Auswahl der wissenschaftlichen Literatur zum Thema „United States. Circuit Court (Pennsylvania : Eastern District)“

On April 8,1986, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held, in the case of Hinton v. Devine (Civ. No. 84-1130), that Executive Order No. 10422 of January 9, 1953, as amended, under which the International Organizations Employees Loyalty Program had been instituted, was unconstitutional in that it violated the First Amendment rights of American citizens. The district court also enjoined the United States Government “from publishing, communicating, or advising any third parties, including any international organizations, as to the loyalty of William H. Hinton or any other United States citizen.”

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently upheld United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York Judge's denial of petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court held that it was not objectively unreasonable for the Appellate Division to conclude, in light of clearly established federal law as expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States, that a New York statute providing for the recommitment of specific defendants who plead not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect (NRRMDD) under a mere “preponderance of the evidence” standard does not violate either due process or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS), enacted as part of the State’s pioneering Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32), purports to regulate the amount of carbon emissions associated with fuels consumed in the state. Part of this scheme involves assigning numeric scores to vehicle fuels reflecting the amount of carbon emissions associated with their production, transportation, and use. The scores are part of a “cap-and-trade” scheme to lower the state’s total amount of carbon emissions associated with fuel use. Out-of-state industry groups brought a challenge in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, alleging that the LCFS violated the “dormant Commerce Clause” of the United States Constitution. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California agreed with the Plaintiffs, and issued a preliminary injunction. On October 16, 2013, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. This Note describes the background of the dormant Commerce Clause and its application in previous environmental regulations. It then analyzes the arguments on both sides of the challenge to California’s LCFS, and suggests a course of action for California and other states going forward to comply with the Constitution in this developing area of law. Finally, this Note discusses the application of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to the scenario of global climate change, and the relevance of global warming as a critical issue that states can be allowed to regulate, especially when the federal government has not.

In United States v. DiCristina, the Eastern District of New York ruled that Texas Hold ‘Em poker is game of skill, and thus, not illegal under the federal Illegal Gambling Business Act. In the decision, the court found that the statute’s text and legislative history did not indicate that Congress intended to include Texas Hold ‘Em poker amongst other illegal gambling activities. But most importantly, the Eastern District found that the analytical and psychological elements of the game allow a skilled player to perform better than another. This, the court reasoned, differentiated Texas Hold ‘Em poker from other types of illegal gambling activities. Though the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately disagreed on statutory interpretation grounds, the Eastern District’s skill analysis still stands and gives credence to the longstanding argument that the game, because it allows skilled players to excel over non-skilled players, sits on its own compared to prohibited gambling activities. In effect, DiCristina laid the foundation and answered one of the last remaining questions keeping Congress from legalizing online Texas Hold ‘Em poker. This Comment will explore various legalization surges throughout America’s history of gambling that ultimately helped push forward new periods of regulation and reform. This Comment will also examine the rise and fall of internet gambling and the current federal laws keeping the once thriving industry from returning. Additionally, this Comment will look at prior conclusions of the skill-versus-chance argument before DiCristina, and the Eastern District’s approach to resolving the skill versus chance issue. Lastly, this Comment will examine recent developments surrounding online Texas Hold’ Em poker that mirror surges of prior periods of reform, and together with DiCristina, urge Congress to use these final strongholds to advance federal legislation allowing for interstate online Texas Hold ‘Em poker.

