioned Influence“. In Beijing's Global Media Offensive, 247–58. Oxford University PressNew York, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197515761.003.0010.

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Abstract In addition to media and information efforts, China is boosting its traditional influence efforts in many countries: funding political parties in other states, gaining control of student groups in other countries, using allies among other states’ business and political elites to sway policy, utilizing the United Front Work Department (UFWD) to sway ethnic Chinese communities in other states, and other tactics. In the Xi era Beijing has boosted the size and power of the UFWD and given it far more latitude to wield political influence in other countries—particularly among ethnic Chinese, university groups, political parties, and student organizations in other countries. UFWD-linked organizations have used their influence to sway voting among ethnic Chinese in other countries and even potentially insert people with links to the department and affiliated groups into electoral politics in other countries like New Zealand. UFWD-linked organizations have penetrated many ethnic Chinese civic and business organizations in Southeast Asia as well. Chinese operatives have penetrated local, state, and, to some extent, national politics in the United States as well.

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Li, Xiaoxiao. „China’s Belt-Road Strategy“. In Sino-American Relations. Nieuwe Prinsengracht 89 1018 VR Amsterdam Nederland: Amsterdam University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.5117/9789463726368_ch10.

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Xi introduced China’s Silk Road Economic Belt concept and Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) to promote maritime cooperation on different occasions in 2013. The combination of the two forms of China’s Belt and Road Initiative is a vast and complex global development strategy involving infrastructure development and investments in more than 165 countries. China’s BRI is independent of any US involvement or could be described as a China-led system without America. Between 2017 and 2020, tensions between the US and China increased quickly after Trump took office. In 2019, the entire world was shocked by the news that the Chinese government imprisoned more than one million people in Xinjiang. This chapter reviews the history of Chinese policies towards Xinjiang under different leaderships since 1949 and Xinjiang’s new role and position in BRI strategy and US-China relations.

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Konferenzberichte zum Thema "Xi (Chinese people)"

Chen, Yu, und Jiajia Wang. „The Affinity to the People of the Socialist Ideology with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era by Xi Jinping“. In 2018 4th International Conference on Humanities and Social Science Research (ICHSSR 2018). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/ichssr-18.2018.26.

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Pan, Jine. „THE MAIN POINTS ABOUT HUMAN RESOURCES BUILDING IN THE REPORT OF THE 20TH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA“. In International Conference on Political Theory: The International Conference on Human Resources for Sustainable Development. Bach Khoa Publishing House, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.51316/icpt.hust.2023.85.

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"The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China opened at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on the morning of October 16, and president Xi Jinping delivered a report on behalf of the 19th Central Committee. In the Report, there are many important statements about the field of human resources. These statements will guide China's government or the development of human resources in the next five to ten years, which means this is the direction and key areas of Chinese human resources in the future. The report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China pointed out that ""education, science and technology, and talent are the basic and strategic support for the comprehensive construction of a modern socialist country"", and the ""trinity"" of education, science and technology, and talent will be arranged and deployed as one. This is the requirement for highquality development for China to enter a new starting point and new journey, and contains the inevitable logic of supporting Chinese-style modernization with educational modernization. General Secretary XI Jinping pointed out in the report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China that ""cultivating a large number of high-quality talents with both ability and political integrity is a major plan for the long-term development of the country and the nation."" Which indicates: The Communist Party of China believes that: Talent is the first resource, and the fundamental source of national scientific and technological innovation lies in people. Therefore, the Communist Party of China has launched the strategy of strengthening the country with talents."

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Wang, Yiheng, und Siding Kong. „Take Xi Jinping’s New Era of Socialist Ideology With Chinese Characteristics to Create Soul and Educate People - Take Zhuhai College of Jilin University as an Example“. In proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Literature, Art and Human Development (ICLAHD 2020). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.201215.532.

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