On September 11, 2019, Judge Dan Aaron Polster of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, approved a novel negotiation class certification in the massive Opiate multidistrict litigation (MDL). Merely one year later on September 24, 2020, the Sixth Circuit reversed Judge Polster’s certification order. While the Opiate MDL has garnered substantial media and academic attention, less consideration has been directed to analyzing the significance of the negotiation class model and the appellate repudiation of this innovative procedural mechanism. This Article focuses on the development and fate of the negotiation class and considers the lessons to be gleaned from its attempted use in the Opiate MDL. The short unhappy life of the negotiation class raises questions whether its failure was a consequence of implementation or design. This is an important question because if the failure was the result of problematic implementation in the context of idiosyncratic circumstances, then the negotiation class model may live to see another day. On the other hand, if the failure was the consequence of deficient design and judicial overreaching, then the negotiation class may be consigned to the museum of good intentions gone awry. The novel proposal for a negotiation class did not come out of nowhere but was another chapter in a five-decade struggle between aggregationist attorneys and judges seeking creative solutions to mass litigation, pitted against jurists repudiating adventurous use of the class action rule. This Article provides the definitive narration of the historical evolution of expanding novel uses of Rule 23, anchored in the mass tort litigation crisis that emerged on federal court dockets in the late 1970s. The article illustrates how Judge Polster’s negotiation class was the logical culmination of decades of judicial and academic experimentation with innovative procedural means to accomplish the fair and expeditious resolution of aggregate litigation. It traces the role of the American Law Institute in advancing pro-aggregation initiatives, laying the groundwork for the Opiate negotiation class proposal. The discussion elucidates how the debate over the settlement class concept in the 1990s presaged the same debate over the negotiation class three decades later, and how criticisms of the ALI aggregate litigation proposals resurfaced in opposition to the Opiate negotiation class. The negotiation class model promised to ameliorate numerous problems inherent in heterogenous group litigation by infusing class litigation with collective action theories and democratic participatory features. The centerpiece of the negotiation class was to bring class claimants to the table and provide them with meaningful voice through group design of a settlement allocation metric, coupled with a franchise vote to approve or disapprove any offered settlement. Its other defining feature was to provide defendants at early juncture in proceedings with an accurate assessment of the class size as an incentive to enable defendants to secure global peace. The attempted implementation of the negotiation class in the Opiate litigation revealed numerous fault lines in the proposal. The negotiation class as applied failed to provide many claimants with comprehensible information regarding the devised allocation formula. Some claimants believed that it failed to ameliorate the kinds of intraclass conflicts it was designed to remedy. State attorneys general raised the specter of interference with state prerogatives. Furthermore, rather than empowering class members at the negotiation table, the development of the Opiate litigation defaulted to a traditional model of attorney empowerment and dominance in the resolution of aggregate proceedings. The promise of collective action and democratization proved illusory. The deployment of the negotiation class concept in the Opiate MDL also entailed problematic questions concerning the role of judicial surrogates in aggregate litigation and the increasing power and influence that courts delegate to non-party actors. Judge Polster’s embrace of the negotiation class in the Opiate litigation placed the judge, his court-appointed surrogates, and the array of plaintiff and defense attorneys in tension with the Supreme Court admonition to federal judges, at the end of the twentieth century, to cease adventurous use of the class action rule. It may well be that the Opiate MDL was a poor vehicle to test the negotiation class proposal and so the problem was one of implementation, rather than design. The failure of the Opiate negotiation class leaves open the question of whether those who crafted it could have done a better job to avoid appellate reversal. Nonetheless, if the array of special masters, expert academic professors, a seasoned senior judge, and highly experienced complex litigation attorneys were unable to successfully shepherd the first negotiation class, this experience raises doubts about its prospects. It should be remembered that the settlement class of the 1990s was a novel procedure in its day, yet it subsequently became a stock device in the class action toolbox. The history of the settlement class may foreshadow better days for the negotiation class or inspire further rulemaking by the federal judiciary to legitimate the negotiation class model.

Abstract United States v. Joseph Ravara1 is the first reported federal criminal case. It is also the last reported judicial proceeding at which John Jay presided as chief justice of the United States. Ravara, who for two years had been consul general of the Republic of Genoa in the United States, was for a misdemeanor, in sending anonymous and threatening letters to Mr. Hammond, the British Minister, Mr. Holland, a citizen of Philadelphia, and several other persons, with a view to extort money.Although statutory jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act of 1789 was not controverted, whether the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Pennsylvania could constitutionally exercise that juris diction to entertain a prosecution of Ravara, given his consular status, was an issue that the prosecution and the defense disputed at